BACKGROUND AND APPRECIATION OF THE YALTA TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000100420002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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~I0UNI) AND AP PR i. T i E OF THE YAm A TALKS
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APPRAISAL Or, flH II'rO mU8RCHEV TALKS
Why the rw-eting took p
Moscow has been 41a. .rri by recent events, especially
in o3.and. a.nd li4aga ri, which appear to threaten
Soviet control O ' th' t.a .lites and even the sta.-o,
bility of the as li; Co* Lani.st regimes. These
Undesirable aapac i o f 1iba ralization stem in part
fry the Titoief a arapls. Therefore, Moscow has
determined to r ivi1ce it-5 blessing of Titoism inso-
far a it encourages irAependent satellites. : vi.-
d+ence of this dgtrx .ru:.tior is the secret directive
Issued 3 $eptemb ? h j . he central Cot ittee of the
CPSU, warning t ; x:a l;ell tt a against emulating
.,. __
oslav Conl 11th h
au-ji.-ruscev mayave come to
de prepare- to h nd Tito an ultimatum enforc-
es
n" the se`u ' t e Otive~and^to seek Tito 1 E7,
oaoperats.on in rti training satellite tendencies
to factionalism Ln(spendence of Moscow.
b. Reinforcing the a Rge icy of the satellite problet
_
_
was the realiza tLo .)ri both sides that the respective
volved. Conflict Ing Nc:scow and Belgrade views o
but not actually ua~ -- _a
..14s:)lired by earlier mutual dacl,ara_
tions aoknowle z.. g 'different roads to Socialism"
and "equality" (i.e. independence) of Co uniet
(1) Moscow still aia.te at a Communist bloc directed
from Mosco i. .irt, a bloc can exert coordinates
pressure ig t na Tito.
Tito wan
Sure b,
of Masco
strong an
structure
desirable vote 'n ")reasures,
such coordinated pre--
rai> a satellite re 1=0z Independent
But he wants these reg.;' s to be
ttabe4 booauee a weakened Co,untLt
ild I*ar hi:s own regime open to un-
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There is little -`vidunie to confirm reports that
Ithrushchey was see.ki: g Tito's help a, inst opposi
tion $telini st .`. then the fr*sidium of the USSR.
These reports ma~, has en encouraged by the
Yugoslavs as a so ,). -:,.o IS opinion.
2. !What Tito and Khrushhev d.iaouased.
it. The weight of ev. eras aad logic suggests that Tito
and ruehchev were prl; rily con erned with the
stope and pace of litex?11iz tjon In the satellites,
Ind with the the o to !d atabil..i.ty of t'he sate11! to
Comuntet regime . li-`hs di usiic n probably turne 1
on the problem or hat} " r the satellites should bo
permitted to go lr arnulatinn Tito's Yugoslavia.
Although the protlem iq, b adly speaking, ideological
in nature, the rta l c t e 3t .one a' issue were spe i is :
that Com unist lcadex.s : the tellites were mutually
Mm ng visits of aL,c ll lte Cor uunist delegations to
l lg,rade,. would Tit ag. a not to encourage further,
steps toward indtper '.er(.e fxom the Soviet Union?
b. The related prober f how Car the non-?orbit Parties
could go in inte;?crettxigg the "equa:lity" clause of
the Moscow l cl,aa..l-stJ.c a iras probably on the agenda.
A in, the praottoaa. ' .stipn was whether the Yugo-
slavs would encoura4e = n*o bit Parties, particul rly
the talian ?ar'tj, tc she'd ixpannce of Moscow,
or whether he would a ye to restrain suoh tendenojes.
a. The length of the Ewe t_Uigs i.ndicate's that a number
of other topics may hivt been discussed. Various
sources have sugguted that these topics included
the Suez or sis3 ; ith 1x .wai of Soviet troops from
so of the satin.1lte3 Soviet economic aid to
Yugoslavia,; Sovio.c co r rnio relations with the satel-
kites! Y oslav a 3 ario:n : tic e with the US, and the
reeet*blish ent iii' iso,ae gu ve of the Cominform. v e
'
hays no reliable t 1
? :tior whatever on which, if
any, of these c:.~k ,','ot 4 pere di reuaeed.
Possible grounds for iw;o'i.tior .
There is some ev l,1I no ~. hat the Tugaslavs agree wi
~..
the Soviets that 1fl e ?al ization has gone too far toy
2
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Poland 4ad
the shogll a s 1'c
preee to the Pozi- i 1' >1
the Yugoa lava am ta.n sa . y `
1.ectua .b it
the Connunte'
have Convinced
in the satellite a
liberalization,
in this respect ,4 )u:
balance-of-power
Probable li stations
nt.
a.. It is possible that ' ito will agree to discourage
liberalization i - the at,llites t ' orari until
such time as he 1:~c3lirvta stables 1' - to nIzed
Communist regime c, hate been established which may
-
resume tlu m3';,-enxent for independence from
4,714f
b. There to no reaapxa to telieve that Tito has change
his concept that 1_t s*wv~ national security depend 3
on a Ooncept of ida e nt Communist regimen as
a balance against. presea either from the West
or from the So ivi. Lh)lon. 't'hese views cannot be
acceptable to I4oj o . "' r fore fundamental proo-
ieme in Yugoslav-- o+ yet relations, an well as fun-
ntal problemt. i_i tt i3 development of international
+ onunism1 will i E ma-.n -anre. olved by the Tito-
Khrushchev talks.
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volt of iratel-
oy ? j_pparetnt factionalism within
-le vt Poland and Hungary may
a t the Oomniet structure
The signs
Yugoslav Party,
nd indications that
;dangered by uncontrolled
of the Communist bloc
rdie Tito' s advantage between East and test.
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APPENDIX i
THE YALTP T .
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UIPI IDZ.X A
THE,, YAJTA TALM
After eight days of c 13(,ussion between Tito and Khrushchev
In Yugoslavia starting pr, 21' 34:ptei ber, the two leaders
suddenly and unezpected% f'ew to Xal.ta to continue their
conference. , Tito retort ? d tin :5 October, after precisely
eight days in the USSR, Trr ? Yagoal.av party included Rankovic,
generally regarded as of t X11' tl-ie two possible suc eeeore to
Tito;. car,, top Comnii nl_L t In 3oanla 1Iercegovinai and Tito & s
wife. Firyubin,, Soviet ni .s* or to Y L ria., accompanied
the leaders to the USSR # ::7 -vjet Party members Identified as
present were: Soviet UT=3o.a Presic nt Voroshtlov; Central
Con ittee members Xiricts `er : - and Part evaj s.erov, eeeret
police chief; and other 1e8e:er 3. tits. Bulganin and Shepilov
joined the group shortl3r after itsarr1va1 as did Hungarian
Party bode Otero, 8hepilcv het': boi'ort the end of the con -
t?erenoe to attend the tY sakaJ, ri on the Suez. Furtseva
returned to Moscow also tefs the and of the discussions.
A WS report of 29 Septernbe r said that Central Committee
Prestdiu .(Politburo) mea bei s A:ua a.novloh, ialenkov, Mlkoyen,
PIoiotov, Perv'ukhin1 and Eab rorx were in Moscow at an exhibi-
tion on 29 September. 4a fer as to known they did not go
to Yalta at any time. Varic us a 3Qurce.s speculate that some
of this latter group are e,+ i,e of a Stalinist opposition
to r'ushchev.
Early and widesspread# 'evap .psr speculation that Party
relations and ideologio4i Uifft:srences between Yugoslavia
and the USSR were the reaaocs i'Qr 1}1to's departure was
publicly oonfi.rmed in a gees :ont rence hold on 29 Septete-
bar by Branko Draskovio? ar'f 1a.1al ppoke r`I for the Yugoslav
Foreign Secretariat. He ac Sric vrle ;ed the existence of such
"difterances'' but en ,haei +ed ' sat the conversations and
visits were a "normal" procelw?se. He also admitted that a
CPS U letter to the satae.u l i t * 4 tiscusss ng Yugoslavia "appeared"
to exist, but avowed that c tY h '. iagoalava had no copy and
did not know the gontenl. 14 any case, he considered such
a letter al-Bo as normal" p a"siurt . Subsequently Moscow
and Belgrade propaganda , i nph