III. SOME OVERT POLISH COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN FRANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000200390019-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 1998
• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: REPORT

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III. SOME OVERT POLISH COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN FRANCE
A. Background and Development of Present Repatriation Rede-
e c .,ion Program In the years following the liberation of France, the Polish
Government began a vigorous propaganda campaign to persuade
all Poles in France to return to Poland. Official recognition
of the Warsaw regime aided their campaign as well as.the favor-
able status of all Communist enterprises in France.
Political events in 1947-48 such as the. French Communist
ministers being forced out of the French Government and the
collapse within Poland of ,collaboration by Mikolajezyk with the
Warsaw Government represented a change in trend. Unfavorable
letters from Poland to Polish friends in France concerning
conditions under the. Communist system and-liquidation of the
repatriation bureau also contributed to a decreasing emphasis
on the campaign.
From 1948 until early 1954, the organized repatriation
campaign waned until the Polish diplomatic representative
ordered the functionaires,of the "consulates," "volunteer"
workers of the Polish Red. Cross and militants of the General
Confederation of Labor (COT) to resume the repatriation pro-
gram. This move by the Warsaw regime conformed to the
Soviet-Satellite pattern of increased interest in early 1954 in
refugees ofr,Western Europe. Two complementary elements are
considered basic to Soviet-Satellite strategy in this. regard:
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encouragement of "coexistence" externally--both on Communist
the attempt to "popularize" the regime internally and the
propaganda emphasis occurred during 1954, when political pole
To gain good-will among refugees in France, a change in'
terms.
mies were replaced by a program of social contact and cultural
development.
Two recent offers by the Warsaw regime have proved signi-
present First Secretary of the Party's. Central Committee, who
program. The first was a speech on 23 July 1955 by Boleslaw
Bierut, ex-President of the Polish Peoples Republic and
ficant in developing an increasing interest In the repatriation
the aid and protection of the Government. The second was.
the announcement on 21 September 1955 by the Polish Government
and that they would be welcomed on-their return to Poland with
affirmed that Poland forgave the crimes of emigre 'oppositionists
of an offer of extensive assistance to all Polish emigres
wishing to return home--payment of returnees' traveling ex-
penes, providing professional training, pensions,_etc.
At the present time the"Polish regime ii reported to be
exerting Its
ng greatest effort in France, where it is spending
an estimated $8,500.00 (3 million francs) per day to incite
subversion,, redefeetion and repatriation, by using every
means at its disposition, including politics, education,
sports, dancing, movies, theater, art,.music and literature. 4
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Of all the Satellites, the Warsaw Government is.reported-
ly the most completely engaged in influencing the emigres
notwithstanding the fact that Poland entered the Soviet Bloc
redefection campaign later and with leas acclaim than the other
Satellites.
B. Propaganda Appeals of the Warsaw Government
To,achieve maximum impact upon Polish emigres in France,
the Warsaw regime stresses the following major propaganda
appeals in, its repatriation-redefection programs
1. Cultural heritage and national consciousness
The appeal to cultural heritage and national con-
sciousness stresses the longing for homeland and families, and
recognition and encouragement of patriotism as a natural
right belonging to the'Polish emigre heritage and
national aspirations. This appeal also exploits emigre
disillusionment and disappointment in failing to achieve
security and status. The long separation from homeland
and family ties makes the emigre Poles especially vulner-
able to this form of propaganda. Unsuccessful Poles in
France are urged to return to Poland while those who remain
are assured of Communist support in their cultural and
social needs.. Furthermore the latter are encouraged to
become naturalized citizens of France, the desired end of
which, from the Warsaw Government standpoint, is the
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Advantages of. repatriation
The appeal to the advantages of repatriation stresses
creation of a bloo of pro-Warsaw Poles
might give them more power in promoting Cormflunist interests
in Europe
the return of property. Emigres are,"guaranteed"
professional security, the guarantee of: employment and
right to practice their professions and skills.
is and exploits the fact that many prnfeseional`and skilled
'propaganda attempts to show how miserable. life in the West
Poles in France are faced with vocational dislocations
caused by exile. It promises them opportunities and.
openings in
their respective professions. Training Is
Post-war Changes in Poland
This appeal emphasizes the "great changes" which
also promised to, the non-skilled to prepare them for pro-
have taken place in Poland--the mythical
educational advantages of life `in the
extraordinary recovery from war devastation.
present.freedom and opportunity in Poland with the class
Polish reconstruction. Warsaw propaganda contrasts the
plea is made to the emigre to-.return and participate , in
al system of the pre;."
war
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period. Poland is represented as a country where the
former exploitation of peasants and workers by the "land-
lords" has been abolished and where everyone is happily
building .a better future under the Communist aegis.
4. Insincerity of Free World's concern for plight
o Has tern. European peoples
Warsaw explains to Poles at home that they can no
longer expect help from the West. Political refugees
returning from the West show-that resistance is in vain--
they have lost all hope of aiding outside intervention
by remaining in the West, consequently all hope of libera-
tion is illusory. Its propaganda attempts to interpret
the Geneva Conference as-implying Western recognition of
the status quo and utilizes ,the theme of co-existence to
persuade exiles to that effect. Further resistance to
the regime is futile and refugees are urged to avail them-
selves of the regime's favorable provisions and return
to Poland.
5< Exploitation of French and Polish fears or a
reunited ermany
Warsaw propaganda attempts to enlist French support of
Polish rights to the Oder-.Neisse area, and suggests that
a Polish-French. alliance would be a corner-stone of a truly
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peaceful Europe as a first step toward peaceful existence!
~.
French sympathy by describing the happy experiences of
repatriates and alleging that emigre leaders are lying
with the USSR. Warsaw broadcasts indirectly appeal to
effected by strengthening ties between Poles at home
about oppression in Poland. This appeal is-further
is presented at the same time to both French and Polish
dinated program of social, cultural and pm paganda events
naturalized Frenchmen as officers.throu
gh which a coor-
policy-forming circles in France. The Polish Government,
for example, has established friendship committees with
are influential among moulders of public opinion and
and Poles in France, particularly the intellectuals who
audiences.
Methods of Action .
The Warsaw regime utilizes the following methods of action
to achieve its objectives of repatriation, redefection and
because they are a means by which the Polish Government
importance of Polish school teachers and schools in France,
The Polish Ambassador in France has emphasized the
subversion of Polish emigres in France:
1.. Polish Schools and Teachers in France
win over emigre youth and exploit Palish teachers for
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repatriation propaganda purposes.
The Pre-war Polish-French' agreement which gave the
Polish Government the right to conduct cultural and edu-
cational activities among the Polish emigrants in France
was renewed on 19 February 1947. It provided for the
instruction of children of Polish origin residing in
France, as well as for the teaching of Polish language,
literature, history and geography. / Thus Poles in
France are permitted to have their own teachers and extra-
curricular sohools.. Traditionally the teachers for
these schools were supplied by. the Polish Government. Q/
The Lycee Pol,onais'in Paris, under the control of
the, Polish Ambassador, prepares young Poles of Western
Europe for Polish baccalaureate examinations. Its 150
students come primarily from Northern French mining areas
and scholarships are reportedly based on the devotion
of their parents to the cause of "New Popular Poland." 10
The Polish Embassy utilized Polish teachers in its
pay to resume the repatriation campaign in early 1954.
Despite the-fact the French Government took over the pay-
rolls of 60 Polish teachers and replaced a number of Commu-
nist teachers, the Warsaw regime still controls a system
of educational posts employing 160 teachers. 11 Although
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the French educational authorities feel that the schools
are no longer a. dangerous source of Communist influence,
the Free Polish representatives state that considerable
Communist influence remains and flourishes in these
schools.
2: The.Youth Vacation Colonies
The Polish Communists regard the so-called vacation
colonies as an effective means of influencing Polish
emigres to return to. Poland and of recruiting agents for
operations-in France. Polish youth aged 1k to 16 of emigre
parents attend vacation camps. in France and Poland where
Koh of courses are taught.'
The Polish Red Cross and "Embassy" teachers sponsor
the organization of these vacation colonies. In 1954
the Red Cross sent 4000-5000."children" to these summer
canape. About one. thousand youth of Polish emigre parents
in France: went to Poland; the: remainder attended-Communist-
organized camps' in France. Upon returning to France, some
of.. the children who went to Poland persuaded their
families to go back to Poland. 13
In 1955 a more. intensive and selective drive for
enrollment concentrated on children of the most impression-
able ages (ii-16) and from groups considered most sus--
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ceptible to Communist influence.
Nord and Pas de Calais, there were
and Polish Red Cross representatives carried on the organize-
in 1951L Aided by posters and tracts, "Enbassy" teachers
3. Pardon and Assistance to Repatriates
tion, of this. campaign.
France and Western Europe were two appeals made by the
One of the major aetiona to attract repatriates in
Polish regime, one on 23 July 1955 and the other on 21
September 1955.
Bierut, ex-President of Poland and present First Secretary
of Party's Central Comittee, told a delegation
Poles from abroad that Polish citizens were welcome
b. Assistance to Repatriates l/
The second appeal one of the most positive yet
who returned now. He stated further that the Polish
return and that, Poland generously pardoned. any of these
natiion aces not aesire to remember t
errors of the past.
made to any Soviet Bloc emigres since the inception of
the redefection campaign--was the' resolution of 21. Septem-
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The resolution offers the following bait to potential
returnees:
.ber 1955 in which the Polish Government offered extensive
assistance to all Polish emigres wishing to return home.
Although relatively few Poles have been repatriated so
far, this offer may attract some who lack security in the
West or increase the disillusionment of other remaining
abroad.
(1) The Polish Government will assist repatriates
in paying travel expenses incurred on the return.
journey; furnish free food and medical aid until
employment is secured;.assist repatriates in pro-
curing housing; give them one. lump-sum cash payment;
and exempt from customs duties any possessions
brought back to Poland.
(2) The government promises to provide professional
training if necessary; to give full educational
opportunities to young people.; and to provide
farmers with buildings and help them to purchase
livestock, or employ them on state farms.
(3) The government commits itaelf.to provide pen-
sions for the aged and for invalids . Pert ods of
employment outside Poland will be considered in
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computing pensions, and persons with Physical
disabilities arising from nElitary service will
receive pennsions regardless 'of the state for
which military service was performed. The pro-
mise to recognize service eonnee.ted.disabilities
as pensionable is considered by some to be almost
the same as an amnesty.,
(4) In addition, returnees may keep the. rank they
held in the Polish or Allied military units up to
the end of the war with Germany.
4: Press
The Polish Communist language press aimed at Polish
emigres in France originates both in Poland and in France.
Redefeotion propaganda began to appear in the Polish
Conununist Press in France at the end of March and early
April 1955.E The Polish-language Communist daily in
.Paris is now responsible for presenting new arguments to
its. readers) to persuade them to return to Poland. The
repatriation campaign dominated its news coverage in July
and August 1955. Articles contained either official
declarations, such ae Poland+s offer to pardon?returnees,
or the statements.',-6f, "happy" returnees. indirect propa-
garidaa, described the "brilliant progress" of the Polish
economy and the improved status of workers. i
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5. Letters from Poland
Another method which the Warsaw regime uses to impie-
meat its repatriation program is that of personal letters,
which are mailed to Polish refugees in France inviting the*...
to return to Poland.. Some letters, written inihe form
of a manifesto, are sent from different Polish towns
and are signed by forty persons, none of w1om are Commu~
niste. Those signing are well-known pre-star university
professors, writers, and prominent priests who cooperate
with the regime. These letters are sent to'emigre
leaders, intellectuals, writers and politicians. 9
D. Number of Repatriates
The returnees to Poland reportedly average-About 30-50
each month. The number, a'small fraction oftthe total number,
of Polish emigres in Prance, has been relatively insignifi-
cant; in comparison to Communist efforts. TYie reasons for
returning to Poland are usually personal and economic rather
than political, i.e., unfavorable economic status, professional
and language deficiencies, dismal prospects of emigration
overseas, old age, reunion with family, and desire for
land and security. No prominent individuals have redefected
from France. Those who have redefected have been older
people, the indigent,-.farm workers and ex-le; ionnaire8. 0-
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However, these is always a danger of the redefection and
subversion of the/,"elite," a primary target of the Warsaw
regime.
Even a small number of repatriates to Poland constitutes
a setback for the Free World because it is of immense propa-
ganda value to the Soviets, it contributes to the creation
of anti-Western sentiment within Poland, and It supports
Warsaw's claims that the existence of the Iron Curtain is
fictitious and that new conditions prevail which enable emigres
to return.
Although about 36,000 emigres returned to Poland before 1947,
and about 7,000 between 1947.49, only about 100 have emigrated
to Poland in each'`subsequent year since 1949. The figure
reportedly rose to 263 during the first halt of 1955, two-
thirds of whom were agricultural laborers.'22 Because of
the Polish Government's intensification of its repatriation
program, the total figure for 1955 will probably reach 500.
No "massive" returns are envisaged. Agricultural workers and
older people motivated by nostalgia for Poland are reportedly
the most susceptible to repatriation, 23 but the total
number of repatriates will probably remain at this general
level unless a major economic disaster befalls France.
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France ranks second after Belgium in the number of re-
turnees to Poland. Sixty-five per cent of those who have
returned to Poland thus far have come from Belgium.
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