SURVEY OF SOME COMMUNIST TACTICS AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000300020005-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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SURVEY OF SOME CQ15 T TACTICS
AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
A. Tactics Preceding International Conferences
B. Tactics Within the Conference Hails
C. Tactics Outside the Conference Halls
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The Communist delegates and delegation staff are very veil
selected and are fully adequate for conference purposes.
jk=Rk* About one third of the Chicom delegation to the Geneva
Conference was made up of security personnel. A sub-
stantial number of this group could speak German, a
lesser number could speak French.
B. Mice Within the Conf, aM w UUA
Once the Communist conference plan is set, any change in
the negotiations has to be referred back to headquarters, unless
the highest-ranking Communists are present at the conference.
When new directions arrive, they have to be obeyed to the letter,
The Communist line is likely to begin as a hard, rigid position
and gradually soften up as it develops a more conciliatory tone.
Each point, however, regardless of how insignificant it may be,
must be thrashed out in detail, apparently to provide the Cowmtmist
delegate with proof that he has really "beat his head against a
stone wall," before it is conceded.
The 19+.4 negotiations in Lo:3+don for the establishment
of an emergency Eui pesua Inland Transport organisation,
which involved nothing detrimental to Soviet interests,
dragged along until the Potsdam Conference in 1945,
when Stalin personally approved the Soviet participation.
At the London Conference of the Council of Foreign
Ministers in September 1945, the phrase "in the main"
was contained in brief instructions. Weeks of daily
argument on this phrase took place in successive
conferences concerning the Yugoslav.-Italian boundary.
Eventually, the negotiators were forced to suspend their
meetings without agreement on the terms of reference.
Only then,. did the Soviet Government permit its dele.
gation to approve the inclusion of the controversial
phrase.
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In the absence of new inttrue- ions. Cci-nunist delegates
reiterate their original poeiti:)rms evfn when confronted..,Jtl: new
points of view on the part of other members of the conference.
At times, reiteration constitutes a refuge for the Communist
delegate wbin he is unable to answer the opposition or desires
to stall for time.
Ems. At the Berlin Conference, after the Western delegates bad
agreed to the almost impossible tome which the Soviets
demanded for an Austrian peace treaty, Molotov, taken by
surprise, could only fall back on reiterating familiar
Communist arguments, since be had no expectation or
intention of coming to an agreement over the treaty.
The various Communist delegations participating in a con.
ference operate jointly in accordance with a prearranged and weU..
understood plan.
&MMIge. At Geneva, the various delegations made a series of
speeches evidently planned ahead as to exact sequence.
They likewise exhibited fairly ostentatious respect
for each other in matters of decorum and protocol.
At various ECAFE conferences, it has been the prao-
tioe for various Communist delegates to propound their
presumably aeparate views, to be followed at the end
by "generous support' from the Soviet Big Brother.
From the Communist point of view, international conferences
constitute sounding boards for propaganda'themee to be played
tl:szoughout the world. The exploit such opportunities to the
fullest.
ExaMID19. US speeches at the plenary sessions of the Geneva
Conference were drowned by well planned repetition
of Coemunist themes by the Soviets, the Chieame,
the North Koreans, and the Viet Minh, speaking in
turn.
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Communist delegates delay ad infinit= agreement on pro-
cedural matters in order to avoid including in (or excluding from)
the agenda matters of strong importance to the Communist cause.
Also, they attempt to gain acceptance of an agenda which In, in
effect,'a statement of their solutions to the various it e.
&KOJAaa?
An indication of Soviet dependence on the technique
of delaying an agreemmmt on the agenda was the sur-
prise that was engendered at the Berlin Conference,
when Secretary Dulles immediately accepted the Soviet
agenda and thus elimminated. the necessity for a pro-
cedt a1 debate which had characterized all previous
conferences.
During the Korean peace talks, the Communists sub-
mitted the following items for inclusion in the agenda,
which item, if accepted, would have obviated the need
for substantive discussion: "To establish the 38th
parallel as a military demarcation line, the armed
forces of both aides to withdraw 10 kilometers from
the 38th parallel and simultaneously complete the
withdrawal from Korea within; a definite time limit,
leaving the evacuated areas demilitarized, and the
civil authority would be restored by 25 June 1950."
The opposition frequen y attempts to introduce irrelevant
material in the conference. It insists ran attempting to include
matters extraneous to what the other delegations consider to be
the agenda. This Is done /isually for political reasons or for
the effect on the world opinion.
n ea. The Soviets repeatedly attempted to have the Chinese
Communists included in the Berlin Conference, the
agenda of whit m dealt with German and Austrian prob.
le>'ms only. N e Soviets argued that Chinese Communist
participation would help world peace. Actually, a
dozen Chicoms'ware present at the Conference as
observers.
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At the Geneva Conference, there was a consistent
Communist attempt to fords the consideration of
political matters prior to the military matters on
the agenda. The Ccamunlsts also insisted on dis-
cussing Laos and Cambodia, although Vietnam was
the only subject of discussion.
Communist delegates frequently accuse other confess: '-3 members
of crimes with which they themselves are about to be confronted.
They make a special attempt to bring up their own grievances,
real or imaginary, before any other: delegation has an opportunity
to do so, in order to gain the edge on publicity.
. At the Potsdam onference, the Soviets made bitter
and prolonged attacks on , cpresence of British
troops in Greece, the Dodecanese, Syria and Lebanon.
After the Westerners had been worn down by these
wrangles, the, Soviets could more easily face the
Western protests against brutal Soviet tactics is
the Satellites. The Soviets thus encouraged their
supporters in Greece, upheld their reputation for
hostility to colonialism in the Middle East, and
weakened any coordinated Western effort to loosen
the Soviet grip on the Satellites.
The Communists frequently attempt to influence negotiations
by conducting military activities concurrently with the conference.
REp
. The assault on Dienb'enphu was engineered on the eve
of the Geneva Conference. Later, the Chieams blandly
undertook delaying tactics at the very time when
Bidault was attempting to arrange a battlefield truce
for the Dienbienphu wounded.
Communist delegates can be erected, particularly when an
impasse at the conference is reached, to make separate appeals
to various conference delei=ati;ms playing upon their special
interests, hopes, or fears. Onc aim of this tactic is to divide
the opposition,
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Ecam~?pes. At the Berlin Confers:-ca, the Soviets and the Chi-
coms held out attr ctive trade possibilities to the
British and prospects for an easy Indochina settlement
to the French, for the purpose of gaining agreement
for the proposed Geneva Conference.
3'uring the Geneva Conference, as the position of the
French in Indochina, grew progressively worse, the
Viet Minh delegates made a ?+ parate approach to
Mendes France knowing that he was hard pressed by
French opinions
Soviet Bloc delegates also play upon personality traits of
other conference members when they have sufficient knowledge to
slant their approach. They exploit their knowledge of opposition
personal.iti&. to the fullest.
At the London conferences of the Council of Foreign
Ministers in 1945, Molot.v tried with great pertina-
city to trip up Secretary- Byrnes when the latter in-
dulged in his proclivity for off-the.-cuff remarks.
He baited Englandas 3ee:ir by making him angry, and
then taking advantage of Sevin' a trait of being
apologetic for his aster. Kolot:v also used petty
tactics to slight Bidault9e pride, at a time when
the French felt sensitive, by neglecting to inform
him of schedule changros which he had arranged with
the other conferees.
=Premier Chou Fn-Jai, particularly, has been described
as an extraordinaril;v harsh bargainer. Master of
repetitive arguments, he possesses infinite patience.
At the conference tab e; he is crafty, deft, and
quick to spot holes in his opponents 9 arg gents.
He is also described t,a a very good actor.
C. c iess outside _he 'Confe r co I'M A
The Ccmunist delegations exhibit mutual solidarity. There
is little or no mingling Sith foreign #;roup?e beyond official
intercourse.
i
EP?R gq At the Geneva Conference, the Communist delegations
stayed close together. I the halls, they marched
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together in the approximate order of rank. Out-
side the hal .s, they nearly never appeared singly
but stayed in groups of four or five.
The delegations include a sizeable naiber of guards and the
leaders are always under ?the prote -tion of their security m({$.
Las. le,,,. At Geneva, ommunist delesgaten were extremely secur-
ity conscious., The yr wtp.%ga, iad body guards who, at
g ~a opr?s tae d .a ,s, uu?' er;n. ,~d th n delegates in an
k i; l ehera patters cl m, v, 6tent, xesemtlinc blocking
in football. Of tbt 3W C'ia.,.ecam delegates, about a
third were security mer. *I I"ar as the. ;,.u) P,?tnhance
of control over indiv: r ua .a was concerned, the Chi..
co .e were the most eecvr .-Vv--cont cjous of all Communist
dF=,iegations.
The relations between Comeupirt delegations and the press
are marked by cordiality to selected press and news outlets
only. Press and other propaganda channels are well arranged in
advance of the conference. During conferescea, Comuniat delegations
entertain leftist and neutral press and supply them with special
releases.
Ales. At the armistice talks in Peumrunjon, Communist press
outlets were orgaiaic elements of the delegations.
This arrangement enabled the Communists to manipulate
the necessary publicity, so that press etntements
often appeared aimulta teamaaly with the actual occur-
rence of an event.. Pry:,c&&edings at closed session
were at times leaked r the press outlets of the
Communist delegations.
Soon after the start of the Geneva Conference, the
Chiecm delegation bald a cocktail party for neutral
and Communist preens rearaesentatives,, This was fol-
lowed by various ewall dinners and t M"=e presenta-
tions. Chicam informs-:=ion officers handed out
large quantities of free propaganda material designed
to enhance the preatigo of new Chi:'+.
Ccwn st pr paganda activities extend to other participating
delegations, as well as the press.
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_21g. At the Geneva Conference, the Chiccm delegation
presented to the chiefs of other delegations hand.
lamely bound collections of Chinese art. Other
delegates were sent copies of a somewhat,leas fancy
brochure with flattering photographs of Communist China
ear h" ,' ju,
t- ltu ._ bievements and economic and industrial
activities,
Chinese Communist delegates exhibit unusual pride and arro-
gance at international conferences, particular,tir 4 ,n their
delegation chief delivers an address. Soviet representatives
usually remain in the ba*kground, allowing the spotlight to fall
on their puppet protagonists, tut tbere are st.ong indications
that the delegations of the Asian .Satellites take their instructions
not from Communist China, but from the Soviets.
KEMWIe ? At the Geneva Conference, the Chiccros showed a desire
to "be equal" to the Russians. They made bigger demands
on the Swiss for hotel room, once they determined the
number requested by the Ruwians. Also, when they.
discovered that the Reaasaane brought some of their
food from the USSR, they had their own food transported
from China. There was no doubt, however, that Molotov
was the real master. Rio headquarters were visited by
the Viet Minh and North Korean delegates much more often
than ChoWss. Molotov apparently passed instructions to
these delegations directly, rather than through Chou.
Korean speeches bore vidence of having been or~-jinally
written in issian.
The participation of Cemi>uraist delegations at international
conferences is usually accompanied by "!ids shows," such as
demonstrations, parades mdmass meetings, conducted by Communist
front organizations. The embaorsiee of the Communist countries
represented are likely to remain in the backgaY9und, The degree
of activities by local leftist organisations usually indicates
the extent of their penetration by :~aeaunist parties.
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Fla. The actions of the Indon ian riInistry of Education
c ox ink, the Afro-A$ian -cart erence will likely reveal
the degree which it is pent,rated by the Cac?unisteo
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