THE LESSON OF DOG RIVER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000400200002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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No. 57-584
Approximately 10 kilometers north of Beirut, the Dbg River
(Nahr al-Kalb) flows into the Mediterranean. It is a small stream both
in length and volume; and from the standpoint of the economy of the
Middle East,, or even that of Lebanon, its value is negligible. It
supplies some water to the city of Beirut, but beyond that it serves
little purpose. Its waters turn no electric turbines, irrigate no
large tracts, Yet the Dog River is not without significance, for it
is, in a sense, symbolic of the entire Middle East and of that arears
history,
Since the dawn of recorded history, the Middle East has been
disputed by contending nations, by opposing armies. Here the air has
echoed to the sound of Assyrian, Babylonian, Pharaonic chariots, the
marching of Greek phalanxes and Roman legions, to the tramp of Byzantine,
Arab, Mameluke, Turkish, English and French armies. Most of these
armies, in the course of their campaigns, have passed by the mouth of
the Dog River; and near the sea, on the rocky walls of the ravine
through which the river flows, many of them left a reminder of their
passing -- engraved inscription or sculptured relief to perpetuate
the memory of their conquests.
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Today, the thoughtful Middle Easterner or, for thtt matter,
any serious student of area affairs, when he reflects on the lesson of
Dog River and, at the same time, on the current situation in the
Middle East, must inevitably wonder if the Soviet Red Army 7i7 be
the next to add to the Dog River inscriptions.
The Soviet Union is today more active in Middle Eastern
affairs than at any time in its 40 years of history. But this activity --
sale of arms to Egypt and Syria, machinations in Jordan, increased tempo
of diplomatic and propaganda action throughout the area -- represents
neither a new interest nor an interest which is peculiarly Soviet.
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
This activity is merely the latest manifestation of a policy
which the communists inherited from the previous Tsarist regime a
policy which Peter the Great put into force for the first time in the
latter part of the 17th century with a series of campaigns against the
Ottoman empire. Although the territories he gained were held only
temporarily by the Russians, his insistence on the need for warm water
ports made the idea of southward expansion an integral part of Russian
policy.
When he died in 1725 he left behind a document known as the
"Political Testament of Peter the Great," in which he set down for the
guidance of his successors his recommendations as to the policy which
Russia should pursue with a view to becoming a great empire. One of
these recommendations is particularly significant:
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"To take every possible means of gaining Constantinople and the
Indies (for he who rules there will be sovereign of the world): excite
war continually in Turkey and Persia; establish fortresses in the Black
Sea; get control of the seas by degrees, and also of the Baltic, which
is a double point, necessary to the realization of our project; accelerate
as much as possible the decay of Persia; penetrate to the Persian Gulf;
reestablish, if possible by way of Syria, the ancient commerce of the
Levant."
There has been some argument as to the authenticity of this
testament, but authentic or not, it outlines succinctly the policy laid
down by Peter and followed consistently by all his successors, not
excluding the Communist leaders of Soviet Russia. Constantinople and
the Straits of the Persian Gulf, together with the lands lying between '-
these were the goals of the Tsars; they are now the goals of the Soviets'.
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
By the end of the 18th century, through ware and their
resultant treaties., Russia's policy of expansion southward showed
remarkable results. During Catherine the Great's reign (1762-1796),
for the first time, subversion was used, with Russian agents agitating
among the slavic and orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire.
In the Russo-Turkish war waged from 1768 to 177+ Russian
forces were generally successful, both on land, especially in the
Rumanian principalities, and on the sea, by means of a Russian flotilla
on the Mediterranean.
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The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji in 1774 was a triumph for Russia,
which gained for the first time direct access to the Black Sea, between
the mouths of the Dnieper and Bug Rivers, as well as the fortresses of
Kerch, Yenikale, Azov and Kinburn and the districts of Kuban, Terek and
Kabardia. Territorially the treaty represented an even greater gain
for Russia than appeared on the surface. One of its clauses provided
for the independence of the Crimean Tatar Khanate, which the Russians
promised to respect. Nine years later however, the Russians occupied
and annexed the Khanate. The annexation was later agreed to by Turkey
in the Treaty of Jassy (1792) which ended another Russo-Turkish war.
By that treaty Russia also gained an additional stretch of Black Sea
Coast, between the Bug and Meister rivers.
THE NINEMNTA CENTURY
During the 19th century Russian expansion southward was made
at the expense of both Turkey and Iran.
In 1801 Russia annexed Georgia over which Persia had claimed
sovereignty.
The Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, following a six year war
between Russia and Persia, resulted in Russia's gaining the provinces
of Baku, Karabagh, Shirwan, Derbent, Shaki and Talish. Persia was also
forced to renounce all claims to Georgia, Daghestan, Mingrelia, and
Abkhasia (which the Russians had already claimed and occupied) and to
agree to domination of the Caspian by the Russian Navy.
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In 1828, after another war with Russia, Pers.La - :eded the
provinces of Erivan and Nakchivan, thereby establishin; the Perso-
Russian border in the Caucasus at the Aras river, wher,; it still remains.
In Transcaspia Russian expansion continued. In 1837 Russia
had occupied the Persian Island of Ashur Ada in the bay of Astarabad
and, in 1869, the city of Kransnovodsk, which had been under nominal
Persian suzerainty.
Russian expeditions in 1873 conquered the hitherto independent
Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara, leaving the Turkomen steppe -- a nominal
Persian possession -- encircled on three sides by Russian territory.
This area was occupied in 1881 when the Russians broke Turkoman resist-
ance at the battle of Geok Tepe, and in the same year Russia and Persia
agreed on the Atrek river as their boundary line.
By 1900 Turkey had ceded Russia Southern Bessarabia, Kars,
Ardahan and Batum.
At the turn of the century, however, although Russia was
thousands of miles closer to the area Peter the Great had coveted, she
had not yet achieved her objective. This objective was cited in Novoe
Vremya, a leading conservative St. Petersburg newspaper on April 28,
1901: "We do not desire India, but we must get down to the Persian
Gulf."
WORLD WAR I
In World War I, with Turkey on the side of the central powers,
and Russia allied with Britain and France, the situation seemed ideal
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for possible further Russian acquisitions leading toward the Middle
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As P. N. Milyukov, later to be Foreign Minister in the 1917
provisional Russian. Government, wrote in 1915:
The participation of Turkey in the war on the side of our
enemies has made it possible to put on the order of the day the solution
of the age:-old problem of our policy in the near east. The acquisition
in complete possession of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles together with
Constantinople, and of a sufficient part of the adjacent shores to insure
the defense of the straits, must be the aim of this policy for the time
being." (What Does Russia Expect From The War?), Petersburg, 1915, p. 57.
And this was the policy which Russia pursued. In 191:5. she
concluded an agreement with Britain and France which provided that at
the war's end Russia would annex' Constantinople, the western coast of
the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles; Southern Thrace
as far as the Enos-Midia line; the coast of Asia Minor between the
Bosporus and the River Sakarya and a point on the Gulf of Izmir to be
defined later; the islands in the Sea of Marmara and the Islands of
Imbros and Tenedos.
Russia was at long last to have her "fnrarrn water" port to
obtain the long-desired straits. And a subsequent agreement reached
in St. Petersburg on April 26, 1916, forming part of what is generally
known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, recognized Russia's right also to
annex the Turkish provinces of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van, and Bitlis, as
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well as territory in the northern part of Kurdistan aloag a line from
Mush, Siirt, Ibn Omar, and l ,diya, to the Persian bore-er, comprising
in all an area of roughly 60,000 square miles.
THE SOVIET ERA
With the collapse of the Tsarist regime, the Bolshevik
Revolution, and Russia's withdrawal from the war, it seemed that an
end had finally come to the Russian dream of expansion to the Mediterranean
and the Persian Gulf. Such was not the case however. Although the
Communists denounced Russia's wartime treaties and returned Kars and
Ardahan to Turkey, their change of policy was more apparent than real.
The expressed Bolshevik desire to "liberate the Middle East from
colonialism," which is still reiterated today, fell before reality;
and it soon became clear that Soviet policy was dictated by practical
power considerations rather than altruism.
Between the two world wars the Soviets instigated a Communist
revolt in the Iranian province of Gilan and, later, attempted to
establish a network of espionage, propaganda and subversion in northern
Iran.
WORLD WAR II
On August 23, 1939, Nazi Germany and Communist Russia signed
a treaty of nonaggression, thus paving the way for the outbreak of
World War II. During the following year, Germany proposed that the
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two states further cement their relations by joining with. Italy and
Japan in a Four Power pact. The offer presented Russia with a new
opportunity to resume its march south: On November 26, 19+0, Schulenberg,
the German Ambassador in Moscow, informed Berlin that the Soviet Union
prepared to sign the pact if certain conditions were appended. One
of these was for the establishment of a Russian naval base on the
Straits, while another read: "Provided that the area south of Batum
and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as
the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." A glance at a map
will clearly show that the Soviet Union was, in effect, announcing its
intention to annex a large part of Turkey and Iran as well as the greater
portion of Iraq.
Fortunately for the middle east, Germany and Russia were unable
to agree on the division of the envisaged spoils; and as is well known,
German forces invaded Russia on June 21, 1941. Up to the last moment,
however, the Soviet Union entertained hopes of achieving its age old
ambitions in the Middle East through agreement with Germany.
Just a week before the German attack, Molotov was in Berlin
where, on behalf of the Soviet Government, he offered Germany a full
military alliance against England and her allies in return for, among
other things, complete control of the Dardanelles, a free hand in Iraq
and Iran, and an important position in Saudi Arabia so as to assure
Russiats domination of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden.
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POST WAR MOVES
During the wax, Russia, in conjunction with Britain, occupied
Iran; and in a treaty of alliance concluded with Iran on January 22,
1942, the two occupying powers agreed to withdraw their troops within
six months of the end of the war. Later, American troops were also in
occupation. The United States never formally adhered to the tripartite
treaty of alliance; but by means of the Tehran Declaration of December 1,
191+3, issued by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at the conclusion of the
Tehran Conference, the United States associated itself with the "desire"
of its two allies to maintain "the independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iran." At the war's end, Britain and the
United States completed withdrawal of their troops before the expiration
of six months, as provided, but the Soviets refused to honor their pledge.
Instead of withdrawing her troops, the Soviet Union used them
to sponsor and protect an autonomous Communist-controlled government in
Azerbaijan, to help establish an autonomous Kurdish Republic in the
Mahabad region, to force the Iranian Premier to grant an oil concession
to the Soviet Union, and in general to consolidate Soviet influence in
the country. It was not until May 191+6, after Iranian, protests to the
United Nations Security Council had brought down on the Soviets the
condemnation of the world, that Soviet troops were finally withdrawn.
Nor did the Soviets neglect Turkey. In June 191+5 Russia
demanded that Turkey cede her the districts of Kars and Ardahan, grant
military bases on the Bosporus and Dardanelles to the Soviets and agree
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to a revision of the 1936 Montreux Convention which would take the Black
Sea straits from international control and place them in the hands of
the Black Sea powers,
The story is told that the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, when
called in by the Russian Foreign Minister and presented with the Russian
demands, immediately replied that the demands would not be met.
In amazement the Russian foreign minister pointed out that
the Ambassador was not empowered to reply to a government note and that
the answer would have to come from the Turkish government in Ankara.
The Turk responded that a formal reply would be forthcoming
from Ankara but that the reply would be no and he simply wanted the
Russian government to know the answer immediately.
As an added pressure on Turkey, three important Soviet news-
papers, on December 20, 1945, published an article written by two
Georgian scholars who demanded that Turkey "rest" to the Georgian
Soviet Socialist Republic a Black Sea coastal region 180 miles long
and 75 miles wide, which comprised eight Turkish provinces.
The Turkish determination to maintain their sovereignty and
territorial integrity unimpaired regardless of consequences proved
stronger than the Communists had expected, and the Turkish government
continued resolutely to refuse to accede to the Soviet demands. The
resulting increasingly strained Soviet-Turkish relations, together
with communist guerrilla warfare in Greece, led in 1947 to the
enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, under which extensive American
aid was given Turkey to help her withstand Soviet pressures.
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The Soviet designs on Turkey and Iran.. having been forestalled
by the resistance of those states, backed in the first instance by
American aid and in the second by United Nations support, came to a
halt. But the respite was only temporary. Soviet activity began again
on a large scale in 1955 after the Turkish-Pakistani Mutual Aid. Agreement
of April 2, 1954 became the Baghdad Pact of 1955. This alliance of
Russia's immediate southern neighbors meant that the Soviets could not
hope to progress through Turkey and Iran with impunity. The Soviets
changed tactics, they decided to by-pass those countries and concentrate
on the Arabs.
The change in tactics became evident in 1953. In June of that
year the Soviets dropped their claim against Turkey for the Kars and
Ardahan areas; incendiary broadcasts in Kurdish ended in August; a long-
standing border dispute with Iran was settled in December 1954. in
1955 the Soviets concluded an arms agreement with Egypt. Recently they
have expanded their middle east arms dealings to include Syria.
It is significant that Arab governments, once denounced by
the Soviets in the most vitriolic terms, are now praised. The Nasser
regime in Egypt, for example, as late as 1954 was characterized by
Russia's leading Egyptian expert, L. Vatolina, as "madly reactionary,
terrorist, anti-democratic, demagogic", Yet in June, 1956, IInitri T.
Shepilov, then Soviet foreign minister pledged to that regime "eternal
and inviolable friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Egypt,"
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TODAY
The sale of arms to Egypt and Syria serves the Soviet objective
threefold: economically, it provides the Soviets with a means to strengthen
its grip on the economy of those countries; politically, it adds to the
risk of war and so tends to create the instability which is so advantageous
to Soviet tactics; and psychologically, it meets with a large appeal in
the recipient countries and thus tends to boost Soviet prestige and
influence. Such machinations as those recently carried on in Jordan and
Syria can best be explained as attempts to create confusion, unrest and
uncertainty, which the Communists have discovered by experience are the
conditions in which they have the best chance of succeeding.
Soviet aims in the Middle East today are stategic and economic,
but mainly strategic. Today Communist imperialism accounts for the largest
empire on earth -- an empire which has grown by five million square miles
and 732 million people of 17 countries since 1940. In Europe, the western
Soviet border is protected by a thousand miles of satellite territory.
In the north lies the ice of the Arctic; in the east, Communist China.
Only in the south are the countries on Russia's borders not subservient
to Moscow's will. The Soviets are working to change this situation.
It is evident that post-war military action in Iran failed to
achieve success; harsh ultimatums failed to achieve success in Turkey.
The Soviets have apparently abandoned these techniques for the present
and are concentrating on winning the Middle East through diplomacy and
subversion.
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The Soviets have never been more active in the diplomatic field
in the Middle East than they are at present. The maintenance of large
diplomatic missions in every Arab country, intensive propaganda activity
by large and well-financed organizations, the manifestations of other
activity along these lines are too well known to require amplification.
In every Middle Eastern country save Turkey there is an active
(whether legally or illegally) Communist party whose every move is dictated
by, and designed to serve, the interests of Moscow.
Today, Soviet Russia, thanks to the entree granted her by Egypt
and Syria, is closer to achieving her ambitions than ever before. It must
be remembered that it is not necessary for the Soviet Union's purposes that
she occupy and annex the countries of the Middle East, though it should
not be imagined that her hunger for more territory is yet appeased. It
will be sufficient if she is able, as she was in the satellite states of
Eastern Europe, to undermine existing regimes and establish subservient
governments in their stead and thus control the area as surely as if
Russian soldiers were in occupation.
The lesson of Dog River remains valid. The last inscription
there dates from January 19+7 and commemorates not the victory of a
conquering army but the attainment of full independence by the Lebanese
Republic. Only by keeping the Soviets and Communist influence out of the
Middle East, by keeping the Soviets from realizing their ambitions for this
area, can the Arabs be sure that the Lebanese incription will be the last.
A new inscription, whether it commemorated the passing of the Red Army or
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the establishment of a Communist-controlled government, would spell the
end of Arabi of all Middle Eastern hopes,
IPS/EN
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