DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD LEADING TO NEUTRALISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000500040002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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IN TH ARAB WORLD
NG TO NEUTRALISM
P(4
League states are at present split
on the question of Arab policy toward the bi-polar
vorld. Iraq early in 3355 cast its lot with the
West, through the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Syria declined such an association in
favor of an Arab pact free from foreign alignments.
Lebanon and Jordan remain uncommitted.
Continued Arab suspicion of Western intentions
in the Arab world, lack of full appreciation of the
danger Communiem poses to Arab institutions and Arab
tradition, and Communist activities in the Arab world
are principally responsible for the present diversi-
fied Arab attitudes toward East and Wmt. However,
inter-Arab rivalries also prevent the establishment
ef a mown Arab policy.
Events Affecting Arab-West Relations.
A. Origins of Arab Nationalism
The "Arab Awakening," brought to life simultaneous
"Young
Turks" revolution of 1908 by Arabic-speaking Christians and Muslims,
initially began as a movement for revival of Arab society within the
framework of the Ottoman Empire. The liberal revolution of the "Young
Turks" envisaged the subject peoples fully equal with the Turks. It
was enthusiastically supported by the Arabic-speaking population. But
Turkish nationalism proved stronger than liberalism, and Turkish
authorities gradueJly became more arbitrary and oppressive than the
old had over been in their relations with their non-Turkish subjects.
The growth of Turkish nationalism was matched by that of Arab nationalism
and "pan-Arabiem0" a movement aligned with modern nationalism and rooted
in the Arab past.
B. World War I Developments
In World War I, Arab nationalists east of the Suez Canal deserted
Turkey for the Allies to free themselves of Turkish despotism. Led by
Sherif Husayn, the sharif of Mecca and head of the Hushimite family, they
fought actively with British expeditionary forces in the Palestine-Syria
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The conclusion of the conflict brought the final die-
n of Ottoman Empire and the occupation of its Arab
north of Hijaz and Najd by British, Arab and finally French
forces.
The occupied territo
dad in 1920
mandated states
france and Britain, despite the British promise to uold the independence
of the Arab region within the frontier proposed by Sherif Husayn. France
receied Syria and Lebanon, and the British received Iraq, East Jordan
and Palestine.
In Egypt (nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire, but actually
under British occupation rule since 1882), nationalist elements refused
to cooperate with British occupation forces. In 191h When the Ottoman
Elepire declared its armed neutrality in the European conflict, the
British authorities found it necessary to declare martial law, abolish
the khedival* set-up and make Egypt a British protectorate. In 19220
following continued nationalist resistance, the British Government granted
Egypt its independence, but on terms which preserved for Great Britain
final control of Egyptian policy --reserving decisions on security,
imperial communications, defame, foreign interests and minorities and
the Sudan, pending a final agreement.
C.ro....et-eijztLiLom_4Deverrts
Arab nationelJem, which during World War I spurned the Turkish
sponsored Ielamigm" and *Jihad" (struggle against the infidels),
thus became the Arab formula for resistance to Western penetration and
domination. The ensuing struggle brought several revolts against British
and French rale and wen some of the Arab states part of their national
demands after the local governments agreed to grant the oceupying
powers long term concessions.
an title chedivet (ruler), beetowed in 1867 by the
me Porte on Isma1il Pasha (grandson of Muhammad Ali,
ernor general of the semi-autonomous Ottoman province
his direct successors. The bestowal was made in
tion of two actions made by Ismatil Pasha in 18661 exten-
tary aid to Turkish forces, hard pressed by Cretan
and raieing the Egyptian annual tribute to the Sublime
307,000 to 720,000 Turkish pounds.
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On 16 2 the Iraqi parUaent ratified a new Anglo?Iraqi
treaty through w'Ach Iraq became an 1ndepexent state. Iraqj however,
had to aecept certain British reservations, free disposition of the
resources of Iraq in the event of war and permanent use of the air
bases
On 26 August 2.936 Egypt concluded a treaty with Great Britain
rieing the 1922 treaty, The treaty was ratified by the Egyptian
:ornament on 15 and 18 November and by the British parliament on
214 and 25 November. It eliminated the military occupation of Egyp by
Brit1 combat forces, except for 10,000 troops in the coastal zone to
defend he Sues Canal. In recognition of the abeolute sovereignty of
Britain was to be represented in Cairo by an ambassador, who was
to be accorded precedence over the representatives of other powers.
Britain was to sponsor Egypt's entry into the League of Nations.
Both countries bound themselves not to enter into any relations with
other courttriea detrimental to their alliance. Egypt bound herself to
place all the resources of the country at the disposal of Britain in time
of war and, if necessary to introduce martial law and censorship. Egypt
VAS to build up her railway network at the points regarded by Britain as
etrategic. Without prejudice to the queetion of aovore1ty the admini
stration of the Sudan remained in the hands of the governor /lora', to
be appointed by Britain to whom the Egyptian troops in the Sudan also
were subject. St-da4.-
The immigra ion of Eeyptians/wast o be limited reasons of
public eecurity and health. Britain declared her rdineaB to support
Egypt in the abolition ot capitulations, with the ultimate object of
dissolving mixed courts as well. The treaty was initially concluded for
20 years after which any differences were to be submitted to the Council
of the League of Nations.
On 9 September 1936 Syria concluded a treaty with France granting
Syria its independence. France, hev,r, was permitted to maintain one
garrison each in Homan and Latakie provinces and two permanent air bases.
The treaty, which was not to enter into effect for three years, was never
ratified by the French parliament.
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1
6 Lebanon concludnd with France a treaty similar
to the Syrian treaty. It was not ratified by the French parliament
either, however.
P. World Wr //
The outbreak of World War II found rticuiate Arabs djyjd.d in
their attitude toward the Allies and the Axis. weals for revenge*
coupled with initial victories scored by the Axis, caused ?oue of the
extreme nationalists and a nuMber of opportunist politicians to side
openly againet the Allies. Other nationalist elements, having secured
promises of independence after the war fauna cooperation with the occupy
ing powers expedient. During the last phases of the war pressure from
the US and the UK brought Syria and Lebanon their independence fram
FrariCes
This development removed much of the imbedded Arab suapicion of
Western designs an their region and gave impetus to other Arab states
seeking revision of their treaties with the UK Their roles in Syria
and Lebanon brought the US and the UK a high degree of popularity in the
Arab World for a time
E.
1
en the UK and wytt. Ir
rod tc a certain extent fruitless. While East Jordan accepted
terms Iraq and E t balked bending theublic clamor for
i al evacuation of UK forces.
Subsequently, the generally unfriendly estern (including Communist)
approach to Arab aspirations in PaleAine in 1947, the Arab-Zionist war
and the debacle of Arab armies and the establishment of the state of
Israel exaceleated a situation already charged by Arab diplomatic failure.
Xenophobia? originally restricted to fundamentalist MUslims who have
abr8 rejected the Nest and everything Western, began to find subscriber*
among astrated nationalists. Muslim political-religious movements,
suchs the Mhslim Brotherhood, found new adherents and muahroomed through
out the Arab East, ebaflenging establiehed political parties.
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Naflona1it parties,formed and led by individuals most of whom
ern-directed institutione, also found it
expedient to ride the tide and adopt a hostile attitude toward the
West. Local governments, auperficially organized along Western lines
and controlled by old-line politicians, had either to give in to the
waves of anti-Westernism or to face the wrath of angry street mebs ih
urban centere. Politicians who maintained their moderation became
discredited.
Ite. _cold War
In 1948 the cold war ushered in a period novel to the Arab in
their nascent history. The Western morld, hitherto united againat the
Arab position in Palestine, waa divided into two bloc h vying for
sueremaey. To both the Arab world was a strategic area worthy of
control. To the Arab morld in general neither bloc waa attractive.
The Arabs believed they could take advantage of the new situation to
achieve the aspirations they had failed to realize by diplomacy
force.
The Western bloc, represented by the UK, was
had been edu
ono
number of military bases and facilities in the Arab East. It also had
binding mutual defense treaties with Egypt, Iraq and Jordan. Aware of
moenting Arab resentment against the preeence of foreign troops, the
West became anxious to arrive at settlements with local governments
without prejudicing its rights to the bases in timo of war. As a
condition for replacement of the treatise, held obsolete by the Arab
tates it proposed that the Arab states, singly or collectively, join
regional detente arrangement committed to the West. To allay Arab
suspicion, the West attempted to expose the real intentions of Com-
munism and the threat it poses to defenseless nation.
The Communiat bloc was at an over-all disadvantage in the Arab
wor.d, without bases there and without appeal to the traon-bound
Its =sympathetic attitude toward Arab aspirations in Palestine
in 1947 and 1948 caused even the Utopians among the Arabs to doubt the
sincerity of Communist governm nts and their declared intentions. Local
Communist parties were weak and ineffective.
The Ccamuniat bloc saw in the basea an obstacle to its long range
DbjeCtive in the area. It contended that Weetern bases and Weotern-
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iancee in the Near East were a direct threat to
ite . To reove this obstacle and threat it embarked on a
eampaign designed to deny the Arab world to the West. It charged that
tbe bases 'were means through which Western imperialime has managed to
p.rpetmte its exploitation of the whole region. It also denounced
regional defense schemes as Western conepiraciee aimed at involving
the Arab nations in a oataetrophic war. To cotexw Western charges
that Communism was not compatible with 11
$R protested that
under its rale Muslim eubjecte hare continued to enjoy unrestricted
religious freedom and that Western ebargee were unfounded. To lend
force to this claim it invited at varioue intervals a number of Muelim
leaders to visit the Soviet Union to obeerve the condition of its
Maelim citizens. It also permitted a limited number of Muslim leader
from Central Asia to perform their pilgrimage to Mecca.
In the political, economic and cultural fields the Soviet government
and its satellites opened an offensive aimed at winning the Arab peoples,
Ce?hoiova)cia allowed certain Arab garernmente to eurchaee a Uflited
number of small arms and ammunition, and the USSR intimated on eeveral
000asione ite willingness to supply Egyptte and Syriate military need,'
under certain conditions. In the UN the USSR altered its position to
favor the Arab point of view in ArabeIsraeli dierntes. Communist trade
representatives toured the Arab World aad were quick to negotiate
bilateral trade agreements with local governments. USSR and satellite
sutural and youth fronts extended invitations to Arab intellectuals
and, youths to participate in their international events.
The Arab attitude toward cold war developments was opportunistic.
Arab governrnenta under obligation to the UK saw in the cold war a
.1anca to improve their statue. Revision of their bilateral treaties
tlX and favorable solution of the Palestine question were among
the conditions stipulated by Arab governments for joining the West in
a regional defensive allangements
Extreme nationaii?ta and fundamentalist Muslim, dis1iiueiord b7
their governmentt past diplomatic and military failures and ever
auapicis of Western designs on their respective countries, regarded
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the cold war as an opertizi1.ty to rid their countries of foreign occu-
pation and domination. Consequently they began to press their govern..
ant to insist, in their negotiations with the UK, on complete withdrawal
of all foreign troop without committing their coun ries to the West.
They intimated that failure of the UK to meet their wiehes might dtive
their countries to join the opposite bloc.
Local. Communists and fellow travelers echoed Moscow's line. The
Arab-UK diepute over stipulations in treaties under negotiation and over
regional defense proposals provided the local Ceeemnists an opening
through which they could irk to obliterate the stigma of having once
favored the partition of Palestine and to gain acceptance on the national
level, hitherto denied to them by the traditionally conservative Arabs.
Condemning the Nestle position on the treaties amd regional defense
$chemes as contrary to the national aspirations of the people they strove
to equate the objectives of Communism With those of Arab nationalism.
Nationaliet elements which refused to accept the Communiet interpretation
were termed reactionary and in the aervice of colonialism and Anglo-
American imperialiem.
0. Neutraliem
Arab hopee Dor quick realization of their a! ations, however, did
net materialize. Early Iraqi, Egyptian and Jordanian negotiations for
revision of their UK treaties fell short of their objectives, and com-
bined Arab efforts with the West to settle the Palestine problem in
accordance with their plane were unproductive.
IIK-Bygptian negotiators were unable to resolve their differences
over the status of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the control of UK-occupied
Suez Canal Zone. UK-Iraqi negotiations resulted in a draft treaty which
VW not acceptable to extrene nationalists and led to bloody demonstra.
tiona in Iraq, causing the government to discard the treaty. UK-Jordanian
negotiations were successfully concluded, but again the treaty did not
meet with the approval of extreme nationalists, who objected to the
continued preaence of UK troops and control of the Jordanian army (the
Arab Legion) by British senior officers.
On the Palestine question, the Western powers fat reluctant to force
Iarael to accept the main Arab demandst to eithdraw to the frontiers
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a
n the 1947 UN Palestine partition plan, and to readmit to
Israel Arab refugees desiring to return to their homes and lands, or
aompensate those who were not willing to return. Instead they meow-
mended mediation and amicable settlement of outstanding Arab-Israeli
differences. The mediation attempts that followed proved to a great
extent fruitless, because neither the Israelis nor the Arabs would
compromise on their stated positions.
The impasse that followed in Arab-West relations lent some weight
to anti-West arguments of the extremists and Communistsagainst close
association with the West, resulting in a rapid growth of a neutralist
sentiment among uncommitted Arab moderates. This growth was paralleled
by a diminution in the popular following of the Arab ruling groups.
By 1951 neutralism had become accepted by the majority of articulate
Arabs, and as a result the ruling groups, to remain in power, found
it necessary to adopt toward the West an attitude reflecting this
aentiment. Consequently, the pro-Western ruling group in Iraq suspended
indefinitely its official treaty negotiations adth the UK, while the
Egyptian Wafdist negotiators insisted that the only treaty acceptable
to them was one which provides for complete evacuation of UK troops
from the Suez Canal Zone and the unity of the Nile Valley (Egypt and
Sudan). Led by Egypt the Arab states also declined to join theliestern-
sponsored joint defense scheme MEDO (Middle East Defense Organi tion),
preferring a wholly Arab pacts
H. Partial Improvement in Arab-West Relations
Western efforts to assure the Arab states of the West'sgood inten-
ts toward them produced limited but promising results. The Western
efforts included the 1950 Franco-US-UK tripartite declaration guaranteeing
,he Arab states-Israel status-quo, US offers of technical assistance and
e UK's willingnees to grant most of Egypt's demands on the Suez Canal
and to allow the Sudan to choose its .own destiny. In 19514 Iraq signed
a military aid agreement with the US, Egypt concluded its protracted
negotiations with the UK by signing a treaty returning the Suez Canal
Zone to Egyptian military control but making it available to the UK
in the event of armed attack against any member of the Arab League or
Turkey
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The authorities in Iraq ,nsequerit1y felt that the time was ripe
for the Arab governments to repudiate their neutrality and formally
align their conntriee with the West. However, Egypt, pressed by
domestic difficulties and Muslim Brotherhood agitation against the
new Anglo-Egyptian treaty, believed that action should be held in
abeyance. In the meantime it felt that the Arab Collective Security
Pact should be strengthened and should serve as the basis for Arab
defense against external aggression in any Arab-West agreement. Iraq
believed that the Arab Collective Security Pact was not sufficient
and therefore should be broadened to include Turkey, Pakistan, Iran,
the US and the UK.
Net willing to wait ind 0 Iraq subsequently
tiative and opened bilateral negotiations with Turkey, a member of
NATO. On 12 January 1955 the Iraqi and Turkish governments issued a
communique stating that the two governments, to strengthen the
.swirity of the Middle East, had agreed to conclude in the near future
mutual defensive pact. The communique expressed the hope that other
Middle Eastern countries would also join the pact.
On 74 February 1955, undaunted by subsequent opposition m the
Eygptian and Saudi-Arabian governments and opposition from Communists,
leftists and extremist elements, the Iraqi government concluded its
pact with Turkey. On 26 February the Iraqi Parliament ratified the
pact.*
states that the parties will cooperate for their
and defense, consistent with Article Si of the UN Charter,
measures for Ithich will be determined by competent authorities of
racting parties as soon as the pact comes into force. It
states that the parties will refrain from interference in
er's internal affairs and declares that the dispositions
act "are not in contradiction with any of the international
one contracted by either of them with any third state or
The contracting parties also undertake not to enter into
ational bbligation incompatible with the present pact.
states that the pact shall be "open for accession to any
member state of the Arab League or any other state actively cone
corned with the security?and peace in this region and which in
fully recognized by both of the high contracting parties..."
In addition Iraq and Turkey exchanged notes which placed on record
an understanding that the pact would enable the two countries "to
omperate effectively in resisting any aggression directed against
either of them, and that in order to insure the maintenance of
peace and security in the Middle East region we have agreed to
work in close cooperation for effecting the carrying out of the
UN resolution concerning Palestine."
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cation of IntereAreb Rivalriesaid
- ion of Ara:Le-14st telatiens
The ratification of the Turkieh-Iraqi pactsi the Arab world
into two hostile groups, revivifying the dynastic rivalry between the
Saudi and Haehimite ruling houses and the conflict between Egypt and
Iraq over leadership in the Arab world. The Iraqi government aligned
itselfwith the West and launched a drive to min to its side as
oonnitted Arab states as possible* ooncentrating mainly on
Lebanon and Jordan. The Egyptian goverement, realizing that
Srri
its * /limed leadership of the Arab world was being challenged* began
a counter-effort aimed at containing Iraq and at organizing an Arab
bloc favoring Egypt's declared independent foreign policy. Saadi
Arabia, fearing Iraq's growing strength, backed the Egyptian effort
In the contest that followed, Egyet was able to achieve limited
emcees in Syria* which was plagued by fragmentation in parliament and
bethind-the-scenes rule of an army clique antagonistic to Iraq's chronic
desire for amalgamation with Syria. In early March 3.955 the Syrian
and Egyptian governeents issued a "joint communique0 containing a blue-
print for future action.. Saudi Arabia later subscribed to this com-
munique, which became the basis of a projected pact identified as the
ESS (Egypt Syria and Saudi Arabia) pact.
Jordan and Lebanon, however, managed to stay on the fence between
the two cemee. Jordan based its position on its alliance with the UK
and the bilateral treaty of 190 with Iraq, which provides mutual
assistance in case of attack and consultation on internal disturbances.
The Lebanese government.-which fears a serious threat to its irAependence
* /he aonunique, whic
prised the following
not a fo
lute*
and binding agreemen
(1) A pledge not to join the Turkish-Iraqi Pact, or any other
military or political alliance, without the consent of other members,
(2) The establishment of an Arab defense concert with a permanent
joint command covering training, troop dispositions military pro-
duction, and oemmunicationse
(3) The creation of an economic union, directed by a permanent
Eeonomic Council. This union would be based on the issuance of a
single currency by a regional Arab Bank, the reduction or elijd nation
of intra-Arab ortoms barriers and the formation of joint limited
liability companies to finance development projects with Arab, rather
than foreign, control.
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if Syria either is allied to Iraq or inflamed by Egypt?claimed that
it has Arab unity at heart and assumed the role of honest broker.
Remote Yemen, feuding with the UK over controversial territory
separating Tanen from the UK protectorate of Aden, is considered
sympathetic to the Egyptian position. The Libyan government is con-
sidered pro4lestern and privately sympathetic to the Turkish-Iraqi
pact. Publicly, however, it gave lip service to the Egyptian viewpoint.
divided internally on the question of alignments, fearful
of losing its profitable trade with Iraq and doubtful of Saudi Arabian
and an ability to deliver promised military and economic assist-
ance,o d it necessary to expound in detail on the economic section
of the proposed pest and to extract irrevocable commitments from both
the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian governments before finalising the
agreement. The Egyptian and Saudi Arabian governments, unwilling to
agree to most of Syria's economic and military aid conditions, and
discouraged by their failure to 'sin Lebanon and Jordan, somewhat
relaxed their pressure on Syria for quick conclusion of the ESS pact.
The intensification of inter-Arab struggle regenerated by the
ratification of the Turkish-Iraqi pact produced two significant develop-
ments unfavorable to Western objectives in the leas-East*
1) In Syria, neutralist, Communist, anti-West and opportunist
elements aided by Egyptian and Saudi Arabian machinations,
found a common cause. They combined their efforts to defeat
or intimidate pro-West elements and to sell their own ideas,
without effective opposition, to a frustrated and dieillu
stoned public In a fragmented parliament they managed to
wedge themselves into a position to manipulate and dictate
the polioies of the government and subsequently to penetra
its various services.
(2) In Egypt, the initially pro-Nest military regime
in its efforts to arkve at a favorable settlamen
*Mit, Was drive n to adopt a neutral policy similar to that of
India. Although the regime continues to be anti-Communist in
disposition, its tactical opposition to proposed Western
regional defense schemes, as manifested in statements and
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"IMF
de1arationa by ita key.men and in it amed-West propaganda
directed to domestic and Arab vorld consumption, has served
well the anti-Western and Commweist elements. And now the
Eg'ptian government finds itself forced to continue a course
it had taken primarily as a temporary measure of defense
sinet domestic oppoeition and against Iraq's recent
initiative toward Arab vorld leaderehip.
T rd the Arab World
wit-Soviet
League etate
e Arab East
ea
a
iat attitudes and policies toward
x.
long-range Communist effort
tt politically, economically, and
Apparently realizing that it is at a disadvantage in tho Ara states',
the USSR has since the begiening of the cold war endeavored to detach the
Arab states from the West. In this effort it has thus far achieved limited
'access in Egypt and Syria, where the governments are weak and lack a
broad base of support.
In it effort the VS R has concentrat on:
exist.-
tug Arib -West differences and at the same time equating Comnmeist
objeetives edth those of the Arabs on such questions as the presence of
Western-proposed regional defense shcemeall and (2) convincing the Arab
etates and people that trade with the Soviet bloc would be more profitable
for them than trade th the West and that the USSR in milling to extend
to the Arab 'states badly needed equipment, denied them by the West1 in
exchan& for agricultural products.
On the Palestine question the USSR and it satellites have not
taken a definite stand. On certain occaeions in the UN Security Council,
series, o attacks by the USSR, local Communists and
t nationalists against Western-sponsored Middle Beet
est the USSR Foreign Minietry issued on 16 April 1955
the opening of the Azian-Africsus Conference at Bandune)
erely denoencing the West'seffort toward x33Jancee, The
van in Attachment 1) conoludeds "If the policy of pres-
if Lag continued toward the countries of the Near
this question ell have to be considered in the United
et Government, supporting the cause of peace, will
Independence, and noninterference in internal
of the Near and Middle East.*
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Araks in A
tly has deemed it advantageous' to fa
erdispites.
Communist although until recently no
ost no time at the April 1955 Asian-African Con
-
ems'. at Bandung in aligning itself with the aspirations/ of the Arab
preplan,*
Gownist China allowed itself to be more definite on Palestine
then did the USSR when Arab grievances against Israel were aired at
Bandung. Chinese Communist Proder Chou En-lail heading his delegation,
in an obvious move to win the Arab states representatives to support of
the Communist position, backed the Arab contention that the conferenee
had the right to discus's the controversial Palestine ieeue. Later Chou
cast his vote for an amended Arab draft-resolution condemning Israel
for its adamant position toward unsettled Palestine questions and its
refusal to carry out the UN resolutions on Palestine.
with Arab p
Y cancer
drees to the confer ice (reproduced in Attachment 2) Chou
e foflmdng pronouncements "I would like to declare
at the Chineae people extend their full sympathy and
e struggle of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia
or self-determination and independence, to the struggle of the Arab
ple of Palestine for human right, to the struggle of the Indonesian
pl. for the restoration of Indonesian sovereignty over West Irian
itherlands Nev Guinea) and to the just struggle for national inda.
pendence and the peoples* freedom waged by all the peoples of Leta
and Africa to choke off colonialism.'
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