NASR: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE (SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF SPEECHES OF NASR AND HIS LIEUTENANTS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000500070001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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NASR.- PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE
(SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF SPEECHES OF NASR AND HIS LIEUTENANTS)
Domestic Policy
A. Egyptian Economy under Nasr
to Aswan
2. Canal Seizure
3. The Canal Seizure and Aswan
B. Nasr and Democracy
II. Foreign Policy
A. Nair?s View of Arab Unity
1. Self-Assumed Leadership of Arab World
2. Interference in Internal Affairs of other Arab Countries
3. Lack of Consultation with other Arab Leaders
B. Case Histories on Unpredictability of Nasr
1. Suez Canal Seizure
2. Arms Deal with Soviets
III. Nasr and Communism
(Fuller treatment to follow)
Appendix Aa Source References
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to Aswan
I. DOMESTIC POLICY
EGYPTIAN ECONOMY UNDER NASR
The construction of the High Dam appears to many Egyptians as the
only feasible way to meet the country's urgent need of more farm
land for its rapidly growing population and of more electric power
for its expanding industry. To the present rulers of Egypt' the
project seems the best possible scheme for showing the people that
the military regime is bringing tangible economic benefits to the
country.
This project, so vital to Egypt?s future well-being., seemed
recently to be on the verge of realization. The world Bank had
expressed a willingness to consider a large loan., and the governments
of the United States and Great Britain had similarly expressed a
willingness to extend financial assistance. Unfortunately for the
Egyptian people, these sources of aid have now been made impossible
by the rash and ill advised actions of ?Abd al-Neer.
First., the Cairo regime; arranged to purchase from the Soviet
Union an amount of arms vastly in excess of what the strained
Egyptian economy could afford., and to pay for these arms the military
clique mortgaged the Egyptian cotton crop for years to come.
Inasmuch as Egypt?s cottof provides much of the country?s foreign
exchange., the International Bank could only conclude that the
arrangements with the Soviet Union cast serious doubts as to Egypt's
ability to repay the desired loan and to raise the other funds that
would be needed for the internal expenses of the High Dam project.
Secondly, Nasr aggorantly refused to consider any supervision by
the Bank over the spending of the loan funds and insisted that the
Bank simply hand the loan funds over to him. The fact that Nasr and
his cohorts have not shown themselves to possess a degree of compe-
tence in economic and financial matters such as would inspire
confidence and the fact that such a procedure would be contrary
to the Bank's normal practices were blithely ignored by the Cairo
regime which emotionally declared that any kind of supervision
would be a form of imperialism. It is indeed strange that all other
recipients of World Bank loans consider such supervision merely as
sound, normal financial practice and that only in the case of Egypt
does it shomehow become sinister and imperialistic.
The result was that the United States and Great Britain withdrew
their offers of aid., while the World Bank loan failed to materialize.
Considering this development as an unbearable blow to his pride and
prestige and realizing that his regime would meet growing opposition
among the Egyptian people unless he could divert their attention to
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some other problem, Nasr reacted by announcing on 26. July 1956 the
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.
2. Canal Seizure
In his book, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasr cynically
remarks-- 'How easy it is to appeal to the emotions of the peopleP"
The Suez Canal issue is a good example of how Nasr puts this
philosophy into practice. In wildly emotional terms he justified
his action to the Egyptian people by charging that the Canal Company
was an instrument of imperialistic exploitation sucking out the
lifevs blood of the Egyptian people. Truly this was a most sudden
discovery, for only a month earlier, in a speech in Cairo on 19 June,
he had declared.-:
Today Egypt is entirely free. Not a single foreign flag
flies. over Egyptian soil. For the first time in centuries we
are completely free to fight for our own destiny. Today marks
the beginning of a new era in which we shall be ruled by a
constitution of the people . . o A.phase of the struggle has
come to an end . . , Today for the first time in a long period
we feel sovereign in our own country. f
Yet by 26 July Nasr had discovered that Egypt was still groaning
under the yoke of imperialistic exploitation.
On 26 May 1956, the Canal Company was still sufficiently
honorable so that the Nasr regime deemed it proper tq negotiate an
agreement whereby the Company would invest $60 million of its
reserves in Egyptian development projects. , Yet by 26 July the
Company had somehow become an instrument of imperialistic exploitation.
On 20 June, Burhan Said, representative of the Egyptian government
to the.Company, made a public statement in which he referred to
the developing of plans for the future reversion of the Canal to
"Egypt in 1968. 31 Yet by 26 July the nature of the Company had
somehow changed so radically that it became necessary to seize it
immediately.
In announcing the Canal nationalization Nasr told the Egyptian
people that the Company had an annual profit of $100 million which
Egypt would now take for herself, thus permitting realization of
the High Dam project without recourse to foreign financial assistance.
:/ This was a flagrant deception of the,Egyptian people, as Nasr was
well aware.
Let us consider the facts. In 1-951 for example. the total
revenue--not profits but revenue--of the Company were roughly $93
million of which $30 million represented profits. In 1955s total
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revenue was $98 million of which again $30 million represented profits. 51
Since Egypt was already receiving one-sixth of the profits, the maximum
annual additional amount that Egypt could hopeto botain by nation-
alization of the Canal is $25 million.
But this is only part of the story. First of all, the Canal
properties themselves constitute only a small part of the company's
total holdings and Canal fees and charges only a smrvall part of its
revenue. As Nasr well knew the Company's properties located outside
of Egypt and the revenues derived therefrom were beyond his reach
and control and would continue so whatever he might do to the
Company's assets in Egypt. Secondly, as Nasr must have suspected
would happen, (as indeed it has,) many shippers have continued to
pay Canal charges and fees into the Company's accounts in London
and Paris where they cannot be touched by Nasr. Thus prospective
profits for Egypt are further reduced. Thirdly, at the time of
nationalization, the Company was preparing plans for extensive and
expensive improvements to the Canal to meet growing urgent needs. J
Egypt, if it wishes to keep the Canal is operating condition, will
be forced to carry out these plans; and the money used for this
purpose obviously cannot be used for the High Dam. Finally, Nasr
has promised that Egypt would compensate the Company for its nation-
alized. property, thus adding still a further drain on the prospective
reduced revenue from the Canal.
3. The Canal Seizure and Aswan
The above facts and figures make it abundantly clear that Nasr
was deliberately misleading the Egyptian people when he spoke of
profits of $100 million a year that would be available for the High
Dam project. Not only were Company profits less than a third of the
figure he cited, but he also knew that even this lesser figure was
greatly in excess of what Egypt could possible hope to obtain after
nationalization. Moreover, the necessity of expending funds for
improving the Canal and for paying compensation for the seized
property reduce still further prospective net profits. In effect,
nationalization of the Canal will not provide Egypt with $100 million
a year for the High Dam project but., at most, only a few millions.
This fact was tacitly admitted during a press conference held only
a week after nationalization by Ali Sabri, a spokesman for Nasr,
who, when asked pointedly if Canal revenue would be enough to meet
the cost of widening and deepening the Canal as well as finance the
High Dam, could not answer in the affirmative and had to give the
evasive reply that there were 1tundoubtedly other ways for the state
to implement its projects." 8/
4. Social Development
Programs: Promise and Performance*
The controlled Egyptian press and radio have not admitted the
truth on the Aswan project to the hopeful Egyptian people. As long
* For a more detailed criticism of the Nasr regime's development
programs see Lehrman Hals' "Potemkin Village on the Nile", The
Reporter, May 3, 1955 (News Highlights October 11, 1956)
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as the Nasr regime can hold out hope of the High Dam project, the
people will be less inclined to think about the harsh realities of
other economic problems or about the regime?s failure to bring
to Egypt the better life which Nasr and his cohorts have so loudly
and so frequently promised.
Let us consider the regime?s record. One of the most highly
propagandized actions of the Nasr regime has been the land reform
movement,., allegedly designed to free the Egyptian peasant from
dependence.on a landlord and to give him an adequate plot of ground
that he can call his own. No one can quarrel with this objective,
but what are the facts?
Initially the Nasr regime announced that it would distribute
three to four million fedd "* of land among peasants and landless
agricultural workers. Subsequently the figure was reduced to one
million, then to three-quarters, and by July 1953,9 Deputy Premier
Gamal Salim was speaking of 500,000 feddan. The fact is that by
the end of 1955 the government had distributed only 105,000
feddan, consisting almost entirely of former royal estates while
private landowners had sold an additional 95,000 feddan. 9 Much.
of this was bought by well-to-do peasants in the mto- O feddan class,,
while many landlords arranged spurious sales to tenants w om they
still controlled. At the most, only 20,000 peasants out of Egypt's
millions have benefited from this land distribution scheme.
Yet.Nasr, has all but claimed that every Egyptian peasant is
now happy and prosperous. In an article published in January 1955
in Forei Affairs, Nasr wrote that The Egyptian peasant is no
longer the virtual serf of big landlords but his own master, The
The agrarian reform program has resulted in a substantial increase
in his real income."! ll/
On 17 January 1956, Nasr stated in a speech.-
Farmers, you have achieved your objectives. The regaining
of the right to life and freedom was not an easy matter.
Today, 0 farmers, you should look at the future and feel the
right demands of your deeds and struggle so that you can
preserve. . We all look at the future with a feeling of
equal opportunities, social collaboration and with hope. 12,`
Speaking on 18 June 1956, Nasr added the statements
This generation was privileged to feel a great change. The
dignity of the fatherland was restored to it deservedly and by
right. Its sons are no longer the harvest of poverty and
disease.. 13,'
Approximately two acres.
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And during a speech in Cairo on 19 June 19568 Nasr declared,,
Today . . . the peasant has been freed of slavery and for
the first time in the history of this homeland he is free and
not threatened in his livelihood, living,, dignity., security for
his family. llt/
0 ye Egyptian peasants, Will ye testify that none among you fears
for tomorrcw9s breg.d, that none among you feels oppressed by fate
as did your fathers?
The NAsr regime has carried out the more dramatic features of
its development program1J the projects with a high propaganda
appeal, the projects which everyone can see and thus perhaps ever-
look the lack of accomplishments elsewhere,, Liberation Square in
Cairo has been beautified and completed,, The corniche along the
Nile was constructed in a few weeks., complete with trees and
flowers. Cairo airport has been enlarged. 15 Other conspicuous
projects also have been undertaken, but the lot of the ordinary
peasant and worker remains as miserable as it was under the Faruk
regime.
Economic Policies bf the Reimer
The Nasr regime also has given much fanfare to elaborate plans
for large-scale industrialization of Egypt and has fostered the
construction of numerous installations to that end. This is a
worthy ambition with which no one can quarrel. However., the details
of these plans and the manner in which they are being executed show
how little qualified are the present rulers of Egypt in the realm
of economics. For example., the Helwan steel plant, the most widely
publicized of the industrial projects, will be producing 220,000
tons of steel annually after it goes into full operation in the
middle of 19578 and the Egyptian leaders have been boasting of the
large amount of foreign exchange which Egypt will save as a results
But they have not told the Egyptian people that the steel to be
produced at Helwan will cost Egypt three times as much as imported
steel or that this high production cost is, to a large extent, the
result of their decision to locate the plant at Helwan far from'the
sources of the raw materials which the plant will consume. Thus
funds which could be used for more urgent projects,, projects which
would serve directly to improve conditions of life for the peasant
and worker,, are spent on an uneconomic project designed primarily
to boost the prestige of Egypt and of its ruling clique.
The current inflation in Egypt, which causes such hardships
for the poor classes, has already been mentioned. The Nasr regime,
instead of solving this problem., is, on the contrary., undertaking
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measures which will further .,intensify it. . To raise funds for its
various schemes the government has announced two loans,, one for
100 million Egyptian pounds to be raised abroad,, and the second
for $200 million pounds to be raised internally by having the
National Bank of Egypt print and issue currency. When the experienced
financiers of Egypt protested that this would increase the amount of
money in circulation by one-third,, thus inducing a dangerous rise
in prices, the government issued a decree which removed the protesting
financiers from the Bank?s board of directors,, they were replaced
by a minions amenable to-the government?s dangerous policy of
inflation. Not unnaturally,, the immediate result of these actions
was a flight of capital,, a rise in prices,, and a hoarding of
consumer goods, 16
Egypt?s economic difficulties have been further intensified
by the recent nationalization. It has already been pointed out
how Nasr deliberately misled the people when he said the seizure
would enable Egypt to build without foreign aid the High Dam,, which
is so important to Egypt?s future prosperity. The truth is that
not only is Egypt not going to get from the Canal the funds necessary
for the construction of the Dam but the economic consequences of
the nationalization are soon going to bring Egypt to the brink of
bankruptcy,
Let us examine some of these economic consequences. First of
all, foreigners who have previously invested capital in Egypt are
seeking to withdraw itg while prospective investors have hastily
cancelled their plans. Egyptian merchants,, moreover,, are finding
it increasingly difficult to import goods,, for their sterling
accounts have been blocked by British government., while Egyptian
cotton,, which formerly supplied the country with most of its
foreign exchange,, has been pledged to Soviet Russia for many years
to come as payment for the recent arms purchase. Is not every
citizen of Cairo and Alexandria,, for example,, able to see for
himself that already some of the most basic and necessary commodities
have disappeared from store shelves? The Canal nationalizatiop
also has resulted in a drying up of .a second source of foreign
exchange the tourist trade. For what tourist is willing to go to
Egypt when the international crisis caused by the nationalization
could conceivably result in armed conflict
Nasr must have realized that all this would come to pass. Yet
he was so absorbed in the problem of maintaining and even increasing
his own personal prestige and so little concerned with the economic
welfare,Qf Egypt and its people that he chose to ignore the inevitable
consequences of his act.
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The Nasr regime has failed to keep its promises, has failed to
improve the lot of the Egyptian people but has, on the contrary,
plunged the Egyptian economy into a perilous states In his book,
The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasr, in discussing the plans of
himself and his cohorts, wrote that "I would be surprised if we
were able to solve all the problems of our country," L7/ How right
he was;
-7-
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On 23 July,1952, a revolution occurred in Egypt, Its announced aim
was to replace the corrupt and discredited Faruk4tafdist regime with one
which would truly represent the Egyptian people, This was indeed a
noble and worthy concept, and the people of Egypt as well as of the entire
world hailed the new regime and looked forward to Egypt?s taking its
place without delay in the ranks of the worlds democratic nations.
How bitter has been the disillusionment'. Today there reigns in Egypt
not a democratic government but a dictatorship, a military oligarchy,
That fact cannot be denied even though the members of the ruling military
clique have recently exchanged their uniforms for civilian garb. In
Egypt today are to be found all the elements of a police state& secret
police, concentration camps, press censorship, a single party, the use
of plebiscites, the constant eulogizing of a single individual as the
indispensable, all-seeing, all-knowing man.
9Abd al-Nasr has written in his book, The Philosophy of the Revolution.,
that the aim of the army movement headed by himself and his associates
was to secure for Egypt and its people self-government and sovereign
independence. I In an article written for the January 1955 issue of
Foreign Affairs., he states that "our ultimate aim is to provide Egypt
with a truly democratic and representative government." 2j Similar
views also were expressed by General Naguib, the leader of the Revolution.,
whom Nasr and his cohorts have since abused and slandered in an effort
to destroy his reputatioh in the eyes of the people, In a radio
address on 10 December 1952, Naguib announced that a republic was to be
established, based on a constitution "to be so drafted as to realize the
people's desire for clean and sound parliamentary government." 2 And
on 6 March 1951, he declared that !II believe that the people's participation
in directing the affairs of their country is the only safeguard against
every kind of oppression." Y
For a time it seemed that the Revolutionary Council would honor its
promises and that Egypt would achieve a true democratic government, On
5 March 1954, Ali Maher, following an interview with Naguib and ?Abd
al-Nasr, stated that the Egyptian people would elect a civilian constituent
assembly within three months. Two days later Major Salah Salim, a
member of the Council, announced that the assembly would be elected in
June and would meet on 23 July for the purpose of drafting a constitution. y
On 25 March the Council issued a statement containing the following points 1/
1. The Council will transfer sovereignty to a constituent
assembly on 2) July 195L, with a statement that the
Revolution had ended.
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2. Political parties dissolved by the military regime
can reform immediately,
3. The Council will not form a new political party.
4. All citizens will enjoy full political rights.
5. Elections for assembly members will be free and direct.
6. The immediate task of the assembly will be the election
of a President.
This program of action seemed to be a vindication of every hope
cherished by the Egyptian people. But al ase It never came to pass.
The month of June came and went,, but there was no meeting of an
assembly. There was merely still another promise by 'Abd al-Nasr on
19 Maya repeated on 26 July,, that a parliamentary regime would be
established in January 1956.
Why this sudden change of plans? Why the postponement of the
election and meeting of a national parliament representing the
Egyptian people? The answer is simple. When the 25 March statement
was issued,, General Naguib,, who believed in the right of the people
to govern themselves,, was still in control of the Revolutionary
Council. But when he was forced from the premiership on 18 April
1954, as the result of machinations by 'Abd al-Nasr and his cohorts,
the situation changed. ?Abd al-Nasr forced the Council to adopt a
decision to postpone this transfer of power. When Naguib was removed
from office entirely in November 1954,, the last hope of the Egyptian
people for a democratic government vanished. It is not surprising
that only several months later,, on 21 March 1955, ?Abd al-Nasr told
an Indian press delegation that we prefer to remain in office a
few more years,," 91 and on 18 May 1955., declared that "we see no
advantage for Egypt in the establishment of a parliament." lO/
The attempted assassination of ?Abd al Nasr in Alexandria on
26 October 1954, gave the Nasr clique the opportunity to consolidate
its position and tighten its hold on Egypt. ?Abd al-Nasr and his
associates seized on the incident as an excuse for a bloody
liquidation of the Moslem Brotherhood,, the last effective organized
opposition to their dictatorship. They also attempted to justify the
virtual arrest of General Naguib by iretending that he was implicated
with the Brotherhood in a plot to seize control of the government.
This desire for dictatorial rule is not surprising when it is
remembered that 'Abd al-Nasr,, as well as several other members of
the ruling clique,, such as Fathi Radwan, were once members of the
Fascistic Greenshirt organization (Misr Fat-at) headed by Ahmad
Husayn, which greatly admired the tactics and techniques of Hitler
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and Mussolini. 11,_ Radwan, in fact, seems to be an admirer of dictator-
ship whatever its form, for he was an enthusiastic delegate to the
Communist so-called Peace Congress held in Vienna in 19510 Radio
Cairo, which he controls as QAbd al-Nasr?s Minister of Propaganda
(euphemistically termed Minister of National Guidance), declared on
11 October 1955, that "The USSR is a true democracy."" 12
Like all dictators, however, 9Abd al?Nasr wished to cloak his
arbitrary rule under a mask of legality, so on 22 July 1955, during
a speech to a rally in Cairo, he promised the Egyptian people that
"in January 1956 Egypt shall witness a Parliament which will include
the elite of its sons."" 13 Who this "elite""' was was not specified
but the matter was theoretical, for, like the other promises of ?Abd
al-Nasr, this one was not fulfilled. No parliament was established
in January 1956 or later in 1956. January 1956 did witness the
proclamation of a new constitution for Egypt. But were the Egyptian
.people allowed a voice in the drafting of this document so as to
assure that its provisions would provide for a truly democratic
regime? The Constitution was drafted arbitrarily by ?Abd a1=Nasr and
his cohorts, and its provisions reflect the desires and aspirations
not of the Egyptian people but of the clique which rules Egypt.
To be sure"Abd al-Nasr permitted the people to go the polls on
23 June, but they were allowed to vote only "yes" or "ho." The
results were inevitable, for there are few Egyptians who dare to test
the wrath of Interior Minister Zakariya Muhyi ad-Dings secret police.
Besides, rejection of the Constitution would have been meaningless,
for-the military regime would still have remained in power. Hence
an impressive affirmative vote of 99 per cent was registered. 14,/
On the same day the Egyptian people were allowed to elect a
president. But there was but a single name on the ballot= Abd
al-Nasr--and the regime had not made a single arrangement for the
possibility that the Egyptian pe6ple might have another choice.
It has rightly been said that power corrupts, and this is true
of all dictators. Once they seize power they set about methodically
to eliminate all rivals and to build about themselves an aura of
indispensability until they achieve the rank of demigod. Hitler,
Mussolini, and Stalin travelled that path, and "Abd al-Nasr has seen
no reason to change the pattern. The Egyptian people have not
forgotten that General Naguib, whom they love, was the original
leader of the Revolution. But ?Abd al=Nasr keeps him under house;
arrest, and has systematically tried to discredit him in the eyes
of the Egyptian people. Other members of the original Revolutionary
Council also have learned the dangers of association with a power-
hungary dictator. Colonel Rashad Muhanna and the Muhyi ad?Uun
brothers have been ousted from the Council on charges of alleged
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Communist and subversive activities-meaning that they objected to
vAbd ala-Nasr?s dictatorial ruled At the beginning of the Revolution
the Council asked for the support of the Moslem Brotherhood, as
'Abd al-Nasr himself admitted in a Cairo speech on 21 August 1954.
But as soon as power was secured and the Brotherhood began objecting
to 'Abd al-Nasr~s policies and actions, the clique denounced the
Brotherhood and ruthlessly suppressed it, thus eliminating the only
organized opposition to its rule,
Like all military dictatorships, the ?Abd a1-Nasr regime is based
on the army aided by a secret police. Though ?Abd al-Nasr is fond of
saying that his government reflects the desires of every Egyptian for
democratic rule, he has on occasion betrayed the real situation.. In
an interview with a foreign journalist in October 1955, he stated that
"Throughout my life I have had faith in militarism." Then admitting
that the. army was his regime?s only organized support, he continued.
"Our revolution was stimulated in the army by a lack of equipment.
If our officers feel that we still have no equipment they will lose
faith in the government." 15 But was not the Revolution supposed
to have arisen out of the wishes of the people and for the purpose
of giving them true democracy?
Let us consider this so-called democracy which ?Abd a1-Nasr
has brought to Egypt by means of the new Constitution. Speaking
in Cairo on 19 May 1955'. he described it ass 16
..ea strong democracy seeking to fulfill the interests of
the majority, the liberation of the individual, true justice,
individual and collective freedom, and a sound social justice.
...Freedom can exist only if everyone feels that he has
equal opportunity, that he can say what he pleases, and
that neither his means of livelihood, his sons, nor his
future will be in jeopardy.
And on 16 January 1956, in connection with the new Constitution,, the
Revolutionary Council issued a statement in which it was stated- l
We cannot say that there is a freedom, that there is a
parliament and that there is a constitution if the individual
does not feel this freedom, and if the individual is threst-
ened with a lack of food, and in his daily life if the
individual is threatened in his present and in his futures
These are fine true words but meaningless. The Constitution
guarantees the inviolability of the home, freedom. of opinion and
research,. freedom of press and publication, and freedom of associ-
ation; but all these are within the limits of the law. And who is
to enact the laws governing the exercise of these rights' An
assembly composed of members nominated by a single party which will
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be under the absolute control of ?Abd al-Nasr. Thus., in reality, the
extent of the rights is only such as ?Abd al-Nasr approves.
The Constitution also provides that Egyptians are not to be
arrested., imprisoned or punished except by law; not to be banished
from Egyptian soil or to be compelled to reside in or abandon a
specific area except by law; and not to be liable to the confiscation
of their property except by law. And who is to enact the laws
governing the exercise of these rights? An assembly composed of
members nominated by a single party which will be under the absolute
control of ?Abd al-Nasr. Thus, in reality., the extent of the rights
is only such as ?Abd al-Nasr might approve.
The Constitution says that there shall be freedom of the press.
But does any Egyptian truly believe that any publication could,, with
impunity,,, print any criticism of ?Abd al-Nasr or of his regime? There
is supposed to be freedom of the press. But no Egyptian journalist
can practice his profession before first obtaining a license from
the government. And is it not true that in 1955 the government
barred 234 of Egypt's 529 journalists from their profession by
refusing to renew their licenses? 18
The Constitution says that there.shall be freedom of opinion.
But does any Egyptian truly believe that he can, with impunity, voice
criticism of 'Abd al-Nasr or of his regime? Indeed,., he is not even
free to listen.to the opinions of others if those opinions are
critical of 'Abd al-Nasr or of his regime. For did not Zakariya
Muhyi ad-Din., Minister of the Interior and head of the secret police,
announce in April 1955 that any Egyptian caught listening to the
Voice of Free Egypt would be considered as conspiring to overthrow
the government and would be treated accordingly? 19 'Abd al?Nasr
has absorbed well the lessons of his fellow dictators, for did not
Hitler proscribe listening to the BBC and does not the Soviet Union
and its satellite states still proscribe listening to the Voice of
America and to Radio Free Europe?
The Constitution says that workers shall have the right to
unionize. But doe= any Egyptian worker truly believe that he can
organize a trade union that will not be subservient to the govern-
ment or that he and his fellow workers can strike to obtain their
justified demands? Control of labor unions is an immediate and
primary target of every dictatorship, and that of ?Abd al-Nasr is no
exception. As early as January 1953, the independent labor union
had vanished from the Egyptian scene. Major Ibrahim al-Tahawi., then
secretary general of the Liberation Front., (predecessor of the present
single party National Union), boasted on 25 January 1953, that Egyptian
trade unions had joined the Front and had., therefore, ceased to exist
as separate entities. 2Q/ Does any Egyptian worker truly believe
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that ?Abd al Nasr will now permit unions to be recreated and thus to
become a possible source of organized resistance to his regime?
The Constitution guarantees freedom from arbitrary arrest,
imprisonment or banishment. But is there any Egyptian who does not
know of Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din's secret police and concentration
camps? The ?Abd al-Nasr regime, moreover., has not even been content
with the limiting qualification "except by law" and the resultant
power deriving from its absolute control of the assembly and its
members who will enact that law. The final act of the Revolutionary
Council on 25 June 1956, was to issue a decree giving the Minister
of the Ihterior the authority during a 1O-year period to place under
administrative detention or arrest any person whom he decides to
accuse of counter-revolutionary activities or graft. 21,
The Constitution guarantees freedom of association and assembly,
which, in a real democracy, would imply the right to fora political
parties. But this is not the case in Egypt, for eslewhere the Consti-
tution drafted by ?Abd al-Nasr and his cohorts provides for the
formation of a so-called National Union which will make the nominations.
for membership in the National Assembly and which will be the country's
sole legal political organization.
President 'Abd al-Nasr has taken the further precaution of adding
to the Constitution a provision which states that the President of
the Republic shall proclaim by decree the manner in which this National
Union shall be constituted. Thus he will be able to control the
Union completely. In his Alexandria speech of 26 July, he described
the Union as "a national front comprising all sons of this home-
land except the reactionaries, the opportunists, and the stooges of
imperialism." 22 And who is to decide who are the reactionaries.,
the opportunists, and the stooges of imperialism? ?Abd alWNasr.
And whom will he place in these categories? Any who dare to raise
their voices in protest against his regime and against his betrayal
of the objectives of the Revolution. Dictatorship can brook no
opposition, and ?Abd al-Nasr has been careful to draft a Constitution
which permits him to-suppress it under a cloak of legality.
?Abd al4Nasr and his cohorts have declared that "opportunities
must be given for new leaders to step forth" 23J and that the
National Union assures this since every qualified Egyptian may
submit his name for nomination to the National. Assembly. However.,
according to a broadcast of Radio Cairo on 12 June 1956, after the
names of all hopeful candidates have been received, the executive
committee shall prepare a list of those prospective candidates" to
whom it has no objection." 2I~; In this way, since ?Abd al-Nasr
controls this executive committee., he retains the power to exclude
ffom the ballet any person whom he feels is not personally loyal to
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himself. In addition, 'Abd al-Nasr has asserted that "we shall watch
over these persons after they succeed in the elections. Some of
them might turn into opportunists or exploiters.,,.Anyone turning into
an opportunist should fall." 25/ In other words9 even though he
has been elected. by the people,, any member of the National Assembly
who dares to criticize 'Abd al=-Nasr or his regime will be expelled
from his seat.
The ?Abd al-Nasr clique may speak continuously about the
democracy it has brought to Egypt, but to apply the word democracy
to the present Egyptian regime is a flagrant misuse of the word--
remember that the Communist tyrannies of the Soviet satellite states
also call themselves democracies. Nothing can conceal the fact
that the QAbd al-Nasr regime is a dictatorship based not on the will
of the people but on the strength of the army and secret police..
The high-sounding words used by 'Abd al-Nasr and his associates
are but a smokescreen, designed to conceal and deceive. In pondering
them every Egyptian should hearken to the words of Allah, revealed
in the sura al-Bagara3
There is the type of man whose speech about this world's
life may dazzle thee, and he calls Allah to witness about
what is in his heart; yet he is the most contentious of
enemies. 26
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II. FOREIGN POLICY
NASR's VIEW OF ARAB UNITY
Egypt., so the new Egyptian Constitution declares, is an integral part
of the Arab nation which Nasr has described as stretching from the Atlantic
'Ocean to the Persian Gulf. I/ It is, moreover, Egypt's announced aim to do
everything possible to make this single nation more than a dream, to bring
it to a state of reality. It is an ambition which is shared by every Arab,
whether from Syriac, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or any other Arab state. Yet these
Arabs would hardly approve of Egypt's plans for accomplishing this objective,
for Nasr envisages not a uniting of.equals but an Egyptian hegemony with
himself as the only authoritative leader and spokesman for the entire Arab
World.
Nasr's own'-words betray his grandiose ideas of expansion and Egyptian
aggrandizement. In his book., The Philosophy of the Revolution, he writes.
We cannot look at the map of the world without realizing
Egypt's position on the map and her role by the logic of that
position. Can we fail to see that there is an Arab zone
surrounding us,? ... Can we possibly ignore the fact that there
is an African dontinent which we have been made part of by
fate? ... Can we:,ignore the fact that there is an Islamic
world with which we are united by bonds of religious principle
reinforced by historical realities? ... It always strikes me
that in this area in which we live is a role running around
aimlessly looking for a hero to give it being The role is
there. Its characteristics have been described. This is the
stage. By the laws of geographical circumstance, we alone are
able to play it.
Self Assumed Leadership of Arab World
Thus has Nasr arrogated unto Egypt and unto himself as ruler of that
country the role of leader of the Arab if not of the entire Islamic world.
This same self-assumed mantle of leadership also has been mentioned on
other occasions by members of the Cairo junta. For example, Nasr told
the graduates of the Egyptian Aviation College on 15 September 1956, that
""he who attacks Egypt will have attacked the entire Arab world." / But
who has given him the right to commit the armed forces and destiny of the
other nations on Egypt's behalf, especially when any conflict will have
been caused by Egypt's reckless violation of international law, taken
without the slightest consultation with the other Arab states? On 22 July
1955, War-Minister General 'Abd al-Hakim Amir asserted that ""in order that
Egypt may occupy her traditional place as the center of gravity in the
African and Asian group of ,states and in order that we may be fully prepared
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to fulfill our obligations towards our Arab brothers, it has become incum-
bent upon us to build up our armed forces." And in a press interview on
7 ,July 1955, Salah Salim, then Nasr's Minister of National Guidance, declared
that Egypt9s army "has taken it upon itself to defend every foot of the
Arab Torld."t Did he thus imply that the other Arab countries had no
voice in their own defense or were incapable of defending themselves?
Aside from the arrogance of such statements., the ironic fact is that
Egypt has displayed on all occasions her complete disdain for the. security
and integrity of the other Arab lands. When the Israeli army carried out
bloody raids into Syrian and Jordanian territory, the Egyptian army,
despite these high-sounding promises, did nothing. When Saudi Arabia
complained to the, Arab League that British forces had occupied the Buraimi
oases, the Egyptian army, despite these high-sounding pkpmises, did
nothing. When the Sultan of Oman appealed for help to prevent the'occu-
pation of Oman by forces of the Sultan of Muscat, the Egyptian army.,
despite these high-sounding promises, did nothing. In fact, the only
military danger threatening the Arab world other than that posed by Israel
comes from the Soviet Union, and it was Egypt who, without bothering to
consult the other Arab states., opened the gates of the Middle East to
Soviet penetration. And if the threat of armed conflict hangs over the
area today as a result of the Suez Canal crisis, it was Egypt who, without
bothering to consult the other Arab states, took the action which pre-
cipitated the crisis.
The Nasr regime has pledged to support the Arab League. For example,
in a statement made on 1 January 1955, Nasr declared:
The Arabs are fully determined to back it so as to realize
their aspirations of the establishment of a federation among
them, which is no doubt the first and last aim of every Arab
state.
In an earlier statement made on 5 September 1951, Nasr stated: 7J
Our first objective is to consolidate the Arab League in order to
insure stability and security in one of the most sensitive spots
in the world.
Like all of Nasrus statements, these sound very good, but unfortunately
there is no substance or sincerity behind them. For Nasr regards the Arab
League not as an organization of equals designed to foster Arab unity and
the interests of all Arabs but rather as an instrument of Egyptian foreign
policy, to be supported as long as it serves Egypt Is national interests
but to be discarded if and.when it ceases to do so. This fact was made
abundantly clear in early 1955 when Nasr threatened that Egypt would with-
draw from the League if Iraq insisted, despite Egypt?s objections, on
forming an alliance with Turkey.
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The. North African situation presents another example of how willing
Nasr is to sacrifice the principle of Arab solidarity for purely Egyptian
interests, Not unnaturally every Arab sympathizes with the national
aspirations of the Algerian people, and the Arab League Council has
adopted resolutions in support of those aspirations. Cairo has long
been a center for North African nationalist activity and Radio Cairo
the principal channel for nationalist propaganda. In November 1955,
however, Nasr agreed with France to end these anti-French broadcasts
in return for a French promise to resume arms shipments to Egypt. 9
If Nasr were truly concerned with the fate of the Algerian people, no
concessions could have persuaded him to abandon,, even if only temporarily,
his support of the North African nationalists.
Interference in Internal Affairs of Other Arab Countries
The question of interference in the internal affairs of other Arab
state provides a further example of the contempt in which Nasr holds
his promises and his fellow Arabs. Article 8 of the Arab League Charter
clearly forbids such interference, and such action was also condemned by
the resolutions of the Bandung Conference, which have been enthusiastically
endorsed by Nasr and his cohorts. 1? The latter also have reiterated
this principle in their public statements. For exampled In a statement
to the Cairo publication al-Akhbar al Yawm on 29 May 1956, Nasr stated
that "Egypt will not allow itself to interfere in the internal affairs
of any Arab state." 11 During the course of his Alexandria speech on
26 July 1956, Nasr asserted that "our policy is based on non-intervention.
We have no business in any domestic matter, and we would never interfere."
And Minister of State Anwar alcSadat, writing in the Nasr mouthpiece
Al-Jumhuriyah on 27 April 1955, voiced the opinion thats
Interference into the internal affairs of a nation is even more
hateful now than it was during the days of imperialism in our
country, because those who practice it through pressure, intimi-
dation, use of violence, or the instigation of citizens to kill
their leaders? are those who profess to love and support the
Arabs and who claim to wish to protect them.
Although he did not intend them as such, al-SadatBs words are a
perfect indictment of Egypt's activities, for there is scarcely a single
Arab state which has not felt the results of Egyptian interference. The
activities of Salah Salim in the Sudan became so blatant that the Sudanese
government was forced to ask him to leave. Libya has found it necessary
formally to order Nasr to close down his propaganda centers in that
country. Strikes in the Saudi Arabian oilfields and unrest in the
Shaykhdom of Bahrayn have been traced to funds expended by Egyptian
agents and agitators. During the early part of 1955,, when Egypt was
trying to prevent Iraq from signing an alliance with Turkey, Iraqi
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police apprehended Egyptian-paid agents who were trying to persuade loyal
Iraqis to sign statements denouncing their Premier, Nuri as-Said, as a
tool of imperialists -- Nuri as-Said who was fighting for Arab inde-
pendence before Nasr was born. And a so-called Radio Free Iraq transmitted
from Egyptian soil inflammatory broadcasts designed to incite internal
rebellion in Iraq. 14 In Syria, because Premier Fairs al-Khuri refused
to side with Egypt in condemning Iraq, Nasr promoted a campaign of
rioting and violence which led to al-Khuri?s resignation on 7 February.
Egyptian intereference in the internal affairs of Jordan has been
even more flagrant. The riots and violence which wracked J'brdan in
December 1955 were led and organized by agents in the pay of Nasr. In
has Alexandria speech on 26 July 1956, Nasr admitted that "we cannot say
that the December battle of Jordan was not our battle." 15 In an article
published in al-Jumhur ah on 27 December, Anwar al-Sadat, one of
'Abd al-Nasr's minions, boasted that his chief was responsible for keep-
ing Jordan out of the Baghdad Pact.
There is the type of man whose speech about this world's life may dazzle
thee, and he calls Allah to witness about what is in his heart; yet he is
the most contentious of enemies. When he turns his back, his aim is every-
where to spread mischief through the earth . . . 17
Lack of Consultation with Other Arab Leaders
Equally strange is his concept of consultation and coordination of
Arab foreign policies. It will be remembered that Egypt bitterly
criticized Iraq for having decided on such an important foreign policy
step as the Iraqi-Turkish alliance without consulting with the other Arab
states who were sure to be affected thereby. This interdependence of
Arab states is, in fact, a favorite theme of Nasr and his cohorts. In
his book, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasr writes that-. "What
happens s Baghdad, and seitswcounterpart in Damascus the next day, and Beirut,
It is a single region." 18/ And in a
Amman,,
recent speech he declared8 "My fate in Egypt is linked with that of
my brother in Jordan, in Lebanon, Syria, and in every country, and also
in Sudan. Our fates are linked.... The fate of one of us affects that
of the other." 19 His erstwhile Minister, Salah Salim, has said-. 20
Our foreign policy was drawn up from the beginning on the basis
of complete cooperation for the glory of the Arab nation and the
unity of the Arabs because this is the only way to put an end
to the trials, disasters and sufferings of the past as a result
of the disintegration of the unity of the Arab peoples and of
conflicting orientations.... What would be the meaning of all
these meetings, what would be the meaning of a pact of all Arab
states, and what would be the meaning of a league of our govern-
ments if any one of us separately takes the most serious and
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important discussions he wishes to, without mutual understanding
or consultation with the others.
Egypt has even made formal commitments in this regard. Speaking in
Damascus on 28 February 1955 in connection with the newly proposed
Syrian-Egyptian alliance, Salim pledged that Egypt would make its foreign
policy agree with that of the other Arab states. 21 On 6 March, he joined
with Sabri al-Asali and Khalid al-Azm in issuing a communique which
declared that neither member of the new alliance would conclude any
international military or political agreement without the consent of
the other 22/ In September 1955, Nasr and Lebanese Foreign Minister
Hamid Franjiyah issued a joint statement in Cairo whereby the two
countries agreed Cato consult and exchange views and information con-
tinuously and without any delay on everything connected with international
politics,, defense, public security, and common interests of Egypt and
Lebanon." 23
What does the record show? The record shows that since the very
inception of the Nasr regime it has proceeded to do what it promised
not to do and what it condemns in other countries. It has consistently
and continually taken the most vital foreign policy decisions without
ever bothering to inform the other Arab countries, must less consult
with them, even though those decisions had repercussions which affected
profoundly every state. Let us consider a few examples of Egypt?s actions
in this regard:
In the fall of 19539 Nasr rejected all possibility of a defense
alliance of the Middle East with the Western Powers and declared that
the Arabs would follow a course of neutralism and would seek defense
from within the area. In committing the Arab world to such a policy,
he arrogantly ignored'the fact that the other Arab states might have
other views and might wish a voice in deciding the future course of the
area. Not unnaturally this arrogance was not everywhere appreciated, In
this regard it is appropriate to cite, for example, an editorial which
appeared in the Beirut newspaper LDarients
It is for Egypt, and for Egypt alone, that Lebanon and Syria,
and even to a lesser extent Jordan and Iraq, are turning their
backs on Britain. It is for Egypt, and for Egypt alone, that
Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, who have common frontiers with the
Jewish State, have refrained from seeking from the Western Powers
firm guarantees against the dangerous pressure of Israeli irreden-
tism. Now9 without taking into account the special interests of
Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and without even taking the trouble
to inform the Arab League, the Cairo Government is turning towards
neutralism and claims to be committing the rest of the Arab states,
During the lengthy negotiations that resulted in the 1954 Anglo-
Egyptian agreement on the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone, Nasr did
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not consult with any of the other Arab leaders even though the with-
drawal of British troops from the zone was certain to affect the power
balance of the Middle East,, Nevertheless., Nasr did not hesitate to
demand the support of every other Arab state for himself and his regime
against Britain.
?Abd a1=Nasr proclaims his allegiance to the ideal of Arab unity
and to the necessity of working for the success of the Arab Leagues but
his actions belie his words. He has made it clear that to him the
Arab League is only an instrument for Egyptian national aggrandizement.
In February 1955, he warned the League that Egypt would withdraw if it
did not join with Egypt in condemning Iraq's alliance with Turkey. 25
In other words., he was quite prepared to wreck the League if it did not
bow to Egypt's wishes. This is indeed a strange way to foster Arab
unity.
In criticizing the Iraqi=Turkish pacts 'Abd al-Nasr as well as his
Foreign Minister have insisted that the Arab Lezgue Charter requires
consultations among all the Arab states on such important matters. This
interdependence of the Arab nations has been a favorite theme of the
present Egyptain rulers. For example., in his book,, The Philosophy of the
Revolutions ?Abd al-Nasr writess "What happens in Cairo as i scounter
pain"am.aseus the next days and Beirut, Amman Baghdad, and elsewhere...
It is a single region." 26 And Major Salah Salim, while Minister of,
National Guidance, declared on 16 January 19550 27
What would be the meaning of all these (League) meetings, what
would be the meaning of a pact of all the Arab states, and
what would be the meaning of a league of our Governments if any
one of us separately takes the most serious and important
decisions he wishes to, without mutual understanding or con-
sultation with the others?
The Egyptian leaders also have made formal commitments on this
subject to the other Arab states. Speaking in Damascus on 28 February
1955, in connection with the Syrian-Egyptian alliance then being
negotiated, Salim promised that Egypt would make its foreign policy
agree with that of the other Arab states. 28 A week later he joined
with Sabri al-Asali and Khalid al=,Azm in issuing a communique which
pledged that no member state of the new alliance would conclude any
international political or military agreement without the consent of
the other member states. 29 On 1 September 1955, ?Abd al-Nasr and
Lebanese Foreign Minister Hamad Franjiyah issued a statement in Cairo
whereby the two countries agreed to "consult and exchange views and
information continuously and without any delay on everything connected
with international politics, defenses public security, and common
interests of Egypt and Lebanon." 3 /
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But as is the case with all of his promises, ?Abd al-Nasr has broken
these constantly, In spite of his commitments,, ?Abd al-Nasr has taken
and continues to take the most vital foreign policy decisions without
bothering to consult with or even to inform the other Arab states and
without considering the effects of such decisions on those states. The
arms deal with Soviet Russia, which certainly fell within this category
since it opened up the entire Middle East to Soviet penetration and
influence, was presented to the Arab nations as a fait accompli. So
too was the Canal nationalization decision taken without consulting the
other Arab states, even though the consequences of that action threaten
the peace and stability of the entire Middle East and, because of the
possible stoppage of oil and pipeline royalties, jeopardize the economic
welfare of every Arab nation,
The other-Arab states have faithfully fulfilled their obligations
in this respect, but in return they receive from Egypt only contempt.
Even as early as December 1953, the Beirut newspaper L'Orient, which
is generally friendly to the ?Abd al-Nasr regime, observed that: 31
It is for Egypt, and for Egypt alone, that Lebanon and Syria,
and even to a lesser extent Jordan and Syria, are turning their
backs on Britain. It is for Egypt, and for Egypt alone., that
Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, who have common frontiers with the
Jewish State, have refrained from seeking from the Western Powers
firm guarantees against the dangerous pressure of Israeli irre-
dentism. Now, without taking into account the special interests
of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and without even taking the trouble
to inform the Arab League, the Cairo Government is turning towards
neutralism and claims to be committing the rest of the Arab states,
In September 1955, Nasr concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union
(which he claimed for months was with Czechoslovakia) for the purchase
of arms. This was perhaps the most important and vital decision ever
taken by any modern Arab state in their history, for it opened a breach
through which Soviet technicians and therefore Soviet influence could
penetrate this strategic area,, an area previously denied to such influence
by the united front which the Arabs had followed in their opposition to
the atheistic doctrine of Communism, Yet Nasr did not bother to consult
or even to inform the other Arab states about this step,
In May 1956, Egypt agreed to a new United Nations-sponsored cease-
fire agreement with Israel without an Israeli guarantee not to divert
waters of the River Jordan., thereby leaving Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon
in an embarrassing positions
In July 1956, Egypt took a step that had consequences for the entire
Arab world second in importance, if not equal, to those of the Soviet
arms purchase, This was the nationalization of the Suez Company, The
action took the leaders of every other Arab state completely by surprise,
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Nasr, thinking only of his on personal prestige and self-glorification,
took this momentous decision without bothering to discuss it with them,
although it brought the possibility of warfare to the N ddle East and,
at the very least, threatened a stoppage or reduction of oil exports
with an attendant reduction of oil and pipeline royalties, unemployment
of Arab workers, and a halt to major development projects dependent on
such royalties. At the same time, Nasr demanded that all Arab states
support him in the international crisis that ensued from the nationali-
zation. He further showed his contempt for the economic interests of
other Arab states by arranging for the Egyptian-dominated executive
committee of the Federation of Arab Trade Unions, meeting in Cairo, to
adopt a resolution pledging that its members would blow up and destroy
all oil installations in the Middle East in the event that the Canal
crisis led to armed conflict. )
All the above-cited examples show only too well that Nasr's only
concern with the Arab nation, despite his frequent and dazzling statements
to the contrary, is to use the Arab states to assure Egyptian hegemony
and his own grandeur. In dealing with him, the leaders of the other
Arab countries would be well advised to use caution lest they suddenly
find themselves mere puppets manipulated by strings from Cairo. The
statesmen of Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, which have all entered
into military alliance arrangements with Egypt during the past year,
especially have reason for care. Those three states are all militarily
weak with small populations, while in comparison Egypt is a populous
country that is relatively strong militarily. And as Nasr himself said
on 7 July 1955, at a rally at al-Fayum, "Any alliance with a big state
means domination in various forms.... The alliance of a small state
with a big state-resembles the alliance of a lamb and a wolf." /
The statesmen of the Arab world would do well to ponder these words,
for the wolf of the Nile has shown himself to be ambitious and hungry.
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CASE HISTORIES ON UNPREDICTABILITY .0 A?A
1. Suez Canal Seizure
The crisis which has arisen in the world in the wake of the
Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company does not, con-
trary to what 'Abd al-Nasir has asserted, involve a question of
imperialism but a question of whether or not unrestricted freedom
of navigation through the Suez Canal is to remain in force and
whether or not international treaties may be violated with im-
punity.
The Constantinople Convention of 1888 provides in Article I
that the Canal should always remain free and open whether in peace
or war for every merchant and naval ship without nationality dis-
tinction. This is a clear and -unambiguous commitment to which
Egypt adhered by signing the Convention. The continued binding
force of-this pledge has not been denied by Egypt. 'Abd al-Nasir
acknowledged it in his 26 July speech in Alexandria when he an-
nounced the Canal's nationalization 1 and again at a press confer-
ence in Cairo on 12 August. / In his letter to Australian Prime
Minister Menzies, who headed the 5-nation delegation which went to
Cairo to submit Western proposals to the Egyptian government, he
declared that Egypt's policy was to continue "freedom of passage in
the Suez Canal and to guarantee its use indiscriminately." Y In
another statement., read by his colleague Ali Sabri at a press con-
ference on 31 July,, 'Abd a1-Nasir asserted-. "As always Egypt is
determined to safeguard its international obligations. In this con-
nection it will fully observe the agreement concluded in 1888 and
the assurances pertaining to, it in the agreement of 1954 between
Egypt and England." W
In view of these assurances, the naive observer might wonder
why the Western Powers are worried about possible future interfer-
ence with free navigation through the Canal. The answer is simply
that they do not feel that the record of the present Egyptian gov-
ernment is such that they can rely on its promise that no interfer-
ence will occur. For the record shows only too well that promises.
by 'Abd al-Nasir ahd his colleagues are not to be trusted.
The Egyptian government has., in fact, already shown its con-
tempt for its obligations under the 1888 Convention. Although the
Convention states quite clearly that freedom of passage is the right
of: all nations without exception., Egypt has barred Israeli shipping
since 1948 as well as ships bound for Israeli ports or sailing from
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them,, Since a state of war technically still exists between Israel
and Egypt, the barring of Israeli ships could perhaps be justified
on the grounds of national defense,, But the ban of ships of a
friendly foreign power simply because of their destination or port
of departure is a clear violation of the Convention., a flagrant uni-
lateral interpretation of the Convention without any legal basis in
international law.
Consequently, it should not be considered strange that the West-
ern Powers now decline to accept as sufficient Egyptian assurances
of future freedom of passage through the Canal for ships of all na-
tions. If today BAbd almNasir feels free to bar ships on the basis
of such a unilateral interpretation, what guarantee is there that
tomorrow he will not undertake to bar shipping on other grounds?
In fact, despite the previous promises that freedom of passage would
be respected unreservedly, Ali Sabri, one of ?Abd al Nasir's closest
associates and his personal observer at the first (22-nation) Suez
Conference in London, threatened the Western Powers at that time
that any action on their part which did not meet with the approval
of Egypt would result in EgyptQs barring the Canal to their ships,
While the Cairo government later disavowed this threat because of
the unfavorable reaction throughout the world, it was a clear indi-
cation of the thinking of the Egyptian rulers on the subject and'of
the small regard in which they hold their pledged word,,
The West has had too recent and too agonizing experiences with
the false promises of dictators to fall into the same trap again.
Every European has vivid recollections of how Hitler blithely made
one promise after another, only to break them as soon as he deemed
it convenient to do so,, Why should they now trust BAbd al?Nasir.,
who is traveling down the same road? His own words convict him.
Speaking to a rally in Cairo?s Republic Square on 19 June 1956,
only a few weeks before the Canal nationalization, he remarked that
"the objectives keep changing, aspirations grow, and demands always
loom before peoples-." / Such a statement might have come straight
out of Mein Kampf,,
In explaining the reasons for the Canal?s nationalization., 'Abd
almNasir asserted that it was to rid Egypt finally and forever of
all'traces of imperialism and exploitation and to bring the Revolu-
tion to an end,, But let us consider the record for a moment. In
a press interview on 19 August 1954, he declared that "After the
Suez settlement there is nothing standing in the way of our good re-
lations with the Westoaa Y On 22 March. 1955, in a speech at Shallufa
Camp, he said-. "We have been completely liberated internally and ex-
ternally. We have been liberated from internal exploitation and from
foreign occupation. We feel that our homeland has become our own and
the property of our sons,,'s i/
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On 2 May 1956., the Egyptian government and the Canal Company
reached an agreement whereby the Company would invest $60 million
of its reserves in Egyptian development projects. J At that time
BAbd al=Nasir obviously felt that the Company was sufficiently honor-
able so that he could accept its money.
On 19 June 1956, only a month before the nationalization, he
stated in a speech in Cairo As Republic Square that "Today Egypt is
entirely free. Not a single foreign flag flies over Egyptian soil.
For the first time in centuries we are completely free to fight for
our own destiny. Today marks the beginning of a new era. . . A
phase of the struggle has come to an end.ea 91
It is indeed incredible how quickly and completely the nature
of the Company could change.' The specters raised by 'Abd al-Nasir
in his speech were merely a callou appeal to the emotions of the
Egyptian people, a smokescreen to hide the facts and the real rea-
sons for his flagrant violations of Egypt~s international obliga-
tions.
The truth is that the nationalization of the Canal was the im-
petuous and rash act of a temperamental child. When the United States
and Great Britain withdrew their offer to extend economic and finan-?
cial assistance toward construction of the High Dam project because
'Abd al-Nasir had undermined Egypt's future economy by his commit-
ments to the Soviet Union, ?Abd al1Nasir considered their action a
blow to his personal pride and,, without thought to the consequences
to Egypt or to the other Arab nations,, he seized on the idea of na-
tionalizing the Canal. as a spectacular soup de theatre which would
restore his shattered prestige. It- has been sai 10 .
Somebody gives a quick judgment about a certain subject.
But if he considered the factors and the reasons that bring
about this decision, he finds that his judgment was not juste
Anyone before giving judgment on something or an action should
first determine the reasons., the factors,, and the causes that
brought about this decision.
eAbd al?Nasir would have done well to follow this advice. In fact,
it might be considered strange that he did not,, for he himself made
the statement to the opening session of the General Cooperative Con-
ference at Cairo on 1 June 1956, only a month and a half before the
Canal nationalization occurred. But obviously, BAbd al-Nasir does
not feel that the advice he gives to others applies equally to him-
self.
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As another example of 'Abd al-Nasir's penchant for indulging in
falsehood. and.deceit, consider the matter of the arms deal with
Soviet Russia. The Egyptian people are deeply opposed to Communism
and view the Soviet Union with distrust. Therefore, when the arms
deal was negotiated, he informed the Egyptian people and the world
that the agreement was with Czechoslovakia. 11/ On 30 September.
1955, he declared, categorically in a statement to the Arab News
Agency that no bargain with Russia had been made 12 and. on 12 Octo-
ber he told the United. Press that Russia had. not taken part in any
negotiations with Egypt. 13 As late as 25 March 1956, he was
still talking about arms from Czechoslovakia. 14 His colleagues,
for example, Deputy Premier Gamal Salim, War Minister General 'Abd
al-Hakim Amir, and Minister of State Anwar al-Sadat, also consist-
ently referred to Czech rather than Soviet arms. It was only in
his Alexandria speech of 26 July 1956, that 'Abd al-?Nasir finally
admitted the truth when he told. the Egyptian people that "wd were
able to " is from Russia. I say from Russia and not from Czecho-
slovakia.' 15/
'Abd. al-Nasir speaks of peace, but he spreads confusion and un-
rest. 0 ye Moslems of Egypt and of the Arab nations'. r
what the Holy Quran says of such men in the sura al-Bagarao 24/
When it is said to them. "Make not mischief on the earth,"
they say- "Why, we only want to make peace."
(I)
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III. NASR AND 4 0MMUNISM
0 ye who believed Choose not My enemy and your
enemy for friends. Do ye give them friendship
when they disbelieve in the truth which hath
come unto you, driving out the messenger and
you because ye believe in Allah, your Lord? If
you have come forth to strive in My way and seek-
ing My good pleasure, show them not friendship.
Do ye show friendship unto them in secret, when
I am best Aware of what ye hide and what ye pro-
claim? And, whosoever doeth it among you, he
verily hath strayed from the right ways J
This injunction and warning to all true Believers, revealed
by Allah in the holy sura al-Mumtahana, was to point out to Mos-
lems the perils of association with the idolaters of Mecca. But
can any true Moslem believe that this warning does not refer
equally to the idolaters, the atheists, of today, that is, the
Communists, who slander Allah and persecute his followers?
The Egyptian people and leaders in the other Arab states
might.properly have been surprised by the sudden Egyptian-
Communist friendship because of the repeated anti-Communist state-
ments made by the Egyptian leaders since they seized power in July
1952. Let us review some of these statementss
On 3 August 1954, ?Abd al-Nasir, in a public statement
said: 2/1
We are fighting an open battle in Egypt with Communists.
We are convinced they are working under.Soviet direction.
And by the nature of the situation, Egyptian Communists
could not approve of this present government because we
are working for peace and stability, whereas what they
want is disorder.
On 21 August 1954, ?Abd al-Nasir stated during a speech
In- Cairo a
Who is presently opposing us for the love of opposition
and subversion? First of all we find the Communists.
We all know that Communism in Egypt has only one pur-
pose and objective, that is, chaos, because it cannot
live except on chaos. Communism does not accept or ap
prove of raising the standard of living or improving
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social conditions, because under such conditions Communism
cannot thrive or spread its power. Communism always seeks
to spread confusion . , All of us know the aims of the
Communists, The only aim is to achieve a Communist re-
gime,
In January 1955, 9Abd al-Nasir, in an article written for
Foreign . fairs, declared. W
The greatest internal enemies of the people are the Com-
munists who serve foreign rulers.
On 29 March 1955, in an address to the Egyptian Officers'
Club, Abd al-.,sir stated-
I consider Communism a menace , , , The East Camp is try-
ing to dominate states outside its orbit by subversive
activity.
On 23 April 1955 during a speech made in Cairo, ?Abd al-
I-asir ssai F
What the Communists have achieved by Communism is that
they have become tools of a general production q)paratus,
whereas they were formerly human beings with their own
free will. They have denounced religion because Commu-
nism considers religion as a myth. They have denounced
the individual because Communism holds that an individual
has no integrity. They have attacked freedom because
freedom is the belief of man in himself, and under a Com-
munist regime the individual has neither integrity nor a
will of his own. They have denied equality in their state
system, because the Communist concept of the state is a
pyramidal class structure at the top of which power is in
the hands of one person while millions of people form the
base.
Yet 'Abd al-Nasir after some arrests of low-level Communist
agents, has now embraced the Communists in friendship., It is strange
indeed how, after the above and many other similar statements,, BAbd
al-Nasir should suddenly have discovered in the Soviet Communists
the best friends of Egypt. Could it be that the Communist envoys
have deluded him through flattery? The eulogies of him which fill
to overflowing the state-controlled Egyptian press and radio bear
witness to his. vanity and love of flattery. Perhaps in his naivete
he believes that he is smarter than the experienced Communists and
that he can manipulate them to his own glory and personal aggran-
dizement. Much wiser men than he9 however, have fallen martyrs to
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freedom because they believed that they would outwit the Communists,
and in so doing have dragged dorim their countries into slavery: for
example, Mickolajzcyk of Poland., Benes and Masaryk of Czechoslovakia.
The unfortunate people of Egypt, who are denied a voice in their gov-
ernment, and the other Arab peoples, in considering their future., can
only sorrowfully remember the warning which Allah gave to his follow-
ers in the sura Ali'Imrans
0 ye who believes Take not into your intimacy those
outside your ranks. They will not fail to corrupt
you, they only desire your ruins raik hatred has
already appeared from their mouths: what their hearts
conceal is far worse.
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APPENDIX A
SOURCE REFERENCES
I. Domestic Policy
A. Egyptian Economy under Nasr
1. New York Times, 20 June 1956, p. 19 and FBIS3 Al and A4, 20 June
1l79 67-Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,, 19 June 1956, 1740 GMT).
2. Middle East Journal X (Summer 1956), po 283.
3? FBIS,, 21 June 1956.
4. FBIS, A375 27 July 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 31 July 19569
1741 GMT).
5. New York Times, 27 July 19560
6. The Suez Canal Company, prior to nationalization, is reported to
have planned a $60 million improvement program.
7. When Premier Nasr announced the seizure and nationalization of the
Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956, he promised to compensate
shareholders based on the market price of the stocks on that date.
The value of the shares on the Paris Bourse at the close of business
on 26 July was $256. However, Nasr conditioned such repayment on
Egypt s s receipt of all Canal company assets held out8ide Egypt.
Total assests of the Company totalled about $240 million, of which
only about $85 million are located in Egypt. There are approximately
800,000 shares of stock outstanding with a market value of abofit
:180 million.
8. FBIS3 A3 1 August 1956 (Cairo,, Egyptian Home Service, 31 July 19569
1030 GMT~o
9. Middle East Journal IX (Autumn 1955)., p. 3830
10. New York Times, 25 September 1955, p. 12.
11. Abdel Nasr, Gamal. "The Egyptian Revolution," Foreign Affairs
(January 1955), p. 208
12. FBIS, ALO, 18 January 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
17 January 1956, 1500 GMT).
13. FBIS,. A3, 19 June 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 1.8 June 19569
1230,. GMT).
14. FBIS, A5, 20 June 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 19 June 1956,
1740 GMT).
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15. See John Badeau. "A Role in Search of a Hero: A Brief Study of
the Egyptian Revolution," Middle East Journal IX (Autumn 1955), p0 3840
16. Ibid., p. 383.
17. Abdel Nasr, Gamal. The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo, no date),
P. 48.
B. Nasr and Democracy
1. Abdel Nasr, Gamal. The Philosophy of the Revolution. (Cairo,
no date), p. 18.
2. 0 The Egyptian Revolution," Foreign Affairs (January,
1955), p. 208.
Cited in John Badeau. "A Role in Search of a Hero: A Brief Study
of the Egyptian Revolution," Middle East Journal (Autumn 1955)9
P. 376
Cited in World Today X (March, 1954), p. 140.
5. New York Times, 5 March 19549 p. 2.
6. Ibid., 9 March 19549 P. 30
7. lbid., 26 March 1954, p. 10
8. Ibid., 26 July 19549 p. 4.
90 FBIS, A29 22 March 1955 (Beirut, 21 March 1955).
10. New York Times, 19 May 19559 P. 9.
11. Lichtheim, George. "Nationalism, Revolution., and Fantasy in
Egypt.," Commentary (January, 1956)9 p. 38-9. See also New York
Times,-6November 1952, p. 36.
12. Lichtheim, M. Lit-, p0 38-
13- FBIS, A409 25 July 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 22 July 19559
1905 GMT).
14. FBIS9 A 2'., 26 June 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 25 June 19569
1605 GMT).
15. New York Times, 22 October 1955, p. 18.
16,. FBIS, A2-4, 20 May 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Servide, 19 May
1955, 2325 GMT).
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17. FBIS3 A7, 17 January 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 16
January 1956, 1535 GMT).
18. FBIS3 A79 23 June 1955 (Paris, AFP, 22 June 1955, 1125 GMT).
S ~wr err vw u) .
19. FBIS,. A7, 18 April 1955 (Voice of Free Egyrt, 15 April 1955, 1 400
- a a
20. New York Times, 26 January 1953, p. 3.
21. Ibid.., 26 June 1956, and FBIS, A6, 26 June 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian
Home Services 25 June 1956, 1605 GMT).
22. FBI S, A273 27 July 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 26 July
19569 1711 GMT).
23. F'.$IS, A2 7 July 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 7 July 1955,
1255-GMTS.
21 . FBIS112 June 1956.
25. FBIS, A2L 27 July 1956.
26. Quraxn, II, - 204.
II. Foreign Policy
A? Nasr ? s View of Arab Unity.
1. FBIS, A 119 17 January 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 16
January 1956, 1535 GMT).
2. ?A.bd a1-.Nasr, Gamal. The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo no
date), p. 58-9a
3. FBIS, A 10, 17 September 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 15
September 19569 1230 GMT).
FBIS, A 443 25 July 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 22 July
1955, 1905 GMT)
FBIS2 A 3, 8 July 1955 (Cairo9 Egyptian Home Service, 7 July 1955,
1630 GMT).
6e, FBIS2 A 29 3 January 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Hope Service, 1
January 1955, 1830 GMT).
FBIS, A 3, 7 September 1951 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 5
September 1954, 2100 GMT).
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0 See FBIS, A 59 3 February 1955 (Cairo, Arab News Agency, 2 February
19559 1733 GMT
90 Middle East Journal X (Wintery 1956)9 p0 66.
100 FBIS5 A 143 22 July -1955 (Cairo,, Egyptian Hose Ser. -ice,, 21 July 1955.,
2030 GMT )
11. FBIS, A 19 29 May 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,, 29 May 1956,,
0530 GMT).
120 FBIS,, A 323 27 July 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 26 July
19569 1711 GMT).
13, FBIS,, A 12,, 28 April 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,, 27 April
1955,, 0715 GMT).
14. FBIS6 18 May 1955 (Paris,, AFP, 17 May 1955, 163)4 GMT
150 FBIS2 , A 139 27 July 19560
16. FBIS, A 23 27 December 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 27
December 1955, 0545 GMT).
17, Quran9 II0 pp. 201-50
18, 7Abd a1-Nasry op. citoy po 670
190 FBIS, A 139 27 July 1956.
200 FBIS, A 19 17 January 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 16
January 195.5, 1830 GMT).
21. FBIS, A 7y 1 March 1955 (Cairo,, Egyptian Home Service, 28 February,,
1230 GMT),
220 FBIS7 7 March 1955 (Damascus, 6 March 19553 1830 GMT),
23, FBIS,, 2 September 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,, 1 September
1955, 1830 GMT).
24. Quoted in World Today XI (January, 1954)9 P. 50
250 FBIS,, A 5y 3 February 1955 (Cairo,, Arab News Agency, 2 February
1955, 1733 GMT Pp""
0
260. Abdel Nasr, Gamal,, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cario no
date), p. 670
moo
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27. FBIS, A 19 17 January 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 16
January 1955, 1830 GMT).
288 FBIS, A 29 1 March 1955 (Cairo,, Egyptian Home Service,, 28 February
19559 1230 GMT)O
298 FBIS, 7 March 1955 (Damascus, 6 March 19559 1830 GMT),
308 FBIS, 2 September 1955 (Cgiro9 Egyptian Home Service, 1 September
195, 1830 GMT),
31. Quoted in World Today XI (January 1954) P. 5e
32e New York Times,, 12 August 1956, P. 2a
33, FBIS, A'ly 8 July 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service., 7 July 19559
1245 GMT)
Case Histories of Nasr Unpredictability
14 FBIS, 27 July 1956 (Cairo., Egyptian Home Service; 26 July 19569
1741 GMT),
20 FBIS, 13 August 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 12 August 19569
1655 GMT)o
38 FBIS2 A 79 10 September 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,, 9
September 1956, 2107 GMT).,
FBIS, A 10 1 August 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 31
July 1956, 1830 GMT) e
58 FBIS, A 4, 20 June 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 19 June
19569 1740 GMT)
6e New York Times, 20 August 1954, Po 10
78 FBIS, A 49 23 March 1,954 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service., 22 March
19548 1245 GMT) e
8. Middle East Journal X (Summer 1956), po 283,
New York Times, 20 June 1956, pe 19 and FBIS, A 1?49 20 June 1956
170 GMT
10. FBIS3 A 19 4 June 1956 (Cairo., Egyptian Home Service, 1 June
1956, 1600 GMT).
118 New York Times, 28 September 1955, and FBIS, A 49 28 September
1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 27 September 1955, 1945 GMT).
v5-
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12. FBIS, A 11, 3 October 1955 (Cairo, Arab News Agency, 30
September 1955, 18 45 GMT , -- - - _ -.--
130 FBIS, A 19 12 October 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service., 12
October 1955, 0615 GMT).
14. F13IS, A 6, March 1955 (Cairo, Arab News Agency., 25 March1955,
0715 GMT
15. FBIS, A 149 27 July 1956.
16. Ibid., A 13.
17. New York Times, 6 March 19541,9 p. 2.
18 Ibid..,
19, Ibid..,
20. Ibid..,
21. Ibid..,
9 March 1959 p. 3.
12 May 1951 9 p. 15.
26 July 1954, p. t.
22. FBIS, A li.Os, 25? July 1955 (Cairo., Egyptian Home Servid.e, 22 July
1955,9 1905 GMT).
23. FBIS, A 2, 22 March 1955 (Beirut, 21 March 1955).
2. Quran, II, p. 110
III. Nasr on Communism
1, Quran, LX, 10
2. Washington Star, It August 1954.
36 FBIS, A2?39 23 August 1954 (Cairo, Egyptian Home-Service., 22
August 1954, 1300 GMT).
It. FBIS, Al. 7 September 1955 (Cairo., Egyptian Home Service, 5
September 1955, 2100 (ZIT).
5. Abd el-Nasr, Gamal., "The Egyptian Revolution Foreign Affairs
(January, 1955), p. 209.
6. FBIS, A6 1 April 7.955 (Cairo., Egyptian Home Service, 31 March
19559 1300 GMT - - - -
7. FBIS, A29 25 April 1955 (Cairo., Egyptian Home Service,, 23 April
19559 0515 GMT).
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