NASIR'S DEMOCRACY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000500080004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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DEMOCRACY
On 23 952 a revolution occur-ed in Egypt.
noUnced im wa to replace the corrupt and discredited ruk-
dist regime with one which would truly represent the Egyptian
people. This was indeed a noble and worthy concept, and the
people of Egypt as well as of the entire world hailed the new
regime and looked forward to Egypt's taking its place without
delay in the ranks of the world's democratic nations.
ow bitter has been the disillusionment; Today there
in Egypt not a democratic government but a dictatorship,
ary oligarchy. That fact cannot be denied even though
bers of the rullng military clique have recently exchanged
iforms for civilian garb. In t today are to be found
.lements of a police state: score police, concentration
ss eensorehip? a einfle party, the use of plebiscites,
he t q11,04W.214,14 of a s.ngle individual as the indiepen-
.
gable, a seeing, all-knowing man. this is indeed a strange
kind of democracy'.
'Abd al-Nair has written in his book, Th ?)iiQpp)y of
en, that the aim of the army mov ment headed by
aaeociates was to eecure for Egypt and its
rnment and sovereign independence. V In an
for the January 1955 issue of the American
n Affairs, he states that tour ultimate aim 15
to p ov wftfi a truly democratic and representative
govenent, Similar views also were expressed by General
Nagulb, the ? oved leader of the Revolution, whom Nasir and
hie cohorte have since abused and slandered to destroy his
reputation in the eyes of the people. In a radio address on
10 December 1952, Naguib announced that a republic was to be
oetablisbed, baeed on a constitution *to be ao drafted as to
realize the peop1e'e desire for clean and sound parliamentary
government.* And on 6 March 1954? he declared that "1
billieve that the people's participation in directing the affairs
of their ountzy is the only safeguard against every kind of
oppression.' 4
loor a time it eemed that the Revoluttonary Council woull
honor its promises and that Egypt would achieve a true demo-
orati overimcnt. On 5 March 1954, All Maher, following an
interview with Naguib and lAbd a1-Nasir1 etated that the Egyptian
PeOple would elect a civilian constituent aesembly within three
months. V Two days later Major Salah Salim, a member of the
Council, announced that the aseembly would be elected in June
and wou24 meet on 23 July for the purpose of drafting a consti-
tution. On 25 March the Council issued a statement containing
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the following point st V
1. The Council will transfer sovereignty to a
constituent assembly on 24 July 19540 with a
statement that the Revolution had ended.
. Political parties dissolved by the military
regime can re-form immediately.
3. The Council will not form a new political party.
4. All sitizeno will enjoy full political rights.
5. Elections for assembly members will be free and
direct.
6. The immediate taek of the assembly will be the
election of a President.
Thie program of action seemed to be a vindication of
every hope cheriehed by the Egyptian people. But las: It
never came to pass. The month of June came and went, but there
Were no election. The month of July came and went, but there
waa no meeting of an aseembly. There was merely still another
promise by tAbd al-Nasir on 19 May, repeated on 26 July, that
a parliamentary regAma would be established in January 1956. _81
Why this sudden change of plans? Why the postponement of
the election and meeting of a national parliament representing
the ESYPtian people? The answer is simple. When the 25 March
statement Wa6 iesued, General Naguib? who believed in the right
of ,people to govern themselves, was still in contrel of the
Revolutionary Council. But when he wae forced from the premier-
ship on la April 1954, as the result of machinations by lAbd
a1-Nair and his cohorts, the situation changed. For 'Abd al-
Nasir and his cehorts, having tasted power, were loath to sur-
render it to the elected representatives of the people. They
forced the Council te adopt a decision to postpone this transfer
of power. When Naguib was removed from office entirely in
November 1954, the last hope of the Egyptian people for a demo-
eratic government vanished. The military dictatorship which
still rulea BEYPt had become firmly entrenched. Hence it is
not surprising that only several months later, on 21 March 1955,
sAbd al-Naeir boldly told an Indian press delegation that we
Prefer to remain in office a few more years 0? and on 18 May
1955, declared that ?we see no advantage for gypt in the estab-
lishment of a parliament.' 12/
The attempted aesassination of Abd al-Nasir in Alexandria
on 26 October 19514, save the military clique the opportunity to
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consolidate its position and tight n its hold on gypt.
'Abd al-Naeir and hie associates seized on the ircident as
an excuse for a bloody liquidation of the Moslem Brotherhood,
the last effective organized opposition to their dictatorship.
By pretending that General Naguib was implicated with the
Brotherhood in a plot to seize control of the government they
attempted to justify their seizure of dictatorial power.
sire for dictatorial rule Is not surprising when
ered that lAbd al-Nasir, as well as several other
ing clique, such as Pathi Radwan were once
cistic Oreenshirt organization (Alsr Patat
ayn? which greatlysdmired the tactics and
er and Mussolini. Radwan, in fact, seems
dictatorship whatever its form for he was
egate to the Communist so-called Peace Congress
in 1951. Radio Cairo, which he controle as 'Abd
of rrepaganda (euphemistically termed Minister
dance), declared on 11 October 1955, that "The
democracy." 12/
headed b;
hnicue
to be an
an enthue
held in V
of Naairt
National
USSR is
dictators, however, 'Abd al-Naeir wished to cloak
rary rule under a mask of legality, so on 22 July 1955,
speech to a rally in Cairo, he promised the Egyptian
people that *in January 1956 EgYpt shall witness a Parliament
nclude the elite of ita sons."_.4k3 Like the other
of 'Abd al-Naslr, this one Was not 'filled. No
az established in January 1956 nor has it even
October 1956. January 1956, however, did wi
tion ef a new constitution for yPt. But
people allowed a voice in the drafting of
nt so as to assure that its provisions would provide
y democratic regime': They were not. The Con titution
d arbitrarily by 'Abd al-Naeir and his cohorts, and
provieions reflect the desires and aspirations not of the
Bgyptian People but of the clique which rules Egypt and intends
to continue doing so.
To be sure, the magnanimous 'Abd al-Nasir permitted the
people to go the polls on 23 June, but they were allowed to
vote only 'yes' or 'no.* The results were Inevitable, for there
are few yptians who dare to test the wrath of Interior Minister
i ad-Dints secret police. Besidee, rejection of
ion would have been meaningless, for the military
d still have remained in power. Hence the impressive
ve vote of 99 per cent was registered. W Even Hitler
at the height of their power never as d to such
restits
On the SUM day the EgYPtian people were graciously allowed
to elect a president, but it was indeed a peculiar kind of election.
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There w& but a single name on the ba lot- Abd al 1 an
it is eijniticant that the regime had not made a sIngle range -
sent tor the possibility that the Egyptian people might have
ther choice. But why should the junta worry i Egypt was
D its firm ontrol and the existence of the secret police
d keep the masses from registering anything but an affirms -
ote. The leaders indeed had judged the situation aceu
for the astounding affirmative vote for 'Abd al -Naeir
t was 99.9 per cent. Never in the history of the
h unanimity been seent
been said that power corrupts, and this is
a. Once they seize power they set about
te all rivals and to build about them-
selve an aura of indispensability until they achieve the rank
of demi-god. iItl,r, Mussolini, and Stalin travelled that path,
and 'Abd al-Masi seen no reason to change the pattern, The
Mgyptian people have not forgotten that General Naguibi whom they
love, wasthe original leader of the Revolution. But where is
today?iAbd al -Nasir keeps him under house-arrest, and
iy tried to discredit him in the eyes of the
Other members of the original Revolutionary
learned the dangers of association with a
tor. Colonel Raehad MUhanna and the Mullyi
brothers have been ousted from the Council on charges of
d Communist and subversive activities - -meaning that they
d to 'Abd al -Nasirla dictatorial rule. Other 'Abd al -
stes - -for example, Salah Salim, Genial Salim, Anwar
,ire been forced out of their government posts when
ness to ,Abd al -Nazi' was finished, At the beginning
ution the Council asked for the support of the Moslem
as 'Abd al -Neeir himself admitted in a Cairo speech
1954. But as soon as power was secured and the
d began ob4est1ng to "Abd al -Nasiris policies and
no, the clique denounced the Brotherhood and ruthlessly
sed to thus eliminating the only organised opposition
e time the oliqUe o propaganda media have been
y to portray ,Abd al-Nair am the great hero
would be lost, the ail-knowing leader on whom
ry field depends, the unrivalled genius who
4gypt prosperity and greatness. This propaganda
do when on 16 April 1956, the newsPaPer al-
e's
mouthPieces declared that nAgypt-rs
is 'Abd al-Nash', who has achieved his
nuous and bitter struggle...It was ,Abd
ulated pt's independence and constructive
hadee o or and Stalin',
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dictatorships, the ,Abd al-Naeir resime
ed by a secret police. Thou tPbd
ng that his government reflects the
for democratic rule, he has on acca-
eal situation. /n an interview with a
n October 1955, he stated that "Ibroughout
aith in militarism. Then admitting that
mete only organized support, he continued
timulated in the army by a lack of equip-
s feel tbst we sti
h in the government.1
d to have arisen out o
the purpose of giving them
I have no equiPment
But was not the
e wishes of the
rue democracy?
us cQnEicier this so -coaled demosraolr which 'Abd al-
Nasir ha8 brought to Egypt by means of the new Constitution.
SP./eking in Cairo on 19 May 19550 he described it ast
t democr407 s
the maiorit
true justice
d a sound so
it ev
to fulfill the
e liberation of the
ndividual and collective
justice...Freedom
els that he has
say what he pleases,
livelihOoda hie
in jeopardy.
n 16 :
SevoIutiona ouns
d:
eonnotion with the new Constitution,
ssued a btaternent in which it was
that there is a freedom, that
nt and that there is a constitu
the indlvldu&1 does not feel this freedom,
it the ndividual is threatened with a lack of
do and in his daily life if the individualis
?atened in his present and in his future.
eed fine end true words, but in reality
se. The Oonetitutiono it is true, guarantees
of the home, freedom of ()Pinion and research,
arid publication, and freedom of association;
indeed a large but- -all these are within the
. And who is to enact the laws aoverning the
16-hts? An, assemb;.y composed of members
le party which will be under the absolute
i-Na.tr. Thus in realitY, the extent of the
is such as lAbd alfNasir approves.
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The CQnatitutiqn also provides that Egyptians are not
to be arrested, imprisoned or punished except by law, not to
be banished from Egyptian soil or to be compelled to reside
in or abandon a specific area except by law; and not to be
liable to the confiscation oftbairproperty except by law.
And who is to enact the laws governing the exercise of these
ghts? An assembly composed of members nominated by a single
party which will be under the absolute control of 'Abd al-Nasi r.
Thus, in reality, the extent of the rights is only such as
"Abd al-Nasir graciously approves.
Itis Constitution says that there shall be freedom of the
press. But does any Egyptian truly believe that any publication
could, with impunity, print any criticism of 'Abd al-Naeir or
of his regime? There is supposed to be freedom of the press.
Dut Can any Egyptian Journalist practice his profession before
first obtaining a license from the government, which can give
or withhold it as it pleases? And is it not true that in 1955
the government barred 234 of Egypt's 59 journalists from their
profession by refusing to renew their licenses? 20
The Constitution Says that there shall be freedom of
opinion. But does any Egyptian truly believe that he can,
with impunity, voice criticism of 'Abd al-Nasir or or his gime?
Perhaps he is free to hold any opinion he chooses, but woe to
him if he dare to!live utterance to it. Indeed, he is no
even free to listen to the opinions of others if those opinions
are critical of lAbd al-Nasir or of his regime. For did not
Zakarlya MUhyi ad-Din, Minister of the Interior and head of the
secret Police, announce in April 1955 that any Egyptian caught
listening to the Voice of Free Egypt would be considered as
conspiring to overthrow the government and would be treated
aocordi.ngly 'Abd al-Nasir has absorbed well the lessons
o his fellow ictators, for did not Hitler proscribe listening
to the BBC and does not the 4oviet Union and its satellite
states still proscribe listening to the Voice of America and
to Radio Free Europe?
The Constitution s e that workers shall have the right to
unionize. But does any 'tian worker truly believe that he
can organize a trade union that will not be subservient to the
government or that he and his fellow workers can strike to
obtain their Justified demands? Control of labor unions is an
immediate and primary target of every dictatorship, and that of
"Abd al-Nasir is no exception. As early as January 1953, the.
independent labor union had vanished from the Egyptian scene.
Major Ibrahim al-Tanawi, then i4OretarY 6enera3. of the Liberation
Front, the predecessor of the present single party National
Union, boasted on 25 January 1953, that Egyptian trade unions
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had joined the Front and had, therefore, ceased to exist as
separate entities. 22 Does any Egyptian worker truly believe
that sAbd a1-Nair 11 now permit them to be re-created and
thus to become a possible source of organized resistance to
his regime?
The Constitution guarantees freedom from arbitrary arrest,
imprisonment or banishment. But is there any yptian who does
not know of Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din's secret police and concentra-
tion camps? The lAbd al-Nastr regime, moreover, has not even
been content with the limiting qualification "except by law"
and the resultant power deriving from its absolute control of
the assembly and its members who will enact that law. The final
act of the Revolutionary Council on 25 June 1956, was to issue a
decree giving the Minister of the Interior the authority during
* 10-year period to place under administrative detention or
arrest any person whom he decides to accuse of counter-revolu-
tionary activities, or graft. 2 This is indeed a strang sort
of freedoms.
The Constitution provides that the government ahall assure
every citizen employment and fair hours, wages, and working
conditions. but does any Egyptian truly believe that this
guarantee means anything when a member of 'Abd al-Nasir's
cabinet, Minister of Wears Hasan al-Baquri, has revealed the
regimess concept of what is fair by remarking cynically during
a radio address on 30 August 1956, that "Eypte population is
frugal and can live on next to nothing?" 2
The Constitution guarantees freedom of association and
embly, which, in a real democracy, would mean the right to
rm political parties. Butthis is not the case in Egypt, for
where the Constitution--the Constitution drafted by sAbd
al-Nasir and his cohorts and not by the Zgyptian people--
provides for the formation of a so-called National Union which
will make the nominations for membership in the National Assembly
and which will be the country's sole legal political organization.
Has anyone ever heard of a democracy in which only a single
party is permitted?
'Abd al-Nair has taken the further precaution of adding
to the Constitution a provision which states that the President
of the Republic, that is, himself, shall proclaim by decree the
manner in which this NationalUnion shall be constituted. Thus
he will be able to control the Union completely. In hie Alex-
andria speech of 26 July, he described the Union as "a national
front comprising all sons of this homeland except the reaction-
aries, the opportunists, and the stooges of imperialism." 25
And who is to decide who are the reactionaries, the opportunists,
and the stooges of imperialism? Why 'Abd al-Nasir, of course.
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om will he place in the Be cate or ts? All those who dare
se their voices in protest aaint his regime and against
rayal of the objectives of the Revolution. Dictatorship
brook no epposition, and 'Abd al-Naeir has been careful to
draft a Conetttution which permits him to suppress it under a
oloak ef legality.
tAbda1-Nair and his cohorts have declared that portu-
muet be given for new leaders to step forth* 2 d that
atiOnal UniOn alseures this eince every qua1if1eEgyptian
submit his name for nomination to the National Ase
aocordin to a broadcast of Radio Cairo on le June 1956,
r the namesbf au1 hopeful candidates have been received,
utive committee shall prepare a list f those prospective
es !to whom it has no objection.* 2 In this way,
bd 1-Naeir controls thie executive oonuiiittes, he retains
0 exclude from the ballot any person whom he feels is
ly loyal to himself. In addition, 'Abd al -Nasir has
t V shall watch over these persons after they
lectiOns. Some of them might turn into epportu-
...Anyone turning into an opportunist should
r words, even though he has been elected by
ember of the National Assembly who dares to
ze 'Abd asir or his regime?for that is what oonsti-
he er.me of oPPortuniem in his eyes?will be expelled from
. This ic indeed a strange kind of democracyt
The Abd al-Nasir clique may speak continuously about the
democracy it has brought to Egypt, but to apply the word democracy
to the present 4yptian regime is a flagrant misuse of the word--
remember that the Communist ,tyrannies of the Soviet satellite
iso call themeelvee democraciee--for nothing can conceal
the 'Abd al-Nasir regime is a dictatorship based
not on the will of the people but on the strength of the army
and 5eret polloe1 The high-sounding words used by 'Abd al-
Moir and aemociates are but a smokescreen, designed to eo -
Seal and deceive. In pondering them every Egyptian should
hearken to the words of Allah, revealed in the sure al-Bac:18.ra:
There is the type of man whose speech about this
world' ife may dazzle thee, and he calls Allah
to witness abOut what to in his heart; yet he is
the most contentious of enemies. 2
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ouRp riz
? Abdel Nasser* Gamal. The Ph242...4. of the Revolution.
(Cairo, no date), p.
he EgyPtian Revolution,*
Foreign (January, 1955), p. 208
Cited in John Badeau. 'A Role in Search of a Hero:
Brief Study of the EGYPtian Revolution,' Middle East
Jgurnal (Autumn 1955), P. 376.
Cited in World To dgy X (March, 1954)
New York Timeet 5 March 1954, p. 2.
6. d 9 March 1954, p. 3.
7. 26 March 1954, p. 1.
8 I14d.$ 26 July 1954, p. 4.
Affairs
P. 140.
9. PSIS, A2, 22 March 1955 (Beirut, 21 Marah 1955).
19 May 19550 P. 9.
10. 121...1 IpprS T
A
11. Lichtheim, George. 'Nationalism, Revolution, and Fantasy
In EgYPt,' Commentary (January, 1956), p. 38-9. See also
e Ybrk pmeal 6 november 1952,p. 36.
12. Lichtheim, 22. c.,p. 38.
13. FIS, A40, 25 July 1955 (Cairo, gyptian Home Service 22
July 1955* 1905
14. BIS, A24 26 June 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 25
tune 1956, 1605 GMT).
15. Ibid.
16, FBIS A2* 17 April 1956.
17. New York Timee 22 October 1955, p. 18.
18.
?BIS, A2-40 20
May 1955 2325
1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Se
).
19. FBIS0 A7, 17 January 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian HOMB Se
16 January 1956, 1535 GmT
20. ,11j3grily.7.,i, June 1955 (Paris, AFP, 22 June 1955,
US J Ali ) )
19
ep
1125 GMT
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???9*
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of
ree
u ry 15530 p. 3.
i956, and ?BIS, A6? 26 June 1556
Iorne ervioe 25 June 15560 1605 Nr).
zst 556 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service, 30
0 GMT).
A27 27 JulY 1956 (Cairo, Egpti an R
1956, 1741 Oft
7 July 1955 (Cairo,
5 ONT)
June 1956.
A24, 27 July 1956.
pt 5 April 3.955,
Ptian Rome S?i?e, 7 July
.10.
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riww 'i? wo
f4,10.3,-,xat
cr vt
thi1-;',2;t4Dra Povere.
tc.4:1't vitti the
hr.=
t
14eur
ve,y
Qt pod .
exiat.Ga44
-??? that da
Oa 22 Iffotti 19.35,14
frma tatorna
owe -,luttwatra h bee
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Z-1700080009000N I.LLZ0-8/dCIN-V10 n/80/6661. eseeieN iod peAwddv
Z-1700080009000N I.LLZ0-8/dCIN-V10 PZ/80/6661. eseeieN .10d peA0.1ddV
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A
6 (Cairo Eg
OMT).
at 1956 (Cairo,
56* /655 GMT).
A7,
1, 1 August
19564 1330 OMT
ber 1956 (Cair
1956, 2107 OMT .
(Cairo) Egyptian Home
A 4, 20 June 196
UP* 1956, 1740 ONT).
MtlYork T1m, 20 Augue
Ld
A 4 2
rc
A 1,,
1956, 1600
19
1 X
Cairo
t Ian
vi
4 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Se
).
956),
203.
20 June 956, p. 1 and Ma
Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
Tune 1956 (Cairo, Epttan
1955, and IS,
Cairo, Egyptian H me Serv
12.
30$
A 11$ 3 October
Ptember 1955# 1845
vie
vice
A 1-4,
9 June 1956,
Ser
4$
Cairo Arab News Army,
("Tr'vi )
A1, 12 October 1955 (Cair
toter 19551 0615 OMT)
A 6, 26 March 1955
0715 ONT
ptian Home Service
Arab News Agency, 25 March
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16, FBIS. A 14. 21 Ju1y 1956.
17. .Ibtd.$ A 13.
10. mw2LALtujl2Icos, 6 March 154, .
19. /1.41.4,? 9 March 1'.354, p. 3.
20. Ibid., 12 May 1754. p. 15.
21. Thtd. 26 July 1954, p. 4.
22. Th U.
23. 'BIS, A 40, 25 July 19.g , Egyptian Home ?:)ervice,
22 July 1955, 1905 0
24, Fs:I:al A 2, 22 March 1955 (Beirut, 21 March
2
17)55).
25. PSIS, A 5$ 3 Februsr2/ 1955 (Cairo Arab Nowa AgenoY,
2 February 1955, 1733 GMT
26. AbdalMasser, Goal. ,The PJ.J11.2woli 0- the volution
(Cairo, no d;te)0 P. 67.
27. PBXS, A 1. 17 JanuarY 1955 (Cairo, 14yptin Hone rvice,
16 Jamar l 19550 1a30 GMT).
28. ISIS, A 2, I March 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Roue Service,
28 Pebruary 1955, 1230 GMT)
29. rtis, 7 March 1t;55 (Damascus, 6 March 1)55, 1330 GMT).
30, 7214, 2 September 1,955 (Calro0 17.syptian Home Service,
1 as tenber 19550 1330 GMT).
31. Ouoted in :?147r14TodaT XI (January, 1)54) p. 5.
32$ FBIS. A 2 27 December (Cairo, L4 _tiao Home
27 Desemb;r /955, 0545 GMT)
33$ IS, A 13, 27 July 1956.
34. (*ran, II, P. U.
35* Ourem. I/. pp.
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36 ru'an LI p. 10.
37, Purim* VIII
ran* XVI, p. 2:9.
39 nQ:1 XXXU, p. 72.
MI, pp 37-v.
40. Ouren
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--79qt
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AO AIR
not mr enemy
give them ftis
truth wbieh bat c
messenger and you bo.
your Lord? If ye
ve in W vai and sloshing
ow them not friendahip. DO
in secret, when I OA
what ye proclaim?
u, he verily bath
lievers, revealed by
nt out to Meslems the
cos,. But can any true
equally to the idela.
Ccznmst5, who slander
. since t1
sia as
th in the
-
of
a have aub
aeoutiont
s +schools have
forbidden; Moslems have been
sacred fasting oe Ramatawn copie
setr1d and turned and its publication
and intellectual leaders of the Meta= 15.4)"'
rtured, and imprisoned or slain: and the
orD4den.
h Wo r3 have long been aware of the suffer-
their consequent hatred of Communisi hes
free peoples.
Zn every Arab country Ccmmup.
have boon outlawed, and the loaders of ths
yr &rote to take every precaution against
t influence of Whatever shape or form. In this
ea wore spared the danger of Communist subversion6
guided persons associated themselves with out.
ts, the vast majority hearkened to the warning
t Communist influence was prevented from
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T4x7 the tion has changed. A red o oud bergs over the
Arab lands its ominoun shadow on the faithful. In every
Arab state of Communiet subversion is growing for the closed
reeks of the Believers have opened. allowing the atheistio Communists
to gain a foothold in the Arab World from which they can work to ez.
tend their influence and control. 'Abd alaNasir, the military dictator
of Egypt, has grasped it friendship the bloodied hand of the Soviet
Vniomaathe hand stained eith the blood of millions of martyred Russian
Moslems. 'Me vtll be a fearful fate, for has not Allah earned in the
et= alp?mailaa; ij
the vers eke ior trend or helpers
re rather than Believers; if ally do that,
here be help from
that Cemmunist influence had
933, whom 'Abd alaNasir ann
deal with Communist Czechoel
no Arab could or would view with eve.
luenee into the Art* World* mo ha
tions had been with Czechoslovakia
a as was actually the cam,. on lg Coto.
that Russia was not involved in the
the months that followed he repeated
minions, Deputy Premier Gamal Selte,
at, and War Minister General lAbd
. is falsehood. The latter, on 30
this deoeption in DOWASOUn where he
he new SyrianaEgyptian raelitary alli
must be ter Syria to have an ally mho
e such an portant and vital questiont
1936, that 'Abd alaNasir found the
clasped in friendship the bloody hand
on. On that day, in a speech in Alexan.
ople and those of the other Arab states
re ab Le to bi a112a from Xsay from Russia and
o.tovtkia.t4 f By this statement *Ad al-Ma:sir revealed
the duplicity he and his cohorts had practioed against their own
people as well as the rest of the Arab World.
chase of Soviet arms in iteelf may not mean the
influence, the attendant reeult make this cour e
e modern complicated instruments of warfare will
an. Once such scoffer.. of Allah were denied
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1040P10,they 14111 be free to spread their
site propaganda. Of course, 'Abd al.Nasir has claimed,
a statement to the Arab News Agency on 30 September 1935
ew with a foreign journalist on 3 October, thet the
a purely commercial one and that there would be no need
nor had the Egyptian government any intention of intro.
But since he lied about the origin of the arms, what
to believe that he had not aloe lied about this int?
tish government revealed on 23 March 1956, that
ciane and aviation instructors were working at an
How many others are there of whom the
who believes that any Communist, even if
a dangerous an agent of the Kremlin as
spyl
y heed the
as an unwelcome surprise to the other trab
use they have no love for Communism and because
of Allah revealed in the aura elagildg: 21
avet Take not for friends and protectors
your religion for a mocker,- or sport.
only had the leaders of Egypt proclaimed theiiselvea
also because they had pledged not to take any
decision of international policy without first consulting the
l.a&rs of the otherArab states. Por example on 6 March 1955, Egyptian
m
MinistzT of Natial Guidance. Major Salah Salim, acting on behalf of the
Egyptian Revolutionary Council, joined with Sabri al-As-11 and Khalid
et.eme of Syria in issuing a communique in connection with a 5'Yrian-
Untian alliance then being negotiated, -which pledged that no member
weed conclude any international.politioal or military agreements with
out the consent of the other. Tot Egypt did not bother to consult
with Syria about the arms purchase or even to inform her that it was
pending.
xmples can be cited. on 2 September 1951, lesa than four
the arms deal was announced, 'Abd a1-Nair and Lebanese
ster Hamid Franjiyah issued in Cairo a joint statement
dged thsi two countries to consult and exchange views and
continuously and without any delay an everything connected
tional politios, defense, public security, and oommon
Egypt and Lebanon. Yet Lgrpt did not bother to consult
about the arms purchase or even to inform her that it was
h is the manner which 4Abd al.Naair observes his inter.
tentst
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The Arab sttos might also properly have been surprised by the
sudden Egyptian. ommuniet friendship because of the repeated anti.
COmmuniet statements made by the Egyptian leaders since they seized
power in July 1932. They did not then know that these statements
were mere words spoken in order to solicit the support of the faith.
ful Egyptian Moslem people for the new military regime. Let um review
some of these statements:
1 1 Voi4 45Itk "
al-Naeir, in a pUblic statement, said: 21/
We aro fighting an open battle in Egypt with Communists.
convinced they are working under Soviet direction. And
nature of the situation, Egyptian Communists ol'uld not
of this present government because we are working for
ace and stability, whereas what they want is disorder.
'Ad al -Naeir has now eebraced the Communists in friendship!
2. gliAmp 954; 'Abd al.Nasir stated during a speech in
Cairo:
presently opposing us for the love of oppoettion
ienT First of all we find the Communists. 144 all
sm in Egypt has only one purpose and Objective,
cause it cannot live except on chaos. Com.
cept or approve of raising the standard of
g social conditions, because under ouch
am cannot thrive or spread its powers
s seeks to spread confesion . ? All of us
of the Communists . . . The only atm is to
t regime.
braced the Communists inf
tAbd alaNasir, speaking to a liberet
athering in Cairo's Republic Square, said
agents whose purpose is to dominate arbitrarily.
you know that these people are financed by a
'Abd al-Na
has now embra
e C endship!
41111 'Ad al in an rtie1e written for the
magazine 7ere4en Amax declared: 1A/
greatest internal enemies of the people are the
COMMOta s who serve foreign rulers.
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A
ibraeed the
sn friendshtpt
an addrees to the Egyptian OffiClub,
ir etated; 141
r Communiem a menace . The East Campis
to states outside its orbit by subversive
Tet A
6
/et 'A
has now embraced the Coiziun1.sto in friendsht
During a speech made in Cairo. *Abd al-Nasir
masts have achieved bY Commmisrn ta that
vole of a general production app
formerly human beings with their
denounced religion because Communi cone
a myth. They have denounced the individual
bade that an individual has no integrity.
aeked freedom because freedom is the belief of
under a Communist regime the individual
ty nor a will of his own. The's have
her state eystem, because thee Communiot
is a pyramidal Class structure at the top
in the hands of one person while millions
o balm0
now eMbraced the Communistsin frtnds
indeed how, after the above and many other similar
eNesir should suddenly have discovered in the
the best friends of Egypt. Could it be. that the
ave deluded him through flattery? The eulogies of
verfloeing the state.controlled Egyptian press and
to his vanity and love of flattery. Perhaps in his
inexperience he believes that he is emetter than
the erienced Coumiwiita and that he oan manipulate them to his
wi glory and personal aggrandizement. Much miser men than he, however,
fallen martyrs to freedom because they believed that they would
the Communists, and in so doing have dragged down their
p into slavery: for example, Mainu of Romania, Peteov of
Ilickolalzeft of Poland, Penes and Masaryk of Czeehoslovakia.
ertumate people of Egypt, who are denied a voice in their govern-
the other Arab peoples, in considering their future, an
ber the warning which Allah gave to htn fo lovers
12,
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believe! Take not into yo
ur ranks. They will no
=Ay desire your ruin: r
from their mouths: what the
ree.
those
t you,
has already
hearts conceal
hearts of the Cairo rulers have dy been corru
above, before the arms deal 'Abd asir declared
eta were Egypt's worst enemy and he labelled the
system no better than slavery. The jails of Egypt were filled
iccussd of being Communists. Now theme former enemies
ends. Before the arms deal 'Abd aleasir accused
to dominate other nations, but afterwards,
on 2Premier Gamal Salim declared that "I do not
s with Russia will turn us into Communists
policy. Moreover, I do not believe the
im to do esp." lal Verily, a great corruption hes occurred!
r 19551 Radio Cairo, that obedient mouthpiece of Egypt's
lared that "Tho USSR is a true democracy, with rulers
* country through the Communist Party." al Verily, a
on has occurredt
ir also has extended the hand of friendship
twee hand le as stained with Moslem blood as is
on. Since the Chinese Coementsts seized power,
hod the country. which China's Moslems bee*
upon thousands of China's Moslems, faithful
aid to His holiy directions, have scorned to
ore the Peking rulers and have paid for their
ee Thousands more have chosen almost certain
scape across the enowecapped Himalayas into
se Communiets also has 'Abd aleliasir extended
hip
Truly, the future lot of the Egypt an people and of 411 Prabe is
frought with peril as long as the 'Abd aleNasir regime remains in
power and continues its present unholy policies,. Once the Arab
World Was secure against any Communist danger save only the danger
of open invasion. But today that is no longer true. The new despot
sof the Nile has torn down the iron gates of Zuleearneyn and has let
loose on the Arabs the savage idolatrous peoples of Gog and magog, aff
This ruler of Egypt, this Bo-celled slave of the Helper, would truly
be more properly named the slave of Nasir.
6
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Z.
3. lilark
teMber 1955.
955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service
1953 (Pelts, AFP, 29 N r 1953, 1305
v.)).
27 July 1936 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,26 July
ow).
, 6 October 1955. and FBIS A6 and All, 3 October
Egyptian Home Service, 1 October 1955, 2100 OMT,
irallo News Agency, 30 Soptembor 1955, 1645 GMT (OFFICIAL
0 ?
a. az 124i TUitef
9. Quran, V, 60.
C
1956.44 6.
O. FEIS Al, 7 March 1955 (Damascua,
qn Star, 4 Augufst 1954
3, 23 August 1954 (Cairo,
1954 13oo anT)
7 September 1955 (Cairo,
1955, 2100 OMT
14. Abd er, Camel. The E tian Hevoluti.on, Arepip
war7. 1955). P. 209.
13 1 April 1953 (Cairo, Egntian He Service, 31
5, 1300GMT 411PPOINIMEININOM
26. MS, A2, 23 April 1955 (Cairo, tartian Homo Service, 23
0313
rch 1955, 1630
Egyptian He Service,
Egyptian one service,
ch
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1955?
eirnin "Nationalism, Reyoiatton, nd ntasy
anusry, 1956), p. 38
a
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The
0
contruct1on of the High Dam appears to many Egyptians
1Y reaeible way to meet the country's urgent need of
land for its rapidly growing population and of more
Power for its expanding industry. To the present rulcrs
the project seems the best possible scheme for showing
e that the military regime is bringing tangible economic
to the country and, by diverting the people's attention
and away from their many immediate problems increasing
rt for the regime.
project, so vital to Egypt's future well-being, seemed
to be on the verge of realization. The World Bank had
-ed a willingness to consider a large loan, and the govern-
or the 'United States and Oreat Britain had similarly
ed a willingness to extend financial assistance. Unfor-
y for the Egyptian people, these sources of aid have now
l e impossible by the rash and ill-advised actions of
Abid air and his cohorts.
Cairo regime arranged to purchase from the Soviet
of arms vastly in excess of what the strained
aid afford, and to pay for these arms the
aced the Egyptian cotton crop for years to
Bank is not a philanthropic organization
ed financial institution, every thinking
y appreciate that inasmuch as ypt's cotton
untry's foreign exchange, the Bank could
arrangements with the Soviet Union cast
ypt's ability to repay the desired loan
Crfunds that would be needed for th internal
nec-c of the Zih m project.
Secondly, Nasir arrogantly refused to consider any supervision
by the Bank Over the spending of the loan funds. He insisted that
simply hand the loan funda over to him, which he would
ceed to spend as he thought best. The fact that Nasir
rta have not gbown themselves to possess a degree of
economic and financial matters such as would inspire
d the fact that such a procedure would be contrary
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the Bank's normalpractices were blithely ignored by the
o regime which emotionally declared that any kind of super -
n would be a form of imperialism. It is indeed strange
all other recipients of World Bank loans consider suoh
vision merely as sound, normal financial practice and that
in the case of Egypt does it somehow become sinister and
listicl
he result, as the Egyptians now mow to their sorrow, is
that the United States and Great Britain withdrew their offers
of aid, while the World Bank loan failed to materialize.
Cenaiderine this development as an unbearable blow to his pride
and prestige and realizing that his regime would meet growing
opposition among the Egyptian people unless he could divert their
attention to some other problem Nasir reacted like a frustrated,
temperamental Child and on 26 July 1956 announced the nationaliza-
tion of the Suez Canal Company.
In his bookl The Philosophy of the Revolution Nasir cyni-
cally remarks: "JEW -easy it is trapa. to the emotions of the
People!" The Suez Canal 18OUR 15 a good example of how Nasir
puts this philosophy into practice. In wildly emotional terms
he jaetified his action to the Egyptian people by charging that
the Canal Company was an Instrument of imperialistic exploitation
sucking out the life's blood of the Egyptian people. Truly this
a most sudden discovery, for only a month earlier, in a speech
iro on 19 June, he had declared:
Today Egypt is entirely free, Not 5 single foreign
lies over Egyptian soil. For the first time in
tea we are completely free to fight for our own
destiny, Today marks the beginning of a new era in which
we shall be ruled by a constitution of the people4 . ?
A phase of the struggle has come to an end. . . Today for
the first time in a long period we feel sovereign in our
own country.
Yet by 26 July Nasir had discovered that Egypt was still groaning
ander the yoke of imperialisticxploltation!
On 2 May 1956, the Canal Company was still sufficiently
honorable so that the Nasir regime deemed it proper to negotia
an agreement whereby the Company would invest $60 million of I
reserves in EgYptian development projects. V Yet by 26 July
the Company had somehow become an inatrument of Imperialistic
exploitation! On 20 June, Burhan Said, representative of the
Egyptian government to the Company, made a public statement in
2
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Ilia he ref erred o the developing of plans for the future
reversion or the Canal to Egypt in 1968. Yet by 26 July
the nature of the Company had somehow changed so radically
that it became necessary to seize it immediately!
In annoencing the Canal nationalization Mair told he
ptian people that the Company had an annual profit of $100
lion which Egypt would now take for herself, thue permitting
realisation of the High Dam project without recourse th foreien
financial aseistance.Lti( This was a flagrant deception of the
Egyptian people, as Nes r was well aware.
it us consider the facts. In 1954, for example, the tota
revenue-not profits but revenue--of the Company were roughly
93 million of which $30 million represented profits. In 1955,
total revenue wai OS million of which again $30 million repee_
eented profits. Since Egypt was already receivins one-sixth
of the profits, The maximum annual additional amount that Egypt
eould hope to obtain by nationalization of the Canal ia $25 mil
lion.
But this. is only part of the story. First of all, the Canal
roperties themselvea conetitute only a small part of the Company's
tal holdings and Canal fees and charges only a small part of
its revenue. As Nasir well knew the Company's propertiea located
outside of Egypt and the revenues derived therefrom were beyond
I16 reach and centrol and would continue so whatever he misht
do tp the Companyle assets in Egypt. Secondly, as Nair muet
have seePe cted would happen, as indeed it has, many shippers
have continued to pay Canal charses and fees into the ComPanY's
aecounte in London and Paris where they cannot be touched by
Nair. Thus proepective profits for Egypt are further reduced.
Thirdly, at the time of nationalization, the Company was preparing
plans for extensive and expensive improvements to the Canal to
meet growing urgent needs. Egypt, if it wishes to keep the Canal
in operating condition, will be forced to carry out these plans;
and the money used for this purpose obviously cannot be used for
the Hieh Dam. Finally, Nasir hae promised that Egypt would
eompensate the Cempany for its nationalized property, thus adding
etill a further drain on the prospective reduced revenue from
the Canal.
The above tgcts d figures make it abundantly clear that
r was deliberat ly misleading the Egyptian people when he
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poke of profite of $ 00 million a year that would be available
for the High Dam project. Not only were Company profits less than
a third ot the figure he cited, but he also knew that even this
leaser figure was greatly in excess of what Egypt could possibly
hope to obtain after nationalization. Moreover, the neceesity
of expending funds for improving the Canal and for paying compensa-
tion for the seized property reduce still further prospective
net profits. In effect, nationalization of the Canal will not
provide Egypt with $100 million a year for the High Dam project
but, at moot, only a few millions. This fact was tacitly
admitted during a pre es conference held only a week after
nationalization by All Sabri, a spokesman for Nasir, who, when
asked pointedly if Canal revenue would be enough to m et the cost
of widening and deepenins the Canal ea well as finance the High
Dam, could not answer in the affirmative and had to give the
evasive reply that there were "undoubtedly other ways for the
state to implement its projects." fl
But the controlled Egyptian press and radio have not admitted
the truth of the matter to the hopeful Egyptian people. As long
as the Nasir regime can hold out hope of the High Dam project,
the people will be less inclined to think about the harsh realities
of other economic problems or about the regime's failure to bring
to Egypt the better life which Nasir and his cohorts have so
loudly, so lavishly, and so frequently promised,
Let us consider the regime's record. One of the most highly
propagandized actions of the Nasir regime has been the land reform
movement, allegedly designed to free the Egyptian peasant from
dependence on a landlord and to give him an adequate plot of ground
that he can call his own. No one can quarrel with this objective,
but what are the facts?
Iritia1iy the Nasir regime announced that it would distribute
three to four million feddan of land among peasants and landless
ultural workers. tubsequently the figure was reduced to one
ion, then to three-quarters, and by July 1953, Deputy Premier
Salim was speaking of 500,000 fedelan. The fact is that by
the end of 1955 the government had distributed only 105,000
feddan consisting almost entirely of former royal estates, while
r e landowners had sold an additional 95,000 fedan.
Much of this was bought by well-to-do peaeants in t'he-to-50
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clasp, while many landlords arranged spurious sales to
whom they still controlled. At the most, only 20,000
peasant? oat of Egypt's millions have benefited from this so-called
great land distribution scheme. 2/
Yet, despite this miserable record, the Nasir regime pretends
that today the peasant is the real ruler of Egypt and that every
peasant haa achieved a wondrous standard of living. 0 ye peasants
of Egypt! Do all among you now own your own land? Do all among
you have enough to eat, proper housing, adequate clothing? Do
all among you feel satiatied and content with your lot?
The thundering roar of denials would shatter the heavenB.
But how ia that possible? as not Nasir, that new Pharaoh of the
Nile, declared that every Egyptian peasant is now happy and
prosperous? In an article published in January 1955 by the
American magazine Pore n Affairs, Nair wrote that "The Egyptian
peasant is no longer the virtual serf of big landlords but his
own maSter. The agrarian reform program has reaulted in a sub-
stantial increase in his real income." 2/ 0 ye Egyptian peasants:
Will ye teatify that none among you must-still work for a land-
lord, that none among you still knows want?
On 17 January 1956, Nasir stated in a speech:
Parmers, you have achieved your objectives. The
egaining of the right to life and freedom was not an
easy matter. . . Today, 0 farmers, you should look at
the future and feel the right demands of your deeds and
struggle so that you can preserve. . . We all look at
the fature with a feeling of equal opportunities, social
collaboration and with hope. 1.91
0 ye Egyptian peasants; Will ye testify that all among you have
obtained your heart's desire, that all among you view the future
with hope?
Speaking on 13 June 1956, Nasir made the statement:
This generation was privileged to feel a great
change. The dignity of the fatherland was restored
to it deaervedly and by right. Its sons are no longer
the harveat of poverty and disease. 11/
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0 ye Egyptian peaants1 Will ye teatify that none among you still
feel the oppression of poverty, that none among you till knows
the suffering of disease?
During a speech in Cairo on 19 June 1956 Na1r declared:
Today . . the peasant has been freed of slavery
and for the first time in the history of this homeland
he le free and not threatened in his livelihood, livings
dignity, security for his family. 12/
o ye Egyptian peasants! Will ye testify that none among you
rears for tomorrow's bread, that none among you feels oppree ed
by fate ae did your fathers?
The expl nation of the wide gulf lying between the true
istate of the Egyptian peasant and the false propagandistic stet
ments of Nadir lies in the fact that the Cairo regime feels a
great contempt for the peasantry. Their callous attitude is
reflected in the statement made in a radio address on 30 August
1956, by Ahmed Hasan al-Baquri? Minister of Waqfs and one of
Nasir's minions, who remarked that "Egypt's rural population is
frugal and can live on next to nothing." It may well be true
that, because of necessity, the Egyptian peasant lives on virtually
nothing. But ye peasants of Egypt! Will ye testify that all
among you do so willingly?
And how has the urban worker thrived under Na sir's so-called
regime of social justice? The new Constitution guarantees the
worker fair hours, wages, and working conditions, and Nair has
boasted that the Egyptian worker is now getting a new deal. But
ye Egyptian workers! / call on you to testify. Is it not true
that an anakilled worker still receives only 20 piasters a day
at a maximum?21-V. Is it not true that even the best paid worker
makes no more TE-an $20 a month? Is it not true that inflation
caused by the regime's financial policies has caused the cost
of living to increase thredbld in recent years? Is it not true
that despite Nasir's claims of universal prosperity beggars are
still to be seen on the streets of Cairo? Is it not true that
deepite the right to unionize assured you by the Constitution
you do not dare to attempt to form your own free trade unions
or to etrike for your justified demands? Yet Nasir claims that
his regime has done eo much for the common people! Strange
indeed are his standards.
6
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u'ed1y the Nair regime has carried out the more dramatic
Of tts social program, the projects with a high propa-
ppeal, the projects which everyone can see and thus perhaps
look the lack of eccomplishments elsewhere, Liberation Square
has been beautified and completed. The corniche along
e was conetructed in a few weeks, complete with trees and
Water pipes have been laid in some villages. Cairo
has been enlarged. Other conspicuous projects also have
been undertaken. lore." But the fact remains that the lot of the
erdinSrY Peasant and worker remains as miserable as it was under
the Park-Wafdist regime.
The Nasir regime also has given much fanfare to elaborate
for large-scale industrialization of Egypt and has fostered
onstructiOn of numerous installatione to that end. Thie is
?hy ambition with which no one can quarrel. However, the
e ails of these plans and the manner in which they are being
exeoUted show haw little qualified are the preeent rulers of
t in the realm of economics. Por example* the Helwan steel
nt the most widely publicized of the industrial projects,
rodacine 220,000 tons of steel annually after it goes
oPeration in the middle of 1957/ and the Egyptian
ve been boasting of the large amount of foreign exchanee
t will save as a reeult. But they have not told the
n people that the steel to be produced at Helwan will cost
three times as much as imported steel or that this high
on cost is* to a large extent, the result of their decision
e the plant at Helwan far from the sources of the raw
which the plant will consume. Thus funds which could be
more urgent projects, projects which would serve directly
rove conditions of life for the common peasant and worker,
mt on an uneconomic project designed primarily to boost
ge of Egypt and of its ruling clique1
urrent inflation in Egypt which causes such hardships
poor claseee* has already been mentioned. The Nasir
instead of eolving this problem, is, on the contrary,
undertaking measures which will further Intensify it. To raise
fiends Per it erandiose schemes the government has announced two
loan, one for $100 million Egyptian pounds to be raised abroad,
and the second for $200 million pounds to be raieed Internally
by having the National Bank of Egypt print and issue currency.
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When the experienced financiers of Egypt protested that this would
increase the amount of money in circulation by one-third, thus
inducing a dangerous rice in prices, the government issued a
decree which removed the protesting financiers from the Bank's
board of directors, who were thereupon replaced by minions amenable
to the government's dangerous policy of inflation. Not unnaturally,
the immediate result of these actions was a flight of capital, a
rise in prices, and a hoarding of consumer goods. .2..W
Egypt's economic difficulties have been further intensified
by the recent nationalisation. It has already been pointed out
how Naair deliberately misled the people when he said the seizure
would enable Egypt to build without foreign aid the High Dam,
which is so important to Egypt's future prosperity. The truth
is that not only is Egypt not going to get from the Canal the
funds necessary for the construction of the Dam bUL the economic
consequences of the nationalization are soon going to bring Egypt
to the brink of bankruptcy.
Let QS examine some of these economic consequences. First of
foreigners who have previously invested capital in Egypt
seeking to withdraw it, while prospective investors have
ily cancelled their plans. For who wishes to risk his money
a country whose rulers flagrantly violate every rule of inter-
national law and Justice? Egyptian merchants, moreover, are finding
it increasingly difficult tt? import goods, for their sterling
cceunte have been blocked by the British government, while
Egyptian cotton, which formerly supplied the country with most of
its foreign exchange, has been pledged to Soviet Russia for many
Years to come as payment for the recent arms purchase. Is not
every citizen of Cairo and Alexandria, for example, able to see for
himself that already some of the most basic and necessary com-
modities have disappeared from store shelves? The Canal nationali
zation also has resulted in a drying up of a second source of
foreign exchange, namely, the tourist trade. For what tourist is
willing to go to Egypt when the international crisis caused by the
nationalization could conceivably result in armed conflict?
Surely, if he is as clever as he pretends to be, Nasir must
have realized that all this would come to pass. Yet he was so
absorbed in the problem of maintaining and even increasing his own
personal prestige and so little concerned with the economic welfare
of Egypt and its people that he chose to ignore the inevitable
consequences of his act.
8
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n.. ea ant, worker, businessman, intellectual--
i s only toes cll aware that the Naair regime has failed to keep
its promises, has failed to improve the lot of the Egyptian people
but has, on the contrary, plunged the Egyptian economy into a
Perilous state. In his book, The Philophy of the Revolution,
Naair in discussing the plano?nr mse and-Tis cob:Otto wrote
A ,
that I would be sur rised if we were able to solve all the problems
of our country." 1 How right he was!
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20 JW 1956, P. 1, and FBIS, Al and A4,
ro, gyptian Home Service, 19 June 1956,
amtpqmpl X (&uwner 1956), p. 283.
21 June 1956.
A37, 27 July 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
1956, 1741 GMT).
Timm, 27 uly 1956
A3, 1 August 1956 (Cairo,Egyptian Hone Service,
y 1956 1330 GMT)
ournal IX (Autumn 1955) p. 383.
T.4ppe, 25 September 1955, P. 12.
Abdel Nasser, Gamal, "The Egyptian
(January 1955), p. 208.
10, IS, ALO, 18 January 1956 (Cairo,
17 SanuarY 1956, 1500 GMT
A3p 19 June 1956 (Cairo, Egyp
me 1956 1230 GMT).
A5, 20 June 1956 (Ca
e 1956, 1740 GMT).
13. PIS, 31 August 1956 (Cairo,
30 August 1956, 1930 GMT).
14. tayLigl. 1111, 25 September 1955, P. 12.
15. See John Bdeau. tiA Role in Search of a os A Brief Study
of the Egyptian Revolution," Mddle t 3orn IX (Autumn
1955), P. 384.
Revolution,"
n Aflairs
gyptian Home 8ervlce,
Ian Home Service,
o, Egyptian Home Service
Egyptian Home service,
10
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16. Ibi?l,
17 Abdel Nasser, Gamal.
Cairo, no date), p,
P1i1o0ophy of the evo1ut1on
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TiE EGYPTIAN VIEW OF ARAB UNITY
Egypt, so the new Egyptian Constitution declares, is
an integral part of the Arab nation which Nasir has de-
scribed as Stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the
Persian Gulf. It is, moreover, Egypt's announced aim
to do everything possible to make this single nation more
than a dream, to bring it to a state of reality. It is
an ambition which is shared by every Arab, whether from
Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or any other Arab state. Yet
these Arabs would hardly approve of Egypt's plans for
accomplishing this objective, for Nasir envisages not a
uniting of equals but an Egyptian hegemony with himself
as the only authoritative leader and spokesman for the
entire Arab World.
Naeir's own words betray his grandiose ideas of expan-
sion and Egyptian aggrandizement. In his book, The
Philosophy of the Revolution, he writes: 2
We cannot look at the map of the world ... without
realizing Egypt's position on the map and her
role by the logic of that position. Can we fail
to see that there is an Arab zone surrounding us?
Can we possibly ignore the Pact that there is
an African continent which we have been made part
f by fate? ... Can we ignore the fact that there
Is an Islamic. world with which we are united by
bonds of religious principle reinforced by histori-
cal realities? ... It always strikes me that in
this area in which we live is a role running around
aimlessly looking for a hero to give it being ...
The role is there. Its characteristics have been
described. This is the stage. By the laws of geo-
graphical circumstance, we alone are able to play
it.
Thus has Nasir arrogated unto Egypt and unto himself
as ruler of that country the role of leader of the Arab
if not of the entire Islamic world. This same self-assumed
mantle of leadership also has been mentioned on other
occasions by members of the Cairo junta. For example,
Nasir told the graduates of the Egyptian Aviation College
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on 15 September 1956, that "he who attacks Egypt will have
attacked the entire Arab world." 2/ But who hae given him
the right to commit the armed forces and destiny of the
other nations on EgyptIs behalf, especially when any con-
flict will have been cauaed by Egypt's reckless violation
of international law, taken without the slightest consulta-
tion with the other Arab states? On 22 July 1955, War
Minieter Oeneral lAbd al-Hakim Amir asserted that "in order
that Egypt may occupy her traditional place as the center
of gravity in the African and Asian group of states and
in order that we may be fully prepared to fulfill our obli-
gatione towards our Arab brothers, it haebecome incumbent
upon us to build up our armed forces." ,Itt? And in a press
interview on 7 July 1955, Salah Salim, en Nasirle Minister
of Propaganda (euphoniously termed Minister of National
Guidance), declared that Egypt's army "has taken it upon
itself to defend every foot of the Arab World." V Did he
thus imply that the other Arab countries had no voice in
their own defense?
Aside from the arrogance of such etat ments? the ironic
'act iu that Egypt has displayed on all occasions her com-
plete disdain for the security and integrity of the other
Arab lands. When the Israeli any carried out bloody raids
into Syrian and Jordanian territory, the Egyptian army,
despite these high-sounding promises, did nothing. When
Saudi Arabia complained to the Arab League that British
force had occupied the Buraimi oases, the Egyptian army,
despite these high-sounding promises, did nothing. When
the Sultan of Oman appealed for help to prevent the occu-
pation of Oman by forces of the Sultan of Muscat, the
Egyptian army, despite theee high-sounding promiees? did
nothing. In fact, the only military danger threatening the
Arab world other than that posed by Israel comes from the
Soviet Union, and it was Egypt who, without bothering to
coneult the other Arab states, opened the gates of the
Middle Eat to Soviet penetration. And if the threat of
armed cOnflict hangs over the area today as a result of
the Suez Canal crisis? it was Egypt who, without bothering
to consult the other Arab statee, took the action which
precipitated the crisis.
At the present time, it cannot be denied that the
strongest force for Arab unity is the Arab League, and this
the asir reugime has pledged to support. For example, in
a statement made on 1 January 1955, Nasir declared: 6
2
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The Arabs are fully determined to back it so as
to realize their aspirations of the eetablishment
of a federation among them, which is no doubt the
firet and last aim of every Arab state.
In an earlier statement made on 5 September 1954, Natr
s
at ted:
Our first objective is to consolidate the Arab
League in order to insure stability and seeuritY
in one of the most sensitive epots in the world.
Like all of Nasirts statements, these sound very good,
but unfortunately there is no eubstance or sincerity behind
them. For Nair regards the Arab League not as an organi-
zation of equals designed to foster Arab unity and the
interests of all Arabs but rather as an instrument of
Egyptian foreign policy, to be supported as long aa it
serves Egyptte national interests but to be discarded if
and when it ceases to do so. This fact was made abundantly
clear in early 1955 when Nasir threatened that Egypt would
withdraw from the League if Iraq insisted, despite Egyptte
objections, on forming an alliance with Turkey. Was
thie not the action of a fruetrated, self-centered child
rather than of an Arab leader devoted to the cause of Arab
unity?
The North Afriean situation presents another example
of ho,w wil ing Nasir le to sacrifice the principle of Arab
solidarity for purely Egyptian intereete. Not unnaturally
every Arab sympathizes with the national aspirations of the
Algerian people, and the Arab League Council has adopted
resolutions in support of those aspiratione. Cairo has
long been a center for North African nationalist activity
and Radio Cairo the principal channel for nationalist propa-
ganda. In November 1955, however, Naeir agreed with France
to end these anti-French broadcasts in return for a French
promise to resume arms ehipmente to Egypt. / If Nasir
were tru d ly concerne with the fate of the Algerian people
no concessiens could have persuaded him to abandon, even
if only temporarily, hi support of the North African
nationalists.
The question of nterference in the internal affairs
of another Arab state provides a further example of the
contempt in which Naeir holds his promises and his fellow
Arabs. Article 0 of the Arab League Charter clearly forbids
such interference, and such action was also condemned by
the resolutions of the Bandung Conference which have been
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enthusiastically endorsed by Nasir and his cohorts. 10
The latter also have reiterated this principle in the
public statements. For example: In a statement to the
Cairo publication al-Akhbar al-Yawm on 29 May 1956, Nasir
stated that "Egypt win no aflow itself to interfere in
the internal affairs of any Arab state." IV During the
course of his Alexandria speech on 26 July 1956, Nasir
asserted that "our policy is based on non-intervention.
We haVe no business in any domestic matter, and we would
never interfere,"/ And Minister of State Anwar al-Sadat,
writing in the Nae r mouthpiece Al-Jumhuriyah on 27 April
19550 voiced the opinion that:
Interference into the internal affairs of a nation
is even more hateful new than it was during the
days, of imperialism in our country, because those
who practice it through pressure, intimidation, use
of violence, or .the instigation of citizens to kill
their leaders, are those who profess to love and
support the Arabs and who claim to wish to protect
them.
Although he did not intend them as such, al-Sadat's
words are a perfect indictment of Egypt's activities, for
there is scarcely a single Arab state which has not felt
the results of Egyptian interference. The activities of
Salah Salim in the Sudan became so blatant that the
Sudanese government was forced to ask him to leave. Libya
has found it necessary formally to order Nasir to close
down his propaganda centers in that country. Strikes in
the Saudi Arabian oilfields and unrest in the Shaykhdom of
Bahrayn have been traced to funds expended by Egyptian
agents and agitators. During the early part of 1955, when
Egypt was trying to prevent Iraq from signing an alliance
with Turkey, Iraqi police apprehended Egyptian-paid agents
who were trying to persuade loyal Iraqis to sign statements
denouncing their Premier, Nuir as-Said, as a tool of
imperialists--Nuri aa-Said who was fighting for Arab inde-
pendence before the upstart Nasir was even born! And a so-
called Radio Free Iraq transmitted from Egyptian soil inflam-
matory broadcasts designed to incite internal rebellion in
Iraq. 11/ In Syria, because Premier Faris al-Khuri refused
to si6 e with Egypt in condemning Iraq, Nasir promoted a
campaign of rioting and violence which led to al-Khurils
resignation on 7 February.
Egyptian interferenoe in the internal affairs of Jordan
has been even more flagrant. The riots and violence which
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racked Jordan in December 1955 were led and organized by
g to in the pay of Nair. In his Alexandria epeech on
ie July 1956, Nair admitted that "we cannot say that the
December battle of Jordan was not our battle." 1.5_/ While
at the very time of the riots, al-Sadat boasted-In an
article publiehed in al-Jumhuriyah that Nair eas responsible
for keeping Jordan out of the Baghdad Pact. .1g Many other
eimilar examplee could be cited, but surely These are enough
to show that strange indeed le Naeirts concept of non
interference.
Eua11y strange le his concept of consul ation and co-
ination of Arab foreign policiee. It will be remembered
Egypt bitterly criticized Iraq for having decided on
such an important foreign policy step as the Iraqi-Turkish
alliance without consulting with the other Arab states who
re Sure to be affected thereby. This interdependence of
Arab states is, in fact, a favorite theme of Nasir and his
cohorts. In his book, The Philesoptx of the Revoilut.ion,
Nailer writes that: "Whirhappene in aIr5-has fte counter-
pert in Damascus the next day, and Beiruti Amman, Baghdad,
and elsewhere.... It is a single region." And in a
reoent epeech he declared: "My fate in Fisyt-t is linked
with that of my brother in Jordan, in Lebanon, Syria, and
in every country, and also in Sudan. Our fatee are linked....
The fate of one of us affect that of the other." His
erstwhile Propaganda Minister Salah Salim, has s
Our toren policy wae drawn up from the beg nning
on the basis of complete cooperation for the glory
of the Arab nation and the unity of the Arabs he-
use this is the only way to put an end to the
trials, disasters and sufferings of the past as a
esult of the dieintegration of the unity of the
Arab Peoples and of conflicting orientations....
What would be the meaning or all these meetingA,
t would be the meaning of a pact of all Arab
ea, amd what would be the meaning of a league
our government:5 if any one of us separately
the most serioue and important discuesione
wiehes to, without mutual underetanding or con-
sultation with the others.
Zgypt has even made ormal comm tme ts in this regard.
SPeAking in Damaseue on 2ti February 1955 in connection with
the newly proposed Syrian-Egyptian alliance, Salim pledged
that Egypt would make ite foreign policy agree with that of
the other Arab states. 2.2/ On 6 March, he joined with
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Sabri al-Asali and nand al-Azm in issuing a communique
which declared that neither member of the new alliance
would conclude any international military or political
agreement without the consent of the other.W. In
September 1955, Nair and Lebanese Foreign MIEIster Hamid
Franjiyah iesued a joint statement in Cairo whereby the
two couretriee agreed "to consult and exchange viewe and
information continuously and without any delay on every-
thing connected with international politice, defense, public
security, and common interests of Egypt and Lebanon." 22/
What does the record show? That Nasir and his regime
have conformed to this principle? It does not. The record
shows rather that since the very inception of the Nasty
regime it hae proceeded to do what it promised not to do
and what it condemns in other countriee. It has consistently
and continually taken the most vital foreign policy decisione
without ever bothering to inform the other Arab countries,
much less consult with them, even though those decisions
had repercussions which affected profoundly every state.
Let us coneider a few examplee of Egypt's actions in this
regards
In the fall of 1953, Nasir rejected all possibility of
a defenee alliance of the Middle East with the Western
Powers and declared that the Arabs would follow a course
of neutralism and would seek defenee from within the area.
In committing the Arab world to such a policy, he arrogantly
ignored the fact that the other Arab states might have
other viewe and might wish a voice in deciding the future
course of the area. Not unnaturally thim arrogance was no
everywhere appreciated. In this regard it is appropriate
to (site, for example, an editorial which appeared in the
Beirut newspaper L'Orieret: 2
It is for Egypt, and for Egypt alone, that Lebanon
and Syria, and even to a lesser extent Jordan and
Iraq, are turning their backs on Britain. It is
for Egypt, and for Egypt alone, that Lebanon, Syria,
and Jordan, who have common frontiers with the
Jewish State, have refrained from seeking from the
Weetern Powers firm guarantees against the dangerous
pressure Of /eraeli irredentism. Now, without taking
into account the special interests of Lebanon t Syria,
and Jordan, and without even taking the trouble to
inform the Arab League; the Cairo Government is
turning toyards neutralism and claims to be coiiunittlng
the rest Of the Arab states.
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During the lengthy negotiations that resulted in the
1954 Anglo gyptian agreement on the evacuation of the
Suez Canal Zone, Nasir did not consult with any of the
other Arab leaders, even though the withdrawal of British
troops from the Zone was certain to affect the power balance
of the Middle East. Nevertheless, Nasir did not hesitate
to demand the support of every other Arab state for himself
and his regime against Britain.
In September 19550 Nasir concluded an agreement with
the Soviet Union (though he claimed for months that it
was with Czechoslovakia, being afraid or ashamed to admit
the truth) for the purchase of arms. This was perhaps the
most important and vital decision ever taken by any modern
Arab state in their history, for it opened a breach through
which Soviet technicians and therefore Soviet influence
could penetrate this strategic area, an area previously
denied to such influence by the united front which the
Arabs had followed in their opposition to the atheistic
doctrine of Communism. Yet Nasir did not bother to consult
or even to inform the other Arab states about this step.
In May 1956, Egypt agreed to a new United Nations-
sponsored cease-fire agreement with Israel without an
Israeli guarantee not to divert waters of the River Jordan,
thereby leaving Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon in an embarrass-
ing position.
In July 1956, Egypt took a step that had consequences
for the entire Arab world second in 'importance, if not equal,
to those of the Soviet arms purchase. This was the nationali-
zation of the Suez Company. Surely any Arab statesman having
the best interests of the entire Arab nation at heart would
have conaulted with other Arab leaders. But since that
description does not, in any way, fit Nasir it should not
be too surprising that the action took the leaders of every
other Arab state completely by surprise. Nasir, thinking
only of his own personal prestige and self-glorification,
took this momentous decision without bothering to discuss
It with them. And momentous it certainly was, for it brought
the possibility of warfare to the Middle East and, at the
very least, threatened a stoppage or reduction of oil exports
with an attendant reduction of oil and pipeline royalties,
unemployMent of Arab workers, and a halt to major develop-
ment projects dependent on such royalties. At the same time,
Naeir Unashamedly demanded that all Arab states support him
in the international crisis that ensued from -the nationalization,
7
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and he further zhowed hie contempt for the economic interests
of other Arab states by arranging for the Egyptian-daminated
executive committee of the Federation of Arab Trade Unions,
meeting in Cairo, to adopt a resolution pledging that its
members would blow up and destroy all oil installations in
the Middle East in the event that the Canal crisis led to
armed conflict. 21...il
All the above-cited examples show only too well that
Na irls only concern with the Arab nation, despite his fre-
quent and dazzling statements to the contrary, is to use
the Arab states to assure Egyptian hegemony and his own
grandeur. /n dealing with him, the leaders of the other
Arab countries would be well advised to use caution lest
they suddenly find themselves mere puppets manipulated by
strings from Cairo. The statesmen of Syria, Saudi Arabia,
and Jordan, which have all entered into military alliance
arrangements with Egypt during the past year, especially
have reason for care. Those three states are all militarily
wee.k with small populations, while in comparison Egypt is a
populous country that is relatively strong militarily. And
ae Nasir himself said on 7 July 1955, at a rally at al-Fayum,
nAny alliance with a big state means domination in various
forms.... The alliance of a small state with a big state
resembles the alliance of a lamb and a volt." The states-
men of the Arab world would do well to ponder Thee words,
for the wolf of the Nile has shown himself to be ambitious
and hungry.
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- 7,y/
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SOURCES
FBIS, A 11, 17 January 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
16 January 1956, 1535 amT).
2. lAbd al-Nasir? Gamal. The T114.1.0e0Phy of the Hevolution
(Cairo, no date), p. 53777
FBIS, A 10, 17 September 196 (Cairo, Egyptian Home
Service,
15 September 1956, 1230 GMT).
4. FBIS, A 44, 25 July 19,55 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
22 July 1955, 1905 GMT).
5. FBIS, A 3, 8 July 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Serv ce,
7 July 1955, 1630 GMT).
6. PBXS, A 2, 3 January 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
1 January 19550 1330 GMT).
7. nasj A 3, 7 September 1954 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
5 September 1954, 2100 GMT).
8. See FBIS? A 5, 3 February 1955 (Cairo Arab News Agency,
2 February 1955, 1733 GMT OOPPIONMSmO;Pm@NOVS.
9. Mdd1e East Journal X (Winter, 1956) p. 66.
10. FBIS, A 14, 22 July 1955,(Ca1ro, Egyptian Home ervice,
21 July 1955, 2030 GMT).
11. RIS, A 11 29 May 1956 (Cairo Egyptian Home Service,
29 May 1956, 0530 GMT).
12. FBIS? A 32, 27 July 1956 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
26 July 1956, 1741 GMT).
13. FBIS, A 120 28 April 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
27 April 1955, 0715
14. FBIS A 6, 18 May 1955 (Pa is, APT, 17 May 19551 1634 GMT
41(61ALn,u var., vpiLx)).
15. FBIS, A 130 27 July 1956.
9
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16, FBI, A 2, 27 December 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
27 December 1955, 0545 GMT).
17. 'Abd al-Naeir, a. cit., p. 67.
18. FBIS, A 13, 27 July 1956.
19. MIS, A 10 17 January 195 (Cairo, EgyptianHome Service,
16 January 1955, 1830 GMT
20. FBIS? A 2, 1 March 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
28 Febru4ry, 1230 GMT).
21. MIS, 7 March 1955 (Damascus, 6 March 1955, 1330 GMT).
22. MIS, 2 September 1255 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Service,
1 September 1955, 1830 GMT).
23. Quoted in World Today XI (January, 1954) p, 5.
24, New X9rk TtIllPe, 12 August 1956, p. 2.
25. FRAU, A 1, 8 July 1955 (Cairo, Egyptian Home Services
7 July 1955, 1245 GMT).
10
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