BI-WEEKKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 15, 1960
• Content Type: PERRPT

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201. President Eise-'tower's Trip to Latin Am
erica
February 22 esident' :.senhowe will begie- s ten-day trip to the four
southern Latin American republics of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay,
returning approximately 4 March to the US after a brief stop in Puerto Rico.
Current plans indicate he will tae in Brazil 23-26 February, Argentina 26-29
February, Chile 29 February-2 March, Uruguay 2-3 March. He will be accom-
panied by Secretary of State Herter, Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom and
other officials concerned with Latin American affairs. The trip is essentially a
good will mission with discussion of substantive issues to be kept to a minimum.
Reasons for the trip at this time are to reassure Latin America of our concern
for her problems, to demonstrate US good intentions toward helping to build a
stable, economically sound Latin America, and to strengthen inter-American
political and economic solidarity. The selection of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and
Uruguay for the visit indicate the importance of these countries as leaders on the
continent. Relations with Brazil which were decidedly cool during 1959 as a result
of US unwillingness to provide large-scale economic aid have improved and should
be given a boost by this visit. The President's visit may have the effect of increas-
ing the waning prestige of the Argentine Government which is in a precarious
position politically and economically. The President is visiting Chile because it is
considered to be a political and cultural leader in Latin America, and Uruguay
because it is an example of democratic stability. It does not appear likely that the
visit will meet with any large-scale, organized opposition or will be subject to
deliberate planned attacks by the Communists as in the case of Vice President
Nixon's tour. However, in some of the countries to be visited, situations exist
or may develop which may give rise to "anti-Ike" demonstrations. In Argentina,
Brazil and Uruguay there are labor, leftist, government-opposition and other
dissident groups not under the direct control of the Communist party who may take
this opportunity to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with government policies.
Student groups, a most vocal and unpredictable element in Latin America, may
demonstrate against the visit. There also exists a danger that demonstrations may
occur as a result of a sudden turn of events in Cuba, real or contrived. Recently
Radio Moscow in Spanish to Latin America and NCNA in English radio-teletype
to Europe and Asia have broadcast false charges of US Marine Intervention in the
Dominican Republic.
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15 February
202. Communist T1ry on the Breakdown of Capitalgm
Erik Molnar, an eminent Hungarian Communist historian who has occupied
the posts of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Justice in the Hungarian
Communist Government, has challenged the Marxist law of the inevitable break-
down of capitalism. Molnar's views are set forth in his latest book entitled Some
Economic Problems of Contemporary Capitalism. His theory can be summarized
as follows: (a) The laws which govern the development and decline of capitalism
can be invalidated by conscious action of the people or of the various classes in a
capitalist society. (b) Marxss laws concerning class struggle and the growing
misery of the people are no longer valid. (c) The law of the general crisis of the
capitalist system, as redefined by Stalin, cannot be considered valid since World
War II. (d) Defense expenditures In a capitalist society do not have the economic
importance attributed to them by Communist theoreticians. Defending his thesis
against the attacks of the orthodox Communist economists, Mr. Molnar stated
".... We Marxists must face the facts without allowing old theories to blur our
vision. I do not agree with tendencies which seek to switch the struggle against
revisionism from politics to science. Dogmatism is the principal danger in our
science - economics". Although Mr. Molnar may have exceeded the limits of
currently acceptable revision of Marrs economic theories, his views are
consonant with those of Khrushchev, who has written: "If Marx, Engels and Lenin
could arise now, they would laugh at those bookworms and quoters who instead
of studying the life of contemporary society and developing theory creatively turn
to the classics for a quotation about how to act in connection with a machine
tractor station.... One can even meet such economists who, in speaking of wages
In contemporary circumstances, use examples given almost a hundred years ago
by Marx in his famous Capital." (Kommunist No. 12, 1957). The compelling need
to utilize scientifically sound meth'ods' n economic planning, even when such
methods are at variance with Marxist ideological tenets, may gradually lead to an
adjustment of what George Kennan has termed their "Byzantine dogmatism of
political thought and utterance".
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--- 15 February 1960
203. The Trial Begins...
In recent months a remarkable work, a novella, or long short story, by a
young Soviet author has appeared in various West European publications including
Encounter and Kultura. Entitled The Trial Begins..., it is a profoundly grim satirt
on the lives of members of the Soviet "elite" in Moscow ("The Great City") prior
to and on the occasion of the death of Stalin ("The Master"). The authenticity of
the book as the work of one brought up in modern Russia has been attested to by
some Soviet experts. Whether it was in fact written in the Soviet Union and
spirited out for publication is less clear due to the secrecy surrounding the
channels through which it was acquired. Doubt on this latter question, however, in
no way detracts from the significance or usefulness of The Trial Begins, for it
clearly represents one of the most direct, damning, and effective criticisms of
life in the Soviet Union yet to appear in the West. Granting its authenticity, one of
the most encouraging features of this manuscript is its style. Completely devoid
of the crushing stereotype of "socialist realism" and reflecting a kinship with the
most modern western literary argot, it provides refreshing proof of the stubborn
survival of the tradition of Europeanization in Russian culture despite four decades
of ruthless Communist suppression. But most significant in The Trial Begins are
its mood and themes. Abram Tertz's portrait of present and, more importantly,
future Soviet life is one of "various shades of black", unrelieved, permanent and
hopeless. The regime and the life it dictates is corrupt, deceitful, and cruel, but
no one is shocked or even indignant, only profoundly and cynically resigned. The
"ideals" of communism have long been forgotten by both the regime and the people.
By mutual understanding the great "Aim" now is solely and precisely what the
latest regime order dictates. Symbolically, Tertz presents one "resistance group"
in his book, made up solely of a naively idealistic youth and his recruit, a female
student, who attempt to erase the contradictions of the communism of his day by
citing classical Marxist-Leninist theory. For this he is sent to a work camp and
diligently undertakes his own political re-education. Tertz's pessimism toward
the Soviet future is perhaps most emphatically portrayed in a scene in a Moscow
square after the death of Stalin when the people, bewildered and afraid, wait
longingly for a new leader and, like dogs, reflect: "I don't want freedom, I want a
master."
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15 February 1960
204, Soviet Propagawda
The Central Committee of the CPSU, In January 1960, passed a resolution
on "The tasks of party propaganda in contemporary conditions". In the introduction
to this propaganda directive the need for a new type of propaganda is related to the
transition from socialism to communism - the necessity of "fashioning the new
man with Communists' traits of character" - and to the beginning of the era of
"coexistence's during which, however, the Ideological struggle must be continued
relentlessly. The highlights of the directive can be summarized as follows.
Persuasion of the masses must increasingly be used to replace the former
coercion. In examining the contemporary scene, the directive notes the great
economic and technological achievements of the USSR and the fact that "the
material basis for party propaganda has become much stronger", I. e., that the
gap between future promises and present achievements has been narrowed. At the
same time party propaganda is still "focused mainly on the past", on the works
of Marx and Lenin, without sufficient attention to the resolutions of the 20th and
21st CPSU Congresses (the latter, in February 1959, served to launch the Seven-
Year Plan). Propagandists have so far been unable to "overcome dogmatism and
uncritical adherence to the letter". In oral and printed propaganda they have a
"'mania for quoting" (tsitatnichestvo). They often adopt "passive and defensive
positions regarding idealistic and revisionist ideologiest . Too much propaganda
is directed at party members, while large segments of the population are
altogether beyond the influence of propaganda efforts. Frequently the propaganda
has been so dry and drab that it has not succeeded in attracting the interest of the
audience. These shortcomings must be overcome by livelier presentation, by
more emphasis on practical achievements, by greater reliance on "the heroic
deeds of the present" and concentration on party activities "especially after the
20th Party Congress".
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it Noe 15 February 1960
205, Further Indo--akistan Accord
The government of India and-Pakistan on 11 January announced that they
had reached agreement on all but one of their remaining border delineation
disputes. The remaining area is the Rann of Cutch, "a large salt waste by the
Arabian Sea on the western Indian coast; both sides wanted time to digest
voluminous data on the matter and agreed to meet "later" on this issue. Areas
at present in "adverse possession" of either party are to be vacated by the
adverse possessor by October 15, 1960. The East Pakistan-India boundary
differences had been settled some months before. The recent step settles all
important issues between the two governments except those of Kashmir and the
canal waters of the Indus River basin. The two sides are still discussing the
exceedingly complex canal waters dispute with progress continuing. The
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has worked out a "package'
which should serve as a catalyst for the settlement of this dispute, sometime s
regarded as a more basic issue than the emotionally bitter Kashmir question.
Indeed, much of Kashmir' s importance lies in the fact that it controls the head-
waters of several of the significant tributaries of the Indus. The total cost of the
Bank's "package" proposal, which envisages Important irrigation, hydroelectric,
flood control, and land rehabilitation elements of benefit to both countries, is
about $1, 000, 000, 000. About $200, 000, 000 will be contributed by India and
Pakistan. Foreign aid would provide the remainder and is to be contributed by the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and West Germany as well as
by the United States and the International Bank. The big aid operation will begin
only when India and Pakistan sign a treaty on Indus. waters rights and related
matters. Undoubtedly, a factor in driving the two sides closer to agreement has
been and no doubt still is the Chicom threat from the north. Both sides have
already reached agreement in principle, but two or three knotty problems remain
unresolved. Basically those revolve around the division of the waters during the
construction phase of the huge project and India's uses upstream of the rivers
earmarked for Pakistan. If, as may now be hoped, agreement is reached on this
question, it may help toward an eventual resolution of the Kashmir issue.
X1
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"5 February 1960
206, De Gaulle and Army Nwv
The Fifth Republic has undergone its first major crisis. Faced with an
uprising in Algeria, de Gaulle threw the full force of his influence and prestige
against the insurgents. The critical group during the revolt and for France's
immediate future is the army. Among the officer corps of the army there is a
group whose loyalty to the regime is in doubt. The army, since World War I, has
suffered increasing alienation from both the French people and the political leader-
ship. The Fourth Republic's political sterility and successive military defeats
contributed to the development of a state of mind within the army which has blinded
them to political reality. Since Indo-China, the French army has. studied intensive-
ly the doctrines of revolutionary warfare developed by Mao Tse-tung and used so
effectively in Asia. The army concluded that to fight a revolutionary war the
defender must also have in his arsenal the spectrum of tactics used by the
revolutionaries. In particular, subversion, clandestine action groups, propaganda,
front organizations, and terror must be employed. This theory was applied to the
Algerian war with the consequence that the purpose of the war became a central
point of concern to the officer corps. This deliberately cultivated concern was an
important factor in the inability of the government to moderate the political aims
of the war, which remained, for the army, the total extinction of the ALN and its
political body - the FLN. The army's programs in Algeria were largely self-
generated and independent of the metropole government's policies. When the
political aims of the army were, de jure, revised by de Gaulle on the 16th of
September, the inevitable counter-reactions brought into question the validity of
de Gaulle's position on Algeria, and hence his leadership of the nation. On 29
January de Gaulle reaffirmed the principles of his 16 September speech and
ordered the army to break the insurgents' threat to the state. The force of de
Gaulle's personality and the nation-wide support he engendered swung the army
onto his side and, stripped of army support, the colon's uprising collapsed. De
Gaulle has immediately moved to purge from positions of power those individuals
who were associated with the uprising. There remains the constant threat of
another uprising. Indubitably the army will again remain the key factor in the even:
of renewed disturbances.
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207. Khrushchev in France `+x `15 February 1060 27 T Khrushchev will vis t France during the last two weeks of March as the
guest of the French nation. His primary objectives in such a visit are to continue
his courtship of de Gaulle which has so far manifested itself in the USSR I s
moderate support for de Gaulle on the Algerian question, in the recent activities
of the French Communist Party which has been quite pro-de Gaulle, in the
roderate posture that the USSR has taken towards the French A-bomb, and in the
ready acceptance of de Gaulle as a great leader of a world power. He will
undoubtedly seek to exploit the "peaceful coexilbtenee" campaign in furthering the
eventual development of a united front in France. He will probably hope to sound
out de Gaulle on the forthcoming Summit conference and if possible to moderate
his position on Berlin. The continuing objective of Soviet policy towards France is
to utilize French nationalism, manifesting itself in de Gaulle's desire to create a
"third force", to break up both the NATO alliance and the European Economic
1C
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M J=6- February 1960
208. Self-Determination for Tibet
In the near future, the United States Government will make public its
support of the principle of self-determination for Tibet, through publication of an
exchange of letters between the Dalai Lama and Secretary of State Herter. The
Dalai Lama's letter will express his gratitude to the US for its active support
during the UNGA debate on Tibet, which helped them in their ''effort to determine
for themselves their own political destiny." The Secretary of State will reply to
the effect that it has been the historical position of the United States to consider
Tibet as an autonomous country under the suzerainty of China, and that the
American people have also traditionally stood for the principle of self-determina-
tion - a principle which should apply to the people of Tibet, who should have the
determining voice in their own political destiny. This position is consistent with
that of the United Nations as stated in its charter, which is to "develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples." At the Bandung Conference of 1955 the Chicoms
signed the communique which supported the "principles of self-determination of
peoples and nations as set forth in the charter of the United Nations. to They avoid
applying this principle to Tibet, however, by maintaining that Tibet is part of
China and that the Tibetan problem is an internal affair of China. In contrast to
this position, the Dalai Lama, who is the recognized spiritual leader and temporal
ruler of Tibet, has said that before 1950 Tibet was a sovereign state.
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15 February 1960
Item #203: The full text of The Trial Begins is carried
in "Press Comments" of 5 February. There
are no copy right restrictions involved in
republication.
Item #206: Reference BI-Weekly No. 24, Item 1146,
"Algeria", dated 12 October 1959
CROSS-INDEXING
201. President Eisenhower's Trip to Latin America - D, J, U.
202, Communist Theory on the Breakdown of Capitalism - C, H.
203. The Trial Begins... - E.
204. Soviet Propaganda - E, U.
205. Further Indo-Pakistan Accord - F, P.
206. De Gaulle and the Army - B, G.
207. Khrushchev in France - I'4, E, R.
208. Self-Determination For Tibet - A, 3, M, S, U.
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 95. US_US!i'p(eq or Release 2007/03/05 :'CIA- DP78-0306 A 10~ ~( 1008-5
A major theeaww of the peaceful coexistence ca aign of Khrushchev is
the identification of expanded trade with the US as a method of lessening East-
West tensions. The campaign developing the trade issue began in June, 1958,
with a letter from Khrushchev to President Eisenhower pointing to the desirability
of increased trade and suggesting various commodities which might be traded.
The subject has been vigorously prosecuted as a major theme through the US
visits of Mikoyan, Kozlov, and Khrushchev. Khrushchev agreed to resume
negotiations on the outstanding lend-lease claims after US Insistence that settle-
ment was legally necessary to allow private credit grants.* Recently the Soviet
campaign has abated. If trade should not develop we may anticipate the USSR will
attempt to pin a charge of intransigence on the US. We have pointed out that a
certain measure of trade could begin any time that the USSR so desired since US
businessmen are free to trade in non-strategic goods. Legislative restraints,
however, prevent the extension of private long-term credits. Such credits are
barred by the Johnson Act (1934) which prohibits the extension of private credits
of more than 180 days' duration to any country in default on an obligation to the
US Government. The US considers the USSR in default both on debts of the Russian
government before the October revolution and on the World War II Lend-Lease
agreements. The availability of long-term credit is the real key to a major
expansion of trade with the Soviet Union, since she is presently unable to sell
sufficient goods in the US to support expanded trade. Further blocks result from
US export controls, although only about 10% of the goods available for international
trade are banned from export because of strategic considerations. The import
of Soviet goods by the US is currently restricted by several laws and executive
regulations. Most significant of these are the denial of most favored nation
treatment, which raises US tariffs considerably, and a ban on several types of
furs. Aside from all this, the refusal of the USSR to abide by internation copy-
right and patent agreements has created doubt as to the motivation behind the
trade offensive.
Guidance
The A T.T. A CcEmg
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196. The Revolt of the ind
w February 1960
Early in January, Frederic A. Praeger, Inc. , 64 Univ. Place,
New York 3., N. Y. announced publication of a new book, jointly authored by
Tawas Aczel and Tibor Meray, dealing with the Hungarian revolt of 1956, entitled
The Revolt of the Mind, which represents a significant and unique contribution
to the literature on that historic event. Aczel and Meray, both members in good
standing of the intellectual elite of the Communist regime which has dominated
Hungary since June 1947, have chronicled the atmosphere of the revolution and
its causal circumstances through a series of concise, documentary personal
histories or thumbnail portraits of the most prominent personalities of the period
in the fields of culture and politics. In this fashion The Revolt of the Mind relates
the history of physical and intellectual suppression, progressive denial of
individual freedom, cumulative economic blundering, ignorance of the aspirations
of the people, and slavish response to Moscow directives which ignited the
abortive October revolt. More important, The Revolt of the Mind provides a rare
glimpse into the beliefs and motivations of the key figures of the Hungarian regime
and, like Czeslaw Miloz' The Captive Mind or the early writing of Arthur Koestler
offers a valuable revelation of the spiritual and intellectual gymnastics demanded
and practiced by any functionary of a Communist government if he is to survive.
The value of this document is supplemented by the fact that the authors were not
minor, dissatisfied careerists in the Hungarian Communist machine, but
successful, ideologically-committed members of its elite. Thus, the biographies
they present exude an unquestionable authenticity and reveal the authors'
disillusionment with and eventual rejection of communism. The compilation is an
impressive variation on the familiar but by no means trite theme, "The God that
Failed". The Revolt of the Mind will probably not achieve a large audience
because of the considerable material relating to the Hungarian revolt which has
preceded it. Nevertheless, it is the most effective portrayal of the worst aspects
of communism (both in theory and practice) recently available and an indispensabl,
adjunct to the research of any student of communism in general or as applied to
one of its darkest hours - the Hungarian Revolution.
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197. The Khrushchev N t to Asia
Soviet Premier Khrushchev, concerned by the deterioration in the
strength and acceptability of communism in Asia (resulting primarily from the
belligerent activities of Communist China during the past year), will leave soon on
a tour of selected Asian countries. His current itinerary calls for visits to India
(1217 Feb.) and Indonesia (for ten days beginning 18 Feb. ), as well as unscheduled
stops in Burma and Afghanistan. This itinerary leaves no doubt as to the
motivation for his trip. The visit to Indonesia, which capitalizes on a long-standing
invitation from President Sukarno, was the first to be announced, on 1 January.
Indonesia is the most recent Asian country to run afoul of Chicom muscle-.flexing,
and has experienced an intemperate propaganda and action campaign directed from
Peking against the Indonesian government's decision to break the hold of aliens,
mostly Chinese, on the retail trade of the countryside. The situation has resulted
in a severe strain in Sino-Indonesian relations. Khrushchev next proceeded to
arrange "invitations" from the Indian and Burmese governments, both of which
have been involved in bitter frontier disputes with Communist China. We anticipate
that the Soviets will attempt to cast Khrushchev in the role of "great peacemaker",
while attempting to take credit for any real or postulated concessions which the
Chicoms have already made or may make in the future in their disputes with
India, Burma and Indonesia. The popular belief in a split between the USSR and
Communist China should augment considerably the ability of Khrushchev to build
credibility for his pose as "friend" of fre. A2
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198. Elections in Ceylon
I February 1960
On March 19, 1960, a national election is due to be held in Ceylon
following the resignation of Prime Minister Wijayananda Dahanayake's cabinet in
early December 1959. Dahanayake has held the office for only a few months,
having succeeded the late Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike after the latter's
assassination in September 1959. He is heading the current caretaker cabinet until
the elections. Dudley Senanayake, leader of the rightist, somewhat pro-West
United National Party (U. N. P. ), is hopeful of receiving a majority in parliament.
In order to avoid losing votes to splinter groups and independents politically close
to the position of the U. N. P., he says he will not form a government if his party
does not gain more than a plurality. This party, under the leadership of the late
D. S. Senanayake, father of the current leader, and of Sir John Kotelawala, who
is now retiring from politics, had governed Ceylon since independence in 1947 but
was overwhelmingly defeated in 1956 by Bandaranaike, leader of the left of center
coalition Mahana Eksath Peramuna (M. E. P. ). It is ironic, in view of the political
support given him by large numbers of the island's 20, 000 Buddhist monks, that
it was one such monk who assassinated Bandaranaike. The elections present an
exceedingly complex picture. Altogether there are 23 parties contesting for the
151 seats. The principal left-wing groups, such as the M.E.P., which designation
was recently adopted by Philip Gunawardena, leader of the Viplavakart Lanka
Sama Samaja Party (V. L. S. S. P, ), have considered joining forces but they have
not done so as yet. Also on the left are the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Party (L. S. S. P
led by Dr. N. M. Perera, and the Ceylon Communist Party. The people of Ceylon
are made up of different races and religions: there are two major races, the
Sinhalese, who have lived in Ceylon for a very long time, and the Tamils, many of
whom are immigrants or the descendants of immigrants from southern India. Ther
are also several minorities such as Moors, Malays, Eurasians, and Europeans.
The religious structure of the electorate is also complex: Buddhist, Hindu,
Christian, and Muslim. There is some question about how much Buddhism is going
to influence the voting at this election. (Before the 1956 elections it was greatly
underestimated.) However, it might be considered to have lessened for the
moment because of the shock that struck the nation when the bullet shot by a
R,,.~rll,; c* ,~,.,,.,7_ 1_.?17_ ~ r~__s -- ~ . - _
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. _ _ ' [ February 1960
It-B&
199. The Role of State Security in the USSR
On 13 January 1960, TASS announced "the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet, on the recommendation of the USSR Council of Ministers, has abolished
the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and shifted its responsibilities
to the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the Union Republics. " The functions of
the MVD had not included state security duties since the 1954 administrative
reorganizations. The civil police duties have now been transferred to the
republic ministries. Thus, the abolition of the central MVD organization Is
the final step in a process, initiated even before Stalin's death, in which the
important security functions of the MVD were gradually transferred to the state
security organs (MGB). The process was briefly interrupted and the two services
(MGB and MVD) merged in 1953 at the time of Beria's ill fated attempt to seize
power. At present the KGB is responsible for the following major fields of
intelligence activity: foreign intelligence, internal and external counterintelligenc
armed forces counterintelligence, and border security. In theory, the Soviet
intelligence services are regarded as the "unsheathed sword of the dictatorship
of the proletariat". The purpose is to protect the party from all enemies,
domestic and foreign. The Soviet intelligence services have many times been
reorganized. There have been numerous changes in nomenclature, such as
Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, but the role of the organization responsible for "state
security", the repressive mechanism for perpetuating the regime, has remained
the one constant factor. Soviet propaganda has represented the demise of the
MVD as additional evidence of the "withering away of the state", and further
liberalization of the regime and a major step in the construction of a Communist
society. In his January 14, 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev said
that the MVD was abolished "not only to reduce the size and expense of the
apparatus, but mainly in the interests of the further development of Socialist
democracy, the enhancement of the role of the community in the struggle against
violations of the law, in the interest of granting powers to local authorities. "
Actually, the MVD was abolished because it had become an economic and
political liability. Under Stalin, it was regarded by the Soviet people as the
hated symbol of oppression and terror. Beria, who combined under his authority
the police and state security functions, became a rival to the power of the Party.
Unquestionably, since the death of Stalin there has been an effort to submit the
powers of the security police to responsible judicial control. We see this in the
changes of the penal code, particularly those sections dealing with civil crimes
and prison camps; the new emphasis on rehabilitation as opposed to punishment;
and the evidence that the traditional methods of the state security organ have
become subject to increasing scrutiny. However, it is still too early to
determine the significance of these modifications or their effect upon the central
security organ as opposed to the civil police. It is safe to predict that the state
security forces will continue to play an important role during the period of the
"construction of a Communist society. " Their activities will be justified as
the "need for constant vigilance against foreign enemies working inside Soviet
society"; the resurgence of "local nationalism" (a natural consequence of
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199. (Cont. )
Khrushchev's decentralization and encouragement of local initiative), and the
necessity to guard against ideologieal infection resulting from Khrushchev's
"peaceful coexistence" and the concomitant increase in the East-West contacts.
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February 1960
ZOO. Yugoslav Role inure Detente
In recent months, as an imminent Summit meeting holds at least seeming
prospects that the tensions and conflicts between the Western and Soviet blocs
may ease, speculation has grown over the future role of Yugoslavia in international
affairs. In a mid-December speech to the Zagreb Town Committee Marshal Tito
attempted to put to rest the potentially damaging effect of this speculation on
Yugoslav internal and external policies and objectives. Noting his support for
Moscow's initiatives in the fields of disarmament and the relaxation of tensions,
Tito nevertheless reasserted Yugoslav independence from the Soviet bloc: "What
is all the fuss about? We are an independent country. We have our own interests.
We cannot all blow the same trumpet. " He added that it was "wrong" to reproach
Yugoslavia for not joining a "camp". "Blocs are not a happy solution when it come:
to insuring coexistence and peace", he stated. "Some say that Yugoslavia has
finished playing its role since tension is relaxing. However, Yugoslavia never had
any understudy.... Yugoslavia has not changed its foreign policy". Quite recently
the US Government has demonstrated the continuity of its policy, which recognizes
the significance of the Yugoslav role in international affairs, with the announceme.
on 17 December of an additional Development Loan Fund grant to Yugoslavia of
15, 000, 000 dollars to assist in the construction of a hydroelectric plant on the
Trebisnjica River near Dubrovnik. It is anticipated that Yugoslavia will continue
to pursue her aim of leadership of, or major influence in, an informal grouping
of underdeveloped nations pursuing genuine non-bloc status: militarily, politically,
and economically.
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ADDENDUM T
NUMBER 32
1 February 1960
Item #195: * Reference Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 30,
Item #184, "US-USSR Lend Lease Negotiations".
Item #198: Reference: Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 31,
Item #192, "Elections in Kerala".
Item #200: References: Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 1,
Item #1, "Tito Visit to Asia", 24 November 1958;
Bi-.Weekly Guidance No. 7, Item #43, "Tito
and the Non-Bloc Policy", 16 February 1959;
Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 12, Item #72, "Peking
Yugoslav Dispute", 27 April 1959;
Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 13, Item #77, "Tito
Throws Down the Gauntlet," 11 May 1959;
Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 14, Item 82, "Yugoslav
Accuses China of Violation of Bandung", 25 May
1959.
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