Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 23, 1998
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 15, 1960
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010006-5.pdf1.14 MB
Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Approved For Release 200 - 8-03061~~ObI~~t~Cl~O KrJF/ 201. President Eise-'tower's Trip to Latin Am erica February 22 esident' :.senhowe will begie- s ten-day trip to the four southern Latin American republics of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, returning approximately 4 March to the US after a brief stop in Puerto Rico. Current plans indicate he will tae in Brazil 23-26 February, Argentina 26-29 February, Chile 29 February-2 March, Uruguay 2-3 March. He will be accom- panied by Secretary of State Herter, Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom and other officials concerned with Latin American affairs. The trip is essentially a good will mission with discussion of substantive issues to be kept to a minimum. Reasons for the trip at this time are to reassure Latin America of our concern for her problems, to demonstrate US good intentions toward helping to build a stable, economically sound Latin America, and to strengthen inter-American political and economic solidarity. The selection of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay for the visit indicate the importance of these countries as leaders on the continent. Relations with Brazil which were decidedly cool during 1959 as a result of US unwillingness to provide large-scale economic aid have improved and should be given a boost by this visit. The President's visit may have the effect of increas- ing the waning prestige of the Argentine Government which is in a precarious position politically and economically. The President is visiting Chile because it is considered to be a political and cultural leader in Latin America, and Uruguay because it is an example of democratic stability. It does not appear likely that the visit will meet with any large-scale, organized opposition or will be subject to deliberate planned attacks by the Communists as in the case of Vice President Nixon's tour. However, in some of the countries to be visited, situations exist or may develop which may give rise to "anti-Ike" demonstrations. In Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay there are labor, leftist, government-opposition and other dissident groups not under the direct control of the Communist party who may take this opportunity to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with government policies. Student groups, a most vocal and unpredictable element in Latin America, may demonstrate against the visit. There also exists a danger that demonstrations may occur as a result of a sudden turn of events in Cuba, real or contrived. Recently Radio Moscow in Spanish to Latin America and NCNA in English radio-teletype to Europe and Asia have broadcast false charges of US Marine Intervention in the Dominican Republic. Appiuved ase 2007103/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006 54 15 February 202. Communist T1ry on the Breakdown of Capitalgm Erik Molnar, an eminent Hungarian Communist historian who has occupied the posts of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Justice in the Hungarian Communist Government, has challenged the Marxist law of the inevitable break- down of capitalism. Molnar's views are set forth in his latest book entitled Some Economic Problems of Contemporary Capitalism. His theory can be summarized as follows: (a) The laws which govern the development and decline of capitalism can be invalidated by conscious action of the people or of the various classes in a capitalist society. (b) Marxss laws concerning class struggle and the growing misery of the people are no longer valid. (c) The law of the general crisis of the capitalist system, as redefined by Stalin, cannot be considered valid since World War II. (d) Defense expenditures In a capitalist society do not have the economic importance attributed to them by Communist theoreticians. Defending his thesis against the attacks of the orthodox Communist economists, Mr. Molnar stated ".... We Marxists must face the facts without allowing old theories to blur our vision. I do not agree with tendencies which seek to switch the struggle against revisionism from politics to science. Dogmatism is the principal danger in our science - economics". Although Mr. Molnar may have exceeded the limits of currently acceptable revision of Marrs economic theories, his views are consonant with those of Khrushchev, who has written: "If Marx, Engels and Lenin could arise now, they would laugh at those bookworms and quoters who instead of studying the life of contemporary society and developing theory creatively turn to the classics for a quotation about how to act in connection with a machine tractor station.... One can even meet such economists who, in speaking of wages In contemporary circumstances, use examples given almost a hundred years ago by Marx in his famous Capital." (Kommunist No. 12, 1957). The compelling need to utilize scientifically sound meth'ods' n economic planning, even when such methods are at variance with Marxist ideological tenets, may gradually lead to an adjustment of what George Kennan has termed their "Byzantine dogmatism of political thought and utterance". Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05': CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 --- 15 February 1960 203. The Trial Begins... In recent months a remarkable work, a novella, or long short story, by a young Soviet author has appeared in various West European publications including Encounter and Kultura. Entitled The Trial Begins..., it is a profoundly grim satirt on the lives of members of the Soviet "elite" in Moscow ("The Great City") prior to and on the occasion of the death of Stalin ("The Master"). The authenticity of the book as the work of one brought up in modern Russia has been attested to by some Soviet experts. Whether it was in fact written in the Soviet Union and spirited out for publication is less clear due to the secrecy surrounding the channels through which it was acquired. Doubt on this latter question, however, in no way detracts from the significance or usefulness of The Trial Begins, for it clearly represents one of the most direct, damning, and effective criticisms of life in the Soviet Union yet to appear in the West. Granting its authenticity, one of the most encouraging features of this manuscript is its style. Completely devoid of the crushing stereotype of "socialist realism" and reflecting a kinship with the most modern western literary argot, it provides refreshing proof of the stubborn survival of the tradition of Europeanization in Russian culture despite four decades of ruthless Communist suppression. But most significant in The Trial Begins are its mood and themes. Abram Tertz's portrait of present and, more importantly, future Soviet life is one of "various shades of black", unrelieved, permanent and hopeless. The regime and the life it dictates is corrupt, deceitful, and cruel, but no one is shocked or even indignant, only profoundly and cynically resigned. The "ideals" of communism have long been forgotten by both the regime and the people. By mutual understanding the great "Aim" now is solely and precisely what the latest regime order dictates. Symbolically, Tertz presents one "resistance group" in his book, made up solely of a naively idealistic youth and his recruit, a female student, who attempt to erase the contradictions of the communism of his day by citing classical Marxist-Leninist theory. For this he is sent to a work camp and diligently undertakes his own political re-education. Tertz's pessimism toward the Soviet future is perhaps most emphatically portrayed in a scene in a Moscow square after the death of Stalin when the people, bewildered and afraid, wait longingly for a new leader and, like dogs, reflect: "I don't want freedom, I want a master." Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 15 February 1960 204, Soviet Propagawda The Central Committee of the CPSU, In January 1960, passed a resolution on "The tasks of party propaganda in contemporary conditions". In the introduction to this propaganda directive the need for a new type of propaganda is related to the transition from socialism to communism - the necessity of "fashioning the new man with Communists' traits of character" - and to the beginning of the era of "coexistence's during which, however, the Ideological struggle must be continued relentlessly. The highlights of the directive can be summarized as follows. Persuasion of the masses must increasingly be used to replace the former coercion. In examining the contemporary scene, the directive notes the great economic and technological achievements of the USSR and the fact that "the material basis for party propaganda has become much stronger", I. e., that the gap between future promises and present achievements has been narrowed. At the same time party propaganda is still "focused mainly on the past", on the works of Marx and Lenin, without sufficient attention to the resolutions of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses (the latter, in February 1959, served to launch the Seven- Year Plan). Propagandists have so far been unable to "overcome dogmatism and uncritical adherence to the letter". In oral and printed propaganda they have a "'mania for quoting" (tsitatnichestvo). They often adopt "passive and defensive positions regarding idealistic and revisionist ideologiest . Too much propaganda is directed at party members, while large segments of the population are altogether beyond the influence of propaganda efforts. Frequently the propaganda has been so dry and drab that it has not succeeded in attracting the interest of the audience. These shortcomings must be overcome by livelier presentation, by more emphasis on practical achievements, by greater reliance on "the heroic deeds of the present" and concentration on party activities "especially after the 20th Party Congress". Approved For Release 20 5'.'"C1i\-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010006-5 it Noe 15 February 1960 205, Further Indo--akistan Accord The government of India and-Pakistan on 11 January announced that they had reached agreement on all but one of their remaining border delineation disputes. The remaining area is the Rann of Cutch, "a large salt waste by the Arabian Sea on the western Indian coast; both sides wanted time to digest voluminous data on the matter and agreed to meet "later" on this issue. Areas at present in "adverse possession" of either party are to be vacated by the adverse possessor by October 15, 1960. The East Pakistan-India boundary differences had been settled some months before. The recent step settles all important issues between the two governments except those of Kashmir and the canal waters of the Indus River basin. The two sides are still discussing the exceedingly complex canal waters dispute with progress continuing. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has worked out a "package' which should serve as a catalyst for the settlement of this dispute, sometime s regarded as a more basic issue than the emotionally bitter Kashmir question. Indeed, much of Kashmir' s importance lies in the fact that it controls the head- waters of several of the significant tributaries of the Indus. The total cost of the Bank's "package" proposal, which envisages Important irrigation, hydroelectric, flood control, and land rehabilitation elements of benefit to both countries, is about $1, 000, 000, 000. About $200, 000, 000 will be contributed by India and Pakistan. Foreign aid would provide the remainder and is to be contributed by the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and West Germany as well as by the United States and the International Bank. The big aid operation will begin only when India and Pakistan sign a treaty on Indus. waters rights and related matters. Undoubtedly, a factor in driving the two sides closer to agreement has been and no doubt still is the Chicom threat from the north. Both sides have already reached agreement in principle, but two or three knotty problems remain unresolved. Basically those revolve around the division of the waters during the construction phase of the huge project and India's uses upstream of the rivers earmarked for Pakistan. If, as may now be hoped, agreement is reached on this question, it may help toward an eventual resolution of the Kashmir issue. X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 "5 February 1960 206, De Gaulle and Army Nwv The Fifth Republic has undergone its first major crisis. Faced with an uprising in Algeria, de Gaulle threw the full force of his influence and prestige against the insurgents. The critical group during the revolt and for France's immediate future is the army. Among the officer corps of the army there is a group whose loyalty to the regime is in doubt. The army, since World War I, has suffered increasing alienation from both the French people and the political leader- ship. The Fourth Republic's political sterility and successive military defeats contributed to the development of a state of mind within the army which has blinded them to political reality. Since Indo-China, the French army has. studied intensive- ly the doctrines of revolutionary warfare developed by Mao Tse-tung and used so effectively in Asia. The army concluded that to fight a revolutionary war the defender must also have in his arsenal the spectrum of tactics used by the revolutionaries. In particular, subversion, clandestine action groups, propaganda, front organizations, and terror must be employed. This theory was applied to the Algerian war with the consequence that the purpose of the war became a central point of concern to the officer corps. This deliberately cultivated concern was an important factor in the inability of the government to moderate the political aims of the war, which remained, for the army, the total extinction of the ALN and its political body - the FLN. The army's programs in Algeria were largely self- generated and independent of the metropole government's policies. When the political aims of the army were, de jure, revised by de Gaulle on the 16th of September, the inevitable counter-reactions brought into question the validity of de Gaulle's position on Algeria, and hence his leadership of the nation. On 29 January de Gaulle reaffirmed the principles of his 16 September speech and ordered the army to break the insurgents' threat to the state. The force of de Gaulle's personality and the nation-wide support he engendered swung the army onto his side and, stripped of army support, the colon's uprising collapsed. De Gaulle has immediately moved to purge from positions of power those individuals who were associated with the uprising. There remains the constant threat of another uprising. Indubitably the army will again remain the key factor in the even: of renewed disturbances. Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 207. Khrushchev in France `+x `15 February 1060 27 T Khrushchev will vis t France during the last two weeks of March as the guest of the French nation. His primary objectives in such a visit are to continue his courtship of de Gaulle which has so far manifested itself in the USSR I s moderate support for de Gaulle on the Algerian question, in the recent activities of the French Communist Party which has been quite pro-de Gaulle, in the roderate posture that the USSR has taken towards the French A-bomb, and in the ready acceptance of de Gaulle as a great leader of a world power. He will undoubtedly seek to exploit the "peaceful coexilbtenee" campaign in furthering the eventual development of a united front in France. He will probably hope to sound out de Gaulle on the forthcoming Summit conference and if possible to moderate his position on Berlin. The continuing objective of Soviet policy towards France is to utilize French nationalism, manifesting itself in de Gaulle's desire to create a "third force", to break up both the NATO alliance and the European Economic 1C Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 M J=6- February 1960 208. Self-Determination for Tibet In the near future, the United States Government will make public its support of the principle of self-determination for Tibet, through publication of an exchange of letters between the Dalai Lama and Secretary of State Herter. The Dalai Lama's letter will express his gratitude to the US for its active support during the UNGA debate on Tibet, which helped them in their ''effort to determine for themselves their own political destiny." The Secretary of State will reply to the effect that it has been the historical position of the United States to consider Tibet as an autonomous country under the suzerainty of China, and that the American people have also traditionally stood for the principle of self-determina- tion - a principle which should apply to the people of Tibet, who should have the determining voice in their own political destiny. This position is consistent with that of the United Nations as stated in its charter, which is to "develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." At the Bandung Conference of 1955 the Chicoms signed the communique which supported the "principles of self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the charter of the United Nations. to They avoid applying this principle to Tibet, however, by maintaining that Tibet is part of China and that the Tibetan problem is an internal affair of China. In contrast to this position, the Dalai Lama, who is the recognized spiritual leader and temporal ruler of Tibet, has said that before 1950 Tibet was a sovereign state. Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 15 February 1960 Item #203: The full text of The Trial Begins is carried in "Press Comments" of 5 February. There are no copy right restrictions involved in republication. Item #206: Reference BI-Weekly No. 24, Item 1146, "Algeria", dated 12 October 1959 CROSS-INDEXING 201. President Eisenhower's Trip to Latin America - D, J, U. 202, Communist Theory on the Breakdown of Capitalism - C, H. 203. The Trial Begins... - E. 204. Soviet Propaganda - E, U. 205. Further Indo-Pakistan Accord - F, P. 206. De Gaulle and the Army - B, G. 207. Khrushchev in France - I'4, E, R. 208. Self-Determination For Tibet - A, 3, M, S, U. Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Q Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 95. US_US!i'p(eq or Release 2007/03/05 :'CIA- DP78-0306 A 10~ ~( 1008-5 A major theeaww of the peaceful coexistence ca aign of Khrushchev is the identification of expanded trade with the US as a method of lessening East- West tensions. The campaign developing the trade issue began in June, 1958, with a letter from Khrushchev to President Eisenhower pointing to the desirability of increased trade and suggesting various commodities which might be traded. The subject has been vigorously prosecuted as a major theme through the US visits of Mikoyan, Kozlov, and Khrushchev. Khrushchev agreed to resume negotiations on the outstanding lend-lease claims after US Insistence that settle- ment was legally necessary to allow private credit grants.* Recently the Soviet campaign has abated. If trade should not develop we may anticipate the USSR will attempt to pin a charge of intransigence on the US. We have pointed out that a certain measure of trade could begin any time that the USSR so desired since US businessmen are free to trade in non-strategic goods. Legislative restraints, however, prevent the extension of private long-term credits. Such credits are barred by the Johnson Act (1934) which prohibits the extension of private credits of more than 180 days' duration to any country in default on an obligation to the US Government. The US considers the USSR in default both on debts of the Russian government before the October revolution and on the World War II Lend-Lease agreements. The availability of long-term credit is the real key to a major expansion of trade with the Soviet Union, since she is presently unable to sell sufficient goods in the US to support expanded trade. Further blocks result from US export controls, although only about 10% of the goods available for international trade are banned from export because of strategic considerations. The import of Soviet goods by the US is currently restricted by several laws and executive regulations. Most significant of these are the denial of most favored nation treatment, which raises US tariffs considerably, and a ban on several types of furs. Aside from all this, the refusal of the USSR to abide by internation copy- right and patent agreements has created doubt as to the motivation behind the trade offensive. Guidance The A T.T. A CcEmg Approved For el ease 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007103105 CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010006-5 196. The Revolt of the ind w February 1960 Early in January, Frederic A. Praeger, Inc. , 64 Univ. Place, New York 3., N. Y. announced publication of a new book, jointly authored by Tawas Aczel and Tibor Meray, dealing with the Hungarian revolt of 1956, entitled The Revolt of the Mind, which represents a significant and unique contribution to the literature on that historic event. Aczel and Meray, both members in good standing of the intellectual elite of the Communist regime which has dominated Hungary since June 1947, have chronicled the atmosphere of the revolution and its causal circumstances through a series of concise, documentary personal histories or thumbnail portraits of the most prominent personalities of the period in the fields of culture and politics. In this fashion The Revolt of the Mind relates the history of physical and intellectual suppression, progressive denial of individual freedom, cumulative economic blundering, ignorance of the aspirations of the people, and slavish response to Moscow directives which ignited the abortive October revolt. More important, The Revolt of the Mind provides a rare glimpse into the beliefs and motivations of the key figures of the Hungarian regime and, like Czeslaw Miloz' The Captive Mind or the early writing of Arthur Koestler offers a valuable revelation of the spiritual and intellectual gymnastics demanded and practiced by any functionary of a Communist government if he is to survive. The value of this document is supplemented by the fact that the authors were not minor, dissatisfied careerists in the Hungarian Communist machine, but successful, ideologically-committed members of its elite. Thus, the biographies they present exude an unquestionable authenticity and reveal the authors' disillusionment with and eventual rejection of communism. The compilation is an impressive variation on the familiar but by no means trite theme, "The God that Failed". The Revolt of the Mind will probably not achieve a large audience because of the considerable material relating to the Hungarian revolt which has preceded it. Nevertheless, it is the most effective portrayal of the worst aspects of communism (both in theory and practice) recently available and an indispensabl, adjunct to the research of any student of communism in general or as applied to one of its darkest hours - the Hungarian Revolution. Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007 .78-03061~Fe0b100a0ry0p~6~ 9945e I 197. The Khrushchev N t to Asia Soviet Premier Khrushchev, concerned by the deterioration in the strength and acceptability of communism in Asia (resulting primarily from the belligerent activities of Communist China during the past year), will leave soon on a tour of selected Asian countries. His current itinerary calls for visits to India (1217 Feb.) and Indonesia (for ten days beginning 18 Feb. ), as well as unscheduled stops in Burma and Afghanistan. This itinerary leaves no doubt as to the motivation for his trip. The visit to Indonesia, which capitalizes on a long-standing invitation from President Sukarno, was the first to be announced, on 1 January. Indonesia is the most recent Asian country to run afoul of Chicom muscle-.flexing, and has experienced an intemperate propaganda and action campaign directed from Peking against the Indonesian government's decision to break the hold of aliens, mostly Chinese, on the retail trade of the countryside. The situation has resulted in a severe strain in Sino-Indonesian relations. Khrushchev next proceeded to arrange "invitations" from the Indian and Burmese governments, both of which have been involved in bitter frontier disputes with Communist China. We anticipate that the Soviets will attempt to cast Khrushchev in the role of "great peacemaker", while attempting to take credit for any real or postulated concessions which the Chicoms have already made or may make in the future in their disputes with India, Burma and Indonesia. The popular belief in a split between the USSR and Communist China should augment considerably the ability of Khrushchev to build credibility for his pose as "friend" of fre. A2 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05 :'CIA-RDP78-03061 A000100010006-5 198. Elections in Ceylon I February 1960 On March 19, 1960, a national election is due to be held in Ceylon following the resignation of Prime Minister Wijayananda Dahanayake's cabinet in early December 1959. Dahanayake has held the office for only a few months, having succeeded the late Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike after the latter's assassination in September 1959. He is heading the current caretaker cabinet until the elections. Dudley Senanayake, leader of the rightist, somewhat pro-West United National Party (U. N. P. ), is hopeful of receiving a majority in parliament. In order to avoid losing votes to splinter groups and independents politically close to the position of the U. N. P., he says he will not form a government if his party does not gain more than a plurality. This party, under the leadership of the late D. S. Senanayake, father of the current leader, and of Sir John Kotelawala, who is now retiring from politics, had governed Ceylon since independence in 1947 but was overwhelmingly defeated in 1956 by Bandaranaike, leader of the left of center coalition Mahana Eksath Peramuna (M. E. P. ). It is ironic, in view of the political support given him by large numbers of the island's 20, 000 Buddhist monks, that it was one such monk who assassinated Bandaranaike. The elections present an exceedingly complex picture. Altogether there are 23 parties contesting for the 151 seats. The principal left-wing groups, such as the M.E.P., which designation was recently adopted by Philip Gunawardena, leader of the Viplavakart Lanka Sama Samaja Party (V. L. S. S. P, ), have considered joining forces but they have not done so as yet. Also on the left are the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Party (L. S. S. P led by Dr. N. M. Perera, and the Ceylon Communist Party. The people of Ceylon are made up of different races and religions: there are two major races, the Sinhalese, who have lived in Ceylon for a very long time, and the Tamils, many of whom are immigrants or the descendants of immigrants from southern India. Ther are also several minorities such as Moors, Malays, Eurasians, and Europeans. The religious structure of the electorate is also complex: Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, and Muslim. There is some question about how much Buddhism is going to influence the voting at this election. (Before the 1956 elections it was greatly underestimated.) However, it might be considered to have lessened for the moment because of the shock that struck the nation when the bullet shot by a R,,.~rll,; c* ,~,.,,.,7_ 1_.?17_ ~ r~__s -- ~ . - _ Approved For Release 2 { iC 5 C'A-RDP78-03061 A000100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010006-5 . _ _ ' [ February 1960 It-B& 199. The Role of State Security in the USSR On 13 January 1960, TASS announced "the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, on the recommendation of the USSR Council of Ministers, has abolished the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and shifted its responsibilities to the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the Union Republics. " The functions of the MVD had not included state security duties since the 1954 administrative reorganizations. The civil police duties have now been transferred to the republic ministries. Thus, the abolition of the central MVD organization Is the final step in a process, initiated even before Stalin's death, in which the important security functions of the MVD were gradually transferred to the state security organs (MGB). The process was briefly interrupted and the two services (MGB and MVD) merged in 1953 at the time of Beria's ill fated attempt to seize power. At present the KGB is responsible for the following major fields of intelligence activity: foreign intelligence, internal and external counterintelligenc armed forces counterintelligence, and border security. In theory, the Soviet intelligence services are regarded as the "unsheathed sword of the dictatorship of the proletariat". The purpose is to protect the party from all enemies, domestic and foreign. The Soviet intelligence services have many times been reorganized. There have been numerous changes in nomenclature, such as Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, but the role of the organization responsible for "state security", the repressive mechanism for perpetuating the regime, has remained the one constant factor. Soviet propaganda has represented the demise of the MVD as additional evidence of the "withering away of the state", and further liberalization of the regime and a major step in the construction of a Communist society. In his January 14, 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev said that the MVD was abolished "not only to reduce the size and expense of the apparatus, but mainly in the interests of the further development of Socialist democracy, the enhancement of the role of the community in the struggle against violations of the law, in the interest of granting powers to local authorities. " Actually, the MVD was abolished because it had become an economic and political liability. Under Stalin, it was regarded by the Soviet people as the hated symbol of oppression and terror. Beria, who combined under his authority the police and state security functions, became a rival to the power of the Party. Unquestionably, since the death of Stalin there has been an effort to submit the powers of the security police to responsible judicial control. We see this in the changes of the penal code, particularly those sections dealing with civil crimes and prison camps; the new emphasis on rehabilitation as opposed to punishment; and the evidence that the traditional methods of the state security organ have become subject to increasing scrutiny. However, it is still too early to determine the significance of these modifications or their effect upon the central security organ as opposed to the civil police. It is safe to predict that the state security forces will continue to play an important role during the period of the "construction of a Communist society. " Their activities will be justified as the "need for constant vigilance against foreign enemies working inside Soviet society"; the resurgence of "local nationalism" (a natural consequence of Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007/03/05 CIA-RDP78-03061 A000100010006-5 199. (Cont. ) Khrushchev's decentralization and encouragement of local initiative), and the necessity to guard against ideologieal infection resulting from Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" and the concomitant increase in the East-West contacts. Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007F03105 CIA-RDP78-03061 A000100010006-5 February 1960 ZOO. Yugoslav Role inure Detente In recent months, as an imminent Summit meeting holds at least seeming prospects that the tensions and conflicts between the Western and Soviet blocs may ease, speculation has grown over the future role of Yugoslavia in international affairs. In a mid-December speech to the Zagreb Town Committee Marshal Tito attempted to put to rest the potentially damaging effect of this speculation on Yugoslav internal and external policies and objectives. Noting his support for Moscow's initiatives in the fields of disarmament and the relaxation of tensions, Tito nevertheless reasserted Yugoslav independence from the Soviet bloc: "What is all the fuss about? We are an independent country. We have our own interests. We cannot all blow the same trumpet. " He added that it was "wrong" to reproach Yugoslavia for not joining a "camp". "Blocs are not a happy solution when it come: to insuring coexistence and peace", he stated. "Some say that Yugoslavia has finished playing its role since tension is relaxing. However, Yugoslavia never had any understudy.... Yugoslavia has not changed its foreign policy". Quite recently the US Government has demonstrated the continuity of its policy, which recognizes the significance of the Yugoslav role in international affairs, with the announceme. on 17 December of an additional Development Loan Fund grant to Yugoslavia of 15, 000, 000 dollars to assist in the construction of a hydroelectric plant on the Trebisnjica River near Dubrovnik. It is anticipated that Yugoslavia will continue to pursue her aim of leadership of, or major influence in, an informal grouping of underdeveloped nations pursuing genuine non-bloc status: militarily, politically, and economically. 0 s t r re. Approved For Release 2T0'/'/0Y/6% : ^I -RDP78-03061 A000100010006-5 Approved For Release 2007%03105: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5 ADDENDUM T NUMBER 32 1 February 1960 Item #195: * Reference Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 30, Item #184, "US-USSR Lend Lease Negotiations". Item #198: Reference: Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 31, Item #192, "Elections in Kerala". Item #200: References: Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 1, Item #1, "Tito Visit to Asia", 24 November 1958; Bi-.Weekly Guidance No. 7, Item #43, "Tito and the Non-Bloc Policy", 16 February 1959; Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 12, Item #72, "Peking Yugoslav Dispute", 27 April 1959; Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 13, Item #77, "Tito Throws Down the Gauntlet," 11 May 1959; Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 14, Item 82, "Yugoslav Accuses China of Violation of Bandung", 25 May 1959. Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010006-5