BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 7, 1949
• Content Type: PERRPT

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~.Ui~IBER ~$
7 December 1959
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1'70. The Resurfacin~f l~a~nacheyey ~ 7 .December 1959
C7n ox about 15 December 3959, Aleksandr 'Y'urievich I~a.znacheyev, who
defected to the US on 24 3une 1959, will. be resurfaced, w3e formerly was an
Information Cf?icer at the Soviet embassy in Rangoon, Burma. iLaznacheyev broke
with communism and the U5R alxxiost entirely fox ideological reasons. l/Ie is
intelligent and has provided a good deal of solid factual information which will be
useful for propaganda exglostatian. Kaznachey'ev~ s resurfacing has been carefully
planned to provide for maximum impact and timeliness without conflicting with
any of the various international conferences which are to be held in the next half-
year, It is now known outside U3 official circles that 1Caznacheyev has been
granted asylum by the US. This fact unavoidably will. associate the government
with anything he says or does, However, plans fox his resurfacing and subsequent
~~cpation have been designed to rsinir:i~ze the impression of official US invelve-
rn.ent and to portray his revelations as the statements of a sincere young man try-
ing to tell the world the truth. The major themes which will be covered i.n hi.s
expl4ita,tivn will be: the joint strategy of the USSR and. Communist China to gain
control of Burma and the rest- of ~isia; the USSR-CPR agreement that Burma is a
primary sphere of interest of the ^PR (this is conditioned by a tactical disagree-
ment aver violent versus peaceful parliamentary means of takeover); the major
sole of the Soviet official representation in >3urxna in clandestine intelligence
operations and covert golitical manipulation of Burrnais internal affairs; a descrig-
tian of the P~;a$cow-controlled propaganda net in Asia and. its use far political
purposes; the gxawiza.g embarxassmer~t which Chicom actions in Asia are causing
the Soviet Union; the assertion that the CP5U does not represent the views, desires
or ~rel?are of the Soviet peoples and that- much of the progress which has been
achieved has been. in spite of the party rather than because of it; a ;3escxiption of
the unhappiness, discontent and occasional active opgosition of the younger gener-
ation ion the USSR; a gresentation of the view that, while the Cl' SU has been con-
demned historically for brutality, it inay be criticized burrently for its failure to
represent and ,govern its people fairly and wisely; and, lastly, a discussion of
the particular Cox~nrxzunist inspired hardships which have been endured by the
Great Russians, which in some ways have been worse that those suffered by
other nationalities in the USSR.
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~ December 1959
171, Felix Moumie and the UPC
The F ranch Camexoons, a trusteeship territory of the French since
World War II, will achieve independence on January 1, 1960. Immediately before
and after this date there is likely to be a revolutionary uprising Ied by the Union
des Population du Cameroon (UPC}, whose current leader is Felix Moumie~'
The UPC was organized in 1947 as a party whose aims were to achieve fnde-
pen,dence far tl~ French Camexoons and unification with the British Camexoons.
The party, banned in 1955 allegedly because of its paramilitary nature, under-
took. to disrupt the elections to the Territorial Assembly in I3ecember 1956. The
parami.iitary campaign continued until September 1958 when the UPC's leader,
iJtx~ Nyobe, was killed. Felix ivioumfe, the claimant to Um Nyobe's mantle, left
the cauntxy in 1955 when the battles with the French were beginning. He now lives
in C,uinea though he recently returned from a visit to Peking. Following Um Nyobe'
death those membexs of the UPC involved in the actual fighting took advantage of
the French amnesty offer, left the UFC, and began to take part in the legal
political life of the community. The Moumie faction fn exile has continued to
oppose the existing moderate government, favoring new elections undea~ TJN
auspices before independence. The UN has voted agafnst such elections and
instead has urged that elections be held not too long after independence is
achieved, Moumie probably feels that he must gain power within the near future,
since once- independence f s granted the exiled UPC's tale as a revolutionary
party becomes increasingly anomalous. Maumie may be a Communist; there is,
however, no confirmed evidence that the UPC is aCommunist-controlled
organisation. There is no doubt that the bloc has provided funds, weapons, and
continuing Soviet diplomatcc suppoxt, both in the UN, and in the :~ tench
Parliament through the French Communist Party.
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,~,,, December 1959
l7'2. Indian Communist's Defection
arly in November, I}hani Ram, one of the 8 Communist members of the
PIO-man New Delhi 3vauncipal Assembly, defected from the Communist ;Party tsf
India (CPI}, He is among the leaders of India's lowest caste, the Harijans. These
are India's Untouchables, upon whom the CPI is probably counting heavily to
help win the forthcoming elections in Kerala to be held about the end of January
or beginning of February le,6Q. Dhani .Rani, who has now formally declared his
allegiance to the ruling Congress Party, began to question some of the policies
of the CPI and the sincerity of their proclaimed concern far the Harijans. He
sand: "The Communists have na program for the betterment of our lot. I came
to feel that they were simply using me and other Hari jan leaders to gain
influence and power, "But hi.s growing distrust of Communist motives was
sharply increased by the equivocal stand the CPI took when the Chinese Commun-
ists violatzd the McMahon Line in Sndia's l:imalayan border. "I decided, " he
said, "that my country comes before my party. So I re signed, "Dhani Ram says
that the CPI gets direct guidance from both the Soviet and Chinese Embassies.
Initial indoctrination of the party's membership, Dhani Ram has pointed out, is
partly through wide distribution of the Communist press (including the tabloid
weekly Blitz in Bombay) which belaboxs Western "imperialists" but extolls the
virtues. of the Communist bloc. Massive propaganda, as well as funds, far the
CPI come from the vast quantities of books and periodicals flowing into India
from the Communist bloc, sales of which are handled through the Feople's
p-ublishing House, run by the CPI, "I doubt the success of the CPI's efforts to
spread out in the country, "Dhani Ram said. "Its ways of thinking and its ideals
are foreign to India, There is a growing belief that it is directed from abroad, "
There are about 5b, QOt? I-iarijans in .Outer l7elhi, as well as large numbers
almost everywhere in India. Those in I3elhi, like almost all Harijans, live lax
h?vels which have sprung up in the old city, in the shadow of the residences of
caste Hindus, carrying out for a few pennies a day the most menial tasks.
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~I)ecernber 1959
173. Development in Laos
The report of the UN Sub-Committee on Laos was submitted 4 November
to the secretary General of the UN, The Committee xept~rts that forty of forty--
one witnesses interviewed stated that hostile indigenous elements received
support from. the 1~emacratic Republic of 'V'ietnam {DI2 V) consisting of eq,u~pment,
artn s, ammunition, supplies and help of political cadxe s. Witnesses also indicate
attacks against I:ao posts wexe centrally coordinated. The report concludes
there is insufficient evidence to prove .crossings of the frontier by regular I7RV
troops. The SYG has indicated privately he favors media#ion of the situation
directly between the Lao and DR V Governments and that the presence of a
"neutral representative" in Laos would serve to bring this about. The SYG has
indicated that some foam of UN presence should be maintained in Laos and that
this xnay be accomplished by the assignment of UN economic representatives to
i-aos. SYG hopes to accQxnplish this through the power of his own position rather
than submit the question of a UN presence to the Security Council or the General
,Assembly. Unconfirmed rumors, growing out of these reported views of the SY'Cr,
resulted in press reports that Laos was planning to withdraw its comgiaint to the
UN against the T:~R'V and that such action complied with the urgings of India. and
the S,YG in an effort to ease relations between Laos, the DRVR and Communist
China.. Lao officials have nat verified this rumor and have denied any such t
intention, A concurxcnt development concerns the detention and proposed treason
trials of the Neo Lao Hak Sat {NLI-LS} leaders in Vientiane. The SYG is known to
fav~ar an indefinite postponement of the trial pximaxiiy because holding the trial
would contribute to an already explosive situation in Laos..
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174. Democratic Soeialisrr~ and Marx
Since German prosperity offers no immediate hope for a change in the
Socialist .Party~s political fortunes, it has voted a revision of its program by
an overwhelming 32~-16, whereby many of the doctrines of pure socialiszra have
been discarded. The new program., the first major revision in German Socialist
doctrine in 34 years, rejects many of the basic Marxist tenets. In the field of
economic policy, the class struggle and State ownership of the means of
production were repudiated by the SPI? which declared that both lead to a
concentration of economic power which endangers the socialist aims of justice
and individual freedom. The new program maintains that the consumer's free-
dom of choice and the worker's freedom to choose his job are "fundamentals of
a socialist economic policy, " The saci~elists now accept the role of private
enterprise and free competition as "important features" of economic policy,
defining the relative extent of the private and public sector by the phrase "as
much competition as possible and as much governmental regulation and planning
as necessary. " However, public ownership of key industries is described as the
last of several passible means of control, C?n the basis of these considerations,
communism, as it exists today, was denounced as a betrayal of the socialist
idea. Traditional internationalism, is replaced by the recognition that national
defense and participation therein is a dgty of every citizen.. -The traditional
anti-clerical attitude is replaced by a willingness to cooperate with religions
for the common good - "Socialism is not a substitute for religion. "
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_ December 1959
175. Communist Plans to Disrupt C).AS Conference
In February of 19 ~ the 11th Inter-Americ~.n Conference of the Organiza-
tion of American Mates (CAS) will be held in Cluito, Ecuador, International
communism has among its major goals the destruction of this organization, and
the concurrent shattering of Latin American unity. Communist parties and front
groups throughout Latin America already are busy with preparations for a major
effort to disrupt the conference and discredit the CAS as a tool of US imperialism.
Meetings to whip up anti-C3AS spirit have been held outside Ecuador by
Communist-influenced youth, labor and women's groups. Other such gatherings
undoubtedly are planned, During the conference itself, the Communist Party of
~%cuador (FCE) wi11 spearhead the actual agitation, supported by Communist
propaganda barrages and ,group actions elsewhere in Latin America. If it is to
cause serious trouble during the talks, the FCE will have to gain the cooperation
of the adherents of othex parties. Ecudaor's five major parties are jockeying for
position in the June, I96t?, presidential elections. One of the few clear-cut issues
with which the opposition parties can rally popular support is the Peru-Ecuador
boundary dispute, which most Ecuadarans would like to have discussed at the
February conference. The opposition parties realize that the talks provide them
with a unique opportunity to gain votes and consequently hay^e joined the PCE in
demanding that the C7AS reconsider the issue. Strong popular feeling aver the
harder, coupl~:d with a genexal restiveness aver growing unemployment and the
sls.ckening xate of economic development, have given rise to a situation in which
severe rioting is an-ever present possibility, The FCE undoubtedly will try to
capitalize on these conditions to send mobs into the streets. :Ecuadoran police
may enhance the impact of the demonstrations by taking harsh repressive
~xzeasures against the rioters, tJne major restraining influence which might act
on politicts.lly conscious Ecuadarans is their pride in having their country selected
as the site of the: meeting. Many responsible leaders probably would oppose
violent disruption of the talks, if they felt that Ecuadoran prestige among other
Latin nations would be damaged.
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_. _ _ - "'"'' 7 December 159
1?6. Peaceful Coexistence
Since his emergence in 1955, Soviet Premier lihrushchev has identified
himself with and sought to gain acceptance far a program known as "peaceful
coexistence",. which he defines as the economic, political and ideological -but
not military -struggle between the "socialist" and capitalist systems.
Khrushchevrs program appears to have. three major objectives: to reger.~erate
and advance the cause of international communism; to anesthetize and promote
antagonism among the Western eountrie s sa that they wt'll na longer cansti tote
an effective barrier to Communist expansion or be capable of advancing a
positive program of their ~ewn; to accelerate the ideological expansion of
communism in the developing nations of Asia, Africa and South America. The
tactics of "peaceful coexistence" include flanking, encircling and isolating
measures wherein more subtle and diversified political and ideological weapons
replace the total assault of the Stalinist era. domestically, while making certain
economic concessions and ideological adjustments, the leadership seeks to
control and strictly circumscribe the limits to which this relaxation may attain.
Some of the major consequences of these tactics include: reduction of
repressive police controls; concessions to the consumer; modification of the
internal and external propaganda line (including the partial allaying of the spectre
of "imperialist aggression"); increase in economic, cultural and scientific
exchange s with non-Communist countrie s; improvement of relations with W e stern
and "neutral" countries; public disavowal of control aver the free world .
Communist parties; refinement of the technique involved in infiltration and
subversion in general. Above all, the program decreases the possibility of
imminent armed conflict. Regardless of f{hrushchev's motives, a policy which
entails such consequences is certain to have far-reaching repercussions upon
bath the Communist countries and upon the free world. It is significant that in
pursuit of his strategic objectives, Khrushehev has been willing .*.o accept the
risk involved in allowing even a modicum of relaxation and decentralization of
e.uthority in the Soviet Union and satellites; Tt will be recalled that Khrushchev's
initial attempt at rejuvenating communism by granting more independence to the
satellite countries resulted in promoting strong revisionist and nationalist
tendencies (witness Poland and Hungary) and led not so much to a revival of
pristine enthusiasm as to a disenchantment with communism in general.
Moreover, it demonstrated the difficulty of keeping such tendencies from
spreading throughout the Communist world, Similarly, within the USSR itself,
a relaxation of the mass terror of Stalin's day and concessions tt~ the intellectuals
generated a potentially explosive reaction. In China, lvlao's "Hundred flowers
program" produced consequences equally unfortunate for the Communist regime
Today there are indications that other leaders in the bloc as well as in the
CPSLT itself are not so sanguine as Khrushchev in evaluating the consequences
of "peaceful coexistence" specifically:
a. Hungarian Communist Party officials are reported to
believe that the Americans will be the gainers from a detente
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I7 ~6, {Cont. )
and will increase their pressured on weaker members of the
Soviet camp.
b. A leading Italian Communist reportedly argued at a
party meeting that Khrushchev~~ policies were a.ll very well
far the CPSU which had been in powex for forty-two years but
acceptance of the principles of internal detente in countries
where Communists are not in power would be an egregious error.
c. Certain veteran CPSU members are reportedly concerned
that the Khrushchev-Eisenhower exchange can only be expected,
by destroying the symbol of anti..communism previously represented
by America, to intensify the younger genera~tis~n's growing
ideological indifference and its cynical rejection of party doctrine.
d, Upon learning of the exchange of visits between Khrushchev
and Eisenhower, ahigh-ranking Bulgarian official wag reported
(reliably) to have commented: "The Americans must have an
ai;ent in the Kremlin, " This is believed to typify the reaction of
the inveterately Stalinist Eulgarian Party to Khrushchev and his
"peaceful coexistence".
Despite its failure to gain the universal support of the Communist camp,
Khrushchev's program is likely to prevail for the immediate future. Moreover,
once implemented, such a course could be revexsed only with considerable
difficulty, At the same time, the "peaceful coexistence" program includes
several paints which, if energetically and purposefully exploited, could serve
to further our own national policy objective of promoting ecrolution within the
Communist countries. Such things as concessions to the Soviet consumer,
increased East-West contacts, modification of virulent Communist propaganda,
a diminution of jamming, etc, could ultimately work to the advantage of the
free vuorld, For example, once the Soviet citizen ceases to be haunted by.fears
of Western aggression, he may take it upon himself to press his government to
devote a greater share of the national wealth to consumer products. In the
field of international trade, it may he possible to export some traditionally
"capitalist" ideas such as freedom and representative government along with
helicopters and corn. Nor is the West daspleased with a certain d~enioralization
and fragmentation of many of the Communist parties in the free world, which
has been asignificant - if transitory consequence of Khrushchevt s new course.
At the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge the potentially grave
consequences to the West of a policy which by professing to proscribe war and
to coexist peacefully with everyone, increases the natural proclivities of our
Z
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176. (Cont. ~
society to devote its energies and resources to intexnal development. "r''eaceful
coexistence" can be advantageous to the West only in so far as we recognize the
challenge for what it is, resolutely ogpose all form of Communist expansion and
Ott the same time, energetically and purposefully advance a positive program caf
Our own. Such a program would be addressed not only to restraining communism
a~nel supporting our friends, but to the basic problem of finding a way to ensvr~.
the peaceful and democratic evolution of the developing countries, In 1{hrvsk~~hev's
"~x~a.ceful coexistence" tactic, the free world has an opportunity to encaura~e-
tr~*nd within the Soviet Union. which could cause the na~ssianic zeal of the
Comnnunist movement to be re-oriented and uitirnately consumed in interns,l
develt~pment. At the same time, by refurbishing its own ideological armory it
pan successfully meet I~.hrushchev's challenge in the struggle for the developing
nations of Asia and Africa,
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CORRECTIC:N
.Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance No. 27, 23 November 1g59
Item X154: Crisis in Indonesian and Chinese Communist
R e lati+~ns
Change 1 3anuaxy 1851 tcs 1 January ig60.
C1mit Berne before Neue Zuricher ~eitung
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