BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 15, 1960
• Content Type: PERRPT

.......... ...
SE ~ l
III
PIG
G ul DA
CE
NUMBER 46
................: ?]a}lt't~V~ ~}]:?::2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Cult of Mao -
Ernesto Guevara - The Man Who Rules
Cuba
Communists Demand "World Disarmament
Conference
Soviet Approach to Ritual
BERLIN: Communist Miscalculations
Western Response
Disarmament: The General Background
New Force in Africa
The Sixth and Seventh Meetings of
Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of
American States (OAS)
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273. The Cult of Mao
There is substantial evidence that, after a quarter of a century of ever-
increasing power, -Tao Tse-tung's belief in his own infallibility has become an
obsessl.-):1, His SWalinesque posture, combined with hJ s ie,,.orance cor.ce.z-ning
the rest the world and h-.s emphasis on violence a- t~.. :3olutio,-l ~o alt problems,
present, a Serious threat to world peace and stability. By 1949, when the
Communists came to power in China, Mao was the undisputed head of the new
c '+-,ern:rnnent. All the successes of the Communists were attributed to his wisdom
and valor. During the ensuing years, every !!achievement" of the Communist
r,=,,::.me was credited to Mao, while "counter-revolutionaries", "rightists",
were blamed for the failures. At the launching of the "Great Leap Forward" in
-`i`} 3, the cult of Mao was pursued with even greater intensity, while Peking's
p. '_icies, both domestic and foreign, displayed less and less relation to reality.
Dvring Mao's tour of the provinces in 1958, Chinese Communist propaganda
played him np as a kindly man of the people, while biographical studies were
replete with testimonies to his omniscience as a leader. When, in April, 1959,
Mao was replaced as head of the state, he retained his chairmanship of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Far from being relegated
to a position of less prominence, he was fervently eulogized and continues to be
so today. Mao has extended his claim to infallibility as the successor of Marx
and Lenin to, the international sphere. His gospel is being spread by the Chinese
Communists in the underdeveloped countries as well as in East Europe where
some of his major writings have recently been translated. His theses on
communes as the only road to communism and on the inevitability of war have
represented an assault on the Soviet Union's position of leadership in the
Communist world.
Guidance
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15 August 1960
274. Ernesto Guevara - The Man Who Rules "-"vba
Major Ernesto "Che"Guevara leas long been recognized as the gray
eminence in C'iu }1 '' '
Cuban re.gi-e., ;?cent events Indicate that he may
indeed be the _A stron,,'_ n.:an. During the current illness of Castro, he has
made several major policy statements, and, on 24 J-61,r, he signed the Cuban -
Communist Chinese trade agreement - the first such agreement signed between
Chicoms and any Latin American country. Guevara was born in :Rosario,
1". .,ntin_ , in 1 32 8. He studied medicine between 1947 and 1952 and was active
against Peron in his student days. Fleeing Peron's Argentina, he wandered
from Bolivia to Ecuador to Panama and, finally, to Guatemala, where, in 1954,
he worked for the pro-Communist regime of Tacobo Arbenz. When Arbenz
was overthrown, he went to Mexico where he met Castro and joined his movement.
C:.uev-:ra played a key role in Castro's m litary campaigns, wrote a textbook
on guerilla warfare, and, following Castro s victory, has occupied a series of
im portant posts, being currently president of the National Bank and de facto
economic czar of Cuba. His basic economic policies have been the
nationalization and state control of the economy, and the curtailments of economic
ties with the US and their replacement by close ties with the Sino-.Soviet bloc.
He is an outspoken Marxist and has promoted known non-Cuban Communists
into key positions in the Cuban government, including the National Bank, the
P'-grarian Reform Institute (INRA) and his own personal office. (See addendum
sheet} Guidance 25X1 C1 Ob
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 L~MJA- L30t1 renw.PU= UT
on ere...
Communist propaganda exploitation of peace, disarmament and ban-the-
bomb slogans is being intensified, despite the increasingly sinister sounds of
renewed bellicosity which have characterized many statements by Khrushchev
and other Communist leaders since the U-2 incident, despite Chicom insistence
that "war with the imperialists is inevitable", and despite the fact that the
Communists broke up, the Summit meeting, left the Geneva disarmament
conference, aa,a are now opposing the meeting of the UN Disarmament
Commission. The Communist-controlled World Peace Council (WPC) held an
"emergency" meeting of its Presidium ("Presidential Council") in Stockholm,
28-29 May 1960. According to PRAVDA, Moscow, 31 May, this meeting, after
':piing the US "military commandand government (in this order) for the 'failure
of the Summit meeting, reiterated its belief in peaceful co-existence, expressed
confidence that another Summit meeting would be held "in the near future" and
called "upon all people of good will to pool their efforts to prevent a return to
the cold war, to establish peaceful co-existence and to attain disarmament and
to create favorable conditions for a meeting of the Great Powers". (FYI:
adoption of this resolution had been preceded by a long struggle behind the
scenes, largely caused by the insistence of the Chinese Communist delegates
that the anti-US line be more strongly emphasized, while certain European
delegates --thou;-h also Communists -- wanted the line of the WPC to remain
acceptable to non-Communists as well). This was followed by an "extended"
session of the WPC Bureau, again held in Stockholm, 9-11 July. t.t issued a
disarmament appeal, stating inter alia, according to TASS: "We demand the
calling of an International Conference in which all States, both members and
non-members of the UN, would be represented.... to achieve disarmament. The
first stage must envisage the banning of all means of nuclear weapons delivery
and the dismantling of.... bases.... We demand that all governments proclaim
their readiness to take part in, this conference with the intention of adopting
concrete measures. We demand that all governments now create favorable
conditions for such a conference. For this purpose.... they must renounce nuclear
tests and respect the sovereignty... of other nations. We call upon the people
of the world to support this demand.'" The same session also adopted a general
declaration, insisting that ".... the world peace movement must intensify its
struggle... ", welcoming "recent events in South Korea, Turkey and Japan",
demanding "the release of all imprisoned peace workers" and recommending a
world-wide campaign: "Press for large-scale international solidarity with the
peoples fighting for independence.. .Organize a world-wide referendum for
disarmament. 1"The WPC Bureau recommends that the national peace committees
prepare most thoroughly for the next WPC session which will be held before the
end of the year, preferably;rin an Asian country. It will be an important stage
in the world-wide campaign for disarmament, against military bases and nuclear
tests, and for national independence... 25X1C10b
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276. Soviet Approach to Ritual
Notwithstanding the official Com!nunict c ition on religion as bourgeois,
decadent and unscientific, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Soviets
are showing great concern with the continuance of cultural traditions inside
Russia. In the lengthy policy statement on propaganda issued by the Centra 1
Committee, + PSU, on 10 January 1960, great emphasis was placed on the
necessity of intensifying the struggle against religious prejudices. This
intensification is now demonstrated by a series of articles in current Soviet
publications, as well as by reports of serious Soviet study of cultural phenomena
within Russia. The 30 June 1960 issue of The Listener contains a short article
by Walter Kolarz on "Religion and the Russian Peasant". Ostensibly a report on
the findings of a recent study group of the Soviet Academy of Sciences concerned
with the habits and beliefs of Russian collective farmers, the article in fact
points up the growing dilemma of the CPSU in attempting to do away with ritual
ceremonial observance of significant social events in the life of the Russian
peasant (people?). The Kolarz article points out that the Soviet Academy of
Sciences expedition was somewhat perturbed, according to Kommunist, at the
extent of religious survivals, such as the presence of ikons in many peasant
homes, the widespread observance of religious holidays, and the fact that
religious ceremonies - christenings, weddings, and funerals, - are still held
in high honor by many people in the Russian countryside. In an article on The
Family and Communism by A. Kharchev in Kommunist for November 7, 1959
another aspect of the extent of Soviet concern with their failure to alter many
basic aspects of social life in Russia is made clearly evident. The article seeks
to assert the "tremendous concern shown by the Party and the Government for
strengthening family relations". Its major thesis is the explanation that the
Communist attack on marriage, the family, and relations between the sexes was
solely directed at bourgeois family life, bourgeois marriages and bourgeois
sex. 25X1 C10b
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277. BERLIN: Comm unisr:Miscalctlations and Western Response
In assessing the meaning behind the aggressive tactics adopted by the
Soviet Union since the Summit collapse, we must remember that the real test of
Soviet intentions lies not in the spate of abuse employed to characterize US
policy and leaders (aimed as much at the countries around the periphery of the
Soviet. Union where we have bases and at the developing areas as at the US
itself), but whether - as they recently have implied - they are actually prepared
to resort to force to achieve their aims. Lacking proof of any more basic change
in Soviet international strategy and in the absence of a specific act of
aggression on the part of the USSR, we can assume that the current tough
propaganda line represents no more than a concerted tactical maneuver. At
present, there is no conclusive evidence that the Soviets are prepared to initiate
actions involving a degree of genuine risk. The threats against Berlin have
continued: rumors of an annexation coup; the particularly pugnacious and
aggressive attitude of the East Germans; their harassment activities which may
have gone further than the Soviets intended; their patent attempts to force
Moscow's hand; however, the Soviets and East Germans have made ominous
statements about Berlin since 1958 and the latest round may well result from a
desire not to appear to be retreating from previous demands or from a desire
to distract attention from East Germany's internal difficulties (growing food
shortages throughout the country and problems arising from government policy
of collectivization). Although it is not likely that the Soviets will make any
decisive moves against Berlin until after the US election, or at the least, before
calling a conference of some kind to discuss the states of Berlin, it is possible
none-the-less that the Communists fhcrease pressures on the city and that some
form of unilateral action be initiated in October or early November. The
possibility that Khrushchev could underestimate the danger involved in unilateral
action cannot be ignored. Lesser Soviet initiatives such as the expulsion of
Western military missions from East Germany is also possible as a move which
would increase Western concern without actually incurring a great risk.
Similarly, the Soviets might give the Chinese a green light on Formosa thus
testing the US response without immediate Soviet involvement. 25X1C10b
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278. Disarmament: The General Background
The Soviets wrecked the Summit meeting and walked out of the Geneva
Q-natie.. 7 ia''r ,';:;?~,e-~t t' the Nuclear '.lest Ban Conference, also in Geneva,
now in its second year, i ; Lv7geo cdow;;n in-technical details and may be expected
to he recessed or entirely broken up -- soon. Cn the other hand, the WN
Disarmament Commission is scheduled to convene l ,ugust 15 and the
forthcoming UN General Assembly, expected to start September 2t?, can be
expected to devoto considerable time and attention to disarmament and related
issues. 1Aoreover, the dommunist campaign for a V orld Disarmament
Conference and the general, intense desires for disarmament and other
safeguards against nuclear war, likely to be manifested in parliaments,
political parties and other national and international bodies, as well as in mass
media anywhere, contribute to make these issues a central problem of high
importance for a long time to come. Soviet-Communist treatment of these
questions in diplomacy and propaganda is de signed to make people believe that
(a) the problem can be solved by simple, sweeping agreements between all
governments, from "outlawing all nuclear weapons" to Khrushchev's "universal
disarmament" plan before last year's UN General Assembly); (b) the prohibition
of certain types of weapons and,//or the "neutralization" of some countries or
zones (iapacki Alan) will eliminate -- or at least materially reduce -- the
danger of war; (c) the danger of war stems exclusively from the Western
"imperialists", either from their aggressive intentions against the "Socialist
Camp" or from conflicts among themselves or between imperialist and colonial
countries (cf Soviet-;Communist propaganda on the Suez conflict, US troop
landings in Lebanon and, currently, the Congo crisis), These Soviet-Communist
tactics have tended to obscure increasingly the tri e basic facts, i. e.: (1) wars
are not started because people _have weapons, but because conflicts between
nations or their rulers arise and are not settled by peaceful means -- just the
same, disarmament is highly desirable in the interest of pe ace and for
economic and social reasons: but unless combined with other effective measures
(e. g. universal acceptance of compulsory arbitration in international conflicts,
revision of the UN veto so that it cannot prevent such arbitration, etc. ), the mere
reduction of weapons or elimination of some types of weapons is no panacea
against the threat of war; (2) the principal obstaclesbarring peaceful solutions
of penling international problems, including disarmament, are the character
and the intentions of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, a group of totalitarian dictatorships,
established liy means of war and civil war, aiming at world conquest,
doctrinally convince:' that wars are inevitable in the "transition from imperialism
to communism" (unless, of course, the "imperialists" peacefully submit to
Khrushchev's avowed intention to bury them), with a record of cynically
violating any and. all agreements and surrounding their territories with
extraordinary secrecy which makes the conclusion of disarmament agreements --
which depen:l entirely upon mutual trust and. effective controls -- extremely
Difficult. Soviet-Communist tactics in disarmament negotiations -- whether or
not de.signe '< to lead to any actual agreement -- are always conducted with
maximum emphasis on propaganda exploitation The hroa;.?, sweeping demands
of the Zornmunist spokesmen make effective copy easy to grasp even for the
uned.ucate--1, while the patient attempts of We ,tern negotiators to transform
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278. (Cont.
c, er_f i } 1 tr(?ty ti:'-ts, without
looph;)les for Suvi11t surpri~c , ttaclcs or ..th~:r trickery, result in lengthy,
tedious speeches and