BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE NUMBER 48

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 12, 1960
• Content Type: PERRPT

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288.
289.
290.
Communist Forgery Specialists at
Work Again
CUBA: The World Communist Movement
Supports the Cuban Communist Party
Yugoslavia and the Developing Areas
Khru she he v and the UNGA
Khrushchev's Visit to North Korea
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286. Communist Forgery Specialists at Work Again
On 2 September 1960, the State Department made a public announcement
and a formal repudiation of a purported official US document which was being
circulated in Latin America. The document was later published in Siempre, by
Vincent Lombardo Toledano, well-known Mexican pro-Communist labor leader.
The forgery is an alleged circular State Department airgram sent to all Latin
American posts, 5 February 1960. The "airgram" discusses the Cuban can for
a conference of under-developed nations and contains such statements as "the
rapprochement between Cuba and the Asia-African states will complicate the
implementation of the program set up to liquidate the Castro regime". Obvious
errors which reveal the forgery include inter alia, the signature by Under-
Secretary Dillon, who was not in Washington on 5 February, (the date assigned
to the document), the serial number which corresponds to no actual series, the
signature of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs which is given
as Roy Rubottom whereas Mr. Rubottom signs all documents R.R. Rubottom, Jr.,
and the British spelling "defence" which is used for the word "defense". During
1957 and 1958, the Communists engaged in a systematic forgery campaign. Some
twenty documents were issued between February 1957 and July 1958.
Inttirestingly, seventeen of these twenty dealt with crisis situations in Near
Eastern or Far Eastern nations similar to the Cuban crisis of teaoci'ay, e. g., the
"Israeli-French General Staff War Plans", published in October 1957 and again
in April 1958, the "Taipei Cables", published in September 1957, dealing with
alleged US plans to unseat Sukarno in Indonesia, the "Loy Henderson Papers",
r,ablished in May 1957, alleging an anti-Syrian plot. (See Addendum Sheet) These
Lorgeries were cogently exposed in a series of articles by Roscoe Drummond,
j rst published in August 1958 and reprinted in the Readers Digest of November
19!38 (See Addendum Sheet). Since that time, the forgeries have fallen off.
Recently, however, a fake British paper on African trade unions and a fake US
Tokyo Embassy memorandum on U-2 flights have appeared in addition to this
Cuban document (See Addendum Sheet). The Cuban document is apparently being
widely circulated in Latin America by Prensa Latina, the Cuban news agency
dominated by Communists, and it represents precisely the kind of document
prevalent in 1957-1958, i. e. , a document designed to show the US attempting
crass manipulation of the affairs of small nations. 25X1C10b
Guidance
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 287. ~KAVqe F9f ?Aeese 200Q st Movement Suppor 0 the Cuban C h ommunist
Party
The Cuban Popular Socialist Party (PSP), the Communist Party of Cuba,
held a National Congress from 16 to 22 August 1960. The Congress was attended
by at least sixty-five "fraternal" delegates from thirty-one Communist parties.
These "fraternal" delegates were all high-level, and included, in addition to
central committee representatives from other Latin American pparties, such
internationally prominent Communists as Jacques Duclos . of France. The
Communist PSP is the only party legally permitted to operate in Cuba. While
Castro's "own party", the 26 July Movement, is apparently being neglected, the
PSP develops cells, fronts and the other paraphernalia of a Communist party
getting ready to take over a country completely. The Congress featured the
expected violent attacks on the United States, unreserved praise for Castro, and
pleas for unity among the forces backing the Cuban regime. PSP Secretary
General Blas Roca in a twelve hour speech stressed the unity theme and called
for the "coordination, cooperation, and fusion of all the conscious and radical
Cuban revolutionary forces into a single revolutionary movement under the
leadership of Fidel Castro. " Jacques Duclos :echoed this same theme and added,
significantly, "it is important that the Cuban revolution represent for all the
.American nations the possibility of freeing themselves". General Wu Hsui-chan,
Chicom central committee representative, also stressed the latter theme,
praising Cuba for giving Latin America a "brilliant example" in the struggle for
"emancipation from US domination". The Russians conspicuously sent no
delegates. However, on 17 August, while the conference was in progress, Soviet
Ambassador Sergey M. Kudryavstev and his staff of twelve officers arrived in
Havana. (See Item 256, Bi-Weekly Guidance Issue #43). The PSP Congress took
;;Lace concurrently with the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization
of American States, held in San Jose, Costa Rica. The world press paid major
attention to the OAS meeting with only minimum mention of the PSP meeting.
Within Cuba, the two meetings received equal play. Castro's speech on 23
August to a meeting of a new woman's front group - an obvious example of the
""unity" approach stressed at the PSP Congress - did receive general attention.
In this speech Castro specifically welcomed Soviet and Chicom aid, and it may
be considered that this line grew out of the significant attention paid to the PSP
Congress by the World Communist Movement. 25X1C10b
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288. Yugoslavia and the Developing Areas
Yugoslavia is significant in the East-West struggle as an example (the
only one to date) of an independent, national Communist state whose evolution up
to this point gives reason to believe that it is reducing - though certainly not yet
abandoning - the more virulent aspects of orthodox communism. Thus, in order
to cope with changing world conditions, Yugoslavia has been forced to adapt -
and, occasionally, actually revise - some basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism.
Today, the ingenuity of Yugoslav scholars is being strained to the utmost to find
theoretical justifications for economic and political practices which are dictated
by contemporary necessity but which - partially or wholly - run counter to the
theories of Marx and Lenin. In its economic program, Yugoslavia is turning,
increasingly, to the precedents and experience of already-developed industrial
societies: in other words, to the West, There is some basis for hoping that the
adoption of certain Western economic practices together with their concomitant
social orientations eventually might provide the right soil for the germination of
Western political assumptions also. It is not their unorthodox and revisionistic
interpretation of Marxism-Leninism that has earned the Yugoslavs the epithet
"revisionist" (Khrushchev himself has repeatedly called for a "creative
interpretation" of the Communist classics), but the fact that they instituted their
program without prior coordination and approval by the Soviet Union.
Since its break with the Bloc' in 1948, and, more particularly, during the
last two years, Yugoslavia has made a serious effort to expand its ties with the -.
developing countries of Africa, Asia and South America whose markets and soft-
currency sources of raw materials were needed to guarantee Yugoslavia's
economic independence following the suspension of Soviet aid. Yugoslavia was
also motivated by political and prestige factors such as the hope of persuading
these countries to join a loose association of neutralist nations in which
Yugoslavia would be the leading element. These efforts were highlighted by Tito's
tour of Afro-Asia and the visits of Afro-Asian leaders to Belgrade; by the
dispatch of important Yugoslav missions to Latin America; by the extension of
over 128 million dollars in credits to developing countries; and by intensive
efforts to create a cultural, technical and economic community of interests with
these countries. Belgrade has hoped to develop and lead an informal grouping of
"positive neutralists" which would adopt a imn-Bloc position on international-
issues. This objective was re-emphasized during the period of improved US-
Soviet relations. To date, its efforts have centered on Asia (India, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Burma, Iraq) and Africa (the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, the
Sudan, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). Except for Cuba, Yugoslavia's relations
with Latin America _ are still limited and aimed primarily at increasing trade
and strengthening diplomatic ties.
Since Yugoslavia is not a member of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and - alone or
jointly with other "neutralists" - does not constitute a threat to the national
security of the United States, but on the contrary is the embodiment of the
Communist heresy, revisionism, the activities of Yugoslavia in general cannot
be construed as hostile to United States interests. This acknowledgement,
however, does not imply we should ignore certain negative aspects inherent in
all forms of communism, such as the primacy of the state bureaucracy over the
individual, the implicit authoritarianism of Leninist organizational principles,
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288. (Cont. )
the addiction to police state methods and to subversion, the denigration of
spiritual values, and, in general, the arbitrary and anti-democratic nature of
Tito's regime.
Obviously, there are many concomitants of the Yugoslav program which,
in an absolute sense, we should not wish to promulgate. However, in dealing
with Yugoslav influence on the developing countries, we are concerned, in many
cases, not with a theoretical alternative between Marxian socialism as practiced
in Yugoslavia and some form of Western parliamentary democracy, but between
Yugoslav influence and Soviet or Chinese infldence. For, in certain areas such
as the Bloc-oriented neutrals, the Yugoslav form of communism constitutes the
only realistic, current alternative to a Soviet or Chinese orientation. In
deciding whether a specific Yugoslav foreign program is advantageous to United
States interests, the principal criterion should be the direction in which it leads
the third country concerned. If Yugoslav influence were to turn a country like
Indonesia - now strongly inclined toward the Soviet Union - toward Tito's brand
of neutralism and revisionism, this would definitely be advantageous. If, on the
other hand, Yugoslavia were to attempt to proselyte a country such as Greece,
which already has a Western orientation, this - obviously - would run counter
to United States interests.
Also to be considered, in assessing the relative merits and drawbacks
of Yugoslav's influence in the developing areas, ie the fact that Tito is in a
unique position to speak from experience concerning the dangers of Soviet and
Chinese hegemony. On balance Yugoslavia's activities in Afro-Asia are
considered to be more favorable to the West than to the East. 25X1C1Ob
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289. Khrushchev and the UNGA
Khrushchev's appearance before the 15th UNGA will obviously be a major
propaganda show, for which much stage-setting has been done beginning with his
wrecking of the Summit Conference and continuing throughout the summer. The
unprecedented attendance of the leading figures of all European satellites points
to a show intended to surpass that of last September, the impact of which may,
in fact, have been overestimated by the Kremlin. A new and spectacular Soviet
space accomplishment prior to or coincident with Khrushchev's arrival is
possible.
Whatever the further buildup, we can assume it will be designed to
enhance Khrushchev's two primary objectives:
a. the continued-indictment of the US and its present
administration as both aggressive and dishonorable, as contrasted
with the pacific and patient Soviet Union, and,
b. the further restoration of the image of the CPSU as the
authoritative voice of world communism in contradistinction to
that of Communist China.
In speaking to his first (though probably not most important) objective,
we should anticipate a review of the charges already made and incessantly
repeated concerning aerial overflights (C-130, RB-47, and U-2) as well as
repetition of the charges made by Mitchell and Martin. It may be expected that on
this occasion the charges of US aggressive intent toward the Soviet Union will
play a secondary role to an emphasis on alleged activity calculated to embaras s
close allies of the United States and/or to impair relations between the US and
other countries. Some material, whether true or false, is obviously already at
hand from the "confessions" of Mtchell and Martin; other material can be
presumed to be available to the Soviet government as a result of the information
known to Powers but not brought into the open at his trial.
In pressing his second objective, Khrushchev will speak, over the heads
of the assembled leaders of the satellite countries, to restate the correctness
of the S oviet approach to general disarmament, detente, and peaceful
coexistence. His intent will be calculated to re-affirm and, where necessary,
reestablish, the peaceful image of the Soviet Union and of the Communist
Movement led by the CPSU. Implicitly, he will be seeking to demonstrate, once
more, this time in the broadest possible public forum rather than within closed
party debate, that the CPSU's way is the monolithic, right way and that China
is isolated so long as it diverges in its views.
We may expect new hints and gimmicks concerning disarmament which
may be spelled out by Khrushchev or, more likely, left for later amplification
by subordinates; he may produce specific proposals for a new Summit meeting
next spring.
Of the other big four power leaders Mr. DeGaulle almost certainly will
not attend the UNGA; there is no present indication that Mr. MacMillan will;
and Mr. Eisenhower has not committed himself to do so, although he has
indicated there are many factors which argue in favor of his doing so. As to
meeting Khrushchev personally, Mr, Eisenhower has indicated that many
conditions would first have to be met, of which only one was the release of the
two BB-47 pilots still detained in the USSR.
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290, shchevts Visit to North Korea
S ecula on is now rampant that Khrush.chev will announce a major
proposal for the reunification or neutralization of Korea during his visit to
Pyongyang in October. It is significant to note that all past proposals emanating
from Pyongyang and other Communist capitals have consistently flouted Free
World proposals for holding nation-wide elections under United Nations
supervision. It is apparent that these Communist proposals were merely stalling
tactics to provide time for them to attempt unification through penetration and
subversion of the ROK Government. As demonstrated by the April 1960 overthrow
of the R he regime and the formation of a democratic parliamentary form of
government in South Korea, it is clear that Communist atbversive techniques have
failed and that their proposals have been flatly rejected by the ROK population.
During the heat of the April revolution, there was not one known instance of
pro-Communist activity manifested by the ROK demonstrators. It is also
significant to note that since the overthrow of Rhee and the scrapping of his
personal policy of reunification by force, the Communist capitals have virtually
ignored commenting in depth on the Korean situation. Additionally, North Korean
Premier Kim 11-song mysteriously dropped out of sight in June - supposedly
because of an undescribed illness - and did not re-emerge until August, when he
announced that Khrushchev would visit North Korea. Since all Communist
maneuvering are calculated by design, it is likely that there is a significant
connection between the virtual silence of the Communist press on the Korean
situation, the weak explanation for the Kim 11-song disappearance, and the
Khrushchev visit. Given the above, it is probable that to offset the prestige
gained by the ROK since the April revolution and to divert attention from the
establishment of a democratic parliamentary form of government in the ROK, a
fresh Communist approach to the problem of reunification is in the offing.
A second rajor purpose of the visit is most probably related to the
current massive efforts being made by Khrushchev to line-up support of
Communist parties everywhere on his side in controversy between the Soviets
and the Chicoms on the best tactics for ensuring Communist world domination. 25X1C1Ob
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