BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 7, 1960
• Content Type: PERRPT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sino-Soviet Tensions: Reconciliation Rally
in Moscow?
The Algerian Problem and the UN
Castro Tightens Totalitarian Controls
in Cuba
Contingency Guidance on Unification of
Central Asian Soviet Republics
Chinese Communist Penetration of Africa
Chicom Use of Food Imports and Foreign
Exchange for Political Purposes
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NUMBER 52 DATE: 7 November 1960
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Soviet
c+ _ r n r T 7 November
Tensions: Reconciliation Rally in Moscow?
Leaders of many, if not all, Communist Parties are convening in
Moscow in a further effort to settle the continuing differences between the
CPSU and the CCr. Information on the particulars of this meeting has been
scanty thus far; it is obviously related to the anniversary of the Bolshevist -
Revolution (7 November); it (or subsequent meetings) may also have signifi-
cance in connection with the next plenum of the Central Committee, CPSU,
which, according to an unconfirmed report, is to meet on or about 16 November;
another event to which the meeting (s) may well relate will be the 22nd CPSU
Congress expected to take place in December o r January (see Guidance #298,
10 October 1960). It is not presently clear whether this meeting represents
essentially the "reconciliation commission", reportedly appointed at the
Bucharest Conference of last June, or whether it may take the form of a
"summit Meeting" of all Communist top leaders, comparable to their rally
in 1957 at the 40th anniversary of the Revolution. It may, of course be neither.
Liu Shao Chi, Chairman of the Peoples Republic of China is present with a
delegation rather than Mao himself.
Several recent incidents indicate that the Communist leaders have
difficulties with their time tables: Khrushchev did not visit North Korea early
in October, nor did he visit Cuba after Us attendance of the UNGA, the East -
German Communist Party has postponed its Congress, and so forth. Never-
theless, further development in the relations between Moscow and Peiping
should be watched attentively. The significance of these cancellations may
become clear during the November meeting. 25X1 C10b
Guidance
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7 November 1
309. ` The Algerian Problem and the UN
Riots in Paris, persistent rumors of behind-the-scenes manoeuvring
amongst dissident political and military groups in France, Khrushchev's apparent
de facto recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government (PAG) and Ferhat
Abbas' announcement in Rome that he will receive arms from the USSR and
Communist China all highlight the grave dilemma that now confronts President
de Gaulle and the extreme sensitiveness of the situation at the UN as it approaches
consideration of the Algerian problem again. French leaders have urged the US
and, presumably, other Western countries not to take a position on the Algerian
question that would give further encouragement to untra-nationalist groups in
East
France and make further negotiations more difficult. Ifgica, in the Near
stronger.
and in Asia, the demand for Algerian independence grows Y
'-ulte recently, President Bourguiba of Tunisia has suggested that there be a
"fusion" of the PAG with his country. Morocco displays increasing concern over
"Wrance's failure to find a peaceful solution. And Moscow and Peking continue
to exacerbate the situation by openly supporting the cause of the Algerians. 25X1 C1 Ob
 November 1960
310. Cq~ %T? idaUta2OW/O8h27cilCL4-ROWS-03061 A0001 00020013-6
In mid-October Fidel Castro began a propaganda campaign charging that
the United States threatened Cuba with invasion. The campaign was obviously
designed for impact on the international scene but seems possibly to cloak a
series of measures which he is taking to tighten already considerable
to alitarian controls on the country. He announced at the outset of the campaign
that he expected every member of his militia to act as an informant and report
immediately any indications of anti-regime activity. Reports from Havana
indicate that the militia, which the government boasts numbers over 200, 000,
has taken over the actual duties of the regular police force: the latter now being
restricted to the house-keeping role of merely running the police stations.
La Revolucion, official newspaper of the regime, has been printing evidence that
i.nforrmer system is now functioning on a regular basis. Stories of children
informing on their parents are increasing. The militia apparently is being
organized into a Cuban version of the Fascist and Communist bloc warden
system. On 30 October an announcement was made that Havana was being divide6
into forty-three districts. One hundred and forty-seven militia members and
;o be assigned to be in charge of each district and specific arms and
c~riters established in each of these zones. Also on 30 October, thought control
was increased in the mass commmanications media field, which has been
completely under government control for many months. The 30 October
announcement was that the last remaining entertainment feature would be banner 3
from television; henceforth all television programs will be strictly government
propaganda. Meanwhile, restrictions on movement and travel are being
tact eased. For some time attempts to limit travel have been in effect. Plans to
nationalize travel agencies and ticket agents have been announced. Recently a
special list of bankers, heads of nationalized businesses and other key figures
in the economic field who will not be permitted to leave the country has been
circulated. The list includes Nunez Jimenez, chief of Castro's all-powerful
National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), who regards himself as a Cuban
version of a Russian commissar.
The classic Communist pattern of takeover in Eastern Europe involved
among other things: 1) Infiltration of Communists and fellow-travelers into key
positions in the government and the economy, 2) Elimination of the upper and
middle classes through (a) redistribution of the land, (b) redistribution of
housing, and (c) nationalization of industry, banking, and commerce. A similar
process has already progressed to a high degree in Cuba. The Cubans have also
adopted from the Chinese Communists an additional important technique of
control, i. e. , the establishment of an armed people's militia on a wide scale,
which has in effect replaced the Cuban -arrhy. These controls are fast being
imposed largely along traditional Communist lines, even if the facade of a
non-Communist revolution is being preserved. 25X1C10b
Guidance
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 Tovember 1960
311, Con jeGft1P easVW0W6W7o# c l {OPMQ3'1f61A0106 k 2 13-6
A report from an official West German intelligence service states that,
on 16 November 1960, the CPSU Central Committee will hold a plenary meeting,
at which a special commission will present a plan for the union of the Uzbek,
Tadzhik, Kazakh, and Kirghiz SSR's in a Central -Asian SSR, "in keeping with
a long-standing wish of Khru she he v. "
Assuming that this unification takes place, it will represent more than the
satisfaction of an old whim. The Kazakh SSR, whose population roughly equals
all the others put together, has long been a trouble-spot. On the agricultural
side, Kazakhstan is a principal theater for the "New Lands" program, which has
keen pushed by Khrushchev himself. This program, involving the cultivation of
n-arginal soils in an area subject to drought and early frost, is believed by expert,
t-, be unworkable in the long run. In practice, 1956 and 1958 were bumper years,
tut in 1955 and 1957 most of the "New Lands" suffered drought; in 1955, the yield
was 30% below average. In 1959 four million acres of grain were not harvested
before the frost, and latest indications are that there will be even more losio from
this cause this year. Developments in the "New Lands" have been reflected in
the career of Nikolay Ilich Belyayev; an agricultural expert, he had a meteoric
rise to a position on the CPSU Predidium. Then, for unknown reasons, he was
sent out to Kazakhstan to head the party; apparently he was being given a chance
to redeem hilself by making a success of the Kazakh "New Lands". In January
1960, Khrushchev downgraded him to purely local office as a result of the 1959
harvest losses, and he has recently disappeared completely from public notice.
There has been trouble in Kazakh industry, too, and in October 1959 there were
strikes, due to unbearable living conditions, in Karaganda Oblast; these workers'
protests were followed by police repression ( an eyewitness estimated that 100
rioters were killed and a thousand wounded) and firings of officials. Since the
hunting of scapegoats has not improved the Kazakh economy, Khrushchev is now
apparently seeking to meet the situation and to control it by completely reorganiz-
ing Central Asian administration. But he can hardly abandon the impractical "New
Lands" program, as this would mean too great a loss of prestige for him.
Aside f rom the economic problem, there are other factors which may have
a bearing on the proposed unification. One of these is the persistence of the
Moslem faith in this area. Another is the danger of pan-Turk sentiment in the
population, probably intensified by the new Slavic settlers. There is now a Slavic
majority (70%) in Kazakhstan, due to immigration, and unification will tend to
blot out the native cultures in the whole area. Probably more important is the
proximity of the Kazakh, Tadzhik, and Kirghiz Republics to Sinkiang Province in
Communist China. Before 1949, Sinkiang was subject to Soviet penetration. Now
the threat may be moving in the opposite direction. Some pre-1955 Chinese maps
assign the Pamir salient of the Tadzhik SSR to China; other, more recent maps
indicate that the Sino-Soviet border in this area is not officially.. settled.
Photographs in the 1 May 1960 issue of the Chieh-fang-chun Hua-pao, a Chinese
Communist illustrated magazine, showed Chinese troops training and quartering
on the Pamir border. The leaders in the Kremlin may fear that the Chinese
will start moving in, as they did in Northern India, and that the small Tadzhik
and Kirghiz Republics will be the object of Chinese Communist "salami tactics"
unless they are merged into another, larger unit. It is interesting to note that
the German report makes no mention of the inclusion of the Turkmen Republic,
which lies at a great distance from the Chinese frontier.
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7 ovem er 60
312. Chinese Communist Inetration of Africa
The Chinese Communists -- during this year in which so many African
states have achieved independence -- have been making especially strong efforts
towards penetration of that continent which they began immediately following
the Bandung Conference of 1955. Chicom activity already includes an ambitious
spread of broadcasts to Africa, with programs in French, English, Arabic, and
Portuguese; Cantonese language broadcasts are also directed toward Chinese
minorities in South Africa, Mauritius (where Chinese number some 16, 000), and
the Malagasy Republic. New China News Agency offices have been established in
Ghana and Morocco, and an additional one is planned for Guinea. Chinese
:~xblications in substantial numbers are reportedly on the market in Zanzibar, and
th number of these is said to be growing in both Guinea and Senegal. A Chinese-
,~ '--can Peoplets Friendship Association was formed in April 1960, and "people's
...,iorn.acy" is extensively employed. Dance and opera troupes try to arouse
p:. j-ular interest in China, and, this year, a group of Chinese acrobats concluder?
an extensive tour of Africa with calls in Sudan, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Gu aeati~.+.
The Chicom representative on the Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-
:.cian Solidarity Organization, however, has ?mund himself somewhat frustrated
because of the influence of the UAR, which has its own designs on the new
African states. The Chicoms have not only to combat Chinese Nationalist
5ufluence (which is not negligible), but find themselves also at odds with the USSR,
which disagrees with Peiping over methods of exploiting the African situation.
These differences with the USSR arose over the fact that the Soviets consider
most African countries not yet ripe for revolutionary action, Communist style ,
an-1 are willing to offer aid to what Peiping terms their "bourgeois governments",
while Peiping wants to support revolutionary action and is more willing than
Moscow to accept the risk that such action might develop into major war.
Moreover, so far, only six African states (Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Guinea,
Ghana, and Mali) have recognized Peiping. However, it is likely that several
of the new states will try to recognize both Peiping and Taipei, The rebel
Algerian government has already been recognized by the Chinese Reds, and the
Algerian rebels have agreed to set up a diplomatic post in Peiping. Efforts have
been made to expand Africa's trade with China, although the potential is limited
by the-distances involved and China's inability to provide large quantities of
much---wanted industrial goods. A trade pact has been signed with Morocco and,
,wring his recent visit to Peiping, President Sekou Toure of Guinea received a
$25, 000, 000 interest-free credit. 25X1 C1 Ob
Guidance
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313.. Chicom Use of Food Imports and Foreign Exchange for Political Purposes
Prolonged droughts, combined with serious floods and self-defeating
agricultural policies, have led to a near famine situation in certain areas of
Communist China. This has obliged the Chinese to suspend rice deliveries to
bloc countries, has seriously hampered the Chinese industrial program and
could subsequently have a marked effect on the standard of living throughout the
country.
An intelligence report indicates that a Chinese Economic Mission has
purchased 4, 200 tons of rice from Cambodia and is attempting to purchase an
additional 7, 000 tons. The Chinese preps has reported that China will import
4n0, 000 tons of rice from Burma in 1961 as a result of the settlement of the
Sino-Burmese border dispute. We believe that most of this high quality rice
w3.1l, in all probability, be exported in order to fulfill C hinats commitments as
a result of trade agreements with Cuba and Ceylon.
The Albanian radio reported on 10 October that a large shipment of wheat
ha:f been received from the Chinese People's Republic. Albania, which is not
c riculturally self- sufficient, has been relying almost entirely on the Soviets
t fill its needs. It is probable that, as a result of the growing political rift
between Albania and the USSR, the latter has cut off its shipments and the
Chinese are attempting to fill the gap.
Guidance
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