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November 17, 2016
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December 19, 1960
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''. ..... .....................?.......????.....:??? ..................?:::: ? ? ? ? ?????????? ? ? ? ? ? ???????? ? ? ? ? ? ??????? .... : ............: ...... ...: ................... :.*: ? ? .......: ..................?.?.?: ? ? ? ? ? ???????? ? ? ? ? ? ?????????? ? ? ? ? .......................... :::.?:: e? ? ???????????? ? ? ? ?????????????? ? ? ? ????? .. . . . ............ .................. ................ ? ? ????????????? ......................????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ..X.:.:.:4?.?40.6:0%.:0???????????:?:?:?:?:??????????:?:?:?:?:?:?:??????:?:::::??? .:.:.:.:40:40:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0?:?:?:?:?:?:?:?:?::::?:?:?:?:?:?:?:?:**::::::.:*:*:*::::::::::.:. .....*IVi/Xriik ???? ?????? ... ?? ........ ? ? * NUMBER: 55 DATE: 19 December 1960 TABLE OF CONTENTS 327. SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS: Manife sto 328. Growing Disillusionment in Iraq With Soviet Trade Agreement and Aid 329. The "New Soviet Man" Develops Slowly 330. The Situation in Hungary Four Years After the Re volt The Moscow X1 C 7.747.74747: 47.7.747.747: 8.10? 0. ? ???? ????? 07:0 ???????????? ???????????????????????????????? ??? ? ????? .0.0. .0. ? ?????? ??????????????? ???????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????? ??????? 111Me) S Moor 327 (Cont.PProved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 I 3. Peaceful Co-Existence. The principle of peaceful coexistence is stressed throughout the text, but it is surrounded by many not so peaceful reservations and limitations. Under the heading "Workers Educated in Internationalism", the document alleges: "War is a constant companion of capitalism" "As long as imperialism exists there will be soil for wars of aggre ssion" "U.S. imperialism is the main fame of aggression and war " After the customary attacks on West Germany, the declaration states under the heading "Imperialists Accused of Causing Arms Race": ? "The imperialists frustrate all constructive disarmament pro- posals by the Soviet Union..." "The U.S. ruling circles have wrecked the Paris meeting of the heads of government" "The aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed" Only as though an afterthought, the document adds: "War is not fatally inevitable" One might suspect that this language permits the CCP to continue believiu:Y war to be inevitable, as long as they are not fatalistic about it. Further; under the heading "Prevention of War Called Pressing Task", the declaration first seems to confirm Moscow's repeated warnings against the dangers of nuclear war: "The democratic and peace forces today have no task more pressing than that of safeguarding humanity against a global thermo-nuclear disaster. The unprecedented destructive power of modern means of warfare demands that the main actions of the anti-war and peace-loving forces be directed towards preventing wars," This pseudo-humanitarian approach, however, quickly turns into aggressive Communist maneuvers: "To fight for peace today means to maintain the greatest vigilance, indefatigably to lay bare the policy of the imperialists, to keep a watchful eye on the intrigues and maneuvers of the warmongers, arouse the righteous indignation of the peoples against those who are heading for war.... "In the countries where the imperialists have established war bases, it is necessary to step up the struggle for their abolition... "The struggle of the peoples against the militarization of their countries should be combined with the struggle against the capitalist monopolies connected with the U.S. imperialists...." Finally, the document threatens openly: "But should the imperialist maniacs start war, the peoples will sweep capitalism out of existence and bury it." This contradicts various recent Soviet statements which admitted that general nuclear war might inflict intolerable damage upon the Communist nations, too. 4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 _ 3Z7. (cofienoved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 f. Cold War - No, Intensified Class Struggle - Yes? The paper reiterates the allegation that the "cold war" is a US invention. Under the heading '?Socialist Victory Predicted in Peaceful Competition", the declaration proclaims: "Communists emphatically reject the U.S. doctrine of cold war and brinkmanship, for it is a policy leading to thermonuclear catastrophe." Throughout the paper, however, there are numerous indications of intensified class struggle, both national and international, whether "peaceful" or violent. Actually, the entire text contains far more "violent" words, such as struggle, revolutionary, etc., than references to "peaceful coexistence". Under the heading "Peace is Described as "Socialist Ally", the declaration asserts: "Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle, as the revisionists claim. The coexistence of states with different social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. In conditions d peaceful coexistence, favorable opportunities are provided for the develop- ment of the class struggle...." After asserting that "the working class and its vanguard ? the Marxist- Leninist party -- seek to achieve the Socialist revolution by peaceful means", the document threatens (under the heading "Class Struggle Stressed as Path to Reform"): "In the event of the exploiting classes' resorting to violence against people, the possibility of non-peaceful transition to social- ism should be borne Di_ Mind. Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily." g. Communist Tactics: The declaration confirms and re-emphasizes at length well-known Communist tactics, such as: United Fronts, especially with labor unions and Socialists; peace propaganda; support of national independence movements. The Chinese have apparently won their point on this latter issue: not only does the declaration specifically acknowledge the impact of China in Africa, Asia and Latin America, but it also accepts the Chinese distrust of the "national bourgeoisie" in the newly independent countries, by stating (under the heading "Basis of Unity Stated for Progressive Forces"): "As social contradictions grow, the national bourgeoisie inclines more and more to compromising with domestic reaction and imperialism. The people, however, begin to see that the best way to abolish age-long backwardness and to improve their living standard is that of non-capitalist development." Somewhat new, at least in its choice of certain target countries, is the appeal on behalf of policical prisoners, under the heading "Monopolies Accused of Contradictions": 'I.... this meeting expresses proletarian solidarity with the courageous sons and daughters of the working class and the fighters for democracy, languishing behind prison bars in the 5 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 .34161;e4114.061A000100020016-3 Now awroolikii140.111m 327. (41patipled For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 U. S.A. Spain, Portugal, Japan, West Germany, Greece, Iran, Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Iraq, Argentina) Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Union of South Africa, the Sudan and other countries." 25X1 C1 Ob Guidance pprove ? or 'a ease III I: " I I. III II . 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 vele It@igtrnber 1960 328. 62804115iniligesase 2000/t08/27 : C til-030611400irade01010 ..?????????????nw.ft*Ol. ionrrae23 iraq wi oviet ' Agreement and Aid Shortly after the Iraqi coup of July 1958, bilateral trade agreements were signed with various members of the Soviet Bloc, and the Bloc subsequently made further attempts to penetrate Iraqi markets with trade fairs, exhibits, and attractive price offers to potential Iraqi buyers. An agreement for economic aid and technical cooperation was reached between Iraq and the USSR in March 1959.- However, within the past year, Iraqis have been manifesting growing dissatisfacek tion with the outcome of trying largely to substitute Bloc aid in an economy which previously had been largely dependent upon the free world. Criticism has even appeared in nationalist organs of the Baghdad press. Three derogatory articles have already appeared in Al-Hurriyah, and one long editorial in Al-Ahali has had some questioning and rather plaintive "observations to make." Apparent Bloc shortcomings in trade practices of which the Iraqis complain, include: a general inflexibility about specifications and prices regarding exports from Iraq; Iraqi consumer dissatisfaction with some Soviet products (such as automobiles); inadequate spares and maintenance; and dissatisfaction with the apparent Bloc inability to meet desired delivery dates. The economic aid and technical cooperation agreement has come in for even more severe adverse criticism (although the Iraqis themselves as well as the Qasim regime are in part to blame). A major point of complaint is the exchange rate, which was pegged at a value considered to be highly favorable to the Soviets: 11, 2 Rubles to the Dinar. For example, the UAR, with a currency unit valued at about 75% of the Dinar, receives 11. 5 Rubles. Furthermore, under the original credit of 137. 5 million dollars under the agreement of 1959, intended for use in an ambitious program aimed at the economic development of Iraq (beginning with 25 specific, listed projects), not a single factory has been established under the Soviet plan, which included a steel mill, a pharmaceutical plant, an agricultural machinery factory, textile mills, and some other light industrial plants. The Iraqis may - remember Soviet actions in the past with their purchases from the UAR of long - staple cotton: USSR sales were made at prices and in places which undercut normal UAR markets. Similar action with Cuban sugar is now being taken by the USSR: for example, 1, 500 tens of Cuban sugar was bought by the USSR and shipped in Soviet vessels to Bulgaria and later sold to Jordan at prices well below those prevailing in Jordan. (Do not use in Jordan) For UAR audiences emphasize that the Soviets are responsible for cut-rate cotton marketing practices. Guidance 25X1 Cl Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/2ilaiiiiiMilliii.0061A000100020016-3 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Narl 4?I 411?110111?11?1111 Pribecember 1960 329. ThiPPRadkiFilMfati 39q9N4iliieRrARV8-03061A000100020016-3 A basic problem for the Soviet elite is, how is the ordinary man to be led to do what the elite thinks he should? In a democratic society, men work willingly for their own private material and spiritual goals, along the lines accepted in and compatible with such a society. But the followers of Lenin scorn the shibboleths, as they consider them, of the "bourgeoisie," and seek to mobilize humanity for "socialism, "actually for the furtherance of their own power status. The difficulties involved in doing this compelled Lenin himself to give ground and introduce the New Economic Program. Stalin adopted a policy of coercion and terror, and his partial successes were attained at terrible cost. Since his death, there has been some back-sliding, in that the need to offer more material incentives to the Soviet people has been partly (though somewhat reluctantly) recognized. But Khrushchev and his lieutenants cannot move too far in this direction without sacrificing their ideology, weakening their own control, and crippling the Seven-Year Plan. The solution they have adopted is to evangelize the Soviet people with the concept of the "New Soviet Man". In January 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSU issued_a comprehensive resolution "On the Tasks of Party Propaganda in Present-Day Conditions," spelling out how this was to be done. Party propagandists were lectured on the isolation of their activities "from life, from Communist construction," and the persistence of crime and bourgeois ideology was attacked. Although the goals laid down included the development of civic spirit, morality, and "culture", the first and inmistakably the greatest emphasis was on work: the resolution stated: "The leading place in all ideological work must be given to the struggle for strict realization of the principle 'he who does not work does not eat, against persons who shun participation in socially useful work, and for inculcating a Communist attitude and developing moral incentives to work." Actually, K Khrushchev is only re-emphasizing an old Stalinist concept. Soviet writers and educators have been preaching on the New Man since at least the start of the first Five Year Plan, and in the 'Ws the idea was popularized in the Stakhanovite Movement, in novels, motion pictures, stage plays and other expressions of "socialist realism." After almost a year on the "Tasks," the Party appears to be less than satisfied with the results. At the end of September, Party Life, magazine for all CPSU activist s, in its lead editorial, charged that "there are still such ugly manifestations among our people as embezzlement of state property, speculation, bribery, overstaffing of subsidiary administrative functions, and the turning of collective gardens into a source of personal profit." On 7 September a lead editorial in Komrnunist Tadzhikistana pointed out that, though there had been much talk at party meetings in local educational institutions, "violations of the norms of Communist morals" were continuing. Most significant, the September issue of the theoretical journal Kommunist prominently printed an article which, after claiming progress, went on to say, "The fact however must be faced that, i the implementation of the great program of ideological work set forth in the CPSU CC resolution, only the first steps have as yet been taken. The organiza- tion and content of propaganda still show defects and are, in many respects, lagging behind the demands of real life. " It is up to the party organizations to manipulate and remold the people, since "of one thing there can be no doubt: the formation of the minds of men in the conditions under which we live is not a spontasheptuAtectiPtirRatefttted0 piotagintec l'AApiipsosetwoocmooesobae-0 local Now gtryved For Release 2000/08/2rtMlift3061A000100020016-3 3Z9. (Ct personalities and party organizations are singled out for censure or praise, and there is a strong hint that they will be judged by the production results in their areas. The article does not admit failure, of course, and some limited results have probably been obtained. But this Communist "revivalism" seems as unlikely as ever to solve the problem of making people work. Guidance Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 25X1 Cl Ob Now Ilungary leour ears A terWeAVe?viojlelt Aftiggpsber 1960 330. ThirgiMiligrirRelease 2000/08/2 ? The Hungarian people, who in 1956 revolted against nine years of despotism and subservience to Moscow, did not succeed in their immediate objective of ridding themselves of their Communist oppressors; however, they did succeed in calling the attention of the entire world, Communist and Free, to certain truths: that communism has alienated and disaffected not only the peasant but also the very working class it claimed to represent; that even the most pervasive and rIthless totalitarian regime can be destroyed from within (immediately or gradually); that there is no such thing as a monolithic Communist world - there are Hungarian Communists and Polish Communists and Bulgarian Communists but no homogeneous Communist society. Thus, it was the destiny of the Hungarian people, by their courage and their suffering, to explode for once and for all time the myth of the invulnerability of the Communist police state. Today, despite their bitter disillusionment, the Hungarian worker and peasant know what they can achieve through their own efforts and also the cost of such achievements. The other Communist countries know it too. In order to reassert Communist Party leadership following the Revolt. (and in accordance with his views of Communist development, which are con- siderably more moderate than those of his monstrous predecessor, Matyas akosi), Janos Kadar has attempted to avoid the excesses of the Rakosi era. His concessions include: a) improvement in the standard of living; b) curtailment of the more blatant excesses of the secret police; c) a stricter observance of "socialist legality" and the provisions of the Hungarian constitution; d) more tolerance toward religion and the arts; e) expanded contacts with the West; f) reduction or abolition of the more obvious forms of Russification. Of course, these changes affect only the more intolerable transgressions. Of those arrested for participating in the Revolt, several thousand remain in prison despite partial amnesties. While no one has been publicly charged or prosecuted for political crimes in 1960 -- the last show trial was that of journalist. Sandor Fekete and psychiatrist Ferenc Merei and colleagues in 1959 - recently there have been rumors of retrials of some prominent revolutionary leaders. Internationally, the Hungarian regime has attempted to outlive the particularly unsavory reputation produced by its activities during and after the 1956 Revolt and to regain at least the amount of acceptance and recognition afforded other East European regimes. The West, on the other hand, by continually reminding the vorld of the brutality and vindictiveness of the Hungarian regime, has striven to deny them such recognition. In this battle, time is obviously on the side of the Hungarian regime and, barring any new outbreaks or the need to use excessive coercion, it is likely that Kadar will make progress in convincing the neutral and certain Western countries that there has been a return to pre-Revolt normalcy in Hungary. In the economy, Kadar's first task has been to rebuild Hungarian industry following the setbacks it suffered during the Revolt. Thanks Ito the substantial aid received from the Soviet Union and from other Satellites, this was largely accomplished by 1958. Although the economic goals set immediately after 1956 were modest, in 1959 the regime attempted once more to accelerate its industrial program. Despite all its efforts, disinterest and inefficiency have remained rampant. Approved For Release 2000/081111a1eheiblili9O61A000100020016-3 vide Ise mrsisliketiffikisaistaffm 330. (Coniffroved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 As is the case throughout the bloc, the agricultural problems in Hungary remain unsolved. In 1958 and 1959, in an attempt to make up for the large-scale dissolution of collectives during the Revolt, the regime renewed its collectivization drive and increased the total collectivized and state sector to over three quarters of the total arable land. Then, in order to mollify the peasantry which had been aroused by these drives, the regime offered cash payments, payments in kind, bonuses, special subsidies for livestock breeding and grape growing, and extended reasonably liberal credit terms for construction and purchases of machinery, stock, seeds and fertilizers. It has invested 17 billion forints in agriculture, 40 percent more than was allocated in the draft Three-Year Plan for 1958-60. As a result of these concessions, many of the peasants have demanded an eight-hour day, better medical care, paid annual vacations and other benefits enjoyed by their industrial brothers. During November, the Ingarian press showed increasing concern over the lags in agriculture. Fall sowing of grain was reported to be 10 percent less than in 1959, and 35 percent ci the corn area and 22 percent of the sugar beet area remained unharvested; there are rumors of an impending food shortage. These problems reflect a lack :4 organizational control over the collectives as well as the perennial passive sistance of the peasant to collectivized farming. Although the indications were that the collectivization of Hungarian agriculture would be deferred until 1962 - 63, on 24 November the regime outlined a new agricultural plan which apparently presages the completion of agricultural collectivization during this winter. Such a decision will further complicate the regime's organizational and supply problems and increase the bitterness and resistance of the peasant. Guidance 25X1 Cl Ob 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 AttacftilarRASWAegn2000/08/27,klagaggikgaplA0001?*MWrnber 1960 . ? THE SIt4O-SOVIE.T DISPUTE INTER -PAR TY DEVELOPMENTS AT.. AND AFTER THE RUMANIAN Vit)RKERS PAR TY. CONGRESS--BUCHARE$T, 2.0-25 JUNE 1960 The b'ackground Of the dispute (1957-1960) 1. The present dispute between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the toMmunist Party of China (CPC) has its origins in differences which date back at least -three years?that is, to the summer of 1957. On the Chinese side, amteCedent resentments may date as far back as the formative periorcl of the cpq in the twenties, When Stalin's policy of alliance with the - Kuomintang drove the CPC to disaster, as well as to the war and early post-war period, when Soviet suPport for the Chinese Communist cause was minimal,a.nd did not inhibit the stripping of Manchuria: There is clearly no single cause for the current dispute. Rather, it woulcrappeai, an accumulation of Chinese policies and actions increasingly displeased and challenged Khrushchev and, presumably, a majority Of the Soviet leadership.. In the field of domestic policy, it is now known that Mao's 'Let a hundred flowers bloom" program aroused Soviet doubts about its usefulness. The program Tfor, the "great leap forward" beginning in early 1958 and The cothrnunes program,' adopted by the CPC in May 1958, were readily recognizable as a considerable irritant in Sino-Soviet relations by the silent treatment which they received in the Soviet Union. 2. Disagreement over foreign policy manifested itself_ in August 1958 when Khrushchev, after four days of discussion with Mao Tse-tung, publicly rejected, on 5 August, Western proposals for a summit meeting within the 14.N. Security Counal on the crisis in the Middle East?proposals which he had accepted in July. Nevertheless, on 23 August the Chirieee began shelling of the off-shore islands. On 23 May 1958 the Commander of the Chinese "Air Force predicted that China would make atomic bombs "in the not too distant future" and the Chinese press ceased to refer to Khrushchev's earlier plan for an atom-free zone in Asia. Khrushchev revived'his concept of an atom-free zone for "the Far East and the entire' Vacific a.t the 21st COSU Congress in February 1959 . Chinese reactions were not enthusiastic, and, from April 1951 on, reference to the plan disappeared altogether. In the light of these and other indications, it can be' fairly assumed that Soviet unwillingness to deliver atomic weapons to Chinese control had beCome a serious issue. It is now known thitt the SoViets cited as the reason for their reluctance of their apprehension over Chinese policies and pronouncement in the external field which were in conflict with Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" tactics, which affirmed that global or limited war need not be avoided, and which objected to Khrushchev's aid programs for "bourgeois" ? _ regimes in under-developed countries on the grounds that they would delay - revolution. Chinese objections to'peaceful coexistence tactics 'manifested them- selves after 1957 in the deliberations of the International Communist Front organizations, especially within the World Peace Council and the International Union. of Students?two organizations which were most directly and intensely ' engaged in building their appeal on the unity campaign so typical of the peaceful coexistence period, They desired to involve bourgois and nationalist groups in mass action and therefore advocated informal conversations, negotiations, and concessions to such groups. The Chinese refused to "sit around the table" with them except in formal meeting of designated representatives, and resisted Soviet efforts to broaden the scope of concessions on program and organization questions Chinese resistance was particularly manifest after the Soviet decision of June 1q59 concerning Khrushchev visit to the United States. 25X1C10b (More) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 No.?i Nor 15?13rcrhektgafirff99,2WV,SfnegVqiiRalk-fiXiidilafillie010103623post at Longju' and reopened the border dispute with India, after eight years of quiet. The Soviet position on this dispute significantly failed to give full endorsement to the Chinese Claims, although earlier Chinese repressive actions in Tibet had been promptly supported as just and as an "internal affair." Khrushchev, as was known later, did not interpret the reopening of the dispute as a mere attempt to register opposition to his trip to the United States, but as an un-Marxist blunder which needlessly undermined Indian neutralist attitudes and potential value in the peace and disarmament campaign and impaired the appeal of CP India. When Khrushchev visited Peiping, after his trip to the United States, for the October anniversary celebrations in 1959, the Sino-Indian dispute was one topic of discussion and it is virtually certain that Khrushchev presented his views on improving USSR -U.S. relations. Sino-Soviet discussions were unsatisfactory, however, and no commun- ique was published. According to three widely separated and reliable sources, in Octobei 1959 the CPSU sent a letter to at least the bloc parties, holding fast to Khrushchev's views on USSR -U.S. relations. In November 1959. V. Ilyichev, Chief of the Agitprop Department of the CPSU, published an article in Problems.. of Peace and Socialism that justified the policy of peaceful coexistence as struggle on the international plane" and significantly noted Lenin's criticism of "Left Communists." It is known that the Chinese have since been accused of criticizirtg'the November 1959 joint program of the European parties, which is clearly based upon the same premises as the article. In December 1959, Khrush- chev warned the Chinese in stating at the Hungarian Party Congress that "we must all synchronize our watches." 4. In January 1960, the Chinese positions hardened. At the Rome meeting of the PresidentialComrnittee of the World Peace Council in January 1960 it trans pired that the Chinese had charged the USSR with seeking to isolate China in the ' interest of achieving. a. modus vivendi with the U, S. A reliable source states that: the USSR in January 1960 informally broached te the Chinese the idea that the Sino-Soviet differences required discussion, only to be told by the Chinese that the differences were between the parties and should not,be mentioned. The CPC appears to have reached during January important decisions which had a major effect on the dispute. On 23. January the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted a resolution concerning disarmament which specified that China would be`bound only by treaties it takes part injframing; and in Febru- ary 1960, at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countriei, the Chinese observers, K'ang Sheng, incorporated the statement in his speech, broadening it to include "all international agreements." The contrast between the descriptions of the world situation Kiang Sheng's speech and. those given by the European bloc speakers was striking. 5. It is at this point that the 1957 Moscow declaration first began to be quoted to support'the conflicting positions, when the People's Daily of 6 February 1960 asserted that "the development of the international situation. has borne out the correctness of the declaration." It appears like3.y, therefore, that the Chinese decided in late January to take the initiative in broadening the debate. But also on 6 February a verbal messa,ge from the. Central Committee of the CPSU asking the CPC to attend a meeting to discuss outstanding problems was reportedly delivered in Peiping., 6. In mid-April 1960 the Chinese took advantage of the 90th anniversary ' of Lenin's birth to make their most serious public attack on the theoretical inno- vations developed by. the CPSU at and after the 20th Party Congress in January 1956. Using oblique but unmistakable arguments, the Chinese challenged the premises underlying Soviet foreign policy and by implication disparaged Khrush- chev's stature as a Communist theorist. The Chinese attack comprised three major statements: two articles in the party's theoretical monthly Red Flag (issues no, 7 and 8, 1 and 16 April), the first entitled "On Imperialism as the Source of War. in Modern Times" and the second entitled "Long Live Leninism," as well as an editorial, on 22 April in the, authoritative newspaper, the People's Daily., 2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 (More) vow Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 7. The Soviets replied in the speech delivered in Moscow on 22 April by Otto Kuusinen of ,the CPSU Central Comrnittee and Secretariat. A very strong defense of current Soviet foreign policy and of the general lines endorsed at the 20th and 21st CPS11Congresses; 'his 'Speech confined its critical comments to general stateMente condemning "dogmatic positions' as backward positions." On ths same day a. Chinese Politburo alternate, Lu Ting-i, gave a speech in Peiping which incorporated -many of the arguments of the "Long Live Leninism" article. The divergences between the two speeches were so great that when one Communist party seriottsly affected 1?1,the dispute, the Indian party, published both speeches side by side In the 8 May issue o its neWspaper New Age, without comments, its action aroused considerable' comment and created=n-fissron among party Members : . ? ' 8. The Chinese then began to carry their case to the other parties. "Long Live Leninism, " the Lu Ting- speech, 'and the -People's Daily editorial of 22 Apr: were translated and-published in the widely circulated English language Peking Review of 26 April.' At the same time, the first edition of a book containing the three articles was produced by the Foreign Languages Press in Peiping in many languages for distribution abroad. Two further editions of this book were pro- duced, one in May and the other, .after theBscharest confrontations, in August. The book is l?wn to exist in English, Spanish,' French, the Eastern European languages (including Russian), and Vietnamese. It has been distributed in'India and in Certain countries at least of Latin America and Western Europe. It appears that the Chinese liter attempted to circulate the articles in the USSR in one of their two Russian language publications, Druzhba,, an action which the Soviets protested. The magazine was in fact suspended from circulation in the USSR after the publication of the June issue. It is known that there were earlier instances of Szwiet refusals to circulate Chinese doctrinal writings in the USSR. 9. After the Kuusinen rebutal Of Chinese charges, the' CPSU took advanta.g of the 40th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's book Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder (10 June 1960) to carry the public ideological debate with the Chinese to new heights, including the use of the charge of "deviation,,,," Two Soviet articles published on 10 June, one by D. Shevlyagin in the newspaper Soviet Russia and one by N. -Matkovsky in the party newspaper Prairda, expressed this criticism by attacking "contemporary left-wing deviationism" in terms which referred to the positions 'held by the 'Chinese party. Both articles highlighted the significance of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957. Matkovsky characterized it as a "programmatic document of the international Communist movement, " and as a validatiOn Of the' general line eXpressed by the CPSU. Shevlyagin, on the other hand,' referred particularly to the declaration as authorizing and requiring a struggle against "leftist opportunism" as well as against ,"rightist opportunism" such as that of the Yugoslays. In discussing manifestations of lift opportunism he made the significant point that "not only groups' of Communists but the leadership of individual parties have veered into - leftist deviationism." Neither of the articles explicitly identified the Chinese as the target of criticism, but their 'relevance to the dispute was unmistakable. 10. The tithing Of this intensification of the Soviet attack on the Chinese views coincides with a CPSU letter' on the Summit Conference Which was circulatet shortly after Khrushchevrs return home following the collapse of the conference, to the communist parties of the bloc and some others. Although the text of this letter is not available, it seems likely to have been unacceptable to the Chinese, who emphasized from mid-May on that the course of events before and at Paris ? provea the validity of the Chinese arguments concerning imperialism and the illusory and fruitless character of negotiation. Perhaps the worst offense of the Chinese, 'in Soviet eyes, was their argument that the only value Of Communist participation in such peace negotiations was the purely tactical advantage that came out of their eventual exposure of the true character and intentions of the enemy. ' This 'observation was precisely the kind of Statement which the CPSU was most eager to avert. 3 (More) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RD078-03061A000100020016-3 ? ? Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 11. The CPSU decided at this time to send a sharp letter of criticism to the CPC. CPSU letters calling for a conference were reportedly sent to the Chinese on Z 'june and on,7 June, and it appears likely that the letter of 2 June was the nsharp'e one. is also worth noting, thatthe CPC leaders werrt into closed. conference in Silabghai on 8. June, a ropy.? which may well,have been pro- inbterl by the 'receipt of the two CPSU lettere, They were in fact still meeting when the Chinese delegation left for the Bucharest party. congress. 12. The gbinese too made a major move in the now rapidly deyelopinfig dispute. They did this in early June at the ?tIth general Council meeting of the World Federation, of Trade ?Unions in Peiping., On 2 :Tune they presented an ultimatum of the official WFTU report to the chief Soviet representative, who rejected it. The Chinese claimed that the report contained objectionable features, including attacks on the communes. At this meeting, which opened on 5 June after a five-day delay, in the presence of both WFTU affiliates and representatives of some twenty-five unaffiliated national trade union federations, the leading Chinese figures Chou Liu Sha.o-ch,11, Liu Ning-i, Tens lisiao-pling, and Liu Chang- sheng publicized the Chinese views on the peace struggle?, and threat of imperial- ism, and the _1114eione" aroused by the campaigns for peaceful; coexistence and by programs forgiving substantial economic aid to bourgeois ..led underdeveloped oduntries. Using a tactic they had employed earlier in April, the Chinese leaders accompanied those.eriticisms with fulsome e?epressions of approval of the Soviet posture towar,ds.the,U,,S, at the time of the collapse ofthe Summit Conference. This approval of the. Soviet actions was accompanied by expressions of solidarity with the USSR in its, stand, against U.S., acts of aggression. It was learned that the CPSU was, pa,rticularjy stung by the -speeches of Lill Ning?yi and Liu Chang- sheng. 13. When the Chinese convened a private meeting of Communist party members_ameng the delegates to hear a statement-of the Chinese criticisms of CPSU doctrines, representatives of We, CPSU promptly opposed the continuation of the talks acid made the 011144.0US charge that the Chinese action was violation of the authority of the Moscow declaration. paralleled the similar appeal in the Shevlyagin article published in Moscow, and the charge ,has since figured pro- minently in the C,PSP's presentation of its case. According to creditable reports, during the WFTU session Teng Hsino-pling, general secretary of the CPC, accused the CPSU in turn of abandoning thez Moscow declaration. 14. Soviet representatives in Peiping not only criticized the Chinese actions in personal discussions with foreign communist representatives but took concrete ,steps to enlist the support of other CP's against the Chinese. 15.. When a group of European and African delegates to the WFTU meet- ing arrived in Moscow on 13 June, a number of CPSU officials_conferred with them. The Soviets informed them of the interpretation of the CPSU placed on recent Chinese actions at Peiping. According to a statement broadcast while the Bucharest congress was in session, representatives of the French and Spanish Communist parties held a meeting on 14 and 15. June,. at which they reaffirmed Weir adherence to the 1Z ;Party Declaration. -Because the leadership of both these parties was represented in the group of WFTU delegates in Moscow at this time, it appears possible that the meeting in question took place there and that the reaffirmation was a reaction, to the Peiping events. 16. In contrast to these cryptic endorsements of the Moscow declara- tion, on 19 June 1960,a staternent by Agoatino Novella, a leading Italian Communist and president of the WFTU, .was published in the Italian Party newspaper Unita. In this statement, which was also broadcast in Italian from Czechoslovakia on 20 June, Novella described the Chinese criticism of the resolutions proposed at the WFTU Couinril meeting in Peiping and, like the 10 June Soviet articles, 4 (More) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 characterized the Chinese views as "deviations.," So far as can be determined, this was the first instance in which a Free Worl Communist Party publicized this charge, against, the Chinese. the appearance Of the Statement coincided with the opening of the 3rd Congress of the Ruthenian Workers Party in Bucharest, where the nesd,phase of the'dispute develOped? ? , ? .t,f =1,; ;^:".4 ? The BuOharest debate 0047 June 1960): ! .17, The, Chinese deterininatiatt ia'pre'igiS,:it'Bucharest fer 6aviet adoption of a militant line is, suggested by an -era:Cie.:hill:a-4 June issue Of Red Flag*, which, in an obvious reference to the t:Pg0'ts earlier justification of its Views on? peace and peaceful coexistence; 'ObserVefd'iliat' atandi `Cann& separate oneself from the revisionists merely by stating that the for des :socialism predominate over the force's'. of #nperialiern." The Chinese dele)Otiait to the congress of the Rumanian.Werkers,Party stopped in Moscow far,anekthange of views on 17 June., It presented a letter from. the CPC which limited its powers to agreeing on a dat,..r. for a party conference to discuss Sino-Soviet .differences and exchanging views, without, however, adopting any formal resolniiOn. r The OPSU*representatives were not successful' in, obtaining ,an, admission from the Chinese delegation Of the errors of .the, CPC. The ,Chinese, however, expressed a willingness to correct their positions if in an exchange of views with ,the delegates at Bucharest a major- ity should _prove them wrong? The CPSU, justifying its aation by invoking the November 1957 .Peace, 14nifesto 12 Party becla.ration adopted at the same time), , insisiedthat.the views of all the Communist parties should eventually ? be ascertained*.befOre attempting a meeting to reach a final solution. In this con- text, the Bucharest session should- presumably haVe`iniralVed nothing but an exchange of views. The Chinese claithed that at this Meeting in'Moscow the CPSU had first made the proposal that other .parties be brought into the debate, but had wished to confine the group to delegates from the bloc parties onI. The 'Chinese said that they had rejected this proposal. It wouldappear, then, that th-e -Chinese adherence to their Instruction forced the Sokiets I hand. le. Although there are reports that the CPO intended by the end of May to attack Oe chine se;,at Bucharest, the Soviet decision to make .a major effort there to enlist the support of other parties appears to have been reached as a result of the Chinese stand on 17 June, yirtgaLly.none of the major Free World' parties sent top-level delegates to the congress. the fact that IthiliShcheV Was to lead the:Soviet delegation was announced only; on -June 18, the'da,y of his' departure , AU the ,European satellites delegations except Were led by persons of national, stature .equal to that of lihrushchev, but the late arrival of Cornulla of Poland and the 'aril:departure of Novotny of Czechoslovakia suggest that this top-level representation was organize ,d on short notice. The leader of the Chinese delegation Peng Chen, was clearly outranIced by this group. Fifty parties were represented at, the congress. ..Twenty-five of the thirty-five nOnbloc fraternal delegations identified as present were composed of second and third echelon party leaders and none of the more; significant Free *,-Orld Parties, ex- opt Chile and Syria, were represented by their leaders, 19. :The Scry14, delegation to Bucharest inaudea'V?. Ponamerett. and Y. Andropoy,;:the 'heads' of the two Central 'Committee fieCtionslOr relations with the non-bloc partis nct bloc parties, respectively. .During the fistilaYS di the congress they and their.,-col/eaines-Concentrated on brietOg fraternal delegates. It is known'that, groups of delegates Were called together Separately and briefed froth: a long letter which the, CPS,.0 intended to issue to all parties. The letter had apparently been either completed o-r revise at the fast ,moment, ;for it contained the po!4et account of the. Moscow exchanges ,of.17.3,une eiici'e*Aii:ued the Soviet .view of.: how the inter -party cliscuesion should be handled. -The :inclusion of Wu 1-islu-Ohluan, :the deputy director of theCPC's. InteitlatititiariA4isor Departnient I one of the faux Chinese deleoie suggeete that the Ch'inesetOdAilanneci to exploit their .sipporters and acquaintances **long the delegates.7:., . d? ? Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 (More) Ng." N.00 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Oi Ziie reporting o the..secpierice ;of events a.t Bucharest cOncerning the Sirio.;Soyiet dii,puivis in some re sPectS'coritradictogy;. The following probable" chronology, however, emerge a .fram';an analysis .of ..the available information. . t,. ? a. On 21 June the Rumanian party cotigresfe ,beganits open sestions." N. S. Khrushchev, in his first public speech to the congress, ,presented the essentials of the Soviet line and criticized "mechanical repeattersof what' Lenin ilaid on imperialitmL" .called such persons "children", arid' altatked'"those who do not understand that warda,under ,pre'sent cicumstances ubtr inevitable." Other public speeches by Rumanians and .fraternal delegateis, -.including the Chinese, , ;Peng Chen, occupietd most o tlie 'Zist 22nd and t * ? V4( ? a? ( 04. b. On 2:2 /line Preng Chen Spoke ',publicly in the .rn.orning.- He included his rewarks acbaracteriiation Ofirecilit,V.S; actions as a "peace fraud, "...and, he warned tio-t CariTne4i;er'be trusted." ,lkeferring on a number :Of points to the 12. 'Party becliratidii, he emphasized the doctiinal statements pre viously high ighted. in the Chinese criticisms of the Soviet line. He praised the "..;uban and Algerian StruggleS, and's-aid:that-war could bp averted and peace pre- served by aiding iiberation.moVenienta-and reVoltitionary Struggles. He also called for Commtinistennity_andibi'uhroadeet P6ssibIe-,anti-imperialist United front with this unity at ifs core:" Se further'charged, as his party had done earlier, that the imperialists Were using modern revisionists (Nib) to disrupt Communist unity, and he called for a struggle to the en.cfagainst Modern revisionism. He made no inentiOn Of npeaCekul coelastelice, '1 arConiission for which he Wee later , . ? upbraided by KhrushChev. It was on this day that the CPSTY begun- caucusing 4tith the fraternal delegates. g.. Three inter-part' meetings .dealing wi,th.the$ino-So:iriet dispute appear to, have, been ,h041, The fir st,.ocCurred.c,nZ4,June, When iber Soviet bloc represen- tatives met ? clay to drat e.Cornikuniciue... Noinforinationlis available on this meeting beyond a statement that the fiik draft of the 'cOMMunique was presented bythe Soviet .representative and that the Chinese felt obliged to: refer the final to the central Committee in Peiping for pOssible amendment. The Move to produc a communique appears, in.-the -light of the CPC instructions to its delegation; to have, been AlSurprise 'preaSiire'rnoVe by the .CPSU. The Chinese delegates were . obvi9up1y, faced with a dilemma,' but succumbing to pressure, they did sign the communique on the 24th. , 22. Ori 25.iune, after the conclusion of the cOngieis at Mid-day, a closed meeting of ibbut"1.13,iteleiateri':irom about 50 parties was 'ciinvened. This second meeting, a fat-scale 'debate, Was opened bi/the, first Secretary of the'llumanian party, :`Ghe,Orghiu-Def,' who read the draft 'coriiniunicine-.. A:ritunber of other dele- gates .then, spoke, Including, at least, " representatives of East Oerniany, the UK, France, ; and litaiy, In fact, aqcqing to:,one.eource,' a-large number Of delegates spoke before the Chinese representatives took the floor. ;. The Soviet caucusing' and: briefings bad had s.Oine effect. for most of the speaker's are reported to have adhered in general to the Soviet line, 91 argtnrient. By not speaking early in the:, debate, the Soviet representative, Pospelov, resorted to an old Soviet tactic which permitted the.,t PSC, to have the last word and to appear. is an objective . mediator rather than, merely .as .one,MOre partisan participant in a debate! When the Chinese, representative finally spoke, he attacked the line taken by Most .of. the preceding; speakers, .Charging that it was slanderous and One-sided.. He also.:. criticized Soviet attitudes toward ;certain Chinese domestic policies' and, spec ificalk that the-reports prepared for the Virrtl Peiping meeting had contained attacks ? against the communes ,and great-leap forward programs. (See note.) He denied that the Chinese had dragged 'Atilt :feet on Soviet peace policies. He also insisted, that the Chinese had supportedii4a,coful coexistence, noting in particular their role in the 1955?t anthing conference. The Chinese representative also stated that Chirlawould.-stia;nd on the :IVIdic ow, :declaration 'Of 1951; supported the idea that a reappraisal of the international ,situation was peCessark; and wick rike a a, piop.psali ii?F?CmilieirmTm (More) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Noe Nor Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 that the reappraisal should be carried out on a multiparty basis., Pospelov too endorsed this proposal. This Chinese reaction appears to have been mainly defeneitef'what new facts the Chinese delegate brought forward were apparently selected to prove that the Soviet case was a Waded and an incomplete presentation. (Note.' This Chinese charge is particularly interesting.because the two main'WFTTI reports .piesented it Peiping, by Marcel Bras and Ibrahim Zak:aria, did not criticize:thei? Chine ie policies. In.fact,tie Bras report contained. two, laudatory references to the corrimunes. /t ii'knoWzi., 'however, that just befOre the delayed opening of the Peiping meeting, the Chinese informed the head of the Soviet delegation that the treatment of the peace and disarmament themes In the draft WFTU reports was inacceptable and would be'-'6Pertly attacked if the drifts' were not amended before presentation;.- It is also kiiOWn that these sections Were not amended to meet Chinese demands--in fact; a number of amendments actually made in the final report strengthened the..WPTUis PuPport for the Soviet peace line At least one amendinent, dealing with ,the ,question :Of Free World economic trade and aid with underdeveloped countries, was, in fact, of such a nature as to be p-J.iticularly unpalatable to the Chinese. It seems likely then that the Chinese charges referred te the original 'draft of the WFTU report prepared by Louis Saalant. The offending language probibly was edited out, at Soviet insistence, before Bras actually delivered the report to the council.) 23. Delegates at this second Meeting received a number of papers, includ;. lug an 80-plus page Chinese translation of a CPSU document. This document appears to be a criticalfactor in the fu'ither development"Of the dispute. It was a sharp, Wide-ranging, and bitterly critical eunimary So*viet criticisma of the CPC It embodied criticisms of Chinese foreigg.PolidytoWard India and Algeria, ai as charges that Chinese actions were destroying "Vourgeoisn confidence in Conirnur 1st desires for peace and arousing Afro-Asian suspicions of international nisrn, In addition, the Soviet letter criticized Chinese nationalism and Chinese: refusal to cooperate fully with the USSR in military matters. Presentation of the document by the Chinese was clearly a part of their effort to set the record straight and undoubtedly disrupted the Soviet tactical plans for the meeting. Such a signifi. cant decision Must necessarily have been made by the CPC Central Committee, probably durirtg. ita early June meeting, and suggests that the CPC's attitude toward the Bucharest Meeting was .predicated, at least to some extent, on the use of this tactic. There l?ome question whether Khrushchev was present at this first day of debate. It was reported that he was present, but there is no evidence that he participated in the discussion.. -24. On 26 June came the final riieetlng,r another closed session that was attended by those present on the preceding day. It was at this second installment of the debate that Khrushchev personally presented his general indictment of the Chinese and provoked a heated exchange with P'eng Chen. The Khrushchev speech opened the proceedings. It was a 'Ong one and involved direct attacks on Mao Tse- tung, comparing him to Stalin as"alWays thinking in his own terms" and "formulat- p.,tg theories without coming into contact with the events a the modern world.," It appears that Khrushchev's,speech was arranged at short notice, and was at least partly extemporaneous,' with Khrushchev injecting facts, anecdotes, and direct , . charges that effectively demolished the attitude of restraint, tact,, and adherence: to principle which the CPSU had previously tried to maintain in the debate!' $peak- in angrily, with violent gestures, he described the CPC doctrines as ultra-leftist, as dogmatic, and, finally, as left revisionist. He said the Chinese did 'hot 'Under- stand the nature of modern'War, and rejected Chinese protests Olier the fa.ct,that the USSR had failed to support China in her border dispute with India, characterizing the dispute as a conflict " of purely national interests in which the interests of world Communism were not involved. There is reason to suspect that his attack also in- cluded charges directedagainst some elements of other Communist parties of com- plicity with the Chinese. He attacked Peng Chen hirnself'fOr lifs failure to refer to peaceful coexistence in his public address to the congress On the 22nd. In general he apparently reiterated in stronger and less arnbiguoue terms virtually all the 11:K; ? ' f? ; Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 (More "7 - , . vielf Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 ' charges embodied in the original CPSU letter to the CPC, and it seems likely that it was in fact built areund the argumentation of the?draft circular letter a 21 June earlier shown. to Free World delegates. 25. Peng Chen replied in very heated terms. He said he had asked for a , discussion to be held on equal terms, and that the CPC respected the ,CPSU, but refused to be treated paternalistically. Counter-attacking strongly, he accused Khrushchev of organizing the meeting to make an attack on the CPC and Mao Tse- tung and to cover up a Soviet effort to undermine the 'prestige of the CPC. He defended Mao as more in contact with the modern world than Khrushchev, and more active than ever since he gave up his leadership of the government. Referring to Khrushchev himself in terms reminiscent of the 16 June Red Flag article, he charg that Khruhhev'a policy is a policy of :revisionism, creating nilLasions" about? imperialism and underestimating its true nature. Speaking of the abrupt shifts in Khrushcb,e0s lici toward the imperialist powers, he asked the delegates whsthe.. "any couclusior.3 ca-.4 be drawn regarding Khrushchev's policy toward the imperial- ist powers lie stated finally that the CPC had no trust in Khrushchev's an.alysis of the world situation and especiaUy his policy toward the imperialists. Refuting Khrushchev's charges that.the Chinese did not understand modern war, P,eng said the Chinese had proved in Korea as welllas against the Japanese that they have mor experience than other peoples of the word...? He further registered a protest, sayir that he had asked for delay in the issua.nce of the communique but had been told on 24 June that it had to be signed in the interest of unity. He stated for the benefit of other delegates the instructions under which he was working, and sitid that if the communique were published without the approval of the CPC's Central Committee corrections might later be required. 26. A number of statements by others were then made in a general discus. son. Todor Zhivkov spoke and gave full. support to Khrushchev's position; others, white less warm than Zhivkev, were generally pro-Khrushchev in their views. No ono spoke against the Soviet position. Khrushchev ended the session by saying that further bilateral discussions between the CPSU and the CPC were necessary. 27. A commission (or committee)was set up at these sessions to prepare for a'couference to be held, during the next November anniversary celebrations la Moscow, where all parties were to present their views. Divergent reports on the composition of the committee have been received. In general they agree that the committee was to involve about twenty parties and that all the bloc parties were to be represented. Reports state that the parties of Argentina, Cuba, Brazil, Japan, West. Germary, Italy, France, and others were also to be represented on the commission. The terms of reference of this commission are not known. The commisSio:a has since been. called to meet in Moecow at the end of September. A eepp.rate CPSD committee has allegedly been set up as well,, to prepare a new CPS' iocument- on the dispute. It seems probable that the CPSU is planning to use it in November as the draft letter of 21 June was used at Bucharest, to predetermine 1,..1 outcome of the cpnference. According to pne source, Khrushchev gave instruc- ..,ions to the delegates at the end of the sessien that they were to report back to theix Ceatrai Committees that a plenum should be convened to discuss the doctrinal dispute, with the results of these plenums to be disseminated at all levels of the party. On the basis of Other information, however, it appears probable that most parties did not construe his statement as a command, for there were few such i.zograrns initiated before the CPSUis plenum Of -July. 41. 28, The final communique approved by the fraternal delegates was release by 'rAss in Moscow in 27 June, and it was adopted primarily to conceal the fact that the meeting had failed to accomplish anything. However, the CPSYT, particular ly Xhrushchev, clearly wanted it as a device to exert pressure for prompt resolu- tion of the dispute. A short and virtually mechanical reaffirmation of the validity of the 12 party Declaration of November 1957, its text did not in fact clarify any of the issues in the dispute. This became apparent in a few days with the appeararc 8 aormirod.C."1" Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 (More) 44%.0 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Of the' 'tC4fit:itild`Chinetiie' Pre-kW Statethents -on ther.coMmuliique. The signatures of the 12 bloc 'parties. (includin0 the' CPCY regietered on.Z4 June, and the unanimous. approval given hy the fifty parties repredented Were to prove the only significant featitie df the c?1ninicjue.' - ? ? ? ;,? ? 29. The principarreinits Of the Buehareet meetings, appear to be the following. The chinese succeeded in making known to a large audience of bloc and non-bloc Oomniuniet Party delegates.' their 'strong excieptions to Khrushchev's Oli- ci?and sdnici ;;Sftite iessiolprincipled" a.ctiOtiS takewagainst them by the CPSU. They may have lio-Pikt that their adamant tactiCe-woulcUtreate- fear of an open split andthuis' force the'SoViets to break down or comprOmise... Their actions left the 3.-miets and their supporters in other pa:rties little ?choice. but ,to defend the Soviet position as the supreme, authority and policy maker in the international Communist movement' and td apply against the Chinese all their :influence within the bloc and Tree WorAa'Cornmuniitt peities. It Wonld 'appear that the final Chinese position was one from which they will have to retreat if they desire' a settlement. It is premised that this will be the situation with which the Soviets will attempt to con- front thetn" in Novifiriber'1960, when the world 'Communist leadership meets in Moscow on the oCCrision of the celebration of the October Revolution. The CI:int Dbentrierit 'Of ZI June19'60 _ 30, The CPSU circular of 21 June consisted(:Oksome.seventy pages. It outlined the history of the dispute in "recent' years- (a point which the Chinese were eoonto refute); It presented a bill of particttlars on instances of Chinese violation of discipline and refuted the Chinese arguments. 31. dbviet 'views on the background-Of the dispute. The document stated that, de spia,?ong history of 'friendly, relatione 'and cooperation between the USSR and the CPA, the Soviets noted that the Chinese had "recently" begun to take divergent psiditiona On very iMportant qiiestiona and that this stand threatened to :distupt good relations and the. soliera.rity Of the international movement. early as 1956, the Soviets aid,S the Chinese had been making known to other CPs their criticisins of Siiviet fvOlicies. ? r 32. This divergence was manifested in the Chinese articles on the anniver- sary f Lenin's 'birth iti ApriV'Staternins within the WFTU and -other international organizations, and Chinele. statements at -variance with the 1957 Moscows Declara- tion and Peace Manifesto. ? The CPSU had made no move against these, Chinese statements, considering it necessary to hold a meeting to discnss. them. . ? 33. According to the Soviets, Chou En-lai told the Soviet Amba s sador to China in January that the problem was eseentially a Party matter and that he preferred not`to discuss it. Early in February 1960, the Central Cdmmittee of the CPSU prOposed a disensaion to r?zlso1ve the differences, The, Chineie refused taiteiid such a meeting and began pubiicizingtheir views.. 34. At the time of the rneetiig of the General Council of the WFTU iti early June, the Chinese revealed to the Soviets their great disstisfacti0U with CPSU positions and they also told otherCommunists of their; attitude. L1uu Ning-yl told Grishin that, the Chinese were very dissatisfied with the pcksition Of the WFTU on the question of peace and disarmament. Liu Ning-yl said.that."to it down at ex same table with imperialists" meant the "betrayal of all mankind." ?fie warned Grishin that, if the report .of the WFTU were not changed, the Chinese would critize the WFTtrand ex:pose its "right oPportunism." . 35. At a session of the General Council, Liu Ning-yl presented views that differed from the Soviet pOsitiOni,? the, CPSU' document charged,. Then, at a supper and meeting to which the Chinese. Politburo invited some delegates,. Liu Shao-chi said that there were important differences of opinion among the Communist Parties Teng then spoke on "War and Peace", accusing the Soviets of errors 9 =MI Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Wore) **me Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 - in the 20th COngress,thes IS on " peac;efut coexistence" and 'Ithrowing overboard" the Moscow the same time, according to the CPS 13 document, as he himself contradicted the Moscow Declaration He aitacked. Soviet efforts to negotiate with the West as a "betrayal" of world Communism. Chou En-lai was going to speak, 'but the delegates asserted 'that they would not condone criticism or discussions "behind the backs" of the Communist Parties. - 36. The Chinese said that because of the opriotition expressed against their attitude, they would not speak in the WFTU sessioni; but they did so never- theless, even in discussion with non-Communist delegates. Then, the Chinese speakers at the WFTV 'meeting tried to inipose the Chinese line on the WFTU and openly to line the WFTU up against the CPSI..T. 37. In addition, the Soviet document charged, the Chinese were distril- ing "Long Live Leninisrn" and other critical articles within the Bloc, without the perinission of the other CPs. 38. Within the international fronts the CPSU charged, the Chinese had been taking a separate pOsition wlitch made' it difficult to arrive at decisions. 39. As early as 1949, at the conference of Asian trade unions in Peking, the Chinese had proposed "'surd aiding bitter struggle in 6?1i:tills,' and semi-coloni- al countries' "and formation. of "liberation armies" under Party direction. This had been done without consulting the Parties and had helped the "imperialists" in their fight against the WFTU. The Chinese had later revised this attitude, the document said. 40. In May 1954, the Chinese Central Committee had sent to the CPSU a report of the, Communist fraction of the Chinese trade*unions which agreed with the WFTU decisions which applied to all countries. This caused trouble between the WFTU and some CPs. "Now", the CPSU document said, "the Chinese talk of WFTU opportunism, and this threatens the unity of its ranks." , 41. More recently, within the World Peace Council, the Chinese had refused to vote on key resolutions. ,.?42. At the IUS meeting at Tunis in February 1960, the Chinese had oppose "broader contacts with student organizations in capitalist ccuntries" and had instead emphasized the need for "uncompromising struggle." At a WFDY meetin: in March, ?and at the Afro-Asian conference in April, the Chinese had opposed discussion of disarmament on the ground that the "cal), for disarmament lulls the popular masses and derntibilize's them in the struggle against imperialism." ? 43. In viotation of the principle of correct "frafernal relations!" of Com- munist Parties, the Chinese have ariticiZed Parties "behind their backs." This criticism of the policies of the CPSU "does not contribute to the prestige or unity' of the international movement. In particular, the Chinese had disagreed with the -November 1959 "Appeal" of seventeen West European CPs and had called this document "opportunist." In this way, the Soviets Say, the Chinese have set them selves up as the "judges over the group of most experienced parties," and they , aid it in the absence of these parties, at a meeting at Pelcing. In criticizing the CPSU itself, the Chinese CP has not been direct; but has made ase of "'indirect methods and functionaries." 44. The CPSU chargeil the' Chinese With deParting from:the Moscow Deck ration and "Peace Manifesto" of 1957 on several counts. ? . They had "revised" the characterization of the present "epoch' so as t Make it read that this is "an epoch of wars, and revolutions". a_ I 10 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 (More) , ,? . - --APii;r6tied For Release 2000/08/0' CIA:RDP18.103061A000:1000200:16-3? ' . ? .: 2. They say that the "Lenirtist,pri44pte of. peaceful coexistence", s it is spellea.pA jr:1;. the ,Moscow beclaraticni; c.:ree.ted;"illusiotie" and that 'peaceful ? coexistence is impossible; it only gratiftieS the iMperialitits and enables them to murder the peoples of Asia and Africa With impunity." 3. .7.110.,Chinese say that the thesis ji.tthe,MosceW Declaration that "'the, struggle for .peace ri9/. the foremost ta,,sk".;42the Corranunist Parties is "erroneous and inti7i.eninipt" and that it encourages the, 'delusion that there can be peace with capitalism." 4. The,Chinese reject the Mescow Peelarationls thesis on" 'different: of transition' "as coming from an ";',incorrect iinderstanding of ' " ? 5. The Chinese question the thesis of the Moscow Declaration that the 20t1CPSU Congress had opened "a new stage" in the international movement, and they ?ant to reopen the question of the "cult of personality." The Chinese had endo=ser te CPSU's action regarding the "cult of Stalin", and Mao Tse-t?mg himself had :lane so at the 1957 Moscow meetings. The new proposal to reopen the discussion "detracts from important Party tasks, and weakens the struggle against the conse- quences of the cult of personality" in some other parties, the docu=tent.declared. 45, It is necessary to discuss the problems of the character of ithe present "epoch", "war and peace", "coexistence", and "roads to socialism", the CPSU document states, because these problems are not seen clearly within the Commu- nist movement. , 46. Character of the present "epoch". The document criticized as one the Chinese characterization of the epoch as one of "imperialism, wars, and revolutions." The Chinese claim that any other attitude is a departure from Lenin's views. The CPSU believes that the Chinese fail to take into account the changes in the correlation of class forces and, that they misunderstand and mis- interpret Lenin's thesis. The Chinese analysis is incomplete and it conflicts with the Soviet characterization Of the "epoch" as one also of "disintergration of imperialism, transition to socialism, and of formation and consolidation of the world system of socialism." Developing further the well-established Soviet con- cepts in this regard, the document stated that the definition of the character of the epoch has "great fundamental importance", for from this definition are derived different conclusions regarding "strategy and tactics, peaceful transition, peaceful coexistence, war, peace, and disarmament." 47. The Chinese claim that the CPSU,has departed from Leninismin appraising the nature of "imperialism," but they are wrong. The document cited statements at the 20th and 21st., Congress and by Khreshchev on his return from the /3, S. and later, from 'France, to support the Soviet refutation of the Chinese charges. 48. War and Peace. At one time, the Cpsu. deem:tent said, the Chinese adhered to the ,Khrushchev thesis on peaceful cowdstence. Lately, inthe. April articles and at the.NIfFTU meeting,. the Chinese haVeldeparted from thi,s the Si.E3_. In Red Flag- the Chinese said that only the "imperialist general staff", ancl?iiPt the: Communists, could decide whether there would he war or peace, whether to launch local orgeneral war, or -whether to intervene ahread. This attitude is based , . ?. . a wrong analysis of forc,es. ,T.he dpcument reiterate4. the Soviet argument that "war is .not merely an economic phenomenon", but depends upon the ,correlation of forces, and that the forees of peace,may, be able to prevent the "imperialists" from resorting Ito war. The_ most "depisive!!, factor is, the Communist Camp. , 49. To take the position that war id inevitable leads to "fatalism", "para- lyzes the struggle", and "disarmsthe people..." Events after the 20th Congress confirm the Soviet thesis. By 1965 "even the most rash imperialists will see that war is impossible." 11 VIN1101110?11151mi (More) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Nov Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00010002001Q-3 50. At the Moscow conference in, 1957 Mao himself said that " 'Everything reduces itself to gaining fifteen years. Lasting peace will be assured throughout the world.' " Today, the Chinese are inconsistent. On the one hand, they call imperialism a "paper tiger". On the other hand, they say that the imperialists cannot be restrained. The CPSU, however, says that the imperialists should be neigher over or underestimated. 51. According to Chinese articles, whoever defends the thesis I-of avert- ing wa.;/ is " lopposed to wars of liberation' ". This is false. Coexistence "does not mean renunciation of proletarian class war, or of national liberation, including armed struggle." The contrary is true: class struggle will increase once the threat of war has been ilirninated. 52. The Chinese have persisted in their view that "as long as imperialism exists...the succession of people of war and peace will be permanent and inevital. (The document cited Red Flag and People's Daily.) At the WFTU meeting, Liu :.hang-sheng said that it was an "illusion" to think that there could be a world ,,ithout wars and without arms so long as imperialism exists. At a public session of the WFTU, members of the Chinese Central Committee launched a polemic ..igainst the Peace Manifesto which had been signed by "all" Parties, including the Chinese. 53. The CPSU document declared that peaceful coexistence means "gaining time" for the "Consolidation of the Socialist system and the acceleration of the building of socialism and Communism." The "Communist Parties cannot permit society to be thrown back hundreds of years" and the destruction of "hundreds of millions" of people. 54. It is impossible to aocept the arguments of Red F"We need not Lear war. Atom bombs are paper tigers /used by the imperialists"( to subjugate people. The losses from war will be compensated by the victory of socialism." 55. The Soviet position, the CPSU document said, is that ten or fifteen years of peace will assure the supremacy of Socialism and it will then be possible to exclude war, "even if capitalism remains in part of the world." (The document cited Lenin in support of this policy.) 56. Coexistence, the Soviets asserted, will encourage centrifugal force: within the "imperialists bloc" and will "sharpen contradictions" within "imper- ialist countries" and between them. 57. The Chinese say that coexistence means "class peace". This is wrong. The Soviets never included within the concept of coexistence relations between colonies and colonialist countries, between dependent and imperialist countries, or between the proletariat and the exploiters. Coexistence, on the contrary, is a "form of class war" on the international level. It opens up possi- bilities for solidarity with the masses for the eventual defeat of capitalism. (The document cited the November 1959 Rome "Appeal" of the 17 West European CPIs), 58. The Chinese say that, in connection with the struggle for national liberation, "the CPSU is flirting with the national bourgeoisie" and "abandoning . class positions." This is wrong. The Soviet position on participation of the nation bourgeoisie in the national liberation struggle is "Leninist". 59. Soviet economic aid to the "liberated countries" is justified by the fact that "objectively" such aid promotes the cause of peace and weakens imperia ism. The Chinese say that the policy should be "revised" on the grounds that vvhe the national bourgeoisie gains power it loses its ability to fight imperialism 7Indiz: Egypt, and Indonesia were cited7 and "are themselves becoming imperialists'. 12 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 (More) Nor Nor Approved For Release 2000/08/27 ? CIA-RDP78r-03061A000100020016-3 ..6000410.1. 60. The Soviets answered this by saying that it is recessa.ry not to "skip stages in the reValution". ?To do so can cause "serious damage." It is essential to "look at the correlation of class forced." The "imperialists" try to exploit "splits in the national liberation movements. '1 The Communists must try to increase their "friends" among the neutralists. This used to be the policy of the Chinese, with their slogan of "unity and struggle", but no longer. 61: The CPSU document sand that it was necesaary to exploit contradic- tions in the enemy bamp" and cited Lenin'ts statements on this subject. The Chinese argument that one should "not sit at the' table .with imperialists" is a denial of this Leninist policy. 62. The Soviets consider it essential not to minimize the military strenge of the "imperialists" because to do so would make it impossible to "mobilize 'be znasses against the threat of war." 63. The document denied that coexistence weakens the military ability of he "Socialist camp", and refuted Chinese insinuations at the WFTU meeting that cEsarrnament proposals encouraged "illusions". The current Soviet approach to clisarmarnent is "new". It is based on the belief that the Soviet policy would make it possible to create "broad popular fronts" and mass movements, and that it make a it difficult for "'s-to intensify the arms race. " The Soviet .,-ffort to get rid of U.S. 'overseas bases is a:major aim at the disarmament cam- paign, and events in Sapan have shown the effectiveness of Soviet policy. The Chinese concept of a "third way" which was 'put forward at the WFTU meeting means nothing less than continuation of the cold war and of the arms race, and causes political difficulties for the peace policies of the USSR by substantiating imperialist charges that Communists want war. 64. Different forms of transition to socialism. The CPSU document refute the Chinese charge that the CPSU had been advotating the idea that the "peaceful way" was the "only way of transition." It cited the 20th Congress thesis on this point and the statement in the 1957 Moscow Declaration. The Chinese apparently no longer agreed with these statements, which they had at one time endorsed, but if so, they should say so frankly. 65. The need for closer unity between t he socialist camp and the inter- national Communist movement. The CPSU document said that the Chinese positior threatens serious damage to the unity of the socialist camp and that "many" Chinese actions have been "disloyal and uncomradely". -66. Although the Chinese say that the USSR should lead the "camp", behin the back of the CPSU they have attacked the CPSU, through "trade union represen, tative s, representatives of the national liberation movement and other representa? t5.ves of the Communist parties." This shows a lack of "sincerity" and is a violatic of the "principles of proletarian internationalism." 67. The document cited cases when the CPSU had disagreed with the Chinese Party, but had not intervened: the "hundred flowers" program: the Chinese abandonment /In the commune program7 of the "Leninist principle of material incentive under socialism." In Soviet eyes, "loyalty to Leninism is teste not only by words but by deeds", the document said, and it cited Soviet aid to the Chinese (5 billion rubles in deliveries and 6.6 billion rubles credit.) 68. The document said that it was necessary and possible for the differeei between the Chinese and the Soviets to be overcome "without compromising princi? plea." The Chinese must take into account the "interests of the world Communist movement"; dissension can only benefit "imperialism, the common enemy." 13 (More) 613?Lim Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Nipoi Noe Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 familmelmtIPEINIP 69. On 17 June, CPSTI representatives met with CPC ,delegates enroute to the Rumanian Party Congress. The Soviets told the Chinese that they considered the latterswviews and methods erroneoui.11 The Chinese refused to change their stand, but said that they would be willing to "admit their errors" if a majority at the'Bucharest Cosnference "proved" them to be wrong. 70. The CPSU document said that, in view of the fact that the issues in aspute had been defined in the Peace Manifesto of 1957, signed by all Communist Parties, the CPSU considered it necessary to exchange views with representa- twes of all parties. 71. The document concluded with an expression of confidence that the PC would "weigh our comradely criticism in a Marxist way and draw the necessary .:.onclusions, bearing in mind the interests of the entlre Socialist camp and the ,nternational Communist movement, wino:eh are inseparable from the interests of e building of Communism in the Chinese Peoples Republic." Developments after Bucharest '72. In, the three months following Bucharest, the dispute continued unre- solved, and indeed, there was no serious attempt to resolve it. Each side con- t3..nued to argue the merits of its respective position; each continued its effort to get support within the world movement. The Soviets sent a series of letters to the r,binese criticizing the Chinese propaganda activities and putting the Chinese on notice that Soviet technicians would be withdrawn during August. The Chinese replied to these letters and, on 10 September produced a comprehensive rebuttal of the charges which the Soviets had made in the circular draft letter of 21 June. The contents of the Chinese letter of 10 September were made known to ?sorne foreign Communist leaders, just as the Soviets had done with their 21 June circular. As of mid-September, leading circles throughout the international movement were well aware of the gravity of the dispute and many were 4sturbed by the prospects of an international meeting, scheduled for 9 November, in Moscow, at which they would be called upon to commit themselves. 73. The developments during these three months will be treated chrono- logically and in summary form. JUNE 74. On 29 June both Pravda and the Peiping People's Daily carried edi- torials on the Bucharest communique that made it abundantly clear that both Parties remained firm in their divergent views. Neither of the articles criticized the opponent, but the "principles" statements of position were clearly divergent. 75. Pravda falsely claimed that in signing the communique the entire Bloc had endorsed the thesis of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses, as well as the proven validity of both Moscow Declaration and the Peace Manifesto of 1957. The article was clearly intended to create the impression that the CPSU had the full support of the world movement. 76. Peoples Daily disposed of the communique briefly, using it mainly as peg for lenggaly presentation of the correctness of the Chinese interpretation of th Moscow Declaration, with emphaeis on "revisionism" as the "main danger". 77. In late June, representatives of the French, Italian, and Danish CPs were in Moscow and were presumably briefed, on how to handle the dispute. (More) 14 sriermrsmil.rml Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 No" low Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CaltklipmaX61,1A000100020016-3 78. ,During july the CPSU took action against Chinese propaganda activities in the USSR, arranged to withdraw Soviet technicians from China, reasserted the fundamental's of .the Soviet position, and adopted a resolution which formally endorsed'Ithrushchevts actions atBucharest while sharply attacking Chinese views , 79.. The CPC leadership apparently held along conference during the ? . month. It is believed that the Chinese decided to withdraw temporarilyfrom open disputation, to concentrate on strengthening dotheatic 'controls in order to counter soviet pressures, and, in preparation for a resumption of open -debate, to ? exert prepsitres on the international movernent. ' 80. Early in ?Suly, the CPSU iritorrned the CPC that, in carrying some off.ensive editorials, the Chinese Russian-language journal Druzbba had violated "no-criticism" agreement: The articles wee characterized as against Marxism Leninism and; the Moscow Declaration'. The Soviets told the Chinese that the i.,ovidt publication in Peking was being stopped and, they asked that Druzhba also ? be stopped.* 81, Kommunist No. 1.0, signed to the press -11 Yuly 1960, carried an important article by F. KonStantinov and K../Vibmdihyan, who proceeded to Upholi..' CPSU positions and refute the Chinese arguments onuthe basis of "revolutioran (7.".alectics" and "creative Marxism", '."onlk,diictrInaires,, and not revolutionaries' u/d,faill to understand the.significance,of peaceful coexistence in the "changed coriditiOrist! of toe.y, they said. Those V;ThCi argue (as the Chinese have) that coexistence "could disarm the peopleajdeFilOgiCally'and demobilize them" are guilty Of "misleading" Some CPs.'irhey can only drag these Parties to the positicro of sectarianism and dogmatism's. Anyone WhO'acts,to create disunity in the Bloc, the author's charged, are "willy or,nilly" WOrking against the "success, of the struggle for peace and socialism the sacred duty" of all Communists. ? 82. On 12 July the Central Committee of the CPSU convened in plenary session; and its finarresolution, dated 16 July, ?went far beyond a mere criticism of left-wing dogmatism. The resolution gave unusually heavy emphasis of the CPSUls approval of the Conduct of the Soviet delegation to BUCharest, and it actually distorted the result of the Bucharest debate to make it appear that it had formally endorsed the theses of the 20th and 21St CPSU Congresses and that it had included denunciation of "narrow nationalism". For the first time, the Central Committee formally characterized as "deviations" such views such as those held by the Chinese, 83. The strong commitment by the Central Committee to:the Khrushchev line at 13ucharest reflected new, disturbing developments in Sino-Soviet relations dnring the two weeks following B ucharest. Military relationships snagged, and the matter of the Soviet technicians was reaching a.critical stage. 84. A Soviet military mission dispatched to China after Bucharest to conclude certain defense arrangements reportedly found that the Chinese had abruptly decided that they, and not the Russians, should control the facilities in question. A CPSU foreign section official told ,a leading Free World Communist in, July that problems had arisen from Chinesedemands for modern (presumably atomic) weapons. *In addition to suspending the distribution of Druzhba, the Chinese illustrated periodical Kitai was dropped for at least two issues. It is not n4tnown whether or not this was also mentioned in this July issue, 15 =11111111ftimi Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 (More) Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 85, Later in July the CPSU wrote the CPC, compla.ining about the Chinese attitude toward Soviet technicians. According to the CPSU, the Soviets had wanted to withdraw their technicians for work at home some years earlier, on the ground that sufficient numbers of local technicians had been trained. The Chinese had refused. Then, when the Chinese complained about the behavior of some techni- cians; the Soviets had considered their withdrawal, but the Chinese, demurred. Recently, the CPSU letter charged, the Chinese had added to their disrespectful treatment of the technicians by circulating "anti-Marxist" literature, such as "Long Live Leninism" among them in an effort to subvert them. 86. In a letter dated four days later, without waiting for a reply from Peking, the CPSU served notice that all Soviet technicians would be withdrawn during August. 87. Less is known of Chinese activities during the month of July. "Long Live Leninism" was widely distrubuted abroad in an effort to publicize the Chine 53 views within the world movement. A theoretical journal (Hsiang River Critic): 'which had played a key role during the period in the 1920's and 3010 when Mao was opposing Soviet influence on Chinese Communism, was revived in the middle of July. Liu Ning-1, leading a delegation to Japan at the end of july, subsequently demonstrated by 'his actions in. japan the content of the hard Chinese line in foreign policy. The Chinese leadership, apparently in extended conference from 2 July to 22 JulY, prepared,its answers to the CPSY letters, and it seems likely that the Chinese were then in favor of conciliating the Soviets as much as possible without, however, retreating from positions of principle. 88. RelatIons, continued to worsen during August. The month opened with a Chinese reply on the questions of the technicians and publications. Later, the Chinese leadership appears again to have met and probably to have decided to take a harder position against Soviet pressures. In mid August the Chinese began again to participate in the open disputation. The CPSTJ cceytinued to publish artic/es attacking Chinese poEitions and employed the Bulgarian Party leader Zhivkov, to push pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese theses in the international Communist journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism. Late in the month the CPSU was circulating ars.a.Ann,stwwwi*. areormroot mr.s.?????????marrbirmoommow*o to foreign CPs a revised and strengthened version of the 21 June letter which had been shown to foreign C P delegations at Bucharest. 89. , In the Chinese reply to the CPSU letters of July regarding the publica- tions and technicians, the Chinese said that the CPSU publication in Peking had been writing objectionable pieces since 1959; The Chinese pointed out that the publication Amerika was distributed in the USSR and that it publicized the "Ameri- can way of life" and "imperialism". The Chinese acknowledged that they must bow to Soviet wishes, but requested reconsideration. 90. Concerning the Soviet technicians, the Chinese refuted the CPSU charges. The CPC had only complained about a few technicians, and this had been settle& It was not true that the advice of the technicians had been treated derise15, as the CPSU had charged. The technicians themselves had asked for Chinese literature at the very beginning, and it was not unusual that they had attended occasional lectures. The distribution of "Long Live Leninism" was not exception., able: the technicians had not been forced to discuss it. 91. The Chinese said that if the Soviets continued to object to these prac- tices, they could be discussed, but the CPC did strongly object to the unilateral Soviet action. It constituted a violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty. It would damage the Chinese construction program, create difficulties, weaken the Bloc, and encourage the "imperialists". 16 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100021016-3 . An Orientalists Congress, which had been long and widely-hearalded by the Soviet's and at wiuch Sinelogy had been given high booking, opened in Moscow on 9 August--eitithciiit the Chinese. 'Their withdrawal, without explanation, and with lame explanation by the Soviets, was probably intended to demonstrate disapproval of "opportuniet" Soviet efforts to attract praticiparits from the West. a ? xo 93, Another Iiieeting of the Chine seleadership appears to have been held between 2 and 13 August.. No details are 94. In mid-August, Problems of Peace and Socialism carried an irticle by Bulgarien Party chief T odor Zhivkov, who had signally supported Khrushchev at Bucharest. Zhivkovis defense of Khrushchevis peace strategy as both access= and feasible followed the line preViously enunciated by Khrushchev, Gomulka, ? Novotny, and Togliatti, and indicated that the CPSU was beginning to steP up its use of Problems of Peace and Socialism as a weapon in the dispute. 95. Li Fu-Chlun, Pclitburo member and Chairman of the State Planning Commiesion, reopened the Chinese campaign in the overt debate. His 16 August article in Retliatl. (like the April "Long Live Leninism" article) was published in English in Peking Review, 23 August. He charged that the "modern revisionist: who had been trying to isolate China since 1958 would only isolate themselves (as the CPC had said privately to the CPSU in late 1959 or early 1960), In. mid-month, the deputy director of the CPC's international Liaison department led a strong Chinese delegetion for the Cuban Party congress to Habana, where he concentrate( on lobbying among foreign delegates to line them up against the "neodernirevision- late. I - ? ee- 96. Also in micl-Augnit, areiped?h by Li Wei-han. asserted that the Chinese were the only correct interpreters of Leninism: "The Mao Tse-tung ideology is Marxism-Leninism in its fullest developed form in the era of socialist 'revolution by the proletariat." Characteristically, the speech added a ,second major thesis reminisceet r)f 1949: "armed struggle is the principal form of waging theiegeektiree It is of coa,isiderab1e s;gnificztxthe that this speech was not published until 24 'Septers her, by which time the CPC had definitely decided upon a much more intransigeant attitude toward the CPSU. ,,.? . 97. Meanwhile, the CPSU in mid-August was continuing to elaborate its ideological position. Following an important artide by Frantsev in Pravda of 7 August age:lest a "rebirth of-views similar to those of the left-wing Communists" , a leading spckesman'for the foreign section of the Pa.rty, B. N. Ponomarev, ]i 'c in Pravda that peaceful coexistence was "nothing else but a higher form of class 6truggle. ". On 16 August, an article by S. Titarenko explicitly singled out Chinese for warnirtg against the dangers of "isolation." ?-0, Almost coincidettally, on 16 August Li Fu-chiun wrote irk.Rod F14 about the teed ter the Chinese to "rely mainly on our own efforts". 99, On 26 Auguit the leading CPSU expert on Communist tactics in under- developed countries, 'ie. Zhukov, wrote in Pravda on "5 OTTAS Questions of the Ceetempoeary Natiouel Liberation Movement, 17 This was a sheep rebUttal of Chinese hostility toward "liQtxr4eois nationalists", which "haughty attitude", Zhukc said, constituted "sectarianesen of the most dangerous kind." _ 100, tate in Aegust it appeared that the CPSU had circulated among the Free World CP, s a revised and strengthened version of the 21 June circular which had been shown to delegates at Bucharest, 'The- CPSU seems to have told the recipients thet they 'mould now have sufficient time to digest the Soviet charges and to reach clear-cut deeisions prior to the scheduled meeting in Moscow in Novembei The letter emphasized that the CPSU intended to seek clerification and to reach a clear agreement With the CPC. Il rseiiimPONEIT Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 (More) vow Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 101. Chinese determination to stand firm on its positions, demonstrated by statements in the Chinese press and at the Vietnamese Party Congress, was comnrunicated to the CSU in the Chinese letter of 10 Septerriber. Soviet state- ments during the first half of the month indicated that MoSCOw Was also not pre- pared to retreat. 102. On 4 September the Chinese belatedly published the full text of a speech delivered on 22 July to the Chinese Writers.COngress. The speech includ- ed a direct attack on the concept:a "humanism"--theme in both the domestic and foreign programs of the. CPSU. ' ? 103. The following day Li: Fu-chlun, who headed the Chinese delegation to the Vietnamese congress, delivered a speech reasserting the correctness of the basic Chinese positions. The response of the leading Soviet delegate N. A. Mukhitdinov on 11 September was a violent attach on the Chinese: rt ? ? 104. The Chinese letter of 10 1960. By far the most import-int develorment, owevcc, wal the 10 September CPC letter to the CPSU2 which ',vas ay ii.hc Chlricse for the 'benefit of foreign CPIs in continua.tion of the Chinese effort to enlist their sympathy. The letter is organized on a pattern similar to that of the 21 June CPSU circular for the purpose of countering each of the charges in that circular. 105. chines.e views on the back.synd2Lt:L?e. current dimitt. It was not true, as the CPSU had alleged, that the CPC had agreed with the CPSU in the past and had only recently diverged from the CPSU. .:,Alctually, the letter stated the differences began at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, when the CPSU wrong- fully struck off Stalin's "positive role" without prior discussion with the fraterna; parties, and when the CPSU put forward an erroneous theory of "peaceful transi- tion", also without consulting the other CP1s,, The CPC had registered its objec- tion to these CPSU actions, both in principle and in unilateral way they had been taken. 106. In October 1956, the Chinese letter stated, the CPSU had rnobilizsd armed forces against Poland and the CPC had objected. The CPSU had wanted the fraternal CP1s,japparently in a joint meeting) to condemn the Polish Party collectively, but the CPC had objected to this proposal. 107. In the case of the Hungarian uprising, the Chinese had again been obliged to intervene with the Soviets to get them to crush the uprising by force. The Soviets had at one point been determined to withdraw their forces from Hungary. 108. At the 1957 Moscow conference of OP's and CPC had been instruther tal in forcing significant revisions in the first draft of the 12 Party Moscow Dec- laration. The first draft had said nothing about the subject of state power of class st:.:uggle, but rather outlined apurely"parliamentary path" for "transition"? The CPC had objected, but, in order to "save face" for the CPSU, had eventua,I1), agreed that the Declaration should show a link between the formulations containec In the De.zlaration and the 20th CPSU Congress theses.* 109. A', the MO.,3C.V conferonoe, Mao had caref.7:17/ specified that the CP1 should "lead" the Bloc. This preeminence carries witil it the responsibilities of leadershyp, the 10 Septwalber letter stated, and L.he CPSU should discuss matte with the other CPIs on aar,qui/ basis. 110. The CPC letter, in refuting Soviet charges to the contrary, assertec ? that the CPC had not discussed these differences with other CPIs. A key symbol of the current dispute has been the consistent Chinese avoidar of the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses in their affirmations of the Moscow Declaration. 18 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 (More) .7 ? . Approved For Release 2019(1/08/2, : 61AIRDPI8i03061A00016002111016-3 111. The Chinese declared that the CPSU had gradually deviated from the Moscovi,DeclarartiOn and had gone back to the "wrong" theses of the 20th CPSU Congress. Khrushche;, especially, was.suilty of this frern September 1959, and of open criticism of the CPC and its leaders. The letter cited numerous exam- ples of the incorrect CPSU attitude; allegations that the Chinese want to main- tain the cold War, characterUation of the Sino-Indian border dispute as "stupid"; insinuation that Mao had Outlived his Usefulness; "testing" the West by arms; Khruslichevle friendly characterizations of Eisenhower; talk about war; etc. Kuusinen's,Lenin day article, the Chinese claimed, did not even fnention the Moscow Declaration--which 'shows how far the CPSU had departed from it. Even if Khrushchev say's that no names have been mentioned in these statements it is av.tar to everyone according to the Chinese, who is meant. 112. The CPC letter defended the Chineie actions at the WFT0* meeting in Peking in June 1960 and pointed out the inconsistency of the Soviet position: it is correct for the CPSU to attack the CPC in the presence of non-Communists and ?imperialist,' reporters at Warsaw (i.e.,. at the CEIV1A. conference) and Bucharest, v./Tong :''or the Chinese to call a meeting.of.Comnitmists trade unionists at Peking, Furthermore, the CPC letter reireals.the main point of the Chinese objec? i ion to the Sa.illant report (concurred izi by the Soviets, the letter states) to the VTFTU meeting': the report mentioned the free world without quotation marks, whereas communes and the Leap Forward were put in quotation marks. This 6-,yling constituted an open criticism of the CPC's policy. ,? 113. According to the 10 Septernher.Chinese letter, the C.F'SU had sent a letter to the ,CPC' on Z .Tun'e calling for an international meeting to resolve the differences. The CPC had agreed but had asked for tune to prepare itself. Then, on 7 June, the CPSU suggested that there be. held at Bucharest a preliminary con- ference to discuss tactics following the collapse of the Summit. The CPSU assured the CPC that no resolution would be adopted at this meeting. Again, the - Chinese agreed. But at Bucharest Khrushchev surprised the Chinese by launching on their. positions a full scale attack for which they were not prepared, Instead of an attack On.. "ireperi&lism"i as the CPSIT had proposed, the discussion was diverted to a "harmful and disruptive" attack on the CPC. After Bucharest, a press campaign was launched against the Chinese, The CPC letter criticized the CPSU for rashness and ?said that the latter Seemed not to have understood how , much this had damaged Soviet prestige as the leader of the camp. 114, Concerning the assessment of the character of the "present epoch!), the CPC letter reasserted the correctness of its assessment of the present bal7 a.nce of forces and its interpretat13n of this shift as meaning "gzezter opportunities for struggles for Socialism, for national liberation, for peace, to expand and to succeed." Khrushchevis views on the significance of the shift (which Mao'recog- nized as early as 1949) are erroneous. The CPSU and Khrushchev have deviated from the Moscow Declaration in talking about 0.banishing war for ever", "world without arms and weapons", "export of capital helping the development of colonial paople"? local ware leading "inevitably to world war", etc.. The CPSU, by empha- sizing the importance of discussions with imperialist statesinen, promotes the "personality cult," These views harm the "liberation struggle". Khrushchev overestimates the weakening of "imperialism"; and his views are "subjective" and "idealist". 115. Concerning the question of "war and peace", the CPC letter chal- lenged the CPSU positions. The CPSU has turned the slogan "war is not fatalis- tically inevitable" into "war is fatalistically avoidable". The CPSU not only "hesitate,t3",itk support "liberation struggles" but, even nottposes" them. Of all the forces for maintaining peace cited in the Moscow Declaration, the strength of the camp is the most important, but the CPSU is *eakening the carnp by with- drawing technicians. The letter justified Mao's "paper tiger" thesis by quoting Lenin to the effect that "Anglo-French imperialism has feet of clay". The well- known Chinese emphasis on "vigilance" and "struggle" was reiterated, and the 19 oNsirePirlemf' Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 (More) Now' Nee Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 letter argued. thatt,nit the Chinese but the Soviet argument about*the'"Aeltrdetion ' of mankincl" bu nuclear war "is to create panic and lead to surrender and black- . 116. On the question of "peaceful coexistence", the Chinese letter con- ceded that negOtiating with "imperialists "may be necessary but Objected to any- thing that would "beautify" them. It might also be necessary to compromise, but t the Chinese would trust more in the efficacy of "exposing the mass struggles" than in the "good ?wishes" of the. imperialists. The letter held out for what the 21st June CPSU circular had called.the "third way": "world war can and must be avoided, but the alternative may not be peaceful coexistence. It may be some - thing like what obtains atV present, call it cold war' of anything you like." ' The letter objected to specific Soviet formulations, such as calling peaceful coexis. tence "the highest, form of Class, struggle" * and saying that the "-upsurge of liberati on struggles is the result of coexistence". ** It said that Zhiiikov had carried this (false)line of reasoning further in saying that "coexistence is the road to socialism, "*** The Chinese attitude toward bourgeois nationalists was reaffirmed. ,47, On the question Of "peaceful transition", the Chinese claimed that the CPSU had taken a "one!..sided" view, had sought in the first draft of the Moscow Declaration to "evade" thatard iaCts of "state power, class struggle, dictatorship, smashing the state machinery"c and had been: guily of turning "Leninism into bourgeois humanism". The que.stion of "peaceful transition" must not be confused with the "parliainentaxy 0141'1: "we should have no'illusion about the possibilities of bringing aebut, structural changes through Parliament." 118. "Tactics in the International Mass Orgeknizations." The CPC letter defended the Chinese ,attitude toward the international fronts: they should be "fighting organizations"; they must fight "imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism"; they must "support unequivocally all national liberation struggles" and "democratic struggles inside capitalist countries"; they must be "flexible" and not merely rubber-stamp Bloc policies. But the 'Soviet we re' "all along" opposed to support of national liberation struggles by the World Peace Council, and the International Union of Students nearly. was "liquidated du* td Soviet insistence on the merger of reactionary students' organizations. 119. Concerning Revisionism and Dogmatism, the Chinese letter reaffirm- ed the Moscow Declaration assertion that "internationally revisionism is the main danger" and rebuded the CPSU for holding that "'revisionism has already been smashed' ". It shought to turn around the Soviet attack on "dogmatism" by pointing out that it was "dogmatic" to attack .such "concrete applications" of Marxism as the Communes and Greap Leap Forward. ? - 120. With respect to International Solidarity, the 10 September letter returned to the CPC's -views on the way the CPS V should conduct itself as the "leader" of the Communist "Camp", The relationship must be on a basis of equality and responsibility. The CPSU violated this principle when it said that "all" 'the parties at Bucharest supported the Soviets. This assertion was not true, the Chinese said: some CPIs had taken different positions, Also, it was ** See reference to the Ilyichev article of November 1959, in pare 3 above. .? Possibly, a reference to the Pravda article of 26 _August 1960 by lie. Zbukov, In which such an argument is implicit. *** An elided excerpt from the article by Zhivkov in Problems of Peace and Socialism, August 1960. V .20 (More) imrimGailwrimTmi Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 Nee Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 "unfortunate" that the CPSU had raised the dispute to th.e.level of state relations in the matter of the technicians. The letter expressed the Chinese -conviction that "Socialist unity is basic, while the differences are temporary." As for the Nov- imber meeting in Moscow, the Chinese believed that it would be a good thing if there could be an agreement, but they feared that one meeting might not be sufficient. Meanwhile, they.would continue to emphasize issues on which agree- ment existed, while continuing to discuss unresolved differences. 121. Follwing the issuance of the 10 September CPC letter, the last devel- opment to be accounted for in this survey is the publication in mid-September of two Soviet-inspired articles in Problems of Peace and Socialism, and an article in Kommunist. The F'PS articleTlYte on Bohr and Jean, further develop the validity of the Soviet argumentation and present a number of the anti-Chinese charges. Neither writer has been identified. The names may well be pseudonyms and the CPSPIs "use of functionaries" to conceal its hand is interesting in view of the fact that it had accused the CPC of using this same device earlier. 122. An article by A. Belyakov and F. Burlatsky in Kornmunist No. 13 (10 September 1960) systematically criticized "dogmatic" (Chinese) positions on peaceful coexistence, class struggle and national liberation movements, and the pos sibility of "peaceful tre,nstion." Significantly, the article upheld the "creative approach" of the November 1959 Rome "Appeal" of the seventeen West European Communist Parties, which the Chinese had been covertly attacking as "opportunist, The Bloc Parties 123. In the first three weeks after Bucharest (i.e., prior to the CPSU plenum), the Soviet effort to get full support for their positions on tie part of the other Bloc parties met with mixed success. The CPSU plenum of mid-July stimulated further developments in this direction. 124. By mid-September the following Bloc parties were on record as formally committed to the Soviet side on the issues in dispute: Hungarian (29 Jun4 Bulgarian (13 July), East German (24 July), Rumanian (1 August), North Korean al August), Polish (15 September ). In addition, Novotny of Czechoslovakia early in. July made statements endorsing the CPSU line. His statement and a similar one by Gomulka at that time were sufficiently satisfactory to the CPSU for publica? tion in Pravda (8 July). 325. The Mongolian Party on 4 July and the Albanian Party on the 11th adopted resolutions which clearly failed to satisfy the CPSU, and they were ignored by the Soviet press in a 20 July roundup. The CPSU evidently exerted pressure on these two parties, for on 14 August the Mongolian party publication 1.mally presented a vigorous criticism of "dogmatists" and aligned itself with the CPSU, and on 2 August, Enver Hoxha of Albania spdie in support of the Soviet vie,. on war and the desirability of peaceful coexistence. He did not, however, retrea': from the Albanian party's firm insistence that right revisionism remains the main danger to the Communist movement, and in fact the Albanian CP is clearly on the Chinese side in the dispute. 126. The North Vietnamese Party at the outset indicated that it wished to remain neutral in the dispute and has continued to do so despite evidence of Soviet pressure. In private conversation in September, Ho Chi Minh reportedly stated that he was determined to remain neutral. He considered it important that an agreement between Mao and Khrushchev be reached before the November meeting in Moscow, but he feared that neither would give in. On the questions of "transi- tion" and Chinese policy toward India, Ho appeared to support the Chinese views. 127. In addition to the adoption of formal positions on the dispute, "expla,n Wry" programs were objjerved in some Bloc countries. 21. fmrimrimi6rmTmi Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 (More) *me' Noe Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3 128. Folltving a conference reportedly held at Varna arnong tulgarian, Hungarian, Pplish, Czech, and Rumanian representatives in the last week in July, the Bulgarian party leadership discussed the launching of a "mass explanation" within the party in order to explain the issues in dispute, to justify Bulgarian support of the CPSU, and to allay *licit was described as a feeling of "general tension bordering on panic" in the upper echelons of the Party as a result of the Sino -Soviet dispute. ? 129. The East German party also launched a briefing campaign at the same time, Lower cadres were briefed on the basis of extracts from the report on the Bucharest conference. An attempt was made to create the impression that the dispute involved practical matters rather than basic policy considerations. 130. In borh the Bulgarian and East German parties it seems that Party' officials were told to watch out for manifestations of deviations similar to those of the Chinese, and countermeasures against "nationalist" deviations figured in the plans for the anti-Chinese effort in both countries. 22 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020016-3