BI-WEEKLY PROPAGENDA GUIDANCE NUMBER 71

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 31, 1961
• Content Type: PERRPT

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'31 July 1961
Briefly Noted
1. Anti-Church Measures by the Polish Government: New anti-church
measures undertaken by the Polish Government serve to emphasize the
deepening gulf between the aims of the Gomulka regime and those of the
Catholic Church in Poland. Similarly, East German measures to prevent
the celebration of Kirchentag in Berlin heighten the conflict between the
Communists and religious organizations everywhere in the Bloc.
2. Forced Relocations in Bulgaria: Deportations from Sofia, and
presumably from other Bulgarian cities, have been taking place during May,
June and July. One diplomatic mission estimates that between 3, 500 and
3, 000 individuals have been forcibly expelled from Sofia and that the cam-
paign is slackening. Although the reasons for deportations are not clear,
like other East European satellites, Bulgaria has chronically been plagued
by an influx of peasants to the cities looking for better jobs and higher
wages than are available on collective farms. Consequently, housing
facilities have become even more strained.
3. History of the CPSU: We wish to call attention to an article by Leopold
Labedz in the July-September issue of Survey, "CPSU History in the
Remaking", which surveys some of the falsifications and distortions in the
current (1959) official History of the CPSU. We also recommend, on the
same subject, an article by Branko Lazitca, "La nouvelle Histoire du Parti
communiste de 11U. R. S. S., " appearing in the July-August issue of
Itineraires. Either or both of these articles provide excellent background
material for editorials, review articles of the History, etc. Copies of the
latter will be furnished upon request to headquarters. See Press Comment
of 27 July 1961.
4. Soviet Youth in Soviet Literature: Despite all talk of the "New Soviet
Man", and a l such visions of the future as those contained in the CPSU
Draft Program for the 22nd Congress, the Soviet people, the youth as well
as the older generation, refuse tp become dehumanized automatons, to
develop a Communist morality idealizing labor "for the benefit of society. "
This refusal is evident in current Soviet literature, which constantly
strains against the leash; the young writers try to describe life as they see
it, even though the life they describe does not conform with official party
goals. One recent reflection of the dissatisfaction of Soviet youth was
Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin's Leaf of Spring. The literary trend is described
in an attachment to this guidance issue. We recommend using this
attachment as background material for articles and editorials in
revisionist and intellectual publications, and for general use in refuting
the "wave of the future" line propounded in the Soviet party program.
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 31 July 1961
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round: The government of Colombia is now workin on an rote t d
e
plan to promote community development at the local level, begi
6 4" nning with the
villages. Legislative enactments and executive decrees in 1958, 1959, and
1960 gave official status to a community development program. The new plan
is designed to coordinate private efforts, such as the training programs of the
Coffee Growers Federation of Colombia, the office of the Director of Communi; ?,
Development in the national government, and the activities of local officials.
The community development program is designed to attack the basic
causes of oral poverty and the socio-economic isolation of the rural population
tnd to stimulate greater production and a higher general standard of living.
'Mae new plan emphasizes the principle of self-help and village-level initiative.
specifically, the plan calls for the national government to select two private
citizens (one from each major political party) in each Department or
tz.tendencia to visit each village within the Department or Intendencia to
investigate the special needs of the village and recommend projects to a
departmental-level Citizens Committee for Community Development. Such
citizens committees will be formed not only at this level but at the national
level as well. Paralleling the citizens committees will be governmental
Community Development Councils. The concept is to bring about the maximum
participation of the people in ; the activities and projects proposed and under-
taken. Seminars will be held for members of both the governmental councils
and the citizens committees to facilitate coordination between them by providing
all engaged in community development with a common set of guiding principles
and methodology. In addition community development project specialists will
be trained who will actually work directly with the village people and, at the
same time, serve as the secretaries of the Departmental level Councils. This
structure indicates the care that is being taken to see that both administrative
efficiency and democratic practices are maintained. The Colombian govern-
ment, in other words, has determined that there shall both be the broadest
possible democratic base for the program while at the same time it has tried
to devise a means to insure that the program will not bog down in a morass of
impractical or merely politically expedient projects. The htpe is that useful
activity producing tangible results will give the program maximum popular
support so that the unrest and local banditry in Colombia which has provided the
Communists with a means for expanding their subversive efforts will thereby
be eliminated.
The Colombian government has asked for United States Peace Corps
volunteers to assist in the community dev
t
r
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31 Jul 1961
412. COMMUNIST CHINA: Calculated Extermination of the Un roductive
Elements of the Population - A Solution to Communist China's Economic
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haos ?
ac ground: In 1954, Peking used to speak of the existence of 600 million
Chinese. In July 1961, Chen I, Communist China's Minister of Foreign Affairs,
stated that "to feed 650 million Chinese we have to increase production by
every means, for we cannot rely on imports of grain, " Since 1954, however,
despite the deaths during the winter of 1960-61, the population figure has risen
to nearly 700 million and the population is increasing at 2. 5 to 3 percent (or
about 20 million annually). This population growth would require an increase of
over 11 million metric tons of grain per year just to provide 500 grams per day
per person, which is the amount of grain estimated to be presently available
to the population. This, together with different other types of food, furnishes a
total of about 1, 440 calories per day but this is the barest subsistence
minimum for a Chinese peasant. A Chinese Communist nutritional study states
that a peasant needs 3, 000 calories per day to do his work.
Annual production figures for grain, including potatoes, were as follows:
1957 t 185 million tons (an average year's production)
1958 - 220 million tons
1959 200 million tons
1960 .. 195 million tons
1961 - estimated to be about the same if not less than the figure for
1960.
If we add 11 million tons to the total production figure for every year since
1957, this shows that it would be necessary to grow about 230 million tons of
grain in 1961 in order to provide a mere subsistence quota for the population and
take care of essential industrial and fodder requirements. There will clearly be
a lack, however, of about 40 million tone. The Communist regime has negotiate I
purchases of about 5 1/2 million tons of grain from Canada, Australia, Germ
and France but will also be exporting about 750, 000 tons of grain to Hong Kong,
Albania, Ceylon and Cuba. The difference between what Communist China will
have and the amount of grain it will normally need will amount to about 35
million tons or what is necessary to feed about 70 million people.
How is the dilemma to be solved? The answer is to be found in one of the
basic axioms of Marxist dogma: "From each according to his abilities, to each
according to his needs' or, to simplify the problem, let those who produce eat,
the others can starve. This policy is, in effect, leading to the elimination of the
old and the feeble, the maimed and the weaklings. It is a brutal application of the
old theory of the survival of the fittest.
Whereas the Chinese Communists have achieved much in establishing a
uniform level of subsistence and, by rationing and other measures such as
communal eating have guaranteed a minimum subsistence level to all, the
standard of living in China has been levelled "down". Experts have estimated
that it will take 5 years of " jl- haep
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production to the 1958 output and 10 years to restore the livestock and poultry
numbers to the level they were in 1958 prior to the establishment of the
communes. It is dubious, therefore that the regime can, within the next few
years, overcome its own ineptitude as well as natural disasters to raise agricul-
tural production to the point where it could provide the entire population with
an adequate diet and can forestall a recurrence of malnutrition on a sizeable
scale.
Chinese Communist propaganda publicizes their "happy homes" for the
aged; in fact, however, these homes are but places where the old may wither
away. Numerous letters from the mainland attest to the plight of the old and
weak: inhumanly scant provisions are made for these elderly, relatively
unproductive members of the new Chinese society; consequently, the prevalence
of disease, and suffering, as well as the death rate probably is much higher
among the old now than was the case prior to the institution of the commune
system.
Medical experts estimate that 20 to 30 percent of the population is
^fflicted with oedema and that malnutrition has already taken the lives of one out
of every five persons over the age of 55. Hepatitis, dropsy, beri beri, amoebic
dysentry, gastro- enteritis and tuberculosis are spr eading rapidly. The future
generation will have a hard time overcoming the difficulties of this period.
Many conditions created by the Chinese Communist system help to worsen
conditions and spread disease. The epidemic of hepatitis, which began in 1960,
was caused by the system of communal feeding instituted in Shanghai and by the
fact that the hepatitis virus spread easily among children herded together in
kindergartens while their mothers were working. This problem has been
recognized by the Chinese Communists. An article in People's Daily on, Z Febru-
ary 1961 says: "The sanitary problem of communal messhalls has created a
major problem in safeguarding the health of the masses. " Another article in
Kuang Ming Daily on 15 November 1960 said: "Messhall cooks have instituted
a system for preventing three things from being cooked as food, namely unclean
grain, unclean tregetables and the meat of animals having died of disease or
hunger. " The sale of meat from animals having died of disease or hunger has
been confirmed. There have also been a number of cases alleging attempts to
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414. Moscow Declar'on and Berlin Crisis
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Background: The Moscow Declaration (See Item #327, Sino-Soviet
Tensions: The Moscow Manifesto, dated 19 December) the most authoritative
document of the World Communist Movement since the preceding declaration of
1957 which had been adopted in connection with the 40th anniversary of the
Bolshevik revolution, furnishes a rationale for Khrushchev's current offensive
against the West in Berlin. Its principal assertions, relevant in this context,
are:
a. The world-wide victory of communism over capitalism,
imperialism and colonialism is inevitable:
"Our time... is a time of the breakdown of imperialism, of
the abolition of the colonial system.... bf the triumph of
socialism and communism on a world-wide scale;"
b. The US is the principal obstacle impeding this inevitable victory:
"The United States remains the main economic, financial
and military farce of modern imperialism.... U. S. imperialism
is the chief bulwark of world reaction.. ,it has become an
enemy of the peoples of the whole world;"
c. Western Germany is the principal accomplice of US imperialism:
"The imperialist forces of the U. S. A. , Britain and France have
made a criminal deal with West German imperialism... The
threat to peace and the security of the European nations from
West German imperialism is increasing, ... Like the Hitler
clique in its day, the West German militarists are preparing
war against the socialist and other countries of Europe. "
d. The "threat" of West Berlin must therefore be abolished:
"In the opinion of Communists the task which must be accom-
plished first of all if peace is to be safeguarded are to... conciuc'.e
a peace treaty with Germany, turn West Berlin into a
demilitarized free city, thwart the aggressive designs of the
West German revanchist s.... "
e. The Communists are confident that they will win this (or any other)
struggle because:
"The narrower the sphere of imperialist domination, the stronger
the antagonisms between the imperialist powers" and the world
Communist movement has become the most influential political
force of our time. "
f. While the Communists do not consider war to be "fatally
inevitable" (provided the rest of the world submits peacefully to their
peremptory demands), they are convinced of emerging victorious from
any military conflict:
"But should the imperialist maniacs start war, the peoples will
sweep capitalism out of existence and bury it. "
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NUMBER 71
31 July 1961
ADDENDUM
Item #414 - See Item #327, 19 December 1961 and Item #350 , 13 February
1961.
ATTACHMENT: Trends of Opinion in the Soviet Younger Generation
Foreign Radio and Press Reaction to President Kennedy's
Speech on Berlin Crisis (FBTS Dailyeport Supplement
Word Reaction Series, Thursday, 27 July 1961)
411. Democratic Reform in Latin America - The Columbian Community
Development Program - D, P.
412. COMMUNIST CHINA: Calculated Extermination of the Unproductive
Elements of the Population - A Solution to Communist China's
Economic Chaos? - A, P, L, V.
413. Not Used.
414. Moscow Declaration and Berlin Crisis - C, E, R.
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zcza
DAILY REPORT
SUPPLEMENT
World Reaction Series
NO. 4 -- 1961
FOREIGN RADIO AND PRESS REACTION
TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S SPEECH
ON BERLIN CRISIS
THURSDAY
27 JULY 1961
Laws relating to copyright, libel, and communications require
that dissemination of this publication be limited to persons
having an official interest in its contents. Exception can be
granted only by the issuing agency, and users are warned that
noncompliance may subject violators to personal liability.
Foreign Broadcast Ino formation Service
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FOREIGN) RADIO AND PRESS REACTION
TO PRESIDENT KL1'NNEDytS SPEECH
ON THE BERLIN CRISIS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
West Europe
Asia and the Far East
Middle East and Africa
Latin America (except Cuba)
SINO--SOVIET BLOC AND CUBA
USSR
East European Satellites
Communist China
Cuba
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NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Available noncommunist radio and press reaction to president Kennedy's
speech on the Berlin crisis is generally favorable, with West E'iropean
commentators stressing both the firmness of the American position and
the expressed desire for negotiations. Far Eastern commentators also
praise Kennedy's statement as an indication that the United States
will show determination in resisting communism throughout the world.
Middle Eastern and Latin American radios widely report the speech but
offer little comment.
Soviet commentators generally assess President Kennedy's 25 July
speech as an attempt to justify a new armaments race with the pretext
that West Berlin is threatened by the Soviet Union. Noting that the
President presented an extensive program of military preparations,
Moscow's domestic service says that he tried to present this step as
a reply to the Soviet aide-memoire on Germany and to the increased
Soviet military expenditures, but that he had to admit that the
United States had actually begun to increase its military strength
considerably earlier. The President's remarks on willingness to
negotiate outstanding issues have so far been avoided in domestic
service comment, and only one broadcast notes other than the "bellicose"
aspects of the speech, saying that the president concluded by giving
reassurances of the United States' peaceful aspirations. Only very
brief commentaries on the speech have appeared so far in the Soviet
domestic service, but it is reported that Moscow papers carry
"detailed" accounts of it.
Satellite transmitters in general criticize the atmosphere of "war
hysteria" in Kennedy's speech and accuse him of maintaining an
unrealistic position regarding West Berlin. Only East Germany
emphasizes the President's remarks about negotiations, with
commentators predicting, in the words of Ulbricht, that "there will
be no fighting" for West Berlin.
The small amount of monitored Peking comment follows the Soviet line,
charging that the President is using the West Berlin crisis as an
excuse for intensified war preparations.
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A. West Europe
Great Britain: The press review of the BBC's general overseas service
on 2'7 July indicates that Kennedy's Berlin statement was the main
subject of comment. While all papers quoted support the President,
generally the emphasis was on the willingness to negotiate. The
DAILY TELEGRAPH says there was more emphasis on negotiation than
Kennedy's European critics had expected, The DAILY HERALD says that
it was more than a defiant speech--there were hopeful passages in
which the President made it clear that America is willing to negotiate.
There is also a note of disappointment that the President was not more
explicit in indicating what areas were negotiable.
The GUARDL%N writes: "Mr. Khrushchev has not said that he intends to
seize West Berlin by force. What he has said is that he intends to
hand over Soviet responsibility for supervision of Western access to
the East German Government. The greatest weakness in President Kennedy's
speech is that he made no positive suggestion for dealing with that
limited threat." The DAILY IffMLD asks what an acceptable solution to
the Berlin problem is and suggests that a clue to Kennedy's ideas would
have been helpful. The TIMES says that the speech was hardly the kind
to give. a clear definition of what sort of talk would be considered
useful. But the door was left open wider than before for Russia to
come forward. The TINS believes that the search for peace could be
conducted through quiet exploratory talks even while the long-range
debate is still thundering.
BBC also broadcasts man-in-the-street interviews with London citizens,
who generally voice approval of Kennedy's stand. A British Foreign
Office spokesman is quoted by AFP as stating that the "British
Government shares the American Government's readiness to negotiate
on the German problem with the Soviet Government on a reasonable basis."
West Germany: All West German news media give heavy play to the
President's speech. West German television and several radio stations
carry the complete speech on 26 July. All West German papers carry
extensive reportage and comment on the speech and several papers carry
the full text. West German press and radio commentaries stress
gratification concerning the President's Berlin stand and the firm
leadership he has assumed in the political offensive against the Soviet
threat. Richard Thilenius, over Rad:',_o Frankfurt, comments that the
President's great speech can only be termed an "admirable document" on
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%MMO2
the strength and determination as well as the flexibility and
responsibility of U.S. policy. He concludes that after this "masterful
.,ravation of the Berlin crisis may be avoided if Moscow
address" an agg
desires.
Peinhard Gerdes over Radio Mainz calls the speech defensive in the
military field but offensive politically. Wolf Rochlage, also over
Radio IiIainz, maintains that Chancellor Adenauer desires to place the
accent of the speech on its warnings to the Soviet Union.
Max Schulze-Vorberg, a Radio Munich commentator, believes the free
West has started a political diplomatic offensive while staying
defensive militarily.
While the West German press on 26 July concentrates on reporting the
military measures announced in the speech, the press on 27 July acclaims
the speech as a historic document. All papers are gratified with the
President's Berlin stand and express the realization that this will
also mean greater sacrifices for the German-people, which they must
be willing to make. Such headlines as "Yes-to Kennedy," used by the
Berlin daily B.Z., or "The West Is Firmly Behind Kennedy," in the
BERLINER MORGENPOST, reflect the opinion of the West German press.
The Berlin progovernment paper TAGESSPIEGEL points to the unprecedented
clarity and determination of the President's brief and pregnant
formulations on the manifold role of Berlin. The Berlin paper B.Z.
says it was the most determined speech an American president ever made
for freedom.
An official West German spokesman, quoted by AFP, states that
President Kennedy's speech was received in Bonn with "great satisfaction"
and "gratitude." The spokesman particularly praised the "firmness,
precision, and balance" shown in the talk, noting that the United States
had set forth its position firmly but had left the door open for
negotiation. The West German DPA reports that Bonn government circles
have described the statement as clearly strengthening the West in
regard to the imminent Berlin crisis and demonstrating the leading
role played by the United States in the Western alliance. West Berlin
Mayor Brandt is quoted by DPA as thanking President Kennedy for the
"firmness with which he has supported the rights of the allies and
people" of West Berlin.
France: Radio Paris comments that President Kennedy reaffirmed the
American position with "vigor and determination" and a "tone of
exceptional gravity." An ABP commentary observes that the "United States
does not want to maintain a negative attitude" and thus is "taking
concrete, immediate, and long-term measures to strengthen its defensive
system and that of the free world." French Government circles, according
to AFP, have stressed that the firmness of the U.S. President fully
accords with the French position.
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Italy: The Italian paper TEMPO, reviewed by Radio Rome, describes the
dd.ress as "one of the firmnest speeches made in the past few years
from the White .souse." Other Italian papers, including IL POP'OLO and
L'AVANTI, stress that while Kennedy showed firmness and determination
he also expressed. a desire for negotiation. IL QUOTIDIANO says the
speech was "full of dramatic material but not essentially pessimistic."
IL NESSAGGERO sees no alarmist psychosis in the United States. The
communist UNITA says that Kennedy has personally assumed responsibility
for further inflating war hysteria.
Austria: The Austrian radio and press give great prominence to
Kennedy's address. The radio broadcasts extensive summaries of the
speech and news reports on favorable Western reaction but does not
comment. Austrian noncommunist press reaction is favorable, with
headlines emphasizing Kennedy's determination to defend Berlin and to
fight rather than surrender and, to a lesser degree, his. continued
readiness to negotiate. Only the communist VOLKSSTIMVIE reacts
negatively, summing up the speech as "saber rattling" and an attempt
to use the Berlin problem as a pretext for an increased armaments race.
Long press summaries of the speech highlight the President's announcement
of increased arms spending, his argument that the fate of the whole
tree "world rather than that of Berlin alone is at stake, and his
statement that the United States will "reeist with force" if force is
used against it.
The independent OBEROESTERREICHISCHE NACHRICHTEN considers the President's
hints at readiness to negotiate on certain aspects of the Berlin question
the key point of the whole speech. It believes them to be a reply to
I;nrushchev's suggestion that European security be discussed and an
indication that Kennedy is ready to make concessions regarding Western
propaganda and intelligence activities in West Berlin. An independent
PRESSE editorial hails Kennedy for having taken up the "often-demanded
Western leadership in an acute crisis."
An editorial in the socialist ARBEI_TER-ZEITUNG welcomes
Kennedy's "strong and courageous words" as well as his actions, which
were "probably not expected by those who have recently accused him of
excessive leniency." The paper considers the current military
preparations to be moves in the war of nerves rather than genuine
war preparations, but it voices regret that "a development is being
initiated which at some future stage might escape the control of the
statesmen."
Switzerland: Among several Swiss papers welcoming President Kennedy's
firmness, the Basel NATIONALZEITUNG states that he demanded from the
American people the sacrifices needed to ward off the worldwide threat
from the East and fearlessly accepted Khrushchev's challene, being
aware that "what is at stake above.all is to stand up to a test of
nerves." Kennedy aroused no illusions and put the situation in a
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realistic light, the paper adds. BASLER 1ACIIRICHTEN, on the other
hand; wonders whether ?trushchev might conclude from the speech that
the Americans' will to resist is not to be taken so very seriously.
In another article the paper says West German officials were struck
by Kennedy's offer to negotiate with the USSR--which might require
"greater sacrifices of Germany policy." U.S. allies in Europe are
particularly favorable to the offer to negotiate, stresses the
GAZETTE DE LAUSANNE. The JOURNAL DE GE H E writes that the military
buildup asked by the President aims at strengthening NATO in such a
manner as "not to provoke the Soviet side to indulge in.a military
walkover through weal ess . "
Scandinavia: The Swedish paper SVENSKA DAGBLADET points to the
seriousness of both Kennedy's warnings to the USSR and his assurances
of U.S. willingness to cooperate in a peaceful solution.
STOCKHOLMS-TIDNINGEN, also lauding this assertion of readiness to
negotiate, emphasizes the President's "outspoken understanding of
Soviet security problems." The speech does not indicate, however,
whether the United States and West Germany are willing to pay the
price for an atom-free zone in central Europe, the paper adds.
A Radio Copenhagen commentary questions the seriousness of the military
measures announced by President Kennedy, suggesting that he does not
expect a military crisis in Berlin but is merely effecting an arms
reorganization he considered necessary before assuming the presidency.
The United States is arming for negotiations on Berlin, the commentary
says, but for negotiations that can be carried out during limited
military operations, thus escaping the choice between capitulation
or atomic war. The President felt compelled to express readiness to
negotiate on Berlin, the broadcast adds, because the recent Western
notes to the USSR indicated unwillingness to negotiate on anything
but German reunification.
South Korea: Unconditional support for President Kennedy's "clear
pronouncment" of U.S. policy on the Berlin situation, and particularly
his reaffirmation of U.S. determination to defend freedom throughout
the world from "communist aggression," as well as pledges of ROK-U.S.
solidarity characterize the congratulatory messages from
Gen. Pak Chong-hui and Song Yo-chang, broadcast in full by Radio Seoul
within hours after the speech. In the first press comment on the
speech carried by the Seoul radio, a CHOSON ILBO editorial commends
the Kennedy administration for translating into positive action
campaign Fledges made last summer. The editorial goes on to voice the
hope that other Western powers will develop a "unity of views and
action." along the line set by the President, and regards as "significant"
the fact that Kennedy has left the door open to Khrushchev for negotiations.
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Nationalist China: An anonymous press commentary aired by Radio Taipei
applauds the firm stand taken by the::United States.as a "guarantee c;.
world peace" and a "course of action taken by the. democratic bloc in
the cold war'with determination instead-of meekness.." At the same time,
the commentator wonders whether other NATO nations will back up this
firm stand, "especially the vacillating and opportunistic Britain,
meek attitude toward Berlin has already aroused the resentment of the
United States."
Australia: Australian papers, according to the Melbourne radio,.exj.reis
themselves:in favor of Kennedy's'"straight talking and the action being
taken to back up his words," with equal emphasis given to.Kennedy's
willingness to negotiate and preparedness to resist aggression. While
the ADELAIDE ADVERTISER notes that the "full risk" of a nuclear war iu
"inescapable," the MELBOURNE AGE sees two alternatives to an al!--out
nuclear war: Negotiations around a table or minor aggression with
conventional weapons. The paper believes that Kennedy should offer a
new basis for negotiation, a more concrete proposal for peaceful
discussion. An optimistic note is sounded by the SYDNEY MORNING
which says Khrushchev, unlike Hitler, is a realist and does not want to
risk a nuclear war, but warns that the real peril lies in that he may
go ahead with his plans in the belief that the West would not dare
resort to nuclear war. A newspaper commentator quoted by the Melbourne
radio labels the speech "an unmistakably grave and clear warning" to
the Soviet Union and "a constructive message which opened the door wide
to peaceful negotiation.of East-West differences."
Japan: Extensive Japanese press and radio comment on Kennedy's speech
views it css an even stronger expression of determination to meet
American commitments in Berlin at any cost while still leaving the
door open for negotiations with the Soviets. All commentators are
impressed by the determination marking the president's words, but
some regret that both the United States and the Soviet Union tend
more and more toward the principle of "power against power." MAINICHI
notes that "both Kennedy and Khrushchev left the door open for
negotiations through diplomatic channels." The JAPAN TIMES justifies
the proposed American arms buildup on the basis of the Soviet throats
but regrets the obvious setback to disarmament hopes. Several editorials
appeal to the Soviet Union to abandon its aggressive tactics. The
Japanese Communist Party publication AKAIIATA charges President Kennedy
with deliberately opening up the arms race for the purpose of increasing
international tension and stimulating the U.S. economy.
The ruling Liberal-Democratic Party and the government regard U.S.
determination to face the Berlin crisis with increased military paper
as a "natural reaction" to recent Soviet threats, the KYODO agency
reports. The Socialists, however, are critical of Kennedy's attitude
and say it will deepen the East-West conflict over Berlin, the agency
says. Hiroo Wjda, chief of the Socialist Party's International Bureau,
said over a nationwide Japanese radio and television hookup that ?:,ot'r:
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the United States and Russia should continue to hake efforts to eaoe
world; tension.. by peaceful means and not by force of arms. A Ja7paree
Foreign Office statement, carried by the Tokyo JAPAN TIMES,. eirz.hf. , _ ,cr-
that "Japan strongly hopes that the freedom of West Berlin will be
protected by peaceful means."
Arab World and Israel: Arab transmitters offer,-no comment on the
speech but generally report, in varying detail, the main points
brought out by Mr. Kennedy. Virtually all note the' President's
request to Congress for additional defense funds, and report Adenauer's'.;
satisfaction with the speech. Of the UAR radios, Damascus. givestwice:
as much coverage as Cairo. It carries a five-minute resume of the
speech a. ong with two briefer reports, one in a Hebrew-language ne?.aecList
as well as reporting congressional approval and British support. ' Boith
Damascus and Cairo note the TASS comment that Kennedy used the allege .
threat to Berlin as Justification for the arms race. Cairo's only
brief report on the speech comes in its early morning newscast 26 July.
Baghdad, giving a slightly longer summary, also refers to the TASS
reaction, and cites an Iraqi press headline that "Adenauer declares
his submission to American imperialism." Beirut radio gives a six-minute
resume in addition to a shorter report, while Amman, Mecca, and Sana
radios carry only short single references.
The Israeli radio, giving several brief accounts of the speech, also
broadcasts recorded excerpts, calling attention to the "warlike tone"
of Kennedy's address and observing that the speech apparently reflects
the recent consultations of the American National Security Council.
The radio also reports the TASS comment.
Greece, Turkey, Iran: In addition to an AFP summary of the Kennedy
statement, Athens radio reports Western reaction, noting that official
Paris circles have described the speech as "militant" and as saying it
make; clear to the USSR that the We t will not hesitate to defend
West Berlin. Broadcasting a brief summary of the speech, Ankara also
reports favorable Western reaction in sevii:-al items, .ntin~= ,.,out
French, British, and West German support. Of ai~. MiddT.e Easy.
transmitters, Teheran gives by far the most coverage, carrying not
only a 24-minute version of the speech but three "Topic of the Day"
talks devoted to the subject, as well as considerabI e reportage
describing the warm reception at home and approval abroad from
Western press and official ci,rcl s.s Introducing a talk on possible
Russian reaction, the radio calls the. Kennedy message "still one of
the most important subjects under discussion by world political circles."
D. Latin America (except Cuba)
While Latin American transmitters have been prompt in reporting
Kennedy's speech, emphasizing his call for an increase in the military
budget, there has been little monitored comment.
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Chile: As a result of Kennedy's request for additional military
appropriations, says Radio Santiago Y`s commentator, the U.S. military
budget is "the biggest in the history of the United States and the
entire world. Radio Valparaiso, in a Washington-datelined item without
source identification, observes that Kennedy clearly sought to achieve
a "psychological effect," and it asks what practical redults are caused by
increasing the armed forces by a more 200,000. For years the
United States has been "dancing to the tune played by the Russians,"
says the radio, adding that the United States will now begin to show
"some initiative in dealing with the Soviets."
Radio Panama commentator Carrasco on the morning of 26 July notes that
the Cubans, who were preparing a surprise for the world on the Castro
anniversary, were themselves dealt a surprise, as were communist elements
throughout Latin America. With the United States on a "war footing,"
he says, the threat now is "not so much-from Cuba toward the United States,
but from the United States toward Cuba."
Soviet reaction to-.President Kennedy's epeech follows the
lines of an initial TASS report which asserts that the President merely
"chose the so-called threat to West Berlin as an excuse to justify the
arms race" as part of a previously conceived U.S. military buildup.
PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA are reported by TASS and the domestic service to
have published "detailed" accounts of the speech, IZVESTIYA's version
being carried under the headline "On Old Positions."
TASS commentator Orlov asserts that the West Berlin question,
"deliberately inflated by Western propaganda, is being used by U.S.
ruling quarters to speed up realization of plans mapped out long ago--
during the first days of the new administration, or probably even by
its predecessors." He charges that U.S. military buildup plans antedated
both the new West Berlin crisis and the Soviet announcement on increased
military outlays. "If there were no West Berlin problem," Orlov says,
"imperialist quarters would simply have invented an excuse for stepping
up the armaments race just to try to solve, with its help, the internal
and external problems besetting the United States and its partners in
the North Atlantic bloc." Washington apparently has decided to use an
old formula, trying to spur the slow revival of the U.S. economy after
a prolonged slump by injecting large military preparations. Regarding
some of the external implications of the U.S. stand, Orlov cites a
New York TIMES comment that the new plan is primarily aimed not at
defense of the former German capital but at increasing the ability of
the,Western allies to wage any kind of war in any part of the world.
What is meant, Orlov remarks, is "active opposition to the national
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liberation movement in Africa, Asia, and Latin America," for only this
can explain the words of the President about the need for creating a
"sea and airlift capable of moving forces quickly and in large numbers
to any part of. the world."
Radio Moscow commentator Vavilov notes in a widely beamed broadcast
that the President--in times of peace--requested an increase in military
expenditures thrice in the past six months. There have been only two
instances when U.S. military expenditures have increased at such an
unheard-of-rate--during World War II and during the Korean war--he says,
"but now there is no war. There is peace. Nobody is attacking..the
United States and nobody intends to launch an attack against it.".
People who are free of prejudice can form only one opinion, he avers--that
"the United States is openly preparing for war." Vavilov urges that it
is "now more than ever necessary that every statesmen handle international
problems soberly and realistically" and that "commonsense trrast be the
keynote in the solution of international problems." He concludes with
the warning that "if a third world war breaks out, no ocean will protect
America. It is very dangerous to play with fire in the age of hydrogen
bombs and ballistic rockets. If the United States sincerely desires
peace it must abandon the destructive arms race policy."
TASS reports of the speech, in contrast to the domestic service treatment
and the Vavilov commentary, note the President's remarks on the USSR's
legitimate concern for its security and his willingness to negotiate
outstanding issues. However, they charge that the President's words
on negotiation are "drowned out by his military program" and obscured
by his failure to put forward any proposals on the admittedly abnormal
situation in Germany.
TASS briefly reports former Vice President Nixon's statement in
Los Angeles, which supported Kennedy and urged his administration "to
crush the Cuban revolution, to resume nuclear testing, to push the
fight against Communist China's U.N. admission, and to postpone
realization of the nonmilitary programs of the United States."
B. East European Satellites
East Germany: East German transmissions devote proportionately more
attention to the speech than the other satellites. They condemn it
to the extent that it deals with military measures, but they see
something positive in the statement recognizing the USSR's need for
security. Commentator Schultze-Walden describes the speech as "empty
propaganda" meant only to bolster the "shaky unity" of the West and to
obtain a better position for negotiations. He assures German listeners
that Kennedy "well knows that he cannot and will not wage war for
West Berlin," much as Adenauer and Strauss would like him to, and
there is .therefore "not the slightest reason for panic." They know in
Washington that "a conventional war in the heart of Europe would
certainly turn into a nuclear war, a risk no U.S. government can take."
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An East Berlin domestic service comment stresses that "if we look at
Kennedy's speech for points that make for understanding and not for
estrangement, we find that this speech confirms what Walter Ulbricht
said just three weeks ago : 'There will be no fighting, but negotiations
on West Berlin. There will be a eements.' Kennedy was compelled to
agree that there are actual irritants and elements of friction in
West Berlin. He reiterated that'teUnited States is ready to eliminate
these irritants." Commentators maintain that the speech has caused some
uneasy stirring in Bonn officialdom, and ADN says West Berlin
Mayor Brandt was forced to falsify a portion of the speech concerning
Kennedy's "possible readiness to negotiate."
Gerhard Kegel, a GDR Foreign Ministry official, comments over
East German television that the United States cannot intimidate the
Soviet Union with Kennedy's new armament demands. Kegel doubts
Kennedy's sincerity, believing that the real reason behind the
President's measure is the increase in profits to be gained by the
monopolies. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND regrets that the President in his
"contradictory" speech did not withdraw from the ultras who have been
demanding military demonstrations. The paper comments that it is a
dangerous policy to dwell to such a great extent on increased armaments.
BERLINER ZEITUNG echoes the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND line but welcomes Kennedy's
statement to the effect that as a signer of the U.N. Charter the
United States will always be prepared to discuss international problems
with all nations that are willing to talk and listen.
Poland: Reaction in Warsaw follows the Soviet line, the domestic
service even carrying a TASS commentary on the speech. PAP reports
a TRYBUNA LUDU article by Kowalewski which charges that Kennedy "spoke
about increased armaments in a manner which leaves no room for
interpretation, while he spoke about negotiations in a most vague
manner." TRYBUNA LUDU maintains that the President's offer to negotiate
is "glaringly inconsistent" with his new stage in the armaments race.
"If the first military decisions are followed by others, the difficulties
will grow instead of diminishing," according to the Polish paper.
Czechoslovakia: Czechoslovak papers sum up President Kennedy's speech
as an effort to justify the arms race through the so-called Berlin
crisis, according to CTK. Kennedy has decided to use the old
prescription of huge injections of military spending to overcome
economic recession, BRATISLAVA PRACA adds. Prague radio says Kennedy
rejected all Soviet proposals on Germany and indicated no willingness
to understand the present Berlin situation.
Hungary: A Budapest commentator tells listeners in West Europe that
the speech "indicates that the American Government has passed from
fostering war hysteria to overt threats of war." He maintains that
Kennedy intended to step up the ai rns rare in general and that
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West Berlin is "nothing but a transparent pretext" to serve that
purpose. An 1121 correspondent in Washington charges Kennedy with
trying to "conjure up the danker of a rcommunist challenge' to rouse
and alarm the American public."
Rumania: The first monitored reference to the`?speech over the Bucharest
domestic service is a Moscow-dateline d1item' noting TASS commentator
Orlov accusing the President, of saber rattling and charging that the
West Berlin problem is being intentionally exaggerated by the West.
The domestic service press review on 27 July carries a Washington-
datelined item referring to President Kennedy's speech as "a speech
intended to incite war psychosis." The paper SCINTEIA on the same day
carries a TASS commentary, "According to the Old Recipe," which points
out the "unrealistic content" of the speech. No commentaries on the
speech have been heard yet on the domestic service.
Bulgaria: Sofia in Arabic says the President resorted to "military
hysteria" to conceal the fact that the United States wants to defend
its "right" of "exploitation, spying, and provocation in West Berlin."
He should have admitted that the U.S. leadership is "prepared to go to
the very end and to throw the world in a war, even if it is a nuclear
one," Radio Sofia says. In a four-minute review of the speech,
Radio Sofia points to the fact that although Kennedy attempted to
represent the intensification of American military preparations as
an answer to the Soviet note, he admitted that the United States had
begun to increase its military power much earlier. Another brief
report on the speech notes that Bonn revanchists welcome it with
"great joy."
Albania: There have been few monitored references to the speech from
Tirana radio. On 27 July it briefly reported the President's request
to Congress for more funds to increase the non-nuclear forces and the
air and sea transport means, and to expand the antisubmarine weapons
program.
There has been little monitored Peking comment on the speech. An NCNA
report in Chinese on 27 July follows the line of Soviet comment, charging
that the President used the "pretext" of the Berlin crisis and other
"challenges" to step up "frantic" arms expansion. The report outlines
the six steps proposed by Mr. Kennedy, as well as the other major
proposals contained in the speech. The Peking domestic service and
an NC A dispatch in English on the same day briefly refer to the
President's "bellicose speech" and then go on to report his message
to Congress asking for revision of the military budget and for
authorization to call up additional reservists as part of a series of
"extensive war preparations." NCNA further asserts that the announced
U.S. arms expansion has "greatly pleased the munitions monopolists,"
and notes the rise in prices of certain shares on the New York Stock
Exchange.
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Tere is no original comment from Cuba on the speech. H Wana's
Radio Progreso carries the first TABS report on the speech, and
PRENSA ''-,AT-TEA carries a brief reference to it without comment.
Yugoslav foreign-language broadcasts stress Kennedy's intention to
build up U.S. armed forces and also note his expression of readiness
to negotiate. A TANYUG dispatch claims that the President intensified
the U.S. "war psychosis" and that the country is in an unproclaimed
state of alert. Asserting that Kennedy failed to specify what remains
to be negotiated regarding Berlin, the dispatch attributes the
President's va,,eness on negotiations to Jack of agreement on strategy
among; Washington, London, and Paris. Belgrade radio also observes
that while the President was "clear when laying down military
objectives," he was "vague in dealing with U.S. readiness for
negotiations" with the USSR on eastern and central Europe.
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TRENDS OF OPINION IN THE SOVIET YOUNGER GENERATION
Soviet youth, as depicted in current Russian literature, in the main accepts
the political and social system which it has inherited but is unresponsive to the
creed on which the system is based. The philosophically minded are concerned
with finding a more satisfactory reason for existence than is offered in the
slogans of the Communist party. Others are increasingly frank in demanding
material benefits now, in place of the vague rewards of the Communist future.
In an effort to deal with this unresponsiveness the regime las sought to 'Increase
discipline among the youth by raising requirements for labor training in the
educational system. Further, Komsomol activity has been stepped up. But
neither of these actions seems to have strengthened youth's allegiance to official
party goals.
Despite Khrushchev's chastisement of Soviet writers in 1957, the noncon-
formist authors have continued to try to expand the province of Soviet literature.
Obedient to Khrushchev's injunction to leave fault-finding to the party, they have,
:.a A he main, ceased writing the exposes of Soviet life in fictional form which
enlivened the literature of the early 1950s, and have shifted their efforts to
understanding and describing their fellow man.
The regime has long demanded that writers concentrate on inspiring
enthusiasm for the socialist system and "education" readers to conform to its
requirements. Efforts to move beyond the individuals public duty to the state
and portray his private emotional life are regarded at best as a waste of the
state's resources and at worst as subversive. Nevertheless, this private
emotional life preoccupies the most promising of the young Soviet writers, both
because of their own inclinations and because of the enthusiastic response of
their readership.
In the face of harsh strictures from critics, the continued appearance of
such subjective works in major literary magazines suggests the existence of a
receptive readership as well as of editorial boards anxious to increase circula-
tion. Moreover, their popularity appears to infect even the more conformist
writers. The more.lifelike characters with which the conformists have
attempted to meet the challenge of the nonconformists are often inadvertently as
revealing of Soviet attitudes as are the work of their rivals. Together, the two
groups of writers present a picture of an important element of Soviet youth as
it sees itself.
This picture, however, does not encompass the large mass of conformists
who accept ,the system as they find it and learn to live with it. Nor does it
reflect the extreme nonconformists whose ideas, too unconventional for public
print, occasionally circulate in handwritten manuscripts or in small groups of
trusted friends. What it does portray is a middle group of bright young people
from whom the future leaders will probably be drawn, and to the regime's
obvious concern, this group apparently is failing to respond to the dream of a
Communist future.
Search for Life's Meaning
Within this group, Soviet youth accepts the system it has inherited, but
apparently finds the accompanying creed sterile. It is deeply concerned with
finding a reason for existence.
Considering the regime's 40 years of militant atheism, religion surprisingll
often is suggested as a possible answer. Frequently, it appears as an early hope
which later fails. In Save Our Souls* by B. S. Lvov, a son, grief-stricken at the
loss of his father, searches for the meaning of life. After the failure of his
school and of a well-meaning but doctrinaire aunt to help him, he enters a
theological seminary but is disillusioned there also. In the end he is "rescued"
by the Komsomol. However, the author makes no pretense that the Komsomol
can provide him with the answer to his question.
Occasionally, religion turns out to be the answer. In The Torch a "good"
character is revealed as an able student and much-decorated hero of World War
II who entered the priesthood on his discharge from the army. "Among the
partisans I saw a priest. He fought and died like a soldier. He knew just what to
say to people. After all, I have seen during the war, I too came to kiow what to
say to people; I came to understand what it was they needed most--comfort, that
is, faith, And now I am needed. "
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Many other writers portray the same search without reference .to
religion. The 18-year-old of V. Nikitin's Thaw Lands goes to the remote polar
regions to "build communism. " He is soon disillusioned: "What common
cause am I serving? What new life am I building? I am simply digging trenches
....Is this what I dreamed of, what I am meant to do with my life? Why did I
study for ten years?... It begins to appear that I shall never understand why I
am living .... It is becoming awful. "
In The Difficult Test by N. Dubov, another youngster is repelled by the
deceit and injustice in the factory. He is also shaken by the cynicism and greed
of a prominent party member's son. "Greenhorn! Are you trying to convert
me? You needn't. I know more about communism than you do. They are still
constructing it, but I have already reached the Communist stage--I receive
according to my needs. Work! Do you think I am a beast of burden--a donkey?"
In his search for a faith, the "greenhorn" receives understanding and
sympathy from a Baptist worker: "The young don't know what to do with them-
selves. Their daily bread is assured, but that isn't enough. Having fed the body,
man strives to feed the soul, but he finds no spiritual food, so he wanders in the
darkness of crude sensual pleasures. It is impossible to quench spiritual
thirst. And this thirst dries man out, makes him callous and indifferent to
others. "
Attempts by the conformist writers to fulfill this spiritual thirst often
appear awkward. An experienced party leader in Vasily Aksenov's Colleagues i;
asked: "What are those glittering heights (of communism)? They're too
abstract. " He dreams of the future of his small town in the icy north-western
USSR: "Soon the small town will become the big town of Kruglogorsk. Our
children will drive their motors with atomic energy. And so an endless chain
of progress will reach forward into the future; bright houses with enormous
windows will be reflected in the warm waters of the lake, palms will wave their
bran ches, and glass automobiles will speed back and forth over broad white
highways. "
Another writer, climaxing the story of a sea captain, found the reason for
his continued existence in the need of his ship to transport a record load of
caviar.
The Individual
A large group of stories is devoted to probing man's mind, describing
relationships between individuals without attempting moral judgments. Yuri
Kazakov in The Apostate presents a buoy-keeper on the river, a braggart,
drunkard, and loafer, who has a beautiful voice. Visiting travelers, listen ing to
him sing, "forget his roughness and stupidity, his drunkenness and boastings, th,
long journey behind them, and their fatigue. " For the singer, however,
the point of existence is not the pleasure he can bring others, but singing itself.
The author's assertions of the validity of being, regardless of contributions to
society, is reminiscent of Hemingway's Old Man and the Sea, which has enjoyed
extraordinary popularity in the USSR.
Other Values
The search for the meaning of life has led to a re-examination of other
values beyond the simplified Communist code of contribution to the state. In
Nihilist a young poet, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, contrasts a youth who dressed in
narrow trousers, liked Picasso, and daringly read early Hemingway, with the
"honest production workers" who called him a nihilist. The youth dies rescuing a
comrade and the poet asks which was the nihilist.
Vladimir Tendryakov's Court of Justice contrasts the efforts of three men
to clear their consciences with a socialist court of law which is swayed by
political influence and willing to convict the innocent in order to clear court
records.
Skepticism
The Komsomol daily newspaper recently complained that the schools, by
failing to "explain the contradiction between what is written and what is seen in
*All novels, short stories, and plays cited here,
with the exception of "Continuation of a Legend, "' have
been published within the last two years.
2
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in daily life, " are breeding "cynics, hypocrites, and demagogues. " In The
Difficult Test an old worker tells the questioning hero, "Brother, you have to
work out everything with your o4vn mind. Otherwise, they will tell you today
that a thing is white, you will believe them, and tomorrow that the same t ping
is black and again you will believe them.... Or worse still, you will no longer
believe anytne. And that is the end of everything when a person does not
believe in anything. "
A newly graduated doctor in Colleagues protests: "If only you know how
sick I am of all that cant, all those highsounding phrases. It's not only the vast
multitude of idealists like you that uses them, but just as vast a multitude
of rascals. Beria probably talked like that to deceive the party. Now that our
eyes have been opened, that blab doesn't go. Let's do without it. I love my
country and all it stands for and would give my life, legs, arms for it without
flinching, but for that I answer only to myself, to my conscience, and I don't
need any cheering on. It only confuses a person. "'
This frank skepticism sometimes extends to the Communist party itself.
In Aleksandr Shteyn's Ocean, a character explains why he does not join the
party: "I want to say yes when I think it necessary to say yes, and no when I
think it necessary to say no. If I join the party, I shall have to say yes when I
want to say no and no when I ought to say yes. "
The secretary of the regional party committee in Aleksandr Chakovsky's
The Roads We Choose describes a party colleague thus: "Seers were high
priests in ancient Egypt. They deluded the people who believed them. Bnt when
they met each other, they could not refrain from exchanging knowing glances,
winking at each other as if to say 'We know all about this game.' That's
what smirnov is--a Soviet seer. "
Materialism
Valentin Ovechkin warned in It is Time to Reap the Fruits of the increas-
ingly materialistic outlook of youth. The "bad" brother says: "Why didn't I go
to the country" To drag up some backward farm? Let each live according to his
merits.... Was it easy tcsr me to get a high education? Stone and iron will not
bear what I have borne as a boy. With my teeth I got out of life what is mine. "
His wife agrees: "Our fathers suffered enough in order for us to have a good
life. Sacrifices, difficulties, shortages--when will it all end?....It is time to
reap the fruits which have been sown. " The hero can only splutter helplessly:
"One should know how to fight your kind of people .... I'm boiling with rage, but
I don't really know how to answer....It's time to reap the harvest, but it's
time, too, that people of that kind don't dirty our land. "
The young critic Stanislav Rassadin in The Sixties, a non-fictional article
on current Soviet literature, attempted to justify the frankly material motives
of many Soviet youths. He quotes a young tractor driver in Kazakhstan: "There
is a lad in a book I once read who hives up his money, gives up his house, sleeps
in a tent, and goes about in overalls... and at work he cracks one record after
anoth er like sunflower seeds. But if I have nowhere to live, I can't do my work
properly. And I may look young, but I have a wife and two kids. They've got
to eat, haven't they? So there you are. No, don't argue with me, mate, it's
just a lot of bragging.'" Rassadin concludes that in the USSR'a "current stage
of development, " youth's revulsion from the storied selflessness of the older
generation is right and natural.
For those who feel they cannot afford the luxury of such frankness, there
has developed what Komsomolskaya Pravda describes as the "umbrella
mentality" -- the ability to parrot the appropriate phrases and even to go through
the appropriate motions of "agitating" in public, while privately living by an
entirely different code. In Colleagues, a reprehensible character who takes
bribes and uses influence to get a soft job is asked: "Wasn't it your article I
read a little while ago about labor discipline?" No whit disconcerted, he replies:
"Well, I've got to retrieve my reputation somehow. "" Publication of the story
predated the press exposure this spring of a reallife counterpart--a Moscow
student, Komsomol member, model activist, and head of his institute's circle
for extracurricular study of political economy, who had also found time to
engage in large-scale black-marketeering.
3
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Class Antagonisms
The nonconformists in their published works lave been less concerned with
material inequities than with man's inner life. The conformist publicists,
however, have provided some startling glimpses of class antagonisms in the
"classless" Soviet society.
In the highly praised Continuation of a Legend by Anatoly Kuznetso',
published in July 1957--the hero, a teen-alter in school, goes to visit a
glamorous classmate who receives more in monthly pocket money than the
hero's mother can make in a month as a seamstress. His confusion and embar-
rassment when confronted with her wealthy home and snobbish mother, and h.s
own recognition of the deep gulf between them, eventually develop into hostility,
for "her kind." "Yes, now I see, we are enemies.... Thus be prepared. We are
going to annihilate you. Everything in the world is just in the stage of a begin-
ning. In life there is a lot of fighting waiting for us. Our generation is only
entering that period." These words, the closing lines of the story, are
addressed, not to the aristocrats of Tsarist Russia, but to "comrades" 40 years
after the revolution.
Since wealth in the USSR usually follows education, the stereotype of the
simple wholesome masses is a strong one. Villains are either those with
higher education or sophisticated city dwellers, preferably both.
In Vil Lipatov's Wild Mint resentment of higher education is especially
noticeable. Not only is the villain a highly trained young engineer who attempts
to sabotage the work of the simple -lumbermen, apparently out of pure malice,
but two otherwise inoffensive teen-agers fulfilling their work obligation before
going on to college are also objects of dislike. They offer their specialized
knowledge to make repairs without which the team cannot meet its vrork quota
but are contemptuously refused. "What scientific terms they use, not just
"coil, " like any ordinary worker would say, but 'induction coil. "' The hero
sneers and "eyes the lads with hatred. Dolled themselves up! In ski suits
and leather ankle-boots and wearing ties with those snow-white shirts under
their jackets. 'Sissies. "'
International Brotherhood.
Notably lacking in this picture of Soviet youth is any suggestion of the inter
national brotherhood of the working class, or of a hostile outside world. On the
rare occasions when lands outside the USSR arementioned, they are used chiefly
to satisfy Soviet youth's deep hunger for the exotic. A young doctor in
Colleagues, on receiving an assignment aboaad a ship, thinks: "Like a magician
performing for children, the man in the worn coat had raised a curtain and
revealed a vast expanse of shimmering water. And out of the water rose a
mirage--palm trees, skyscrapers, cathedral spires, pyramids. You dreamed
of a life extraordinary, intense, filled with interest? And thought you would
never get it? You were wrong, you see. Here, take your ticket and ride into
a future as bright and entertaining as a film. "
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2001/11/16 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100040004-4