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December 4, 1961
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25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 December 1961 Approved For Rele se 2000/Olefp{PP78-030 A000100050001-6 De-Stalinization Techniques; The 22nd CPSU Congress started a new campaign, aiming at eliminating 'a'fl memories of Stalin in the Soviet Union, the European Satellites and even in free-world Communist Parties (especially where they25X1C10b control city councils which can name streets or erect monuments, as in Heavy Rainfall in East Africa: The rainfall in Kenya and Uganda is exception- a.Ilyheavy this Novem-be; instead of decreasing after the rainy season in October, they appear to be getting even heavier this November. There is a rumor in East Africa reported from Uganda which, like Kenya, is chiefly affected by the floods - that the unusually heavy rainfall is somehow the result of Soviet nuclear test explosions whic h have accentuated low pressure areas in that part of the world. CUBA: "Che' Guevara Yearns for Communism: In a speech he made on 25 November in avana, "C,he" Guevara, Minister for Industrialization declared: 'Socialism is a social system which offers to all new opportunities and new happiness. It prepares nations to reach the highest level of organization known or imagined up to now by man, and that is the Communist society. We cannot predict the day when we will reach it, we see it as a possible goal. Toward that goal, where each will work according to his capacity and w ill receive according to his needs, that is where we have to travel. V e have to go step by step. We must destroy the enemy today, supporting the brother countries which struggle for their liberation, counseling them, guiding them if possible along good roads, constructing socialism, which is the first phase and the goal of or a[forts today; and one day we will also pass into that great aspiration of the future which is the communist' society. " We ask whether there can be any further doubts concerning the Communist path down which the Cuban leaders are presently leading downtrodden Cuba. We warn that Guevara does not hesitate to declare his intention to export Cuban Communism to every country in Latin America. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 4 December 1961 nest 25X1C10b the Soy iet Union, Khrushchev said: "Delegations from 80 foreign Marxist- Leninist parties have arrived to attend the 22nd Congress of our party. Allow me to warmly welcome the delegations of the glorious fraternal parties present here. " He then proceeded to greet, one l,r one, the Communist Parties of all ?ie countries represented. Among them, he greeted: "The United Revolutionary Organizations of Cuba, headed by Comrade Blas Roca." Khrushchev did not refer to Blas Roca as the head of the Popular Socialist Farty (PSP) which was the designation used by the Communist Party of Cuba. Khrushchev made a poin t of the fact that the ORI is the Communist Party of Cuba. When, on 26 July 1961, Castro announced the formation of the ORI, he indicated that this was to be an almagamation of his revolutionary 26th of July '11Zovement with the Communist PSP together with numerous revolutionary organizations, such as the Association of Revolutionary Youth (AJR) and the Federation of Cuban Women (FM C). On 4 N-~vemb&F,,-"Che"-Zile vara .stated that "the OPI constitutes the central nucleus of what is to be -- and practically speaking is -- the United Party of the Revolution, the political motor of the entire country. " He went on to explain that the ORI administrative organization is vertical, In effect, OPI cells are being organized throughout Cuba as the first phase of an entity that is to be called the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution. Blas Roca's public statements foreshadow a party system in which membership will be limite& to the elite of the revolutionary struggle, and which will, in turn, be a requisite to holding any position of economic or political importance in the country. It is clear from the statements of ORI leaders that the new party is to be con- trolled by the Communists and based on "Marxist-Leninist principles". A com- mentary on Havana radio on 22 August stated that "the task of ORI will now be to lead the republic safely toward the edification of 'socialism"' (i. e. communism). Following the overthrow of Batista, the only party which was permitted to function as such was the PSP. It remains, to this day, the only real party organization in Cuba. Although the 26th of July Movement has an executive, it has never functioned as a political party. By means of the ORI, the Communists are setting up a classic Communist state in which the party dictates to the Government. The following list of ORI officials illustrates this situation vividly: Blas Roca - Secretary General of the PSP and National Director of the ORI. Carlos Rafael Director of the Communist newspaper Hoy, Rodriguez - Head of the Economic Commission of the PSP and head of Economic Planning for the ORI. (Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 463. (Cont.) 4 December 1961 Approved For Rele se 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-0306 A000100050001-6 Annibal Escalante - Secretary of the PSP and Executive Secretary of the ORI. Lazaro Pena, _ +:/--ember of the Executive Commission of the PSP gin:' ?resident"of its Labor -ommission, and heau' of Economic Y lanning for the ORI. Severo A.guire - Member of the Central Committee of the PSP and in charge of Agriculture for the ORI. Leonel Soto - In Prague from 1953 to 1956 working for the International Union of Students and head of the Juventud Socialista, in charge of education for the CRI. Edith Garcia Buchaga - Member of the National Committee of the PSP, in charge of culture for the ORI as well as Secretary of the National Council for Culture in the Cuban Government. The ORI will not only be closely associated with all aspects of life in "uba but will also play an important role within the army. Special schools lave been established for the political indoctrination of military cadres. The political instructors who graduate from these schools are intended to serve as 25X1C1Ob liaison between the army and the ORI. (Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 Background: The Soviets, (to whom the concept of nationality is only a tool to be used as they see fit) have never raised obstacles to placing non- Russians in positions of confidence and responsibility within the administration or the armed forces, so long as the Soviet leaders are satisfied as to the allegiance of the individual to tenets of world Marxism-Leninism. The following cases illustrate the Soviet Communist use of non-Russian nationalities in the construction of world communism: Karl Radek, born in 1885 in Austria. In 1904, he was a leading member of the Social Democratic Party of Poland. From 1906 to 1914, he was a Social Democratic journalist in Poland and Germany. In 1918 he organized and became a leading member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany. In 1931, he was the editor of Izvestia in Moscow. Otto Kuusinen, born in 1881 in Finland. .From 1908 to 1917 he was leader of the Social Democratic faction- within the Finnish Parliament. In 1918 he founded the Finnish Communist Party and was a member of the Bolshevik Government in Finland. He continued to lead the Communist Party of Finland until 1930 when he emigrated to Moscow. In 1939, he was appointed Premier of a Finnish Red-Puppet Government set up by the Soviets in the Karelian Isthmus. In 1940, he was elected deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and in 1957 was elected secretary and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Marshall Rokossovski, born in 1896 in Warsaw. A red army officer from 1917 to 1949, he was elected a deputy to the Council of the ni:.on of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1946. Reverting to his Polish citizenship in 1949, he was appointed Minister of National Defense and Commander in Chief of the Polish army and also elected to the Polish Parliament. With a largely Soviet Russian staff of officers, garbed in Polish uniform, he practically transformed the Polish armed services into a subdivision of the Soviet military organization. In 1956, he returned to the USSR as a Marshall of the Soviet Union and was appointed a Deputy Defense Minister there. The following alarming parallels are to be found today in Cuba: Ernesto "Che" Guevara, born in 1928 in Argentina, he graduated from the University of Bienos Aires in 1952. He worked in the pro-Communist administration of Jacob Arbenz in Guatemala from 1953 to 1954. From 1954 to 1956, he was in Mexico working w ith Vincente Lombardo Toledan b(who has been prominent for over twenty years in hemispheric pro-Communist agitation), and in November of 1956 landed in Cuba with Fidel Castro. In 1959, he acquired Cuban citizenship by Government decree and became head of the Cuban Central Bank. He is the aithor of a manual for armed insurrection entitled Guerrilla Warfare which was published in April 1960. Jaime Barrios, a native of Chile, formerly an official of the Central Bank in !" i e in Santiago and a dues paying member of the Communist Party of Chile, arrived in Cuba in September 1959 where he was employed in the Indus- trialization Department of the Cuban Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). He was subsequently tran4f erred to the National Bank of Cuba where he has become Approved For Release 2000/08 - 06i A 0001-6 464. (Cont.) December 1961 11Ched Y6 Pb'0dFlbVW 10 98127: CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 Juan Noyola, a Mexican economist who became chief of the ECLA Economic Development Section and head of the UN Economic Advisory Group in Cuba. He was removed from this position in December 1960 as a result of his public criticism of UN aid ECLA policies. He subsequently became a Cuban citizen and was appointed Director of Economic Organization in the Central Planning Board. In May 1961, the Mexican press reported Noyola as the President of the Cuban National Economic Planning Board attending the meeting of the Economic Commission for Latin America which took place in Santiago, Chile. He is on the staff of the Cuban National Bank. Jorge Masetti, Argentine journalist .wh' formerly worked as a Democracia, La Prensa, Critica and Radio El Vlunde in Buenos Aires. In 1959, Castro called him to Cuba to organize Agencia Prensa Latina of vhich he became the Director General. In August 1961, he became director of the Havana daily R evolucion. Fernando Revuelta, Spanish Communist who formerly worked as a journalist in Mexico was appointed Director General of Cuba's Agencia Prensa Latina in April 1961. Julio Caceres, Guatemalan Communist who worked in the administration of Jacob Arbenz, was in Mexico from 1954 to 1959 where he became a close fri nd of "Che" Guevara. In 1959, Guevara brought Caseres to Cuba to work in the Industrial Division of INRA where he is responsible for all appointments. In December 1960, he was placed in full charge of the operations of the Cuban subsidiary of the Otis Elevator Company. Guillermo Lorentzen, Guatemalan Communist, was in Vienna working for t he World Peace Council from 1957 to 1959 after which he went to Cuba. He was subsequently appointed to an important position in the Cuban National Printing Office where he is Secretary of the Directive Council of the Enciclopedia Revolucionaria. Rene Depestre, an active member of the Haitian Communist Party, left Haiti in 1947. After spending some time in France, he lived in Brazil until 1959 when he moved to Cuba where he was given a position in the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was subsequently transferred to the National Printing Office and then to the Agrarian Reform Institute. The above men belong to a group of well over 50 Argentines, Panamanians, Guatemalans, Chileans, Venezuelans, Peruvians, Haitians or 25X1 C10b Mexicans employed in the Cuban administration. J, (Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 December 1961 46`Ap e*ritm g as= awd: IAGQ.Pw&im69 *?0 G81'4rn Malnutrition 25X1C10b Background: As indicated in referenced guidances (see ADDENDUM), the people of mainland China continue to suffer from critical food shortages, and there is no prospect that the Chinese Communist program to cope with the problem will relieve the situation in the foreseeable future. Despite near--- starvation in certain areas, the Peiping regime continues to export m,'ch-needed Lasic food stuffs to Cuba. This phenomenon of a "hungry China" exporting food i,2 nothing new. With regard to grains, for example, Communist China has traditionally exported more grain than it has imported. It was not until the current year that this tradition was broken. Faced with three successive years -bad crops, which can be attributed mainly to Communist mismanagement of ill-conceived agricultural programs, estimates for 1961 indicate that for the first time Communist China will be importing more grains than it exports. However, even under this austere program it is estimated that China will export 600, 000 metric tons of grains during 1961, the bulk of which will go to Cuba and Albania. The fact that Communist China in 1961 will for the first time be a net importer of food, with food exports sharply cut from previous levels, demon- strates the severity of their own food problems and reflects a basic decision on the part of the wiping regime to seek external help. Exports to Cuba are based on the 5-Year Trade and Payments Agreement signed by the two parties in July 1960. Precise figures are not available on amounts and types of food- stuffs exported to Cuba in 1960. However, it is mown that Communist China and Cuba agreed on the following levels of exports to Cuba for the year 1961: (NOTE: Quantities are indicated in thousands of metric tons) Rice/120, Rice Seeds/13. 7, Soy Beans/42, Vegetable Oils/10, Beans/10, Pressed Pork/6, Pressed duck/,;8, Canned Port/4, Canned Beef/. 8, Canned Mutton/1. 5, Canned 7ish/, 5, Canned ChickenAl, Other Canned Foods/. 5, Raisins/12, Ham (speci- fications to be discussed)/7. That the agreement is in operation is revealed by the following press notices as they appeared in Revolucion, Havana, the official daily newspaper of the CASTRO regime: 21 July 1961 "From China, Cuba has received 3, 400 bags of red beans and 10, 230 cases of canned pork of various kinds. " 22 Aug 1961, "At the port of Havana 1, 000 tons of rice, 2, 440 boxes of tinned stowed chicken, 200 boxes of tinned anchovies, and 5, 865 boxes of pickled pork." 13 Sep 1961 "The following goods lave arrived at the port of Havana from the People's Republic of China, 5, 000 tons of soybeans and 11, 000 cases of canned foods. 25X1C10b (Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 fw Background: In February 1962 India will hold national general elections. Despite the weaknesses of the Congress Party, particularly at the provincial level, there is every reason to expect that, with the continued vast appeal- of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress Party will win - as indeed it has throughout the lifetime of the Indian Republic. In addition to the appeal to t:'ie voters of the magic name of Nehru (now 72), there is also one additional factor which enhances the chances of the Congress Party: the strategy of the Communist Party of India (CPI) for some time has been to support certain members of the Congress Party. The CPI's stated objective is to stimulate the growth of "genuine democratic for-ces" (including, of course, itself) which, it Maims, are endangered by "right-wing reactionary forces" in key positions in the administration, in the military apparatus, and in the Congress Party itself. For nearly two years, S. A. Dange, Communist Party leader in the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), has urged his followers to support the "progressive elements in the Congress Party represented by Nehru and (Defense Minister) V. K. Krishna Menon" against "right-wing reactionaries" - particularly 'inance Minister Morarji Desai. The party's difficulties and proposed strategy were outlined in a policy statement issued at the end of April. It was adopted only after a week of angry recriminations between two rival groups - one I:;aning to Moscow for guidance and willing to concede that China was guilty of aggression on the Indian borders, and the other seeking to minimize the gravity of the threat from Peking. China's aggression in Tibet and along India's Himalayan border has for long been a matter of dispute in the CPI. So strongly do the Indian voters feel about-Communist China's aggression particularly about the Sino-Indian border dispute - that in a Manifesto issued in October the 'c`ommunists stated that the Party "has made it known time and time again that it stands for the territorial integrity of our country. " (A state- ment which is far from the truth and whose publication by the Party in an official Manifesto must have made the Party's "leftist" elements squirm.) For the moment, at least, the "nationalist" wing of the CPI seems to have won the di spute. The Manifesto also stated: "We have made it clear that, in our opinion, the frontier of India... lies along what is known as the MacMahon line. " Meanwhile, even so prominent an Indian Communist as Ajoy Ghosh, Secretary- General of the CPI, said on 21 November that the incursions into India by the Chinese Communists could "create deep resentment among the Indian people and further embitter relations between the two countries. " The chances are that the CPI will continue to run a poor second to the :congress Party. It is possible that the weakened Communists may hold the 10 percent share of the popular vote which they received during the last elec- tions, but they are considered unlikely to cb any better, the Praja Socialist Party's position is apparently deteriorating; the right-of-center Hindu nationalist party, the Jana Sangh, seems recently to have picked up some (Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 8 27'F P78-0306" A000100050001-6 466. (Cont.) December 1961 Approved For Relee 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-030A000100050001-6 strength, but probably can at best hope to run third; the Swatantra (Freedom) Party, founded in 1959 by the first Indian Governor-General of India, C. Rajagopalachari, has powerful backing from Indianprivate enterprise butnot much mass support and there seems little likelihood that it will improve its present weak standing. Despite the fact that the Congress Party is expected to win with its customary ease, its main asset is still Prime Minister Nehru himself and the mass appeal that he commands while some s1.pport for the party will result from the dispute within the CPI over the Chinese Communists' incursions into India. Efforts have been made within the Congress Party to rid itself of chronic factional strife, corruption, lethargy, and casteism - but with little effect. Cf much interest will be the electoral standing of the controversial Krishna Mexican, whose principal strength is that he always manages to retain the potent support of Nehru. Menon is standing again in Bombay (his present seat) but this time against much tougher opposition: opposing him is Acharya Kripalani, a long-time associate of Gandhi's, an eloquent orator of 73 (Menon is 64), and a terrific vote -getter. Kripalani is backed by three opposition groups, namely the 'raja Socialists, the Jana Sangh, and the Swatantra Parties. 25X1 C10b 2 Approved For Release 200 -03061A000100050001-6 4 December 061 25X1 C10b 467Ap xaXesd Rod IWe 000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-0306000100050001-6 Background: On 30 October, without any previous warning, the USSR handed to Finland a long note demanding that Finlan,-1 consult with the USSR on "measures for insuring the defense of the frontiers of both countries from the threat of a military attack ly Western Germany and allied states". Legal basis for the demandlies in provisions of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet treaty. The note itself argues at length the aggressive intentions of NATO against the USSR, with particular emphasis on West Germany, and with marked reference to Danish and Norwegian participation in military consultation and maneuvers with West Germ any. Almost immediately after delivery of the note, Russian Foreign Minister Gromyko informed Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen, that the USSR was ,:seriously concerned over the political instability of the Finnish Government and might possibly not insist on military consultations if the situation were corrected. On 14 November, President Kekkonen dissolved the Finnish Parliament and called for new elections in early February, thus advancing the election date from mid-summer 1962. On 16 November, the Soviet Foreign Office informed the Finnish Ambassador that these measures were considered evasive and that Finland would have to send a delegation to Moscow as soon as possibl< arguing that the military situation in the Baltic and Northern Europe had deter.. iorated since 30 October and hence there was an "immediate" threat from West Germany to the security of the USSR and Finland. On 18 November, the Finnish Cabinet announced that the Government had proposed a meeting between President Kekkonen and Chairman Khrushchev. On 24 November the two heads of state met at Novosibirsk in Siberia, In the ensuing communique, the Soviets repeated the assertions of the imminence of West German aggression against Finland and the USSR, but postponed insistence upon military consultations at this time on the basis of Kekkonen's statement that initiation of consultations might cause "anxiety and war psychosis" in the Scandanavian countries. It was agreed that Finland would closely follow developments in Northern Europe and report on them to the USSR. At the same time, Kekkonen admitted that there was validity in the USSR's claim of the danger of war in Europe, while reaffirming Finlands policy of friendly net,trality toward the USSR. Coinci- dently, Kekkonen's chief rival for the Presidency in the January elections withdrew his candidacy. Olavi Honka, who withdrew, had represented five opposition parties regarded as more friendly to the West. His statement, that he was withdrawing in the interests of harmony, clearly indicated the weight 25X1 C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA4(DP _0309i`050001-6 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 25X1 C10 4_ December 1961 468Ap r ftm' - Background:Khrushchev at the 22nd CPSU Congress described the new 20-Year Program many other things -- as "above all an example of the rapid development of productive forces, of the powerful upsurge of the living and cultural standards of the people, and cf the creation of conditions for a peaceful and happy life for the people. " He also stated: "As internationalists, we are happy when communists of other countries state that they get inspiration for their practical activities and their struggle from the program of the CPSU, that the successes of our party are augmenting their forces, the forces of freedom, peace, and socialism all over the world.. " It is no doubt true that many Communists, if not those in Tirana or Peiping, have found inspiration in the Pro-ram. But those people who have not blindly accepted Nhrushchev's l adership might well have some doubts, after taking a close look at what the Program contains. It us note some points: 1. The Program is basically a propaganda paper, not a plan. It would, of course, be difficult for anyone to frame aplan -which would stand up for 20 years; no one 2 years ago, including no one in the Soviet Union, would have predicted the conditions of today. But since Communists believe that the future is determined and predictable, it would be logical to expect them to pro duce a precise, concrete blueprint. This has not been done. Naum Jasny, an outstanding Western analyst of the Soviet economy, has pointed out that only a few figures are provided and that they are round. ones, that figures are not given for five-year but for ten- year periods, and that while national income is to rise most sharply in the first decade, labor productivity is scheduled to rise more strongly in the second decade: the last two factors should, of cou- se. develop together. In any case, he adds, it is very unrealistic to expect labor productivity to increase more at a later date; in this field, the big, easy gains, are to be made first. In regard to agriculture, the Program fore- casts an increase of 10% per year in the first decade, and this is grossly over-optimistic. We are reminded of the Sixth Five Year Plan, which predicted that the Soviet Union would surpass the US in meat production in 1961. Farm output grew only 5-6% per year from 1953 to 1960. Jasny concludes that the real Soviet planners could not possibly have produced this plan by themselves, and guesses that they submitted a rough draft, already on the optimistic side, to higher-ups, who then exercised their imaginations, with Khrushchev contributing the agricultural figures. The '_ PSU Central .Committee recognized (after sad experience with the Sixth Five Year Plan) that a good plan must be realistic, and conseq;;r;r:.~:iy the Sixth Five Year Plan was junked in favor of the 1959-65 Seven Year Plan. Evident-1y the Seven Year Plan proved too prosaic for Kh'?ushc1iev (he may also have been bothered by the impossibility of attaining its agricultural goals), and now he has added a large slice of pie in the sky. It remains to be seen whether the 20-Year Program will have to be junked in a few years. This may not be necessary, since it is so full of caveats that the Soviets will be able to claim to have followed it out. Approved For Release 2000/ 03061 T E 468. (Cont. ) A Lecember 1961 Approved For Rele sae 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-0306`tA000100050001-6 2. The Program does not indicate that the turn of the Soviet citizen has cjme. Khrushchev reportedly said last 20 May, at a reception: "Now we consider our heavy industry as built. So we are not going to give it,_priority,. Light industry and heavy industry will develop at the same ph:ce. " As we shall see, this statement has not been borne out by the Program. Some Western observers have suggested that, since it was not borne out, Khrushchev must have been defeated by other ele- ments in the Soviet leadership. But as Jasny points out, it is unlikely that the foundations of the plan were changed at what should have been an advanced stage of preparation (the Program was announced on 30 July). Moreover, Khrushchev has practically repeated his May statement at the 22nd CPSU Congress, saying: "When our heavy industry was only just being created we were forced to direct accumulations primarily to enterprises of the first type /capital goods production enterprises] and restrict investments in the second group of enterprises /enterprises for light and food industry, agriculture, housing construction, and everyday cultural services for the people.7 Now we have the opportunity to substantially increase capital investments in enterprises of the second type, which will accelerate the rate of growth of popular con- sumption. " The explanation then is not that Khrushchev had to give up hi program, but that he was and is practicing deception about its iture. For while light industry will grow, at a rate of 8%n, heavy industry will grow at a rate of 10-11% according to the Program. Thus consumer goo~r which formed 60. 5% of Soviet industrial production in 1928, and which fell to 31.2 % in 1950 anr', less than 28% in 1960, will constitute an even. smallerproportion of total production in 1970 and 1980. The Soviet press shows that in the last two years the Soviet living standard has slipped... clothing is hard to find, appliances have de- clined in quality, food is less abundant and less varied. It will be noticed that Khrushchev lumped light industry together with agriculture, housing, and "cultural services", and if agriculture expanded according to the program, the total of "the second type of enterprises" might be more impressive. We should note, however, that it is basically incorrect to suppose that Soviet consumer goods production, as planned by Khrushchev, will ever catch up with United States, even if all plans are over-fulfilled. They will not catch up because they are not running the same race. One of the primary purposes of the 20-Year Program: may be to make clear that the Soviet dtizen of the future vill not be compar.'ale to his Western counterpart, but will be living a totally different life. The improvements in his standard of living are to include "free goods and services" such as streetcar rides (rather than owning his own car), communal dining halls and kitchens, more apartment space (but not a home of his own), and more leisure time, which he will be "free" to devote to party activities. Meanwhile, he can look forward to 20 years of hard labor. Khrushchev has always been a partisan of schemes, like the "agrogorod", which bring the citizen under closer party control and deprive him of choice (such as the choice between spending his money on a streetcar ride or walking and having it to spend on ice cream; Big Brother has chosen the streetcar ride for him.) One need not su pose App eUl=d ' @1h? '00 akVht QAiRPP78- ,Or@l,1-QQQ1QQ9M,D~ ze that Khrushchev's utopia is a plan for the erasure of the individual. 468. (Cont.) 4 December 1961 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-030M000100050001-6 3. The Program -- and some of the speeches at the 22nd Congress -- reveal that the Soviet government faces serious problems. Soviet official figures, released on 21 July, revealed that while heavy industry was practically up to 7 Year Plan schedules, light industry and housing had fallen significantly behind. Many of the short-falling industries were not reported at the end of the third quarter, but light industry generally was reported increasii.g only at the rate of 3%; even steel, cement and electricity were not up to schedule, though they may catch up by the end of the year. One of the speakers at the Congress revealed that 25C, 000, 000 square meters of housing would be completed in the first three years of the 7-Year Plan which means, taking account of actual results in 1959 and 1960 (in 1960 the plan was underfulfilled by almost 20%) that this year the housing plan will be underfulfilled by 10%. Conditions in the construction iindustry evidently verge on the chaotic, for Khrushchev has been obliged to call for a moratorium "perhaps for a year" on starting new construction projects (except with special Moscow approval), while Kosygin proposed various curbs and adjustments of rules to check the tendency to start many plants and finish them slowly. Manpower is a limiting condition on Soviet economic expansion, anc7 one solution is to try to increase productivity by better training; this is doubtless the main reason for the Program's emphasis on education. Figures released on the eve of the Congress purported to show a growth of productivity of 11%, but this was achieved by calculating on the basis of a short w ork week; the actual rate of increase was 4%n, although the 7-Year Plan called for 5. 9% and the new Program calls for 7% up to 1970 and nearly 8% after that. One curious result of the unrealism of the labor figures in the Program is that the number cf persons employed is scheduled to fall by 6-9 million from 1970 to 1980, implying large-scale unemployment. The agricultural problem (which Khrushchev called the "main task" of the party)has been discussed in a number of guidances,most recently in Guidance #457. On 21 November Khrushchev interrupted a Kazakh party leader's speech try ?sa:r'.that this year's New lands harvest was not merely "decreased" (as the party leader was saying), but "wrecked". This year the problem is drought. As Stalin did in his last days, Khrushchev seems to be turn- ing to grandiose canal and irrigation projects to solve Soviet agricultura' problems, proposing to more than triple irrigated areas in western Russia. The new plans are more practical than Stalin's were, however, and may make it possible to increase cotton production almost up to the 1980 goal. Other crops will fare less well. 3 (Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6 `6App%0 b or Rele a 2000/08 -0306A~A( 0bi0Tj0'* 4. The pursuit of the 20-Year Program, insofar as it is successful, will tend to increase rather-than ease world tensions. We have already noted that one aim of the program. is to lay ;down the nature of Communist society in the future. This may reflect the desire of an old man (Khrushchev) to tie up the future of his heirs along the lines of his own ideas. Past performance does not suggest that the creation of a new Communist society is going to come as easily as the Program suggests. But in order to make it practical at all, an intensification of indoctrination and a maintenance of the insulation of the Soviet people from the outsic'e world are necessary. It uill also be essential to con- tinue the suppression of "factionalism's and "revisionism". Thus the 20 Year Program in no way provides a charter for liberalization, rather the contrary. The observation has been made that the combination of the Program with the current de-Stalinization campaign bears a certain resemblance to the combination of the Stalin Constitution of 1936 with the terror which began after I'irov's murder; the impractical character of the 20-Year Program does not augur well for the future of the Soviet bureaucrats who will have to try to meet its goals. Another feature of the Program, its emphasis on continuous growth in heavy industry, is significant for the future. The Soviet leadership is now committed to "conspicuous production", much as the West was before the Great Depression, only more so. There is no serious danger of overt unemployment in Soviet society, which lost 2C, 000, 000 lives in World War II and which will always be able to employ surplus hands in superfluous tasks, but there are definite signs of future overproduc- tion of such commodities as steel, pig iron, and cement. Since the surplus is not to be used to produce consumer goods, such as automobiles, where is it going to go? One answer is, in the production of armaments, such as tanks, transports, missiles (and associated gear), and defensive works. These things will be used as threats, intended to demonstrate Soviet military superiority. The other possibility is foreign trade. If the Soviet Program should be as success.. ful as Khrushchev hopes, it would put the Soviet Union in a position to bid against western industry in many underdeveloped areas. In view of the actual, as opposed to the scheduled, future of Soviet agriculture, the end result may well be to make the Soviet Union what Britain became in the 19th century, a country exporting manufactures and importing foo--.. As the British and Japanese experience shows, such a country is likely to follow the trader with the flag. The world is already well-provided with countries with industrial surpluses and food shortages, and. the competition for food is likely to add new dangers to those of ideology. Moreover, as an exporter of manufactures, the Soviet Union will lose interest in the balanced development of under- developed areas, regarding them rather as dumping grounds. Rather than accept their development (as the British and Japanese have come to do largely because they have turned to consumer goods and votes for the workers), the predictable Soviet answer will be a development 4 Approved For Release 2000/08/P" A REP P191115 61i.8OG51D001-6 4Appr~V'RtObr Release 2000/08/2 A- - 308'rAbaVM M6dq of Communist ideology to justify a Soviet empire, Indeed, Khrushchev is already saying: "The building d Communism in our country is an integral part of the creation of a communist society in the whole socialist commonwealth, " prudently adding: "There cannot be one common moment at vhich all socialist countries enter a higher phase of the new society. " M 1enkc v, like the Sorcerer's Apprentice, did more than he or other Soviet leaders bargained for when, in 19'74, he came out for increased produc- tion of consumer goods. Khrushchev flatly opposed Malenkov and drove him from office, but then found it expedient to continue the policy of concessions to the o nsumer. Khrushchev, however, is no more motivated by concern for the consumer now than he was in 1954. Instead he is motivated by a desire to 25X1C1Ob (Continued) 468. (Cont.) 4 1 61 Approved For Rele'te 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-030WA00016685 '0~1-66 25X1C10b 6 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6