BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 4, 1961
• Content Type: PERRPT

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 December 1961
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De-Stalinization Techniques; The 22nd CPSU Congress started a new campaign,
aiming at eliminating 'a'fl memories of Stalin in the Soviet Union, the European
Satellites and even in free-world Communist Parties (especially where they25X1C10b
control city councils which can name streets or erect monuments, as in
Heavy Rainfall in East Africa: The rainfall in Kenya and Uganda is exception-
a.Ilyheavy this Novem-be; instead of decreasing after the rainy season in
October, they appear to be getting even heavier this November. There is a
rumor in East Africa reported from Uganda which, like Kenya, is chiefly
affected by the floods - that the unusually heavy rainfall is somehow the result
of Soviet nuclear test explosions whic h have accentuated low pressure areas
in that part of the world.
CUBA: "Che' Guevara Yearns for Communism: In a speech he made on 25
November in avana, "C,he" Guevara, Minister for Industrialization declared:
'Socialism is a social system which offers to all new opportunities and new
happiness. It prepares nations to reach the highest level of organization known
or imagined up to now by man, and that is the Communist society. We cannot
predict the day when we will reach it, we see it as a possible goal. Toward
that goal, where each will work according to his capacity and w ill receive
according to his needs, that is where we have to travel. V e have to go step by
step. We must destroy the enemy today, supporting the brother countries which
struggle for their liberation, counseling them, guiding them if possible along
good roads, constructing socialism, which is the first phase and the goal of or
a[forts today; and one day we will also pass into that great aspiration of the
future which is the communist' society. " We ask whether there can be any
further doubts concerning the Communist path down which the Cuban leaders
are presently leading downtrodden Cuba. We warn that Guevara does not
hesitate to declare his intention to export Cuban Communism to every country in
Latin America.
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 4 December 1961
nest
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the Soy iet Union, Khrushchev said: "Delegations from 80 foreign Marxist-
Leninist parties have arrived to attend the 22nd Congress of our party. Allow
me to warmly welcome the delegations of the glorious fraternal parties present
here. " He then proceeded to greet, one l,r one, the Communist Parties of all
?ie countries represented. Among them, he greeted: "The United Revolutionary
Organizations of Cuba, headed by Comrade Blas Roca." Khrushchev did not
refer to Blas Roca as the head of the Popular Socialist Farty (PSP) which was
the designation used by the Communist Party of Cuba. Khrushchev made a poin t
of the fact that the ORI is the Communist Party of Cuba.
When, on 26 July 1961, Castro announced the formation of the ORI, he
indicated that this was to be an almagamation of his revolutionary 26th of July
'11Zovement with the Communist PSP together with numerous revolutionary
organizations, such as the Association of Revolutionary Youth (AJR) and the
Federation of Cuban Women (FM C).
On 4 N-~vemb&F,,-"Che"-Zile vara .stated that "the OPI constitutes the
central nucleus of what is to be -- and practically speaking is -- the United
Party of the Revolution, the political motor of the entire country. " He went on
to explain that the ORI administrative organization is vertical, In effect, OPI
cells are being organized throughout Cuba as the first phase of an entity that is
to be called the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution. Blas Roca's
public statements foreshadow a party system in which membership will be limite&
to the elite of the revolutionary struggle, and which will, in turn, be a requisite
to holding any position of economic or political importance in the country. It
is clear from the statements of ORI leaders that the new party is to be con-
trolled by the Communists and based on "Marxist-Leninist principles". A com-
mentary on Havana radio on 22 August stated that "the task of ORI will now be
to lead the republic safely toward the edification of 'socialism"' (i. e.
communism).
Following the overthrow of Batista, the only party which was permitted
to function as such was the PSP. It remains, to this day, the only real party
organization in Cuba. Although the 26th of July Movement has an executive, it
has never functioned as a political party. By means of the ORI, the Communists
are setting up a classic Communist state in which the party dictates to the
Government. The following list of ORI officials illustrates this situation vividly:
Blas Roca - Secretary General of the PSP and National
Director of the ORI.
Carlos Rafael Director of the Communist newspaper Hoy,
Rodriguez - Head of the Economic Commission of the PSP
and head of Economic Planning for the ORI.
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 463. (Cont.) 4 December 1961
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Annibal Escalante - Secretary of the PSP and Executive Secretary
of the ORI.
Lazaro Pena, _ +:/--ember of the Executive Commission of the PSP
gin:' ?resident"of its Labor -ommission, and
heau' of Economic Y lanning for the ORI.
Severo A.guire - Member of the Central Committee of the PSP
and in charge of Agriculture for the ORI.
Leonel Soto - In Prague from 1953 to 1956 working for the
International Union of Students and head of
the Juventud Socialista, in charge of education
for the CRI.
Edith Garcia Buchaga - Member of the National Committee of the PSP,
in charge of culture for the ORI as well as
Secretary of the National Council for Culture
in the Cuban Government.
The ORI will not only be closely associated with all aspects of life in
"uba but will also play an important role within the army. Special schools
lave been established for the political indoctrination of military cadres. The
political instructors who graduate from these schools are intended to serve as 25X1C1Ob
liaison between the army and the ORI.
(Continued)
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 Background: The Soviets, (to whom the concept of nationality is only a
tool to be used as they see fit) have never raised obstacles to placing non-
Russians in positions of confidence and responsibility within the administration
or the armed forces, so long as the Soviet leaders are satisfied as to the
allegiance of the individual to tenets of world Marxism-Leninism.
The following cases illustrate the Soviet Communist use of non-Russian
nationalities in the construction of world communism:
Karl Radek, born in 1885 in Austria. In 1904, he was a leading member
of the Social Democratic Party of Poland. From 1906 to 1914, he was a Social
Democratic journalist in Poland and Germany. In 1918 he organized and became
a leading member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Germany. In 1931, he was the editor of Izvestia in Moscow.
Otto Kuusinen, born in 1881 in Finland. .From 1908 to 1917 he was leader
of the Social Democratic faction- within the Finnish Parliament. In 1918 he
founded the Finnish Communist Party and was a member of the Bolshevik
Government in Finland. He continued to lead the Communist Party of Finland
until 1930 when he emigrated to Moscow. In 1939, he was appointed Premier of
a Finnish Red-Puppet Government set up by the Soviets in the Karelian
Isthmus. In 1940, he was elected deputy chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and in 1957 was elected secretary and member of
the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union
Marshall Rokossovski, born in 1896 in Warsaw. A red army officer from
1917 to 1949, he was elected a deputy to the Council of the ni:.on of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR in 1946. Reverting to his Polish citizenship in 1949, he was
appointed Minister of National Defense and Commander in Chief of the Polish
army and also elected to the Polish Parliament. With a largely Soviet Russian
staff of officers, garbed in Polish uniform, he practically transformed the
Polish armed services into a subdivision of the Soviet military organization.
In 1956, he returned to the USSR as a Marshall of the Soviet Union and was
appointed a Deputy Defense Minister there.
The following alarming parallels are to be found today in Cuba:
Ernesto "Che" Guevara, born in 1928 in Argentina, he graduated from
the University of Bienos Aires in 1952. He worked in the pro-Communist
administration of Jacob Arbenz in Guatemala from 1953 to 1954. From 1954
to 1956, he was in Mexico working w ith Vincente Lombardo Toledan b(who has
been prominent for over twenty years in hemispheric pro-Communist agitation),
and in November of 1956 landed in Cuba with Fidel Castro. In 1959, he acquired
Cuban citizenship by Government decree and became head of the Cuban Central
Bank. He is the aithor of a manual for armed insurrection entitled Guerrilla
Warfare which was published in April 1960.
Jaime Barrios, a native of Chile, formerly an official of the Central
Bank in !" i e in Santiago and a dues paying member of the Communist Party of
Chile, arrived in Cuba in September 1959 where he was employed in the Indus-
trialization Department of the Cuban Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). He was
subsequently tran4f erred to the National Bank of Cuba where he has become
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Juan Noyola, a Mexican economist who became chief of the ECLA
Economic Development Section and head of the UN Economic Advisory Group
in Cuba. He was removed from this position in December 1960 as a result of
his public criticism of UN aid ECLA policies. He subsequently became a Cuban
citizen and was appointed Director of Economic Organization in the Central
Planning Board. In May 1961, the Mexican press reported Noyola as the
President of the Cuban National Economic Planning Board attending the meeting
of the Economic Commission for Latin America which took place in Santiago,
Chile. He is on the staff of the Cuban National Bank.
Jorge Masetti, Argentine journalist .wh' formerly worked as a
Democracia, La Prensa, Critica and Radio El Vlunde in Buenos Aires. In 1959,
Castro called him to Cuba to organize Agencia Prensa Latina of vhich he
became the Director General. In August 1961, he became director of the Havana
daily R evolucion.
Fernando Revuelta, Spanish Communist who formerly worked as a
journalist in Mexico was appointed Director General of Cuba's Agencia Prensa
Latina in April 1961.
Julio Caceres, Guatemalan Communist who worked in the administration
of Jacob Arbenz, was in Mexico from 1954 to 1959 where he became a close
fri nd of "Che" Guevara. In 1959, Guevara brought Caseres to Cuba to work in
the Industrial Division of INRA where he is responsible for all appointments.
In December 1960, he was placed in full charge of the operations of the Cuban
subsidiary of the Otis Elevator Company.
Guillermo Lorentzen, Guatemalan Communist, was in Vienna working
for t he World Peace Council from 1957 to 1959 after which he went to Cuba.
He was subsequently appointed to an important position in the Cuban National
Printing Office where he is Secretary of the Directive Council of the
Enciclopedia Revolucionaria.
Rene Depestre, an active member of the Haitian Communist Party,
left Haiti in 1947. After spending some time in France, he lived in Brazil until
1959 when he moved to Cuba where he was given a position in the Cuban
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was subsequently transferred to the National
Printing Office and then to the Agrarian Reform Institute.
The above men belong to a group of well over 50 Argentines,
Panamanians, Guatemalans, Chileans, Venezuelans, Peruvians, Haitians or 25X1 C10b
Mexicans employed in the Cuban administration.
J, (Continued)
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 25X1C1Ob
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 December 1961
46`Ap e*ritm g as= awd: IAGQ.Pw&im69 *?0 G81'4rn
Malnutrition
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Background: As indicated in referenced guidances (see ADDENDUM),
the people of mainland China continue to suffer from critical food shortages,
and there is no prospect that the Chinese Communist program to cope with the
problem will relieve the situation in the foreseeable future. Despite near---
starvation in certain areas, the Peiping regime continues to export m,'ch-needed
Lasic food stuffs to Cuba. This phenomenon of a "hungry China" exporting food
i,2 nothing new. With regard to grains, for example, Communist China has
traditionally exported more grain than it has imported. It was not until the
current year that this tradition was broken. Faced with three successive years
-bad crops, which can be attributed mainly to Communist mismanagement of
ill-conceived agricultural programs, estimates for 1961 indicate that for the
first time Communist China will be importing more grains than it exports.
However, even under this austere program it is estimated that China will
export 600, 000 metric tons of grains during 1961, the bulk of which will go to
Cuba and Albania.
The fact that Communist China in 1961 will for the first time be a net
importer of food, with food exports sharply cut from previous levels, demon-
strates the severity of their own food problems and reflects a basic decision
on the part of the wiping regime to seek external help. Exports to Cuba are
based on the 5-Year Trade and Payments Agreement signed by the two parties
in July 1960. Precise figures are not available on amounts and types of food-
stuffs exported to Cuba in 1960. However, it is mown that Communist China
and Cuba agreed on the following levels of exports to Cuba for the year 1961:
(NOTE: Quantities are indicated in thousands of metric tons) Rice/120, Rice
Seeds/13. 7, Soy Beans/42, Vegetable Oils/10, Beans/10, Pressed Pork/6,
Pressed duck/,;8, Canned Port/4, Canned Beef/. 8, Canned Mutton/1. 5, Canned
7ish/, 5, Canned ChickenAl, Other Canned Foods/. 5, Raisins/12, Ham (speci-
fications to be discussed)/7. That the agreement is in operation is revealed by
the following press notices as they appeared in Revolucion, Havana, the official
daily newspaper of the CASTRO regime:
21 July 1961 "From China, Cuba has received 3, 400 bags of red beans
and 10, 230 cases of canned pork of various kinds. "
22 Aug 1961, "At the port of Havana 1, 000 tons of rice, 2, 440 boxes
of tinned stowed chicken, 200 boxes of tinned anchovies,
and 5, 865 boxes of pickled pork."
13 Sep 1961 "The following goods lave arrived at the port of Havana
from the People's Republic of China, 5, 000 tons of
soybeans and 11, 000 cases of canned foods. 25X1C10b
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 fw
Background: In February 1962 India will hold national general elections.
Despite the weaknesses of the Congress Party, particularly at the provincial
level, there is every reason to expect that, with the continued vast appeal- of
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress Party will win - as indeed it
has throughout the lifetime of the Indian Republic. In addition to the appeal to
t:'ie voters of the magic name of Nehru (now 72), there is also one additional
factor which enhances the chances of the Congress Party: the strategy of the
Communist Party of India (CPI) for some time has been to support certain
members of the Congress Party. The CPI's stated objective is to stimulate the
growth of "genuine democratic for-ces" (including, of course, itself) which, it
Maims, are endangered by "right-wing reactionary forces" in key positions in
the administration, in the military apparatus, and in the Congress Party itself.
For nearly two years, S. A. Dange, Communist Party leader in the Lok Sabha
(lower house of parliament), has urged his followers to support the "progressive
elements in the Congress Party represented by Nehru and (Defense Minister)
V. K. Krishna Menon" against "right-wing reactionaries" - particularly
'inance Minister Morarji Desai. The party's difficulties and proposed strategy
were outlined in a policy statement issued at the end of April. It was adopted
only after a week of angry recriminations between two rival groups - one
I:;aning to Moscow for guidance and willing to concede that China was guilty of
aggression on the Indian borders, and the other seeking to minimize the gravity
of the threat from Peking. China's aggression in Tibet and along India's
Himalayan border has for long been a matter of dispute in the CPI.
So strongly do the Indian voters feel about-Communist China's aggression
particularly about the Sino-Indian border dispute - that in a Manifesto issued
in October the 'c`ommunists stated that the Party "has made it known time and
time again that it stands for the territorial integrity of our country. " (A state-
ment which is far from the truth and whose publication by the Party in an
official Manifesto must have made the Party's "leftist" elements squirm.) For
the moment, at least, the "nationalist" wing of the CPI seems to have won the
di spute. The Manifesto also stated: "We have made it clear that, in our opinion,
the frontier of India... lies along what is known as the MacMahon line. "
Meanwhile, even so prominent an Indian Communist as Ajoy Ghosh, Secretary-
General of the CPI, said on 21 November that the incursions into India by the
Chinese Communists could "create deep resentment among the Indian people
and further embitter relations between the two countries. "
The chances are that the CPI will continue to run a poor second to the
:congress Party. It is possible that the weakened Communists may hold the
10 percent share of the popular vote which they received during the last elec-
tions, but they are considered unlikely to cb any better, the Praja Socialist
Party's position is apparently deteriorating; the right-of-center Hindu
nationalist party, the Jana Sangh, seems recently to have picked up some
(Continued)
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 466. (Cont.) December 1961
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strength, but probably can at best hope to run third; the Swatantra (Freedom)
Party, founded in 1959 by the first Indian Governor-General of India,
C. Rajagopalachari, has powerful backing from Indianprivate enterprise butnot
much mass support and there seems little likelihood that it will improve its
present weak standing.
Despite the fact that the Congress Party is expected to win with its
customary ease, its main asset is still Prime Minister Nehru himself and
the mass appeal that he commands while some s1.pport for the party will result
from the dispute within the CPI over the Chinese Communists' incursions into
India. Efforts have been made within the Congress Party to rid itself of chronic
factional strife, corruption, lethargy, and casteism - but with little effect.
Cf much interest will be the electoral standing of the controversial Krishna
Mexican, whose principal strength is that he always manages to retain the potent
support of Nehru. Menon is standing again in Bombay (his present seat) but
this time against much tougher opposition: opposing him is Acharya Kripalani,
a long-time associate of Gandhi's, an eloquent orator of 73 (Menon is 64), and
a terrific vote -getter. Kripalani is backed by three opposition groups, namely
the 'raja Socialists, the Jana Sangh, and the Swatantra Parties. 25X1 C10b
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Background: On 30 October, without any previous warning, the USSR
handed to Finland a long note demanding that Finlan,-1 consult with the USSR on
"measures for insuring the defense of the frontiers of both countries from the
threat of a military attack ly Western Germany and allied states". Legal basis
for the demandlies in provisions of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet treaty. The note
itself argues at length the aggressive intentions of NATO against the USSR, with
particular emphasis on West Germany, and with marked reference to Danish
and Norwegian participation in military consultation and maneuvers with West
Germ any.
Almost immediately after delivery of the note, Russian Foreign Minister
Gromyko informed Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen, that the USSR was
,:seriously concerned over the political instability of the Finnish Government
and might possibly not insist on military consultations if the situation were
corrected.
On 14 November, President Kekkonen dissolved the Finnish Parliament
and called for new elections in early February, thus advancing the election
date from mid-summer 1962. On 16 November, the Soviet Foreign Office
informed the Finnish Ambassador that these measures were considered evasive
and that Finland would have to send a delegation to Moscow as soon as possibl<
arguing that the military situation in the Baltic and Northern Europe had deter..
iorated since 30 October and hence there was an "immediate" threat from West
Germany to the security of the USSR and Finland. On 18 November, the Finnish
Cabinet announced that the Government had proposed a meeting between
President Kekkonen and Chairman Khrushchev. On 24 November the two heads
of state met at Novosibirsk in Siberia, In the ensuing communique, the Soviets
repeated the assertions of the imminence of West German aggression against
Finland and the USSR, but postponed insistence upon military consultations at
this time on the basis of Kekkonen's statement that initiation of consultations
might cause "anxiety and war psychosis" in the Scandanavian countries. It was
agreed that Finland would closely follow developments in Northern Europe
and report on them to the USSR. At the same time, Kekkonen admitted that
there was validity in the USSR's claim of the danger of war in Europe, while
reaffirming Finlands policy of friendly net,trality toward the USSR. Coinci-
dently, Kekkonen's chief rival for the Presidency in the January elections
withdrew his candidacy. Olavi Honka, who withdrew, had represented five
opposition parties regarded as more friendly to the West. His statement, that
he was withdrawing in the interests of harmony, clearly indicated the weight 25X1 C10b
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4_ December 1961
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- Background:Khrushchev at the 22nd CPSU Congress described the new
20-Year Program --arn.ong many other things -- as "above all an example of
the rapid development of productive forces, of the powerful upsurge of the living
and cultural standards of the people, and cf the creation of conditions for a
peaceful and happy life for the people. " He also stated: "As internationalists, we
are happy when communists of other countries state that they get inspiration
for their practical activities and their struggle from the program of the CPSU,
that the successes of our party are augmenting their forces, the forces of
freedom, peace, and socialism all over the world.. " It is no doubt true that
many Communists, if not those in Tirana or Peiping, have found inspiration in
the Pro-ram. But those people who have not blindly accepted Nhrushchev's
l adership might well have some doubts, after taking a close look at what the
Program contains. It us note some points:
1. The Program is basically a propaganda paper, not a plan. It would,
of course, be difficult for anyone to frame aplan -which would stand up
for 20 years; no one 2 years ago, including no one in the Soviet Union,
would have predicted the conditions of today. But since Communists
believe that the future is determined and predictable, it would be logical
to expect them to pro duce a precise, concrete blueprint. This has not
been done. Naum Jasny, an outstanding Western analyst of the Soviet
economy, has pointed out that only a few figures are provided and that
they are round. ones, that figures are not given for five-year but for ten-
year periods, and that while national income is to rise most sharply in
the first decade, labor productivity is scheduled to rise more strongly
in the second decade: the last two factors should, of cou- se. develop
together. In any case, he adds, it is very unrealistic to expect labor
productivity to increase more at a later date; in this field, the big, easy
gains, are to be made first. In regard to agriculture, the Program fore-
casts an increase of 10% per year in the first decade, and this is grossly
over-optimistic. We are reminded of the Sixth Five Year Plan, which
predicted that the Soviet Union would surpass the US in meat production
in 1961. Farm output grew only 5-6% per year from 1953 to 1960. Jasny
concludes that the real Soviet planners could not possibly have produced
this plan by themselves, and guesses that they submitted a rough draft,
already on the optimistic side, to higher-ups, who then exercised their
imaginations, with Khrushchev contributing the agricultural figures.
The '_ PSU Central .Committee recognized (after sad experience with the
Sixth Five Year Plan) that a good plan must be realistic, and conseq;;r;r:.~:iy
the Sixth Five Year Plan was junked in favor of the 1959-65 Seven Year
Plan. Evident-1y the Seven Year Plan proved too prosaic for Kh'?ushc1iev
(he may also have been bothered by the impossibility of attaining its
agricultural goals), and now he has added a large slice of pie in the sky.
It remains to be seen whether the 20-Year Program will have to be
junked in a few years. This may not be necessary, since it is so full of
caveats that the Soviets will be able to claim to have followed it out.
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2. The Program does not indicate that the turn of the Soviet citizen
has cjme. Khrushchev reportedly said last 20 May, at a reception:
"Now we consider our heavy industry as built. So we are not going to
give it,_priority,. Light industry and heavy industry will develop at the
same ph:ce. " As we shall see, this statement has not been borne out
by the Program. Some Western observers have suggested that, since it
was not borne out, Khrushchev must have been defeated by other ele-
ments in the Soviet leadership. But as Jasny points out, it is unlikely
that the foundations of the plan were changed at what should have been an
advanced stage of preparation (the Program was announced on 30 July).
Moreover, Khrushchev has practically repeated his May statement at the
22nd CPSU Congress, saying: "When our heavy industry was only just
being created we were forced to direct accumulations primarily to
enterprises of the first type /capital goods production enterprises]
and restrict investments in the second group of enterprises /enterprises
for light and food industry, agriculture, housing construction, and
everyday cultural services for the people.7 Now we have the opportunity
to substantially increase capital investments in enterprises of the
second type, which will accelerate the rate of growth of popular con-
sumption. " The explanation then is not that Khrushchev had to give up hi
program, but that he was and is practicing deception about its iture.
For while light industry will grow, at a rate of 8%n, heavy industry will
grow at a rate of 10-11% according to the Program. Thus consumer goo~r
which formed 60. 5% of Soviet industrial production in 1928, and which
fell to 31.2 % in 1950 anr', less than 28% in 1960, will constitute an
even. smallerproportion of total production in 1970 and 1980.
The Soviet press shows that in the last two years the Soviet living
standard has slipped... clothing is hard to find, appliances have de-
clined in quality, food is less abundant and less varied. It will be
noticed that Khrushchev lumped light industry together with agriculture,
housing, and "cultural services", and if agriculture expanded according
to the program, the total of "the second type of enterprises" might be
more impressive. We should note, however, that it is basically
incorrect to suppose that Soviet consumer goods production, as planned
by Khrushchev, will ever catch up with United States, even if all plans
are over-fulfilled. They will not catch up because they are not running
the same race. One of the primary purposes of the 20-Year Program: may
be to make clear that the Soviet dtizen of the future vill not be compar.'ale
to his Western counterpart, but will be living a totally different life.
The improvements in his standard of living are to include "free goods
and services" such as streetcar rides (rather than owning his own
car), communal dining halls and kitchens, more apartment space (but
not a home of his own), and more leisure time, which he will be "free"
to devote to party activities. Meanwhile, he can look forward to 20 years
of hard labor. Khrushchev has always been a partisan of schemes, like
the "agrogorod", which bring the citizen under closer party control
and deprive him of choice (such as the choice between spending his money
on a streetcar ride or walking and having it to spend on ice cream; Big
Brother has chosen the streetcar ride for him.) One need not su pose
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that Khrushchev's utopia is a plan for the erasure of the individual.
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3. The Program -- and some of the speeches at the 22nd Congress --
reveal that the Soviet government faces serious problems. Soviet
official figures, released on 21 July, revealed that while heavy industry
was practically up to 7 Year Plan schedules, light industry and housing
had fallen significantly behind. Many of the short-falling industries
were not reported at the end of the third quarter, but light industry
generally was reported increasii.g only at the rate of 3%; even steel,
cement and electricity were not up to schedule, though they may catch
up by the end of the year. One of the speakers at the Congress revealed
that 25C, 000, 000 square meters of housing would be completed in the
first three years of the 7-Year Plan which means, taking account of
actual results in 1959 and 1960 (in 1960 the plan was underfulfilled by
almost 20%) that this year the housing plan will be underfulfilled by
10%. Conditions in the construction iindustry evidently verge on the
chaotic, for Khrushchev has been obliged to call for a moratorium
"perhaps for a year" on starting new construction projects (except
with special Moscow approval), while Kosygin proposed various curbs
and adjustments of rules to check the tendency to start many plants
and finish them slowly. Manpower is a limiting condition on Soviet
economic expansion, anc7 one solution is to try to increase productivity
by better training; this is doubtless the main reason for the Program's
emphasis on education. Figures released on the eve of the Congress
purported to show a growth of productivity of 11%, but this was achieved
by calculating on the basis of a short w ork week; the actual rate of
increase was 4%n, although the 7-Year Plan called for 5. 9% and the new
Program calls for 7% up to 1970 and nearly 8% after that. One curious
result of the unrealism of the labor figures in the Program is that the
number cf persons employed is scheduled to fall by 6-9 million from
1970 to 1980, implying large-scale unemployment. The agricultural
problem (which Khrushchev called the "main task" of the party)has been
discussed in a number of guidances,most recently in Guidance #457. On
21 November Khrushchev interrupted a Kazakh party leader's speech
try ?sa:r'.that this year's New lands harvest was not merely "decreased"
(as the party leader was saying), but "wrecked". This year the problem
is drought. As Stalin did in his last days, Khrushchev seems to be turn-
ing to grandiose canal and irrigation projects to solve Soviet agricultura'
problems, proposing to more than triple irrigated areas in western
Russia. The new plans are more practical than Stalin's were, however,
and may make it possible to increase cotton production almost up to
the 1980 goal. Other crops will fare less well.
3
(Continued)
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4. The pursuit of the 20-Year Program, insofar as it is successful,
will tend to increase rather-than ease world tensions. We have already
noted that one aim of the program. is to lay ;down the nature of
Communist society in the future. This may reflect the desire of an old
man (Khrushchev) to tie up the future of his heirs along the lines of his
own ideas. Past performance does not suggest that the creation of a
new Communist society is going to come as easily as the Program
suggests. But in order to make it practical at all, an intensification of
indoctrination and a maintenance of the insulation of the Soviet people
from the outsic'e world are necessary. It uill also be essential to con-
tinue the suppression of "factionalism's and "revisionism". Thus the
20 Year Program in no way provides a charter for liberalization, rather
the contrary. The observation has been made that the combination of
the Program with the current de-Stalinization campaign bears a certain
resemblance to the combination of the Stalin Constitution of 1936 with
the terror which began after I'irov's murder; the impractical
character of the 20-Year Program does not augur well for the future
of the Soviet bureaucrats who will have to try to meet its goals. Another
feature of the Program, its emphasis on continuous growth in heavy
industry, is significant for the future. The Soviet leadership is now
committed to "conspicuous production", much as the West was before
the Great Depression, only more so. There is no serious danger of
overt unemployment in Soviet society, which lost 2C, 000, 000 lives in
World War II and which will always be able to employ surplus hands
in superfluous tasks, but there are definite signs of future overproduc-
tion of such commodities as steel, pig iron, and cement. Since the
surplus is not to be used to produce consumer goods, such as
automobiles, where is it going to go? One answer is, in the production
of armaments, such as tanks, transports, missiles (and associated
gear), and defensive works. These things will be used as threats,
intended to demonstrate Soviet military superiority. The other
possibility is foreign trade. If the Soviet Program should be as success..
ful as Khrushchev hopes, it would put the Soviet Union in a position to
bid against western industry in many underdeveloped areas. In view of
the actual, as opposed to the scheduled, future of Soviet agriculture,
the end result may well be to make the Soviet Union what Britain
became in the 19th century, a country exporting manufactures and
importing foo--.. As the British and Japanese experience shows, such
a country is likely to follow the trader with the flag. The world is
already well-provided with countries with industrial surpluses and food
shortages, and. the competition for food is likely to add new dangers to
those of ideology. Moreover, as an exporter of manufactures, the
Soviet Union will lose interest in the balanced development of under-
developed areas, regarding them rather as dumping grounds. Rather
than accept their development (as the British and Japanese have come
to do largely because they have turned to consumer goods and votes
for the workers), the predictable Soviet answer will be a development
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of Communist ideology to justify a Soviet empire, Indeed, Khrushchev
is already saying: "The building d Communism in our country is an
integral part of the creation of a communist society in the whole
socialist commonwealth, " prudently adding: "There cannot be one
common moment at vhich all socialist countries enter a higher
phase of the new society. "
M 1enkc v, like the Sorcerer's Apprentice, did more than he or other
Soviet leaders bargained for when, in 19'74, he came out for increased produc-
tion of consumer goods. Khrushchev flatly opposed Malenkov and drove him
from office, but then found it expedient to continue the policy of concessions to
the o nsumer. Khrushchev, however, is no more motivated by concern for the
consumer now than he was in 1954. Instead he is motivated by a desire to 25X1C1Ob
(Continued)
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25X1C10b
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