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December 18, 1961
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25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 . ~_,_- Approved For R2'fease 200~0~$/~7 :~1~4~tDP78-0~61A00010005~ 03-4 r e y o e 1 December 19 Reluctance of Communists to Publicize Castro's Confession of Allegiance to oscow: ow ere as as ro s speec p cem er een pu czze In u~'-TI; C"astro's statement that he is aMarxist-Leninist has not been printed in Cuba, It took Moscow three days before a Tass dispatch from Havana - was published, and then not in Pravda, hailing Castro as the "new Marxist- Leninist". As of 11 December, no copy of the speech was available in the consternation of the Communist Party of Chile, Mexico City was unable to get a copy of the speech as late as 14 December. Clearly, the speech would lessen the appeal of the Fidel as the Latin --- American wonder boy and would reveal him for what he has always been -- aweak puppet of Moscow. Communist Ghina Blames Crop Failure on Mismanagement. The Canton ---- paper an ang ai y on ame a -percent drop in rice out- put by a Kwax~gtun~g'~'rovince production brigade on maladministration in which the brigade "made a mesa of things in the execution of policies." The paper lbointed out that this had nothing to do with natural calamities and said this example should focus attention on the failure of communes to implement the new agricultural policies, This is the first instance noted in which the regime has denied that weather was a factor in declining output and placed the blame on poor organization and leadershi 5X1 C10b 25 The V+Torld Council of Churches: The World Council of Churches, meeting in ew e i in Quern ~er, vo ed to admit to membership the Russian Orthodox Church. In its application for admission, the Russian Church claimed it had 50, 000; 000 believers, served by 30, 000 priest s, 20, 000 parishes and seventy-three bishoprics. While these figures are believed somewhat exaggerated!? their real significance is in relation to the size of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1914, when there were 77, 76? churches and prayer houses and I17, 916 priests. The Soviets appear to be caught between the need to prove that their scientific atheism drive is successful, and at the carne time to qualify a religious organization far membership in a world religious body. In any treatment concerning the admission of the Russian Church care should be taken not to attack or discredit the World Council of Churches, which is a sincere and influential body. It can be painted out, howevex, that the Russian Orthodox Church delegation has not hesitated to parrot the Soviet Communist line, as it did at the Orthodox Church Conference at Rhodes in September, thus"indicating, despite its protestations, that it is under the thumb of the CPSU. Attention is called to articles carried in Press Comment on the New Delhi meeting. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 1$ December 1961 469. he '22nd ` S re 003-4 25X1 C10b Back~~ggroun~d~: Khrushchev's public repudiation of Stalin at the 22nd CPSU Congress Moscow, and the latest demonstration by Peking and Albania that the CPSU no longer commands the unquestioning obedience of the Commun- ist world, are having a profound effect on the fraternal parties throughout the world. The latest denunciation of Stalin caught them by surprise; many delegates `.o the Congress had laid wreaths on his tomb a day or two before the meetings onvened. In some areas the effects of the Congress are already evident; in others they may be gradual. Italy, the home of the largest Communist Party outside the bloc, is one country where the results o~~Khrushchev's words and Chows deeds (the sudden return to Peking) have already caused considerable repercussions. Palmira Togliatti obviously knew he would enc~uter trouble on these matters in his own Central Committee, since its "revisionist" wing had long been advocating reform and knew that Khrushchev himself had now given them a great opportunity. In an attempt to ward off the storm, Togliatti struck the first blow before L-he convening of his Central Committee plenum by having the Party organ 1'Unita republish, in its edition of 5 November, excerpts from an interview he ac given after the 20th Congress in 1956. Togliatti had been severely criticized by Pravda for his remarks at the time. The following were among the points o3~`Tg iatti chose to re-emphasise, under the heading "Polycentric Nature of the System ": "Regarding the equally important problem of assuring that past evils are not repeated in the future, Togliatti.... stressedthe basic factors: not only re-establishing socialist legality, but re-vitalizing the party, reviving initiative among the mss .se s, encouraging research, stimulating discussion in the field of theory and practice;- in sum, giving socialist democracy a positive direction... The inber- na1 political structure of the Communist movement has changed; the need for an ever greater independence of decision has increased. 'The entire system.... is becoming polycentric; one can no longer speak of a single model for the communist movement, but rather of pxogress accomplished by following roads which are frequently different. ~,. problem for the entire movement arises from the criti- nism of Stalin, the problem of bureaucratic degeneracy, suffocation of democracy, of confusion between constructive revolutionary force and the destruction of revolutionary legality, of the isolation of the economic and political leaders from the life, the initiative, the criticism and the cxeative activity of the masses. We would hail the establishment among the communist parties in power of a contest to find the best means of forever evading this danger. It is for us to develop our methods and our road, to safeguard ourselves from the dangers of stagnation and bureaucracy, to work out together the problems of the liberty of the working masses and social justice, and then among these masses to gain greater prestige and a larger following. "' In explaining the significance of the new denunciation of Stalin and the accusations against the anti-party group before the CPI's Central Committee Approved For Release 20 - 3061A000'(~~-}4 ,469. {Cont.) "? December 1961 A proved For FZ'~1'ease 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-O'9~961A000100050~03-4 plenum (~10 November), Togliatti (who had unsus ectingly placed a. wreat on Stalin's tomb before the opening of the Congress was implicitly critical of the way in which the matter was handled. Why was it necessary to re-open this chapter? To provide a detailed reply is not easy, particularly when one doesn'# knew ail the details of the internal life of the CPSU, he said. Speaking of the antiparty group whose opposition may have made the latest denunciation of Stalin necessary, the PCI leader said: ~~Perhaps if more complete information on this attempt /Fiy the anti -Party group to change the decisions of the 20th Congress7' had been made available immediately or soon afterward, it would have been helpful for the international communist movement. Claxity in these mattexs never hurts. The more light there is the more safely and rapidly one can proceed. " And further i n the same vein: "In the construction of acommunist society it is not only the base that undergoes a transformation. The superstructure must also change, the operating methods of the party, its link with the masses, its - method of fulfilling its executive functions in the phase of develop- ment which must be one of the extension of democracy and of the creative initiative of the workers. In such a situation, the attachment to the past and hatred of the new becomes the main obstacle. Here, certainly is the real connection between the fundamental deci-sions of the 22nd Congress and the renewed struggle against the 'anti-party' group. " "Perhaps for us these latest denunciations were no longer necessary, perhaps also they created here and there strong feelings and doubts. However, we must make an effort to understand the situation which exists in the Soviet Union.... Such a denunciation is indispensable in order to bar a return to a past which should be buried forever if -not forgotten. " On the dangers ensuing from the personality cult, the Italian Communist leader warns: "A political party which is inspired by Marxism and which must carry out vast action among the masses cannot become monocephalic. It should stimulate among its rank and file and also in its directorate, debate, the development of a variety of leading personalities, a continual exchange of opinion, without having every divergence lead to discord and recriminations. " Togliatti also tackled the key problem of the origins of the Stalinist aberration and of finding means to avoid its recurrence. Under the heading, "Carrying forward the critical research and analysis begun in 1956, soliciting the collaboration and assistance of the comrades in the CPSU and in other partie s'~, he said: "How were such serious transgressions possible? And how can we guarantee that they are not repeated?" Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP7tt-03061A00010~CQo 0~0 ~-~) 469. (Cont.) 1$ tlecember 1961 ' Toglia~j~~.bjld~~toll'e~~1.s2~~~~~~.~ s~1~~~b~~Q494~~~4~~~03-4_ question which try to reduce everything to the negative qualities of Stalin him- self. It seems that there were others who collaborated with Stalin in violating the laws; and how does one explain that, despite Lenin's warnings, the party paid no heed? "We must go deeper, make an objective analysis of the development of Soviet society not merely to justify what is being denounced at the moment.... but to better understand things and to draw from them a lesson for everyone. " Togliatti then refers to his 1956 interview with the periodical Nuovi Argomenti in which he attempted to make such an analysis, saying that t e reve a ions a the 22nd Congress confirm his theories, It is necessary, ac~~ding to Togliatti, to go back to the period beginning in 1934 with the crime against Kirov, since it was then that an act emanating from the top of the party leadership occurred which violated and destroyed socialist legality. "We must admit that at this very mament and on the basis of these successes, objective contradictions and difficulties of a new type arose which the Stalinist leadership did not understand and thought it would resolve by inaugurating a regime cf suspicion and of unjustified re- pression. We must admit that Lenin was right when he said that success itself could be one of the causes of bureaucracy. We must also go back to the other precedents, to the Long years of civil war, of foreign intervention and of terror which created a particular method of operating and which explained how a portion of the group around Stalin became transformed in a power group for whom every question was reduce d to a clash of material force. Naturally these axe only general remarks which should be verified on the basis of fact in ordex to place each criticism and denunciation in the proper perspective contrasting it with the tremendous positive work of economic construction accomplished by the working masses under the guidance of the party and of the Soviet Government, the foundation and construction of a new society and an international policy of peace which found a resounding echo in the hearts of the people, In 1956 we undertook to conduct such a research and something was done by means of contacts with the leading comrades of the Soviet party, the di spatch of research :relegations, journalistic facilities, publication of inquiries and books of which you certainly are cognizant. We must do more, soliciting new assistance both from the Soviet comrades and from the scholars of other parties. The worst thing which could occur for the entire movement would be to content oneself with juxtaposition of praises and denunciations and letting it go at that. Also in this regard the differences with the Chinese comrades should be better defined by means of research, study and debate. In connection with the development of communism in Italy and to avoid any return to the period of Stalinist terrrors Togliatti stated the following: "It is precisely in order to give and to have this guarantee ~gainst Stalinist deviations? that we affirm the necessity.... of moving~oward socialism by democratic means, adhering to the conditions of our country and to the gains already realized by the working class and of the people in the struggle against fascism. And in order to give and to have such a guarantee we have taken pains above all to maintain and develop Approved For Release 2 8-03061A00 -4 469. I~~p~~~ed.For Release 2 78-030~~~'t~'~~}'Sd~~~-4 +~.? ,,.,r,, the democratic character of our party, always promoting debarte; the confrontation of ideas, and also always accepting debate a nd dis- cussion with any adversary, bu.t in confronting without prejv.dice all the new problems that pre sent themselves today, and in never Fearing to move closer to xeality as it is. If there are mistakes to correct acrd errors to denounce it is from this test that the corrections and denun- ciations must develop. This is the line of conduct that we followed after the 20th Congress...we cannot deny that this approach has given our party its particular and original aspect in the broad camp of the world communist movement.... W e have found nothing in Marx, in Lenin, in Gramsci which contradicts or condemns our approach. We have always asserted the need for the working class struggle and the party as the vanguaxd of the working class to have their own characters comes--- ponding to the conditions and traditions of the country and a correspond- ing line of political action. In this matter also decisions of the 20th Congress are of great importance and particularly the affirmation of the poli~ti.cai and organizational autonomy of each communist party. We were among the first, outside of the Soviet comrades, to maintain that t?day they can no longer be either a guide state nor a guide party, today this fact is acceptable by all. " The following day (11 November) Togliatti's internal opposition had its say. Although their more extreme demands were obviously not reported in the CPI newspaper 1'Unita what remained was enough to show that Togliatti's hopes of limiting discu on were in vain. They said that the contribution of the PCI to the victory of the Khrushchev line was weakened because of excessive caution and procrastination: that the struggle and dissent among the Communist parties re- vealed by the 22nd Congress made it necessary to recognize the diversity of situations existing in the USSR, China, Italy, France, Yugoslavia and Cuba; that polycentricity is the basic condition of real internationalism; that closer tie s with other Euxopean Communist parties bare essential; that only by an open and public discussion of real problems is real unity obtainable; that there should be a return to Leninism also in matters of international policy; that the 22nd CPSU Congress represents the end of a ficticious unanimity which had nothing to do with genuine ideological and political unity; that from time to time in regard to certain problems majority and minority positions could be formed; that regarding the essential question of national roads to social- ism some of the positions adopted in the 22nd CPSU program are insufficient. and do not repre sent a step forward (for example, when the document says there is only one road to socialism since the general laws of socialist construction are always and everywhere the same); Approved For Release 2000/0 4 -03061A00014~~~~~ 4b9. {Cont.) 18 December 1961 Approved For Tease ~OU0~08/~7 : C1~4-R~P78-@SUC1A0~01000500Q~-4 and, finally, t at t e ceps s an most serious arm re su ng from the cult of the individual was the substitution of coercive and administrative measures for discussion of basic political questions and, therefore, the use of party organs merely execute a line already de- cided from above. On 14 November, 1'Unita published a formal and innocuous summary of the Plenum which glosse over he disagreements. The dissenters, however, who were demanding that the date for the party congress be advanced to discuss questions generated by the 22nd CPSU, could not be quieted. Another meeting of the PCI Directorate took place an 17 and 18 November, and on 19 November 1'Unita carried, on its front pages, the following announcement from the CPI irec orate: "The PCI Directorate, taking into account the results of the recent meeting of the Central Committee and the broad, lively and profitable discussions which took place concerning comrade Togliatti's report, stresses that the subjects discussed must and will be gone into more deeply in order to enrich the discussions which are to take place in the party and the workers' movement regarding the decisions taken at the 22nd C PSU Congress, and charges the Secretariat with the task of drawing u.p and circulating to the entire party a public document for the purpose of stimulating and guiding the activities of all comrades. The proposal for advancing the party Congress will be submitted at the next meeting of the Central Committee which is the only authority which can decide. Regarding the proposal itself, the Directorate, which unanimously voted against it believing that there were not sufficient reasons for moving it ahead,. will report to the Central Committee. The Central Committee wilt meet during the month of December.... " Finally, on Z8 November, 1'Unita published the party's "approved docu- ment" on the Z2nd CPSU Congress, cTu"ty signed by the PCI Secretariat. This document indicated that the "revisionist" wing had been successful in obliging Togliatti and company to accept many of ii~s positions, some of which con- tained serious indictments of the PGI leadership itself eisring the Stalinist period. Thus, the document stressed the co-responsibility of the PCI in promoting the cult of the personality. The leadership was guilty of two errors: a. the uncritical acceptance of Stalin's erroneous theory regarding the inevitable and increasing bitterness of the class struggle as a concomitant of socialist construction; b. the practice of noting only the successes and of passing from the recognition of the ability and merits of a revolutionary leader like Stalin to the exaltation of his ~6erson and function. In regard to the latter, while noting the progress which had been made since the $th PCI Congress, in correcting these errors, the document noted: "We must recognize that such advances are still insufficient. The basic problem concerns the autonomy of the party in tie struggle to achieve socialism by means of an original, democratic and national road. "We must recognize that the autonomy of our party has been limited Aptpra~da~ii~e~a~ /~/@~7t#~C Ir~~O~~8~~85b -4 5 (Continued) 469. (Cont.) 1$ December 1961 A~~rQved Fir G~.~elea~e~20t~0/~8/~7 : CIA-RD~7$p8~,~~~~~~~~(~~~0~,4 ntioned a ove an y e ac tha our o n o i u development have not always been given an explicit theoretical formulation which could have contributed a more coherent perspective and a gre ate r idealism . " The xeport also stresses the need for closer liaison of parties operating in the capitalist West. Liaison among parties must provide above all for the development of bilateral and multilateral contacts among parties working under analogous conditions. The developments within the Italian Communist Party are events of major significance in the Communist wrld which may well set a precedent for the evolution of other Communist parties outside the bloc, for example: the clemand for more internal democracy; for greater independence from the USSR; for closer ties with the CP~s in Western Europe; and the challenges both implicit and explicit to the party leadership. Already, Thorez, in France, whose identification with Stalinism makes him particularly vu.lne rable at this time, has made some pointed references to the "revisionism and opportunism" of certain elements in the Italian Communist Party. 25X1 C10b '" ^ '" (Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 469. {Cont. ) 18 I?ecember 1961 25X1C10b 7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 470. A ,~~~~ F~~ea 12~ 18 December 1961 0~4~100050003-4 25X1 C10b $ack round: On 9 December the British administered UN trust torritory of Tanganyika was given its independence. Under the intelligent leadership of the UK-educated Prime Minister, Julius Nyerere, the new state come s into being ixi an atmosphere of relative political stability and racial harmony, with the economy showing a slow but steady advance. This outstanding background nzay be attributed in large part to Nyerere, who became Ghief Minister in October 1960, after he had led the multi-racial Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) to an overwhelming victory in national elections in which TANU adherents won ?0 out of the 71 seats in the legislature. Nyerere named two whites and an Indian to his cabinet t.o demonstrate his belief that a t1nan-racial?1 policy can work in Africa. His government worked smoothly and the transtian period to independence, under the guidance of the British, was accomplished with relative ease. Julius Nyerere, an outstanding African leader who has been described by one British official as "fifty years ahead" of any other Tanganyika African, is one of the many children (52 is probably a good estimate) of a chief of the Zanaki tribe (the father had twenty-six wives), one of the smallest of the approximately 120 tribes in Tanganyika. When he was twelve years old, young Nyerere was sent to school at the Lake Victoria port of Musoma. He showed early promise and graduated to a high school at Tabora in central Tanganyika. While at Tabora, Nyerere was converted to Catholicism and he remains one of the few African nationalist leaders who is a practising, devout Christian. From Tabora, he went to the University College of East Africa, where he studied from 1943 to 1945, obtaining a diploma in Education. Returning to his old school at Tabora, he bought for four years before a scholarship to the University of Edinburgh in Scotland came his way, He stayed three years at Edinburgh, emerging with a master-af-arts degree in History and Economics, an occasional slight Scottish burr, and an awakening national consciousness. Back in Tanganyika in 1952, he resumed his teaching career -this time at St. Francis High School at Dar es Salaam, the capital, He began to take an increasing interest in an organization called the Tanganyika African Association, formed i.xi 1929 by British civil servants as a Social club for Africans. Nyerere had quite different plans for the organization, however, and, after he had been elected its president i.xi 1953, he rewrote its constitution to give it a political complexion and later renamed it the Tanganyika African National Union, Within twelve months he had raised the Union's membership to 250, 000 (it now exceeds 1, 000, 000), paid a visit to the UN to plead independence for the Trust Territory, and been elected to the Legislative Council. As 'I`a ng anyika's outstanding leader, Nyerere conspicuously has not promised his 8, 500, 000 fellow-Africans that independence will bring them pie-in- the-sky, but rather hard work and self- sacrifice. Most (but not all) regard him rather like the Ghanaians, at one time at any rate, regarded their Osagyefo (Deliverer), Nkrumah. To Tanganyika's 76, 000 Indians, 20, 000 Europeans and as many Arabs, Nyerere has held out the promise of equality under the la.w and security of their land titles. These see in Nyerere their best chance for a productive future in their adopted country. (continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 470. (Cont.) 18 December ].961 A" 35'~"src~~i~tda.ii~rs~i-~Igs~i4i~~$/~~a'ss~t~~iF~D~i~1@A~S~ exists. It centers on a dissident faction in the Tanganyika Federation of Labor (TFL), which Nyerere has been trying to turn into a TANTJ-controlled organization an the Ghanaian paktern, and on the African National Congress (ANC). The TFL, led by Christopher Tuxnba, has an assortment of axes to grind, notably the slow rate of Africanization of irxdustry and government. The ANC, whose president is Zuberi Mtemvu but whose zeal leader may be Michael Sanga, was ineffective until early this year. Beginning in January 1961, however, the party's stridently anti-Western line began to take effect as it wan the support of some of the lower ranking African civil servants. At about the same time, Mtemvu visited Feiping, and the ANC is now said to receive funds from Communist bloc sources through extremists in Kenya. Quite apart from this apposition, moreover, it is obvious that independence will not salve the territory's basic weakstesses: the low level of economic development, the paucity of competent leaders, and even Nyerere's awn idealism and inexperience, particularly in foreign affairs. ?nce the euphoria of independence has worn off, such problems as lethargy and 25X1 C10b corruption are likely to assert themselves. {c antinue d) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 470. (Cont. 18 December 1961 25X1C10b 3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 18 December 1961 471. ~ T]~p~.'" ~~#~i08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03861A000100050003-4Z~X1G1Ub Background: Since the eYad of October, the USSR has again moved to =~1 block the progress of European economic, political and military integration by attempting to dictate the direction of policy in independent countries. In the economic field, Austria has been warned that any move towards association with the Common Market would be considered by the USSR as a violation of Austria's neutrality pledge. The warning was based on the political aspects of the European Economic Cormrnunity (EEC or Cornnzon ar et} which officials of the Austrian g?vernrnent say can be eliminated and hence they can associate with the Common Market purely on economic grounds. It should be noted, however, that the USSR specifically states that economic alignment itself is contrary to Austria's neutrality status as interpreted by the USSR. The Austrian's reply - by pointing to the similar position adopted by archetypes of neutrality, Switzer- land and Sweden. At the same time, ice. trade talks with Finland, ~-~the USSR made an agree- ment for approximately 25 percent increase in Soviet-Finnish trade. This will have the effect of increasing .Finland's economic dependence upon the USSR. In the military field, the USSR attempted to obtain Finnish agreement to enter into military consultations with them, consultations provided for under the terms of the 1948 Finno-Soviet Treaty, which specifies tln~w..~?n3t i;s~esta~ished that Finland or Russia ?xe._ in imminent danger of military attack, they should consult on common defensive measures. 'This has, thus far, been successfully avoided by Finland. In view of the frequent and specific references to the formation of a NATO Baltic Command and to Danish and Norwegian cooperation with West Germany and NATO, it is clear that the USSR is not only seeking to keep Finland fully aware of her military comitments to the USSR , but also to limit as far as passible further Scandinavian military cooperation with NATO and the tither members of the North Atlantic Cornmu.nity. /'F'or the extent of Russia's interference in Finland's-domestic political affairs see Bi-Weekly Guidance #$~, Item #467.7 Roscoe Drummond, writing in the New York Herald Tribune for 8 December 1961, p. 27, says: "The communists have fought European unification at every point. When the United States proposed the 'Organization for European Economic Ceflperation OEEC} to help administer the Marshall Plan on a Europe-wide basis, the Soviets walked out and forced Poland and Czechoslovakia to withdraw. At Moscow's bidding, the communist parties of Western Europe and Britain have fought the Common Market.... ~irushchev fears the European Common Market and, most of all, an all-Atlantic economic community. " The Communists in Western Europe have indeed fought all other moves and pro- posals designed to further European unification in any field. Nor has the USSR stopped here. In the economic field, it formed its own answer to the Common Market, its Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA}. In the military (Continued} Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 +,~ 471. , (Cont..) '~ December 14b1 q proved For Rel~se 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-030.,~?1A000100050003-4 field, i't farmed the Warsaw 1~act as its answer to NATO. In both CEMA and the Warsaw ]Pact the participants are dominated by the TJSSR and are oriented toward that country, the principal member and beneficiary. In NAT27 and the Common Market all are equal partners, with full freedom of action within the terms of the particular agreement, and all share equally in the benefits. 25X1 C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 18 December 1961 + Approved For R#ease 2000/ /27 :CIA-RDP78-0+3~fi61A000100050003-4 472. Khrushch.ev, the Old Stalinist, versus Mao, the New Stalinist ~~~ 25X1C10b Bac_~k_~ro~un_d: Political rivalry is a universal phenomenon to which the Saviet~ of c is no exception. Under the surface of the Communist monolitTi, various individuals seek to enhance their political power, and the struggle often gains in intensity and bitterness from the circumstance that it takes place sub rasa. We should never, therefore, underrate authentic indications of rivaZ'ry wi~in the bloc. At the same time, however, we must avoid various forms of wishful thinking, not exaggerating isolated details or giving them a significance they cannot -- from what we know of the system -- possess, Khruahchev rose in the ranks of the CPSU largely through his ruthlessness in carrying out Stalin's policy, and through his simultaneous grasp of political realities. In the Soviet system, which places a premium on the ability to force others into action and on skill in political maneuver, Khrushchev's success- is altogether natural. As early as October 1926, he anticipated Stalin by calling for either total submission by the opposition /Trotskyites, etc,/ or the application of repressive measures. On the day after f~i~rov's murder, -' Khxushchev, Kaganovich, and others signed a document launching the campaign against the "enemies of the people", the stock indictment which would later be used in the Great Purge -- and later still (in 1956} would be denounced by Khruahchev as a violation of "all norms of revolutionary legality". The Great Purge itself was an excellent example of Khrushchev's abili#.g` to eambine the "right kind" of zeal with ruthlessnese:. Khrushchev's career seems to have been closely associated with the early stages of Nikolai Ivanovich $,e~$ov's. ~Yezhov, the rabid chief of the NKVD during the blood purge, had been a member of Khrushchev's party organization in the Bauman District of Moscow in 1931, and later in the Moscow City Party Committee, and Yezhov accompanied Khruahchev and Molotov to the Ukraine in the summer of 1937 to obtain the submission of the Ukrainian party leadership. (See attachment to Bi-Weekly Guidance #79, dated 20 Nov 61}. In May of that year Khruahchev had shown Stalin he was ripe for spurge-time promotion by proposing the following resolution: "The Moscow Party Conference assures the Central Committee of the Party and our vozhd, teacher, and friend, Comrade Stalin, that there has not been and will not be mercy for the spies, diversionists, and terrorists who raise their hand against the lives of the toilers of the Soviet Union; that we will annihilate the spies and diversionists also in the future and will not let the enemies of the USSR live; and that for every drop of workers' blood the enemies of the USSR will pay with ~~o=ds of blood of spies and diversionists." (Pravda, May 3I, lys~~, quoted by Lazar Pistrak, The Grand Tacticia'-'n , p. 153} A year later, Khruahchev told the Ukrainians at their loth Party Congress: "Our cause is a holy cause, And he whose hand trembles, who stops half-way, whose knees shake before annihilating ten, a hundred enemies, exposes the Revolution to danger. It is necessary to fi ht a ies without mercy. Let us erase from the surface Appr~veor~elease 2000/ -0306(ti~flfl~1~?6050003-4 472, (Cont. ) 18 December 1961 ofi4p$~r~ ~t~'~Rr1~Q.~.~~a a1~~~~~.16s1~~~Q~~,~~.`~iQ~03-4 We warn that for every drop of honest workers' blood we will shed a bucketful of the enemy's black blood, " (Bilshovik Ukrainy, No. ?, 1938, p. 11, quoted by Pistrak, p. 153, } In December 1961, Khrushchev acknowledged that he had always been and always would be a propagandist. After a careful study of Khrushchev's statements during the purge period, Lazar Pistrak concludes: "No Communist leader, dead or alive, showed greater verbal zeal in tuneing this Purge into the greatest blood bath ever conducted by any group of men against their own comrades. " {p. 155) IVTor was Khrushchev innocent of the actual blood-letting itself, since as First Secretary in the Ukrainian Republic CP he was quite aware of such mass executions as those which took place ~a.t Vinnitsa {See attachment to Bi-Weekly Guidance #79, dated 20 November 1961}. In June 1953, Khrushchev (if we are to believe hixn) literally grappled with Beria until his military co-plotters came to the rescue with tommy-gune, Seeing a chance to isolate Malenkov in the Party, he had him branded as advocating ashow-down in heavy industry in favor of consumer goods, and as fearful of a Third World War. With two opponents out of the way, he then reversed himself and used the anti-Stalin campaign to discredit his other '`~ ivals. This change was, however, only another tactical move in altered circumstances. A good Communist tactician takes the initiative and keeps his opponents under a barrage of accusations of violating party morality; meanwhile his followers and mouthpieces pick up and repeat the accusations, even when they know that they are unfounded, or that counter-accusations, at Ieast equally valid, could be made. Khrushchev showed his continued readiness to employ "Stalinist" methods in the execution of M. D. Bagirov (announced May 1956), during the Hungarian uprising in 1956 (with the subsequent execution of Nagy), and in sanctioning: the assassination of Stefan Bandera in 1959 (confessed by the Soviet assassin, Bogdan Stashinsky, who recently fled to V`dest Germany, fearing that he was about to be liquidated because, like the assassixxs of Kirov, he knew too much.) Ixx May 1957, during a speech to a group of writers, Khrushchev reverted to a figure of speech he had used in the Ukraine in 193? (see above), saying that Soviet writers "should realize that if they appose us, our hand will not tremble". With his skill 9.rx tactics and his following in the party apparatus, and barring unforeseen circumstances, Khrushchev should have no difficulty in retaining control in the Soviet Union as Long as he retains his physical and mental faculties. Recent personnel shifts in the Central Committee and the Presidium of the CPSU resulted in no real surprises. No persons known to be opposed to Khrushchev received advancement. Suslov, Brezhnev, Kozlov, and Mikoyan have all shown complete acceptance of Khrushchev's leadership in recent years. In previous guidances we have pointed out economic and other problems facing Khrushchev, Where Khrushchev's difficulties are becoming most obvious is with certain other leaders of the Bloc, Hoxha and Mao, Khrushchev does not have a personal apparatus inside the parties of these countries, and his propaganda appeals do not strike a responsive chord in them. Still revolutionaries, they are unable and unwilling to compete in debates on gross 2 continue d Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A 0010005 003-4 472. ~ppr8~red For RE'1'ease - DP78-03G61A00010~~~v'~003-4861 national product, and they regard with suspicion Khrushchev's propagandist hope of swaying the western countries by threats and offers. In 1953 Nathan Leiter pointed out one characteristic Communist belief: "Bolsheviks fear and oppose the disposition to permit the borders between oneself and the enemy to be fuzzy.... If this rule is violated, bhe Party is threatened by dissolution into its hostile environment." Today this principle seems to be given more respect in Peiping than in Moscow, to Peiping's concern. Khrushchev did not originate "popular front" tactics, but neither do the Chicoms venerate the "popular front" part of Stalin's legacy; they well remember the ix debacle of 192?, when Chiang Kai-shek, withwYrom they were working, purged them. The Sino-Soviet debate waxed hot in 1960 s.nd outwardly was patched up at the end of that year at the Moscow $1-Party Conference. Now, at the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev (with his usual disregard for the spirit of past agreements) has sought to reasse~tt Soviet supremacy and, by his anti-Stalin campaign, to compel the other Communist parties to submit. So far, his forcing play has not proved successful: the Chinese are, so far, avoiding either submission or an outright break; the Albanians have, in effect, made the break. Bath Chinese and Albanians have claimed that they speak for the true international faith. The Chinese have also revived their analogy of communism with the "East Wind", with its ominous overtones of an anti-European Asian Communism, and they have stressed their closeness to the African and Latin-American CP's. Why is it important to Khrushchev to win this quarrel ? 1. Comz-nunist leadership in the Soviet Union tries to legitimize itself by its claim to possession of the "correct Marxist-Leninist line". If there are two Marxist-Leninist countries following different lines, obviously at least one of them is not correct, and if they are both large important countries, one has little more chance of being thought correct than the other. Khrushchev has yet to gain international recognition as a Commw.iist theoretician, while Mao has probably been more successful. 2. If the Chinese Communists should succeed in diverting some of the remainder of the world CP's to a "communi; m for underdeveloped areas", USSR communism would lose its claim to represent the "wave of the future", thus would be placed in an isolated position between West and East. 3. If industrialization is added to Chinese manpower, and the Peiping regime is hostile, the Soviet Union ultimately will face a severe military threat. The relatively empty areas of Siberia seem destined to tempt the Chinese, who, moreover, already display an alarming lack of respect for the danger of nuclear attack. 4. There is reason to think that considerations of personal antipathy and personal prestige in competition with Mao play an important role with Khrushchev.. Chinese policy appears "adventurist" in Soviet eyes; appeasement of Chinese desires would commit the USSR to supporting the Chinese brethren without any control over their escapades. Moreover, it is not the Communist way to let things slide in the hope that something "will turn up". Instead, as Approved For Release 2001/$Q~?~'' ?!''^ ?^~4-03061A~Q~Q~5gQ03-4 18 December 1961 X472. ,~~~v~d For Release 2000/ 8 IA-RDP78-0~3061A000100050003-4 Leites has pointed out, the Communist believes in cutting off undesired developments "at their roots", In the Communist lexicon (as Leites argues), the worst sins are to "yield." (i. e, , not just retreat tactically, which may be wise, but accept an opponent's view), to fail to maintain pressuxe, and to lose control of one's actions (or what comes to much the same, to act unconsciously, without sober thought)> With such operating principles on both sides, and in view of recent statements, Sino-Soviet tensions seem likely to increase rapidly, rather than disappear at Khrushchev's command. Approved For Release 2000/08/ 061 A000100050003-4 25X1C10b Approved For Release 20 P78-0~0,,6~'~~~$~~314 ~$~1C~~(~.nce for Progress is an Alliance of the People r ~n.w w.~.+.r r ^ Bac~k~xo_u_n~d: In the preamble to the Charter of Punta del Este, the Amer ci an 1~epuT~lics proclaim their decision to "unite in a common effort to bring our people accelerated economic progress and broader social justice". ~t gaes an to say that "the men and women of our hemisphere are determined to gain access to knowledge and equal opportunity for all, to end those conditions which benefit the few at the expense of the needs and dignity of the many". Among the purposes of the Alliance for Progress are the following: "to encourage programs of comprehensive a~ra~rian reform leading to the effective transformation of unjust structures and systems o n tenure and use, with a view to replacing latifundia and dwarf holdings by an equitable system of land tenure; to eliminate adult illit~erac~; to increase life expectancy at birth, and to increase the ability to leer-^ n~an~-produce by improving individual and public health; to improve nutrition; to increase the construction of low-cast houses or ow-income families. " The charter specifies that national programs of economic and social development should be based on the principle of self-help directed, among other things, to the strengthening of the agricultural base, progressively extending the benefits of the land to those who work it. It recommends that measures should be adopted to establish or improve credit, technical assistance, health and education, storage and distribution, cooperatives and farmers assacia.tions, and community development. It recommends more effective, rational and equitable and use of financial resources through the reform of tax structures, including fair and adequate taxation of large incomes and zeal estate, and the strict application of measures to improve fiscal administration. It finally recommends the improvement of systems of distribution and sales in order to prevent monopolistic practices. The land reform program carried aut in Venezuela and the Community Development Program in Colombia, which has received the support of the Peace Corps, are good examples of major efforts to carry out the basic aims of the Charter of Punta del Este,.. In November 1961, the first Inter-American Cooperative Conference was held in Bogota. This conference decided to organize a uerx institution, the Cooperative Organization of the Americas (COA) as well as an InterwAmerican Cooperative Finance Institution to provide low interest medium- and long-term loans to cooperative organizations in La.tiu American. it is expected that these two (private) organizations will serve as a powerful mechanism for implementing the grass roots concepts contained in the charter of Punta del Este, 25X1 C10b 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4 1$ December 1961 30 " 50003-4 25X1 C10b ... Background: Summary: President Sukarno made a bellico se wee ch pn 30 Novembe r announcing t a e would "liberate" West New Guinea (WNG) and pursue a policy of "total confrontation". This is coupled with subsequent statements by high officials alerting the armed farces to a'and the deployment of troops and material. While these measures may in part represent an inte~.tion to put pressure on the United States and Netherlands in favor of a ~3ro-Indonesian settlement, it is also ;probable that Sukarno ques~Lione the efficacy of politics], efforts in settling his dispute with th.e Dutch over the area. This threat to resort to force follows on~ the heels of debate on the question b~yfore the UNGA which failed to reach agreement on any solution. The key issue in the dispute is Indonesiats claim that it has sovereignty over WNG, while the Dutch contest such a claim and seek a guarantee that the inhabitants of the area be given an opportunity to exercise self determination. History and ~.sis of Dispute: At the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Cr~nferenee o e epu is o ndoneaia achieved its independence and, with the exception of WNG, all .Dutch East Indies possessions were transferred to Indonesia under a federal form of government. It was agreed that the political status of WNG would be determined by further negotiations to be undertaken within one year. Within a few months Indonesia abandoned the federal system of government in favor of a unitary structure. The TJ~itch viewed this as a violation of the Round Table Agreement, and fruitless negotiations on the WNG question were held in 1950 and 1951. During 1951 the .Dutch designated the area "Netherlands New Guinea"". In 1956 Indonesia formally included the area as the "Province of West Irian" in the territories of its Republic. In resolutions introduced before the UNGA in 1954, 1955, 1956 and 1957 Indonesia sought to gain support for resumption of direct negotiations but in each instance failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority. Until the current session of UNGA, no further UN action was undertaken. Developments at the Current UNGA: On 26 September 1961, Nether- 1and~s Foreign xnis er uns propose o e UN a resolution providing for the transfer of WNG sovereignty to its inhabitants under a UN administration - culrninating in the ultimate exercise of self-determination by the people in inde- pendence or some other alternative. The Netherlands further stated that it woul3 continue to contribute $30 million annually to the administration and cultural development of the area. On 9 October, Foreign Minister Subandrio of Indonesia rejected the Itch proposal alleging that the principle of self-determin- ation assumes that WNG is not an integral part of Indonesia, whose people echieved independence with the rest of Indonesia twelve years ago. Subandrio nryted that the dispute should be settled by the parties themselves, but his government would cooperate in temporary UN administration of WNG pending; its return to Indonesia. Two attempts were made toward the adoption of compro,nise resolutions, both of which, inter alia, called for a negotiated settlement between the tw:~ parties. The first, sponsored by thirteen African nations (Brazzaville Approved For Release 200 rA- DP78-03061A00~'~~~v ~U3-4 474. (Cont.) 18 December 1961 g p) pA~prove~For R~le~s~20~0/8/27 ? cIdA-RDP7~-~61A00~10d0050 g03-4-~ rou. r Fosed t at 1f t e e er an s and I~n onesia a of reac a an a ree- ment by March of 1962, a UN commission would investigate the possibility of an interim international administration of the area. The vote-was 53 in favor as opposed to ~1 against with 9 abstentions, The second, a 9-power resolution introduced by India, called for negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia undex the aegis of the President of the General Assembly. It received 41 votes in favor with 40 against and 21 abstentions. $oth resolutions failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority required for adoption. Thus, the majority of the 103 UN members favored negotiations and supported the role of the UN towards possible administration of the area. Indonesian Reaction to UN Developments: Indonesian official and press reaction a.s resen u o e lmsi ion on t e question.. Prior to the current .~:_ssembly, the US had abstained when the WNG question carne to a vote in the UN, Our recent voting in the UNGA, which Sukarno believes indicates that the IJS "has favored the Dutch", was influenced by the Dutch offer to get out of the zLrea, and their proposal to turn the area over to UN administration. These ttivo factors were reflected in the .Brazzaville resolution, hence we voted for it. Sukarno's immediate reaction was to deciaxe publicly on 30 November that "it has become obvious that the West Irian question should be settled outside the UN" and that the "struggle will largely depend on our armed forces". Subsequent developments have included an internal pxopaganda campaign to support the idea of liberating WNG by, force. Implementation of Indonesia's arms purchase agreements with Yugoslavia and the Soviet-bloc (military credits mw total close to $ 600 million) continues at a rapid pace. Finally the deploy- ment of air force personnel and equipment to strategic bases from which an attack on WNG could be m ou.nte d appears to be under way. Dutch and West New Guinea Reaction: The Dutch have portrayed the UN decision as a victory or em, u cri zcism of LunE ha s been re earned in the Dutch press. On 1 December the Dutch undertook symbolic steps when the partially elected local council announced that the area henceforth should be known as West Papua. A West Papuan flag was hoisted and a national antkem published. The Council was established last April as the first step in a ten-year program toward representative government for this area inhabited by some I8, 000 Dutch and Eurasian residents and 700, 000 Papuans. Communist-bloc Attitude Toward Question: As might be expected, the C~rnmu.nis s, par cu, ar y e ovie neon, ave tried to cultivate Sukarno, and Khrushchev has actively supported Indonesia's claim to W~TG. 5ukarno's reliance on the Soviet Bloc for rzr~ral and rnilitaxy support in any military adventure he may undertake against the Dutch in WNG, has probably been reinforced by his failure to attract sufficient support for his- WNG stand at the Belgrade Conference of "Non-Aligned Nations" to have it included in the Cc:nference's final Declaration. The Soviet Union must recognize the strategic importance of Indonesia whose national boundaries now constitute a 3, 500 mile arc dividing mainland SEA and the ]Philippines from the Australian continent. A serious and determined attack on WNG by Indonesia would certainly result in additional Soviet entrenchment in the area, with the Soviet seeking to ine-rease Indonesian military capabilities and dispatching additional Soviet-bloc tech- nicians and equipment. In addition, obvious advantages would accrue to the Communists from the political and military problems an attack on WNG would pose to the already heavily committed West in the unstable Southeast Asian area. 2 Approved For Release 20 78-03061A006~10~~l'v~~}~~)3-4 474? (Cont.) 18 December 1961 ~Cg~EF~~,~~~e$~0~$~/2~, ? C~It4-RDP78-0,61A000100050003-4 v s ro em: Pre si nt Sukarno is an extremely emotional, complex, and flamboyant individua]. Possessing a massive ego, he is extremely sensitive to criticism from any quarter. The fact that he has already magnified the issue, depicting it as the acid test of nationalism vs colonialism (which he equates with Western imperialism) militates against any peaceful settlement of the WNG que anon. 5ukarno~ s ego may be of such magnitude that irresponsible military action might be undertaken. simply to demonstrate to the West and neutxalist leaders that he, Sukarno, is a force to be reckoned with. 25X1 C10b pprove or a ease