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January 1, 1962
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25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 Approved For ~e'lease 200 78=10~1T~-n~}'~`Ab@1`~005-2 ~. - E DI':. ~p it ~.7L P'AG~ The strasses which have been developing in the International Communist movement, associated for some time with the Sino-5eviet conflict, carne to anew head at the ?2nd CPSU C?ngress in Gctc~ber in Moscow with an open show of defiance by ~lbanie,. ~'he Sino-Soviet-Filbanian disputes created a chain reaction which has raised serious d~~ctrinal problems affecting intra- and inter-party reiatiQns. if a few words wexe to be selected to describe the nature of the problems raised in the International Communist complex, they would be: nationalism; polyeentrism (pluralism); ar_d .fractiorialism~- The authority of the C~'SU has been challenged in the international move- ment; the au.tlio~rty of the top leaders in Communist Parties has been challengedi. Seriflus questions have been asked as to the validity of one road to comrzYUnisrn any of democratic centralism (more freedom of speeciz, disci~.ssion and right to question decisions have been demanded). The structure of authc.>rity throughout the Communist movement has been challenged, as have basic theories as to the nature of communism itself. Documents and articles -from Blac and non-Bloc Communist Party ~?fficials and leaders tell the story more vividly than any second hand cGr~zlzzent on the struggles now being waged. The dissemination of statements from each C~ammunist Party to others around the world is the best means 25X1 C10b of exploiting the internal problemQ of international Communism. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :.CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 Approved For R~1'ease 200 P78-~06bA,005-2 BRIEFLY NOTED Soviet Militar Bud et Increased; We may expect that during the coming year, ension etween t e Hite totes and the USSR will continue to prevail. One sure sign of this is the 1962 Soviet budget, announced in eaxly December. The original 1961 budget allowed far a defense expenditure of 9, 2 50, 000, 000 rubles. In July, during the opening stages of the Berlin crisis, this was suddenly increased to 12, 400, 000, 000 rubles. Now the 1962 budget contains a further increase to 13, 410, 000, 000 rubles. These published budget figures are by no means an accurate index to actual Soviet military expenditure, many parts of ~rhich axe hidden under other budget categories. (Actually, increased. Soviet military expenditures probably began before July, in connection with secret p~feparations for the resumption of la.xge-scale atmospheric testing; Khrushchev, however, portrayed the jump in expenditure as a reply to President Kennedy's call for increased American arms expenditures, which had arisen from Khrushchev's Berlin crisis'.) Nevertheless, they are political barametexs, intended to show both the Soviet public and the rest of the world *.hat, in foreign affairs, the t3'SSR proposes to follow a firm line. In discussing ~:ny Western military preparations, or the continuing Amer icon undergxaund r.~.clee.r test program, we should be careful to focus attention on the Soviet :- ~ ilit~txy preparations and diglornatic moves which have obliged the West ba~ make counter-moves. Khrushchev set off the Berlin crisis at Vienna., and Khrushchev was first to resume nuclear testing, in the atmosphere, after long secxet preparations.. l.~a i Teachers Union Withdraws From the Communist-Front International e eration a eac ers nions ; e raga eac ers neon unto. recent y a mem ex o s een Hawn to be so penetrated by Communists as to be regarded generally as a Cammunist-front organization, However, on 11 September 1961, the Baghdad daily Al-Fa r__A_l Jadid published a very damning letter to the Secretary of F~ii~-Tsrague over the signatuxe of Dx. Mohammed Nasser, Fxesident of the Iraqi Teachers Union. He says in this letter that because of the actions in Iraq of agents of FISE, which he describes as "a federation. , ,controlled by the 'I~achers Association in the Communist States," the Iraqi Teachers Union feels compelled to withdraw from VISE. Since FISE is recognized as being Communist controlled, it can naturally be expected to "support the principles of international proletarianism." However, Dr. Nasser points out, "we cannot share your opinion in supporting , the principles of international proletarianism, i. e. , Marxist Communism," for "the Iraqi Republic and its Teachers Association are not Communist." He strongly condemns the agents of FLSE in Iraq far their actions, which were "very antagonistic to our nationality, our religion, our high principles, our ethical values," during the period after the revolution of July, 1958, when the agents imagined they were in control of (or would be in control of ~ tyranny and bxutal acts ~e like of which Iraq has never experienced in its long history. " This sharp reversal should be played wherever there is (or may be ~ Cammunist penetra4ion of any unions, emphasizing the case of Iraq, where there has been so notable a change in a Teachers Union after bitter experience with Communist attempts to use the union for their own purposes. This, of course, applies paxticularly to anv media which directly ar indirectly ma xeach Arab audiences. 2A5X1 C10b 25X1 C10b pproved For Release 20R'DP78-03061A000100050005-2 ' Approved Fo~telease 20 P78 030fi~Ah170~?005-2 475. The 22nd CPSU Congress: Peiish Repercussions 25X1C10b ...^ ~~ .. Back round: In East Europe, the most immediately interesting reactions to Khrus c ev s repudiation of Stalin have occurred in Poland, where the regime appears tc be considering the inauguration of mare liberal policies. At the 2123 No?Jember plenum of the Central Committee, Gomullca indicated the party's concern that the renewed de-Stalinization campaign would have serious repercussions in Poland leading on the one hand to public pressure for greater freedom and on the other to a reinvigoration of revisionist sentiments within the party itself. First Secretary Gomulka told the plenum the correct policy of every party should be "formed by creative, undistorted Marxism-Leninism, which takes into consideration conditions in each country. " This statement typifies Gomullca's policies which are based on a desire for freedom to handle internal problems in a flexible manner while stressing the need to adhere to ovex-all bloc policies. The Polish Communist leader attacked the idea of establishing central or regional organizations to direct the activities of ali parties and defended interparty conferences such as were held in Bucharest and Moscow during 1960 as necessary for the clear elaboration of the principles and policies of Communist countries. He further urged that the decisions of these meetings be binding upon the participants (an obvious allusion to the Chinese and Albanians}. Gomuika's concern over the effect of the de-Stalinization campaign in Poland is apparently well founded. Since the Soviet Congress, autharatative articles by well-known party and non-party figures have called for liberal- ization and increased freedoms within Poland and the bloc in general. The December issue of Howe Dropi , the theoretical organ of the Polish Central Committee, stated t at it is 'not sufficient" to avoid the more embarrassing erross of the Stalinist era, but that the "entire system" must be condemned and liquidated and the "whole truth" stated. Oskar Lange, a leading Polish economist and Central Committee member who has been an advocate of more liberal forms of Polish communism, was among those speakers at the pkenurn to suggest a new framework. He emphasized that the policies Khrushchev enunciated at the 22nd CPSU Congress involve basic changes of method and called for a rejection of conservative practices and traditionalism. Tadeusz Daniszews~[i, Chief of the Institute for Party History, stated in Polit ka of 2 December that it was time to document Stalin's liquidation of t~war Polish Communist Party and, in order to make a fresh start, to study and condemn on a world-wide basis all such "tragic chapters" in the Communist movement: "The dissolution of the Polish Communist Party, with all its wall- known consequences, took place at a moment when the Party was going through a period of ideological triumph, when it offered an example of appropriate implementation of the resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, when it had begun to be a real Party of the workers and the nation. -The greater therefore was the tragedy of the Polish communists... we owe to the present leaders of the CPSU.. ,the complete rehabilitation of t~~,a~tlci~ake~sa?~?ap~sta~ ~~~~[~oa~aoo~?aa~oo5-2 (Continued] 475. (Co ~, P ...~x January 1962 roved For~telease 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 up the struggle against the remnants of the personalty cult, dissociating itself from the apologists of Stalinism, bringing. back the Leninist principle of equality among the fraternal parties, the CPSU brought a fresh breath of socialist humanism into political life not only in the USSR and the socialist countries but far beyond the camp's boundaries." On 10 December, Comrade Sokorski, Chief of the Polish radio and a candidate member of the Central Committee, said aver the state radio that radical changes must be made in Poland's political, economic, cultural and moral life. ?Implying that rehabilitation of those condemned unjustly is not enough, he called fc?r a vigorous pxogram calculated to restore confidence and to instill vigor into `.he Polish nation. Demands for liberalization were expressed even more forcefully by Polish intellectuals. Such statements were carried by both party and non-party ,journals as well as by the official radio. For example, i.n a thinly veiled allegorical dissertation ^n freedom of scientific expression published on 26 October, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, President of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Chairman of the Polish Philosophical Society and member c:f the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and Bulgaria, maintained that freedom of speech should "be a matter of course, while its limitation should be supported by special justification." The 23 November issue of Prze lad Kultur,_a,,ln~,, one :~f the leading cultural weeklies, published an artic-Ie on t e subject of S'Freedom and Scientific Rigors" in which Leopold Infeld, internationally known Polish physicist and disciple of Albert Einstein. stated: "The present situation is not as important as the direction in which we are going, as important as the increase or further restriction of freedoms. I agree to the present state of aff airs on the condition that our children's freedom will be incxeased, not decreased. We talk about competition with the West. This competition cannot be purely economic. It must also be apparent in the-field of freedom... . Only through a simultaneous raising of the standard of living and the extensic:n cf freedom will our socialist system gain more and more followers and will win in the competition with capitalist countries, " The 30 November issue of the same journal, carried an article entitled "A Few Words on Fruitful Discussions" by Roman Ingaxden (Senior) an eminent esthetician, in which the latter addresses his readers in the following terms "Freedam of discussion? Of course. It is a necessary condition to all progress in science and an equally essential factor in any cultural and social develapment. But if such a discussion is to be truly fruitful, its freedom must not be purely formal. It must above all stem from an honest inner desire of all participants and it must be conducted with complete safeguarding of their inner freedom. " On 9 December, Z cie Warszaw published an article by Stanislaw Ehrlich Professor of aw a saw University and party member, entitled "My Three Pennies' Worth on the Freedom of Scientific Expression. " The , following are pextinent excerpts from Professor Ehrlich's article: 2 Approved For Release 2 78-03061AOO~QA~OF.0~5-2 475, ~!ed For_~elease 200 P78-030H4~14gQ4S0005-2 "It appears that the intellectual climate created by the 22nd Congress favors a discussion and--let us make this clear--a regeneration of freedom of scientific discussion.. , .What strikes me in our scientific life is the painful shortage--I am speaking about the social sciences--^f ar. exchane of ideas among the various branches.. , . Freedom of scientific research is also hampered by conformity, traditionalism and conservatism.... If we do not establish for scientific creation at least an appropriate climate--I would not say institutional guarantees--the conditions for fruitful research will be missing. We should not expect that the cult of personality will automatically have positive effects in the realm of science... . Actually the cult of personality cannot be identified with just one person, nor with the imposition of stiff regulations from above. It also grows from below; it is created by eager beavers who offered their sexvices to politicians.. , .Under such conditions there appeared sometimes in the scientific milieu self-appointed guardians ~f entire scientific branches who even today, under changed political conditions, still attempt to exert their harmful supervision, " It is also noteworthy that the newspaper Tr bona Ludu of 1? November carried extensive excerpts from Palmiro Togllat is 'November speech to the Italian Gentral C~mmittea, in which the Italian Secretary General stressed the need for a detailed investigatis,~n into the history of Stalinist transgressions and measures necessary to guard against their recurrence, the desireability :.~f debate and discussion within the Italian Communist Party, and the need for equality among all Communist parties. On 21 November Z cie Warsaw carried a dispatch from its Rome correspondent Ignacy rasic s e. it ed "The Immediate and Future Prospects," in which the Ia. er discussed the 10-12 November plenum of the Malian Communist Party. rasicki stressed those aspects of the lrtalian plenum which helped to illustrate the Italian communist's desire to take into zecaunt the specific conditions and traditions of Italy, quoting Togliatti as sang that the Italian road to communism is not bound to be a faithful copy of the Soviet model He also quotes one of the plenu.n} speakers who said that the ItaLta.n communists must find a modus vivendi betweYe~. the new foams of direct democracy and the institutions of bourgeois democracy, institutions which "we want to retain. " The intense longing far Ereedam to which the above statements of Polish party members and intellectuals testify, are an indication of haw the pr:.blems' involved in de-Stalinization affect the Palish Communist Party. In what measure Gvmulka, like Togliatti in Italy, is purposely taking the lead in "liberalization ~'~ in the hope cf getting the jump on the revisionist elements within the party and thus controlling the degree and extent of the reaction, is not yet clear. However, it is evident even at this date that the Polish party once again has taken the lead in East Europe in the search for new "indigenous' 25X1 C10b forms with which to fill the void left by the repudiation of Stalin and his era. ,,,~, 1 January 19b2 ' Approved Forease 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 476. A RICA: President Toure of Guinea Attacks Communists 25X1 C10b Background: On 11 December President Sekou Toure of Guinea, a Lenin Peacesraze wig, created a sensation in Guinea (which was given independence 'oy France three years ago) by publicly asserting that Communists had been f,~zl.eci in a plot against his government. Toure's attack upon the Communists .vas a particular surprise because of his personal association with the Communist ~I~c, because of his relaxed attitude, at least, i.xi allowing Guinean organization,? y;,::j associate with various Communist fronts, and because of the Guinean practice in the UN of associating with the USSR. In the speech referred to, Toure disclosed that there had been complicity in the plot by an "Eastern Bloc Errkbassy. IIe did not state which Embassy this was but, shortly after the speech, ' Ambassador of the USSR Solod was forced to leave Conakry, the Guinean capital, The Cornrnunists apparently had overplayed their hand in Guinea. Widespread discontent with the government in Guinea for not improving living conditi?~ns had. oentered several months before an the Guinean Teachers Union, which had its: ~~wn grievances aver such matters as the loss of alleged benefits in housing allowances and cavertime pay enjoyed under the French regime. Rumors of inefficiency, corruption and high living by ranking :officials had been exploited' by the Communists and left-wing elements, who spread the thesis (and probably still are) that the workers succeeded in making the Guinean revolution and they c ~ntinue tc be its vanguard. The Guinean Union of Teachers is a member of WEAN (Federation of Teachers of Black Africa), the leftist and extremist teachers' arm of UGTAN (General Werkera Union of Black Africa}. In November the Executive Board of the Guinean Teachers Union was dissolved and its 12 members were jailed. Five were sentenced for a term of 5 to 10 years and the rest were. acquitted. The 12 were headed by Koumandian Keita (not to be confused with his namesake, the President of Iviali} and Ray Autxa, bath well-known as Communists, both old CP militants, and both anti-West. Keita is Secretary General of the Guinean Teachers Union and the FEAN and .~.lso ' an official of the larger Communist Front union FISE (International Federation. of Teachers Unions), He and Autxa were charged with "subversive and anti- revclution activities.. " The anti-Communist accusations by Toure, who is well aware of the Communist affiliations of Keita, Autra (and other Guineans), do not necessarily represent a sudden change of attitude and policy on his part. He may simply be using these attacks upon the subversive activities of Cammunists (there are hundreds of Communist Blac nationals in Guinea) to 25X1 C10b divert attention from the steady deterioration of Guinea's economy, Approved For Release 2000/ 8-03061Ap~:A1~8~ap005-2 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 47 7. ~Rt~i~U R'i~1~ l~~f~i~x~~ a ~8~0611A1~~$'~~~t~~a5-5X1 C10b Background; The UN General Assex;zbly an 15 Becember rejected a Soviet sponsore res`olntion which called for the immediate removal of "the repre- sentative of the Chiang lE~ai-shek clique" and the seating of the Chinese Communist government in the UN. The vote was 48 against the resolution, 3'7 for it and 19 abstentions. This was the first direct test of the China representation question. .Suring the current session, the United States abandoned its ten-year moratorium against General Assembly debate in favor of declaring tho topic "an important question. " Thus, -prior to the General Assembly vote on the Soviet resolution, the United States together with Australia, Colombia, Italy, and Japan introduced a resolution (adapted by a vote of 61 to 34, with 7 abstentions) making any measure on Chinese member- s?zip subject t?a the two-thirds majority required for an "important question. " Ths Soviet resolution failed to get even a simple majority, but the adoption of the_U. 5, five-power resolution Bets a Valui 'ale r-`,c~ '- -.t fnr r*,P fi~t~ii+n 25X1 C10b - ~~+.~~?.+. ru ..aac,.~i u17R~JiJi"V VCLL OL *he Peking regirne this year than last. Forty-eight nations, ar 4b per rent, voted against the Soviet revolution compared to 4~ per cent of membership which last year supported the L75_sponsored moratorium resolution against debate of the question. With regard to the US-sponsored five-power reso- lution, 61 nations, or 5$ per cent of the Assembly supported the American view that the China question was "important, " (FYI ONLY: prior to the opening of the current Assembly it was understood that if Nationalist China vetoed the admission of Outer Mongolia to the UN, the Soviets would veto the admission of Mauritania to which French African countries (Brazzaville Group) were committed. The anticipated reaction of the Brazzaville Group to Nationalist action was as follows: if Nationalist China vetoed Outer 1vlangalia, the Group would support any resolution to give Communist China the Nationalist seat in the UN; if Nationalist China did not veto Outer Mongolia's application, the Group would oppose seating Communist China, Under U. S. pressure Nationalist China abstained from voting on the admission of Outer Mongolia and both Outer Mongolia and Mauritania were admitted as new members. None of the .Brazzaville Group voted for the Soviet resolution. Five of its members voted against it a~zd the other 25X1C10b eight abstained. (Continued) 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 Approved For Reuse 2000/08/ 7 : I - DP78-030611A~(~Ov~~~05-2 478. Stalinist Survivals 25X1 C10b Background: The name of Joseph Stalin is linked in the world's mind with 1~'se off' such totalitarian techniques of rule as secret security police, assassination, slave labor camps, and rigid censorship of the written and spoken word, Khrushchev attacked Stalin in a secret speech in 1956, and led the way in making public attacks on the former leadex duing the recent 22nd CFSU Congress, There has also been much discussion of the trend to liberalization in the Soviet Union, It is quite true that the Soviet regime is- today much less repressive than it was; nevertheless, the change is a rela- tive one, and present conditions would appear less attractive if they were not always compared with the extraordinary violence and terror of the Stalin era. If other comparisons were made, for example with Czarist Russia ar with Fascist Italy, Khru.shchev's regime would show well in some respects but poorly in others, on balance rating at about the same level. Most of the changes which Khrushchev has brought abut are related to the facts that his baekgrou.nd is that of a professional party official, and that his power has been based on the party organization, particularly his own group of personal supporters in the organization. Thus he has consistently acted to diminish the independence of potentially rival sources of power, such as the militat~y, the state machinery in Moscow, and the police. While Stalin was also basically a party man, and while the party was always omnipresent, he had used these various other power centers to pursue a policy of divide and rule; Khrushchev acts to ensure their complete subordination to the party, thus precluding any possible threat to his position. While ending the political role of state organs, Khrushchev does nt intend to weaken their ability to control the public, or to let them wither away within any definite future period. In his 18 October 1961 speech, Khrushchev painted out that, as the Hungarian "c ounterrevolu.tianary rebellion" had shown in 1956, "the working class needs power capable of suppressing the resistance of exploiters, consolidating- the victory of the revolution, preventing in time the attempts at restoration of power of the bourgeoisie, and insuring a defense against aggressive moves by inter- national reaction. " Therefore, dictatorship was still needed, though now in the name of "aIl the people, "rather than in that of the proletariat. l~hrushchev stated: "the tasks which society can carry out only with the help of the state have not been exhausted... The state will remain long after the victory of the first phase of communism. ~, e. , after the end of the 20 year program/. The process of the withering away of the state will be a very long one.-'-It will embrace awhole -historical era and will be completed when society is fully ripe for self-govexnment. " In other words, don't hold your breath, comrades. When Soviet leaders speak of state power in a domestic context, they are thin~ting of an official repressive apparatus, such as the Prussian state was in Karl Marx's mind, or the Czarist state in Lenin's. Tn the Soviet Union, the state is directed by Communists and is thought to serve the pagular interest, but it treats its enemies as Marx believed capitalist states treated their enemies. In concrete terms, this means that Moscow Approved For Release 2000/ P78-0306~~~50005-2 ~?$. ~p~r,~~ed For~elease 2000~O~r27 ~, G.IA~,RDP78-030~'I,~Q~~~1~QQ~y~005-2 must maintain a lame uniformed police farce and ors all-pervasive secret +~~`li:~e..f'r~;s."...~~i~i3,3 th~.T7'.'V'~ (.i~1.'ri:~is~r4~r ~f Ini,:erior--ze;ular r>~IYCe} and i'? 4 ktGB (Committee for State Security--secret police) have been reducers some- what in number (The NiV~ leas n~.}w been abolished on the all-Union level} and have been more thoroughly subjected to party control than in the past, their efficiency has been carefully guarded. All residents of Soviet towns ant',. ~- frontier areas wh~~ are 16 years of age or over are sti11 required to have pass- ports. If a person is visiting for over ?2 haute or making a permanent change of address, he mu: t register with the police within 2~ hours of arrival. Tn the case of a permanent rraove, he must be deregistered from his place of former residence, Many collective farmers have no passports, and must apply for special documentation when they Leave their farms; this provides an additional check on their movements, but na prudent citizen will travel without some evidence that his travel is officially sanctioned. Every worker still has a labox book, in which black marks may be recorded. Pasternak was x7ot executed as an "enemy of the pe:~ple" but, after his death, his woman-friend Madame ivinskaya was sentenced to eight years for "illegal currency tra~t~s~actions." It is not necessary to give penal sentences in many cases--a writer (as in p'asternak's case) can be expelled from the Writers' Union, a student can be dismissed from the university, or an official can be dropped f rem the party rolls or "reassigned" to the Virgin Lands. Corresponding; with the revived cult of Lenin, there is a new veneration for Felix Czerzhinsky, the faxzatical or ~.nizer of the Cheka under Lenin: his statue has been put up in the square named aftex him in front of the Lubyanka; biographies have been written about him; and his collected writings have been published, I~hru,shchev's readiness to deal forcefully with zeal trouble was proved after the Hungarian revolt: 145 executions were reported in the Hungarian press up to 1957, but private estimates were that 2, QOt~ had been executed anel 20, OQQ imprisoned. Assassination has c~oppees up again in the cases of Lev ~ebet and Stefan Bandera, whom FdGI3-man L'c+gdan 5tashinsky, by his own confession, executed in 1959 with a poison pistol. The fact that these victems were Ukrainian exile politicians and that Khrushchev has always taken an intense interest in the affairs of the Ukraine suggests that the Soviet leader may have taken a personal interest in these executions; certainly, he knew of the plats to carry them ovt, for Stashinsky was awarc'led a high medal for his "services. " Since Stalin's death, the Soviet f;overxxment has extended the death penaltyto~ apply to new crixr~es: in 1954, to murder; in 195x, to "terrorism ancL baneitry;" and in - 1961 to em'oezzlernent of public property, countexfeiting of money or docu- ments, and to criminals who disrupt prison discipline or attack the prison administration. The latter reflects the continuing problems of the prison 25X1C10b camps, now disguised as r" colones" (see Attachment}, Approved For Release 200 P78-030~~AA~Og0~b50005-2 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 Tanuary 1962 '479. Latin America o~ .pie i~'ath of Fro res3 ~ 1 C10b -RDP78-03061A000100050005~ Back round: During his trip to Colombia, President Kennedy stated in Bogota t at whereas the United States had made many mistakes in-its relations with the other .t-1.merican republics, the leaders of Latin America must also be ready to admit past mistakes and accept new responsibilities, He went on to say that unless these leaders are willing to contribute the resources of "Latin .America to national development, to initiate basic Rand and tax refarrns, to tas~e the lead ixx improving the welfare bf the people, the leadership wil l be taken from. them and "the heritage of centuries of Western civilization will Le consumed in a few months of violence." TherQ are welcome indications that some steps have already been taken by the Latin. American countries. to initiate reforms. In. Venezuela, a major agrarian refoxxn program is being implemented. In Colombia., new tax laws have been passed which in effect provide for a mare equitable distribution of the wealth; a major agrarian reform law has been passed; and, as a result of the initiative of various private organizations, a study for community development has been staxted and steps taken to establish credit unions to provide low interest loans. In addition, a pxagram fox building low-cost h*using is well undex way. The ,government of Brazil, through the Sudene program, has introduce3 public work projects on the community level to solve some of the major problems for the impoverished peoples of North-Eastern Brazil. A new wind of hope is blowing in E1 Salvador where the government reform party on 1? December won a sweeping election victory aver the wealthy Salvadoran oligarchy which, heretofore, has managed to prevent changes which a~.ight threaten the it dominant contxol over all the wealth of the country. The winning Conciliation Paxty is prepaxing to introduce a long list of economic and social reforms. In Mexico, new steps have been taken to carry out a widespread program far land redistribution. This, however, is nothing new in Mexico where great social progress has been achieved steadily over the past years.. In every instance where the government has taken steps to initiate reforms, whether in Brazil, Salvador, Colombia or Venezuela, the Commun- ists have attempted to sabotage these reforms. President Lleras of Colombia and President Betancourt of Venezuela, the outstanding leaders in the field of reform today, have been particular targets of the Communists, who fear economic and social reforms which meet the needs of the people and eliminate those dissatisfactions used by Communists to exploit and enslave the people. 25X1 C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050005-2