BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE NUMBER 85

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050013-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 12, 1962
• Content Type: PERRPT

25X1C1Ob
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12 February 1962
'. .rushchev on, the Purge: Then and Now
In his secret speech to the 20th Congress of 25 February 1956,.Khrushchev
said:
It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances' surrounding
Kirov's murder hide many things which are. inexplicable and mysteri
ous and demand a most:ca:reful examination. There are reasons for
the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by some-
one from among the people whose duty it was to protect the person of
Kirov. A month and a half before the .killing, Nikolayev was arrested
on the grounds of suspicious behavior, but,,he.was released and not even
searched. It is an unusually. suspcious circumstance`tl at when the
Chekist assigned. to protect Kirov was brought for an interrogation, on
December 2, 1934, he was killed in a car "accident" in which no other
occupants of the car were harmed, After.the murder of Kirov, top
functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD were given very light sentences,
but in 1,937 they were shot, . We. can assume that they were shot in
order to cover the traces of the organ.izCrs of Kirov's killing.
(Movement in the hail).
And on 27 October 1961, speaking to the. 2nd CPSU Congress, Khrushchev said:
The Mass reprisals' began after. the.assassination of Kirov. Great
efforts are :still required to find out who is to beblaxned for' his death.
The deeper, we study the facts surrounding'Krov's death, the more
questions. arise., Noteworthy is the fact that Kirov, killer had been
apprehended twice before by the Cheka near the Sr.,iolnyy, and that
weapons had been found on him, But he was..released both times on
somebody's instruction. Now this man was in the Smolnyy, armed,
in the" corridor through which K,irov usually passed, and for some
reason or other, at the moment of the assassination, Kirov's chief body-
guard was far behind Kirov, though his instructions did not authorize
him to be such, a distance away.
Equally strange is the following fact: When Kirov's chief body-
guard was being taken away for questioning--and he was to be ques-
tioned by Stalin, Molotov,, and Voroshilov--the car, as its driver said
afterward,.,was deliberately involved in,an accident by those who were
taking the man to-the interrogation. They said that he died as a result
of the accident., even,though:he was actually killed by those who accom-
paniedhim. In this, way the man who guarded Kirov was killed. Later,
those who killed him were shot. This was no accident, apparently, but
a carefully-,planned. crime., Who could have don e.this ? A.thorough
investigation is-now being made into the circumstances ' of this complicated
affair. It happens that the driver of the car An which the chief of Kirov's
guard was. being, taken to questionings is alive. He said that a Chekka
agent sat, with him during the trip, that they went in" a truck. It _is of
course very curious that. a truck was, used to take the man to questioning,
as if no other vehicle : could be.found for the purpose. Evidently, every-
thing had been planned in advance", in detail, Two other Cheka agents
were in the back of the truck with Kirov's chief bodyguard.
The driver continued his story. While they were going down a
street, the man next to him suddenly grabbed the steei`ing wheel and
directed the vehicle straight at a building. The driver regained control
of the wheel and the truck only hit the wall sideways. He was told later
that Kirov's chief bodyguard lost his life in this accident. Why did.
he die while none of the other people in the car were injured? Why were
both officials of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, escorting
Kirov's chief bodyguard, shot later.? This means that someone needed
to have them liquidated to remove all traces.
Many, very many circumstances in this and other similar cases
are still obscure. Comrades, it is our duty to thoroughly investigate
cases of this kind connected with abuses of power. This will pass,
we shall die--we are all mortal--but while we work, we can and must
clear up many things and tell the truth to the party and the people. We
are duty bound to do everything to establish the truth now, for the more
time passes after these events, the more difficult it will be to establish
the truth. The dead cannot be brought back to life, but it is necessary
that the truth be told about this in the history of the party. This must
be done so that such things never recur. (Stormy, prolonged applause)
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In regard to responsibility for supporting Stalin's mass repression, pinned by
Khrushchev on Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, et al., Khrushchev himself
was saying on 31 January 1934 (ten months before Kirov died):
On the way to the construction of classless society, no working
man, no. working woman should forget that a classless society can
be won only in struggle. Under no circumstances should vigilance
be di.mini; ed. Comrades! We must strain all our forces and
triple our Vigilance!
On 2 Dec: mhe,,r Khrushchev, Kaganovich and other officials sent a letter
to the Leuing ?ad party organization, referring to Kirov' a murderer as a
"rasca.l secretly sent by the enemies of the people." On ~5a May 1937, You B.
Gamarnik--one of Khrushchev's fellow members of the Kirov f one l commissicxs
--was elected member of the Moscow City Party Committee, of vftdch
T hrusl:.chev was First Secretary. On 2 June, Pra-~c ,. announced that Garnarnik
>:~.ad been entangled with anti-Soviet. elements x': ring exposure, had
commit ed suicide on 31 May. On 5 June, Khrushhchzev stated in a speech that,
despite all checks,
a Trotskyite betrayer, a traitor of the Motherland, the enemy of
the people, Gamarnik, also got into the City Party Committee.
This fact shows again that the enemy foully disguises himself
and carries on his subversive activity in the deep underground....
But let the enemies know that, no matter how deep they sit in
their burrows, we will unmask and annihilate them, and reduce to
dust every last one of them, and disperse them to the wind . that
not even a trace will remain of these damned betrayers of and
traitors to the socialist Motherland.
In June 1936, Khrushchev attacked the "loafers who substitute empty talk for
vigilance, who write resolutions about vigilance and do not notice the enemies
and double-dealers iza their own ranks." On 5 July 1937, he was urging the
Moscow party members to "pull out into the daylight the small roots of the
enemies which still remain here and there and to annihilate all of them. " On
30 January 1937, Khrushchev was saying:
Comrade workers, men and women, engineers, employees,
men of science and. art, and all working people of our country'!
We are gathered here, on Red Square, to raise our prolet;i-rian
voice in complete support of the sentence passed by the Military
CoRegium of the Supreme Court against the en4.;Ymics of the people,
the traitors of the Motherland, the betrayers of the workers'
cause, the spies, the diversionist.s, agents of fascism, the vile,
despicable Trotskyites.... These murderers aimed at the heart
and brains of our party. They have lifted their villainous hands
against Comrade Stalin. By lifting their hands against Comrade
Stalin, they lifted them against all the. best that humanity possesses.
For Stalin is hope; he is expectation; he is the. heacoj, that guides
all progressive mankir4;. Stalin is our banner! Stalin is our will!
Stalin is our victor !
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Economic Adv .ntages of Soviet Socialism'?'
Complaints by Communist Officials
I iY
The free world is handicapped in its study of Soviet Sloe economies by
the paucity of detailed information available'' to it, as well as by the inherently
deceptive nature of the general statistics which the 'Soviet Union publishes for
foreign consumption. The Soviets usually present economic growth in terms
of percentages. Percentage increases are misleading unless they are
accompanied by actual figures (e.,g._ a growth from 1 to ? units 'is a 100%
increase). The problem with . percentage figures is compounded further when
no comparisons are made- which;might provide. a real basis for interpretation.
Some comparisons, which are omitted by the Soviets,.would show, for example,
that: growth in industrial production in Russia before the 1917 Revolution was--
almost, as: great.in percentage; figures as that, claimed for the soviet economy - -
therefore,, that the. Imperial Russian .. G,over iment.,(u.sing anon-Communist
economic system) ] ei.the. country from 'the: industrial backwardness now faced
by developing nations; Russia in 1913 was the fifth largest industrial power in
the, world and rnanufa.cture.d locomotives.,, siege ,guns and armored battle-ships
(contrary to:,the Soviet contention that. the country was "backward, semi-
colonial" and not-industrialized before the'Communists 'came into power; the
greatest economic growth: of the most, industrialized country in East Europe,
Czechoslovakia, took place, ..ironically., under : the .Hapsburg emperors; and
the United States incres.sed its 'Ate'el production during the 40-year period
from 1880 to 1920 at a-rate three times as rapid as the Soviet Union inits
first 40 years of operation, /aee Notes. at end of.paper for other comparisons/
The comparative ? method based on percentage figures; however, . is
exceedingly superficial and will not provide an understanding of .the,'real
economic situation of the Soviet Union pr the Bloc. , A.macrs' satisfactory
approach (given the nature of data available) is to-examine what Communist
leaders say, for:internal,
This paper, in an effort to provide some understanding of the true per-
officials about various aspects . of the'Ir.economic systems,.'Comments on
the validity of their production indices,. which they use widely a.s a ba is for
comparison with the growth rates, of non-Communist economic, systems, are
presented first since- the matter,.gf. validity per se. bears .,upon ;other .state-
ments of economic performance..
11 Production Statistics as Viewed by Communist Leaders The countries
of the ooze oc c lm g er in us aria . growth ra e. an most states
outside the Communist Bloc. Due to the lack abroad of background economic
data and comment, these figures. I are .often: accepted without analysis. Some
of the claims can of course,be dismissed without analysis. For instance, the
claim by the regime of the Soviet Zone of Germany that it . has, maintained a
higher rate of growth than the German Federal Republic must make even
convinced Communists, smile,
Turning to consideration of more interesting cases, Premier Wladyslaw
Gomulka, speaking to the Polish parliament on October 20, 1956, admitted:
""The ,Juggling of fi.gures.whi.ch showed a 27 percent rise in
real wages during the Six-Year Plan proved a failure. It .
only exasperated the people even more and it was necessary
to withdraw; fromthe. ,position taken by poor. statisticians.. "
This admission should cast serious. doubt on.the claims of.an increase. in
production of 35 percent from 1953 to 1956 submitted to theI UN.
The organ of the.Communist Party of:Bul.garia, Rabotnichesko Delo,
on November 5, 1.61, ;de scribes exactly why Soviet Bloc pro ucti.o n 'index
figures are naturally falsified. upward and pting
how the, actual practice of attem
to achieve high index figures retards production under their system, as follows:
"The index figures, . according, to which our,industrial
enterprises were arranged.. , contain?contradictions of
such a nature. that,they hinder. technical progress as
well a.s the, further. fulfillment of. socialist, industrial .
(Over)
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. "The use ,,of the ,index figure "Total Volume of
Production" causes machine works and metalworking
enterprises to try to produce goods, which are as
heavy as possible... for the greater the tonnage
produced, the higher the fulfilliment of the plan for
total production and -the greater the bonus. The
managements of our enterprises are therefore
confronted with.a serious" conflict of conscience,
because on the one hand their.sense of duty demands.
that they.produce light goods, in order to save the
maximum. amount of metal, while on the other hand
the ;production of heavy articles offers great material
advantages, ;because the products are given to the
state according to weight.... "'
Part of the claimed production increase is, therefore, simply extra metal.
In the case of machines, heavier equipment requires more fuel to operate,
which in turn supports "!gains" in, the fuel production figures.
The.Bulgairi:n,situation apparently has its counterpart= in another C"ommunist
economic system, namely Poland'-s. As Gomulka said in the above-cited speech
"At the cost of tremendous investments, ' we built an
automobile factory in Zeran: New industrial establish-
ments have come into. beings-e.stablishments-which
produce, at disproportionately high. production costs
only limited numbers of automobiles of an old type
which' consumes much fuel and which hardly anyone in
the world produces'today. Can the-'construction of an
industrial e-.stabla,shment of this kind be called a
contribution to the productive capacity, of our country?"
Much of, the boasted "increase" of production also consists of goods
inferior. to those., produced in the Free World. '. Sovetskaya Rossiya
(Soviet Russia) on June 23, 1961 said:,
"Everyone, has probably experienced the unpleasant
feeling, of finding that''a'newly purchased article
refuses to work.... Censuring the -quality of goods
has by now become a:?common practice, not only on
the part, of the population, but also on the part of
industrial workers. In;our considered. opinion,
the root, of the trouble is to.be found in the organi-
zational structure. Put yourself in the position of
a director or chief engineer of a,factory. You may
be replaced, the factory may lose the premium,
unless you fulfill the quota... It is .for this reason
that the accent is obviously place d-on quantity at
the expense of quality....,"
';,r- this is the.organizational structure created by the (ontradictionzs within
the Communist, system, which Soviet export propaganda claims to be 'uperior
to various systems in the Free World.
Nepczabade ag, A Communist Party daily in Budapest, Hungary, on
Augu 5, T96-1; iulustrated hove this poor quality in a basic material lowers
quality in the.many things made from'it.
"For some months, Hungarian foundriees- have been
complaining of the poor, quality of pig iron supplied by
the 'Duna" iron Works in Stalinvaros....
"The director of the foundry of the :Ganz-Mavag' ...
machine and Locomotive Factory;. Laszlo Safar, .com-'
plained: 'These last three to four months our quota of
rejects was 30-35%4 as compared to 12-16%a before. "'
The Polish Communist economist Oscar Lange, commenting on the same
subject, wrote in Zycie Gospodarcze, Warsaw on July 16, 1956:
"It is necessary to stop the race for purely quantitative
indices which are attained due to low quality and high costs.
This brings about purely fictitious results, the usage of raw
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materials and of human labor for production of goods which-
do not produce the intended technical effects /e. g. agricul-
tural machinery useless after a 'few weeks.
Farm equipment which lasts only "a few weeks" is c`ompared,' in Soviet Bloc
production statistics, as the equivalent of Free 'World machinery which lasts
for years. This same method of comparing non-equivalents is used in other
commodity fields to make the Communist record look good against free world
figures, which are considered exemplary.
It is a pity that some of the imaginative ways of concocting "plan fulfill-
ment" figures are not disseminated by the Soviet Bloc in developing countries
where Communists are trying to make their system acceptable. If properly
forewarned, economics ministers who are naively trying to imitate Bloc
economic planning might at least take steps` to'mitigaie the effect of these
unpublicized defects in the "perfect" system. The'Czechoslovak weekly
Kulturny Zivot Bratislava' on September 18, 1961, contained some amusing
suggestions as o owe
(1)
"2)
(3)
"A certain kind of salesman gave me'this advice
and I now put it at the disposal of the general public.
He said:
"'Look here, we haven't got it now' -- and winked
expressively while saying this. 'It is the end of the:.
month and so we haven't got it.. If you want to shop
better you must always come the first week of every
month. Then we have everything. '
"And why, if I may ask? Is this some kind of
rush-job in reverse, or what is it?"' was my question.
"'This is simple. We have our fixed plan. A
monthly one..: On about the twentieth of the month we
have fulfilled it up to some 106 percent. And 'this is
enough for us. We are no longer interested in selling.
ii"Why?'
"'Well, you don't know the ropes. The plan for
the next year is. based on the plan fulfillment in the
cu.rrent:year. And'ifwe fulfilled it to 130 percent
this year we would have our work cut out for us next
year. They would raise the targets.
'
"`I see, . so that's it. Well, thank you very
much. I'll come during the first week of the
month'...,r~...
"'Oh, I see, you have brought me a suggestion
for increased efficiency. For the r edv.ction of the
consumption of material. I understand, this is a
nation-wide movement. Your suggestion will save
valuable foreign exchange. Yes, I see. In some
cases one could save as much as 55%. Very
interesting. And remarkable Unfortunately, I
have to return it to you. Under present conditions
it cannot be put into effect. And I'll tell you why.
Our plant has its fixed plan of material consumption
as well as running contracts for the supply of material.
If we reduce the consumption of material our fulfillment
figures for gross production will fall. Come quite
close to me so that I can whisper into your ear what
would happen to our bonuses in such a case'...
"The executives of the building enterprise are
in conference. 'We are 86 apartments short? The
plan is upset? Men, you are greenhorns. This is
no problem. Tomorrow three bulldozers will start
on that site and dig as big a hole as possible...
"'And we can get bur,%ed in it, ' says one of
the others.
3
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r"'Don't,interrupt me.. Daddy knows best. The
earth moved; will be calculated in cubic meters
This will be' added, to. the total as work' in progre its
and so we will not only have fulfilled the plan but.
'"Anc what about the 86 apartments we have not
completed?' ` ..
"'What is the main issue now -- fulfilling the
''
plan or what?
The fact that the Soviet-.type economies, through waste and rejects,
produce fewer machines than would. a free: economy with the, same vast
aroductitn of steel and iron, is not reflectedin.the industrial production
"growth=rate" figures published by. these countries ~ Further, iron of poor
quality is seldom produced in free economies because it...cannot compete,
and, therefore', canno t. be sold a competitive system requires quality
for survival.
It is obvious that the`!'growth.rate" 'figures. disseminated bythe-Soviet
Bloc warrant a considerable subtraction by an unknown amount. Since, in
any case the claimed. figures for the most part fall short of the current
growth rates of non,- such as France', Germany, Italy,
Brazil, Venezuela and Tapan,:,growth'rate figures`-can be dismissed as a
means of proving the "superiority"., of; the Soviet Bloc economic system over
Free World socialist 'aind...capitalist systems. They appear 'to prove the
reverse. , , .. ,
Exploitation of Labor.. , Burdened by the natural defects of,'their economic
system, the Soviet oc, regimes.are forced?to increase greatly the workload
of labor over what it ha'd 1 een under "capitalist" or-'-'imperialist!' rule. This
was eloquently explained by.Gomulka; in- the above- c-ited speech, aa follows:
"Let us ettamine the achievements of the Six-Year
Plan in. coal-mining. .In ..19-49, that is, in -the`, last year
of the Three - 'ear Plan, coal production amounted to over
74 million tons. In 1955, that is, in the last year of the
Six-Year Plan, the corresponding figure was 94. 5 million
tons. These figures indicate that coal:output went up'by
over 20 million .tons,, and this could really'be deemed .a'
considerable" achic,vement if.,this - risemeant an increase.
of the mining industry's. productive capacity.
"But statistical data reveal that in 1955 miners
worked 92,634,000 hours overtime,. and this constitutes
15. 5 percent of the.total. number of hours worked in this
time. Calculated in terms of coal, this amounts to 14'. 6
million tons of coal extracted outside normal working
hours.... In 1949 coal output per working day per worker
throughout the industry a.mounte.d to'1, 328 'ki'lograrm s. In
1955 it dropped to 1,.1,63 kilograms, that is, by 12:'4 per-
cent. If we compare coal output per worker ,erriplc yed under-
ground, this drop amounts, to 7. 7 -percent per working day
In relation to 1938, which for :various reasons cannot be
taken as a basis of cpmpari.son,.:,but illustrates the present
state of the coal mines, output; per working` day per person
employed in the mininginduaatry dropped-in 1955 by 36:
percent. The economic . policyjin relation to the"shining
industry was.marlked.by, unpar.donable..thoiightlessness. 'The,'
system of work' oa Sundays war,introduced; ~'-aand this could,
not but ruin' the 'health and strength of the miners, and at
the same time n' tide i`t difficult to, maintain colliery installa
tions in proper Working order. The practice was also intro-
duced of employing soldiers and prisoners in some of the
collieries. Mining personnel has not~bean stabilized and
changes every year in a vast percentage. This policy could
not but undermine the coal extraction plan; it could not'but
lead to the present state of the collieries. "
In brief, Gomulka says flatly that the increase in coal production between 1-949
and 1955 (by 20 million tons) was achieved only by overtime work, and pre,
sumably more workers. Overtime work was required not only to reach this
higher production level but to counter the sizeable decrease (12. 4%) in
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production per worker per day which occurred in this same span of time
after the Communists came into power.
It must be admitted, however, that a part of the difficulty lies in the added
burden of Soviet Russian exploitation of the East European countries for the
purpose of raising the Soviet Russian standard of living and rate of production.
As Gomulka pointed out, the Soviet Union forced the Poles to "sell" them coal
at $1.00 per ton which cost the Poles $4. 00 a ton to mine. Polish Minister for
Foreign Trade Witold Trapezymski revealed in Trybuna Ludu on April 19,
1957 that "this year's agreements with. the Soviet Union avve been based on
current world prices for the first time. " Working with the available official
statistics, economist H. Menderhausen proved that Russia paid her satellites
from 12-21%a less than the world market prices by using different unit values
with the Eastern European countries than with the Free European countries.
Part of the reason why Russian living standards are higher than prewar
while satellite living standards are lower is therefore self-explanatory.
Agriculture: The inferiority of the Soviet collective system of agriculture
in comparison with private farming is as well known inside the Soviet Bloc as
outside. The Soviet newspaper Sovietskaya Kirgiziya, on September 6, 1961
stated, for example, that the only way some collective farms in Central Asia
can meet the quotas set in the agricultural plan is by maintaining private
farmers on the land.
"The private producers who pitched their tents near
the 'Friendship' collective farm tried to be as in-
conspicuous as possible, but members of the collective
soon found out that the management had allotted land
to them, prescribed a delivery quota and assured them
that they could keep anything they produced over and
above the quota. "
One of the managers, criticized for the practice, retorted, according to the
paper:
"Do you expect us to drive the private producers away?
This would mean destroying what has been achieved.
Without these private producers we hadn't enough
vegetables to fulfill the delivery plan. Now things are
different. Now we fulfill the plan. And don't think
we are the only ones to have private farmers; you will
find them in many other places. "
Ironically the name of this particular collective farm was "Road to Communism.
Gomulka, in the same noteworthy speech cited above, gives figures to prove
that the most efficient form of agriculture is private enterprise and the least
efficient is the state farm, considered the most "socialist" of all.
"Let us see what is the value of the over-all
product, calculated in constant prices per hectare
of land in all sectors of our agricultural economy,
that is, in the individual /private? economy on
collective farms, and on state farms under the
Ministry of State Farms. All data pertain to 1955.
There is 78.8 percent of farm land in the possession
of the individual farm steads. Income-dividing
collective farms were in possession of 8. 6 percent
and the state farms 12. 6 percent of the total area
of farm land owned by these three types of farms.
The over-all produce produced by these farms, as a
percent of the whole, is divided as follows: individual
83. 9 percent, collective farms, inclding cottage
allotments, 7. 7 percent, and state farms, including
auxiliary holdings of agricultural workers, 8. 4 percent.
"The results of livestock production on collective
and state farms were particularly unfavorable. Taking-
total livestock production as 100, individual farms pro-
duced 91 percent, collectives 4 percent, and state farms
5 percent.
5 (Over)
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"When estimating the value of over-all production
per hectare of arable land, we arrive at the following
picture: Individual farms 62111' zlotys, collective
farms 517. 3 zlotys, and state farms 393. 7 zlotys, at
constant prices. 'Thus the difference between individual
and collective farms amounts to 16.7 percent, while in
comparison with state farms individual farm production
was higher by 37, 2 percent.
After listing the heavy government subsidies toihe- collective and state
farms, which were not given to private farmers,'! Gomulka said:
"It can be added 'that the' co'llective'farms availed
themselves, of preferential treatment also in the pur-
chase of artificial fertilizers This is in brief -an'
outline of the' economic'picture ''of cooperative farm s.
It is a sad picture. In spite of great outlays, they
had smaller results and- greater costs of production.''
The Czechoslovakian newspaper::Mlada..Fronta, Prague, October 17, 1959,
addressed'a' querulous question to the -T amper~" ed' collectives in the following
terms
"Never before has, so much care and attention been
devoted to our agriculture is 'at present. Nowadays 'the
collective farms have new cowsheds modern poultry
farms'arid many machines and tractors. Rarely in the
past have ''collective~farmers' been allocated 'so much
fertilizer as now.' How is it'then, that our ' agricultural
production has not, a'syet, even `attained 'the' pre-war level?"
Standard of Living The standard of living is usually drastically lowered
with the impose ion o theSdviet economic system. ' /This usually 'becomes
apparent as the first steps are taken to institute a Communist economy.-/
The government of North Vietnam, for example., admits that the standard of
living was higher under the French: The daily Doc. Lap, on July 28, 1961
disclosed that people
"point out that under the colonialist rule there was'
neither a shortage of food or daily consumer goods
nor difficulties -in' buying 'and selling these items,
and that this is still the food situation in the south.
Still others, doubt the economic superiority of the
socialist regime an' d'the soundness of the'Lao Dong
party and the government. "
Another article, `iii the July issue of Hoc Tap, told of a. village party debate
to correct those who shared the "wide-Ty"he view that "life is worse" today
than it was before the revolution.
"A number of comrades were of the opinion 'that: 'We do
not know what life , is'like'in other areas, but here, life
is not better than -life' 'during the resistance, Moreover,
life now is worse than life before the setting up of
cooperatives. Now we work more and'eat less+."
In some cases the defects of a Communist. imposed system are exposed by
the Soviets. ICommunis't, the organ of the Central Committee of the
Communist Par y e Soviet Union,' in.:Decembe.r 1956 (pp83, 87) shows
a list of the average dailyper capita food ration ,of a working class Estonian
in 1926 and states that this list would hav'e clost him 39 6. percent 'of ,his daily
wage in 1926, while in '195'5;' after the Soviet Russian conquest, he would have
to pay 76, 7 percent of his daily 'wage for :the' same items. The reasons for
this extraordinary' admission` of colonial exploitation by the USSR remain
obscure.
Actually, the persistently low 'standards of ' living in the Soviet Bloc are
a better index of the defects of the system than any economic analysis of
production performance, since the purpose of any economic 'system is to
improve the lot of the people. A glance at the decades of extraordinary
economic growth claimed by the USSR and for lesser periods in the countries
of eastern Europe, and a sojourn in any of these countries where one may
6 (Continued)
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 I
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observe the standard of living, immediately poses the question, "Where did
all the gain go?" After decades of immense effort the average Russian still
has a living space less, than one-third .that of the average inhabitant of war-
devaststecT.Germany.: 'The SovietIln on pbasesses'only a few a more passenger
automobiles than Mexico whose population is, about ten percent that of the
Soviet Union Gornulka, intl e above cited speech,` said that' Poland,'-du ring
its"Sint-Year Plan actually
was 'running backwar'cls on the' hotising front: "During the period of the Six-Yca'r" Plan, about
370,.00.0 rooms were built in, the countryside, of which
some 60,000 were built privately, financed by #C:se
house. owners, and some 110,000 were constructed
under the socialized' building program. In 1950 we had
over 2. 69, million houses in the countryside with over
7. 5 million room s On. the assumption that the average
life of a building considering its 'postwar condition
is. 50 years, we should every year build 150,000 roams
in the countryside in, order to maintain the, number of
r,oom6 existing In 1950. This amounts to about-900,000
morns"for`the Six-Year Plan,while only some 370,000
were built; .It must be concluded that during the Six-Year
d t
hat
'
Plan about 800
000
f
,x
rooms
ell into ruin or are now in a
eta*_ .O f r
i. t .
ut
The way in vvhfch the oxciiriar
k-
w
e
l
i
y
er
exp
o
to
ted for the sake of
spectacular successes was"well
11
letter by an angry Russian to the
newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia), Octal er 4,`1'059:'
"Enough of covering ourselves with sputniks and airliners.
Let us come down srmewhat lower-to the most ordinary
shoes. I have one pair, but I have been walking in them
for four years now. And why' Because they are Western;
a foreign trademark is in them. Personally I don't need a
TU-114; I will get by on the tramway, but I want to live and
dress well."
The fact is, according to the Soviet press, that while the regime astounds the
world with rockets and giant dams, the citizens are arrested for attempting
to buy the clothes off the backs of visiting foreigners.
The purpose of this paper is not to deny that gains have been made; it is
to point out that greater gains have been made in free economies, be they
democratic, socialist or f:.-ee enterprise; with less cT-st than the gains achieved
by the Soviet Bloc. F urthermore the gains of the free world have been
accomplished with a rising standard of living while those of the Communist
world in most cases, have been made at the expense of the living standards
of the people.
Notes:
If startling examples of increases in industrial growth rates are sought,
one can find them easily in the free world. Let us look at the record achieved
by Venezuela, using the production base in 1953 as 100 for measurement.
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
Manufacturing
10 0
119
137
147
167
181
212
Food, Beverages,
Tobacco
100
112
130
134
144
160
185
Chemical, Coal,
Petroleum Products
10^
109
132
148
171
186
210
Metal Products
100
141
161
185
230
292
364
Electric Products
100
113
134
158
200
236
286
In the seven-year period between 1953 and 1959, the smallest increase
registered was eight-five percent and the highest was two hundred and
sixty-four percent -- no small feat it will be admitted.
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Venezuela's economy enjoys the highest foreign investment in
Latin America, and therefore it is not representative of all countries (most
of which, of course, could also borrow for capital development). The
economic data for Brazil, submitted to the United'Nations, cover only the
years through 1958, but this country shows the gains which can be made
even with a lower level of foreign investment than in Venezuela.
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Brazil 100 108 114 129 144 170
Brazil-'s steady economic development has progressed at steadily increasing
rates (with the exception- of one year when it was only six percent) from eight
to approximately twenty-five percent a year.
The experience of Japan, which has considerably more than doubled its
war-devastated industry since 1-953'is perhaps not applicable to the developing
countries today, since it was industrialized before that period. It is
interesting to note, however, that the steel industry of Manchuria before the
Second World War, undertaken by the Japanese, advanced at a more rapid
rate than the steel industry of the Soviet Union during the same period. The
vast steel-making capacity of Manchuria was then removed to the Soviet Union
by the Red Army after the war, thus using the "capitalist" steel capacity to
develop the Soviet economy.
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