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November 17, 2016
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August 14, 2000
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February 25, 1963
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----- - ; ~:~:~ ?: NLT1~r3ER: 110 DAT a ry ,,,, .,,,, trai Pro a ands ~~~~--~~"`~ p g Directive Briefly Noted ,....... ..... 626. So r!" viet Disarmament Proposals and Their Aim 62? NE,b Iran: Referendum on Redistribution of band '~'~'~'~'~~~~"~"'~'~"'~''"""~~~'~'~~'~'~'~' B28 AF, FE Third Afro-Asian Solidarity NE,~H Organization Conference 623 FE, NE The Malaysia Federation 630 EE, Further Dissension in Communist WEe Ranks--The French Comrades do a Switch .......................... ..................--- 631 EE, 6VE United States and a Uni ~;pry r,,,.,,.,e ?---------- .......................... ..... List of :?:; 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010004-6 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010004-6 25X1C10b 1'~ April F3irthday of N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSP Council of Ministers, First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committer (born 18~~) 1Z Ar~ril National Organizations of Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organizat~n (AAPSO) t~ ~3bserve 1'~ April (Bay of Digs) anniversary as Day ~~f Solidarity of AAPSO with the peoples of Latin America ~~ April 15~~: Hitler's Birthday (possible anti-German moves by Communists) ~~!: April ~lorld Youth Day Against Colonialism and for Peaceful Coexistence (Communist) April ~'wen$ieth Anniversary of German's discovery of the Communist ~ATYN massacre April Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference, currently scheduled for Indonesia in April 163 (see DIH 1~3~~ dated 22 J~.nuary i~6S to Stations of ~ar- ticipating nati,~ns at preparat~~ry conference held in Djakarta in February) 1 May ~`J?orld Holiday of Labor (celebrated by G~mmunists, S:~cialists, certain other Labor groups) $ May VE Day , 1~~' 5 12 May End of S2S days :of successful US airlift aver the Berlin land blockade, I~49 5 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : 061~$~~~Q~1~~~~~ Cont. ) re~r~d ~o,~~t~I~a.2~000/08/27_: ~~~`-~D,~78=0306~0~@Qb00~0 004163 l4 stay 6Yarsaw Pact, 20-year mutual defense treaty signed at ~la~s~.w by USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech~sl~vakia, Hungary, P?land, Rumania and East Germany, in 1955. 30 May Cflmmunist coup d'etat in Hungary, 1947. Approved For Release 2000/ 78-03~'IOr2('~04-6 Approved For Rele 200~~~~~7 ~r--~-R~P78-0306~c~OQ?~~,~~~~03 6~6 , S~~viet Dis~.rr,~ame~$ ~'r~;~aJsals, acad 'g'heir Aim -. r.k M . 25X1C10b "A~rlied t~ wars., the lain thesis^~ dialeetics... is th^t 'war is ~imx~ly the c~.ntinuation of ra~litics by ^ther (~: e~"v o`ren me~.ns . ~i ~ ~armu~ a e ongs ~~ausewitz, one of the greatest writers on the hist:~ry of war, whose ideas c~ere fertilised by Rege1. And this ~~as always, the standp?int ?af Marx and ~a~gles, whc~ reg~.rder? ovary ~~aar ~.s the c:~ntinuati:~n -~f the politics of given interests ~c~wers--~.nd the v~,rihe c:~ntr~~l. L~i.T7?rarELtuS, 21,x34 t~G';J ?i ~"''~:ed to 'o],cY"8j,/'c~'. I!1:~rE3 t'~~n $E:l7C?c^e i~:a*~ec- ti:'~~3s not se~blect tr, vet ~. In the s~~rin ~f 7,_~:'~~?~_, t~ze U8 ^~nc3 UI~ ^~ffer~e~~ c:?nces? ~~rds on the contr~~l ~,~~~~~.r^tus ,-,rgani~,^~t~.~~n, ar:,~ ~. n tl~xe ~?umb:;r ^-:~ ~.i~s~~c:cti:~ns t3~'s~ c~,n$r,-~Z stag.-ons (fit flex ibl l~ t~ ~~ insnecti:~rs, ~1et~en:~ing ;n the n1A~r~er of s~~.s~aic dishrbances, ~,nsta~,d r.,f a fixed nutrber cif ~~; l~ c-ontr~l. r~,~~;ts instead ~~f ~l) . The Soviets rev?~oncled by reneing on ~.~~ e''r~.:ker agreeme~3$ in l~rinci~le thE~t t~sere be ~ s~ingl~ ~.dmin-- istr~.tur tc sty??cruise the cnntr~>A srr''~2m, c~et3~~~.~:~in~; instead the a~3~lication ~f ~:;3e ~:roi~a nr~.n~.:~~.e t:~ t?~c~ i~resent ~, counter-^~r~t,~~sal t~ the 10 AIa,t~.:~n disarmament C>mr~~tttee on ~Z June la'S0, the ?polish chairman decl! ~~red that the ~i~r1x ~~f the C^~mmittee was chased, ~,a~d re~> fused to tact>gnize T':restern sl~eal~ars . A~.~. of the Soviet ~Z^c delegates then ~Jal~~e~; out . ?n ~3 Se?~teraber 1~FC~, the Soviets T~resented anew 4alan, cJhiGh ~~r ~vided for the ear~.y redUCtion ~~f c~nvez'.tional as ~~relA as nuclear f~~rces, but although i~.~ service c~as given t ; the insnect~.on conc?~t, the S ~viet t~l~.n dicl n^~t ~.dv~.nce t,~wArd effective ins?~ect~ n, an essential. eT.eme~~t in ~.rxy disarmament ~~r~pram. Tn Set~tember Z~~1, ~:~rin ~.nd John J. McCl~,ay ^~ut a ,j::~int st~.ter,-ent of ~.~;reed ~~r~.raci?~Zes r~hich n:~w serves as the guideline f_~r Approved For Release 2000f08f27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010004-6 (~~~'ro~4~~.?~ Relea~?200~~Z ?-~~-~?DP78=03061OQ;,~~,~~~,~,O~~S present disarm anent ne;otiations. But even tho~?gh the Soviets have accey~ted the concept .~f effective inspection, they still seem re],uctant to deal with its pr~lctical execution. phis has become cle~.r in deliberation within the so-called 1~ Nation Uisarmame:~t ~^~nference (actually 17-nation, since ~'r~.nce re- fused to tat~e its se~.t) which began in March 1~6~. In the cruci~:l issuw of iaspecti:~n, which teas been a big stumi~ling-block ^11 a~:ong, the k~urden of justifying their position lies with ttxe S~~?rxets, especially since they dem-;n- 25X1C10b strated their willingness to conceal arms in ~~uba. (See Y~:t the history of test an an genera sabmam^n neg:> i~.ti-ins atlor~s on the Soviet side no rwa.soned ex~y~.ana~:ions, no wi.llin;ness t^ discuss scientific data, no readiness to compr-~mise, a 1-~ng succession of meaningless pseue'.o-cc~rcessions, retractions of offers pre- viously mar.~e, and i~olitic~.l acts designed to hinF~er negotia- tion, including the sude~e~a rupture of negoti~,t~lon itself. T:~ the Soviets, "disarrnafnent" see:~.s to mean either pro,~~aganda or the surrender of the o;~poncr~t, not any negotiated settle- ment . ~e have lately witnesseca two further Soviet moves of the same nature. Gn 19 Decer~wer, Khrushchev sent President Kennedy a letter offering once again three on-site inspections in the USSI1. President Ke~az~edy's rep?y (2?~ IDecenbet?) stated his own hope that the ti:S reducti~an from 12-~:m t~o ~~-1~D would be matched by an egt~ivale-~~: So~siet rise from ~;k~eir l.~~J figure of three. This Kennedy letter and a second K~1~?azstscc~e:v le :ter of '~ January I8S3 arranged for darect negotiati-~a~s, .which began %~n ).~ January and were carried on in b~~th New York and t"dashingt3n. the ex- change ~f letters euas published on ~0 January. The Soviets sent "negotiators" wh:a refused to negotiate, rigidly clinging to their original number---a number which President i~ennedy had n:~ted in his letter Baas n:~t enough . The Soviets also refused to d~.scuss crucial problF,=ns of the insr~ec- tion machinery, such as tt~e role of the international scien- tific comrzis8i7n, the maz~ing of the decision to inspect, the cor;~positi~n and operation of the inspection teams, and the area t~~ be inspected. To improve the negotiatin~f atmosphere, President Kennedy announced on 26 January that underr~und tests in Nevada would be halted for the duration of the New York-~,1ashi:~gton talks. But to no avail. The Soviets stated later that on 29 January, the chief US negotiator, Vdil~iam C. Fester, asked the Soviet dipl~smats why they had came all the way across the ocean if they h~.d nothing further to offer. They chose to cnnsider this aYleged statement an affront, but the fact rema~.ns that the Savicts adopted a "take it or leave it" position, and when the US refused to accept their terms unamended, the Soviets broke off negotiations on 31 January. Ina 15 February speech in Geneva, Kuznetsov firmly maintained the Soviet position on inspection, saying: "Now it is the turn Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010004-6 (S2fi. Continued) rc~v,,e~ Fpr Relea"~eY200~10.8/27w C1~?RDP78-03061~O~ip~Q~0a1~0~~3 of the United S$ates." S:~viet propaganda claims that the S~3viet Uni~~n has met thQ ~JS halfway--~,s th :augh three was half~ray bey tween three and ~~D, the respective figures in 1~~?. A,nc~ dra- spite the clarification in YennQdy's letter, they continue t~ maintain that the US is fr~rn previous assurances that ~-3 inspect~c~ns would be enough. The other recent move in disarmament dipl?macy was the proposal, made at the reopening of the 1~-Nation meet- ings in d~en~ava on ~~ February, t~ liquidate all f:~reign lases for nuclear rocP~et submarines, aircraft carriers, strategic rockets, an^1 strategic bombers. This suggestion his long been a staple item in aoviet ~l~c disarmament plans, and while the US believes that within a general and complete disarm~:ment program all 'uses--foreign and do~aestic--should eventuaXly be disbanded, it is firmly opposed to this S~~viet propos~.l which would s~rift'~y upset the present military balance be$ween East F.,,nd t~d'est in favor of the USSR.. The proposal adds new fuel to the gr:~t~ring S~~viet campaign against polaris submarine lb~ses. Actua?~ly, these bases are not s~ much a military necessity for the US (the subs could function quite well from US territory), as a ;~~olit~.c~.l guarantee of the continuing US c?~mmitment to N1~.TS~. ~:nd it is such NAT? ties as these that this Saviet pr:>, really aims ?~t . No d?~ubt the Moment seemed propi- ti~us fir the S~~viet pro;~~sal, since there have lately been fricti:,~na Uetween NAT~J countries. but proposals like this, so far as they have any influence on ~overnments,will only help to menu ATAT~J differences. The blatant pr~o~~a~;anda nature of this u~neyotiable draft declaration indicates once that the Soviets are not see~:ing any agreement, but are only con- tin~;~ing the struggle against the US by Wither (i.e., non-military) 25X1 C10b mean: 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010004-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010004-6 Approved For Relea~ 2000~AR~~ ? ~' ~?-~?P78-0308~@~O~I OD8~6 ?5X1C10b 62? ~~' b? IRAN Referendum on Redistribution of Land DAGKGR?UND: The enormously favorable vote obtained in the r~~e~e~~i in Iran held by Shah Reza Pahlavi on ~~ J'anuary may well be expected to lessen, if not to nullify, the impact of Iranian opposition to land redistribution, fox example, in the Iranian Majlis, among mullahs and landholders generally and in the opposition National Front. Although the regime had succeeded in inti~-idating the opposition to so~~ae extent, the affirmative vote was startling: ~J.?~ per cent. For the first time i~~ the history of Iran, women were allowed to vote -- a r~Aatter of considerable significance despite religious objections; these votes, however, werE not counted. Appr?val was sought (anc~ overwhelmingly obtained) Qn six proposals: 1. Redistribution of large landholdings to peasants. ~. Sharing by workers of B~ per cent of the profits of industry. 3. Nationalization of forests. ~. Distribution of shares in government-owned industry to reimburse disp?ssessed land lards. 5. broadening of thQ franchise. " ~. Use ?f military draftees to assist in te~.ching reading and writing in backward areas. Actions of the regir~ie to ~:nsure the affirmative mote took several fcr~as : certain selected pppanwnts of the reform were jailed before the balloting began; secrecy of the ballot was made difficult, to say the least, by having the negative ballots colored blue; protest dem?nstrati?ns were 4~~~ervrhelmed by government-staged prc-reform crowe?s cruising abotA ~, in ?~us- loads; there were intensive eiisplays ?f rriilitary fo~~ .~~ ~ ~~.~"ing the balloting tc~ keep order aaad ensure calm. The o~.~;~~~si~~:1on, plainly, was tey,iporarily demoralized, yet this not be expected to continue indefinitely. The Shah, who started l~.nd redistribution s?me years ago, may be regarded, nevertheless, as having won a great vict?r~. The ATational Front (which favors land ref?rm but a~.ot under the Shah's auspices) , the lane lords, the Moslem mullahs, tt~.e parliament (Majlis) when it meets, et al., may be expected to return to the attack. The National Front led by the moderate Allahyer Saleh, for Approved For Release 2000/0 8-Oti?$'~AGkQ04'L#QO~b04-6 Approved For Relea~ 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03069000200010004-6 (C2a Co"nt.} 25 February 1353 instance, may be expected t? claim that the referendum was not valid because it w~.s done: crithout A~aj lis approval; it wi11 no doubt charge that tI?e Sha~~ pers?nally has profited from land sold tc~ the pe~.sants and will demand that such profits be returnQd to the peasant-lanelowners; the rational Fre~nt may compete with tYae Shah's reforms by offering more to wormers and peasaa~xts than the Shah can deliver. Tt:e refc~rns proposed by the Shah in the referendum and promises of furthe~? refor~as have raised high hopes am?ng the needy in Iran. 7Chese c?uld well turn to disappointment and disillusionment in ~. few months, shoulel the gavernr~ent find its4lf unable to carry out its program. Two of the difficulties the government is sure t? encounter, for example, are the complexity of its c~~wan administration and the enormous financial difficulties with ~=a;~ich it will have to wrestle. ~ curiQUS factor in all this situation has been the :aiffer~ ences in attitude toward the referendum by two of the Soviet Persian-la~~guage br?adcasting stations, the Caucasus-based Clandestine "Voice of Iran," and the Voice of the Iranian (Com~saunist) Tudeh Party from Leipzig, East Germany. The Y~~.tiGnal Voice of Iran (in the USSR) urged Iranians to partici- pate i~~a the referendu~a; the Tudeh R~arty (in East Europe) just as strongly reco~~3nencled that it be boycotted. Said the Nation- al Voice on ~l January: "The peasants of Iran...will participate in the referendum ar~d will in a body vote for the elimination of the pe6~s~,r~.t-landlord system and the death cif tlae fe>.clalist syatem...~y their united and wide partici- pation iia tie referendum, the peasants will be able to name sure ref tl~e succcvs of the results of the refer- endu?~ and et: to mne~w the feudals and their agents and prevent tl~era fr?m riggin the ball?t boxes." ?n the other hand, the Tudeh Party (from East Germany) said three clays l~.ter (on ~~ January} : ,'C?r~ ~5 January the Shah gill imple~-ent his consr~iracy in the name cf national apprbval....His real aim is t? gain su;,~port for the illegal actions of ~:ais bloody tyran:sy....Recent events and the fran~~ opposition of national forces against this r~:ferendura ref lest $he public's opinion of the Shah's conspiracy. Intelligent Iranian people are c~pposeel to the illegal and tric':~y referenelum....It is the duty of every patriot to expose t~~e Shah's airois i~~a tae referendum, to boycott it, and to refrain from 25X1C101~articipatin~; in it." 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010004-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010004-6 ~. Approved For Relea~ 2000/4$07,; ~fAkRDP78-0306'40~~~~.gOQ~~ S2S AF,F~,NE,U~I. Third Afro-Aswan Solidarity ?r~anizatioil 25X1 C10b Can ere~~ce UACKGR,oUND: (Unclassified background is contained in Att~,c rnen s~`~`fihe Third Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organiza- tion (RAPS?) Conference held in Moshi, Tanganyika, from ~ to 11 February has dis?~layed to the world, more clearly perhaps than ever before, that the Afro-Asian concept is being manipu- lated by the Communist "bloc" with Indonesia playing a strong sup?oorting role. The UAFt's influence in AAPSO has definitely faded into the background, although its role ran the Secretariat level is still strong. chile lip service was paid to the "Spirit of Uandung," the Conference trembled on its principles where the nationaX interests of the main forces behind AAPS? were involved, i.e. in connection raith the Indian-Chinese border conflict and the proposed Federation of Malaysia, etc. The Conference has also provided an insight into the strong stresses and grovring anta~:~nisms ~rithin the Communist bloc and bet~~reen nations of Asia and Africa. Asian interests prevailed over African ones and "solidarity" was more of an enforced, artyficial concept than a live reality. The Conference lambasted United States "imperialism" and t~estern "colonialism." Chicom Propaganda. Predictably, Peking utilized the Con- ference as a p a orm o press its views against Moscow's on the best vray to dope arith imperialism and as a forum for con- veying to the Asian and African states that the C1aR, not the Soviet Union, is the champion of their interests. Peking seems to be convinced that there are significant numbers of C?nmmu- nists a_ud revolutionists in the underdevebped countries to whor_i its forceful position ("armed struggle") has more appeal than Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence as an anti-colonial weapon. The Chinese chief delegate, Liu-Ning-yi derided as "deceitful nonsense" the Soviet claim that disarmament would result in significantly increased amounts of aid for the under- developed countries. The majority of the delegations showed that they favored the Chinese view by issuing declarations and appeals which placed far greater emphasis on "active" and "armed struggle" ("moral and material support to freedom fighters"; Afro-Asian States to provide military and financial assistance to achieve the liberation of dependent territories of Africa during 1~SS) than on a need for disarma~re nt and peace. S~yiet Prot'za~'anda. The Soviet Union used the meeting to charge i__nter olio that the European Common Market and American (5~8. Continued) ,~prc~~e~c~ F~r Relea~ 20001Q.8/27. Gi~RDP78-0306`O~Qa'~O~~g?? colonialism. Soviet delegates distributed a 1~-page p,~mphlet under the heading ?'The Common MarPiet--a Threat to the Economy of Afro-Asian Countries.?? The document calls the Common Market's proposed associate status for African countries "group eolon- i~.lism" and says "W~.11 Street" dreams of an integrated Europe incorporated in a '?United Atlantic States" which could serve as a tool f~~r recolonizing Africa in the interests of American monc.,polies. The economic committee declared the Common Market was another expression of ''neo-colonialism" and was aimed at splitting Afro-Asian solidarity and increasing the economic difficulties facing these countries. To counter it, the co~a- ~-ittee called for increased Afro-Asian economic ties and ties with the socialist countries. "Three-Conti~aent" Conference. The Conference accepted Castr::~ s nv a on t~o convene a PeopleTs Solidarity Conference of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in Cuba and it set up a preparatory committee composed, as the announcement saie~, of six ?'representative" countries from Africa (Algeria, Guinea, Morocco, the UAL,, Tanganyika, and South Africa.) and six from 11sia (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the USSR, and Vietnam), which will lie joined by six Latin American countries, not yet named. Thus, a proposition long advocated by the Chinese and pro-Chinese elements in AAPSO but once resisted by Soviet ele- ments, ~~toves closer to realization. Indicative of the increased Chicom voice in AAPSC is that no role appears to have been allot- ted to the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council (W1?C) in any ~alanning or preparations f~~r the three continent linl~up; here- tofc~re, the Soviets had insisted that the WPC act as co-sponsor. Since such a conference gill undoubtedly push a hard, anti- US line of violence, resistance may yet develop within the ranl~s of some Soviet--oriented Latin American Communists who will rese~~eing pressured by Castro and Chinese Co:~~r-unists . Nevertheless, they will find it difficult not to ~;o along with the 7roposal. The Conference designated April 1? as a "Day of Solidarity of Afro-Asian Peoples with Peoples of Latin America." 25X1C10b 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010004-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010004-6 . Approved For Releas~2000/08/ 7 ? I - P78=03061QA?~pe00 ,10004 ~~~~ 6~:~ F~,NI;. The Malaysia Federation 25X1C10b BAC~GRCU~TB: The Malaysia Federation is basically a British an~1 M~~.y p~Ian lto made a single state out of five ~~utheast Asi~.n political entities ti~ahich currently have different ata- tt~ses within the British Comm:~nwe~.lth. The Federatio~i of Malaya is a fully independent member; Sin~ap~re is internally self-urovernin~ but its f:~rei~n affairs and defense riini: tries are still under British control; British Yd:~rth Borne^ anc~ Sarawa~~ are British colonies, and Brunei, an enslave in -arawa~, is a British protectorate. The pr~,oposed I'e~leration, scheduled t~:~ become effective S1 Au;; 153, caould permit Britain to retain ~.s .much influe?~ce as passible in Southeast Asia., w:~uld dive Britain continz~eFa access Singapore and in Sezaeral cJ~uld permit c:~ntinued ~Jdestern military presence in this vital ar c ~. . The following; is a summary of some of the issues involved in the Malaysian Federation proposal: Indonesia. Indonesia's ~~bjective is t~~ block the f-~rr~a- ti~o~~~a~alaysia Federation and to install in the Borneo Territ~~ries a government sym,~athetic to Indonesian aspirations. iTlti~zately it seeks to incorporate the Borneo Territories as part of Indonesia. Indonesia, with a population neariai~ 1QD!0 riilli:~n (the fifth or sixth most populous country in the world), regards the proposed federation as a potential rival capai~le of thwarting Ind~~nesia's extaansionist ambitions in Southeast ..Asia. SuP~arno has ado~~ted a course -~f action vis-a-vis the Federati