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April 8, 1963
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..... .............. . :;:~: :;?:::::: :~:;?::;?::?::?:?:::::?~:: j `` S pril 1 63 ?.;::::::?.NUMB E 113 :Central Propaganda Directive ::Briefly Noted .. 641. Interpreting the Sino-Soviet Dispute': "A Plague on Both Your Houses" '::642. Exposure of RIS Agents at ECAFE Con- ferenco ti ? :::~r : Pg. (" esurrection" ) ?:643N.Rise of the Ba' ath Party and Arab Unity {:~'?:~~: ?:'??::: ::644 d. Further Restrictions on Soviet Litera- ture and Art 45 AF. African Summit: Meeting of the African Heads of State (Conference of s-:~ the Inter-African and Malagasy Organ zat ion - IAMO), Addis Ababa., 23 May l9 6 - * .......... .................: ~646FEa. The Japanese Left ......::?:?: 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000108/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 (Briefly Noted Cont.'' S Ap: . 1963 DATES 25X1C10b 20 April Pan-American Games in Sao Paulo, 20 April - 5 May (per Briefly Noted) 24 April World Youth Day Against Colonialism and for Peaceful Coexistence (Communist) April Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference, Indonesia (Djakarta-Bandung), 24-30 April 1963 2S April Italian general elections scheduled (See Briefly Noted last issue) April Twentieth Anniversary of German's discovery of the Co KATYN massacre 1 May World Holiday of Labor (celebrated by Communists, Socialists, certain other Labor groups) 1 May Indonesia to Assume Sovereignty over West New Guinea (See Briefly Noted last issue) 5 May Togo cabinet sets date for general elections, previously named for 21 April 8 May VE Day, 1945 12 May 328 day Berlin land blockade ended as a result of successful US airlift, 1949 14 May Warsaw Pact, 20-year mutual defense treaty signed at Warsaw by USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and East Germany, in 1955 23 May Conference of the Inter-African and Malagasy Organization, Addis Ababa, 23 May 1963 (See Item 645) 30 May Communist coup d'etat in Hungary, 1947 10 June Twentieth anniversary of Moscow's official declaration disbanding the Communist International (COMINTERN) 17 June Tenth anniversary of anti-Communist riot and strike in Communist Germany against increased work quotas; Soviet troops were required to put down the riot (1953) 17 June Fifth anniversary of Communist Hungarian Government's announcement of the trial and execution of Imre Nagy, Gen. Pal Maleter and other leaders of the Hungarian Revolt of November 1956 (1958) li? Briefly Noted) Approved For Release 2000/08/27: C A- P78-03061A 00200010007-3 -63 Approved For Rele she 2000 -190.0 - 78-0306( 1610007-3 641. Interpreting the Sino--Soviet Disute: " Pl ue_on Both ,r Xol 25X1 C10b DACKG9 OUND : History. Since the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956, differences of opinion between Communist Parties and regimes have come increasingly into the open. Principal antagonists are the Soviet Union and the CPSU, on the one hand, Communist China and the CCP, on the other hand. Other significant factors are: the "modern revisionism" of Tito; the strident "left-wing' _:d} ;- sencion of Communist Albania; "right-wing" deviations climaxed by the uprising in Hungary, October - November 1956, and by the "Polish October" (also in 1956) which resulted in the replace- ment of the Stalinist Uierut regime by Gomulk.a; the "polycen- trism" advocated by Togliatti and the Italian CP; factionalism in several free world CPs--most conspicuous in India--and so forth. Temporarily "contained" by the conferences of all Com- munist Parties hold in Moscow in November 1957 and in October 1960, the differences erupted with new violence at the 22nd Congress in October 1961, followed by direct confrontations at a n .nber of major CP Congresses during the latter part of 1962 and a series of increasingly vituperative articles, speeches, and letters. (F;3r details on this history, see also Di-Weekly Propaganda Guidance Items # 633 "Peking Takes the Offensive (1 ho Au'_s--Du. .' and qed Flag Statements)"; 620 EE,WE, a. "The Sixth East German Communist (S3D) Party Congress: International and National Aspects"; 609 "Sine-Soviet Confrontations at Party Congresses in ) Europe and Italy.") Saptoms and Causes. The dissensions have been articulated primarilyn form of doctrinal disputes, wherein Khrushchev and the CPSU emphasize the need of adapting tactics to the changed world situation--notably to the realities of nuclear war--pro- claiming that "war is no longer fatally inevitable" and that "peaceful co-existence is the basis of class struggle on a global scale." Mao and the CCP, on the contrary, accuse the CPSU of "modern revisionism," of misinterpreting, if not "betraying? the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, while themselves calling the imperialists "paper tigers" and insisting on world-wide class war with no holds barred, especially with no fear of nuclear char. Numerous other doctrinal issues--e.g. whether the Soviet or the Chinese model should be followed by "national libera- tion moveiients" in underdeveloped countries--are also involved. ~~ (641. Continued Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 A1proved For Releage,,2000/0P78-03061 9ApQ011 7-3 (6 1. Cont.) Actually, however, these differences are by no means only-- or even primarily--ideological-doctrinal in nature: this is merely the way in which Communists express tI^emselves, disguis- ing their true motivations and intentions in he process. Without ai: tempting here to resolve the innume able shades of opinion expressed by various and sundry "demonologists," it is safe to list, the following factors as playing major roles in these dissensions: a, Conflicting Stages of Development: 45 years have passed since the Russian revolution: the Soviet regime is no longer genuinely revolutionary (the genei?ation of the Octobei.* Revolution being largely dead), but makes use of revolutionary i ,J.e~ t logy for its purposes (see also Bi-Weekly Propagar.d.a Guidance Item #503 "The Thermidorean ?S :-!ctioaTM 6 Uarch 1962). The Chinese, however, are still carried r?rward by the momentum of their revolution o. 1949, still under the leaders of that revolution. b. Conflicting National Interests: Communist Parties Tn power a sorB increasing y the traditional in- terests of their countries: Khrushchev will not abandon the Tsars' conquests in Asia and pursues Tsarist policies concern.:+_ng the Tur:?',-ish Straits and, the Baltic Sea; Mao follows Imperial Manchu tradi- tions against Tibet, Southeast Asia, Formosa, etc. Even Cps not in power have become increasingly con- cerned with the national interest of "their" workers (cf. the Italian CP and the Common Market: Propa- ganda Guidance Item #613 ae. "Communists and the Common Market-,-The WFTU Meeting in Leipzig on the EEC"). c. Personalit Clashes: Khrushchev, pragmatic manager an arty boss, with a bare minimum of doctrinal proficiency, who did very little fighting--in the Civil War, if at all--and never suffered for his convictions (either in jail or in exile), differs as a person fundamentally from Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Tito, Togliatti, Thorez and others who are Commu- nist doctrinaires in the traditional sense, who have participated first-hand in revolutionary (or at least subversive) action and taken considerable personal risks in the process. Khrushchev, though supreme boss of awesome nuclear, conventional- military and industrial powers, does not, therefore, command much respect or allegiance of his fellow Party bosses in large parts of the WCM, especially not in the key Parties in power or in opposition-- certainly not to the extent which would insure his undisputed global leadership. 2 mma~ (641. Continued) ~?~! Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : C A-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 A ov@ oa Rele 2000/9& CAA 4SP'ts-o3os1 ,off 1~6bo 8687-3 d. Lack of International Organization: Despite their 25X1C10b 0c rir. c.:r rma $ ent ' Ti LL '~1 iona _ unity o the revolutionary proletariat," the Communists have failed to reconstruct an effective international organization since Stalin dissolved the COMI'NTIMIN in 1943. Continued control through the Interna- tional Department of the CPSU, liaison through the COMINFORM (1947-1956), occasional "All-Party", con- ferences (1957, 1960) achieved some results 'but failed to provide an adequate, lasting solution, The International Fronts, built up since 1945 as a partial substitute for the COMINTE tN, though quite effective as instruments of propaganda and subversion, reflect the schism in the TCM rather than contribute to overcome it. 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Relea p 2000/08/27 :.CIA-RDP78-0306000200010007-3 ril 1963 25X1 C10 25X1C10b 642. Exposu ?e of R:IS Agents at 'ECAFE Conference BACKGROUND: The 19th annual meeting of the United Nations Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was convened in Manila on 5 March 1963. ECAFE is a non- political agency of the United Nations whose purpose is to promote the economic development of the area. Its sessions have been called "an economic Parliament of Asia" whose member-countries are represented by high-ranking government officials and experts. The "experts" representing the Soviet Union, however, differ considerably from those of other countries. According to the 16 March edition of the Manila Times (and other Philippine. newspapers), 11 of the 23 Soviet delegates to the ECAFE meeting were trained intelligence officers and "they have been contacting Filipinos who are active in labor, student work, and the pr,::ss. They have shown more interest in contacting various people than in attending the ECAFE sessions." One report said that "their (the Soviet delegates) activities here indicate efforts to establish clandestine contacts and to lay the groundwork for future undercover work in the guise of official conferences." The Philippine press gave biographic data on several of the Soviet delegates who have served in espionage and other subversive capacities around t as world, such as: A.S. Lavrentyev was active in intelligence work in Calcutta from 1954 to 1956; M.S. Pankin has been a highly regarded military intelligence officer since he finished foreign-language school in Moscow 20 years age; Y.V. Filiipov was an important link in the Soviet spy network in Germany in 1951 where he posed as a newspaper man; V.V. Moskov was expelled from Iraq in 1955 when that country broke diplomatic relations with the USSR. /gee Press Comment, March 25 and 26 for articles from the Philippines on EC E,7 (642 Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Relea 2000108L2 7 : I - DP78-03011,000200010007-3 Aril 1963 643 NE,g. Rise of the Ba?ath ("Resurrection") Party and Arab -Unity 25X1C10b BACKGROUND: The 8 February coup in Iraq and that in Syria one month later has brought to the forefront in both countries govornments composed to a major extent by members of a political group widespread in the Arab world--the Ba'ath, or Resurrection, Party. The present Ba'ath party was created in 1953 through the merger of two groups of Syrian origin formed in the 19409--the Arab Resurrection (or Ba'ath) Party and the Arab Socialist (or Ishtiraki) Party. The Resurrection, sometimes called the Renaissance, party had been Michel Aflaq, a Syrian teacher, who is a Christian, and Salah al-Din Bitar, also a Syrian teacher, a Muslim who had been a fellow-student of Aflaq's in the Sorbonne at ?aris and is now the new Syrian Premier. The Arab Socialist party had been organized by Akram al-Rawrani, an anti-western leftist politician (who, having been deprived--among other Syrians--of his civil rights, reportedly is now in hiding) with the object of countering the Syrian Populist and Nationalist Parties, both rightist groups. The main emphasis of the Ba'ath party is on "Arab Socialism"--a combination, as the Party's origin would imply, of socialism and Arabism. It seeks to resuscitate the glories of the Arab past, to achieve unity of the "Arab homeland" (all Arabs favor Arab unity--which is not unlike a politician's view of motherhood in other lands--but they usually run into severe trouble fairly quickly when they try to achieve it), and to free it from the influence and control of the (undefined) "imperialists." Although the party has its differences with ?resident Nasser of the UAR, mostly because he tends to dominate everybody and everything within reach, it is generally in agreement with Nasser's policy of nonalignment with either the Communist Bloc or the free world. Like all Arabs (except possibly some in the Maghreb) it violently opposes any acceptance of Israel, which it considers a creature (if not the creation) of the Western World. The Ba'ath Party, with its widespread influence in the Arab world (such as in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Kuwait), never took root in Egypt, largely because it has endeavored to follow policies that are not dependent upon Approved For Release 200 P78-036MO 0266040067-3 t a d f or Relea 200L0 / 7 ? CI -RDP78-0306000200010007-3 ffi A,, i l 1963 merely one man who, for example, may be like Nasser a charismatic ruler. The Ba'ath party does, indeed, advocate legal restraints on the executive power and the guarantee of individual liberties. On this point it disagrees strongly with president Nasser, who, however, has pre-ompt d sore of the Ba'ath party's economic ideas: redistribution of wealth; state ownership and management of communications, public utilities, and the chief means of production and transport; revocation of foreign concessions; land reform; state supervision of small industrial enterprises (with workers sharing in their direction and profits); and state regulation of inheritance and the ownership of property, although these are asserted to be "natural rights." Anti-Communist actions have so far not been nearly as severe in Syria as they have been in Iraq, doubtless because the Communist tentacles did not reach as far nor take as uenacing a hold in Syria as they had under the Qasin regime in Iraq. Iraq had been the recipient of Soviet economic and military aid in large quantities while Qasim was in charge, and "tochnicians" from the bloc by the hundreds were still entering Iraq until the coup of February S. At the time of Qasizy's fall, there were an estimated 500 Soviet military specialists and some 753 economic technicians in Iraq. The Iraqi Communists have taken a line just as antipathetic to the new government as it has to them (see attached), although some Communists (doubtless as an expedient) have indulged in self-criticism which purportedly "exposed" some of their ?arty's wrongdoings (see attached). The USSR government, however, far from coraia to their rescue, has recognized the new regime while continuing to conduct a vicious propaganda war in favor' of uprisings and resistance by Iraqi Communists and by the minority Kurds. Meetings by representatives of the "liberated" Arab countries (UAR, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Yemen), trying to reach unanimity on the degree of Arab unity desirable for all, are not yet over. There does not seen to be a satisfactory explanation as to why one should consider, say, the UAL. as more "liberated" than, say, Tunisia. No agreement on unity has yet been reached and no lasting one is likely at the present time: the Ba'ath Party doesn't like any single ruler, charismatic or otherwise; the states concerned disagree on this point; and, within each state, there are vigorously opposed views. The Ua'ath Party in Syria, for example, while as much responsible as any group for the original Egypt- Syria union, is now opposed to domination by Nasser--the fawrani faction quite violently so. Nasser himself is doubtless not prepared to accept less because of the existence of pro-Nasser elements, especially in Syria. ?erhaps he will decide to await another Syrian coup, more favorable to his views. Approved For Release 20 -RDP78-0S $Ag00t6?81'd607-3 ArveV1 For Relea 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-0306M00200010007-3 ( on ?) 6 1 ru 1963 The Irate. Ba' ath ?arty does not like the idea or prospect of domination any more than Go the Syrians. The Algerians have enormous economic, social and other problems of their own and, in any event, at present at least, doubtlessly regard the whole matter as relatively peripheral. And the Yemenis (who have a civil war on their hands at the moment), although lively to do what Nasser tells them, at least as long as they rely on him for military and other assistance, do not really carry as mach weight as do the others. 25X1C1Ob 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Relea a 2000/0 8-03061 Od' 0'P T-3 fW16?ObFurther Restrictions on Soviet Literature and Art BACKGROUND: By a series of recent actions, the Soviet leadership is trying once more to clamp down on intellectual freedom. What was originally a campaign against "formalist" and abstract art, sparked by Khrushchev's visit to public and private exhibitions on 1 December 1962 (see Guidance #614 d, 14 January 1963), has now become primarily a wide-spread re- pression of poets and writers. Many people suspect that cul- tural conservatives, the bureaucrats formerly controlling culture, deliberately confronted Khrushchev with abstract art first, correctly expecting a hostile reaction; his animus was then directed on to the field of literature, whose young rep- resentatives had been tolerated by him as a tool in anti-Stalin polemics. Ilya Ehrenburg and Yevgeni Yevtushenko unintention- ally helped to embroil the writers with Khrushchev. Ehrenburg wrote in his memoirs, appearing in Novy Mir, that Stalin's crimes had been generally known, but that people ad wisely kept silent; thus he implicitly raised the touchy question of Khrushchev's behavior under Stalin. And Yevtushenko published a 4eries of autobiographical articles in a French weekly, L'Expr ss, crit- icizing many "Stalinist" attitudes, such as cormism and anti-semitism, which are actually shared by many Soviet offi- cials today, including Khrushchev. Aside from Khrushchev's own attitudes, however, cultural hacks and Party ideologists found it expedient to strike at the young poets indirectly, by way of an attack on the abstract artists; unlike the artists, the poets are genuinely and widely popular. When experimental and progressive cultural activities are being pushed to the wall, we ought to appreciate the force and significance of the revolt against "socialist realism"--the Communist euphemism for degrading art and literature into a more tool of Party rule. This "liberal" movement (the label is Khrushchev's) has had the following bases: 1. Certain teachers and schools were influenced by - Ell experimental eas. a yu n led and taught the group of modern artists whose pictures were privately shown to Khrushchev on 1 December. Ernst Neizvestny was a real pioneer in sculpture, and influenced other artists. In Keiv, students at the conservatory of music were experimenting with music on the twelve-tone scale. 2. Various Soviet writers (e.g., Yevtushenko, Andrey Voznesensky, Victor Nekrasov) have been able to travel abroad. These visits were doubtless intended totem press the world with the vitality of Soviet literature, Approved For Release 2000,08 P78-03Q(~ X00 11Qj Qpy-3 (6 pprovetl'F~or Release 200MIl P78-0306jA0{ 2bb0k1b6b7-3 but they also permitted the visitors to keep abreast of western developments. Publications from more lib- eral East European countries, especially Poland, also kept Soviet readers in touch with modern literature and art. 3. Certain publications were hospitable to new and original work. n Moscow, these included Zvezda (Star), Novy Mir (New World), and (until mid-December) Litera- turnaya Gaze'fa. iii Armenia, the local literary journal Soveea kan rakanutyun (Soviet Literature) has been scolde or pro singor defend ng formalism after the mid-December redefinition of the Party line. Even Pravda printed some of the work of Yevtushenko and oz estvensky. 4. The membership of the Moscow divisions of both the Union of Writers RSFSR and the Union of Artists `,i a become liberal in tone, and oar f the unions were tolerant. was die artists' union which staged the main exhibition seen by Xhrushchov on 1 December.) 5. The artistic and literary experimenters were--and doubtless s are--supported by youth and mem ers of the scientific intelligentsia. Students At Vie`-A n '- vers y o oscow have given a cold reception to de- fenders of socialist realism in art. There has been a notable lack of young men of talent who are also or- thodox socialist realists, and it is all too obvious that the current campaign against the "liberals" has been spearheaded by old Stalinists. On a broader, more popular level, young people all over the country have taken to western dance nusic and western fads in cloth- ing; even the Party's propaganda publications, like Moscow News, now show girls with western hairdos, and the Ivy League look has reached Moscow tailors. Some Moscow artists reportedly support themselves by selling their pictures to Soviet scientists and other well- heeled members of the elite. In the continental Euro- pean tradition, Soviet scientists seek to display a broad, and not merely a technical, education. Some of them have also fought battles with Party ideologists in their own fields, on the questions of quantum physics, relativity, or eugenics. With the publication of Yevtushenko's "Stalin's Heirs" last October, and of Solzhenitsyn's ONE DAY OF IVAN DENISOVICH last November, it seemed that the whole cultural revolt was coming to an open boil. Before the crackdown really came into effect, Victor Nekrasov had also published (in the November and Decem- ber issues of Novy Mir) articles openly criticizing current restraints SovieT7reedom, and openly admiring western aart, films, and architecture. Ilya Ehrenburg was (as noted) 2 Approved For Release 2000/0$127 _CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 (644. Continued) (Approves 'or Release 2000/0 78-0306j?ip00~'10'I10~60'l-3 explaining in print that his generation had known of Stalin's crimes, and had found it wise to keep quiet about them. This outbreak of free expression came close to being a direct attack on Soviet leadership. Not only the literary and artistic hacks were concerned; other Party officials seem to have been dis- turbed at these goings-on at a time when the Party was being reorganized from top to bottom (see Guidances #607, 3 December 1962, and #637, 25 March 1963), and when the USSR had suffered a diplomatic defeat in Cuba and was close to a break with Peking. The actions of the Soviet "establishment" in tightening controls are listed in an unclassified attachment; these events show how the Party has gradually encroached on the bases of liberalism listed above. The writers and artists continued to show some resistence until the meeting with Khrushchev 8 March, when the line was laid down more forcefully. Khrushchev's s_jeech showed his touchiness on three subjects: (1) Ehrenburg's assertion that the older generation knew of Stalin's crimes, but kept quiet (Khrushchev denied that he knew, although he had in effect admitted it in his 1956 Secret Speech); (2) Nekrasov's and film director M. Khutsiyev's hints that there was a split between generations (Khrushchev denied that there was a split, but admitted in the speech that he was "perhaps old-fashioned"); and (3) Robert Rozhdestvensky's suggestion that the younger writers spoke for youth (Khrushchev stoutly maintained that the Party spoke for youth). (For the text of the speech, see Press Comment 8 April 1963.) Khrushchev failed to be very convincing on any of these points, and he also avoided giving a blanket endorsement to the views of the cul- tural reactionaries. But, using Aesopian language, he made it clear that liberalism would not be tolerated. He said: "Can there be breaches of public order and deviations from the will of the collective under communism? There can. But they will obviously be individual cases. One cannot suppose that psychological disorder will be eliminated and that the rules of community will be safe from being violated by mentally deranged people. I can't say for certain but there will obviously be some means to curb the outbursts of lunatics. Today, too, there is the strait-jacket which is put on lunatics to deprive them of the possibility of raving and doing harm to themselves and others." Since his audience knew that several writers (including Mikhail Naritsa, Valeriy Tarsis, Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin and Valentin Ovechkin) had recently been committed to asylums, the meaning was clear. The statement recalled Khrushchev's threats at another meeting with writers in May 1957, when he said that the Hungarian "counter-revolution" could have been prevented if the Hungarian leaders had settled accounts with their writers; if the CPSU had to settle with Soviet writers, "our hand would not tremble." 3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CA-RDP78-03061~-099208019207-3 (644. Cent ) Approved Por Rele.a 2000/09/27 78-0306IA0802660406'67-3 Since the S March meeting, repression has been steppe,1 up. Yevtushenko has been obliged to exercise self-criticism. for permitting the publicati)n of his autobiography in L'ExTress; the authorities have cancelled the trip to England of poet Vladimir Sol3ukhtn; there have been proposal, that the various unions in literature and the arts be amalamated, or even that the party-member writers and artists be enrolled under plant and factory organs. Meanwhile, Stefan Hermlin, head of the poetry section of the East German Academy of Art, has been purged because of alleged.penetration of "enemy" tendencies in East German poetry, and. Soviet books dealing with the crimes of Stalin are now banner E_,st Germany. An edition of a Czech cultural journal (Kulturni Tvorba) has been confiscated because of sympathetic ref ences Soov et "liberals." Step by step, the Soviet regime. is closing in on its "liberals"--ending ex- perimentation in schools, shutting off foreign contacts, chang- ing or intimidating editors of literary journals, reshuffling the writers' and artists' unions. But Soviet youth and the sympathetic members of the scientific intelligentsia cannot be stopped from thinking. If, as in Stalin's day, the regime produces "silence.." that is likely to remain a surface phenom- enon; Ehrenburg's most serious offense is that, in describing the policy of silence, he has pointed out the limits of totali- tarian control. Unlikely to change the direction of Soviet opinion, artistic repression will presumably only isolate the Party from the intelligent public, and the Party will become increasingly a body of aging, outdated hacks. Yevtushenko and his like have tried to reconcile freedom and progress with com- munism; their effort failing, others will turn, not to communism but against it, toward freedom. - L5X1C1Ob 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Relea. 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-0306 00200010007-3 pril 1963 645 AF. AFRICAN SUMMIT: Meeting of the African Heads of to a (Conference of the Inter-African and a agasy rganiza io 1 - 25X1C10b AMO , AC]Mis Ababa, 23 May 1963. BACKGROUND: The forthcoming meeting of African Heads of State In is Ababa and the preceding Foreign Ministers' Conference beginning in Addis Ababa on 18 May result from a meeting of twenty (20) African states at Lagos in January of last year. (See unclassified Attachment for a listing of African states by various regional associations.) The Lagos grouping, known as the Monrovia powers, included a considerable majority of black Africa and represented, in general terms, the expression of moderate Pan-African sentiment as opposed to the so-called Casablanca group which links Guinea, Ghana, and Mali.;-with the Maghrebian and Islamic states of Morocco, the UAR, and Algeria. Despite their common aims on some basic questions, and despite substantial divergencies within the Monrovia group on specific issues, the Monrovia and Casablanca groups have reflected a polarization in the developing move- ment for pan-African unity. The Casablanca powers, in general, sought faster and more radical solutions, criticized continu- ing close relationships between African states and the metro- pole as a lingering colonial vestige, and displayed an anti- colonialism often indistinguishable from a sympathy for Bloc interests. In contrast to the Monrovia states, all of the Casablanca states, for example, received Bloc military aid at one time or another. The Monrovia powers, containing a fairly solid core of thirteen (13) countries (African Malagasy Union - UAM) which maintain friendly ties with France, have sought a more cautious path toward African cooperation, stressing economic and technical cooperation and continued friendly relationships with the West. The Lagos meeting of the Monrovia group, in January 1962 started on a pessimistic note--boycott by the Casablanca powers and confusion over the failure to invite the Provisional Algerian Government--but concluded with a sense of progress. The main result of the congress was a firm step toward effective unity of the African states, calling upon foreign ministers of the participating governments to draw up terms for a permanent, all-African organization. Developments during the past year have confirmed the significance of the Lagos meeting and complicated problems for the forthcoming Addis Ababa conference. Approved For Release 200 78-0300062M1-3 oged Relea 2000/0 /7 I- P78-03061A00200010007-3 on pril 1963 (1). A draft charter for the IAMO had been drawn up and signed December 20-21, 1962, by 17 of the original 20 states associated with the Monrovia grouping. (Selected portions of the Charter are contained in an unclassified Attachment.) Based upon mutual respect for sovereignty, non-intervention in the affairs of other states and peacefdl settlement of disputes, it provides the first concrete expression of moderate pan-African aims. The charter calls for a consultative supranational framework consisting of an Assembly of the Heads of State, a Council of Ministers, and a permanent secretariat with a relatively wide range of prerogatives, The signatory states agree to cooperate in common defense against aggression and subversion and in economic, educational, political, scientific, and health and welfare efforts. In contrast to this progress in organization displayed by the Monrovia states, the Casablanca grouping has become all but moribund, although its leaders are individually among the most vocal and energetic spokesmen for all-African nationalist causes. Guinea and Mali have indicated a desire to adhere to IAMO, and even Ghana.has been reported (in late February) to have decided to attend. The Arab members of the Casablanca powers-- Morocco, Algeria and the UAR-- are similarly reported to have requested invitations, although it is not clear whether they intend to become members. One complicating factor for member- ship may be that by charter, the IAMO's secretary- general must come from a French- or English-speaking country, thus excluding a candidate from the Arab countries. Three newly sovereign countries which were not originally the Lagos conference, i.e. Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, are also expected to join. So far the only known holdouts are Somalia, which is engaged in a border dispute with Ethiopia and dissatisfied with the IAMO's machinery for settling disputes; and Tanganyika, which is the leading member of PAFMECSA (Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa). (2). The overthrow of the government and assassination of President Olympic of Togo on January 13 presents a specific issue for handling by the participants at Addis Ababa. Twelve of the 13 UAM states have for the first time shown a major divergence from French policy by refusing to recognize the Togo rebel government of Grunitzky, which the French support. Olympic attended the Lagos meeting in 1962 and Togo is a charter member of IAMO. More significantly, some African leaders may look upon Olympia's assassination as a danger to the safety 2 Approved For Release 200 P78-03064 Q 30 k11Q#k7.3 rcr ncj F?r Relea 2000/8127_ : CIA-RDP78-0306 )00200010007-3 ril 1963 of other presidents and regimes and a foretaste of continued instability and revolt, particularly if it is "legitimatized" by passive acceptance as a fait accompli. A strong suspicion of Ghanaian complicity in Te rev lt_ is evidenced by the UAM powers who have created a joint defense staff, which however remains only a paper exercise since none of the UAM countries appear willing to surrender their sovereignty in this field. While it has been reported that Ghana's request for admission to IAMO will be granted, it is possible that some of the UAM states will seek to make the Togo revolt a test case at Addis Ababa, arguing that IAMO must take some action or forfeit at its inception any hope of pro- tecting Africa from a "Latin American pattern" of revolutionary instability. (3). Somalia has declined to attend the Addis Ababa meeting because of its diplomatic differences with Ethiopia over territorial claims. Engaged in a border controversy, these two countries represent the latent divisions which are repeated elsewhere--but less sharply at the moment--between Morocco and Mauritania, Guinea and Liberia, Zanzibar and Kenya, and Ghana and Togo. Progress in settling the Sonalia- Ethiopian dispute would enhance IAMO's stature and its hope to achieve a role as arbiter of such disputes. The IAMO must take definite steps to implement the charter, select a headquarters site /fhe French reportedly have offered a building for the secretariat in Dakar7, and name a secretary-general. Given the personal and national competition for leadership in Africa and the significant role such a person could play, the states may not be able to suppress their mutual suspicions and jealousies sufficiently to appoint an effective leader. In addition to dealing with these issues, and debating the terms of the charter, the IAMO conference is likely to deal with a wide range of issues of continuing interest to African states. These include African questions, such as the continuing vestiges of colonialism in Africa, the Angolan struggle for independence, Apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa, the possibilities of an African Common Market and the effects in Africa of the European Common Market, military bases in Africa, and the French nuclear test program in the Sahara; and international (i.e. non-African) questions, which will probably e o secondary importance. The discussions on international affairs may however have considerable anti-Western, anti-colonial overtones. (645 Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 25X1C1Oc Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 200 7 : CIA- DP78-0306.000200010007-3 8 pril 1963 646 FE,a. The Japanese Left 25X1C10b BACKGROUND: Since the end of World War II Japan has been ruled bya succession of conservative governments which have maintained a strong pro-Western and anti-Communist orientation. The ruling conservative Liberal-Democratic Party controls approximately 63?~percent of the popular vote and governs by absolute majority. Since 1945, Japan has not only recovered from the ravages of the Second World War but has re-established itself as the leading industrial nation of the Far East and the country with the highest economic growth rate in the world (average annual growth of 9 percent from 1950-1963 with an 18 percent growth in 1959 and 11 percent in 1963). However, while economic recovery has been rapid and remarkable, political and social reconstruction has been far less certain and today there is still a strong residue of political, social and Psychological disorientation as the country gropes for patterns with which to replace those swept away in the post-War period. Japanese attitudes toward foreign affairs combine a strong penchant for non-involvement with a desire for US assurance of their military and economic security. This latent neutralist sentiment has been particularly marked in the generation which has come of age since the War. Japanese experience in World War II produced a deep distrust of militarism and authoritarian government and concomitantly a desire to avoid the unpleasant realities of international life while pursuing a goal of domestic economic prosperity. Emergent Japanese democracy fostered an excessive degree of political irresponsibility among all major parties, the press, and intellectual elements. In this setting there has been a marked tendency for polarization of political concepts and political forces. Thus, sharply contending political alternatives have been offered the Japanese electorate by a radical Left favoring neutralism and greater rapprochement with China and the USSR, and by a conservative Right supporting the predominance of the United States in Japanese affairs. The cleavage between Right and Left remains deep, but the steady increase in the leftist vote in Japan since World War II has been accompanied in the past two years by evidence of a slight shift to the right by the non-Communist Left. The JSP. In the post-War era, the role of the Japanese Socialist arty (JSP)--the country's second largest political party--has been predominantly one of confused and sterile opposition which in turn has been a factor in retarding the Approved For Release 20 / 8 - DP78-0 MOA60fl 60E40607-3 ro a dtF9r Release 2000/08(27_: CIA-RDP78-030 0 ?09 61 007-3 development of a meaningful two- or three-party system of government in Japan and has adversely affected the growth of democratic political institutions. Despite its fairly strong representation in the Japanese parliament (211 out of a total of 717 seats or approximately 33 percent) and despite the number of genuine issues which it might profitably have exploited, the JSP has not been able to exercise an influence on the Liberal-Democratic Party or on the electorate commensurate with its representation. In the absence since World War II of strong leadership, the JSP has been plagued by disunity, factionalism, irresponsible power struggles, and disagreements over basic strategy (parliamentary gradualism versus mass action and violence) which have prevented it from achieving the position and influence of left-socialist parties in generally similar circumstances (c.f. the Italian Socialist Party under the leadership of Pietro Nenni), and have provoked an attitude of despair, bitterness and opportunism among its members. The lack of steady leadership has resulted in an alternation between the "gradual, " "reformist" tactics and the use of violence and excess in such a manner as to prevent the JSP from benefiting from either a united front with the Japanese Communists or from appealing to the mass electorate as a party of moderate and responsible reform. In 1960, public criticism of JSP extremism in the struggle against the US-Japanese security treaty caused the Party to emphasize the achieve=gent of socialist aims by peaceful means ("structural reform"). This image of respectability helped the Party win 23 seats in the lower house elections of November 1960 at the expense of the more moderate Democratic Socialist Party. Subsequently, however, extreme leftists--the Peace Comrades Society (Heiwa Doshikai) faction--used the then Secretary General Saburo Eda's alleged lack of militance in an attempt to replace him with their candidate. The advance of the militants ran into a snag when the former JSP Chairman Mosaburo Suzuki, heading a Party delegation to Peking, acquiesced (probably under pressure from extremists in his delegation) to the "common enemy" statement about US imperialism (the JCP line) and thus provoked a strong adverse reaction which damaged the JSP's image with the Japanese electorate. In November 1962, the extremist faction of the JSP finally did succeed in ousting Eda as Secretary General because of his "excessively liberal" views only to have their own candidate soundly defeated by Tomomi Narita who, while inclined to a more militant posture, in general appears to share the political philosophy of the deposed Eda. Differences between the moderate JSP faction and the Japanese Communists (according to the 1962 Policy Handbook of the JSP) can be summarized as follows: 2 Approved For Release 2000/ 78-030~jA?OQgQQQjQQq~-3 inr F4r Rele 2000/og/27_- C1A-RDP78-03011 1000?079119007-3 a. The JCP has not renounced the line of violent revolution. The JCP advocates a one-party dictatorship and does not recognize the existence of opposin parties-- L~l how will other parties in any united front fare after the revolution? c. The JCP has neglected the struggle from within the Diet and has spent its energy in censuring from the outside the activities of the JSP inside the Diet. d. The JCP is tied to Moscow and Poking and therefore is not really independent. The JSP has frequently asserted also that it cannot form a united front with the JCP as long as the latter insists on imposing its own stand re the primacy of the "struggle against American imperialism." Regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute, the JSP agrees--or at least its current leaders agree--in general with the viewpoint of the CPSU; however, since they have historic precedents of friendship with the CCP they try to refrain from taking sides or indulging in open criticism of Peking. Roughly paralleling the stand of the JSP on all issues is that of Japan's largest labor federation, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo). Though the Sohyo leadership appears less committed to the JSP concept of "structural reform," it stresses a position of "positive neutrality" and joins the JSP in efforts to diminish JCP influence in its own affiliates and in popular mass organiza- tions such as the anti-nuclear weapons movement, which has been thrown into complete discord and confusion by JSP/Sohyo insistence on criticism of nuclear testing by any country, a position which has placed them in direct opposTon to the JCP and the Chinese Communists. The Democratic Socialist Party (DS?). Formed in early 1960 by rightist dissidents from the , the DSP initially included 54 members of the Japanese Diet and was supported by Zenro, Japan's second largest trade union organization. The Democratic Socialists entered the elections of November 1960 on a moderate platform which advocated an independent foreign policy which was neither pro-Communist nor unduly subservient to the United States, recognition of Communist China and the gradual modification of the US-Japanese Security Treaty. It stressed adherence to parliamentary democratic practices and moderate trade unionism. However, the Japanese voter, accustomed to a more dramatic and oversimplified Approved For Release 2000 6E&Vf W61 7-3 6RRr ` %i For Relea 2000&84.27 : C . RDP78-0306.U000200010007-3 pril 19;3 presentation of issues, responded unenthusiastically and elected only 17 members of the DSP to the Diet. In the Rouse of Councillors election in 1962, only 11 DSP candidates were voted in. The effect of this major defeat of the Democratic Socialist Party was to renov for the imgediato future any prospect of a moderate and responsible opposition party to which governmental powers could be transferred without radical re-orientation of Japan's political and economic structure as well as her international affiliations. The JCP. As for the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which i aa membership of approximately 90,000 and six seats in the Diet, it too is divided over the course of the "revolution" and the basic strategy involved in seizing pottier. In general, the Party leadership believes that the use of exclusively peaceful means will not bring about the changes they advocate and that under prevailing Japanese conditions a more militant and revolutionary approach is in order. While conceding that the forces of the loft are still too weak to seize and hold power and that the establish- ment of pro-conditions for a successful revolution demand a broad united front in order to profitably exploit public sentiments favoring "peace" and a more independent fro reign policy, the JCP leadership is convinced that the most important requisite for takeover is to deprive the present Japanese government of military and economic support from the United States. Since, in their eyes, the United States controls Japan's economic, political and military life through the security treaty, "US imperialism" is for the-al the main enemy and renouncement of the treaty their most important Immediate objective. Thus, the militant JCP leadership favors a "two-stage" revolution on the premise that Japan is a semi-occupied nation dominated by American imperialism and its ally, Japanese monopoly capitalism. In this way, stage one is to be a "people's democratic" revolution in which the JCP with the assistance of other "progressive" forces (presumably the JSP and cooperative elements of the bourgeoisie) seize power and eliminate US influence and its lackeys, the local monopoly capitalists. This first "revolution" would be followed directly (i.e. without the traditional "liberal bourgeois" interregnum) by the second or "socialist" stage of nationali- zation of the industry, the land etc. as in East Europe. Those in the Party who oppose this concept (previously identified with Shojiro Kasuga, former Chairman of the Central Committee Control and Auditing Con-mission who broke with the JCP in July 1961) hypothesize that the country is actually at a more advanced stage and that it is currently no longer controlled by American imperialists but by the local Approved For Release 20 FMP78-036(?' ikaZ820MOD)D7-3 TON 1. or Release 200010.8/27 - C1A_RDP78-0336 ;Oipi02p 9 0007-3 monopoly capitalists. More important, like Palmiro Togliatti and the majority of Italian Communists, they believe that "seizure of power" and the first stage of the revolution can be accomplished more effectively through gradualism and internal reform. Naturally, these ideological differences relate directly to vital practical issues such as increasing popular support, exerting greater pressure on the government etc. Above all, perhaps, the question of strategy relates to the objective need for an effective united front with the more powerful and influential JSP. The accomplishment of JCP objectives is directly related to the degree of cooperation they can develop with the Japanese socialists, who predominate in Sohyo, the largest labor union, and in other mass organiza- tions; however, the inflexibility, intransigence and extremism of the JCP under the leadership of Secretary General Kenji Miyamoto have alienated all but the most rabid JSP elements and have contributed to the relative isolation which has characterized the Japanese Communist Party since 1953 when it abandoned the posture of respectability. The defection of the Kasuga moderates in 1961 has tended to emphasize the trend toward militancy and isolation. While there is no conclusive evidence that JCP divisions are exclusively along pro-Moscow or pro-Peking lines, the Japanese Communists--on the basis of racial similarity, geographic proximity, historic precedents, etc.--are basically inclined toward the Chinese. And further, while the JCP--which only stands to lose from any split in the international movement--has adopted a position of strict neutrality (its latest statements on the question being cited as evidence of support by both Moscow and Peking), Miyamoto and the Party leadership are convinced that the Communist revolution in Japan cannot be effected along the Khrushchev line. Communist Dissidents. The Communist dissidents who broke away from e in 1961 have not thus far been able to pose an effective threat to the ?arty in terms of siphoning off any appreciable number of Communist votes. They have, however, been a constant source of concern to the Party as evidenced by its continuing bitter attacks on them in its publications. Since their defection from the JCP, the dissidents have divided into two organizations, namely: the Socialism Reform Movement (Shakaishugi Kakushin Undo), headed by Tomcchika Naito and Hikoyoshi Nishikawa, which functions as a political party and ran a candidate in the last House of Councillors elections; and the United Socialism League (Toitsu Shakaishugi Doraei), led by Shojiro Kasuga and llo uzaemon Yamada, in which intellectuals predominate and which does not favor the immediate formation of a political party. These two organizations are not inimical, their Approved For Release 200 /1 DP78-03" '1df W07-3 M p fd for Release 200 1 -RDP78-0I06 Q~021S pJ10007-3 differences being over the form of their opposition to the JCP. A number of United Socialism League supporters have lent their services to the JSP and have played an important role in the development of the JSP "structural reform" theory. The dissidents are a particular source of irritation to the JCP on the question of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Socialist Reform Movement, in particular, through its organ, Atarashii Rosen (New Route) holds up to constant public attention its support of the Soviet line and its accusation that the JCP is subservient to the Chinese Communists, causing the Party to react in its own publications, thus emphasizing the dilemma it faces in trying to remain neutral in the dispute. Neither dissident organization has a large membership, but both have organ papers and are fairly vocal. They have not induced any subsequent defections of JCP members in any numbers, but it is possible, as evidenced by recent defections in Saga Prefecture, that their emphasis on the Soviet line may strike a receptive cord in the areas outside Tokyo and cause the Party further trouble particularly if the latter should appear to be becoming more militantly pro-Chinese. 25X1C10b 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For RelG.%se 2000/08/27 : 'CIA-RDP78-0306?1A000200010007-3 TIII: JAPAN TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 24, 1963 Battle of Intelligence Soviet Union Increasing'and Strengthening Espionage Apparatus By HHOIt'I11 KOBAYASHI The Intense rivalry l etween All of the facts known to the United Stites and Soviet Australlan authorities concern- Russia over nuclear weapons in? the Skripov case have been and development of their means revealed through articles In the of delivery is continuing with newspapers and the wire serv- no end In sight despite the ef- ices. In many ways It looks forts of the lit-nation Interna- like the same old story, and in do nal Convention on Nuclear many ways it Is. Disarmament In Geneva. But on the other hand, It I,,,' One of the aspects of this also quite revealing, not only of fierce competition Is shown 1 v the aims and methods of Soviet the Intensified battle of int(,III? intelligence, but of the attitudes gence between the two camps. and problems of the Soviet Gov- Numerous espionage cases ernment. These aspects of the have been revealed In the past case deserve careful considera- several years. The Russian spy tion and should be brought to Rudolf Abel was arrested In the the attention of the world pub- U.S. The Lonsdale case occur- lic generally to Improve its red in Britain in 1959 and, last understanding of the Soviet in- year,'the Vassal spy case came telligenc?e services. into the limelight while the Defection of '11legats' Petrov and Skripov cases in In recent years the cases of Australia also made headlines, some of these Illegal officers The Soviet newspaper Izvestia have come to the attention of criticized the United States in the public through arrest or de- its issue of March 10 charging fection. It was the defection of that a Red Army lieutenant one of them, Lt. Col. Relno colonel had been kidnaped by an llaghanen that led to the arrest che. In of colonel of State Security Ru? American embassy atta dolf Moscow the trial of British husi- Abel, who nad been an "il- nessman Greville Wynne is legal" for many years in the about to start. United States. Another illegal The West recently has been whose case received wide pith- s ante concerned with Soviet Iiclty was that of Conon Mola- espionage activities. At the dy, the man known as Lonsdale, same time, the number of de- arrested In Britain In 1959 and fections of Soviet spies is in- still imprisoned there. creasing. Counteresplonage authorities Skripov (rase of the Free World allege that there are several other cases On Feb. 7 this year, the Gov. In which the Soviet "illegals" ernment of Australia declared have defected or been caught, the first secretary of the Soviet but they have refused to give Embassy in Canberra, Ivan Skrt- any particulars, presumably be? pov, persona non grata, charg cause the "Illegals" in question ing him with "elaborate prepa- are now working as "double ration for espionage." agents." Skripov was alleged to have In the period from the end of recruited an Australian woman the Second World War to 1951 as his agent to support the in. the Soviet Union had succeed- telligence operations of an uni- the in establishing good teiations dentified man who has apparent- with Australia. Soviet purchas- ly not been located by the Aus- es of Australian exports, pri- tralian authorities. In the marily woo]. became an !ncrvas. course of her work for Skripov, Ingly imporant factor in Aus- the woman was given a high tr lia's economic life, although speed radio transmitter, at)- Soviet Influence In Aust'celia waq parently destined for use by the certainly never great. Then unidentified man and she also came the Petrov case. recovered from an Australian graveyard a hidden Canadian Petrov Incident passport, also apparently to Je Petrov was a Soviet Stalle used by "Mr. X." security officer attached to the Although the identity of the Soviet Embassy In Canhcrra. He "Mr. X" called a "man of my- became tnc?reasingty attached to stew" In the Australian press, the free and open Australian remains unknown, his status life he saw around him and cl'is- and the functions he was to per. illusioned with the system of form are quite clear from the communism. Finally when h(, evidence avallable. Ife was a began to be hounded by his Soviet intelligence officer in the headquarters in Moscow for fai- so-called "illegal apparat." That lure to fulfill certain assigned is to say he was an officer of tasks, he defected and told all the Committee of State Securi- to the Australian authorities, ty KGB). Ills defection was one of the Fish That Got Away most dramatic in history be- While this man may prove to Carus(' after he had gone over be one of the fish that got away. to the Australians, oflicials of her i; profe,,sionally related to the Soviet Embassy tried to ltudOIf Al ul and Gordon Lons- kidnap his wife and drag her dale, two Soviet intelligcnc?e of- hack to the Soviet Union. flcers from the "illegal apparat" The impact of the Petrov in- who were arrc:tcd within the trident was Such that the Soviets last few years in the United broke relations with the Aus- State; and Great 131-itain. trallans and all of their careful work in building up a new Image of an enlightened and co- operative Soviet Union was de- stroyed. Then In 1959 the So- viets reestablished relations with Australia and Skripov ar- rived In Canberra in 1959. Increasing Activity The impact on relations be- tween the Soviet Union and Australia of the Skripov case still remains to be measured, but it is certain that again Mos- cow's efforts to present an en- lightened and smiling counten- ance "clown under" have been wrecked and wrecked again by a Soviet State security officer engaged in trying to build up an "Illegal apparat" in Aus- tralia. One would think that one such experience would be enough, but knowing the So- viets one must concede that pro- bably their reaction to their second failure will be to try again. Nikita Khrushchev has stated with great frequency and occa- sionally with eloquence that he believes In peaceful coexistence and that he denies the inevi- tablllty of war. He has gone so far as to say that nations who engage In espionage are preparing for war and to claim that the Soviet Union does not engage in such activity. Counteresplonage authorities of the West assert that at present the Soviet Intelligence system is not only engaging In espionage to the limit of Its abilities, but also giving special emphasis to strengthening and to increasing the size of its illegal apparatus It is particularly noteworthy that control within the struc- tures of the state and the party In the Soviet Union are being reinforced. Total Authority It is the creation of the new party-state control committee of the Central Committee and - even more significant-the ap- pointment of Alexander N. She- ](,pill to bead this new control organ. The summary and comment- ary on the statute of this new committee which appeared in Pravda on Jan. 18, this year makes clear how total Shelep- In's authority will be. It ap- pear; incontrovertible that or- ganizationally he now occupies the party-slot which will weigh most heavily on those elements of Soviet society with the ini- tiative and incentive to seek liberalization. Shelepin's job, It Is said, will be to convert the vast party- state structure into a massive bureaucratic "KG I3 apparatus," rvghnenting Soviet society with- in the framework of Khrush. chevist "Stalinism." Free World secur'ity' services today are Increasingly alert to the menace posed by the illegal agents. We Japanese fervently hop(, that these espionage activities which promotes distrust among nations will be completely- wip- ed out from this earth. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/018/27 :?CIA-RDP78-03 1A000200010007-3 8 April 1963 LIST OF UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS Reference attachment Briefly Noted "Battle of intelligence" from The Japan Times, March 24, 1963 643 NE,g. "The Baghdad Press Attacks Communism" "Recent Statements by Arrested Communists Over Baghdad Radi-" "Chronology of Current Soviet CampaI.n Against Artistic and Literary Freedom" "Regional Lssociations of African States" "Excerpts from 1962 Prop's ed Charter of the Inter-African and Malagasy States Organi- sation" Moscow's Stand on International Communist Unity Moscow's indecisive and often irrelevant answer to the Chinese Communist challenge to its leadership of the World Communist Movement, published in the February 1963 issue of the World Marxist Review, is reprinted and Interpreted in a short introductory essay. Side by side with the text of the Reliew arti- cle is a commentary pointing out its inaccuracies, in- dicating omissions, and otherwise stressing significant features of the "reply." "Moscow's Stand on International Communist Unity" (unclassified) is attached. 25X1C10b 25X1C10b Approved For Release 200iDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Re ggeF?QMQ?/Wi."C, 4 @F0 1?4&9 00010007-3 The Baghdad daily, Al Thawra, in an editorial on 20 March 1963, said: "Communism is a tyrannical movement which wanted to rule the country in spite of its small numbers and in spite of the fact that eighty percent of the local Com- munists are foreigners, a movement whose central com- mittee met in a room at the Ministry of Defense. "We had two enemies: Abd al Karim Qasim and commu- nism. With those two enemies we could not live in peace. That is why they both agreed to fight and crush the nationalist movement. But one thing paralyzed this agreement, because while agreeing to crush us, they were at the same time struggling for power. "We have triumphed and it is our right to purge the country from their filth. It is our right to make an extensive purge and to kill them all. They know that this is our right, but they are trying by all means to stop the using of this right, including the attacks made by Moscow radio and the Communist states. They are making plans to return to act against us, and we are doing the same. "We must rise to the level of the fight against the enemies because any leniency with them will take us below the level of the fight, the fight which must end with one of us remaining in the field, and then regret will be of no The Baghdad daily, Al Jihad, carried a column on 19 March 1064 which stated: "We should not be content with fighting the local Communists only because of their crimes and because they resisted the 14 Ramadan revolution. We should fight communism as an ideology because its tenets go counter to our beliefs as Moslems. Communism is bent on de- stroying the religion of Islam. Communism does not believe in the existence of God and claims that life is only matter; Why should we not fight communism for its blasphemy and heresy. "Our government may say whatever it likes regarding communism for international considerations, but we, as a Moslem people, must express what our immortal divine religion dictates, and what the holy Koran says." Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Anorovetd or Rase 2000/08/27 'CIA-Op -0 1A000200010007-3 cen fate ents By Arrested Communists Over Baghdad Radio March 16: Brigadier Hasan Abbud, former commander of the Mosul garrison, admitted that for some time he was a card- holding member of the Communist Party. He described Qasim as "selfish" and "hesitant" and a chronic "liar" who "had a great flair for contradictions." He asserted that the communists had backed Qasim completely and that Qasim in return had helped the communists materially and morally. Abbud described the circumstances surrounding his appointment as the commander of the Mosul garrison just after the Ash-Shawwaf uprising in March 1959 and said that both Qasim and Major General al-Abdi, former chief of staff and military governor general, told him he would receive his orders directly from Taha ash-Shaykh Ahmad, the communist chief of Qasim's military intelligence. He described the "grisly and barbaric" crimes of the communists and their associates in Mosul and other places after the suppression of Ash-Shawwaf's uprising in Mosul. Abbud maintained that he was being treated well by the authorities and the examining magistrates who were questioning him. March 6: Statement made by Iraqi Communist leader Sharif ash- aykh: In order to refute misleading information media and mercenary trumpets, we present these irrefutable confessions, facts, and items of evidence which are above doubt and forgery because the tongue convicts. During the past few weeks, communist propaganda media have been telling lies and fabrications. During the past few weeks, the enemies of right and justice have been trying desperately to distort the meaning of our progressive revolution and its noble and good aims. During the past few weeks, the rabid campaigns have continued to carry cheap lies and to shed crocodile tears. Today, however, we shall not reply to them. We shall not waste our time. We shall not attempt to argue with them about the lies they have reiterated every day. We shall let their own witnesses voluntarily reveal the facts which the rabid information media have refused to concede. Today we shall begin with Sharif ash-Shaykh, a member of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party. Citizens, Sharif ash-Shaykh addresses you: "I am lawyer Sharif ash-Shaykh. My party pseudonym is Harith. I was a member of the party central committee. I wish to tell the public about events which involved the party and which occurred in connection with the current national revolution which has won control in our country. "It is known that the Iraqi Communist Party drew up a political plan to resist any revolution in the country on the grounds that such a revolution would endanger national independence. However, it is especially important that everyone know that Abd al-Karim Qasim's rule was a dictatorship which caused calamities among all sections of the people, except the reactionaries and the agents of imperialism. Therefore, any plan to resist this dictatorship was a sound plan provided that those who implements xt, or rather those who staged the revolution, undertook to combat imperialism and to support the general national interests of the sons of the people. The plan implemented by the party on the first day of the revolution and the statements against the revolution--which was aimed, as declared in the first communique, against the criminal dictatorship of Abd al-Karim Qasim--were wrong and very harmful to all the interests of the country. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For please 2000/08/27-: CIA-RDP78Q061 A000200010007-3 "Undoubtedly the current national revolution has declared itself against imperialism and has also declared its readiness to destroy the dictatorship under which the people suffered for many long years. The first communique also announced airs which were in the interest of all the people, except the reactionaries. Therefore the party's attitude in resisting this revolution and the propaganda carried by the information media of the socialist countries are not serving the people's interests but are only serving to weaken the existing national revolutionary regime which is anti-imperialist and against dictator- ship and whose aims are in the interest of all the sons of the people. "Therefore all the sons of the people must take a definite stand--first, on consolidating the national revolution; and second, on resisting these propaganda campaigns which are not in their interest, nor in the interest of the sons of Arabhood, nor in the interest of anyone in the world." March 6: Isam al-Qadi, who had been in charge of the Baghdad co aittee of the Iraqi Communist Party, said in a letter to the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (read over the radio): The policy of the treacherous Iraqi Communist party against the revolution is aimed at killing innocent people, creating dissension among the people, and attempting to impede the march of the glorious revolution. Al-Qadi added that this policy is part and parcel of the party's hostile attitude toward national revolutionary elements and its fight against such elements through various ways and means. He also said that the attitude adopted by the propaganda media of some of the communist countries toward the Iraqi revolution shows a lack of understanding of the meaning of the progressive revolution against imperialism and feudalism. March 6: Abd as-Sattar Majdi Muhammad Rida, in charge of the -peasant's office of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party having stated that Qasim, his clique, and his henchmen in the party betrayed the revolution--both its targets and achievements; Qasim, he added, imposed a dictatorship on the people and depended on the Communist Party to help suppress sincere nationalist elements. He added: This was indeed a deceitful and dirty role which led to disunity and a prolonging of the rule of the murderous Qasimite regime. The party played a criminal role in the events which took place in Kirkuk and Mosul where the most abhorrent crimes were committed. Later the party adopted a hostile attitude toward the present blessed revolution and advocated the carrying of arms against it instead of carrying arms against the tyrant dictator. As a result, the party has added a new crime to its criminal record. Because of this criminal attitude adopted by the party, innocent people--who would have enjoyed the people's festivals and participated in the building of the country-- were killed. March 7: Latif al-Haj Ali Haydar. Communist leader: My party pseudonym is Miqdam (meaning: the daring). The party mission entrusted to me was military organization of officers and soldiers at Ar-Rashid camp. For a long time the Communist Party asserted the need to consolidate Abd al-Karim Qasim's regime on the grounds that it was a national regime , and that any movement or revolution against the regime would be an imperialist and reactionary movement which would not serve the people's interests but the interests of imperialism Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Afro ed For Rase 2000/08/27- CIA-RDP78-0 1A000200010007-3 n tvhas basa , the party emphasized that it would resist any movement against Abd al-Karim Qasim's regime. "It is obvious that the Communist Party, which ever since the outbreak of the national July revolution sought to consolidate the autocratic and military dictatorship of Qasim, had an interest in maintaining this regime. By supporting Qasim's regime, the Communist Party intended to destroy other national forces in order ultimately to seize power when Karim Qasim remained alone in the arena. Thus, when the blessed national revolution of 14 Ramadan broke out, the party began to resist it and issued statements calling for armed resistance. There followed resistance movements against the revolution in various parts of Baghdad, including the Kurdish quarter where I myself was. (Passage describing the communist resistance in the Kurdish quarter omitted) "The party's attitude toward the blessed 14 Ramadan revolution has provided new evidence of the Communist Party's betrayal of the mission which it was supposed to perform in order to serve the people. The party has proved that it cares only for its own interests and for its attempt to secure power at the expense of the people's and homeland's interests. The party's attitude is a followup to the chain of criminal and traitorous stands it has taken ever since the outbreak of the national July revolution. "Therefore, the new series of propaganda campaigns launched by the propaganda media in the socialist countries lacks logic and evidence. On the contrary, the national revolutionary authorities which were confronted by the armed resistance of the Communist Party did not retaliate with a terrorist campaign of revenge against the communists as individuals. The authorities simply acted in a justifiable and legitimate manner against a party which declared armed resistance against the revolution from the very beginning. "This campaign of propaganda is aimed at distorting the stand of the revolutionary authorities and at distracting the authorities in order to prevent them from carrying out the constructive work which is expected of them, and which in fact they are doing. This campaign does not serve the Iraqi people's interests; nor does it enhance the attitude of the revolutionary authority toward the socialist countries. This authority does not consider the socialist countries as enemies; but rather, in pursuance of the policy of neutrality, considers them as countries with whom it can cooperate on the basis of equality and nonalignment." (Brief passage omitted saying that the propaganda campaign only serves reaction, imperialism, and forces opposing Arab construction) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For F ease 2000/08/27 ': CIA-RDP78-O.3 61A000200010007-3 Chronology of Current Soviet Campaign Against Artistic and Literary Freedom 1 December 1962 - Khrushchev visits public and private art exhibits, expresses disgust at abstract and "formalist" art. 3 December - Pravda editorial "Art Belongs to the People" condemns jazz and abstract art. 4 December - Boris loganson, moderate President of Soviet Academy of Arts, replaced by conservative Vladimir Aleksandrovich Serov. 17 December - Leonid Fedorovich Ilichev, Chief of CPSU Central Committee, spells out new Party line to 400 writers and artists at meeting attended by Khrushchev, who added his own sharp comments. Writers and artists defend themselves. 18 December - Dmitri Shostakovich's 13th Symphony, composed to accompany five poems by Yevgeni Yevtushenko, performed in Moscow despite attack by Ilichev. (Yevtushenko later obliged to revise text.) Also on 18 December, Party organization of Moscow division of the Writers' Union fails to elect any conservative to its board. 24-26 December - CPSU Ideological Commission, headed by Ilichev, meets with 140 young artists, writers and composers. 27 December V.A..Kosolopov,:liberal editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta, replaced by conservative Aleksandr akovsky. 31 December -.Article in Komm.unist by unofficial conservative leader Vsevolod Koc etov appeals for a return to inspirational literature, but'avoids name-calling.'- 4 January 1963 - A leksandr.Laktionov, conservative artist, attacks .115 formalist artists,, . .5'art critics,, also writers Ilya Ehrenburg and Yuriy Nagibin, in Pravda. 9 January 1963 - In article an Trud, Aleksandr Gerasimov, .art dictator under ,Stalin, attacks' many of those denounced by Lal ti-ono.v, also criticizes ;several publications, Literaturnaya Gaz?ta, the Izvestia Sunday suppiement Nede ya, and ()goner. Izvestia replies with mild criticism of`erasimov, 12 Juary .) : . 14 January - Pravda publishes semi-recantation by artist Andre y Va.>rnetsov., condemning abstract art but asserting the rights of art:.ts,. to use all other styles. Also on 14 January,, _ar,.ieje.:in Kommunist s'larply criticizes L teraturnaya Ga et for b avi :g ailed sculptor Ernst Neizve my whit dolayijig a critique of formalism with bureaucrat is .red-tap.e... 29 January "V. 4 Yermilov attacks Ehrenburg in Izvestia hitting mainly at Ehrenburg's doctrine of "si ence," (Ehrenburg reply `and,.Yermilov rebuttal appear. in 6 February :,Izvesti:a., with .editors siding strongly witli Yermilov. 16 February -,Art uni.on".gfficial D..Mochalsky. admits in article . `in Sovetsk.ya :Kultura. that Moscow division of Artists Union bviid1ed in choosing pictures for exhibition at its '3Oth Anniversary Exhibition (the public exhibition seen by Khrushchev on 1 December; this exhibition closed on. 17 February after attendance by ?4)0, 003 people).. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 21 February - Boris Ioganson, former President of Soviet Academy of Arts, publishes article in Kommunist condemning abstractionism and maintaining that "t people" are the supreme judges of art. 8 March Khrushchev addresses 7-8 March meeting of Party leaders and Sob writers and artists, dismissing ideas that Stalin generation guilty or that it split from younger generation, condemning abstractionism and formalism, and making veiled threat of asylum commit- ment for those refusing to follow Party line. Khrushchev also indicated that non-conforming artists would be kept at home. 11 March - Painter Ye. Vuchetich and writer A. Chakovsky urge in Pravda that all creative intellectuals should be united into a single union. 14 March - Leningrad artists demand freedom of expression at meeting called to lay down Party line. 16 March - V. Kochetov, in article in Literaturraya Gazeta, joins in call for a single union. (0-H_1 r)h: rch,Tarty Secretary Yusupov of Kazakhstan told his Central Committee that he favored proposal made at 7-G March meeting to abolish Party organizations in creative unions, and put writer-artist Party members under Party organs in plants and factories.)) 19 March Ernst Neizvestny says on Moscow Radio,that an artist has a right to experiment, but must not produce something entirely severed from tradition; further, an artist should listen to criticism. 27-29 March -- Work of young writers denounced at plenary meeting of Soviet 'i riters' Union. Ycc,,tushenko admits publication of autoobiography in L'Expross was mistake, claims latter di.._a,orted his text; s ~riticisn of him and of Neizveotny not destructive but constructive. 2 April - 'Writer Mikhail Sokolov (not to be confused with Mikhail Sholokhov; (,azeta article that people like "=Te viushenko wh are ^ umat .re as artists, civilians, and politicitc.,ns should stay home, "learn sense--and only then go out as propagandists of a new world." Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For W ease 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-Q? p61A000200010007-3 Regional Associations of African States Nigeria Ethiopia Liberia S . Le one Mauretania Senegal Ivory Coast Cameroons Dahomey Upper Volta Niger Chad Congo (Braz) Gabon CAR Malagasy Togo Congo (Lea) Somalia Libya Tunsia Morocco UAR Ghana Guinea Mali Algeria Tanganyika Uganda Rwanda Burundi Sudan Original Lagos Signers of Probable Monrovia Conf. IAMO Charter UAM Casablanca IAMO Powers Participants (Dec. '62) Members Powers Members Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Lease 2 6th ' :ffH4a-RIDB'd8-q, 061A000200010007-3 PROPOSED CHARTER OF THE INTER-AFRiCAN AND MALAGASY STATES ORGANISATION (ADOPTED IN PRINCIPLE) PREAMBLE WE the ',African, and Malagasy Heads of States and. Governments assembled'in'Lagos, Nigeria; 'INSPIRED by : the.aim?Qf.our peoples for brotherhood, soli- darity, .co-operat.ion~and unit.y,:?as evidenced by the previous historic conferences held in furtherance of this aim; ANXIOUS to affirm our.adherence to the Charter of th.e. United Nations and the Convention of Human Rights; DEDICP,`TED to the progress of a freed from colonisat.ion; renascent.. Africa forever DESIROUS''th4t all 'Africa should henceforth unite for the preservat-iot of independence and freedom:. without; which the welfare and ell-being. of its people.. cannot be assured;. COIISCIOUS' of t'he responsibility of our governments and peoples to demonstrate the. capacity of the human. race-to over- come ethnic and national differences in the interest of peace and to direct-all knowledge towards the promotion of human progress; CONVINCED that all?the independent_.African -and, Malagasy States are des .rous,.of. creating an African solidarity to which each State can , contribute its: experience ; and achievements, WILLING to'weloome in a spirit of fraternity any concrete proposal intended .,to..-promote =.effective.part icipat ion of all independent African and Malagasy States in a common organisa- tion; '.'avo1.d. r~iyalr..y. . = ,-conf lict'~ among all "independ-~ ent African 'and 'Malagasy,-States by.,-consciously creating and maintaining institutions.capab:le: ;of furthering a common des- tiny. HAVE agreed'..iao the present Charter and by these presents establish an association of : African and Malagasy States. PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES ARTICLE . 1-. 1. The High Cant'r`actix}g, parties of,.African. and Malagasy States do by the present,Charter . estakt:lish..the. organisation.. to.: be known as the Inter African and,Malagasy ORGANISATION 2. This Organisations-abl shed,. for;,the .purpose of -pro- moting a better f0-'.r .the peoples of.Afr,ica and Malagasy by enlisting the:-efforts:o.finember states. through :.cooperative and joint action6; in`order--toi (a) atccslerate :'economic and social development and (bY provide better and broader educational opportu- int.excourse :.aria 'to ? promote, the pooling and effec- tive: utilisation of t3 eir. resources; nit);es for...its peoples; (c) the .levee of.. health-..and well-being of its :,;.and.: 4 ;R Approved For Release 2000108/27: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 (d) concert, as far as possible, political actions and initiate new means of establishing relation- ships in which the interests of the continent of Africa and Malagasy will be better defined and served. The High Contracting Parties, in pursuit of these and similar purposes, agree to attain these essential objectives: (a) Economic Co-operation - (i) to establish means for removing formal obstacles to African and Malagasy trade so as to provide markets sufficiently large to encourage the growth of efficient industries; (ii) to'e'stablish new sources and channels of trade among.countries.and regions of..Africa, (iii) to provide an institutional framework for facilitating economic, commercial, and indus- trial co-operation that shall-permit the mem- ber states jointly to adopt suitable economic programmes within appropriate regions and to speak to the rest of the world on the basis of common economic policies; and (iv) to raise and.establish funds for the develop- merit Of their resources. (b) Educational and Cultural Co-operation - (i) to modernise and expand educational, scientific, and professional facilities on a co-operative basis; (ii) to facilitate a close alignment of educational policies with a view to promoting the co-ordina- tion of educational, scientific, and professional institutions and programmes; and (iii) to accelerate cultural exchangefor the widest possible participation in and sharing of the African and Malagasy cultural heritage. (c) Health and Nutritional Co-operation - (i) to control disease through joint action and to provide joint programmes for appropriate services and training; and .(ii) toco-ordinate national health, medical, and nutritional policies through planned programmes, wit'h.a view to strengthening human potentialities. (d) Political and 'Diplomatic Co-operation - To foster. closer co-operation in. political and dip- lomatic fields (e) 'Scientific and Technical Co-operation - To encourage scientific research and technical train- ing and assistance on a co-operative basis among the Afric _~n and Malagasy States. (f) 'Co-operation for Defense - To.explore the possibility of building up the defense of the Africanand Malagasy, States against external aggression and in safeguarding their territorial integrity.. ARTICLE , For the realisation of the objectives stated in Articles find 2, the Nigh' Contracting Parties adopt and affirm these principles: (a) sovereign equality of African and Malagasy States, whatever may be the size of their territories, the density of their. populations, or the value of their possessions; Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approv d For Fease 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-G.D61A000200010007-3 non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States; (c) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to inde- pendent existence; (d) peaceful and harmonious settlement of all disputes arising among the African and Malagasy States; (e) unqualified condemnation of any subversive activity on the part of neighbouring or other States; (f) the constant promotion and fostering of all avail- able means of co-operation in the fields of economics, health,: nutrition, education, and culture; and .(g) dedication to the total emancipation of the remaining dependent territories of Africa. ORGI'eNISATION OF CO-OPERATION AND SPECIALISED AGENCIES ARTICLE 25 In order to establish conditions favourable to economic co-operation and joint economic endeavours, the High Contract- ing Parties herby. establish THE .ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN AND MLLAQI,SY ACONOMIC. CO--OPERA `IC '.'AND, DEVELOPMENT-, which shall function in .- acc:ordaance with''! a' treaty.'to. be negotiated and which shall be' regarded as an integral part ' of the present t Charter . CULTURAL CO-OPERATION 2 ' 8 " The High Contr'xcting Pax ties agree to promote and accel- erate the. consol ,dat?ion of our African cultures and traditions in the. interest of - preserving' our' heritage, and shall use their efforts in creating the 'machinery for their fulfilment. _.(O-OPERATION IN THE 'FIELD OF HEALTH AND NUTRITION -ARTICLE" 27 , The High Contracting Parties agree to engage in programmes through joint actions ; to er.adicat.e disease; to co-ordinate their respective health, medical and nutritional, policies; and to provide appropriate services and training for these pur- poses. The High Contracting-Parties agree to conclude a sepa- rate treaty for co-operation in the fields of health and :nutrition... CO-4P tATI.O xN 'JE1E . FIELD OF : flESEARCI .RTICLE 28. . 1. The High Contracting ':o arties agree that those member States which have'.medicai institutions-shall serve the Organi- sation in training` medical and paramedical personnel and shall also undertake research, the nature and scope of which shall include continuous ingtaiiry into and study of problems of health -arid nutrition. , 2.` Information derived from .made available.. to all.., these inquiries shall be ARTICLE 29 The High Contracting Parties-further agree that a scien- tific research organisation shall-?,be co-operatively established, developed and supported. `Towards-?this end, they agree to con- clud.e,a separate treat r. establishing a SCIENTIFIC TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE, which s h I.l seek to further coy-operat ion among ,the !member states an the..various 'fields of scientific research as: a moans `oaf romoting:their scientific and. inous- trial. -growth.,: Approved For Release.2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 SPECIALISED AGENCIES 1,RTICLE 30 The Assembly shall have the power to establish such Specialised Agencies as it may deem necessary from time to time, and the officials of such agencies shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers acting in consultation with the Secretary-General. PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ARTICLE 31 The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and, to this end agree to conclude a separate treaty establishing a PERMA- NENT CONCILIATION COMMISSION, which shall function in accordance with said treaty and which shall be regarded as forming an integral part of the present Charter. RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNITED NATIONS The High Contracting Parties agree that nothing herein shall be understood or interpreted as impairing the commit- ments or other rights and obligations of the member States of the Inter-African and Malagasy Organisation under the Charter of the United Nations Organisation. * * * "* * * * * * * * * REGISTRATION AND INTERPRETATION The High Contracting Parties agree that the present Charter shall after due ratification be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations through the Government of conformity with I.rticle 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. The High Contracting Parties agree that any question which may arise concerning the interpretation or the application of this treaty shall be submitted for adjudication-, to the International Court of Justice ,apt the Hague. MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLE 39 The Official languages of the Organisation and all its organs shall be English and French. * * * * * * *.* * * 4y*, A`. DMI SSI ON Off' NEW :MEMBER STATES ARTICLE 45 Any independent ,sovereign State in Africa under indigenous African rule may at any time apply to the Secretary-General for permission to adhere or accede to this Charter. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 %owl Approved For, jlease 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78 p3061A000200010007-3 10.6464. Ar % ? The attached article, reprinted 40 0 4 e. from WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, may be quoted freely, but notes and ; 4 comments must n o t be reprinted verb a t i m . M O S C O W ' S S TAN D O N I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O M M U N I S T U NIT Y We are reprinting here the lead editorial from the February, 1963, issue of WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, the English-language edition of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, authoritative organ of the world communist Move- ment, edited by an international, CPSU-controlled staff in Prague and distributed in more than 20 languages and 4 - 500,000 copies among Com- munist activists in all parts of the world (except China). There is every reason to consider this article as the official position of the CPSU in its current controversy with the Chinese and other foreign Communist Parties, approved at least by the Agitprop Department of the CPSU Central Secretariat, if not by the Presidium. We have annotated the reprint with our comments, drawing attention to the most significant passages of the editorial and pointing out their weaknesses, contradictions and omissions. Our considered judgment of the article as a whole can be summarized as follows: The CPSU's stand in the great controversy is not so much characterized by what this article says, but by what it does n o t say, by its omissions. Though Communist writings in general are often couched in broad and vague gen- eralizations, replete with half-truths, distortions and unproven innuendoes, one would have expected that an editorial in the most authoritative publication of the World Communist Movement, addressed to an elite of Com- munist activists all around the globe, would be hard-hitting, topical, logically convincing and supported by hard facts and conclusive evidence. Instead, the article must be cruelly disappointing to Communist readers, especially to those sympathizing with Khrushchev, as it must disappoint any outside observer because of its political and intellectual inadequacy. It e v a d e s all real issues; it does not even clearly identify the antagonists; it avoids discussing the Yugoslav and Albanian controversies; it bypasses other points of Chinese criticism -- notably the accusation that the CPSU has violated the letter and the spirit of the Moscow Declarations of 1957 and 1960 -- by merely claiming that it is not so (even though some of these violations, notably in the case of Yugoslavia, are a matter of indisputable public record). While justly accusing the (unnamed) Chinese of not offering a positive program, it does not present any realistic solutions for the controversy, either. Why should an article, appearing in such an important publication on an issue of crucial consequence, be written so poorly and incon- clusively? It would be misleading to assume that the CPSU simply can do no better: while Khrushchev, personally, is rather a failure either as a Marxist theoretician or as a writer, he has unquestionably adequate staffs of theoreticians, writers, propagandists at his beck and call. Though CPSU propagandists often blunder or perform ineptly, there is no doubt in our minds that they could do far better than they have done in this article. Two other plausible explanations come to mind: either, the article is a compromise (among contending factions in the Kremlin or between CPSU and foreign CP representatives on the editorial board in Prague), resulting in the elimination of all truly "controversial" statements; or, the CPSU has already abandoned hope of arriving at a genuine reconciliation with Peking and has produced this article merely as a formal show of its willingness to "restore unity," putting all the blame on the other side, while actually preparing to re-impose its hegemony over the World Com- munist Movement -- possibly abandoning China, Albania, North Korea and a few others, at least for the time being -- by "non-doctrinal" means, i.e. on the strength of its far superior military, economic, diplomatic and organizational resources. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 The present leaders of the CPSU, notably Khrushchev himself, are caught in a t r a p of their own making. On the one hand, they try to conduct pragmatic domestic and foreign policies based on the big power status of the Soviet Union, taking Communism as a foundation to be accepted and utilized (somewhat as the French played upon the ideals of the 1789 Revolution until at least 1939), but no longer as a revolutionary ideal to be fought for. At the same time, however, they try (or, at least, have tried until now) to maintain their leadership in the World Communist Movement on the basis of Marxist-Leninist doctrines -- a basis on which they are obviously wide open to devastating criticism by the Chinese Communists and all other die-hard Leninist-Stalinists inside their own Party and throughout the world. The only safe way out of this dilemma would be to admit frankly that the Russian revolution has reached its Thermidor, that Marxist-Leninist doctrines have grown obsolete and to make a realistic, new assessment of the world today the basis of its own policies and of its relations to Communists abroad. But neither Khrushchev nor his presumptive heirs and successors are likely to do just that. ? Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061.A000200010007-3 w Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 World Marxist Review Workers of all lands, unite! English edition of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM Published in Prague VOLUME 6 FEBRUARY 1963 NUMBER 2 Cementing the Unity of the Communist Movement is Our Internationalist Duty THE attention of the world Communist movement is now focused on the task strengthening its unity, cementing the Communist ranks the world over on the basis of Marxism Leninism and the struggle against imperialism. The reason for this is that the leaders of some parties disagree with the international Com- munist movement on cardinal issues of policy. The differences are serious indeed. Some Party publications have actually called for an ouMght split. This cannot but cause grave concern to all Marxists-Leninists, to all sincere and consistent champions of social progress. The Communist and Workers' Parties of the U.S.A., Italy France.. Finland, Britain. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Spain, Indonesia Japan, Argentina, Chile and many other countries have issued statements stressing the urgent need to strengthen the unity of the world Communist movement. (Underlining added) ko At` 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 I Of late, differences have arisen in regard to vital questions of strategy set forth in the 1957 Declaration and 1960 Statement of the Communist and Workers' Parties. The Parties adhering to the positions of creative Marxism are consistently working, in full conformity with the Declaration and Statement, for peaceful coexistence since this ensures the most favourable conditions for revolutionary struggle. But there are also Parties whose leaders, while recognising the principle of peaceful coexistence, nevertheless accuse the Parties working for it of having made a deal with the imperialists, of pursuing the wrong line, of getting together with them. The Parties which believe in creative Marxism, in conformity with the theses of the Declaration and Statement that world war can be prevented at the present time, are carrying out measures aimed at banishing war from the life of society. But the press of certain Parties, while conceding the possibility of averting world war in our time, claims that the policy of maintaining peaceful relations with the capitalist camp, the policy pursued by the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries, is betrayal of the revolution and repudiation of class positions. In conformity with the Declaration and Statement, the Parties adhering to creative Marxism are waging an active struggle for disarmament. But the press of some Parties, while professing to support disarmament, charges that those who are taking tangible steps towards this objective are betraying the national-liberation movement and seeking to disarm the peoples in the face of imperialism. Guided by Lenin's counsel and the documents of the Moscow meetings concerning the variety of forms of transition to socialism, the Parties subscribing to creative Marxism are engaged in extensive theoretical and organisational work to ascertain the forms of transition best suited to the conditions of each given country. But they are accused of renouncing Marxism-Leninism, of relinquishing the class struggle, of abandoning socialism, succumbing to revisionism and seeking conciliation with the bourgeoisie. Some of the accusers have even gone so far as to forget the supreme duty which no detach- ment of the revolutionary movement has a right to evade at crucial moments of the class war with imperialism. In particular this was the case during the Caribbean crisis, when the world, due to the aggressive policy of the U.S.A., was rapidly drifting towards a nuclear holocaust. The imperative of the moment was to ensure united action by all peace partisans, and, indeed, their unity grew hourly. Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union, the combined actions of all opponents of war, and the heroism of the people of Cuba, peace was upheld and Cuba saved as a socialist country. But there were also political leaders who, indulging in pseudo-revolu- tionary phraseology, chose to take a different stand ? they did not sup o t t e efforts to __.__. V rr . L11V y wl ~~ to avci war, thus violating the unity of the peoples in the fight for peace. ko" 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 25X1C10b Outright attacks were levelled against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Its leaders were accused of revisionism, and cries were raised for their removal. In a word, a blow was struck at a Party which now bears the main burden of the struggle against imperialism, a Party which is the rallying centre of all the forces fighting for national independence, peace democracy and socialism. The blow was aimed also at the Communist Parties of most other socialist countries which stand united against imperialism. Attacked too were the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries which are staunchly combating imperialism and reaction in their citadels and outposts-the U.S.A., Italy, France, Britain, Spain, Portugal, Greece and other countries. Nor have the parties in the countries which have recently won or are still fighting for independence escaped accusations of conciliation with imperialism, their record in combating imperialism and the blows they are delivering at it notwithstanding. The critics of the parties adhering to creative Marxism advance no positive programme, no consistent political line which would really facilitate the practical struggle against imperialism and ensure tangible gains for the revolutionary movement. Difficulties are also being created in the international trade union, youth and women's democratic organisations and in the peace movement, which are being pressed to adopt a line that would alienate large sections of the population from the democratic movement. Clearly this is an attitude that may lead to a split in the international Communist movement. ko"M Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 25X1C10b To vindicate these disruptive actions a special concept is advanced which alleges that in the world Communist movement there is a "majority" following a wrong line, and a "minority", the custodian of true Marxism-Leninism, which in time will become the "majority". A completely unwarranted analogy is drawn between the situation in the Second International before the First World War and the present situation in the Communist movement. It is averred that now as then the majority of the revolutionary working-class parties has taken an opportunist stand. 25X1C1Oc This argument is utterly groundless. That the views of the international Communist move- ment are correct is proved by the entire experience of the masses, by the current revolutionary activities of the working class and other progressive forces, by the success registered in build- ing socialism and communism, and by the struggle against imperialism, for peace and national and social progress. This experience shows that the Parties dedicated to creative Marxism are right-not because they are many but because revolutionary practice, the sole criterion of truth, offers ample proof of the creative nature of their theoretical views, the vitality of their policy and the effectiveness of their revolutionary action. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIZRDl 7 -%3061A000200010007-3 II Solidarity and unity are in the very nature of the Communist movement. And this move- ment, having its source in the working class, develops in accordance with inner laws stemming from the objective position of this class. To the international alliances of the capitalists of the various countries and their support of one another the working class counterposes its international solidarity, proletarian inter- nationalism. The victories won by the working-class movement in recent decades are the victories not only of the national detachments of the working class and its Parties, but also of the entire international proletariat. Without proletarian internationalism there can be no successful struggle for peace, democracy and socialism. The unity of the Marxist-Leninist Parties is the supreme expression of the unity and soli- darity of the working class of all countries. This unity has its objective source in the identity of the class interests of the proletariat and all working people irrespective of country and nationality. the international Communist movement is the supreme manifestation o this omunity of interests. Its ranks are cemented by the common ultimate aim of the work- ing class-the triumph of communism on a world scale. Communists everywhere are also spiritually at one, sharing as they do a common ideology, Marxism-Leninism. And whatever the conditions in which they work, all Communists have a common enemy in international imperialism. In the course of its growth and in the changing conditions of the struggle the organic unity of the Communist movement has seen different organisational forms-the communist International, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties, and the conferences and meetings of representatives of the Communist Parties held from time to time. But irrespective of the changes in form, unity always has been and remains the inviolable basic principle of the Communist movement. The strength of the Marxist-Leninist Parties lies in this unity. There can only be one international Communist movement and one Com- munist Party in each country, just as there can be only one truth. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Unity, then, is an inner law of the existence and development of each Communist Party taken separately and of the world Communist movement as a whole. But unity does not come about automatically, spontaneously, without effort to overcome difficulties and without struggle. On the contrary, it is in struggle against all deviations from Marxism-Leninism, in struggle against splitters of all hues that the unity of the international Communist movement is shaped. The national detachments of the working class find themselves in differing objective con- ditions. There are differences in social structure, national traditions, level of consciousness and degree of organisation of the masses, different degrees of preparedness for revolutionary struggle and for building socialism. It is only natural, therefore, that diverging viewpoints are possible in the Communist movement. But it should be said at the outset that these differences are by no means of one and the same order. There can be different ways of applying the general principles of Marxism- Leninism in accordance with the conditions of one or another country. This kind of difference is not only permissible but necessary if Marxists-Leninists are not to become dogmatists and lose touch with the life of their people. Such differences are inevitable. Different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism and reading different meanings into its principles are another matter. Differences of this kind, though they spring up on the basis of the specific objective conditions in which the various detachments of the working-class movement find themselves, stem exclusively from subjective reasons. They must be reckoned with, but they cannot essentially affect the perspectives of the movement as a whole unless they develop into a theoretical and political platform hostile to Marxism-Leninism and harm- ful to the struggle for socialism on the national as well as the international scale. Particularly dangerous is a situation when people persistently cling to erroneous concepts, universalise these concepts and try to impose them on the movement as a whole, and even take organisational steps of one or another kind, challenging the very principles of proletarian internationalism, even the principle of the unity of the Communist movement. In these circumstances diverging viewpoints can grow into political differences. But even then-and this should be emphasised-the root causes of the differences are of a subjective order. They originate neither in the nature o the soda st system norm a nature o the Communist Parties. Consequently, overcoming the disagreements depends above all on the Communists themselves, on their maturity, their awareness of the duty they owe to the working class and all humanity. The unity of the Communist movement is built by the conscious labours of the Parties themselves. It is more timely than ever to recall the injunction of the Moscow Statement: "It is the supreme internationalist duty of every Marxist-Leninist Party to work continuously for greater unity in the world Communist movement. "A resolute defence of the unity of the world Communist movement on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and the prevention of any actions which may undermine that unity, are a necessary condition for victory in the struggle for national independence, democracy and peace, for the successful accomplishment of the tasks or the socialist revolution and of the building of socialism and communism. Violation of these principles would impair the forces of communism." Differences in the Communist movement are a source of joy to all the enemies of com- munism. Indeed, the imperialists openly talk about these differences being "an obstacle to Communist success" and advantageous to the "free world", i.e., imperialism. The imperial- ists, naturally, will try to turn them to their own advantage and to deepen them. But the enemy's hopes must be dashed. Approved For Release 2000108127 : 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 In view of the tasks confronting the Communist movement, the danger of war and the ceaseless imperialist intrigues and attacks, it would be a crime against the working people of the whole world to allow any weakening of Communist unity. Both our contemporaries and posterity will pass severe judgement on any leader who fails to see this and acts contrary to the fundamental interests of the working people everywhere. In the light of its grand goals and the danger presented by its still powerful enemy- imperialism-the world Communist movement is in duty bound to overcome the differences and to rally in greater unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. It is not a "majority" and a "minority" that the Communist movement needs, but the inviolable unity of all Communists, unity of ideology, strategic line and especially of action. A particularly grave responsibility for the preservation of unity rests with the Parties of the socialist countries, which have at their disposal not only ideological means of struggle but also vast material resources serving the cause of building socialism and communism and strengthening economic, political and ideological unity among them. The unity of the Com- munist Parties of these countries is a vital component of the bond cementing both the Com- munist movement as a whole and the entire contemporary movement of the peoples for peace, democracy, national independence and socialism. It is imperative for every Party and every Communist to comprehend the meaning and necessity of the "international proletarian discipline" for which Lenin called. Lenin said: "We take pride in the fact that we are solving the momentous issues of the workers' struggle for emancipation in obedience to the international discipline of the revolutionary proletariat, drawing on the experience of the workers of the various countries, taking into account their knowledge and their will, and thereby building in deeds (and not in words, as the Renners, Fritz Adlers and Otto Bauers do) the unity of the workers' class struggle for communism throughout the world." "No class-conscious worker," Lenin wrote, "should stand aloof for a moment from the international army of the workers". in How and in what way are differences to be resolved and unity cemented in the ranks of the international Communist movement? Lenin helps us to find the answer to this vital question. "Differences within political parties and between them are usually solved not only through polemics on points of principle but by the very march of political life," Lenin said in his Lessons of the Revolution. "In particular, differences concerning Party tactics, i.e., the Party's political attitude, are often resolved by those in the wrong coming over, in effect, to the correct path of struggle under the impact of the march of events which simply sweeps aside the erroneous views, making them pointless and of no interest to anyone. This of course does not mean that fundamental differences on tactics do not require thorough elucidation, which alone can maintain a Party on a level with its theoretical convictions. No. It merely means that it is essential to verify the tactical decisions as often as possible against the latest political developments. Such a check-up is essential from the standpoint of both theory and practice: theoretically, in order to ascertain whether the decisions taken are correct and what amend- ments may have been necessitated y subse uent political events? practically, so as to learn ow be guided by these decisions, to be able to see them as directives to be applied in practice." These ideas of Lenin, brimming with optimism, are a source of inspiration to Communists. They know that life is the best teacher, that the logic of things, far better than anything else, helps the working-class movement to discard everything erroneous and obsolete, and that this is the way the great army of fighters for the working class gathers strength and cements its unity. 25X1C10b 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 Every sincere Marxist-Leninist must keep abreast of events and verify his political position by the pulsebeat of the time. Every Party must see to it that its political line accords with the dictates of the moment, the tasks posed by life. Along these lines the correct way can be found for overcoming the differences that have arisen in the international Communist movement. Lenin pointed out that fundamental differences on political questions require a funda- mental elucidation. The Parties have always explained to their members and to all working people the principles of revolutionary policy, showing the need for unity on the basis of creative Marxism-Leninism, teaching them to recognise the revisionists and dogmatists by what they say and what they do, to compare their words with their deeds and thereby prepare themselves to combat all encroachments on the unity of the Communists of all countries. What distinguishes the Communist Parties from all other parties is that each member is not only able but is obliged to take an active part in all the affairs of his own Party and of the entire Communist movement. Violation of this principle in a number of Parties at the time of the personality cult caused their. grave harm. But the need to elucidate the theory and policy of the Parties, the need to discuss funda- mental questions, does not predetermine the form of the discussion. Both the form and methods of debate (sin th di ce e scussion is between people of identical views) should cement, not disunite the Communist ranks. In examining controversial questions it is essential always to bear in mind that the debate is between fellow fighters for a common cause, between Communists, men who have dedicated themselves to realising the aspirations of the working class. The object in such debates should be to establish the truth, and hence it is necessary to display tolerance, and respect for each other's viewpoints; subjective assessments should be avoided, individual leaders or Parties should not be calumnied, and in no circumstances should views which are alien to it be ascribed to a Party. Only in this way will it be possible to ascertain where viewpoints coincide and where they differ; only in this way can the differences be overcome. Seeking to strengthen unity, the representative of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany made a number of proposals aimed at ironing out the differences. The C.P.S.U. proposed that the open controversy between Parties be ended and mutual recriminations stopped. This was supported by other Communist Parties. it is important not to give free rein to passions but soberly to analyse the situation and find a way out without losing sight for a moment of the best interests of the entire movement, the best interests of the working class and all progressive humanity. The Communist Parties have a tried and tested method of solving disputed questions- joint discussion. There is no doubt that this method will make it possible to rally the inter- national Communist movement in close unity. Lenin said: "Discussing questions, expressing and listening to different views, ascertaining the opinion of the majority of organised Marxists, expressing this opinion in a decision bind- ing on an conscientious y carrying out t is decision-this is what all clear-thinking people everywhere in the world call unity." It is generally agreed that this should be the purpose of the conference of Communist and Workers' Parties which all the fraternal Parties reel shoul , But conference is thoroughly vu11vci1 u. 0 unless such a prepared it can only aggravate the differences. Therefore, prepara- tory work conducted without undue haste or heated controversy is essential to ensure that a meeting of this kind will fulfil the purpose of greater unity. The world Communist movement is a community of Parties. Here no Party is subordinated to another. But no one will deny that in this single Communist community each Party is obliged to respect the opinions of the others, to hearken to them, all the more so if these are 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000108127'. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the Parties whose strategy and tactics in regard to the fundamental problems of the revolutionary struggle are the fruit of the experience of decades. Communists everywhere, all Communist Parties, are entitled to insist-and indeed do insist-on every individual in their ranks acting in the spirit of the principles of Marxism- Leninism, in the spirit of the unity of the entire movement, remembering that he who does not do so places himself outside the ranks of the international army of Communists. The unity of the Communist movement can be strengthened only by strict adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles. And this involves not only adhering to the positions of creative Marxism but giving all one's energies to the realisation of its principles. Only by "taking into account first and foremost the basic distinctive features of different `epochs' . . . will we be able to elaborate the correct tactics", Lenin said. All the Communist Parties proceed from the basic premise that no unity is possible in the world Communist movement except within the framework of the principles of Marxism- Leninism as set forth in the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement and subscribed to by all the Communist Parties. It is of particular importance to strengthen the unity of Communist will and action along the following lines: active struggle everywhere, not in words but in deeds, to prevent world war, since this is indispensable to continued progress in the socialist countries, to success in the struggle for democracy and socialism the world over, and to victory in the national-liberation revolutions; strict adherence to the policy of peaceful coexistence as the most expedient form of class struggle on the international scale; mastery of all means of struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution, including the utilisation of opportunities for a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. Implementation of these principles makes it incumbent on every Party and on the Com- munist movement as a whole to wage a ceaseless struggle against revisionism and dogmatism, as pointed out in the Declaration and Statement of the Communist and Workers' Parties. No one can call himself a creative Marxist who denies the existence of the new features of our time. And if one recognises these new features one cannot but see that this new epoch necessitates a new political line, a new strategic concept of the international revolutionary movement. One cannot agree in words with some aspects of this new strategic concept and in deeds depart from it in the basic respects, narrowing down the possibilities for struggle against imperialism. r For the Communists in all countries the main thing has always been, regardless of contro- versies and differences, their principal duty, the duty to fight, each in his own area of actin, for the common cause, to exert every effort to meet their international responsibilities.This is indispensable to genuine unity among the Communists and all working people everywhere, to unity in the struggle for common goals. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : Cl 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3 It would be a grave error-and one on which the imperialists are no doubt counting--for the Communists to allow themselves to be diverted by disagreements from the most important thing, from the struggle against imperialism, for national independence, for peace, demo- cracy and socialism. The main enemy is international imperialism. And it is the guiding rule for all Communists never to relax pressure against its positions, to hit ever harder, always standing together in the common struggle. Guided by this rule, the Communists in the socia ist countries are steadily building up their economy and culture, pursuing a foreign policy of peace, yet ever watchful of the intrigues of imperialism, reinforcing the defences of their countries, cementing the unity of the socialist camp and solidarity with the working people of the capitalist world and with the peoples fighting against colonialism. The Com- munists in the capitalist countries are redoubling their struggle for peace, democracy, for the triumph of the socialist revolution; they are successfully building the unity of the working people. The Communists and the masses generally in the countries which have won national independence or are still fighting for independent statehood are increasing the pressure on the colonialists, fighting for radical democratic changes, to overcome backwardness and to launch out on the path of genuine progress. The cause, the struggle for the cause, must come first. In this struggle we acquire valuable experience which provides the criteria for verifying our positions. We shall not allow our historical offensive against the positions of the old society to lose momentum. We shall imbue our ranks with that feeling of teamwork, solidarity and mutual support which is a prerequisite and a condition of unity. The unity of the world Communist movement is shaped and consolidated in joint struggle against the common enemy, in struggle for the common goal under one banner-the banner of Marx and Lenin. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010007-3