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June 17, 1963
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release4999/08 8-03061AQLj020U 2bM-8963 Briefly Noted 25X1C10b 25X1C10b Encounter Pamphlet: "Khrushchev on Culture." Encounter, published in London by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, `aas issued a special pamphlet (No.9) containing the text of Khrushchev's S March 1963 speech on Soviet culture and other matters, together with incisive comments and "notes" by Encounter's editors. This pamphlet is aimed at intellectuals in free world countries, and is admirably designed to expose the repressive posi- tion of the CPSU in the field of art and literature, as well as the attempts of Khrushchev to rewrite Soviet history. We strongly recoiuiend that assets with a capability to circulate matter to edu- cated audiences obtain copies of this pamphlet from Encounter, 25 Haymarket, London SW1, and distribute them. In some areas it may be easier to obtain copies from local affiliates of the Con- gress for Cultural Freedom. We are attaching copies to this guidance for selected stations, and will furnish individual copies to other stations on request, but cannot supply these paaphlets25X1C1Ob It is possible that there may be some relaxation in the Soviet cultural line; this could, for example, be decreed at the 18 June CPSU Central Committee plenary meeting. If such a development occurs, it will probably result, not only from the resistance of the intellectuals themselves, but also from the adverse publicity the Soviet line has received abroad, such as this pamphlet. The fact that a Khrushchev speech is open to such adverse exploitation! Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 :(Briefly Noted) (BAb UA48r0F &&9" 99/0 8-03061AQ,Q02Ao01OO?3-&''S DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST 1 July Chinese Communist Party founded (1921) 4 July 4 July 7 July Republic of the Philippines granted independence by the USA (1946) Khrushchev ouster of "anti-Party group" announcl (1957) Communist IUS backing International Seminar for underdeveloped countries, Salvador, Bahia, Brazil Brazil 7 - 14 July. 7 July Argentina: general elections scheduled 9 July ICFTU Vienna World Youth Rally July 9-19. 10 July Lavrenti P. Beria expelled from the CPSU ten years ago. Executed five months later (December 23, 1953) in a purge extending to the Ukraine, Byelorussia and other Soviet states. 20 July Indo-China war concluded with Geneva Agreement 1954 C odia, Laos, Vietnam) 22 July 30 July 31 July August OAS Panama Declaration of principles signed by 19 Western Hemisphere countries in 1956. (US invited first International Conference of Ameri- can States to Washington in 1399, the first step toward creating the Pan American Union.) Pathet Lao guerrillas armed by Communist North Vietnam attacked posts in northern Loos in 1959. Malaya announced end of 12-year fight against Communist guerrillas, 1960. Brazilian municipal elections in Pernambuco State scheduled for early August. Pro-Communist Governor Miguel Arraes. 0 August 2nd Latin American Youth Conference, Santiago, Chile, S - 11 August. 13 August Communist East Germany sealed East-West Berlin border by building a wall in 1901 (mmore than 30,003 refugees had registered in West Berlin in the preceding month). 2 Approved For Release 1999/0 -03061A000IU'0 0.0'3Wted) 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #5 28 May - 10 June 1963 May 24 - June 5 - A high-level CPSU delegation led by Presidium member Podgorny visited Rumania in an effort to persuade the Rumanians to accept the Comecon "socialist division of labor" plan for economic integration which would limit the scope of her industrial development (in order to concentrate on agriculture). Pravda on 31 May published the full text of a speech by Rumanian Marty Secretary Ceaucescu during the delegation's 29 May visit to the Brasov tractor works which made it clear that the Rumanians were remaining adamant in their resistance. He cited Lenin to the effect that the development of heavy industry is obligatory for every country building socialism, and went on to say that "equali- zation of the level of development of socialist countries is an indispensable condition for the construction of Communist society" (a Chinese view). The speeches made by P~odgorny and Rumanian First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej on the eve of the Soviet departure the following week -- as published by Pravda on 5 June -- indicate that the Soviets had failed to move thanians. Commenting on these and other evidences of Rumanian recalcitrance, New York Times Moscow correspondent Topping on 5 June noted thong, polemical CPSU letter of 30 March to the CCP had not been published in full in the Rumanian press. The New York Times of 8 June carried a round-up by its Washington correspondent, M.S. Handler, of "information (which) has reached the US Government of a growing dispute in the Soviet bloc over economic integration and trade re- lations. The quarrels are said to far surpass the recently reported disagreement between Rumania and the Soviet Union." Handler des- cribed primarily Czech and Rumanian problems, but he wrote that Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria were also involved. May 20 - The extent of the CCP's wooing of foreign support is iradi- catec by the following one-day listing of NCNA announcements: -- a Peking banquet to welcome "a delegation of young Japanese lawyers" which was "marked by the militant friendship between the Chinese and Japanese peoples...." -- a Peking banquet for a Bolivian delegation which had arrived from Pyongyang. (NCNA subsequently reported that at the farewell reception for the Bolivians on 4 June, the leader stated: "We Latin Americans are prepared to carry out a pro- tracted and arduous struggle like the Chinese people did.") -- a Peking interview with "the head of the visiting delegation of the National Union of Angolan Work- ers," who said that "armed struggle is the only way shown us by history to win national liberation and freedom." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-030015 3-6 ( 5' C A'ppr1nueg or Relea&9 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 --- a Pekin; interview with a Uganda journalist who is "the secretary for research and information of the Uganda People's Congress." -- a joint communique signed in Bamako 18 May be- tween the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the National Union of Mali Workers, and the return of the Chinese delegation after their Visit to Mali, Guinea and Ghana. -- the arrival in Peking of the "first general sec- retary of the General Confederation of Labor of the Congo." -- the departure from ?eking of "the delegation of the Union of Working Youth of Albania." -- the arrival of the "general secretary of the Ceylon TU Federation" in Peking. -- the departure of "the delegation of the Arab Federation of Labor." -- the departure of a "senior research worker" of the Nkrunah University of Ghana. -- a banquet for the Indonesian secretary of AAPSG. -- the travels in southern China of the Indonesian CP delegation which had attended the May Day celebration in 'eking . -- the return from Japan of a Chinese Buddhist "good will delegation." -- the return of two Chinese TU delegations from Albania and Cuba, respectively. -- the return of the Chinese Communist Youth dele- gation from Cuba. June 5 - In contrast to the Soviet difficulties with their European n, :=. the Chinese apparently are having it their way with the North Koreans. NK Presidium President Choe Yong-kon (Choi Yong Ki.n) and entourage ,,rent by special train to `Peking "for a friendly visit at the invitation of Liu Shac-chi,,, as NCNA out it, with "tumultuous ovations" at the stations in Antung and Shenyang on the 5th and a "tremendous" welcoming ceremony and procession in the capital the following day. Although Liu's welcoming speech at the Peking sta- tion (and also the ''people's Daily editorial of that day) strosse:i their joint efforts in combatting modern revisionism and safeguard- in unity, Choe made no mention of these subjects in his response. 2 (#5 Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Ap?provec? For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061.4000200020003-6 At a banquet that evening, however, Liu returned insistently to that theme: "To safeguard the purity of Marxism-Leninism, the Korean Workers ?arty has wages an irreconcilable struggle against modern revisionism... an army upheld e unity of the soca.a ist camp and of e international Communist movement...." Choe took his cue this time: "Today the parties and peoples of our two countries, holding high the banner of Marxism-Leninism, are closely united in waging a resolute struggle against imperialism and revisionism...'," He concluded with what might be taken as a pledge and a threat -- to whom it may concern: "No matter what storms may rise, our people will forever fight together with the inese people and forever remain their loyal comrades-in-arms." And by the time Choe addressed the rally of 100,O03 in Peking on 8 June, he was hammering away at revisionism in the best Chinese (or even Albanian) manner, including passages such as the follV=ping: "The revisionists are cunningly attempting to kill the revolutionary spirit of the Marxist-Leninist theory, paralyze the revolutionary consciousness of the popular masses, and undermine the socialist camp from within. They are serving the imperialists .... He one has the right to violate at will this prescription ? he $ 0 Moscow tatemen which prescribed it as an essential task of all Marxist-Leninist parties to expose the Yugoslav revisionists and fight against the infiltra- tion of their anti-Leninist ideology").... Only through a determined struggle against revisionism came genuine unity and solidarity o the soc alist camp and the world Communist movement be safeguarded .... Marx- ism-Leninisma has been attacked not only once or twice by opportunists and revisionists of all hues....Today the modern revisionists are again frantically challeng- ing Marxism-Leninism .... There is no shadow of doubt that the modern revisionists will meet the same fiasco as their predecessors." (All underlining ours) June 6-9 - Columns written in Be1?ra:de on 6 June by New York Tines correspondent Binder and on 9 June by the London Observei s obert Stephens (also published by the Washington Post on June des- cribe Yugoslav wariness and uneasiness over te 5 July CPSU-CC'S talks, caused in part by Pravda's omission of certain passages of Tito's 13 May speech, especiallythe sentence which said: "Any compromise or unprincipled agreements at the expense of others, or at the expense of the funda- mental principles on which the contemporary struggle for Socialism rests, would do great harm to the work- ino-class movement.'' The official Yugoslav line (Stephens wrote) is that Khrushchev will survive and will not give way to Chinese pressure on any basic point of his coexistence policy. The Yugoslavs believe that the Chinese are not looking for a compromise and intend to use the meeting to press their offensive against Khrushchev, while the Soviets are trying to find a 'formula for a paper compromise that Approved For Release 1999/08/234: CIA-RDP78-039 ACQ00i000e2)003-6 (# C4VAWFor Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 would reduce Chinese pressure and free Khrushchev's hands to resume negotiations with the US. There will be no oven divorce between Peking and Moscow but a continued unhappy marriage, in which Khrushchev may find it more difficult to push ahead with negotiations with the US, but he will not gc backwards. Nevertheless, as "one of the most influential Yugoslav journalists" is quoted as saying, "...vie should have learned by experience that you can't trust the Russians too far." June 10 - NCNA released in English their account of the 27 May North Crean Party organ Nodong Sinmun article reacting to the 18 May Tito speech to the Yugoslav - enur~i rientioned in our last Chronology) As described by NCNA, the Korean attack on Tito and the modern revi- sionists is almost as harsh and vicious as the language used by the Albanians. The Tito report "constitutes one more outstanding 'feat' in the service of the imperialists." It is "marked by its aim to scww discord and enmity among Communist parties, split the Socialist camp and disorganize the ranks of the international Communist move- ment, while cunningly covering up all their crimes co ittedu in the past against the international Communist and working class movement and their anti-Marxist, revisionist policy." Approved For Release 1999/08/244: CIA-RDP78-030600200020003-6 Approved For Rele ,ftWA812$I,s iBQPF&,MIA000200020003-6 No. 5 28 mai - 10 juin 1963 21 mai - 5 juin: Une delegation de membres importants du Parti communique de 1'U- n.ion sovietique s'est rendue en Roumanie sous la conduite de Podgorny, membre du Presidium, dans le but de persuader lea Roumains h accepter le plan du Comecon sur la "division du travail socialiste" dans une integration economique qui limiterait le developpement industriel roumain (afin que ce pays se concentre sur 1'agriculture La "Pravda" du 31 mai a fait parattre en entier un discours du Secretaire du Parti 'oumain Ceaucescu, prononce lors de la visite faite par la delegation le 29 mai h, l'usine des tracteurs de Brasov, discours d'ot l'on pouvait tirer la certitude que lea Roumains restaient intransigeants dans leur resistance. Ceaucescu cita la de- claration de Lenine selon laquelle le developpement de 1'industrie lourde etait 0- blogatoire pour tout pays en train de construire le socialisme, et alla jusqu'h dire qu'une egalisation du niveau de developpement de pays socialistes "constituait une F,ondition in4ispensable dans la construction de la societe communiste (ce qui re- presente une opinion des Chinois). Les discours que, la semaine suivante, Podgorny et le Premier-secretaire roumain Gheorghiu-Dej faisaient h la veille du depart des Soviets ont subi un echec dons leur tentative de convaincre lea Roumains. Dans ces commentaires sur ces marques d'opposition roumaine, ajoutees h bien d'autres, le correspondant du "New York Times" a Moscou, Topping, soulignait le 5 juin qu'une longue lettre de lolemique adrescee le 30 mars par le Parti communiste de 1'Union Sovietique au Parti communique ch.inois, n'a pas ete publiee in extenso dans lea journaux roumains. Le "New York Times" du 8 juin donnait un compte-rendu de nouvel lea recueillies par M. S. Handler son correspondant a Washington, nouvelle qui "e- tait parvenue au gouvernement des Etats-Unis et qui indiquait qu'une controverse s'etendait dans lea pays du bloc sovietique au sujet de l'integration economique et des relations commerciales. D'aprbs ce que l'on dit lea querelles depassent de loin le desaccord entre la Roumanie et l'Union sovietique dont ii a ete question recem- ment." Handler a surtout traits des problemes tcheques et roumains mail it precisa que la Pologne, la Hongrie et la Bulgarie se trouvaient egalement impliquees. 28 mai: Pour juger des efforts qu'accomplit le Parti communiste chinois dans le but ale s'assurer des soutiens dans lea pays strangers, i1 suffit de consulter la liste suivante d'informations que 1'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle a fait paraTtre en une seule journee: h Pekin, banquet pour souhaiter la bienvenue "h une delegation de jeunes a- vocats.,;aponais," qui se passa "sous le sign de l'amitie militante entre lea peuples chinois at japonais..." h Pekin, banquet en 1'honneur dune delegation bolivienne arrivee de Pyongyanj (1'Agence de la Chine nouvelle annoncait plus tard que le 4 juin, h une re- ception d'adieux en l'honneur des Boliviens, le-:chef de cette delegation de- clara:"Nous. Sud Americains, nous sommes pr6ts a mener une lutte aussi a3~due et aussi prolongee que celle qu'a menee le peuple chinois.") - h Pekin, une interview avec "le chef dune delegation de l'Union nationals des travailleurs angolais," qui a declare que "l'bistoire nous montrait que le combat arms constituait le seul moyen d'obtenir la liberation nationale et la liberte." - h Pekin, une interview avec un journaliste de 1'Ouganda. "Secretaire a la recherche et h 1'information du Congrhs populaire de 1'0uganda." - un communique collectif, signs h Bamako le 18 mai par la Federation pan-chi- Ap /ddsF$unR 89i?8i24113 GMIRD R Mf A Ii.Q ONQU 3Alleurs A d IROr M 'R9~99 4io? UP~8er ~~A?9 2(~Q~i~.C, en uinde et h Ghana. - l'arrivee a Pdkin du "Premier-secrdtaire general de la Confederation gdndrale du travail du Congo." - le depart de Pekin "de la ddldgation de l'Union des jeunes travailleurs d'Al- banie." - l'arrivde h Pdkin du Secrdtaire gdndral de la Federation des syndicats pro- fessionnels de Cdylan." - le depart de la "ddldgation de la Fdddration arabe du travail." - le depart "d'un charge de travaux de recherches" de l'universitd Nkroumah de Ghana. - un banquet en 1'honneur du secrdtaire indondsien de l'Organisation afro-asia- tique de solidarite populaire. - voyage en Chine Mezidionale de la ddldgation du Parti communiste indonesien, qui participa aux fetes du Premier mai h Pdkin. - retour du Japon "d"une delegation de bonne volontd" de bouddhistes chinois. - retour, respectivement d'Albanie et de Cuba, de deux delegations syndicalis- tes chinoises. - retour de Cuba dune delegation chinoise de la Jeunesse communiste. 5 juin: Alors que lea Soviets eprouvent des difficultes avec leurs voisins europdens lea Chinois de leer c$td semblent obtenir gain de cause avec lea Coreens du nord. Choe Yong-kon (Choi Yong Kim), president du Presidium de is Corde du Nord, accom- pagnd de tout un entourage, s'est rendu par train special h Pdkin "en visite amicale 1'invitation de Liu Shao-chi," et ainsi que le declare l'Agence de la Chine nou- velle, it fut salue "par des orations brillantes" aux arre^ts de Antung et de Shenyang le 5 juin, et par une cdrdmonie "formidable" de bienvenue et une procession dens la capitale le jour s .avant. Bien que dans un discours de bienvenue prononcd h la gare de Pekin (et reproduit le jour mae dens un editorial du Quotidien du Peuple), Liu ait soulignd leur effort commun tendant h combattre le rdvisionnisme moderne et h protdger 1'unitd, Choe de son c t ne fit aucune allusion ce sujet ans sa rdponse. Le soir mime an banquet, Liu revenait cependant avec insistence sur le theme:"pour sauvegarder la purete du marxisme-leninisme, le Parti des travailleurs coreens a me- nd une lutte irreconciliable contre le rdvisionnisme moderne... et a soutenu avec fermete l'unitd du camp socialiste et du mouvement communists international..." Cette fois-ci Choe comprit l'allusion et declara:"Aujourd'hui, lea partis et lea peuples de nos deux pays portent haut la bannidre du marxisme-leninisme, et sont d- troitement unis dans une lutte resolue contre 1'impdrialisme et le?rdvisionnisme...!" Sa conclusion peut-4'tre interprdtde comme dtant h 1a fois un engagement et une me- nace h qui de droit:"Quels ue soient lea ore es ui dclateraient, notre peuple com- battra toujours c8te h c8te avec le peuple chinois et reatera idle h jamais h sea camarades d'armes." Le 8 juin an rassemblement de 100,000 personnes h Pekin, Choe se trouvait ddjh en pleine attaque du rdvisionnisme dens le meilleur style chinois (mine albanais) qui contenait des declarations comme celle qui suit par exemple: "Les rdvisionnistes cherchent sournoisement a ddtruire l'esprit rVdvolutionnaire de is thdorie marxiste-ldniniste, a paralyser la conscience revolutionnaire des masses p* g,VEFA ~ 1J~~9 4e 1 0~3d18 6k3~~6 Q(~ Q @~9 i3c~ Its travai bWbVg&Fbw Rgbft$ .19 10.8/ 4i1'G~fA-~ a$ aee O QQQ 6ion ces prescriptions tddclaration de Moscou de 1960 prescrivant en tant quetlche essen- tielle de taus lea Partis marxistes-ldninistes de denoncer lea revisionnistes yougo. slaves et de combattre 1'infiltration de leur ideologie anti-lbniniste")... Ce nest que per une lutte resolue contre le revisionnisme que Von parviendra h sauve- gar er un et so idarit r e e du camp socialiste ainsi cue le mouvement .' communiste mondial... C'eat plus dune ou deux fois que le marxisme-leninisme sleet trouvd attaqud par des opportunistes et des rdvisionnistes de toutes lea teintes... Aujourd'hui, lea rdvisionnistes moderns s'attaquent de nouveau dune manibre for- cende au marxisme-ldninisme... 11 n'y a 1'ombre d'un doute que lea revisionnistes moderns aboutiront h un echec semblable h celui de leurs prdddcesseurs." (Tous lea passages soulignds Pont dte par nous). 6-9 juin: Un article de Belgrade, date du 6 juin, par Binder, correspondant du "New York Times", et un autre du 9 juin par Stephens, correspondant du "London observer" (reproduit le 10 juin par le "Washington Post") parle de sentiments de mefiance et de malaise au sujet des entretiens des partis communistes sovietiques et chinoia prdvus pour le 5 juilleja:j sentiments souleves en partie par l'omission dans la "Prav- da" de certains passages du discours prononce par Tito le 18 mai, et notamment de la phrase suivante: "Tout compromis ou tout accord sans?$crupules aux depends des autres, ou aux depends des principes fondamentaux sur leaquels repose-.,:la lutte actuelle pour le eocialiste ferait un tort dnorme au mouvement de la classe ouvrii:re." Le point de vue yougoslave (dcrit Stephens) eat que Khrouchtchef parviendra . sur- vivre et ne cedera aux pressions chinoises sur aucun des points fondamentaux de sa politique de coexistence: lea Yougoslaves estiment que lea Chinois ne cherchent pas h parvenir h un compromis, et qu'ils out 1'intention de profiter de la reunion pour pousser leur offensive contre Khrouchtchef, alors que lea Soviets sont h la recherche dune formule de compromis fictif, qui attenuerait la pression chinoise et redonne- rait h Khrouchtchef lea mains libres pour reprendre sea negotiations avec lea Etats- Unis. I1 n'y aura pas de divorce public entre Pekin et Moscou, mais une continuation d'un mauvais mariage, au cours duquel Khrouchtehev risque de s'apercevoir qu'il eat plus difficile d'aller de l'avant dans lea negotiations avec lea Etats-Unis, sans que pour cela it ne se decide de faire marche arrihre. Cependant, pour citer "un des journalistes yougoslaves lea plus influents":..."Nous devrions savoir par ex- perience qu'il ne faut trop faire confiance aux Russes." lb juin: Le 27 mai l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle donnait en langue an- glaise son compte-rendu de l'article du "Nodong Sinmoun", organ du Parti communis- te de la Coree du Nord, article qui constituait la reaction de ce journal au dis- cours de Tito prononce le 18 mai h la session pldniere du Parti yougoslave. (Voir notre chronologie precedente). Si l'on en juge par le compte-rendu de l'Agence chi- noise, l'attaque cordenne contre Tito et lea rdvisionnistes modernes a ete faire en termer dont la violence et la brutalite sont comparables h celles pratiquees par lea Albanais: le rapport de Tito "eat un nouvel exploit remarquable au service des im- perialist-es". 11 eat "marque par le ddsir de seiner la discorde et la haine entre lea partis communistes, de diviser le camp socialiste et de desorganiser lea range du mouvement communiste,aternational, tout en masquant adroitement taus lea crimes commis dens le passe contre l'Internationale communiste et le mouvement de la classe ouvribre, ainsi que leur politique de rdvisionnisme anti-marxiste. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061x000200020003-6 CRONOLOGIA -- DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS No 5 28 Mayo - 10 Junco 1963 24+ Mayo - 5 Junio: Una delegaci6n de alto nivel del PCUS encabezada por Podgorny, miembro del Presidium, fue a Rumania en una tentativa de persuadir a los rumanos a que aceptaran el plan del Comecon de "divisi6n socialists del trabajo" para is integraci6n econ6mica, el cual limitaria la amplitud del desarrollo econ6mico de diche, naci6n (haciadolo con".cntrar el la agricultura). "Pravda" el 31 de mayo public6 el texto compieto de un discurso pronunciado por Ceaucescu, secre- tario del PC rumano, durante is visits de is delegaci6n a la fdbrica de trac- tores de Brasov en el que puntualiz6 que los rumanos permenecian f&rreos en su resistancia. Ceaucescu hizo cita de Lenin en el sentido de que el desarrollo de is industria pesada es obligatorio pars todo pals que estd construyendo el socialiemo, s aciendo que "la igualizaci6n del nivel de desarroilo de los passes socialistas es una condicibn indispensable para la construcci6n de is sociedad socialista"' (opini6n china). Los discursos pronunciados par Podgorny y por el primer secretario Gheorgiu-Dej del Partido rumano estando a panto de partir la delegac16n la semano siguiente -- segdn los publicara "Pravda" el 5 de junco -- indican que los sovidticos no consiguieron hacer cambiar a los rumanos. Comentado sobre este y otros comprobantes de la tozudez rumana, el "New York Times" public6 el 5 de ,junco un informe de Topping, su corresponssal en Mosed, que hacta notar que la prensa rumana no habia publicado integramente is larga y pol4mica carts del PCUS del 30 de marzo dirigida por el PCUS al Partido chino. El "New York Times" de 8 de junco public6 un reportaje pox su corresponsal en Washington, M. S. Handler, sobre "datos (que) han liegado al Gobierno de los EE. UU. sobre una creciente disputa en el Bloque sovi6tico con respecto a is integraci6n econ6mica y las relaciones comerciales. Se dice que las rencillas sobrepasan por mucho el desacuerdo entre Rumania y las Uni6n Sovi6tica informado recientemente." Handler se refiri6 mayormente a los pro- blemas checo y rumano, pero declar6 que Polonia, Hungria y Bulgaria tambi6n estaban inmiscuidas. 28 Mayo: El punto hasta el eual el PC chino estd tratando de ganarse el apoyo extranjero lo indica la siguiente relac16n de acontecimientos anunciados per is Agencia chino de noticias (Sinjua): -- un banquete en Pekin de bienvenida a "una delegaci6n de jdvenes letrados japoneses" en el cual "se evidenci6 una militante amistad entre los pue- blos chino y japonds..." -- un banqete en Pekin en honor a una delegaci6n boliviana llegada de Pyongyang. (Sinjua inform6 mds tarde que el la recepci6n de despedida a los bolivienos el 4+ de junco, el lider de ellos declar6: "Nosotros los latinoamericanos estamos listos a Ilevar a cabo una prolongada y ardua lucha coma to hizo el pueblo chino.") -- una entreviata en Pekin con "el jefe de la delegaci6n visitante de is Uni6n Nacional de Trabajadores Angoleses," el coal manifeat6 que "la lucha armada es el dnico Camino que nos muestra is historia para con- quistar la liberaci6n nacional y la libertad." -- una entrevista en Pekin con un periodista de Uganda "secretario de in- vests a or R a ease /del: Co rO$ 'N-M ~de0 ~~1b003-6 Approved o eleae UU Z44 G LJIr7~- W Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061=00200020003-6 -- un coiunicado conjunto firmado en Bamako el 18 de mayo entre la Pederaci8n c Sir dicatos de Toda China y :L Uni do National de Traba- ,jadoxes Ma%, t?;s, -i o1 re reso de la dolegaol.c n c ina de su visita a Mali, Guinea y Ghana. -- la llegada a Pekin del "primer aecretario general de la Confedexaci6n Gener.l del TrabaJo del Congo." -- la partida de Pekin de "la delegaci6n de la Uni6n de J6venes Trabaja- dores de Albania." -- la llegada a Pekin del "secretario general de la Federaci6n Sindical de Ceildn." -- la partida de "la delegaci6n de "la Federaci6n Arabe del Trabajo." -- la partida de "un obrero avanzado de investigaci6n de is Universidad Nkrumah de Ghana. -- un banquete en honor al secretario indonesio de la Organizaci6n de Solidaridad de los Pueblos Afroasidticos. -- el viaje en el sur de China de is delegaci6n del PC indonesio que asisti6 a la celebraci6n del Primero de Mayo en Pekin. -- el regreso del Jap6n de una 'delegaci6n de buena voluntad" budista china. -- el regreso de dos delegaciones sindicales chinas de Albania y Cuba, respectivamente. -- el regreso de Cuba de la delegaci6n de la Juventud Comunista china. 5 Junio; En contraste con las dificultades que tiepen los sovi6ticos con sus vet nos europeos, los chinos parece que se est&n saliendo con las suyas con los norcoreanos. El presidente Choe Yong-kon (Choi Yong Kim) del Presidium norco- reeno y su sequito viajaron en tren a Pekin "en visita amistosa a invitaci6n de Liu Shao-chi," segdn Sinjua, con "ovaciones tumultuosas" en las estaciones de Antung y Shenyang el dia 5 y una "tremenda" eeremonia y procesi6n de bien- venida en is capital al dia siguiente. Aunque el discurso de bienvenida de Liu en la estacion de Pekin, (asi como el editorial del "Diario del Pueblo" el mismo dia) pusieron 6nfasis en sus esfuerzos conjuntos combatiendo el revi- sionismo moderno y asegurando is unidad, Choe en su respuesta no hizo mention de estas materias. En un banquete en is noche del mismo dia, Liu volvi6 in- sistentemente a is carga: "Para resguardar la pureza del marxismo-leninismo, el Partido Coreano de los Trabajadores ha mantenido una lucha irreconciliable contra el revisionismo modern ... y firmemente sosten do a unidad del cameo socialists y del movimiento comunista international ..." Esta vez Choe oy6 al apuntador y manifest6: "Hoy los Partidos y pueblos de nuestros dos palaes, enarbolando la bandera del marxismo-leninismo, est6n estrechamente unidos lu- chando resueltamente contra.el imperialismo y el revisionismo ..." Concluy6 con to que se podria interpretar como compromiso o amenaza -- a quien interese: "No orta au 6 tormentas surjan, nuestro pueblo luchard'eternamente junto al pueblo chino y por siempre permanecerd como su leal compaflero de armas." Y cuando Choe se dirigi6 al mitin de 100.000 en Pekin el 8 de junio, ya estaba f*7 4AMMd0ZM3 - gold ftffl O se 0 en ~ pasajes -9 como 9 los /"/2 e siguientes: ban u Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 "Los revisionistas estdn tratando maliciosamente de matar el espfritu revolucionario de la teoria marxista-leninista, paralizar la conciencia revolucionaria de las masas populares y socavar el cameo socialista desde adentro. Estrin sirviendo a los imperialietas ... Nadie tiene el derecho a violar a voluntad este precepto (la Declaracidn de Mosc de 9 0 que preceptu coma tarea esencial de todos los Partidos marxistas-leninistas denunciar a los revisionistas yugoslavos y luchar contra la inf iltraci6n de an ideologia antileninista") ... Solo por medio de una resuelta lucha contra el revisionismo pueden ser resguardadas la unidad y solidaridad leg tunas del. cameo socialists y del movimiento comunista mundial ... El marxismo-leninismo ha sido atacado no solamente una o dos veces por oportunistas de todos los colores ... Hoy los revisionistas moderns estdn de nuevo retando frendticamente el marxisno-leninismo .?.. No hay ni sombra de duda que los revisionistas modernos se llevardn el mismo chasco que los que les precedieron." (Todo el subrayado es nuestro.) 6-9 Julio: En sendos articulos escritos en Belgrado el 6 de Junio por el corresponsal Binder del "Nev York Times" y el 9 de junio por Stephens del "Observer" de Londres (reproducido por el "Washington Post" el 10 de Juriio) se describe la cautela e inquietud de los yugoslavos con respecto a Ras con- versaciones de 5 de Julio entre el PCUS y el Partido chino, debido en parte a la omisidn en "Pravda" de ciertos pasajes del discurso de Tito de 18 de mayo, especialmente la frase siguiente: "Cualesquier componendas o acuerdoa faltos de principio a expensas de otros, o a expensas de los principios fundamentales sobre los cuales descansa la lucha contempordnea por el socialisto, haria grave daZo al movimiento obrero," La linea oficial yugoslava (escribid Stephens) es clue Kruschev se aalvard y no cederd ante ninguna presi6n china en ning6n panto bdsico de au polftica de coexistencia. Los yugoslavos creep que los chinos no estdn buscando com- ponendas y tienen intenci6n de aprovechar la reuni6n pars proseguir la ofensiva contra Krusehev, mientras que los sovi6ticos estdn tratando de encontrar una f6rmula pars una componenda "de papel" que disminuya la presi6n china y desate las manos de Kruschev pars recomenzar las negociaciones con los Estados Unidos. No habrd divorcio abierto entre Pekin y Moscu sino que continuard un matrimonio desdichado, en el cual Kruschev puede encontrar mds diflcil seguir adelante con las negotiations con los Estados Unidos, pero no retrocederd. Peso a todo eso, en frase atribuida a "uno de los periodistas yugoslavos de mayor influencia," ... debidramos haber aprendido que a los rusos no se les puede confiar demasi- ado." 10 Junio: Sinjua public6 en inglds su relato sobre el articulo de 27 de mayo en el rgano "Nodong Sinmum" del Partido norcoreano en reacci6n al discurso de Tito al pleno yugoslavo el 18 de mayo. (Vdase nuestra ultima Cronologia) Segdn Sinjua, el ataque coreano contra Tito y los revisionistas modernos es casi taxi rudo y salvaje como el lenguaJe empleado por los albaneses. El infor- me de Tito "constituye una 'proeza' sobresaliente mds al servicio de los impe- rialistas." Estd "distinguido por an prop6sito de sembrar la discordia y ene- mistad entre los Partidos comunistas, dividir el cameo socialista y desorgani- zar las filas del movimiento comunista international, mientras que maliciosa- mente encubre todos los delitos que hen cometido en el pasado contra el movi- miento internacional comunista y obrero y su politics antimarxista y revisio- nista." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Relea 1994 78-0306'O002DOWD W3t-663 368. Castro's Mission to Moscow BACKGROUND: In the same mysterious manner in which he made the trio the Soviet Union 37 clays earlier, Cuba's Fidel Castro climbed aboard a Soviet TU-114 in Murmansk on 3 June, waved good- bye to Premier Khrushchev and headed for home. No officials were on hand at Havana's airport to greet him. He phoned the President to announce his return and took a taxi (for which he and his com- panions had no money to pay the fare) into the city. His solitary return was in sharp contrast to the crowds he had met at every turn in his tour of the Soviet Union. For 37 days Castro had walked the "red carpet." He had spent long hours with Khrushchev, talked with other top Soviet leaders, visited most of Russia's major cities, toured factories, military bases, farms and schools and been lionized by large crowds at a series of banquets, receptions, rallies and parades. In Moscow he received, according to the New York Times (5 May), "the biggest welcome the Soviet capital has accorded a foreign visitor." At the traditional May Day parade in Red Square he stood next to Khrushchev and waved as the quarter of a million marchers chanted "Fidel-Khrushchev" during their five-hour march. He was given the title "Hero of the Soviet Union" -- the USSR's highest award, very seldom given to foreigners -- and the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Modal. Moscow had had little to cheer about in recent months: Castro b trip had boosted sagging Soviet morale, added luster to his own tar- nished reputation and strengthened Khrushchev's position for the 5 July Sine-Soviet discussions. When Havana Radio announced his return an hour after his plane landed, ships, trains and factories blew their whistles, special editions of newspapers hailed his return. Anticipation mounted for his promised report to the nation on the results of his 37-day mission to Moscow. On 4 June he re- ported via radio and television in a three-hour, 3C-minute "inter- view" with a panel of three newsmen. Castro's Report. Castro's version of "meet the press" was a rambling, u sae n ec informal talk. He deferred answering several direct questions and displayed irritation with members of the panel for their attempts to question him even in general terms. He was irritated by noises, by the mumbles of translators and by reactions of the studio audience. Castro was effusive in his praise of things Soviet and highly critical of his fellow Cubans and their version of a socialist state. The Soviet, he said, had many "green areas" in tlir cities; Cuba had "very little ... we do not even have a single tree." The Soviets had many forms of transportation and a subway system; Cuba has only one type of transportation. The Soviets have a one-class Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 (6663. Continued) (632A 44 end For Releaj1999/0 8-0306W00a0 Z. ;3 industrious society; Cuba has too many bureaucrats -- "everybody is a volunteer in the front rank in demanding things but everybody hangs back when it comes to producing." "A visiting Cuban feels a little ashamed," Castro said, "be- cause we have not given the economy all of the importance it merits ...* we agitate a great deal, we mobilize ourselves too much... but it seems a little as if we build all of that in the air -- that is, without taking into consideration that everything must have a basis, an absolute fundamental basis, which is the economy. We 'feel somewhat ashamed because we have many comrades who ... do not even know that there is an economy." In what could have served as a commentary on his report, Castro said: "Vie tend to eulogize and to become apologetic. We are extremely confused. We go from one extreme to the other. We do not interpret everything right." Castro reserved his most effusive praise for Khrushchev, "a great leader and a formidable adversary of imperialism." His "magnificent impression of Comrade Khrushchev" included: "extra- ordinarily human character," "simple man of great simplicity," "a hard worker, very well organized," "extraordinarily intelligent man," "extraordinary mental energy," "complete mental lucidity... mental agility, quick thinking," "a most honorable man." "He is," Castro declared, "without a doubt one of the most brilliant intellects that I have ever known ... He is a veritable authority on economic problems. He talks with the authority of one who knows the problems of agriculture, of industry, of the economy." And, Castro concluded, "he perfectly combined his profound theoretical knowledge with great practical experience." Castro reported that he did not go to seek economic aid but that Khrushchev "took the initiative" in suggesting that the Soviets pay more for Cuba's sugar. (The Soviets pay 4 a pound under an earlier agreement; Castro reported that Khrushchev proposed an increase of one third, to 60 a pound. The current free market price is about 120 per pound. Castro did not mention the latter figure but called Khrushchev's offer "a very great contribution.") He also said that Khrushchev took a personal interest in Cuba's cane-cutting problems, provided "a number of ideas on what the machine should be" to solve these problems, mobilized "all Soviet technology and indus- try" to develop it and promised that "within two years the matter of mechanizing the cane harvest would be completely taken care of." With all his praise of things Soviet and criticism of things Cuban, Castro did note one specific offer he made to Khrushchov as Cuban socialist aid to the land of the Bolshoi Ballet and great musical traditions -- to "send some instructors; ... dancing teachers ... or music teachers could help them." JcintC Muni ue. However interesting Castro's "mission-t6-+ Moscow report, a as so devoid of specifics as to make it necessary to review the joint communique and exchanges of Castro-Khrushchev speeches to evaluate the visit. Castro and Khrushchev signed a tint 12 state -le Op III i P 909/0144- 1 ! UM 2Q~p( 0~3~9f caa arewell cer2monies." Q r. rOORMUMOM fnrn (CCs JapREojed For Relea4g-1999/ CI RDP78-03061 Og3O90200gn The major theme of Khrushchev's speech was that the Castro regime should concentrate on consolidation and economic development. He made bellicose statements about defending Cuba from imperialist aggression, but there was no indication of a formal Soviet-Cuban defense pact. He indicated his support of caution and easing of tensions to avoid provocations of the US. Above all, the speech reflected the importance attached to Castro's visit as a symbol of Cuban support of the USSR in its confrontation with Communist China -- a solidarity designed to refute Chinese charges that the Soviets abandoned Cuba and backed down before the "paper tiger." Castro's response reflected the same sort of praise for the USSR and Khrushchev which he included in his report to the Cuban people. He declared Cuba's desire to live in peace and maintain friendly relations with all countries including the US. (In a ges- ture to demonstrate his sincerity he offered to renew trade with the US maintaining that the American people suffered because they could not obtain Cuban tobacco and will find it harder to get sugar this year.) He made an oblique reference to Sino-Soviet differences by pleading for unity in the socialist camp -- "Unity of the inter- national Communist movement is the slogan of all Marxist-Leninists." While the joint communique said Castro and Khrushchev had agreed upon "measures for the further development of economic, trade, and scientific-cultural relations," it did not describe any such agree- mients or reveal any new Soviet commitments. The communique did state that the price the Soviets would pay for Cuba's sugar was being adjusted "so as to bring this price in line th the level of world prices," leaving the impression the Soviets would meet the l2a;-a- pound world price. (There are indications the Soviets do not even intend to honor the cut-rate v~-a-poun;l price Castro revealed they would pay. The Soviets have no need for Cuba's sugar and reportedly were re-selling it at higher prices and it is reported that they have released their claim to one million tons of sugar to allow Cuba to sell it on the world market. This, in effect, will reduce the subsidy that the Soviets have to pay to maintain Cuba.) The communique appeared to endorse the Soviet position on the adlvantages of "peaceful coexistence" in promoting Communist in- fluence and the "struggle for socialism." But at the same time, Khrushchev made militant remarks about the Soviet "international duty" to aid other Communist parties and so-called "national lihor- ation" movements. "What does it mean to render help to the national liberation movement?" Khrushchev answered his own question in his 23 May speech: "It means, first of all, to struggle against the inter- ference of imperialism in the internal affairs of peoples of the liberated countries, to lend all-cut support, including supply of arms, to the peoples who are waging a just struggle against the foreign yoke." This potentially ominous warning of an increasing Communist threat -- especially to Latin America -- may prove to be the most Approved For Release 1994(08/2- r L '^?1p78-03061 20 02 p03- 411111,~ X. A( Con~inue ) (6"3A bAd For Relea ,, -1999 P78-0306 ,?,p002M0 3i6G3 significant result of Castrots visit to the Soviet Union. The Castro- Khrushchev joint car=unique revealed that Khrushchev had accepted an invitation to visit Cuba -- he may utilize the trip to consolidate his influence over Castro and to give new itapetus to aiding; "national 25X1 C1 Ob liberation" movements in Latin America. 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Relea 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-030600200020003-6 17 June 1963 669. The Outlook for the Sino-Soviet Meeting of 5 July 1963 U ACKGROUND : A meeting is arranged. On 21 February 1963, the Kremlin proposed in an open letter to Peking an official discussion on the unresolved questions between the CPSU and the CCP. The Chinese Communists replied on 9 March, agreeing to the meeting, but sug- gesting that it be held in Peking with Khrushchev attending. The Chinese also suggested that the agenda give priority to the strat- egy and tactics of revolution and to opposing imperialism and defending world peace. Neither the form of the Chinese agenda nor the suggestion that Khrushchev come as a penitent to Peking can have been very attractive to the Soviet leader: on 30 March Moscow sent another message, suggesting that the agenda emphasize "the further strengthening of the might of the world socialist system and its conversion into the decisive factor of the develop- ment of human society," and next to that, questions of struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence; the Soviets also proposed that Mao come to Moscow for the meeting, to be held on 15 May. On 9 May, the Chinese proposed postponing the meeting until the middle of June, and on 11 May the Soviets answered, suggesting a further delay until 5 July. The meeting is now scheduled to be held in Moscow, but neither Mao nor Khrushchev will attend. The Soviet delegation is to be headed by Mikhail Suslov, the veteran Soviet ideologist, while Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee is to lead the Chinese representatives. The mere recital of this background shows the difficulty in bringing about the Sino-Soviet meeting. Attempts to build support. As the time for the Sine-Soviet meeting in Moscow approaches, it is difficult to see any signs of a desire to compromise on either side. Evidently one of the main reasons why the Soviets so ardently wooed Castro during his prolonged visit to the USSR was that they wished to commit him firmly to their camp, as opposed to the Chinese Communist camp. Thus, the Soviets saw to it that the joint Soviet-Cuban communi- que of 23 May gave strong support to the Soviet position on peaceful coexistence, the dangers of nuclear war, the impossi- bility of exporting revolution, and the need to stress economic development. In his fare- 25X1C10b well speech to Castro, made also on 23 May, Khrushchev seemed to be hitting at the Chinese when he said: "It is necessary to fight resolutely against any division of the revolutionary forces under any pretext. Non-class division by continent, color of skin, or any other standard, means a division of the forces of the working class." Approved For Release DP78-030 QO ft1 3-6 Approved For Relea 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061WO0200020003-6 (669.Cunt.) 17 June 1963 Meanwhile the Chinese have not been idle. As if in answer to the Soviet-Cuban communique of 23 May, a joint statement of the CCP and the New Zealand CP of 25 May emphasized that reliance on peaceful coexistence as a means to bring about a peaceful tran- sition to socialism was "a modern version of social democracy," and the joint statement also condemned acts of "adventurism and capitulationism," as the Chinese describe Soviet policy in Cuba. On 15 May, while touring in North Vietnam, Liu Shao-chi, the Chinese Chief of State and Mao's heir apparent, made a speech stating: "The International Communist Movement is now in a crucial period of utmost importance. An acute struggle between the Marxist-Leninists and the modern revisionists is going on on a worldwide scale over a series of important problems of principle. The polemics are centered on whether the peoples of the world should carry out revo- lutions or not, and whether proletarian parties should lead the world's people in revolution or not." That the Chinese are indeed carrying on a worldwide struggle is shown by reports of Chinese efforts to circulate leaflets and other material in all areas, including western Europe and even the East European satellites. For example, Lajos Lederer reported in the London Observer of 5 May that the Chinese Embassy in Budapest was distributing leaflets, and that 40 Chinese study- ing in Hungary had broken up an international student seminar with their accusations against Khrushchev for splitting the Com- munist movement. The Chinese have also been pushing forward in their efforts to win over front organizations: following their success at the Djakarta Afro-Asian Journalists Conference in 25X1 C10b April they lavishly a' lcl entert ne a number of these journalists in Peking on 18-19 May. Apparently as a result of Liu Shao-chi's efforts in Southeast Asia, Ho Chi Minh signed with him a joint statement supporting Chicom positions, and the Indonesian CP seems to have been won over to Peking, with Red Flag endorsing its lines. New Chicory charges of Indian border vio ations (in broadcasts during the first week of June), and renewed Pathet Lao attacks on Laotian neutralist forces seem to spell new Chicom aggressiveness, and new embarrassments for Moscow. Soviet problems and position. Speaking generally, the Soviets seem o be in a difficult situation. Following the first sputniks, Moscow apparently concluded that communism was advancing in the underdeveloped areas of the world, that the Bloc could be con- trolled without using Stalinist terror, and that rocket and space successes could be parlayed into such an impression of Soviet military superiority that the West would bow to Soviet demands. None of these expectations has worked out. The greatest Soviet success, the communization of Cuba, must now taste bitter-sweet in Soviet mouths, since it led to the greatest Soviet setback since the failure of the Berlin blockade. Indeed, it may be that Approved For Release 1999/08/24 :2CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200020003-6 V" M (669.Continued) (44pp end for Releasg 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061, p00200020003-6 17 June 1963 The attempt to place medium range missiles in Cuba represented a last desperate effort to attain an overawing strategic position vis-a-vis the United States. The attempt to use trade and aid programs to win influence and prestige has often worked out poorly, as in the cases of Egypt, Syria, Guinea and Iraq; even Indonesia, despite vast expenditures, remains dubious, with its CP turning to Peking. Many of the front movements, such as the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, have also proved uncontrollable by Moscow. As a result of such experiences, a recent article by V. Kudryavtsev in International Affairs (Moscow, May 1963) sug- gested that the CP mus wor w n the local African govern- ments if it is ever to bring them to the stage of "socialism." According to the Italian CP paper L'Unita of 8 and 9 May, a Moscow meeting sponsored by the Soviet Insti e for World Economics heard papers by Institute collaborators stating that, contrary to Chicom beliefs, Asian, African and Latin American revolutions cannot defeat imperialism, which can only be conquered by "socialist" revolutions in the industrialized countries. Such articles and statements are intended to lead to the conclusion that only "peaceful coexistence" can conquer for Communism. Yet the failure of Soviet threats and maneuvers, the decline in the usefulness of the fronts (including the World Peace Council, which among other things quietly called off a meeting scheduled for 8 June in Warsaw), and the divisive effects of peaceful co- existence (with its non-Leninist implications) on the world Com- munist movement, suggested that attempts to deceive both capi- talists and orthodox Communists -- such as the "peaceful co- existence" campaign represents -- cannot succeed. Now the Kremlin must face the fact that even its leadership in the world movement is crumbling: things have reached the point where the leader of the Italian CP can freely criticize Soviet doctrines on art and literature, and Rumania can conduct flirtations (with trade and scientific-technical agreements) with the dissidents in Peking. (See Chronology -- Communist Dissensions in this issue.) The extraordinary efforts required to weld Castro to Moscow are a revelation of weakness. The Council for Mutual Economic As- sistance is obstructed and evaded by its satellite members. The bloc no longer marches on Moscowts orders. Chinese problems and position. The Chinese seem to be gain- ing s rend , yet they have eir problems too. It will be extremely difficult -- probably impossible -- for them even to acquire the leadership in the world Communist movement once exercised by Stalin. In some ways their position is not Stalinist, but Trotskyite, the position of the romantic revo- lutionary who calls for revolution when he has not the means to bring it about. Their strongest appeal is in the underdeveloped countries, and in those areas they are tempted to expand their doctrine of "East Wind versus West Wind" into racialism. But the underdeveloped peoples do not want to be oriental, they want to be industrialized. The Chinese should have even less reason than the Soviets to want an open split in the movement -- though they like to compare themselves with Lenin's "splendid isolation'" Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 (669. Continued) A proved For Relea?e1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A900200020003-6 (66T. Cont.) 17 June 1963 in the Second International. Within the movement they can exert considerable influence, but outside it, they will be weak and vulnerable. Possible developments. Against this background, it seems that there are ree poss le results for the 5 July conference: 1. Theoretically, there might be a grand reconciliation. But every present indication makes this extremely unlikely. To begin with, such a reconciliation could hardly occur without the presence of Khrushchev and Mao, and secondly, there is no sign that either side is relenting in its stand. 2. There might be an open break. This is-definitely possible, yet Khrushchev can hardly be anxious to preside over the dissolution of the Communist Empire, while Mao would lose strength from a break. 3. There might be superficial agreement, resolving none of the basic causes of the conflict. One question on which some statement will be expected is the question of a world conference of Communist parties, yet it is virtually impossible for the disputants to agree on who shall attend, let alone on what shall be discussed. Generally the Soviets do not want such a meeting but the Chicoms do. Perhaps this difficulty can be glossed over with a vague statement that a world meeting will occur at a date still to be announced. An agreement to tone down open polemics or to resume aid for China and/or Albania is also conceivable. It is also possible, of course, that at the last moment some pretext will be found for postponing the conference once more. 25X1 C10t 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 25X1ClOb Approved For ReleasW1999/08/24: 78-0306 IWOO ObT 0 63 670 AF. Danger of Racial-Explosion in South Africa BACKGROUND: Policy. In May 1963 the parliament of the Republic of South Afr cassed two new apartheid laws, adding to the tighten- ing cycle of segregation, protest, and further segregation of the Republic's nearly eleven million Africans. Called "Bantu," the South African Negro's forced separation from the whites and coloreds (mixed blood) is the core of the country's socio-economic policies, the motivating factor for rising extremist opposition and the target of bitter attacks from other nations. Prime Minister Vervioerd's government, with the support of the majority of the Afrikaners (the descendents of Boer settlers), is attempting to implement its decision that separation -- not inte- gration -- of the races is the only way the European fifth of the population can retain control of its own affairs In the country. Total separation of the races is considered impraccical even by VerEwroerd and company in this the most highly industrialized country on the continent because African labor is essential for industrial, commercial and domestic service. The new Bantu laws will help pro- vide a readily available, but controlled, labor pool for the white communities by stringently restricting the African's right to live or work according to his own choice. This also arbitrarily breaks up African families. Complementing the Bantu laws is the General Law Amendment of May 2nd which, according to the International Commission of Jurists embodies "many of the worst features of the Stalinist regime." Its provisions include removal of habeas corpus, requiring the accused to prove his own innocence, arrest w ou warrant, indefinite im- prisonment without trial and denial of other legal safeguards. The government is pushing a "Bantustan" program which will transfer all Africans not needed in the labor force into eight widely scattered areas, comprising approximately thirteen percent of the country. In these areas Africans are presumably to be permitted their own autonomous political development under chiefs who are salaried government servants. But economically the African will still be dependent on the white South African areas; politically he will be subject to ultimate rule from Pretoria. Most Africans strongly object to the Bantustan program but many see it as the best way to gain ultimate independence from the whites. Poverty is the usual lot of the Bantustan African despite the fact that the white South African has the highest living standard in Africa. (670. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 (670 Cont.,) Approved For ReleaV 1999 P78-0306 OOHOdb 0( $?3 Political divisions generally follow racial, cultural lines. Most of the r kaners support the ruling; Nationalist Party which came to power in 1946 by advocating apartheid as the answer to the "them or Vs" racial situation which they believed the white minor- ity faced. 4 healthy economy, base. on abundant mineral resources, and a large, well-trained army have sustained the government which clai-nis to be strongly pro-West and anti-Communist. The largest of the white opposition parties, the United Party, draws its adherents from English-speaking populations and advocates fewer racial restrictions; the small Progressive and Liberal parties want none at all. None has sufficient sur_uport from the conservative white electorate to threaten the powerful Nationalist Party govern- ment. Of the outlawed non-white parties, the largest is the African National Congress (ANC), led by Nobel prize-winner Albert Luthuli and including among its leaders a number of known Communists. The ANC's multi-racial stance and non-violent opposition have proven in- effective in combatting the government's apartheid policies. The militant, sabotage arm of the ANC, called the Spear of the Nation, is now receiving the active support of the small South African Com- mau.nist Party (SACP), underground since 1953. A 1963 SACP manifesto caller for a united front of national liberation. However, a London Daily Worker article of April 17th called for revolutionary action to overthrow white domination through cooperation with the ANC and condemned the other nationalist groups. The Communist decision to work through the nationalist ANC and to advocate a policy of "answering violence with violence" may intrc- duco a foreign element into the picture as CPs of other countries lend their support through arms, training, or money for the SACP- supported fighters. An ANC-authored article in Pravda of March 3rd has already called for "international help" for 3t program. The more extreme Pan-African Congress (PAC), advocating a strictly "African Africa," inspired the 1:63 demonstrations which led to the Sharpeville shootings and ultimately to jailing of their leader and banning of the party. Extremist elements of PAC are be- lieved to have formed the core of the violently anti-white Poqo organization which called for widespread racial violence as recently as early 1963. The South African police claim to have broken the organization by arrests of thousands in the Spring of 1963. External Relations. Attacks on the Afrikaner government's in- movau e adherence to is apartheid policy led to South Africa's withdrawal from the British Commonwealth in 1961. Severing Common- wealth ties has had little effect on South Africa's economic situa- tion and none on the apartheid program. Another source of international friction is the government's refusal to concede United Nations' jurisdiction over neighboring South West Africa, now administered as an almost integral part of South Africa itself. A German colony until 1918 mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations after World War I, South West Africa 999/p81242 CIA-Rnp78-03061A000?~00( 1 0003-6 Approved For Release I (6743. on nued) (~TO'APgAd For Relea,,19 DP78-03061W00jj50ft000S`,*S has international status and should be a supervisory responsibility of the UN, according to an international Court of Justice ruling of 1950. Although conceding some legitimate international concerns for South West Africa, Vorwoerd's government refuses UN supervision and continues to rule this relatively prosperous area under what it claims are the terms of the lapsed mandate. An early 1964 ruling is expected on a suit now in the Court charging that South African apartheid policies contravene the terns of the League mandate. South Africa may refuse to comply with any unfavorable ruling, thus inviting further international friction. The growth of Afro-Asian influence in pushing the UN case has been paralleled by independent African moves. The African heads of state, meeting in Addis Ababa in May, called on countries having "traditional relations" with South Africa to apply UN sanctions against her, to support the UN special committee on apartheid, and to sever diplomatic relations with both South Africa and Portugal. This so-called "decolonialization" resolution also called for a boycott of trade and other economic measures and promised to aid movements of national liberation. (See also BPG Item #672 "The African Heads of State Meeting" in this issue) The imminent dissolution of the Central African Federation (Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) to the northeast has led to speculation that Sir Winston Field, Prime Minister of South- ern Rhodesia, will seek support for his white-supremacy government from Verwoerd. Such a bloc of racist states in Black Africa could 25X1C1Obonly draw increasing fire from its neighbors and from the UN. 25X1C10b lk Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Relea ;? I 999 P78-0306 ,Q,p00tQOd2G@OlW3 671 EE,FE,NE. Sino-Soviet Border Controversies IBACICC?OUND: On 12 December 1962 Premier Khrushchev referred to Communist hi a's criticism of Soviet handling of the Cuban crisis and, in justifying his having reached an accommodation with the "imperialists," he chided Communist China for having failed to kick the "imperialists" out of Hong Kong and Macao. The US Communist Party repeated and expanded the Soviet charge on 9 January 1963. The Peking People's Daily editorial of 8 March took up these charges by discussing"a'little of the history of Imperialist aggression against China." The editorial listed 12 countries, including Tsarist Russia, who had "carried out unbridled aggression against China." The Pacple's Daily referred to a "large number of unequal treaties" that China had been compelled to sign and specifically mentioned nine of them, four of which were between Russia and China and in- volved the cession of extensive territory by China to Russia. The Treaty of Ai Gun (1858) gave some 135,003 square miles of Chinese land by moving the border from the Yabloncvy and Stanovoi Mountain Ranges in Siberia eastward to the Amur River; the Treaty of Peking (1863) gave Russia some 350,000 square miles, including the Chinese terri- tory east of the Ussuri River that makes up the USSR's Far Eastern provinces including the city of Vladivostok; and the Treaty of Ili (1331) gave Russia the lower Ili valley which previously was part of Chinese Sinkiang. The fourth "unequal treaty" between China and Russia gave Russia a series of unilateral economic and consular privileges in China. (For a detailed description of these treaties and maps of the territories involved see the article entitled "Borders of China" in the 20 April 1963 issue of The New Republic and an article by Chalmers Roberts in the 23 Apra 53 issue of The Washington Post. For an excellent analysis of the Sino-Soviet border problem, see "Will There Be a Reconquest of Siberia" in the 22 March issue of Christ and Welt. The former two articles are reprinted in the 30 April Issue of Press Comment and the latter is in the 1 May issue of Press Comment.) The People's Daily editorial explained that when the People's Republic o China was founded "our government declared that it would examine the treaties concluded by previous Chinese governments. . . and would recognize, abrogate, revise, or renegotiate them accor'ing to their respective contents." The People's Daily added that all "these legacies from the past" would ue set a "when the time is ripe." Thus far in this context neither side has made reference to the Treaty of 1924 which re-established normal relations between China and the Soviet Union after the Russian Revolution. This treaty was supposed to implement the Soviet declaration of 1919 which pro- ciaiiied that "The (USSR) government of Workers and Peasants has . declared null and veil . the treaties which were to enable . Tsarist Russia to enslave the people of the East and principally the occa a of China." The s a0~8 nJ f A60620002 ?i~v' s ?ccaACt~v~o~ea cu I )vv ets are no (671. Continued) 67 r Wd For Releas 199 P78-0306W002 0 MA63 imperialistic and also as proof of Communist Fraternal relations. It is not referred to currently by the Soviets for obvious reasons, although Chinese reluctance to cite this treaty is somewhat more obscure. Perhaps they simply prefer to withhold it for later use. It could be a potent device to be used in challenging the current Soviet leaders to demonstrate their loyalty to the original concepts of their own revolution and to the ideas of Lenin. At any rate, the Chinese have served notice that they are at liberty to bring up the 25X1C10b question of these treaties "when the time is ripe." Approved For Releas 199Q~ ~^^? 'A-0Q078-0306WQQ2QQga0Q@JJ6 672 AF,g. The African Heads of State Meeting 25X1C10b BACKGROUND: The meeting of the African Heads of State in Addis a 2-26 May) culminated in the signing of a charter (see attachment) of the new Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was signed by all 30 independent African governments present. Only 3 governments were absent: Morocco boycotted the meeting ostensibly because of Mauritania's presence, but it is expected that it will become a co-signator at a later date. Togo was not seated, presum- ably in deference to Guinean President Toure's continuing opposition to the Grunitsky regime, but may be given an opportunity to join the OAU. The white-ruled Union of South Africa, pursuing apartheid policies, was not invited. The meeting took place in an atmosphere of general rapproche- ment and moderation. Indeed, the conference was a remarkable achievement in that agreement was reached in four days on a number of basic issues, despite personal rivalries and serious differences in approach. The charter was adopted in the face of a strong but unsuccessful plea of President Nkrumah of Ghana for immediate organ- ic union and a recommendation by the preceding Foreign Ministers' meeting to postpone the adoption of a charter. The charter was developed with the assistance of a representative of the Organiza- tion of American states at the invitation of the Ethiopian Govern- ment. The charter is essentially of the OAS type. It provides for a summit-level assembly to meet annually, a ministerial council to meet at least twice yearly, and a secretariat currently (and prob- attly permanently) to be located at Addis Ababa. It establishes a commission for mediation, conciliation and arbitration as well as other functional commissions for defense, economic, social and scientific purposes with the details remaining to be worked out. The charter does not include provisions for collective security or a parliamentary assembly. These institutions presumably will supersede the rivalries between the militant Casablanca powers and the moderate Monrovia states. However, basically regional group- ings, such as the African and Malagasy Union (UAM) of 13 French- speaking states, can be expected to continue for some time and to play important roles. The charter represents an important step in.the African states' attempts to find cooperative solutions to many of the continent's difficult and important problems. It is fairly realistic in view of the present capabilities of the member states and makes very little concession to extremists and their opinions. But it will be some time before the charter will be implemented and there undoubtedly will be many disputes over details of the new pan-African structure, including and particularly over the designation of key personnel. Approved For Release 199AlnR19A rIA_gDP78-030th1 00 0 0p?000$6 (e7A p v9d For Releas 1999/ 78-03061F 002 gQ 6 It appears that the secretariat will be located in Addis Ababa, with assembly and council meetings to be rotated among other capitals and the various commissions to be headquartered elsewhere. A meeting of OAU foreign ministers is to be held in Dakar in July to chart the next steps. Ethiopian United Nations representative Tesfaye Febre-Egzy was named temporary secretary general of the OAU. There is specu- lation among certain African leaders that Tesfaye may be in sympathy with Nkrumah's policies and that he could conceivably use the position as secretary to inject a more militant policy into the OAU than envisaged by the signatories of the charter. Further, the six-nation committee (Ghana, UAR, Uganda, Tanganyika, Niger and Nigeria) set up by the conference to appoint deputy secretaries will include representatives who may well attempt to regain some of the ground in the secretariat's work which Nkrumah lost at the meeting. The resolutions which were adopted reflect the trends in African nationalism and non-alignment. Several of the key reso?.u- tions appeared to have been carefully framed as a direct challenge to the West and were supported by the most pro-Western of the African states. The resolution on decolonization calls on all independent African states to support dependent people in Africa in their struggle for freedom and independence; calls for the establishment of a special fund to be contributed to by the member states by 15 July to supply practical and financial aid to the various African national liberation movements; calls on African states to intervene with the great powers to stop supporting colonialist governments, particularly Portugal "which is conducting a real war of genocide in Africa"; informs the Western nations that they must choose between friendship with the African peoples and support of powers that oppress them; demands the breaking off of diplomatic and consular relations between all African states and the govern- ments of Portugal and South Africa so long as they persist in their present attitude towards decolonization; asks for boycotting the foreign trade of Portugal and South Africa by: (a) prohibiting in-port of goods, (b) closing African ports and airports to their ships and planes, and (c) forbidding the planes of those two countries to overfly the territories of all African states. The resolution establishes a nine-nation committee to be located in Dar-es-Salaam to coordinate assistance to nationalist movements, 21 of which had observer-lobbyists in attendance who were recognized by the assembly. Nkrumah, Toure (Guinea), Ben Bella (Algeria) and Obote (Uganda) were leading the way in the formulation of this militant posture on the freedom fight of the still-dependent African territories. The resolution on apartheid and racism, which condemns racial discrimination everywhere,iexpresses deep concern over racial dis- crimApproved 'or Release 9/a 1 fC~i -V6?ff -~ ~~ Ab6b~16602b18 (672. Continued) '(672 Conn.) ~gO2uOu36 Approved For Relea*,1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061 00200 the continent, particularly in the United States. At the same time, the resolution expressed appreciation of the US Government's efforts to end discrimination. As part of the resolution against apartheid, a special fund was set up for an anti-apartheid movement. The reso ution appeals to all governments still having iplomatic, consular and economic relations with the Union of South Africa to break these off and cease any other form of encouragement of apartheid. The resolution on general disarmament says that the conference has agreed unanimously on the removal of military bases from Africa and the disentanglement of African countries from military pacts with foreign powers; declares Africa a denuclearized zone; and appeals to the great powers to reduce arms and to sign a disarma- ment agreement with effective controls. A resolution on Africa, Non-Alignment and the UN reaffirms dedication to the purposes and principles of the UN charter; accepts all obligations contained in that charter, including finan- cial obligations; and requests that steps be taken for better African representation in the principal organs of the UN. A resolution on economic problems asks that Africa develop its own economy which should tend to eliminate the need for exter- nal economic aid. External aid should be unconditional and not prejudicial to the independence of African states. The conference resolved to establish a preparatory economic committee to study possibilities of establishing a free trade area between various African countries, a common external tariff to protect industries, a pan-African monetary zone, and means for developing trade between African states. 25X1C10b 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved FdtA elea6*uii1 [9`/02124AMMoIRD i0306'I#MQ 20003-6 " . . . The surprise note in this trip of Fidel . . . is that in Cuba they did not-know about it. The news. given by Radio Rebeldo'surpris'ed the, Cubans..... But all this happens naturally in systems'of'government 1-ike those. which rule Cuba now.. . Fidel Castro in Moscow. . . . to appear before the .master . . ." El Heraldo, Barranquilla, Colombia, April 29,1963. "Castro''s trip to Moscow had been, schedu-l.ed for. a long time, but was to have been later. Just a few days ago, the Cuban press, publishing the program of 1 May celebrations in Havana, announced that Castro would attend. Was it Castro or Khrushchev who suddenly insisted on advancing the trip's date? 'perhaps the Soviet Premier deemed necessary the presence, on I May on Red Square, of the least controversial socialist revolutionist today. . . , presenting Castro as an American prize exhibit . " France Observateur (France Observer),, Paris, May 2, 1963. Castro's visit. to Moscow was not his own idea but Khrushchev's . . . . After Khrushchev's withdrawal of Soviet arses from Cuba in October,.som'e method of pacification was nec- essary and the most logical and ostentatious moment was the first of May celebrations. . . . Khrushchev took advantage of the opportunity to'invite the. vain Castro to Moscow and show him off as'a hero of the Communist World. . . . Although Castro never loses an opportunity to proclaim the national sovereignty of Cuba, he is still completely dependent economi- cally"on. the USSR.". Julian Corkin, editorial "The .Consecration of Castro in Red` Square," La.Hora, Guatemala City, May 21, 1963. " Castro is the main pawn . . . The bearded Commu- nist has not'hidden his resentment toward Khrushchev for with- drawing the. armament and the Communist troops from his island. 21 Pais, Cali, Colombia, May 3, 1963. " Castro is no better than a Soviet puppet, a satellite of Moscow... it . . . Both..Khrushchev and Castro seem to have their own versions of the'most'serious question in international politics of recent years which brought the world, almost to the brink of another world war. "Their answers as to how-the Soviet missiles and-weapons came to be planted in Cuba are contradictory. Khrushchev contends this was due to Cuba's request. But Castro contended that. it was at the request of Russia ... Such a'posture leads Castro to.admit implicitly that he has betrayed the revolution'and.put.Cuba into the hands of new imperialism. And when the 'game' was up, Khrushchev did not wait a moment even'to_inform Castro that he was pulling the missiles out of Cuba. ko.gave it the look of a dramatic gesture, spontaneous, in the interests of'world peace.. What more is needed than' these acts :to'skio)r that Castro is nothing .more than a Soviet puppet -- Soviet p1.acement of missiles in Cuba to serve Soviet aims, and the 'stthsequent withdrawkl of the missiles without so much of a by-your--4eave to .Castro. , . " Castro should behave-- like all other satellites." "'Puppet' Visiting Moscow," editorial, The Mail, Madras, India, April 20, 1363. . . " . . . Moscow was covered`, with posters . . . This natu- rally is for propaganda.'. It `was the style of Hitler and the style of Mussolini, the style o9.,.4 ..ctaatorships. . . . Totali- tarianism, red or white, settles not on the truth of its regime or on the goodness of its doctrines or the nobility of its behavior, but on?propaganda, propaganda is the battering ram of Communism. Therefore in Moscow and Peking and in Havana, there are people with only one mission: to inflate dogs. One of these dogs is Fidel Castro., " La Patria, Manizales, Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 " . . . in all this sham, there was no sign or evidence that one chief of state was visiting another. Everybody under- stood, and some commented on the fact, that the visit was the execution of an order for propaganda purposes. The bearded puppet in-the service of Moscow. . ." El Heraldo, Barranquilla, Colombia, May 4, 1963. It . .. Khrushchev wants to rub out the memory of the Oct- ober 1962 crisis when he yielded before . . Kennedy . . . "Despite his tropical impetuosity, his disconnected oratory, and his disordered attitude before persons of state, Castro did not go to. Moscow to return to Cuba with empty hands. . . . This is the second act of Communist intervention in the Caribbean. And it may be the prologue of an intervention even more profound in Latin America. . . ." El Tiempo, Bogota, Colombia, May 9, 1963. he.prolonged travels of Fidel Castro in the Soviet Union continue to be wrapped in the veil of secrecy and mystery . . . the Cuban leader is rather isolated . not allowed to make personal contacts with the common people and even less so with correspondents. . . an extensive program of visits . . . all organized . . with the purpose of showing him everything which is impressive and .-.iagnificent in Soviet Russia and of hiding from him the darker side and the poverty . . . Contrary to the statements initially made by the world press, the reception given to Castro in Red Square was characterized by a lack of enthusiasm and spontaneity of which, furthermore, Prensa Latina /uba's official news agency7 itself was a witness, when it :said that the Soviet government had invited the people to come to Red Square, which means that the Soviet government decided which sectors of the population and in what number should appear. " . . . in spite of the cruel severity of the totalitarian Soviet-Cuban regime, despite the enormous sacrifices made by the Cuban people for freedom from the new tyranny, the flames of popular resistance burn here and there with a new vigor. They furnish irrefutable proof that the truly revolutionary people want the bread and the liberty which Castro robbed from their country. " . . . we would not be surprised if the current rumors . . were confirmed According to these rumors, Fidel Castro may be trying to cure himself in the Soviet Union, of the sickness from which he suffers, the symptoms of which are insomnia and periodical eruptions of irrational behavior. . . ." 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, 5!~,o Paulo, Brazil, May ll, 1963. "The visit of,Dr. Fidel Castro to Moscow has at least been the occasion for some plainspeaking by the Communists. It is no longer others to-say that these have ulterior ambi- tions in the Western Hemisphere. 'The Cuban revolution opened up a front of active struggle against imperialism in Latin America,' declared the Communist Party paper Pravda which added that the Castro revolution provided a powerfu stimulus to the yaovement of the Latin American peoples for their 'full national liberation.' "Soviet Premier Khrushchev . . promised full Soviet sup- port for the Castro regime. From all accounts, it is a funny sort of 'freedom' that the Cubans. are now enjoying but then Mr. Khrushchev's idea of what constitutes freedom is rather dif- ferent from the usual acceptance of the word. "Dr. Castro was even more revealing. 'If the Soviet Union did not exist,' he said, 'there. would be no Cuban revolution . . . Put thin -does, not :mean that ?d~ha Sov i.,a. Union made this .revolution . It is only -r4a Soviet U.Lio:_: t fay holds back the imperialist 1k - attack on our country.' "The Cuban revolutionary leader also said that they were always great admirers of Lenin, but after they became acquainted with the Soviet Union the image of Lenin took on massive Approved For Release 199.9/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-030t1A000200020003-6 Proportions. We seem to see here the suggestion that Dr. C.stro only gradually committed himself into the Communist toils that it was Soviet Russian willingness to support his revolution from ulterior motives that led Dr. Castro to become the whole- hearted Marxist-Leninist he now appears to be. That Moscow was chiefly interested in Cuba as providing a suitable bridgehead for the ideological conquest of all Latin America is a foregone conclusion. . . . We can hardly imagine two peoples that have less in corm-ion . . . it . the rece?ntion in Moscow's Red Square given to Dr. Castro seems to have been carefully organized rather than spon- taneous. "We cannot, of course, foresee what plans Mr. Khrushchev and Dr. Castro will concoct between them. They are not likely to bode well for the peace of the Western Hemistphere, in any case. . . . it should also put the American nations doubly on their guard. " . in actual fact the Cuban revolution has merely moved from one form of exploitation to another! . " The Japan Times, April 33, 1363. 'rasters in the Kre:nl.n. . . . Cuba is definitely enrolled as a Communist satellite . . ." El Pais, Cali, Colombia, May .4, Cartoon: "Castro's Gift to Khrushchev" _ shows Castro p:r?e- senting "Cuba," a female figure in chains, to Khrushchev. Excelsior, Mexico City, May 4, 1963. 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For lease 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-W61A000200020003-6 RACE PROBLEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA "Tearing a Country Apart" by Colin Legum (who revisiting South Africa) In The Observer, London April 28-May 5, 1963 "There is no mistaking the change in temper in South Africa in the three 'quiet' years since the Sharpeville shootings. On all sides now there is a fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability of violence. "Government spokesmen lead public opinion in preparing . . . for what lies ahead. They no longer say 'If violence comes,' but as Dr. Verwoerd recently said: 'When combat is necessary in place of the pen, we will not hesitate.' "Violence has also become the language of.the Africans -- from Congress leaders to women domestic workers.... All talk now is about the tactics of violence, no longer about its relevance. . There is almost a desire for violence, as an outlet for the growing sense of helplessness . . . . "It is not difficult to find out what is happening in Dr. Ven,aoerd's republic as a result of the government's policy of uproot- ing and reorganizing the lives and relationships of millions of peop le . . . . "One out of three of the Republic's eleven million Africans no longer has the legal right to live anywhere in the country. Where these people may live is a decision for bureaucrats. Well ovex 130,000 people have already been forcibly removed from one area to another, or from the towns to the stagnant, workless native reserves. Another 500,000 are under notice of removal. And by the time the process of creating Bantustans is completed, well over five million people will have been uprooted under the plans already announced. Not since Stalin moved the Volga Germans and Hitler moved Europe's Jews has there been such a calculated effort to transport populations solely for the purpose of serving the interests of a ruling oligarchy. "One should begin perhaps by describing what Dr. Verwoerd is trying to do, and why he is being allowed to do it. "His premise (a correct one) is that nowhere in Africa will Africans be willing to share power. Their demand everywhere is to be politically' dominant . Therefore, if a European community the size of South Africa's wants to maintain control over its own affairs it must refuse to surrender any political power. He has put two choices to the white electorate: integration of the races or separation -- and they have decisively rejected the first. They are willing, therefore, to endorse whatever action maybe necessary to achieve the second. They see it as a simple choice between 'them' or 'us.' "The Prime Minister, however, recognizes that it is impossible to go on forever denying political rights or economic opportunities to Africans. And, since he refuses to allow these in the present Republic, his solution to the dilemma is to divide South Africa into nine parts -- a white part, occupying 87 per cent of the land, and :eight black parts, the Bantustans. These, in time, will be allowed to grow to independence. But until this happens they are to be con- trolled, guided and assisted by the whites. "This partitioning of South Africa into nine separate states is what is now being attempted. Dr. Verwoerd, and with him the majority of whites, believe this is the only hope for white survival on condi- tions acceptable to themselves. "Before taking a closer look at the way these plans are working out, important to describe briefly what is involved in tearing the races apart and in setting up Bantustans. The Republic's eleven million Africans are distributed roughly in three equal parts between the reserves. (the future Bantustans), the white areas and the white farms. The.declared official policy is that, in future, the sole criterion for any African to be anywhere in the white areas will be whether or not his labor is needed there.; this decree will affect two- thirds of the total African population. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-030j4000200020003-6 "Nobody knows for sure how many Africans will be declared surplus to the needs of whites. The fact that an African has been born and has lived all his life in a particular place will no longer be relevant to his right to go on living there once the new Bantu Laws Amendment Bill is passed. With half a million Africans at present unemployed, one gets some idea of the immediate surplus that will be pushed back either into the reserves or into labor depots. From there they will be directed, not only where, but also for whom they may work. if they lose their job they must leave their place of: residence until another job is found for them. "The Bantustans are to be reorganized to absorb the surplus work- ers. But the land (13 per cent of the country's total) is insufficieit for those already living there. It has been estimated that 3,600,000 people will have to leave the land in the reserves to enable farming to be made productive. "To provide homes and work for these millions, in addition to those declared surplus to the needs of white areas, the government proposes to build hundreds of new towns inside the borders of the Bantustans. Just across the borderline, white-owned industries are to be located, drawing their labor from the Bantustan populations. Mean- while, the removals from the towns are being pushed ahead even though the 'border industries' are nowhere near ready to absorb the numbers of displaced workers. . . . "The government has already set up its first Bantustan in the Transkei, an area the size of Denmark, in the eastern Cape Province. It is the traditional homeland of the Xhosa-speaking people (1,500,0OQ "The constitution for the Transkei makes it the equivalent of a British colony. Instead of a governor it has a commissioner-general -- a tough, right-wing former Nationalist M.P.- -- who holds all ulti- mate power on behalf of the Republican Government. The functions of the Transkei Territorial Authority are restricted to local affairs. Its Parliament consists of 64 chiefs and 45 elected members. Since the chiefs can be disciplined or dismissed at will by the Republican Government, it has the power to control the nonelected majority. "The Transkei is known as 'Verwoerd's Reich' because its first 'Prime Minister' is Chief Kaiser Matanzima, a 35-year-old, sophisti- cated,, tough university graduate. He is a perfect partner for Dr. Verwoerd. He, too, believes in apartheid: it fits in well with his own deeply held attachment to black racism. "The government has gambled heavily on Matanzima. If he lets them down, or fails, Bantustan would suffer a serious setback, and so would Dr. Verwoerd. Ma.tanzima is no easy tiger to ride. He has al- ready demanded that all between the Fish River and Zululand (which includes the whole of Natal) should be-handed over to Bantustan. And he has begun to menace the white traders in the Transkei. On this point.Verwoerd,'s attitude is consistent: he be- lieves that, just as the blacks have no inherent rights in the white areas, so the whites have none in the Bantustans. "Matanzima's chief opponent is the most powerful chief in the Transkei -- Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo of the Tembu.. He has resisted all government. pressures to make him cooperate; if the gov- ernment hesitates to depose him it is because it fears the trouble this would bring from the numerous Tembu people. Sabata stands firmly for an interracial society. . . . "Things are not going well in the first.Bantustan. A state of. emergency, proclaimed when Pondo peasants revolted in 1961, is: still in force. The leader of this revolt., Magaduzele Bentzwana, heads a violent underground movement in the hills. He has sworn not to be taken alive. "A second underground violence movement, Pogo,. has been responsi- ble for several killings of whites and blacks in the Transkei. oogo's immediate target is to kill chiefs who support Matanzima; his own life is constantly threatened, and he moves everywhere under heavy guard. Matanzima's police are notorious for the brutality they show to their opponents,. who. are. no less violent in their own methods. ,Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 :,CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 . "Thus the Transkei , which until the advent of Bantustan had been one of the most tranquil parts of South Africa -- has been turned into an armed camp, divided between the supporters and oppo- nents of Chief Matanzima. Violence has already become an important factor in the way things work out in the first of the eight Bantustans. But still the government is not hesitating to push ahead its plans to establish another seven." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: 91A-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 "Has South Africa a Future?" by Frank Giles (traveling foreign editors In The Sunday Times, London, March 13, 1963 "The first impression that a visitor to South Africa receives today is of a rich and immensely promising country being led with slow but apparent certainty towards disaster. "On the practical side, admittedly, it is tempting to question whether the shortcomings of apartheid ar9 so great. 'From the moral and human point of view apartheid is detestable, but for the moment it works' was how an experienced foreign diplomatist, stationed in Capetown, judged the situation. . . . "Criticism from outside is easy. It riust, in all fairness, be considered natural for many white South Africans in fear for their way of life (and perhaps their lives themselves) to see things differently and find present conditions quite acceptable if not actually pleasant. But inquiries soon reveal the flaws (apart from its inhumanity) of apartheid. "In its latest form, it seeks to create a series of Bantu (African)'homelands' in the traditional tribal areas where the African will be able to exercise his political rights and develop himself, socially and economically, without the interference or harmful impact of white civilization. This may in theory be a noble vision, but it cannot accommodate two simple facts: first, the 'homelands,' many of them no better than rural slums, are incapable in the foreseeable future of supporting any substantial increase in their existing populations of about 4.5 million. Secondly, the six million Africans living outside the homelands, who supply the cheap labor force indispensable to the economy, are to continue to be denied any sort of status in the white areas where they live and work. . . . "The lack of any political rights for the Africans living in the white areas is justified by a comparison with Italians working in France, or Mexicans in the United States -- 'If they wish to exercise their rights as, citizens they return to their own coun- tr1ae.' Not only does this argument overlook the fact that vast numbers of the Bantu in the industrial areas have become de- tribalized, losing all touch with their homelands and transforming themselves into a depressed proletariat, but it also passes over all the many aspects of racial discrimination which make the African's life a permanently underprivileged one. . . . "Difficult as it may be to find aught for one's comfort in South Africa today, none the less I believe that there are redeeming features, even in Nationalist policy, and that the outside world must by no means despair of a land whose racial problems are, it must be recognized, unique. "To begin with, the very application of apartheid policy has brought its own incidental benefits. For the first time, a South African Government, however questionable its philosophy, is doing something about the native. 'Separate development' means putting Africans to live in townships away from the white areas, and a huge program of native housing has been undertaken, with results that are visibly impressive by African or any other standards. The people who inhabit these townships may not have the vote or access to free- hold rights, but they live for the most part in conditions far better than those to be found in, for example, the Southern Rhodesian townships. . . . "The biggest rift in the lute of Nationalist thinking is to be seen, I think, in the practical realization of the Bantustan idea. So far, only one of the native reserve areas.-- the Transkei, a fertile and picturesque but poverty-stricken rigion lying between East London and Durban -- is being prepared for so-called self-, government and independence by means of a constitution which will come into force some time this year. But the protents of this development are such-that it is not impossible that it may lead to an upsurge of African nationalism which the white Nationalists will be increasingly incapable of controlling. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03nglA000200020003-6 NNOOK 4 Approved For Wease 1999/08/24 ::CIA-RDP78-43061A000200020003-6 "Very few of the Liberals or progressives would agree, it is true, with this view that the Bantustans may be transformed into so many daggers pointed at the hearts of their creators. They can produce what they think to be cast-iron reasons why Transkei's 'nationhood:' is only one more example of Nationalist hypocrisy. They may be right, and certainly most of the educated Africans I talked to in Johannesburg and elsewhere thought like this. "But it is significant that some of Verwoerd's own party are beginning, despite the massive safeguards and reservations built into the Transkei constitution, audibly to protest about what they fear will be a Frankenstein monster, to the point that Verwoerd has even been accused of being a liberal. Far-fetched though this may sound, it is undeniable that the theory of Bantustan, and still more its impending practice as embodied in the new Transkei con- stitution, establishes an entirely new factor in South African politics: that the black man has political rights, and that he is to exercise them within his own homeland by the one-man-one-vote method. is it really conceivable that once this principle, has been ter- admitted it will be possible to limit it, in face of all the inter- nal and external pressures which will surely be forthcoming, nal a number of prescribed African areas?" Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 "The Overthrow of Apartheid" by Patrick Duncan (South African editor of Contact who has fled the country) In The New Republic March 9, 1953 "The Communists' best hope in Africa lies in a land which has not yet found freedom -- South Africa. "Through the unyielding oppressiveness of the apartheid govern- ment there is now no chance of a peaceful transition to freedom and democracy. The way to power in South Africa now lies through the use of force, and the movement that first successfully uses force against apartheid is assured of overwhelming world support. "The Communists and their allies have pioneered the use of sabotage against Dr. Verwoerd's government and are well in the rung- Wing in the race to open the shooting war this year or next. One of the leading anti-apartheid movements, the African National Congress, has for years been anti-Western and during the Cuba crisis it sent messages of encouragement to Castro. Also, Dr. Verwoerd's government is pathologically afraid of communism and smears as Communist any democratic protest against apartheid. The oppressed, who hate apartheid, are therefore tempted to love apartheid's foes, including communism. All these factors make it possible that the South African revolution will be begun by the Communists. What this would mean was well nut by a recent American letterwriter to The Observer (Dec. 16, 1962). 'Should a major uprising against the South rican Govern anent be led by Co=s unists,' he wrote, 'the Western world would be confronted with a choice of evils of unprecedented difficulty.' "The best, perhaps the only guarantee that a future free South Africa will be non-Communist is that the South African revolution be begun and led to victory by men who are not Communist. Such men exist within South Africa, but they have insufficient arms and money. They must now be given what they need. "Although the idea of launching and powering a revolution for the attainment of democratic rights will seem fantastic to more cau- tious spirits in London and Washington, there are precedents. To quote President Kennedy: 'Most political revolutions -- including our own -- have been buoyed by outside aid in men, weapons and ideas' (Strategy of Peace). "There is another Southern African field in which the West dare not allow itself to be outplayed and outbid. Intertwined with the South African revolution is the question of Southwest Africa. Almosi certainly the United Nations will decide in the near future to remove the one-time mandate from the control of the South African Government Any such move will require teeth if it is to be successful, and supporters of a policy of tough action will no doubt have been en- couraged by the recent military successes of the United Nations troops in Katanga, only 400 miles away from Southwest Africa. When this decision to unlock Southwest Africa from the grip of Verwoerd's Government is made, the West will be faced with this choice: to cooperate with the United Nations, to finance, arm and transport its force (backed by an all but unanimous vote of the General Assembly and enjoying the sympathy of virtually the whole human race), or to sit by and watch the Soviets do it. "In Southwest Africa and South Africa., America's policy of nur- turing freedom and blocking.commu.n.ism leads irresistibly to the use of force, force to power the South African anti"apartheid revolution and force to support the United Nations in Southwest Africa. A foretaste of what lies ahead has been experienced in the fighting to free Katanga from Tshombe's concealed colonialism. Africa south of the Congo presents the West now with its next unavoidable choice: is it for or against apartheid? Let the choice be made soon." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CI.4-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03Q6.1A000200020003-6 CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY We, the Reads of African States and Governments assembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; CONVINCED that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their otm destiny; CONSCIOUS of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of to African peoples; CONSCIOUS of our responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in splieres of. human endeavour; INSPIRED by a common determination to strengthen understanding and cooperation among our States in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a large unity transcending .ethnic and national differences; CONVINCED that, in order to translate this determination into a dy- namic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained; DETE.YINE'D to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as T-rell as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms; DEDICATED to the general progress of Africa; PERSUADED that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive coopera- tion among states; DESIROUS that all African States should henceforth unite so that the welfare and well-being of their peoples can be assured; RESOLVED to reinforce the links between our states by establishing and strengthening common institutions; HAVE agreed to the present Charter. ESTABLISI NT Article I 1. The High Contracting Parties do by the present Charter establish an Organization to be known as the "Organization of AFRICAN UNITY." 2. The Organization shall include the Continental African States, Madagascar and all the islands surrounding Africa. PURPOSES Article IT 1. The Organization shall have the following purposes: a. to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;. . to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; c. to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; d. to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and e. to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2. To these ends, the Member States shall coordinate and harmonise their general policies, especially in the following fields: a. Political and diplomatic cooperation; b. economic cooperation, including transport and communi- cations; c. educational and cultural cooperation; d. healtah, sanitation, and nutritional cooperation; Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 e. scientific and technical cooperation; and f. cooperation for defence and security. PRINCIPLES Article III The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II, solemnly affirm and declare their a&;erence to the follorin& principles: 1. the sovereign equality of all Member States; 2. non-interference in the internal affairs of States; 3. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member State and for its inalienable right to independent existence; 4. peaceful settlement of dispute by negotiation, ;mediation, con- ciliation or arbitration; 5. unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assas- sination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other States; 6. absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent; 7. affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs. ____;RSHIP Article IV Each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to be- come a Member of the Organization. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF M& BER STATES Article V All Member States shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties. Article VI The Member States pledfe themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the present Charter. INSTITUTIONS The Organization shall accomplish its purposes through the follow- ing principal institutions: 1. The assembly of Heads of State and Government; 2. the Council of Ministers; 3. the General Secretariat; 4. the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT Article VIII The Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall be the supreme organ of the Organization. It shall, subject to the provisions of this Charter, discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to co- ordinating and harmonising the general policy of the Organization. It may in addition review the structure, functions and acts of all the organs and any specialized agencies which ray be created in accordance with the present Charter. The Assembly shall be composed of the Heads of State, Government or their duly accredited representatives and it shall meet at least once a year. At the request of any Member State, and approval by the major ty of the Member States, the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary Session. Approved For Re1pase 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200020003-6 Article X 1. Each Member State shall have one vote. 2. All resolutions shall be determined by a ti-ro-thirds majority of the members of the Organization. 3. Questions of procedure shall require a simple majority. Whether or not a question is one of procedure shall be determined by a simple majority of all Member States of the Organization. 4. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Oranization shall form a quorum at any meeting of the Assembly. The Assembly shall have the pairer to determine its ovm rules of procedure. TEE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Article XII The Council of Ministers shall consist of Foreign Ministers or such other Ministers as are designated by the Governments of Member States. The Council of Ministers shall meet at least twice a year. When requested by any Member State and approved by two-thirds of all Member States, it slAl.l meet in extraordinary session. The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It shall be entrusted with the respon- sibility of preparing conferences of the Assembly. It shall take cognisance of any matter referred to it by the Assembly. It shall be entrusted with the implementation of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It shall coordinate inter-African cooperation in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly and in conformity with Article II (2) of the present Charter. Article XIV 1. Each Member State shall have one vote. 2. All resolutions shall be determined by a simple majority of the Council of Ministers. 3. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Council, shall form a quorum for any meeting of the Council. The Council shall have the power to determine its own rule of pro- cedure. GENERAL SECRETARIAT Article XVI There shall be an Administrative Secretary-General of the Organiza- tion, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. The Administrative Secretary-General shall direct the affairs of the Secretariat. There shall be one or more Assistant Secretaries-General of the Oranization, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments. The functions and conditions of services of the Secretary-General, of the Assistant Secretaries-General and other employees of the Secretariat Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 shall be governed by the provisions of this Charter and the regulations approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 1. In the performance of their duties the Administrative Secretary- General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the organization. 2. Each member of the organization undertakes to respect the ex- clusive character of the responsibilities of the Administrative Secretary-General and the Staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. COWISSION OF MEDIATION, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION Article XIX Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peace- ful metes and, to this end, decide to establish a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, the composition of which and the condition of service shall be defined by a separate protocol to be approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Specialized Commissions Article XX The Assembly shall establish such Specialized Commissions as it may deem necessary, including the following: 1. Economic and Social Commission; 2. Educational and Cultural Commission; 3. Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission; 4. Defence Commission; 5. Scientific, Technical and Research Commission. Article XXI Each Specialized Commission referred to in Article XX shall be com- posed of the Ministers Concerned or other Ministers or Plenipotentaries desir ated by the Governments of the Member States. The functions of the Specialized Commissions shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the present Charter and of the regulations approved by the Council of Ministers. THE BUDGET Article XXIII The budget of the Organization prepared by the Administrative Secretary-General shall be approved by the Council of Ministers. The budget shall be provided by contributions from Member States in accor- dance with the scale of assessment of the United Nations; provided, how- ever, that no Member State shall be assessed an amount exceeding twenty percent of the yearly regular budget of the Organization. The Member States agree to pay their respective contributions regularly. SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF CHARTER Article XXIV This Charter shall be open for signature to all independent sovereign African States and shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The original instrument, done if possible in African languages, in English and French, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Government of Ethiopia which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all independent sovereign African states. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03WA000200020003-6 Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of Ethiopia, which shall notify all signatories of each such deposit. ENTRY INTO FORCE Article XXV This Charter shall enter into force immediately upon receipt by the Government of Ethiopia of the instruments of ratification from two- thirds of the signatory States. REGISTRATION OF THE CHARTER Article XXVI This Charter shall, after due ratification, be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations through the Government of Ethiopia in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. INTERPRETATION OF THE CHARTER Article XXVII Any question which may arise concerning the interpretation of this Charter shall be decided by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organizations. ADHESION AND ACCESSION Article XXVIII 1. Any independent sovereign African State may at any time notify the Administrative Secretary-General of its intention to adhere or accede to this Charter. 2. The Administrative Secretary-General shall, on receipt of such notification, communicate a copy of it to all the Member States. Admis- sion shall be decided by a simple majority of Member States. The decision of each Member State shall be transmitted to the Administrative Secretary- General, who shall, upon receipt of the required number of votes, communi- cate the decision to the State concerned. MISCELLANEOUS Article XXIX The working languages of the Organization and all its institutions shall be, if possible.. African languages, English and French. Article XXX The Administrative Secretary-General may accept on behalf of the Organization gifts, bequests and other donations made to the Organization, provided that this is approved by the Council of Ministers. Article XXXI The Council of Ministers shall decide on the privileges and immuni- ties to be accorded to the personnel of the Secretariat in the respective territories of the Member States. CESSATION OF MEMBERSHIP Article XXXII Any State which desires to renounce its membership shall forward a written notification to the Administrative Secretary-General. At the end of one year from the date of such notification, if not withdrawn, the Charter shall cease to apply with respect to the renouncing State, which shall thereby cease to belong to the Organization. AMENDIENT TO THE CHARTER Article XXXIII This Charter may be amended or revised if any Member State makes a written request to the Administrative Secretary-General to that effect; provided, however, that the proposed amendment is not submitted to the Assembly for consideration until all the Member States have been duly notified of it and a period of one year has elapsed. Such an amendment shall not be effective unless approved by at least two-thirds of all the Member States, In faith whereof, We, the Heads of African States and Government, have signed this Charter. Done in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, this 25th day of May, 1963. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020003-6