BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 15, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For Release 1999/ /'P78-03061A0dhdb'tsf0(V?
Briefly Noted
Communist Hypocrisy on Genocide.
The Peoples Republic of Mongolia has accused the govern-
ment of Iraq of genocide and announced that she would seek a
United N Pions General Assembly (GA) resolution calling for
cessation of military action against the Iraqi Kurds. Iraq
is attempting to put down Kurdish rebellion against the
government but the charge of genocide is groundless. The
Mongolian action during the September GA session is intended
to afford the Soviet Union the occasion to attack the revo-
lutionary Iraqi government which overthrew Soviet-supported
General Kassim on 8 February 1963, arrested and executed
Iraqi Communists for crimes against the people and handed
Soviet Middle East expansionism a severe setback.
The Soviets are seeking means of weakening the Iraqi
government, hoping that a successor government would be more
amenable to Communist influence. Two recent Soviet moves in
this direction include an announcement that the Soviet Union
would uphold the cause of the Kurdish minority against the
Iraqi government (despite Soviet protestations against inter-
fering in the internal affairs of another country) and would
suspend aid to Iraq if the latter continued its military action
against the Kurds (despite Soviet claims that its aid is
granted without political strings). An additional, clumsy,
anti-Iraq move is reflected in the July 3rd Baghdad Radio
announcement that a group of "Communist and Moscow agents"
had been foiled in an attempt to take control of a nearby
military camp where former Kassim government officials and
Communist enemies of the revolution are imprisoned. The
"vile Communist plot" was quickly put down, said the radio,
declaring that "death, only death is what the plotters and
the Moscow agents deserve." Documents found on the plotters
list the names of persons to be given top posts following a
successful coup. Included were a former high ranking Iraqi
?.
officer now in the Soviet bloc and several Clocia,aufists Will
ing with the Kurdish rebels.
The Soviet Union, whose shrieks of outrage would be
heard around the world if any country presumed to take a case
of Soviet armed action against its minorities into the UN, has
undoubtedly hit on the better plan of arranging for Mongolia's
sponsorship of a genocide charge in the GA. It is ludicrous
that Mongolia, who was unmoved by the real Chinese genocide
campaign in 1959 against fellow Asians in Tibet, should now be
deeply concerned for any reason about the Kurdish tribes in
the mountains of far-off Iraq. The USSR supported Mongolia's
entry into the UN in 1961 and included Mongolia as the only
non-European satellite in CEMA.
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Wherever publicity is given to the Mongolian charge, we
cite facts exposing (1) the Soviet hand, ire and intent, (2)
Mongolia's role vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its inaction
in the Tibetan case which occurred before USSR-CPR differences
broke into open conflict, and (3) the nature of genocide as
defined, documented and condemned by the UN in the Chinese-
Tibetan case, which exposes the fraudulent nature of the charge
against Iraq.
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BATS OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST
6 Aug 2nd Latin American Youth Conference, still sched-
uled for Santiago, Chile, 6-11 August but likely
to be postponed or cancelled.
13 Aug Communist East Germany sealed East-West Berlin
border by building a wall (more than 30,000
refugees had registered in West Berlin in the
preceding month), 1961.
17 Aug Soviet-Polish Treaty went into effect. Poland
received German territory as compensation for
territory annexed by the Soviet Union, 1945.
(see 1? & 19 Sept)
20 Aug Leon Trotsky assassinated in Mexico City, 1940.
24 Aug Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact signed, 1939.
24 Aug North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) entered into force,
1949.
31 Aug Federation of Malaysia (Malaya, Singapore,
British Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak) expected
to come formally into being.
Sept Algeria: Ben Bella's government is responsible
for promulgating a Constitution and holding
parliamentary elections by the end of September.
14 Sept Red China's troops entered Lhasa, Tibet, 1951.
15 Sept Soviet Union signed Friendship and Mutual Assist-
ance and Collaboration treaties with Bulgaria,
Rumania and Hungary, pledging not to change their
social or economic systems, 1947.
17 Sept Soviet Union invades Eastern Poland and divides
country with Nazi Germany, 1939.
17 Sept International Committee for Cooperation of
Journalists (ICCJ) Conference on board Soviet
ship in the Mediterranean, Sept. 17 - 1 Oct.
19 Sept Starts Week of International Struggle Against
Fascism and War (Communist).
29 Sept International Union of Architects (UTA), seventh
Congress, Havana, Cuba, 29 Sept. - 3 Oct. to be
followed by UTA General Assembly and International
Symposium on Architecture, Mexico City, 6-15 Oct.
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#7
Commentary
24 June - 8 July 1963
Principal Developments:
1. The CPBU--G P party talks got under way on schedule in
Moscow and are continuing in complete secrecy, but t car have been
preceded and accompanied by increasingly virulent prwouncements
and hostile gestures on both sides. After two oral warnings to
the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow about the activities of Chinese
personnel in distributing texts of the CCP 14 June letter in the
USSR, the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 27 June expelled five
Chinese as personae non gratae. The Chinese first revealed the
Soviet action y pushing a Peking Foreign Ministry statement
of June 29 denouncing it: simultaneously Peking also announced
the smashing of a display window at the Chinese Embassy in Moscow
by Soviet citizens, calling it "obviously a planned act of
sabotage." The CCP then issued a statement dated 1 July denounc-
ing the Soviet attacks on the CCP and the recall order -- "thus
extending ideological differences . . . to the sphere of state
relations," -- but stating that the CCP would send its delegation
to Moscow as scheduled, despite these Soviet steps. The five
expellees were ostentatiously feted In Peking during the next
few days, including Premier Chou En-lai's personal commendation.
2. The Soviets were finally moved to publish a double-
barreled reply to the Chinese goading on 4 July. Pravda carried
a CPSU statement denouncing Chinese conduct and announcing that:
"Inasmuch as the CC/CCP is demonstrating no interest in cutting
short the polemics . . .; the CC/CPSU . has decided to reps
to the letter of the CCP in the ress." Izvest~a carried a
ov a Foreign n s ry statement which said a Chinese publi-
cation of "its tendentious version" of the recall demand compels
the USSR to set the record straight: it then lists an amazing
range of Chinese distribution activities throughout the USSR.
3. The Chinese responded the next day by publishing on the
front pages of their papers the texts of the above CPSU statement
and the Soviet note demanding the recall of the Chinese, together
with a CCP comment on the former and a Chinese Foreign Ministry
official note of protest to the latter. The FM note, branding as
a lie the Soviet contention that Soviet personnel had not engaged
in dissemination of Soviet materials in China, cites instances
in which they had. The period closed with a mass ralley in Peking
to applaud again the ousted Chinese.
(Commentary Cont.)
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(Commentary Cont. ) 24 June - 8 July 1963
4. Evidence accumulated of a world-wide effort of unpre-
cedented volume by the Chinese to disseminate the texts of their
latest exchange with the CPSU.
5. Developments elsewhere in the Communist world during this
period should not be overlooked. The Albanians went even further
than before in openly inciting rebellion against Khrushchevss
leadership, and the North Koreans had the effrontery to emphasize
their struggle against "modern revisionism" before the Soviet
Charge in Pyongyang on the occasion of the anniversary of the
Soviet-N. Korean friendship and aid pact. The Yugoslavs protested
to the Chinese over the attacks on Yugoslavia in the joint
communique with N. Korea, and the Yugoslav Charge departed Peking
for unstated purposes, with "not a single representative of the
Chinese Foreign Ministry present." The Rumanians continued to
demonstrate an "independent's stance, avoiding the R. Berlin
"summit's gathering with Khrushchev and Ulbricht, sending a highly-
placed representative to a Comecon meeting in Moscow, signing
annual programs for cultural and scientific exchanges with China,
and sending a team to participate in international volleyball
championships in Albania after all other Soviet-bloc countries
pulled out.
6. Apparently the Chinese achieved a significant breach in
the solid wall of pro-Soviet Communist parties in Western Europe
with the formal appearance of a break-away group of "Chinese
dissidents" who are challenging the incumbent CP leadership in
Belgium. And the Communists in Ceylon are reportedly divided on
the issue, although the leadership remains loyal to Moscow thus
far.
Significance:
As of our cut-off date, it is still impossible to forecast
the course which the CPSU-CCP talks will follow, and there might
well be drastic developments before this guidance is received.
With the mounting bitterness and hostility described in the fore-
going, it is clearly possible that the talks might be broken off
before going much further. But whether or not the talks continue,
there seems to be little doubt that the feud will continue and
grow in intensity. In its July 4 statement, the CPSTJ declared
its decision to reply to the basic CCP challenge of 14 June, and
this reply (which could conceivably be the Soviet vehicle for
excommunication of the Chinese) will undoubtedly bring a still
longer and stronger Chinese polemic in retaliation.
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References (classified)
International Communism: Alignment of the Communist parties in
the no-ova D spue, State , May 15, n.
A 14-page analysis of the Communist parties or groupings in all
countries, Communist-ruled and non-Communist, showing status,
membership and percentage of national vote as well as alignment.
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X7 24 juin - 8 juillet
24-2 uin: Le congres de la Federation democratique in-
term ionale des femmes reunies a Moscou eat devenu urn_nou-
veau champs de.bataille de.la.querelle lino-sovietique:
voir egalement 6 juillet.
26 uin: Taus lea journaux de la Chine communiste publient
un article bead sur une depeche du Tass, sur la resolution
du plenum du parts communiste de l'Union Sovietique con-
cernant lea entretiens entre le parti communiste chinois
et le parti communiste de l'Union sovietique y compris lea
declarations que la decision "rejette categoriquement, en
tant que calomnieuses et sans fondement lea attaques" du
parts communiste chinois, et decide "de poursuivre resolu-
ment" la ligne adoptee par lea communistes de l'Union so-
vietique.
226 Juin: La visite d'une delegation parlementaire de la
oree du Nord au Vietnam du Nord (voir Chronologie du 19
juin et la suite) s'est terminee par un banquet d'adieu au
cours duquel Pak Kum-chol et Truong Chinh ont prix de nou-
veau la parole. Cependant, tous deux s'abstinrent d'at-
taquer le revisionnisme. Les Vietnamiens du nord auraient-
ils reussi a faireequilibre aux pressions que la Chine
communiste exerce sur lea Coreens du Nord?
27 uin: L'.agence yougoslave TANYUG annonce que le secre-
tariat des Affaires etrangeres a adresse ce jour "une vive
protestation" au gouvernement de la Republique populaire
chinoise "contre l'attaque brutale et calomnieuse visant
la Yougoslavie et sa politique et contenue dans lecommUnique
collectif" public a la fin de la visite du president de
la Coree du Nord Choe en Chine (voir Chronologie, 23 juin).
27 uin: Des articles parus dans deux journaux de Bruxel-
les, a Dra eau Rouge, organe officiel du parti communiste,
et Le Peu-ple, journal socialiste, font savoir qu'un groupe
de dissidents chinois a tenu son propre congres a Bruxel-
les au cours du weekend precedent. Le goupe dissident eat
diri;e par 4 membres expulses du parti au tours du congres
de Paquea (voir Chronologie, mi-avril), mais qui pretendent
que leur expulsion eat illegale at que la moitie des com-
munistes bruxellois lea soutiennent. Its voterent on fa-
veur de la destitution des leaders actuels du parti commu-
niste coupables de "politique revisionniste et scissionnia-
te". Le Drapeau Rouge met la presse et le public en garde
contre toue publication emanant des dissidents qui~serait
illegale et tendrait a order une confusion, et le depute
communiste Gaston Moulin a declare au Peru le que lea re-
belles ne constituaient un probleme qui Bruxelles, alors
que lea autres membres dans le pays restaient solidement
derriere l'organisation legitime du parti.
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 A oug ~lav~ par un
tic oria3 cue 10.004 m you ii res. 4
sasse lea opinions albanaises sur lea revisionnistes modem
nes et, non content d'insulter Khrouchtchef personnellemeLt,
it incite ouvertement et direotement a la revolte:"Rester
muet pendant que Khrouchtchef parle et agit,,, equivaut a
une complicite daps l'activite hostile de N. Khrouchtchef....
I1 eat grand temps de rejeter avec mepris pardessus bond
l'attitude de soumission tacite et d'approbation en presen-
ce de tel ou tel dictat."
29uin: L'agence, de presse de la Chine Nouvelle fait con-
naitre que le 27 deux evenements a Moacou ont contribue a
la deterioration des relations sino-sovietiques k la veille
de la conferencebilaterale importante, et q 's n!Qnt
pas ete mentionnes par la presse sovietique, Le premier
consistait en "la requete de'raisonnable du gouvernement so-
vietique tendant a faire rappeler par le gouvernement chi-
nois trois membres de l'ambassade chinoise en Union sovie-
tique, et deux autres Chinois (un etudiant et un fonction-
naire d'un institut) qui se trouvaient en Union sovietique."
La declaration du ministere des affaires etrangeres de la
Republique Populaire ohinoise annoncant le rappel pretend
que la revendication sovietique a 4te faite "sous pretexte
qu'ils avaient distribue en Union sovietique la lettre
publiee du comite central du parti communiste chinois en
date du 14 juin" alors que c'est"une action normale et un
droit irrevocable pour l'ambaesade chinoise et le-'per'sonnel
.chinois se trouvant on Union sovietique de distribuer des
documents offioiels du comite central du parti communiste
chinois. Les etabliseements sovietiques et leur personnel
en Chine ont toujours agi de la meme facon sans qu'aucune
objection ne soit soulevee par le gouvernement chinois".
Le ministere alla jusqu'e declarer qu'il etait "parfaite-
ment justifie" de s'enqudrir at, en emettant "des reven-
dications aussi deraisonnables" faites "sous un pretexte
aussi insoutenable," le gouvernement sovietique no cherchait
pas consciemment" a caper l'unite, a gater lea relations et
a Greer des obstacles, Le deuxieme evenement annonce par
l'agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle etait celui au
cours duquel "des vitrines pour photographies de presse
furent briseee en face de 1 ambassade chinoise" h Moscou
par ~'quatre citoyens sovietiques". Le ministre des affai-
res etrangeres de la Republique populaire chinoise a op-
pose une fin de non recevoir aux explications du ministere
des affaires etrangeres de l'Union sovietique selon les-
quelles 1'homme qui s'etait rendu coupable de cet acte "se
trouvait en etat d'ivresse", et a declare titre certain
qu'il s'agissait "d'un acte delibere de sabotage".
._1uin: La Pravda publie he texte du discours de Khrouch-
tchef `prononc le 1 juin au plenum du parti communiste de
1'Union sovietique, qui contenait pour la premiere fois
une attaque direote et en public des leaders chinois qui,
ont grossi a l'extreme leurs divergences avec le parti
communiste de l'Union sovietique et he mouvement communiste
tout entier". Il confirma que la coexis e e cJ.f ~cae
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trangere sovietique et indd rectement accusa les Chinoic4
attitude raciale nationale".
30 uin: En Roumanie, Gheorghiu-Dej se trouvait absent
sans explication dune reunion de chefs dos re i.mes du bloc
sovietique europen, gaui e ,it lieu a Berlin-Est pour celebrer
soi-disant le 7(:e am .versaire de Walter Ulbricnt. Les ob-
servateurs estiient que Iibrouchtchef profitait de occa-
sion pour s'assurer d'un soutien ferme de la ligne sovieti-
que dana les discussions avec lea Chinois qui auront lieu
prochainement, et it presume que l'absence de Gheorghiu-Dej
etait due aux tentatives faites recemment par la Roumanie
d'adopter une position "independante" entre lea deux adver-
saires. Par la suite, deux correspondants occidentaux a
Bucarest 'Binder du New York Times le 3 juillet et un cor-
respondant anonyme de Reuters le 7 juillet) annongaient
"une accumulation de preuves" que Khrouchtchef Be serait
rendu secretement en Roumanie pour discuter aver Gheorgh.iu-
Dej lea 24 et 25 juin, dates pour lesquelles Moscou n'a pas
fourni d'indioations quant au lieu ou it se trouvait.
3Q juu in; Des telegrammes de Moscou font savoir que l'Union
Soovietique a intensifie son brouillage des programmes en
langue russe radiodiffusea quotidiennement par Pekin pen-
dant quatre heures et demie, et cola peu de temps apres
avoir cease, de brouiller lea emissions de la Voix de 1 A--
merique et de la BBC.
0 uin: L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle a public
une declaration du comite+ central du parts communiste chi-
nois datee du ler juillet et publiee dana la presse chi-
noise le memo jour, ou it etait fait mention "des attaques
directes et,deraisonnables contre le parti communiate chi-
nois "dirigees recemment par lea Soviets, ainsi que la de-
mande sovietique de rappel de cinq Chinois, "faisant ainsi
deborder lea differences ideolo~iques entre lea deux partis
dana le domaine des relations d Etat", et a prevenu que
"cette aerie de mesures... eat de nature a eater davantage
encore lea relations sino-sovietiques et a produire une
scission dana le mouvement international."
1-3 luillet: L"Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle an-
nonce que "lea chefs des services gouvernementaux" ont fait
une reception aux cinq Chinois "dont le rappel... fut de-
mande sans raison valable par le ouvernement sovietique"
au cours de cette reception, ill 'converserent cordialement
avec lea cinq personnel et lour exprimerent lour sympathie".
En date du 3, le premier Chou En-lai recut lea ein7, "out
une conversation cordiale avec eux, leur disant qu i1s a-
vaient bien fait leur travail", et "lea felicitant de leur
attitude responsable et active et de lour esprit indompta-
ble". Les journaux chinois publierent cos articles en pre-
miere page, avec photographies.
3 iuillet: Khrouchtehef, s'adressant a environ 70.000
A ema 8 1'Est nnkkZ1u t-s r- der et "pp erceptible-
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lin-Est a declare qu'il nfy avait que eafous
pensaient pouvoir renverser is capitalism3 au goyen dune
guerre. "Quiconque a l'13eure actuelie fe-z1ait eclater une
guerre as trouverait immediatement annihiie dana cette guer-
luillet: Neuf mambres de la delegation chinoise a leur
arrives a l'aerodrowe de Moscou furent detenus pendant 90
minutes.. pour operations de douanes, alors que lea autres
passagers de l'avion furent libere's en 20 minutes. Le meme
jour, l'ambaasade chinoise distribuait aux missions occi-
dentales a Moscou le texte de la declaration du 29 juin par
laquelle le parti communists chinois condamnait l'ordre
sovietique d'expulsion.
-6 luillet: Le comite executif de 1'organisation du plan
economique des 7 nations du bloc sovietique, is Comecon,
qui comprenait is vice-premier ministre roumain Biradeanu,
se mettait d'accord e, Moscou pour continuer a mettre en
commun la production industrielle sur une base cooperative,.
annonce l'agence TASS. Le communique etait suffisamment
vague sur la fapon dont fut resolu le probleme de la Rou-
manie, insiatant a developper sa propre industrie lourde.
4juillet: La Pravda faisait passer en premiere page "une
declaration du com t6 central du parti communists de 1'U-
nion sovietique se?rapportant aux entretiens prochains en-
tre lea representanta du parti communists de l'Union so-
vietique et du parti communiste chinois." Elle donna lea
norns de sept membres de la delegation sovietique en decla-
rant qu'ils "s'en tiendront strictement a la ligne adop-
tee par lea 20e, 21e et 22e congres et qu'ils defendront
is cours general du mauvement communists mondial exprime
dans lea declarations des conferences de Moscou des partis
marxistes-leninistes." Le journal souligne que le parti
communists chinois continue a "agraver la polemique" par
des attaques "ealomnieuses et sans fondement" dana sa
lettre du 14 join, et s'en refere ensuite a la declaration
publiee le ler juillet par le parti communists chinois,
qui "presente sous un faux ,our lea mobiles qui ont pous-
se le parts communiste de 1 Union sovietique a ne pas pu-
blier la lettre du 14 juin. D'autre part, en distribuant
leur lettre, lea Chinois ont "ports une enfreinte serieuse
aux procedures etablies en Union Sovietique," "ont inter-
venu dans lea affaires privees de notre parti et ont fait
passer le desaccord du domaine des relations entre partis
a celui des relations entre Etats". "Au lieu de chercher
une voie very le,rapprochement,... lea leaders chinois
poussent is differend vers une agravation dana lea rela-
tions." La declaration annonce ensuite:
"Dana la mesure ou le comite central du parti
communiste chinois fait preuve d'un manque d'in-
teret it abreger la polemique et qu'elle conti-
nue a diatribuer largement sa lettre et a faire
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comite central du parti communie 1 Ltn23 i
sovietique, dans 1e but de resenter les points
du differend sous une lumiere correcto et oher-
chant a d6fendre le marxisme-leninisme, a ddci-
de pour sa part-de repondre Zt la lettre du co-
mite' central du parti communiste chinois par
voie depresse, t'
Le memo jour, Izvestiya, organe du gouvernement sovi"
tique, publiait unedecllar Eton du niinlstere des affaires
_etrangeres qui disait que "etant donne que le ministere des
affaires etrangeres de la Republique populaire chinoise
s'est hate de publier dans la prease sa version tendancieu-
se concernant la demande sovietique de rappel et qu'il a
" resente une interpretation deformee des faits", le minis-
tere des affaires etrangeres sovietique se trouve oblige de
presenter "lee explications necessaires". Apportant "des
faits nouveaux" la declaration sovietique que lea Chinois
incrimin6s?"A l'inau..des organs sovietiques se s.ont mis a
disseminer illegalement par tons lea moyens at aveo une
persistance oroissante et importune, la lettre mentionnee
ci-dessus qui fut imprimee specialement 'a grand tirage en
langue russe, dans lea bureaux sovietiques, dans lea ae-
rodromes, dans lea stations de chemin de fer,,et dans
d'autres places". Cette lettre fut "distribuee "simul-
taneinent dans lea diverses institutions de Moscou par le
personnel de l'ambassade utilisant plusieura automobiles,
adressee par la poste aux citoyens sovietiques ou remise
h leur domicile, et transportee par des courriers spdcia-
lament affectes do Moscou dans les autres villas." La de-
claration dit quo le ministere des affaires etrangerea
de l'Union sovietique avait fait une representation ver-
bale h l'ambassadeur ohinois le 17 juin et de nouveau le
24 juin, "Mall, meme apres cette seconde representation.,o
la distribution s'est poursuivie sur une echelle meme en-
core plus large. Elle fut pousaee au point que lea equi-
pes chinoises du train Moscou-Pekin en disperserent lea
exomplaires par lea fenStres des wagons dans lea Bares
de chemin de for", et "en donnerent lecture pendant lea
errata des trains, utilisant pour tale lea systemes de
haut-parleur publics." Lorsque des resoortissants so-
vietiques objecterent, lea Chinois "se comporterent avec
defiance dans bien des cas". La declaration sovietique
qualifie de "fabrication" qui n'a "rien a.voir avec la
realite" et do "tentative de blanchir lea agissements il-
legaux des Chinois" l'affirmation faite par lee Chinois
"que lea organismes et le personnel sovietiques en Chine
se seraient livres s des activites analogues".
5 uilleto. La delegation chinoise fut accompagnee jusqu'a
1raerodrome de Pekin par tous lea haute fonctionnaires du
parti communiste chinois k l'exception de Mao (dont l'ab-
sence semble avoir eta voulue of in de maintenir l'opdra-
tion h urn, niveau au-dessous de 1'echelon superieur), et
fut saluee h Moscou par Sept delegues sovietiques, 'a la
tete deaquels se trouvait Souslov. Les journaux de Pekin
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 A ivec For eIease 1999/08/24 CIA aRIarationOa.A to Q -4
p ran ce jour en premiere page un
du parti communists chinois concernant la d claration ' Gem
tral du parts c ;aiat: ~.e' l ITnion _F~avif :z~-ue a e ci?' ~~ u3. Let
ie ; ; e d rptte darn: do .Laratioion e 14 note
avec en plug
de rotestati.on offCi ciei? - du uu.niei .gip dry affaires 3`z.s h
-awg
noia la note du minist6re des affair en res soviusti us e
du uin, par laquelle.celui-c r clamait le rappel de..cincl chinois
avec en plus le texte de cette dernibre note. La breve ddclaration
du mart cozmnuniste chinois disait que elui-ci ne pouvait pas accep-
ter leeee ddformationst lea accusations et lea attaques" contenues daps
la ddclaration du parti communiste de l'Union Sovidtique et qu'il
avant donnd des instructions h sa ddldgation "de faire au cours des
pourparlers lea commentaires qui a'imposaient". Malgrd ces provocar
Lions, le comitd central du parti communiste chinois "a donnd des
instructions b, sa d4ldgation de faire preuve de la plus grande pati-
ence", et it "esperait que le resultat des entretiens ... contribuo-
rait h la preparation dune rdgion des reprdsentants de taus lee partis
comnxunistes et de tour lea ouvriers." La note du ministhre des effai-
res dtrangbres chinois, qui fut ddlivrde h l'ambassade sovidtique le
1+ juillet,.dnumere lea publications dissdmindes par lea organismes
sovidtiques et leur personnel en Chine, y compris lea discours de
Khrouchtchev au Suprhme soviet du 12 decembre 1962 et au congres du
parti de l'UnitC socialists du 16 janvier, ainsi que lea dditoriaux
de Pravda du 7 et du 10 fdvrier. "Ce qu'il Taut souligner aurtout
cleat= a fait que lea or aniames et le personnel sovidti ues en Caine
out distribud la lettre u 30 mara 1963 actress a par le caonitd central
du part communiste de l'Union Sovidtique au comitd central du parts
communiste chinois avant u'elle n'ait dte ublide dana la resse
ehinoise". Maio lorsque es Chinois en firent autant le gouverne-
men sovidtique ddclara inm diatement que cela constituait une action
illdgale et un manque de respect envera le souverainetd d'Etat ...
et emit la prdtention injustifide de faire rappeler le personnel
chinois. Ce]a eat inadmissible dens lea relations internationales
en gdndral, et moil encore dens es relations entre deux pays socia-
lises." Malgr ces ob aclea, le gouvernement n aura pas recoura
des reprdsailles contre le personnel sovidtique en Chine et "il
espere que le gouvernement sovidtique s'abstiendra a i'avenir de se
livrer h des actions nuisibles]" A 1'arrivde de la ddldgation chi-
noise h Moscou la premibre page de Pravda etalait in editorial ddcri-
vant des reunions d.'aktive de partis toute l'Union sovidtique,
prouvant tL i'unanimit a resolution du plenum de juin, y compris
lea instructions du parti b6 la delegation chargde de discuter avec
lee Chinois, ainsi que le rejet "des attaques calomnieuaes et sans
fondement"..profdreea par le parti comnuniste chinois. A Moscou lea
Chinois annoncbrent soudainement leur intention de ne pas participer
au festival du.film qui s'ouvre h Moscou le 7 Millet-
5 uillet: Le Times de Tokyo se basant dens sea comnentaires our lea
traditions historiquea et culturellea ccmnunes qui existent entre le
Japan et la Chine ainsi que our sea liens d'amitids resserres avec
le peuple chinois, demande aux leaders de Pdkin d'abandonner leur
attitude dogmatique h 1'6gard du marxisme-lCninisme et d'adopter un
point de vue plus large pour le rdglement des problCmes mondiaux.
Le mmme jour, le Sankei de Tokyo publiait un article telephone par
son correspondent de scow Kenzo Hori, qui contenait lea passages
suivanta: "Lee etudients sovidtiques s'indignent de l'attitude
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020005-4
chinoise. Its disent que c'eat scandaleux de la part de la Chine
d'8tre hostile envers 1'Union sovi6tique alors qu'une aide sovi6tique
en quantite considerable a eta envoyee h la Chine. Des rumeurs cir'
culent h Moscou que taus lea etudiants chinois pourraient retourner
chez?eux.- 11 y avait environ 2.000 dtudiants chinois h Moscow ii y
a six moil, mais ce nambre ... eat en decroissence constante. Dens
lee gares vers la Sibdrie, noes voyons beaucoup de citoyens chinois
retournant chez-eux. Ii Taut noter que lea journalistes chinois se
sont mis h appliquer "la diplomatie souriante" envers leurs collbgues
.japonais.. A la fin de fevrier, un journaliste chinois a invite des
reporters japonais dons la salle h manger de 1'ambassade chinoise.
Ceci constitue un fait sans precedent. 11 ddmontre que lea Chinois
chercbent ddsespdrdment h attirer lea japonais de leur c8td afin de
remporter une victoire daps la dispute sino-sovidtique. .11 eat pos-
sible que lee Chinois veuillent l'amitie des Japonais car ils appar-
tiennent h la m8me race et qu'ils utilisent la m&e dcriture. Plus
Is Chine a'eloigne de 1'Union Sovidtique et plus, it me semble, elle
se penchera vers le Japon."
5-6 juillet: Celebrant par une reunion h Pyongyang le second anniver-
saire du traitd d'amitid, de cooperation et d'assistance mutuelle
entre i'Union Sovidtique et is Come du Nord, le president de la So-
cidtd de 1'amitid Sovieto-coreenne Yi Ki-yong a mentionnd la lutte
des Cordens "contre le rdvisionnisme moderne" dens son discours
principal; de son c8t6 le charge d'affaires sovi6tique Pimenov
s'abstenait e'en faire mention. Un court editorial du Nodong Sinmun
b, ce sujet contenait dgalement un passage concernant la dense sans
relfiche "de la puretd du marxiame-1eninisme contre le rdvisionnisme
rnoderne."
6 uillet: Les reunions entre Chinois et sovietiques dens la villa
des Collines de Lenine sont entourdes de secret. Les journaux et is
radio de Moscou n'ont mmme pas annoncd que ces reunions avaient eu
lieu. Khrouchtchev se trouve h Kiev. Entre temps, Radio-Moscow a
cessd de diffuser "Pekin vous parle", une emission dune demi-heure
en langue russe transmise par Radio-Pekin h 1'intention des auditeurs
sovidtiques. A Pekin, taus lea journaux out publie un long article
de 1'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle, emanant de Moscou, qui
attaquait violemment le traitement reserve aux Chinois h la conference
de la Federation democratique Internationale des femmes, qui eut lieu
la semaine dernibre, accusait lea Rusaes "de fomenter la discorde et
lea agitations anti-chinoises." L'Agence de presse de la Chine now-
velle a fait dgalement distribuer un article paru dens lea editions
du 30 juillet du Malayan Monitor publie h Londres, qui indirectement
accusait Khrouchtchev de couvrir Pekin de la boue "du ddpotoir exis-
tent dejh de ce qu'on appelle la ddstalinisation." Ching Po, quoti,-
then communiste chinois de Hong Kong, attaquait Khrouchtchev person.-
nellement et se moquait de sa politique.
6 uillet: Un tdldgramme du New York Times de cette date 6=ant
de Colombo annonce que le parti communiste de Ceylan se trouve divisd,
lea chefs parlementairea dduqu~s g Moscou restant fidbles mais lea
membres lea plus jeunes, eons la conduite du aecrdtaire general de
la Federation syndicale de Ceylan, Shanmugathasan, se rapprochant de
plus en plus de Pekin. Ce dernier a annonce qu'il ferait une conle-
Aff firN ffiOW& asJe1 `lbw
#'.'dPA-GRb 004-V3 at 1166 0%V2 005-4
 Ap
au rs de ce /1244 :Jpf HjOfQ2,20005-4
cuproved Fob to Releassemainee, 1999/08is c
avant la date fixde our ordre des chefs du parti, qui le menacbrent
d'expulsion.
7 Juillet: Les entretiens de Moscou ont dtd euspendus pour la jour-
Re.- s Pekin organisa un ralliement-masse de 7.000 fonctionnaires
et employes gouvernementaux pour faire applaudir lea cinq Chinois
expulses, le ministre des affaires dtrangbres Chen I y figurant tom o
principal orateur. Un des Chinois expulsds ddelara h cette reunion
que "tour lea Sovietiques impartiaux ddsapprouvent cette conduite,"
et que "lea autoritds sovietiques emplBchaient depuis longtemps le
peuple sovidtique de prendre connaissance des opinions du parts com-
muniste chinois. Its allbrent meme jusqu'h attaquer et h calomnier
le parti cmni&te cbinois en public, et nommdment." En Italie,
1'Unita, organe du parti communiste italien, ddnongait lea attaques
chinoises dirigees-contre is politique de coexistence pacifique de
IOarouchtchev et accusait lea Chinois de "deformation et d' erreur" dens
leur lettre du 14 join.
7 uiliet: La presse`communiste et is presse de gauche de Hong Kong
d noncent lea agiasements "hostiles des Soviets diriges contra la
Chine Populaire au tours de ces derniers fours, h 1'aide de gros en.
tate en premiere page et d'expressions plus violentes encore que celles
adressdes aux.Etats-Unis h l'epoque de la guerre de Corde", annoncent
lea correspondents occidentaux. Les accusations portent egalement
sur is ddnonciation par lea Soviets de centaines d'accords 6concmiques
avec is Chine.
7 juillet: Hanoi fait.radiodiffuser le texte dun article de 7.000
mots intitule "Le rendgat Tito crache de nouveau son venin du revi-
sionnisme," peru dens 1'ddition de juillet du Hoc Tap, organe de is.
thdorie du parts, article qui se rapproche par as violence de la
ligne communiste chinoise, "le rdvisionnisme est une veritable creation
de l'impdrialisme", leur "cheval de Troie". "La t$che de nous tous2
communistes, est de ddnoncer la position de is clique a to ... de
tirer une ligne entre le marxisme-ldniniame et le rdvisionnisme, entre
m s et l'ennemi dans le domain iddologique, ... d'dcraser le
noune
rdvisionnisme." `=coexistence pacifique ... n'est qu'une partie
de la politique dtrangbre des pays socialistes, et non pas tcnate cette
politique ni la seule politique."
juillet: Le parti communiste indondsien (P.K.I.) annonce qu'il en-
verra une ddldgation sous is conduite du president Aidit h Moscou
et h Pekin, rdpondant aux invitations des deux comitds centraux, et
que,cette ddldgation quitters Jakarta le 19 juillet. Le mime jour
l'Agence de Presse de is Chine nouvelle donnait un discours recent de
Njoto, deuxibme vice-president, fait dans le sud de Sumatra par lequel
celui-ci confirmait que 1'un des principaux objectify de is ddldgation
eat de chercher h combler le fosse qui divise le mouvement cemmuniste
international.
juillet: L'Albanie se plaint que des dquipes militaires de trois
pays communistes seulement parmi ceux invites out participe an tournoi
international de volleyball, et que d'autres pays communistes qui
avaient accept$ de participer se rdcuserent "dune manibre hostile."
Des pays dsents furent la Chine is Coree du Nor$ et la Roumanie.
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 Approved For Release 1J3: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020005-4
Revue de Min, No. 25, 21 juin 1963, 1'edition anglaise
contient le texts en entier de la lettre du parts communiste chi-
nois du 14 juin; les editions francaises et espagnoles n'ont pas
encore et6 revues ici, mail it est probable que le texte de cette
lettre sty trouve egalement. Le texte in extenso fut publie egale-
ment avec des informations utiles sly rapportant, Bans le New York
Times du 5 juillet, aussi bien dans son edition internationals q e
dens son edition locale.
"La Chine, la Russie engagees dans la lutte pour is pouvoir",
par Edward Crankshaw, London Observer News Service, 6 juillet:
reproduit dens Washingto~t le 7 juillet 1963.
"Le grand schisme", par Hugh Seton-Warson, Encounter, mai 1963.
-9-
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020005-4
No 7 I P'; J3.? :t r 8 Julio
24,.-29 Junio: E:! Cong:,-,Go de la Fedc:ra,ci6n Denocriz+:i.-, i.nt.an)acional
de Hujo es en Mooed (VDIDI) se convirtib en otro ca.ripo de atalla en
la contienda chino -sovi ti a. Ver tamb16n 6 de Julio.
26 Junio: Toda la prensa chinocomunicta publica un informe, bacado
en .in despacho de Taos, sebre la resoluci6n del pleno del PCUS con
respecto a las conversaciones entre el PC chino y el PCUS, incluso
las declarations de que la resoluci6n "categ6ricamente rechaza como
infundados y calumniocos los ataques" del PC chino y que resuelve
"proseguir con tes6n" la lines actual del PCUS.
26 Junto: La visita de una delegaci6n parlamentaria norcoreana a
Vietnam del Norte (ver Cronologia, 19 de junto et seq) concluy6 con
un banquete de despedida en el cual Pak Kum-chol y Truong Chinh de
nuevo pronunciaron discursos. Ambos, sin embargo, se abstuvieron
de atacar el revisionismo. LSerd que los norvietnameses ban conse-
guido neutralizar la pres16n chinocomunista sobre los norcoreanos?
27 Junio: La agencia noticiera Tanyug anunci6 que la secretaria de
relacionee exteriores habia mandado ese mismo dia una "fuerte pro-
testa" al Gobierno de China "contra el brutal y calumnioso ataque a
Yugoslavia y su politica cometido en el comunicado conjunto" publi-
cado al concluir la visita a China del presidente norcoreano Choe.
(Ver Cronologia, 23 de junio.)
27 Junio: Informaron articulos en dos diarios de Bruselas -- el
rg~anoooficial comunista "Drapeau Rouge" y el soeialista "Le Peuple~
-- que un grupo eacindido de "disidentes chinos" habla celebrado su
propio congreso en Bruselas el fin de semana anterior. El grupo di-
sidente to encabezan los cuatro miembros expulsados del Partido en
el Congreso a mediados de abril (ver Cronologla de entonces) Pero
que se niegari a reconocer como legal su expulsi6n y declaran que la
mitad de los comunistas de Bruselas los apoyan. Pasaron una resolu-
tion destituyendo a los actuates dirigentes del PC por su "politica
revisionista y escisionista." "Drapeau Rouge" advirti6 a la prensa
y al pdblico que cualqu r material que los disidentes pudieran hacer
pdblico seria ilegal y con intenci6n de confundir, y el diputado co-
manista Gaston Moulin declar6 a "Le Peuple" que los rebeldes eran
problema en Bruselas solamente y que en el resto del pals los miem-
bros estaban s6lidamente en apoyo de la legitima organizaci6n del
partido.
29 Junto: El diario albands "Zeri I Popullit" celebr6 el decimoquin-
to aniversario de la resoluci6n del Cominform que expuls6 a Yugosla-
via con un editorial repitiendo en 10.000 palabras las opiniones de
Albania sobre los revisionistas modernos y no solo insultando a
Kruschev por nombre sino tembi6n abierta y directamente instando a
la rebeli6n: "Quedarse callado mientras Kruschev habla y actiia ...
equivale a hacerse conspirador en la actividad hostil de N. Kruschev
Approved Forte '~B~fO$~~41~(~I[~fi9Q~205~4
 e
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de t6cito sometimiento y aprobaci6n de un diktat tras otro."
29 Junio: La agencia noticiera china (Sinjua) anunci6 dos aconte-
cimientos en Mosed que dafiaron aun mks las relaciones chino-sovi6-
ticas ea la vispera de las importantes conversaciones bilaterales
y e no hablan sido men' ionados en los 6rganos de noticias sovi6-
ticos. primerofula irrazonabie exigencia del Gobierno so-
vi6tico de que el Gobierno chino retirara a tree empleados de.la
Embajada China en la Uni6n Sovi6tica y a otros dos chinos (u estu-
tiante y un funcionario de instituto) de la Uni6n Sovi6tica." La
deelaraci6n del ministerio de Relaciones china dando a conocer la
demanda de retiro expres6 que habla sido becha "so pretexto de que
habian distribuido en la Uni6n Sovi6tica la carte dada a la publici-
dad del CC del PC chino de 14 de junio," aunque "es normal e irre-
prochable que la Embajada china y el personal chino en is Uni6n So-
vi6tica distribuyan documentos oficiales del CC del PC chino. El
peI'eonal y los establecimientos sovi6ticos en China han estado baci-
endo siempre to mismo y el Gobierno chino jamfis ha formulado obje-
ciones." Continu6 diciendo que "se justifica plenamente" preguntar
si, hacienda tan "irrazonable exigencia" con "tan insostenible excu-
sa" el Gobierno sovidtico no est. "intencionalmente tratando" de
socavar la unidad., viciar las relaciones y crear obat culos. El se-
gundo anuncio de Sinjua fue el del destrozo de "los escaparates de
noticias gr6ficas frente a la Embajada china" en Mosed por "cuatro
ciudadanos sovidticos." El ministerio de Relaciones chino rechaz6
la explicaci6n del ministerio de Relaciones soviCtico de que el cul-
pable se hallaba "en estado de ebriedad" y declar6 que "esto fue ob-
viamente un acto premeditado de sabotaje."
29 Junio: "Pravda" dio a la publicidad el texto del discurso de
Kruschev del 21 de junio al pleno del PCUS conteniendo su primer ata-
que directo y ydblico contra los lideres chinos, que habian "exacer-
bado en extremo sus divergencias con el PCUS y el movimiento comu-
nista entero." Reafirm6 que era la coexistencia pacifica la linea
general de is politica extranjera sovidtica e indirectamente acus6
a los chinocomunistas de un "panto de vista racial nacional."
30 Junloo: El rumano Gheorghiu-Dej estuvo ausente sin explicaci6n
de una reuni6n de los jefes de los regimens del bloque sovi6tico
europeo, que se dijo ser en celebraci6n del septuagdsimo cumpleafios
de Walter Ulbricht. Los observadores especularon que Kruscbev apro-
vechaba la ocasi6n para aunar apoyo firme para la linea sovidtica en
las pr6ximas conversaciones con los chinos, y se presumi6 que la au-
sencia de G-D estaba relacionada con las tentativas recientes de
Rumania de adoptar una posici6n "independiente" entre los contrin-
cantes. Mds tarde dos corresponsales occidentales (Binder del
"New York Times" el 3 de Julio y uno sin firmar de Reuter el 7 de
Julio) informaron desde Bucharest una "creciente acumulacibn de
evidencia't de que Kruschev baba volado en secreto a Rumania para
conversar con G-D el 24+ y 25 de junco, fechas en las cuales en Mos-
cd no se dio cuenta de su paradero.
30 Junio: Sinjua dio a la publicidad una declaraci6n del CC del PC
chino fechada (y publicada en la prensa china) el primero de Julio
Applmmav6daa-elsei9?9U+0~3/i~IteR'A6~bA~02~0~05~es
contra el PC chino" por parte del Soviet y a la demanda sovidtica de
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020005-4
que fueran retirados cinco chinos -- "extendiendo de ese modo las
divergencias ideol6gicas entre ambos partidos a la esfera de lea
relaciones entre estados" -- y hacia la advertencia de que dicha
"aerie de medidas ... constituyen un grave paso en e1 empeoramiento
aun mayor de las relaciones chino-sovidticas y en la fabricaci6n de
una excisi6n en el movimento internacional."
1-3 Julio: Sinjua inform6 que "miembros dirigentes de Jos departa-
men os del Gobierno" celebraron recepciones en honor a los cinco
chinos "cuyo retiro ... fue irrazonablemente exigido por el Gobierno
sovidtico," en las cuales "mantuvieron cordiales conversaciones con
las cinco personas y lea expresaron su solidaridad." El dia 3 Chou
En-lai recibi6 a los cinco, "mantuvo una cordial conversaci6n con
ellos, deciendo que habian hecho bien su trabajo," y "Jos alab6 por
su activa actitud de responsabilidad y su e$iritu ind6mito." La
prensa china peso en primera plans estos informer, con gr6ficas.
3 Julio: Kruschev, dirigidndose a unos 70.000 alemanes orientales
en P cZort del Oder, y "notablemente mds caluroso" que en su dis-
curso de Berlin, declar6 que "solo Jos lundticos" pensarian en tra-
tar de derrocar el capitalismo por medio de la guerra. "Cualquiera
que desatara la guerra boy seria aniquilado inmediatamente en ella."
Julio: Nueve miembros menores de la delegaci6n china llegaron al
aeropuerto de Moscd -- donde estuvieron enredados 90 minutos en Jos
menesteres de aduana mientras que a los otros pasajeros los despa-
charon en 20 minutos. El mismo dia la Embajada china distribuy6 a
las misiones dipl6maticas occidentales en Moroi el texto de la de-
claraci6n del PC chino del 29 de junio condenando la orden sovidtica
de expulsi6n.
3-6 Julio: El comit6 ejecutivo del Comecon, la organizaci6n de pla-
neem n oe to oe t econ6mico de siete naciones del bloque sovi6tico, con la
participaci6n del vicepremier rumano Biradeanu, acord6 en Moscd con-
tinuar mancomunando la producci6n industrial en forma cooperativa,
segtn inform6 Tass. El comunicado fue lo bastante impreciso en cu-
anto a si se habia resuelto, y de qud modo, el problems de la insis-
tencia rumana en el desarrollo de su propia industria pesada.
4 Julio: "Pravda" puso en primers plana una "declaraci6n del CC del
Pin relaci6n a las pr6ximas conversaciones entre representantes
del PCUS y el PC chino." Mencion6 a los siete miembros de la dele-
gaci6n sovidtica y declar6 que data "retendrd sin desvio is lines
adoptada por los congresos 20, 21, y 22 y defendard el rumbo general
del movimiento comunista mondial expresado en las dos declaraciones
de las conferencias en Moscd de partidos marxistas-leninistas." Se
refiri6 a que el PC chino continuaba "agravando las poldmices" con
los "ataques ealumniosos e infundados" en su carta del 14 de Junio,
pasando luego a la declaraci6n del PC chino publicada el primero de
Julio que "present6 en una luz falsa los mdvilec del PCUS" al no pu-
blicar la carta del 14 de junio. Ademds, al diseminar su carta, los
chinos ban "violado burdamente los procedimientos establecidos en la
URSS," "intervenido en los asuntos internos de nuestro partido y
transferido divergencias del campo de las relaciones entre partidos
AppIvdcl P" 9' /2*aVPA'Rd5fBZ 6leA a~ g
hacia el acercamiento, ... el liderato chino es empu an o as gas
 Ap~gaea~i~9~1~~$e~a~~ci ""?PQr4
"Como el CC del PC chino no estd demostrando inters alguno en
poner fin a las pol6micas y continda distribuyendo ampliamente
su carte y expidiendo declaraciones contra nuestro partido, el
CC del PCUS, en inter6s de una iluminaci6n de los puntos de di-
vergencia y con el fin de defender el marxismo-leninismo, he,
decidido-por eu parte re$l, car a czu, a del CC del C chino
en la rensa."
El mismo dia "Izvestiya," el 6rgano de prensa del gobierno sovi6tico,
public6 una declaraci6n del ministerio de Relaciones haciendo constar
que "por cuanto el ministerio de Relaciones de la RP china se apresu.
r6 a publicar en la prensa su tendenciosa versi6n" de la demanda so-
vi6tica de retiro y "present6 una interpretaci6n deformada de los he-
chos," el ministerio de Relaciones sovi6tica se ve "obligada a dar
las explicaciones necesarias." Presentando "unos cuantos bechos,"
la declaraci6n sovietica expone que los chinos acusados, "sin el co-
nocimiento de los 6rganos sovi6ticos, empezaron a difundir ilegal-
mente, por diversos m6todos y maneras y con creciente persiatancia
e importunidad, is citeda carte, impresa especialmente en una masiva
edici6n en lengua ruse, en oficinas sovi6ticas, en aeropuertos, en
estaciones de ferrocarril y en otros lugares." Fue "simul.tdneamente
lievada por miembros del personal de is embajada a diversas institu-
ciones de Moscd en varios autom6viles, dirigida por correo a ciuda-
danos sovi6ticos y entregada en sus domicilios, lievada a otras ciu-
dades por trabajadores despachados especialmente de Moscd." La de-
claraci6n expuso que el ministerio de Relaciones de is URSS habia
hecho una intervenci6n verbal ante el embajador chino el 17 de junio
y de.nuevo el 24 de junco. "Pero aun despu6s de esta segunda intez4
venci6n ... la distribuci6n de dicho material continu6 y adquiri6
aun mayor amplitud. Lleg6 a tal extremo que las tripulaciones chinas
del tren de Moscd a Pekin (la] echaron al vuelo por las ventanillas
de los coches en las estaciones" y is "transmitieron por los sistemas
altopariantes de los trenes durante sus parades." Cuando el pueblo
sovidtico mostraba su desaprobaci6n, cos chinos "actuaron con desafio
en muchos casos." La deciaraci6n sovi6tica denuncia como "febrica-
ci6n" que "nada tiene que ver con is realidad" y "una tentative por
dar apariencia buena a las actions ilegales del lado chino" el aser-
to chino "que los fganos y personal sovi6ticos en China dizque lle-
vaben a cabo actividad parecida."
5 Julio: La delegaci6n china fue despedida en el aeropuerto de Pekin
por is. plena mayor de PC chino con exception de Mao (cuya ausencia
se tuvo por intencional, pare, hacer que la medida no envolviera el
mAximo nivel) y recibida en Moacd por los siete delegados sovi6ticos,
encabezados por Suslov. Los diarios de Pekin aquel dia desplegaron
en primers, plena una declaraci6n del CC del PC chino sobre is decla-
raci6n del CC del PCUS de de j io s ei textode esta, yla note
aciones c ino protestando oficialmente la note
del n sterio de Re aciones sovi tico de 27 de junio que demandaba
el retiro de c nco chinos, y el texto de eats time note. La breve
declaraci6n del PC chino expr que "no puede ester de is cuerdo en
las deformaciones, a acusaci6n y los ataques" contenidos en is de-
claraci6n del PCUS y ha dado instrucciones a su delegation de "hacer
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diebas provocaciones, el CC del PC chino "ha dado instrucciones a is
celegaci6n de ejercer la mayor paciencia" y "espera que el resultado
de las conversaciones ... serf ventajoso pars, Jos preparativos por
convocar una reuni6n de representantes de todos Jos partidos coanunis-
tas y obreros." La nota del ministerio de Relaciones chino, gue fue
entregada a la Emba ada sovidtica el 4 de Julio, hace una relaci6n
de los materiales difundidos or el ;~~~rzon.-1 y Jos 6rganos sovi6ticos
en China, incluso los discursos de K.ruscbe,,r ante el Supremo Soviet
en 12 de diciembre de 1962 y en el congreso del SED el 16 de enero
y los editoriales de "Pravda" de 7 de enero y 10 de febrero. "Lo que
debe ser especialmente apuntado con dnfasis es el hecho de que rso-
nal y Sr anos sovidticos en China habian distribuido la carta deft
de marzo e 1963 de CC del PCt3S al CC del P chino antes de u a fuera
ublicada en la prense, china. Pero cuando los chinos icieron to to
mismo, "el Gobierno sovi tico inmediatamente 1o denunci6 como ilegal
y acto de desacato a la soberania del estado ... y e1ev6 la injusti-
ficada demando por le retiro del personal chino. Esto no per ri-
sible en las relaciones internacionales en general y macho memos en
las relaciones entre dos palses socialistas. pesar de dichos obs-
tdculos el Gobierno chino no omar represalias contra el personal
sovidtico en China y "confia que el Gobierno sovidtico no volvera a
tomar acciones dafinas." -- La primera Plana de "Pravda" a la lle-
gada en Moscd de la delegaci6n china llevaba un editorial descri-
biendo reuniones de aktivs del partido por toda la URSS apoyando
undnimemente las resol icuioones del pleno de junio, incluso sus ins-
trucciones a la delegaci6n del partido en sus conversaciones con los
chinos y su rechazo de be "ataques calumniosos e infundados" del
PC chino. -- Los chinos en Moscd anunciaron de repente su decision
de retirarse del festival de cine que comenzaria el 7 de Julio, en
Moscd.
5 Julio: El "Times" de Tokio, fundamentando sus opiniones en las
comunes tradiciones hist6ricas y culturales de Jap6n y China y en la
amistad estrecha con el pueblo chino, elev6 un ruego a los 11deres
de Pekin de que abandoneran su concepto dogmdtico del marxismo-leni-
niemo y tom an una visi6a mde amplia en la resoluci6n de los proble-
mas mundiales. El mismo dia el "Sankei" de Tokio public6 un informe
talef6nico de su corresponsal en Moscd Kenzo Hori que incluia Jos
siguientes extractos: "Los estudiantes sovidticos estdn indignados
ante la actitud china. Declaran que es un ultraje que China Be
ponga en hostilidad contra la Union Sovidtica cuando una enorme can-
tidad de ayuda sovidtica ha sido enviada a China. Aqui en Moscd Be
rumora la posibilidad de que todos los estudiantes chinos vuelvan
a su patria. Race seis meses habla aqua en Hosed unos dos mil estu-
diantes, Pero el total ... va en descenso constante. En las esta-
ciones del ferrocarril siberiano vemos a muchos chinos que regresan
a su patria. Es de notar que los periodistas chinos estdn empezando
a emplear la 'diplomacia sonriente' Para con sus colegas japoneses.
A fines de febrero los periodistas chinos invitaron a reporteros
japoneses al comedor de la Embajada china. Esto no tenia precedente.
Demuestra que los chinos est&n tratando con desesperaci6n de atraer
a los japoneses a su lado para ganar la victoria en la disputa
chino-sovidtica. Puede que los chinos deseen amistarse con los ja-
poneses porque ambos tienen el mismo ancestro y emplean la miema
escritura. Mientras md,s se separe China de la Union Sovidtica, con
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norcoreano de amistad, cooperaci6n y asistencia mutua con una asam-
blea en Pyongyang, el presidente Yi Ki-yong de 3.a Aeociacldni ft
Amistad Coreano-$ovidtica incluyo la lucha coreana "eontra.el r vi-
sionismo moderno" en su discurso principal, mientras que el agrr: gado
sovidtico Pimenov omiti6 mencionarla. El breve editorial de "Jodong
Sinmun" sabre el asunto bambidn incluy6 el pasaje sobre defender
siempre "la pureza del marxismo-leninismo contra el revisionismo
modern."
6 Julio: Las sesiones entre chinos y soviLticos en las Lomas de
Lenin est&n envueltas en el secreto. Los diarios de Moscd ni si-
quiera anunciaron que la reuni6n habia empezado. Kruschev estd en
Kiev. Entretanto, Radio Moscd dej6 de radiar "Habla Pekin," pro-
grama de media horn en lengua ruse producido par Radio Pekin Para
los oyentes rusos. La prensa entera de Pekin public6 un extenso
despacho de Sinjua desde Mosc4i atacando duramente el trato de los
chinos en la conferencia de la FDIM la semana pasada y acusando a:ios
rusos de "provocar disputa y agitaci6n antichina." Sinjua tambidn
distribuy6 un articulo de la edici6n de 30 de junio del "Malayan Mo-
nitor," publicado en Londres, acusando a Kruschev indirectamente de
embarrar a Pekin desde un "sumidero ya hecho de is llamada destalini-
zaci6n." El diario comunista chino de Hong-Kong "Ching Po" atac6 a
Kruschev por su nombre y ridiculiz6 sus lineas de conducts.
6 Julio: Un despacho de eats fecha en el "New York Times" procedente
de Colombo inform6 que el PC de Ceiidn estd dividido, permaneciendo
fiel a Moscu, la dirigencia parlamentaria de formacidn moscovita e
inclindndose mds y mds hacia Pekin los mds jovenes, encabezados por
Shanmugathasan, secretario general de la Federaci6n Sindical ceila-
nesa. Este habia anunciado que pronunciaria esta semana uric confe-
rencia pdblicaa, sobre "Marxismo-Leninismo versus Revisionismo", Pero
la misma fue cancelada el dia antes de ilevarse a cabo por orden del
alto mando del partido, que habia amenazado expulsarlo.
7 Julio: Fueron recesadas por esta dia las conversations en Moscti,
Pero Rkin present6 una manifestaci6n de masa de siete mil funcioner
rios y bur6cratas pars aplaudir a los cinco chinos expulsados, pro-
nunciando el ministro Chen I de Relaciones Exteriores el discurso
principal. Uno de los expulsados dijo a la multitud que "todo el
pueblo sovidtico de dnimo justiciero estd en desacuerdo con esta con-
ducta, "y que "por largo tiempo las autoridades sovidticas habian
impedido al pueblo sovidtico informarse de las opinions del PC chino.
Llegaron hasta el extremo de atacar y calumniar al PC chino pdblicar
mente y por nombre." En Italia el 6rgano del PCI "1'Unita" denunc16
los ataques chinos contra is politics de Kruschev de coexistencia
Pacifica y acus6 a los chinos de "deformations y errores" en su
carte de 14 de ,junco.
Julio: La prensa comunista e izquierdista de Hong-Kong ha estado
condenando los actos sovidticos de "hostilidad" contra China Popular
en los dos ditimos d.ias, empleando "titulares a todo ancho y concep-
tos mds duros que los que dedicaban a los EE.UU. cuando la guerra de
Cores," de acuerdo con los corresponsales occidentales. Las acusa-
ciones se refieren tambi6n al descarte por parte de los sovi$ticos
de centenares de acuerdos econ6micos con China.
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7 Julio: La radio de Hanoi difundi6 el texto de un articulo de
siete mil palabras titulado "El Renegado Tito de Nuevo Vonita el
Veneno del Revisionismo" publicado en la edici6n de Julio de "HOC
Tap," 6rgano te6rico del partido, que se aproxim6 a la dureza de
la Linea chinocomuniata, de que "el revisionismo es la creaci6a
misma del imperialismo," su "caballo de Troya." "La tarea de cads
uno de nosotros los comunistas es denunciar la posicia cams-
rills, Tito ... trazar la divisoria entre el marxismo-leninismo
y el revisionismo, entre nosotros y el enemi o en la esfera ideol6-
gica, ... destrozar el revisionismo. a coexistencia pacifica ..
es unicamente parte y no toda ni la -dnica Linea de politics exterior
de los paiaes socialistas."
8 Julio: El PC indonesio (PKI) anunci6 que mandard a Moscd y a Pekin
una delegaci6n encabezada or su preaidente Aidit a invitaci6n de ,Los
respectivos comit6s centrales, partiendo de Jakarta el 19 de Julio.
El mismo dia Sinjua inform6 un discurso reciente de Njoto, Segundo
vicepresidente, en Sumatra del Sur que confirm6 que uno de los prin-
cipales fines de la de],agaci6a nerd tratar de ayudar a saner la
ruptura en el movimiento comunista internacional.
8 Julio: Albania se quej6 de que 6nicamente Los equipos de v6libol
militares de tres passes comunietas se presentaron pare una compe-
tencia internacional de campeonato, y que otros passes comunistas
que habian convenido en participar se habian retractado "hostil-
mente." Los que tomaron parte fueron los de China, Corea del Norte
y Rumania.
Referencias
"Peking Review" No. 25, 21 de junio de 1963; contiene el texto
fntegro en inglds de la carta del PC chino de 14 de junio. No se
hen recibido las ediciones en frances y espalloi, Pero es probable
que tambi&n to contengan. El texto completo tambidn fue publicado,
ass Como material de Tondo de gran utilidad, por el "New York Times"
de 5 de Julio en sus ediciones tanto nacionales coma internacional.
"China, Rusia Agarradas en Lucha par el Poder," articulo de
Edward Crankshaw del London Observer News Service, 6 de Julio;
publicado en el "Washington Post" de 7 de Julio de 1963.
"El Gran Cisma," articulo de Hugh Seton-Watson en "Encounter,"
mayo de 1963.
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 amp 15 July 1963
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25X1C10b6?7? Lopular rout tra egy evive
BACKGROUND :
Post-War Isolation. The impact of war-time alliance
had brought Communists n o prolonged coalitions with non-
Communists, both in governments and in private organizations.
Communists sat, for instance, in the governments of "national-
unity" of France, Italy and Austria; Communists and non-
Communists jointly reorganized labor unions, including the
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), formed organizations
of victims of Fascism and engaged in quite a few other "united"
enterprises. This "honeymoon" came to an end 1947 -- 1949:
the Communists recognized that their "restraint" (e.g. soft-
pedaling labor demands in France in the interest of post-war
reconstruction) failed to bring them effective control of the
governments in which they participated, while the non-Commu-
nists learned from bitter experience that the Communists had
not been "reformed" as a result of the war-time alliance
against Hitler (as some optimists had hoped) and broke away
from the joint organizations, forming their own labor unions
(Force Ouvridre in France, CISL in Italy) and their own inter-
national federation of labor unions, the International Confed-
eration of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
Since that time -- which coincided with the economic
revival of Western Europe under the Marshal Plan -- Communist
Parties in most countries of the free world remained essen-
tially i a o l a t e d, though in many instances ominously
strong, opposition groups, reinforced by a wide galaxy of
auxiliary and front organizations. In quite a few recently
independent countries outside Europe, the Communists misused
the newly gained independence armed uprisings and guerrilla
warfare (as in India, Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines),
thus insuring their even more rigid isolation. In the majority
of African and Latin American countries, Communist Parties were
-- until a few years ago -- either non-existent, or insignifi-
cantly weak or illegal.
Return to the Popular Front? Most recently, however, the
outlook for new Communist a empts to enlist the help of non-
Comunist parties and even governments has significantly im-
proved in a number of countries -- even though for a variety
of different reasons. Typical examples of this turn in favor
of the Communists are:
a. France -- where Socialist and other middle-of-
the-road parties accepted Communist support in the
last general elections (as a desperate -- and not con-
spicuously successful -- defense against de Gaulle's
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 .(677 Cont.) 15 July 1963
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designed (at least by non-Communist participants) as
a means to prevent the re-election of de Gaulle in
the p-: ?esidentia1 election of 165, is being discussed
by C ?.munists, Socialists and leftist splinter groups*
b. Italy -- where the Communist gain of 1 million
votes in' last general elections induced the PSI
(Nenni Socialists) to break off support of the govern-
ment and where they are now pressing for a government
which could operate only under CP tolerance, if not
with direct CP participation.
c. Argentina -- where a "national front" of Com-
munists an"T"'75r vistas has impeded the stabilization
of a democratic regime for the last several years.
d. Brazil -- where the C? itself is not danger-
ously s ron but where penetration of the adminis-
tration of President Goulart, of labor unions,
peasant leagues, political parties and other mass
organizations by Communists and other leftists
appears to make steady and virtually irresistible
progress.
e. Chile -- where the CP has worked with con-
siderable success since 1935 in the political
Popular Action Front (FRAP), as well as in labor
unions and among agricultural laborers who are a
prime objective, and is now preparing for next year's
elections in the popular front, whose party membership
fluctuates.
f. India -- where the CP, though weakened in its
popular appeal by Chicom aggression, has managed to
come once more closer to the ruling Congress Party
on a "patriotic, national defense" line.
g. Indonesia -- where the CP, despite her 1943
uprising aga nst the new republic, is now the only
legitimate mass party, controlling labor unions and
other popular organizations and exerting powerful
influence on the administration of President Sukarno.
h. Ghana -- where President Nlkrumah and his monop-
olistic government party are treated by Moscow virtually
like a CP, admitted to the CPSU Congresses, etc.
I. Spain and Portugal -- where the Communists,
though underground and in exile, have redoubled
their efforts to form united fronts in view of the
succession crises, expected soon in both countries.
For example, successful approaches of pro-Communist
groups to the Portuguese opposition party leader
General Delgado; and Communist lobbying among
Spanish exile groups in Munich.
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(677. Continued)
 '(677 Cont.) 15 July 1963
A 8vftgtFi(;rnft4et_Je GSM%J11M & 'iDViJ QQ-JJ#09Q8RQ0JQQRt .
No Commun s Party has ever seized sovereign power on the oasis
of a popular majority vote. Communist Parties do not recognize
any other political parties, whether Socialist, Liberal, Con-
servative or anything else, as their equals, but consider them
(at best) as tools, to be used for a while, until they can be
disposed of and liquidated. The relationship between a CP and
a non-Communist group is therefore never the type of "coalition"
or "alliance" arrangement often existing between two or more
bona fide (i.e. neither Communist nor Fascist) parties, whether
in order to form a government or for purposes of joint opposition:
in these arrangements, each partner implicitly acknowledges the
equal right of the other to exist as a political entity -- even
though he will naturally make every effort to weaken his com-
petitors and strengthen his own position within such alliance.
Communists, however, consider any other party (or non-Communist
government) as an enemy to be ultimately destroyed -- even if
they need their assistance temporarily. Consequently, a CP --
regardless of the contents of "unity" agreements -- will continue
to penetrate its "partners," to proselytize among their followers
and to do everything possible to prepare their ultimate downfall
and destruction. Only the CP's own needs will occasionally
impose some limitations on these nefarious tactics -- as Russia's
plight in the earlier stages of World War Two forced Stalin to
make some initial concessions to the West.
(The united front strategy is common to all elements
in the World Communist Movement, regardless of which
side of the crumbling monolith they happen to stand.
It is a basic characteristic of all Communist activities
and not at all related to "peaceful coexistence" or
other issues of the current controversy between Moscow,
Peking and other Communist Parties.)
Communist Alliance Techni ues. A "united front," in Commu-
nist parlance, eno es some form of cooperation between the CP
and a Socialist Party, labor unions or other non-Communist
elements of the labor movement. Communists speak of a "united
front from below" when they proselytize among the rank-and-file
of their par ners," to impose their tactical demands on the
leaders of those groups. "United front from above" implies that
the CP feels compelled to negotiate wither leaders of the
group(s) in question -- which they don't like to do since it
usually hampers their freedom of maneuvering (one of the most
significant exceptions: the "unity of action" agreement between
the Italian C? and the Nenni Socialists, terminated by the latter
a few years ago). "Popular Front" describes Communist coopera-
tion not only with Socialist an Labor groups, but with potentially
any political party or mass organization, including even right-
wing groups, for defense against Fascism (see: Popular Fronts
in France and Spain before World War II, and the reso u on of
e 7th om n.ern ongress, Moscow 1935). "National Front"
denotes a combination of Communist and non-communist forces,
usualllyy at the government level, to prepare a Communist take-over
un%? h
g#d~Fi 9.rng"214
(677. Continued)
 (67 7 Cont.) 15 July 1963
r
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Communist Successes. Communist use of the strategy ant
tactics, Summar zed a ove, though not uniformly successful,
has yielded numerous far-reaching advantages to their cause.
Psychologically, the slogan oi' "unity" -- whether as "labor
unity," "anti-fascist unity" or "national unity" -- has proven
to be a very strong emotional and intel:.&ctuQl attraction in
most countries. Ever since Marx canclud,ed his "Communist
Manifesto" (1847) with the ringing appeal "Proletarians of the
world, unite!", the concept of unity -- at virtually any price
-- has dominated all segments of the international labor
movement, Socialist Parties, labor unions and other organiza-
tions. Politically, the leaders of the political parties and
other mass organizations thus manipulated by the Communists,
were usually no match for the duplicity of the latter: most of
them believed mistakenly that this was merely another instance
of "coalition" and failed to see, let alone to stop, simultaneous
CP penetration into the ranks of their own organizations, CP
propaganda misuse of the "united action," CP occupation of the
key positions in unified mass organization, and so forth.
2ven the imminent danger of Communist seizure of or failed
some times to u n e the non--communist OF; r for defense -- as in Czechoslovakia, Popular Front
in France enabled the Communists to seize control over the
entire labor union movement (where they had held only a minority
position before) and to deprive the Socialist Party of a large
25X1C10b portion of its proletarian following.
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MMPM 15 July 1963
25X1 C1 78' Soviet Espionage Exposures
. BACKGROUND: In June 1962, Khrushchev wrote in a letter to
the Chan the Japanese c, Santo Nozaka (published by Tass,
28 June 19002):
"Espionage is needed by those who prepare for attack,
for aggression. The Soviet Union is deeply dedicated to
the cause of peace, does not intend to attack anybody, and
therefore has no intention of engaging in espionage."
If Khrushchev's first sentence had been correct, then a Soviet
attack would now be overdue, for the last part of his second
*"w sentence has certainly been proven false. The last few months
have seen a rash of exposures of Soviet spy cases. (See attach-
ment.) Some of these cases, such as the (1 July) expulsion of
Gennadi G. Sevastyanov from the US for his attempted recruitment
of a CIA employee, or (7 February) of Ivan Skripov from Australia
for contact with a female double agent, resulted in no damage
to free world security. Other cases, such as those of Col.
Stig Wennerstrom or of H.A.R. Philby, may have been much more
damaging. The case of Profumo, Ward, Christine Keeler and
Yevgeniy Ivanov suggests one way in which Soviet espionage gets
a foothold.,-but the Oleg Penkovskiy case has shown that Soviet
society also produces motivations and opportunities for espionage,
and that the Soviets are also vulnerable; this case has led to
the recall of many RIS officers, to the explusion of General
Varentsov from the CPSU Central Committee, and to the mysterious
disappearance of General.Ivan Serov.
In the flood of revelations on all sides, some of them highly
sensational, some people are shocked, but many ordinary citizens
get the impression that East and West are pretty much alike, both
in conducting espionage and in suffering from it, The day is
passing, if it has not already passed, when espionage as such
surprises anyone.: The public is still impressed by cases with
widespread ramifications (as with Profumo and Penkovskiy), and
some are still startled to find that the Soviets should involve
the nationals of countries like Sweden, Iceland, and New Zealand
in their intelligence: collection effort. But these reactions
are probably growing weaker, and the idea that the Soviets are
villains because they spy could gradually disappear.
But Soviet spy cases need not lose their propaganda value.
For one thing, much will depend on how the play on such cases is
handled; they can be treated as specimens of a larger pattern
of Soviet activity, rather than merely as spot news. Secondly --
anc3 `is `is related to the first point Soviet spy cases can
be uRee d 1h rSveg or ?ease `082005 Oa05-4
A" MOMAMM& (678 Continued)
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(678, Coat,
15 July 1963
espionage teghniques. The more the world becomes aware of these
techniques, the more difficult it will be g9r the Soviets to
operate, and the easier it will be for western agrvices to turn
pr defect Soviet agents and intelligence officers.
25X1C10b
Fkpprovec
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 Approved For Release 19 P78-03061A80OO29029OO5-4
679 EE,WE,a, The June Plenum of the CPSU
BACKGROUND:
The Setting of the Mee in First scheduled for 28 May
1963, the UERSU Central omm ee plenary meeting on ideological
problems finally met from 18 to 21 June inclusive. Two headline-
grabbing events preceded the meeting: the space flights of
Valeriy Bykovskiy and Valentina Tereshkova (which the Soviets
had carefully planned) and the Chinese Communist letter of
14 June (which the Soviets definitely had not planned). Thus
while Bykovskiy and Tereshkova may have faTI d to achieve a
union in space, the Soviets had no difficulty in demonstrating
a high degree of space prowess. But in the light of Soviet
problems with China and even Rumania, Soviet ideological
dynamism and leadership was far from conspicuous when the plenum
began and even less evident when it ended.
As the Central Committee gathered, Tass released (on 18
June) a temporizing statement which expressed "deep regret" at
the "arbitrary interpretation," distortion, and "unwarranted
attacks" in the Chinese letter. The statement explained that
the Soviet press would not publish the letter, since that would
necessitate a public reply, leading "to a further aggravation
of the polemics." (See Propa andist's Guide to Communist
Dissensions #6, BPG No. 119, July 1963.) The nese'them-
se ves immediately undertook to circulate their letter in Moscow.
It had been originally expected that the plenum would pro-
duce a new series of violent attacks on erring writers and
artists. But the Kremlin seems to have found this problem, like
that of the Chinese, so serious that it had to be pushed out of
the spotlight. According to a Moscow-datelined AP story of
17 June, Khrushchev at a 16 May meeting had sharply criticized
his assistant in charge of the ideological struggle, Leonid
Fedorovich Ilichev, because Ilichev had failed to report to him
the hostile reaction of Soviet and other intellectuals to his,
Khrushchev's, attacks on artistic and literary experimentation
and independence. Certainly there had been a serious domestic
reaction; the editors of Komsomolskaya Pravda reported on 23 May
that an earlier article attacking evtus e o had evoked more
than 1,200 letters totalling 5900 pages "in which readers talk
at the top of their voices about life and literature, about the
times, and about themselves." A Young Writers' Conference,
finally held on 7-10 May, had been boycotted by young writers
and was finally eked out with speeches by Komsomol officials,
cosmonauts, and elderly authors. Because of the seriousness of
this resistance, and also b e
the /~iprp ~flr@19ra~
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Ilichev's Speech. In his opening keynote speech at the
plenum, c ev downgraded the problem of the non-conforming
intellectuals by making them only one of a series of ideologi-
cally delinquent groups, such as bureaucratic party hacks,
pilferers of state property, wayward youth, drunkards, church-
goers, and people who regard their home as their castle. He
repeated old cliches about the New Man, about the need for
more work and discipline, and about the party's leading role in
Soviet society. Ilichev gave the impression of a sleek, robe-
wearing minister in what had once been a fiery evangelical sect;
he still used some of the old vocabulary, but he did not offend
the taste of his congregation with too much fire and brimstone.
Thus at one point, Ilichev applied to the critics of socialism
the label of ""kula. lieutenants," but for fear of arousing
memories of Stalinism, he hastily turned to eulogize the
memory of Soviet soldiers. In speaking of art, Ilichev denied
any intention to revert to the "methods of guidance ?f art
practiced during the period of the personality cult.`
One section of Ilichev's lengthy speech discussc;`: the
problem of "imperialist ideological subversion," a danger on
which the Kremlin recently held an intra-bloc conference.
Ilichev listed four alleged cliches of the ideologists of
imperialism: that the Marxist-Leninist analysis is out of date;
that capitalism has changed and that social conflict is dis-
appearing under it, that socialism neglects the material and
spiritual requirements of man; and that socialism and capitalism
are moving in the same direction. These concepts are by no
means impervious to serious criticism. But Ilichev's "refutation'
are not serious criticisms at all, and will convince no one
who was not convinced already; for example, the question of
whether Marxism-Leninism is outdated is dismissed with a pat
reference to "the whole course of development of mankind in the
20th century," and the charge that communism neglects spiritual
and material requirements is "answered" with rhetoric about
socialism stunning the world and exploring the cosmos. Ilichev's
arguments are those of a man who is no longer capable of
logical thoughts -- perhaps the result of his totalitarian
upbringing. Marx, Engels or Lenin would never have produced
such fatuous platitudes.
Plenum Fails to Face Up to Problems. Ilichev's speech was
followed y o ers from party officials and spokesmen for the
Soviet "establishment," expanding on the various areas of
ideological interest: motion pictures, education, literature,
the press, youth activities, labor unions, and so on. The
higher-level speakers generally agreed that there were serious
deficiencies, while the lower-level ones tried to show that,
at least in their own areas of responsibility, everything was
working out for the best. None of the speakers seemed to offer
effective solutions for the most serious problems, such as the
questioning of the past role of present leaders, the conflict
of generations, and the decline in respect for party guidance.
Except for Khrushchev, the speakers followed Ilichev in avoid-
"decision") on ideology faileg to lay down specific measures
a?Ca C'nnt i nrnaA 1
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either for strengthening the belief in communism or for sup-
pressing heresies.
Apparently the CPSU has decided to use less publicized
measures to control literary and artistic expression, thus
avoiding hostile public reactions, especially abroad. The
plenum did not act on a proposal for a unification of "creative
workers" unions, even though supported by Ilichev, but now
the unions will apparently adopt this proposal themselves --
"voluntarily." The unification will provide a pretext for
eliminating liberal influence and tightening control. Following
a vaguely worded recommendation of the plenum, the number of
newspapers in Moscow will be cut in half, with the functions
of the specialized papers taken over by the mass papers, such
as Pravda Izvestia, and Komsomolskaya Pravda; these last will
be expanded site. This action will s rengthen party control,
and reduce chances for placing unorthodox materials in less-
known periodicals. There are also signs that provincial book
publishing will be curtailed: Khrushchev complained at the
plenum that writers whose works were rejected in Moscow or
Leningrad sometimes succeeded in getting published elsewhere.
Secret Discussions on the Chinese Problem. The plenum
could not completely overlook the nese pro lean; the Chinese
were dealt with in secret speeches by Mikhail Suslov, Boris
Ponomaryev, and Yuriy Andropov, who represent the USSR in the
July discussions. The Chinese letter was circulated to the
delegates (a privileged group) and the plenum passed a resolu-
tion on the coming meeting with the Chinese, which was somewhat
stronger than the pre-plenum Tass statement, e.g.: "The CPSU
Central Committee categorically rejects as groundless and
slanderous the attacks of the CCP Central Committee on the CPSU
and other Communist parties, on the decisions of the 2Oth, 21st,
and 22nd CPSU Congresses, and on its Program." Parts of the
resolution sounded almost as though the Presidium had suspected
the Chinese of trying to instigate a Stalinist revolt at the
plenum.
Xlf_
thrushchev's Speech. The concluding speech at the plenum
was
a rus c ev s. This speech was not published until
eight days after its delivery on 21 June, and this time may
have been spent in expurgating the text; there may, for example,
have been a lengthy discussion of the Chinese problem in the
original. In the form we have it, the Khrushchev speech shows
the leader's concern over lack of party discipline and the
influence of western ideas. He repeatedly stressed the unity
of the party, its ties with the people, and its leading role
in Soviet life. He demanded complete obedience to Kremlin
decisions, and threatened disobedient members with expulsion;
one such person, explicitly named, was Viktor Nekrasov, who had
praised some features of western society, and who had refused
to recant.
On the whole, the published speech is less violent than
Khrushchev's 8 March speech (see BPG #644d.). He praised the
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writings of Aleksandr Tvardovskiy (who as editor of Novy Mir
has published much "liberal" material written by others and
said he would like to believe that )rnst Neizvestniy, the
controversial sculptor, "is an honest and gifted man." Be
also claimed to have frankly told Stalin that, despite Malenkovts
claim at the 19th Congress (1952) that the grain problem had
been solved, the Ukrainians had no bread. In this, and in
recalling that he had to overcome Stalinist opposition before
making his famous 1956 secret speech, Khrushchev seemed to be
defending himself against the charge of complicity in Stalin's
crimes.
Khrushchev's speeches are always free wheeling and some-
what eccentric. This speech, however, exceeded the norm in
repetition, disorganization, and non seuituurss. The last sec-
tion, on economic problems, was completely , relevant to what
had been discussed at this plenum, and seemed to be a rambling
rehash of Khrushchev's speeches on this subject over the last
several years. Among other things, he hinted at new changes
in the organization of planning, when the last changes
(see BPG #637) have hardly yet taken effect. His statements
on economics may be partly a matter of reasserting his own
views, apparently contested last spring by Kozlov.
Nevertheless, Khrushchev is now once again the uncontested
leader. Kozlov is apparently out of the picture, whatever the
nature and origin of his illness. Two new Central Committee
Secretaries were named on 21 June, Leonid Brezhnev and Nikolai
?odgorniy (see attachment for unclassified fact sheet on
Brezhnev.) Brezhnev appears now to be Khrushchev's heir
apparent. He has been a "Khrushchev man" since before World
War II -- in the Ukraine, on the Ukrainian front, in the Virgin
Lands, and in the higher leadership. Like Khrushchev, he has
agricultural and industrial experience, and he can be crude
and undiplomatic. But he seems to lack Khrushchev's former
energy and quickness of mind, and he also lacks Kozlov's massive
self-esteem. If the aging Khrushchev should go, Brezhnev might
well prove only a stopgap leader; other heirs-apparent, such
as Trotsky and Malenkov, have failed to establish themselves.
Certainly it will take greater talents than Brezhnev to steer
the USSR through the problems now arising. Only a complete
innovator, comparable to a new Lenin, could restore the moral
leadership of the party. For the Soviet Union has outgrown
the old dogmas and no longer believes in or respects them.
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15 July 1963,
25X1C10b 680 EE,WE,a,. East Europe 10 Years After Stalin's Death
BACKGROUND: Events in East Europe increasingly reflect
national diversity and resistance to Soviet dictat. This
development can be seen now not only in Albania's defiance
of Moscow and in Khrushchev's accommodation to "Titoism," but
also in the unexpected Rumanian refusal to accept her allotted
role in CEMA and in the nationalist pronouncements of Slovakian
Communist writers and journalists.
In 1953 the relationship between East European countries
and the Soviet Union could be characterized as one of direct
colonial-type exploitation on the one side and almost total
subservience on the other. Local Stalins in the satellites,
working closely with the Soviet Embassies and MVD representa-
tives, ruled their satrapies through undisguised police terror.
Khrushchev's "new course," inaugurated in 1954, introduced
a more flexible program aimed at overcoming the bureaucratic
inertia of the Stalinist era. The Soviet First Secretary's
pilgrimage to Belgrade in May 1955 presaged accommodation with
Tito's brand of socialism in 1962-63. The 20th CPSU Congress
with its spectacular denunciation of Stalin, helped to bring
about a bloody revolt in Hungary and drastic changes in Poland.
Although the reaction in the rest of East Europe was less
explosive, the 20th CPSU provided the impetus for subsequent
modifications. Khrushchev's new course and particularly his
peace-making mission to Belgrade marked the beginning of
Albania's resistance to the USSR and its subsequent break
with Moscow. In Bulgaria, Chervenkov's power was challenged
and other Bulgarian leaders began searching for alternatives
to Stalinism. In Czechoslovakia, the modicum of artistic and
intellectual ferment which was in evidence immediately after
the 20th CPSU Congress was quickly suppressed by the Stalinist
Party leaders who ignored the basic forces, including the
nationalism, at work in the country. In Rumania, the
regime of Gheorgiu-Dej maintained both its cohesiveness and
its Stalinist-type controls over a docile populace.
The 22nd CPSU Congress in December 1961 provided a second
strong impetus for de-Stalinization. As such, it even affected
the course of countries like Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and
Rumania, which while paying lip service to Khrushchev's pro-
gram, had retained most of their Stalinist characteristics.
Also, new factors had come into play: above all, the develop-
ment of a second major center of Communist authority in Peking,
but also of importance, Albania's defection and the rapproche-
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The Sino-Soviet dispute also destroyed the m
th (alread
y
y
undermined by the break with Yugoslavia) of a d4.sciplined,
monolithic bloc, and of the infallibility of the CPSU. It
revealed, instead, a more familiar, if equally dangerous
phenomenon, that of aggressive Russian and Chinese nationalism
masquerading in a socialist cloak. In East Europe, the dis-
pute has afforded an opportunity to bargain allegiance in the
Sino-Soviet struggle for greater independence from Moscow.
Compared to what it was at Stalin's death in 1953, East
Europe since the 22nd CPSU Congress not only has a different
composition but a changed internal dynamic and a new relation-
ship with the Soviet Union.
First of all, Albania as of 1960 or slightly earlier
began adopting positions which openly supported the Chinese
side of the Sino-Soviet dispute. All Moscow's attempts to
overthrow the Hoxha regime (by internal plot and external
economic pressures) caxlie to nought and diplomatic relations
were suspended in Deceu, er 1961. Thus, Albania became the
second East European country to throw off Soviet authority.
In Bulgaria, which had no "moderate" precedents and
where the more liberal leaders had long since been purged,
few meaningful de-Stalinization measures were taken until
after Xhrushchev's visit in the summer of 1962. At the
?arty's VlLIth Congress in November 1962, most of the leaders
who had been connected with the Ministry of Interior in the
Stalinist era were ousted. However, in many cases this
amounted to little more than personal vendetta since those
doing the ousting were as much addicted to Stalinist methods
as their predecessors. Still, it is apparent that, obedient to
the wishes of Moscow, the current leaders are searching desper-
ately for new formulae with which to make Bulgarian Communism
a moz%l L-cc?Vp `: ;:h1, vi L.- phonomr..nc?n.
De-Stalinization arrived slowly and belatedly in Czecho-
slovakia. The XIIth Czech Congress in December 1962 reed
the iar line Policies and recommissioned the old-guard Stalinist
leaders. An attempt by Rudolf Barak, representing the more
moderate group in the Czech hierarchy, to take over from Novotny
in late 1961 had failed and Barak had been sentenced to 15 years
in prison. However, by the spring of 1963, pressure from within
the Party (and possibly also from Moscow) reached the point where
Novotny could no longer ignore it. Czech, and particularly
Slovak intellectuals began to criticize the regime openly;allud-
ing to the role of present leaders in the "violations of social-
ist legality" which characterized the purge trials of the Stalin
era, they demanded immediate and far-reaching de-Stalinization
measures. The June meeting of the Slovak Writers Union and
Journalists Union took a strong stand, criticizing Premier
Siroky by name and Novotny by Implication. Although the extent
of internal Party opposition to Novotny is not clear, the latter
may not be able to contain the current dissent. In such an event
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(680 Cont.) n T7 M_ 15 July 1963
there is a good chance that he and his lieutenants -- among the
most durable Stalinist holdovers in East Europe -- will be
replaced with more moderate leaders capable of holding the Party
together during a de-Stalinization phase.
In Hungary, despite the initial abhorrence with which he was
regarded -1-y the people for his role in "selling out the revo-
lution" and liquidating Imre Nagy, Janos Kadar turned out to be
the type of middle-of-the-road leader which, from the Moscow
point of view, the situation demanded. Through the introduction
of economic incentives and, in general, by more flexible internal
policies, Radar succeeded in eliciting enough popular cooperation
to move forward w:Uh his liberalization pm:gram. In August 1962, a
short time before the party Congress, radar was finally in a
position to expel from the Party the former Stalinist leaders
Rakosi and Geroe and to remove Karoly Kiss from the politburo.
Together with the above-named, 17 other political leaders,
prosecutors, judges and State Security officials were expelled
for complicity in the trial and execution of Laszlo Rajk
(accused of Titoism and purged in 1949). These measures were
taken in the context of "liquidating the personality cult,
remedying all wrongs that could be mended, clearing the Party
of the members of the Rakosi clique who abused their power at
the expense of the people and the Communist movement, and putting
an end to the baleful methods introduced by the Rakosi clique."
It was also done in the context of improving relations with
Tito. Thus, Kadar removed the most notorious Stalinist remnants
in the Party and attempted to write a formal finis to the abuses
which led to the 1956 revolt. Since that timT"had continued
to work to improve the image of Hungarian Communism at home and
abroad.
The Gomulka regime in Poland, while it has fallen short of
meeting the initial expectaTFo s of the West and also of many
Poles, made a definite break with the past and set Poland on a
more nationalist and more independent course. Police coercion
Fs been greatly curter ed and although some of the political
"liberalism" of the post-1956 era has gradually been reduced, in
the intellectual and cultural fields Poland compares favorably
with many countries in the world. Moreover, the "Polish road"
has been an example to other countries of the Soviet bloc
including the USSR itself. More recently, the freer experi-
mentation Poland has exhibited in internal policies has begun
to be extended (to a very moderate degree) to external policies
as well. Poland's relations with China, Yugoslavia and with
the West differ, at least in degree, from those of the rest of
East Europe and from those of the USSR itself. domulka (once
accused by Khrushchev of "selling out" Polish Communism) also
appears to be playing the role of advisor and confidant to the
Soviet leader in the Sinb-Soviet dispute.
From Rumania has come perhaps the greatest surprise of all.
On the bash s o is relative economic prosperity, the country,
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(680 Cont.) 15 July 1963
long considered one of Moscow's most obedient satellites, has
openly defied Soviet policy regarding economic integration in
CEMA, and flouted Moscow's authority by returning its ambassador
to Tirana, by refusing (to date) to reestablish Party relations
with Tito and by flagrantly publishing a lengthy summary of the
14 June letter from Peking to Moscow after the latter "in the
interests of unity" had refused to do so.
Yugoslavia has developed, since the advent of Khrushchev in
the USSH, a very interesting and -- perhaps -- portentous
relationship with Moscow. The political course set by
Khrushchev at the 20th CPSU Congress has been well received by
Tito and, together with K.'s 1955 initiative, marked a beginning
for improved relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
Since Khrushchev's new course conceded a greater variety and
looser definition of "socialism," the attitude of the various
CP's toward "Titoism" was to become one of the main tests of
genuine acceptance of IKhrushchev's brand of socialism. The
rapprochement between the two countries in 1962 and Khrushchev's
stubborn defense of Yugoslav "socialism" in the face of Chinese
attacks indicate that this new form of association with the
Soviet Bloc, which permits Yugoslavia to retain its independence,
may be indicative of eventual future relations between Moscow
and East Europe.
Summa : In order to rejuvenate the stagnant bureaucracy
inherited om the period of Stalin's suppression, Khrushchev
was forced to permit greater variety and flexibility. In the
long run viability meant enlisting popular cooperation,
Khrushchev's decision constituted the first step in a process
which was to lead to a gradual loosening of ties between the
USSR and its Eastern European appendages.
The "Soviet bloc" is better described today as an alliance
of Communist states sharing common goals in which the Soviet
Union predominates but no longer commands unquestioning
obedience. Since it has become increasingly difficult to deal
with dissent in the traditional manner, Moscow must rely more and
more on agreement by consensus, In a sense, the former
"satellites" have come of age; they are getting too big and too
sophisticated to control by direct dictat .
Internally, while the Communist leaders of East Europe are
still addicted to authoritarian methods, they are increasingly
obliged to consider c.::. accommodate pressures from the people
and from within the party. In the economic sphere, CEMA is
proving the difficulties of combining economic unity with
pressure for political plurality. Foreign policy in at least
some of the East-European satellites (e.g. Poland and Rumania)
might be described as "complementary" to that of the USSR
rather than "identical." In brief, we are witnessing the
incipient stage of national forms of Communism. This does not
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(630 Cont.) 15 July 1963
imply the likelihood of a break with Moscow; it does mean that --
despite the various unifying factors of geography, ideology, and
economics -- with the advent of n,--.w and younger leaders, the mutual
interests of each side will coincide to a lesser extent.
Finally there is the seemingly inexorciseable spectre of re-
nascent East European nationalism. The most striking example is
that of Slovak resentment of Czech domination which is currently
plaguing Novotny's rule in Czechoslovakia. However, this is only
one of several potentially explosive border and nationalities
problems, including Macedonia, Transylvania, the Polish Eastern
Territories, Bessarabia, etc. which are apt to haunt intra-Bloc
25XlC10brelations for a long time to come.
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601 AF,FR, Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)
25X1 C10b NE,VIH Filth or Congress
BACKGROUND: /Also see BPG #115 item 654 of 6 May 19637
The Women's n erational Democratic Federation (WIDF) held a
congress in Moscow from 24 to 29 June, Reportedly, 1,541 dele-
gates represented 113 countries: 27 European, 23 Asian, 34 African.
25 Latin American, 2 North American; and Australia and New Zealand.
The largest delegations came from Brazil, Japan, Great Britain,
Italy, France, 'Jest Germany, Norway, the USSR, the C?R, Canada
and the US. Fifty countries which had previously not been repre-
sented at WIDF congresses sent delegations. Representatives of
all the uajor international Communist fronts such as the W?C,
V11FTU, WFDY, FIR, ate. also attended. Eugenie Cotton was re-
elected VJIDF president. The elected honorary vice presidents are
Leonora Andrea Andreen (Sweden) and Dolores Ibarruri (Spain).
Khrushchev sent a message to the Congress in which he stated
that any future world conflict would be a nuclear rocket war of
extermination; therefore the Soviet Union would strive for disarma.
went and pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence with both Com-
munist and non-Communist countries. An opportunity for
Khrushchev's "peace" speech had been afforded by the just-com-
pleted space flight of Valentina Tereshlcova who attended the
Congress.
tbxoe
The Congress had significant characteristics: (1) almost
disregarding many militant speeches of delegates, the final
appeal of the Congress to the women of all countries was a moder-
ate general statement with surprisingly few traditional cold war
overtones; (2) contrary to expectations at a women's congress
pursuing broad, pacific charter aims, the Sino-Soviet conflict
interferred far more violently with the completion of its agenda
than at other recent international Communist front affairs, and
with the significant difference that the policies of the moderate,
pro-Soviet forces prevailed; and (3) although the policies of the
moderate, pro-Soviet forces prevailed, they were forced to resort
to heavy-handed, non-parliamentary control procedures.
The Congress did not contribute anything tangible to WIDF's
program of action except the reiteration of traditional Soviet
propaganda themes (on disarmament, peace, anti-colonialism,
sovereignty, national independence, the rights of women, health
and education of children, etc.) calculated to attract sympathy
and support from women of the underdeveloped areas. Rowever,
the tensions which developed and the organizational changes
approved may well be the beginning of a fundamental change in the
makeup and character of the WIDF. For example, according to a
el T9
(681. Continued)
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.(631-Cont.) 15 July 1963
Peking NCNA broadcast, the Chicoms charged that"... the chairman...
forcibly adopted a 27-member executive bureau."
On the opening day, the 50-women Italian delegation equally
divided between Communists and non-Communists and led by a Com-
munist member of the Italian parliament, angrily walked out of
the hall when the Japanese delegate delivered a report that
attacked the US for Its maintenance of military bases overseas,
including Japan, while praising Communist governments for
"sparing no effort" to reduce international tension and to achieve
general disarmament. The Italians issued a statement that the
Congress must not and cannot identify itself with the position of
one of the two power blocs; it cannot and must not take political
sides. This delegation also pointed out that the Japanese report
had not only included vehement attacks on the US but had addressed
itself to Japanese problems rather than to the issue of peace.
(The Japanese Communists, who obviously dominated their dele-
gation, have been leaning increasingly toward Peking's position
in the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking). The
Italian delegation niade it clear that it did not support the US,
but wanted to see the Congress confined to dealing with social
conditions of women and in the home. Reportedly, at an organi-
zational committee meeting, the British and French delegations
joined the Italians in protesting cold war speeches, but they
did not join in the boycott of the Japanese speech. The American
delegation of 65 sat through the Japanese and Cuban -- see below--
speeches.
The second Italian delegation walkout came when the Cuban
delegate, Carmen del Busto, secretary of the Cuban Women's
Socialist Federation gave another report that charged American
troops with deliberately poisoning South Vietnam's water supply
and contrasted these and other anti-US charges with high praise
for governmental policies benefitting women and children in
North Vietnam and in the USSR.
A Chicom delegate (Mrs. Kuo Tien) forced the Congress into
temporary suspension when she sought to refute the Indian
delegate's (Pro--Soviet Communist Mrs. Aruna Asas Ali) accusation
that the Chinese are blocking Indian and neutral nations' attempts
to settle the border dispute. Mrs. Kuo Tien dashed to the
speaker's platform demanding to be heard immediately to explain
the Chicom position. When she continued to occupy the platform
after being declared out of order, an uproar broke out and the
Chairman (Dr. Joan Garritt of the UK) adjourned the session.
Members of the Congress presidium filed off stage, and delegates,
newsmen and photographers converged on the podium. Mrs. Jeanette
Vermeersch, wife of French Communist leader Thorez, violently
attacked the Chinese delegate ("Here is the imperialist press,
and you tell us you are against imperialism!"). Finally, an
African delegate succeeded in persuading Mrs. Kuo that with the
help of African and Asian delegations she would be given a
chance to state her views at a later session. During the same
sessAftr9d
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15 July 19613
Spanish (exile) Communist delegate, Dolores Ibarruri of Spanish
Civil War fame, had praised the policy of coexistence. An
advocate of the Chinese militant view sneered: "Do you want to
come to terms with Mrs. Kennedy?" and to the applause of the
vast majority of the Congress received Ibarruri's affirmative
reply, "if Mrs. Kennedy is ready to help defend her children
from nuclear war."
The fundamental issues of the Sino-Soviet conflict became
evident as the Congress progressed to establish programs and
policy. The leader of the Chinese delegation (Yang Yun-yu)
attacked the "imperialist" US ?resident, claiming that his peace
strategy was designed to pit the CPR and the Soviet Union
against each other. In hardly veiled form she attacked Soviet
coexistence policy and Soviet attempts to reach agreements with
the West; claimed that Khrushchev's peace policies are incom-
patible with Communist revolutionary principles; and maintained
that peaceful coexistence is acceptable and workable only if
based on Chicom principles. Although the speech was milder than
the Chicom letter of June 14 to Khrushchev -- reportedly it had
been modified on the insistence of the Congress secretariat -- it
nevertheless was a clear attempt to discredit the Russians and in
the long term to win supporters for the Chicom point of view. The
Chinese distributed translations of the speech to the delegates,
approximately 50% of whom, according to one estimate, were CP
members of the countries they represented. The speech received
little applause and none whatever from the Soviet delegation and
the many hundreds of Soviet guests present in the meeting hall.
As was to be expected, the Chicoms received the enthusiastic
support of the Albanians in all their actions.
The final statement of the Congress, which appealed to the
women of the world to fight for peace and against an atomic arms
race, f'oeulteri in litt i pro-Peking support in split voting.
All accounts of this voting Lary with the origin, for example:
Moscow TASS and western sources said that the Chicoms and Albanians
"voted against the appeal" and North Vietnamese and North Koreans
"abstained"; Peking NCNA, however, said "The Chinese, Korean and
Albanian delegates voted against it by a show of hands. The
delegate from the DRV abstained and the South Vietnam delegate
did not take part in the voting." The appeal closely paralleled
Soviet foreign policy statements. It did not name the US, its
allies or NATO as responsible for the dangers to world peace.
The salient passages of the Congress appeal state:
". . . Vie do not want war to be a means of deciding
conflicts between states; we are convinced that conflicts
should be settled by negotiations.
3
(681 Cont.)
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15 July 1963
"We'wish to work for the establishment of peaceful
coexistence between states with different social systems
all over the world on the basis of mutual respect,
territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, non-
interference, equality and mutual benefit, for the achieve-
ment of total and general disarmament and the rigorous con-
trol of thermonuclear disarmament in particular.
"We appeal to you:
"To act without rest and without respite to bring
about the cessation of nuclear tests;
"To support the creation of nuclear-free zones;
"To struggle for the removal of all military bases
and the withdrawal of military troops on foreign soil;
"To support the action of personalities, organi-
zations, and governments, and of all those who act in
this spirit;
"To multiply the number of women's campaigns for
peace, peaceful coexistence, and disarmament.
"Disarmament will be one of the greatest victories of
peace-aspiring humanity. It will contribute to peace in
the world, create conditions for true equality among the
peoples, liberate immense material and human resources for
peaceful work, and put science in the service of humanity.
"Disarmament will not solve all the unsolved social
and other problems, but will create conditions in accord
with the interests of the peoples.
"The cause of disarmament and peace is inseparable from
the cause of the peoples' struggles for their national
independence. . . . .
"We support the women and peoples who struggle against
all kinds of imperialist oppression and all forms of
colonialism and remnants of feudalism for their liberty
and national independence. . . oil
The Chicom delegation had favored a militant declaration, con-
demning US imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism as the
basic problurus world tensions. ' Their fai luto to vote for
the final statement brought boos from nearly all delegates and
guests who wildly cheered its adoption.
The Chinese delegate subsequently accused the sponsors of
the Congress of having carried out anti-Chinese maneuvers,
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(33i Cont.) 15 July 1963
manipulated the debate, violated democratic principles, and mali-
ciously spread slanderous stories about the C-.inese delegation --
i.e., similar but more pointed charges to tho a levelled by the
Soviets against the Chinese at the recent Afr