BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 26, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

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Briefly Noted
Attempts of Czech Regime to Limit De-Stalinization
The Czech Party daily Rude Pravo announced in its 8 August
edition that former security and defense ministers Kopriva and
Cepiem had been expelled from the Party. On 22 August the
official news agency CTK said the Supreme Court had completely
absolved Slansky and 8 others indicted with him in 19E2. CTK
names 44 other victims of Stalinist trials of the early 1950's
as absolved. (Washington Post 23 August AP from Prague.)
Actually, party members were informed of the ousters as of April
1963 at which time it was decided to inform the public only
gradually concerning the results of the review of the Stalinist
trials in oreer better to contain popular reaction. Apparently,
the plan backfired. In the present atmosphere in Czechoslovakia,
the announcement of the fate of Kopriva and Cepicka is likely
to stimulate further demands for meaningful action against party
leaders responsible for the trials, including Premier Siroky,
Deputy Premier Dolansky and President Novotny himself. Novotny's
attempts to stifle demands for serious de-Stalinization have
not prevented more liberal elements in the party from proclaiming
their views with increasing confidence. Meanwhile, commentaries
in the Slovak party press are approaching criticism of certain
basic tenets of "socialist democracy" as distinct from the
implementation of these tenets. The press criticized the lack
of choice of candidates in an election and 4rgued that the right
to voice an opinion prior to the nomination of a candidate
is of no practical consequence. By continuing to stimulate
discussion of the basic issues at stake the editors of Bratislava
Pravda, evidently among the leading protagonists of liberaliza-
tion, make it clear that they are interested in more than just
a cultural thaw. All this, despite (if not because of) Novotny's
explicit warnings to its editors! Media should report appropriate
examples of the disintegration of Czechoslovak Communism
accenting particularly the fact that the criticism comes from
within the party itself and that it calls in question not only
the mis-application of Marxist-Leninist tenets but the very
validity of these tenets for the situation.
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Rakosi's Death in the Soviet Union RepOried.
On August 12 Reuters carried reports of travellers coming
to Vienna from the USSR that Rakosi had died (see Washington Post
13 August, Press Comment 14 August). The Soviet Union apparently
has not commented on these stories. We seek to induce reaction
from the Soviet Union and from Hungary, using the report itself
and whatever additional news becomes available to comment on
the following: Khrushchev's responsibility for supporting the
harshest Stalinist regime in the Bloc (1953-1956 especially),
namely former Premier Matyos Rakosi's, and his protection of.
this arch criminal for seven years while executing Imre Nagy
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(Briefly Noted Cont.) samialiaaia.l.. 26 August 1963
whom he had removed from the sanctuary of the Yugoslav Embassy
in Budapest under firm guarantees of safe conduct; Kadar's
complicity in Rakosi's Stalinist regime and the murder of Imre
Nagy and scores of intellectuals and other freedom fighters;
Tito's eagerness to re-establish friendly relations with KhrushchN
a man who had so often broken his agreements and heaped insult
upon Yugoslavia and its Present leaders.
In appropriate media we also call attention to the strange
disappearance of well-known figures into the vastness of the
Soviet Union (nothing was known of Rakosi's activities in the
Soviet Union -- or indeed whether he might have "died"; Malenkov
and others have dropped from public view). We recall the count-
less Communist leaders from foreign countries who disappeared
in the 1930's and 1940's, many of whom were later .known to have
been executed, and wonder how many have met similar fates in
the 12E0's and 1960's. We remember, for example, that: Klement
Gottwald, in Moscow for Stalin's funeral, returned to his
Czechoslovakian homeland gravely ill and died a few days later;
Georgi Diaitrov, Bulgarian, one-time Secretary General of the
COMINTERN and before that hero of the 1933 Reichstag fire
trial, went for "medical treatment" in 1949 to the Soviet Union
and thence home in a coffin;tho Bloc gave two different causes
for the death of Polish Premier Boleslaw Beirut on 12 March
1956 -- he had attended the 20th CPSU Congress 14-25 February
1956 at which Khrushchev delivered his secret diatribe against
Stalin; and Bela Kun, chief of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet
Republic, 1919, who (at the time of the Stalin purge) "drowned
while swimming" -- even though he was known to be a very good
swimmer and sportsman; and we remember that we will never know
how many others met sudd3n unnatural ends in the closed Commu-
nist world.
AAPSO Executive Meeting Scheduled for Cyprus in Early
A meeting of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization
(AAPSO) Executive committee will reportedly convene in Nicosia,
Cyprus, 9 to 12 September 1963. AAPSO Executive Secretary,
Youssef 1-Sebai (ma) and the all-Egyptian Secretariat are
said to arrive in Nicosia 3 September to prepare the conference.
Agenda items may include:
a. Final elimination of colonial territories in Africa-
Asia;
b. Israel as Zionist/imperialist aggressor in the Middle
East;
2
I Ii (Bri0fly Noted Cont.)
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(Briefly Noted Cont.) 6.11:661646126, 26 August 1363
c. Afro-Asian r3lations with EEC and Africa-wide Common
Market;
d. Self-determination;
e. Foreign military bases in newly independent countries;
and
f. Nuclear test ban treaty.
3
airnrwmomiliim (Briefly Noted)
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CHRONOLOGY - COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#13 3-16 Augudt 1963
August - Issue No. 3 of the Prague-based Problems of Peace and
Socialism (English edition only entitled World Marxist Review)
dropped the Korean language edition, thus indicating North Korea
has joined the Chinese in withdrawing from this monthly which has
posed as the central journal of the World Communist Movement.
August 3 and continuing - Peking People's Daily and other major
papers devote main attention to their battle with the "Soviet
leaders," including texts of statements by Chinese Government,
editors and individuals, citations of "world-wide" support for
China (the fight is now almost entirely on an national rather
than party basis) and denunciatory reportage of SOviet or pro-
Soviet attacks on China. On the 3rd, for example, People's Daily
featured an inflammatory editorial entitled "This Is Betrayal of
the Soviet People" which contains the virulent passage: "While
fraternizing with US imperialism on the most intimate terms, the
Soviet leaders and Soviet press have gnashed their teeth in their
bitter hatred toward socialist China. They use the same ian-
guase as US imperialism to abuse China. This is a US-Soviet
alliance pure and simple.-" It concludes: "But the US imperial-
ists and their partners must not rejoice too soon The Soviet
people are a great people with a glorious revolutionary tradition
Eventually, any deal which betrays the Soviet Union, betrays
the Soviet people, and betrays the CPSU certainly will end in
failure." On the same day, the Chinese press devoted two pages
to news reports and comments on subject, under such editorializ-
ing headings as: "Japanese Public Leaders Support Chinese Govern-
ment Statements"; "The Unshakable Truth Is on the Side of China";
"Lamentable and Stupid Tales! Charges Made by Soviet Press
Against CC? Becoming Ever More Fantastic"; etc.
Because of the large -- and largely repetitious --
volume of such material in the Chinese press, we
will describe only a few of the most important
items in the remainder of this installment of the
Chronology.
August 3 - A Yugoslav Tanyug report from Peking describes the
"indignation" among socialist diplomats there caused by the 31
July CPR statement and subsequent People's Daily editorials,
stating, "the Bulgarian, Soviet ana Polisn Ismoassies returned the
Chinese statement on the day they received it." Others returned
it on the following day. The Chinese Foreign Ministry protested
the returns.
August 3 - A Bulgarian Party CC statement supports the CPSU on all
points of the 14 July open letter; Party organ Rabotnichesko Delo
carries a 5,003-word article "Against/Left-wing/ Doctrinairism
and Adventurism of the Chinese Leaders."
August 3-4 - The Hungarian Party organ Nepszabadsag on the 3rd
condemns ChiCom criticism or "international division of labor";
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on the 4th it reports "an extended meeting" of the party CC on the
2nd which "unanimously accepted and approved" the report of Kadar-
led delegation returned from the USSR, its views on Hungarian-
Soviet ties on all policy issues, including CEMA, the principal
issues of the ideological dispute with the Chinese, and Soviet
foreign policy.
August 3-7 - The Rumanian Government issues a statement, on the 3rd,
of satisfaction in the test-ban treaty and intention to sign. A
Party organ Scinteia editorial on 7th supports the treaty, expresses
"great surprise and most profound regret" at Chinese denunciation,
and, instrong words for the Rumanians, says such accusations and
slanders are "completely inadmissible."
August 5 - In a Pravda article devoted to the 20th anniversary of
the Soviet victd7W-Ef-Kursk, Soviet Armed Forces chief Marshal
Malinovsky digresses to condemn "the Chinese leadern/ position
which "is equivalent to virtual complicity with those who stand
for world thermonuclear war and are opposed to settlement of dis-
puted international problems at the conference table."
August 5 - Mongolian Government statement approves the test-ban
treaty "as a genuine success."
August 5 - Editorializing at the end of a news report of Rusk's
arrival in Moscow, the Albanians add: "Nikita Khrushchev is running
wild with joy.... Ea dreams of realizing the imperialist-revisionist
alliance against the However,... the who laughs last
laughs best./ The Soviet people, who have high revolutionary
traditions, will not permit these dangerous games to be played at
their expense." (Radio Tirana domestic)
August 5 - Radio Moscow carried an interesting "report from
Biagoveshchencl: which is on the very frontiers of the CPR." River
port dispatcher Tarasov is quoted as saying that "Things have gone
so far that Chinese ships sailing on the Amur do not even reply
to the greetings of our ships when they pass.... What we have
learned from the Soviet Government statement is so unexpected that
it is difficult to believe.... What the Chinese Government is
saying is utter madness: such a policy can only lead to the deaths
of millions of people."
August 5 - Secretary General Papaioannu of the Progressive Party
of Cypriot Workers (Communist) congratulates the Soviet Government
and c.1.,buiCC and condemns the CPR Government statement on the test-
ban treaty and the path of the CCP leadership, "which in the final
count is anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist." Crass)
August 5 - A Polish Party organ Trybuna Ludu editorial refers to
an August 2 Polish Foreign Ministry statement approving the test-
ban treaty and stating Poland's intention to accede immediately:
it expresses indignation at Chinese denunciation of the treaty as
a fraud.
2 013 Chronology Continued)
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August 6 - Izvestiyals editorial rejoicing in the signing of the
test-ban treaty -- 11The Fruits of the ?olicy of Peaceful Coexistencd'
-- goes on to denounce the "shameful" CPR Government statement and
warns: "The Soviet people angrily and indignantly reject the
fabrications of the Chinese leaders who are trying to drive a wedge
between the peoples and Government of the Soviet Union. The Soviet
people firmly announce: do not deceive yourselves; do not indulge
in wishful thinking. The SOviet people have never before been so
united, so closely rallied around their Government and Party
as now. Take note and remember...."
August 6 - Peking announces publication of a "new book" which fea-
tures the 14 June CCP letter and bears its title: A Proposal Con-
cerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement.
In what must be a uassive volume, the Chinese have included also
the texts of CCP statements of 2,5 and 10 July and a half dozen
:?eopiees Daily articles, plus an appendix containing the texts of
the 33 Larch CSU letter, CPSU statements of 18 June and 4 and 9
July, the CPSU resolution of 21 June and the 14 July CPSU open
letter! (Note: this book should not be confused with the earlier,
widely circulated Peking brochure under the same title which
Included only the 30 March CPSU letter with the 14 June CCP of
those listed above.)
August 3 - The Japanese CP delegation to the Hiroshima Conference
Against A & H Bombs condemn the JSP and Sohyo for their splitting
activities, and especially JSP's statement on its intent to organ-
ize a new movement. (NCNA)
August 6 - No. 11 of the CPSU theoretical journal Kommunist pub-
lishosa detailed criticism of "the erroneous ideological and
political views of the CCP leadership" (according to a Tass review:
journal not yet received here). It asserts: "Clearly, the present
line of the Chinese leaders is due to difficulties that have
arisen in recent years in China as a result of a number of
erroneous preconceotions of the CCP. The CCP leaders are trying
to distract the attention of the masses from the actual causes of
setbacks in China's internal life." Thus, they 'began assuring the
people that the way out of the situation was to step up and egg on
world revolution. For these purposes, they began fanning
nationalism in China and preaching national and then racial exclu-
siveness. Bombastic phrases have emerged about the 'rotten' and
'impotent' West or North and the 'young' and 'powerful' East."
August 3-8 - The Bulgarians express their support of Moscow with
editorials in Rabotnichesko Delo lauding the test-ban treaty and
in Trud opposing the Chinese concept of "relying on one's own forces"
on TE7676th, and again in a statement by the official agency BTA
on the 3th.
August 6-9 - The Indonesian Party organ Harian Rakjat carries com-
mentaries noting that the test ban is not a guarantee against
nuclear war and thus does not satisfy the demands of the PKI and
advocatingtotal ban and destruction of nuclear weapons. Apparently,
hovever, they avoid mention of the battle raging between the China
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August 7 - A. Pravda 4,000-word editorial supports Soviet assistance
to the national liberation movement. In conclusion, it turns to
the "monstrous" actions of the Chinese leaders, who are "pursuing
the line of alienating the national liberation movement from the
socialist countries and the international workers movement, fanning
up nationalistic and even racial prejudices." "But no matter what
tricks the Chinese leaders may use, it is clear that their position
has nothing in common with care for the national liberation move-
ment." On the same day, an "Observer" article in the multi-language
Moscow weekly New Times denounces the "adventurism and demogagy" of
the Chinese leaaersnip.
August 7 - The Prague-based World Federation of Trade Unions issues
a sfatement hailing the test-ban treaty. The Czechoslovak Peace
Committee also hails the treaty and criticizes the Chinese Peace
Committee, and especially Chinese actions at Hiroshima.
August 7 - The Albanian organ Zen i I Popullit carries on with an
article entitled "Khrushchev's Group Has Set the Seal on ItsTreasai."
"You see, Mr. Rusk, my window faces West," Gromyko is quoted as
saying on receiving Secretary Rusk in his office. Zen i Popullit
comments: "Anybody can understand that he was not referring to
the geographical position of his office but to his political
orientation toward the West."
August 3 - Izvestiya extolls the test-ban treaty and condemns the
Chinese in its main editorial, "A Triumph of the Leninist Course,"
and an article, "We Believe in Mankind" by Korneychuk and Vasikvstiap..
Both chastise the Chinese Government statement for its impudence,
and the latter says: "It is hard to know which it contains more
of, impudent haughtiness, or envy of the ever-growing authority
of the Soviet Union throughout the world. These are bad feelings,
and very dangerous." Soviet Russia on tiae same day publishes an
article, "Me and Dead Dogmas" by PhD. Momdzhyan, which says,
inter alia, that behind the "revolutionary spirit" of the Chinese
"are concealed the most vulgar dogmatism, laziness of thought, a
passion for repeating quotations learned by heart, and a fear of
considering new situations and of finding new solutions leading to
the victory of the socialist revolution." And on the 6th Moscow's
youth organ Komsomolskaya Pravda also strikes at the Chinese in an
article on the seminar of students from the underdeveloped countries
in Salvador, Brazil, which condemns the futile efforts of the
Chinese representatives to throw the seminar off the right course,
and then, when they "realized that it was impossible to impose
their wrong line on all students, they made truly titanic efforts
to engineer a split." The article then attacks NCNA for "deliber-
ately falsifying viewpoints," "deliberately selecting quotations,"
etc. kfter the Chinese delegates had "failed to present black as
white," NCNA "took upon itself this unseemly task."
August S - Pravda featured an article by Polish CC member Kliszko
giving solid support to the CPSU's peaceful coexistence course and
the Soviet Government's reply to the CPR statement on the test-ban
treaty, calling the Chinese "all or nothing" postulation only
"demagogery." (Same article was published in the Polkgh organ
Trybuna Ludu on the following day, along with another artiolelon
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subject by Kowalawski which concludes: "The USSR Government is
103 times right when it says that the CPR statement was dictated
"not by concern for the defense potential of the socialist camp."
On the same day a Pravda article "Unworthy Methods" by Ulyanov,
cites a number of 37666EE examples in which the Chinese press has
published excerpts from articles in the Soviet domestic press
exposing isolated economic and social abuses in a doctored and dis-
torted manner to make it appear that they are chronic and typical.
"Was it not to mislead the Chinese people and hide from them the
real state of affairs in our country?"
August 10 - Pravda article, "The Maneuvers of Reaction in India"
by Kutsobin and Pastukhov, extolls the "progressive forces" in
India and denounces Chinese attacks on the CPI and efforts to split
it. Pravda also publishes a statement by Israeli CP Secretary
General Mikunis which "confirmed the complete unanimity of views"
with the CPSU and "vigorously condemns the false, unfounded and
slanderous attacks of the CCP leadership." Red Star article by
Pomazanov criticizes the Chinese for attempting to hinder economic
cooperation and mutual aid of socialist countries. And Tass
announces that Khrushchev and wife would arrive in Yugoslavia for
their visit on 20 August.
Auaust 10 - People's Daily carries a 5,003-word "Observer" article
entitled: "Why Does the Tripartite Treaty Have Every Harm and
No Benefit?" In addition to repeating previous Chinese criticism
it charges that the Soviet Government "does its utmost to prevent
the other socialist countries and all oppressed countries from
acquiring nuclear weapons."
August 13 - A Zagreb Vjesnik article by Bucharest Tanyug correspond-
ent gjurica describes the cautious Rumanian "indirect" method of
saying "no" to the Chinese concepts, which "are contrary to Rumanian
convictions, Rumanian wishes and Rumanian psychology."
August 11 - The E.German organ Neues Deutschland features a Hansen
article denouncing the CC? leadership for "sowing the seed of
disunity and disruption in all organizations fighting for peace"
by its attacks on the test-ban treaty.
August 11 - Among the various expressions of support cited by the
Peking press are an article from "the Mexican paper Atisbos" which
"criticizes the Soviet paper Pravda for slandering China," and "the
London weekly Tribune" which "said thatthe tripartite treaty was
EBT-E-real treaty and that Khrushchev and Kennedy 'vie with each
other in vilifying China."
August 13 - Pravda in a 4,300-word article, "Thermonuclear War and
the gasses" by Arbatov, says that the Chinese position "amounts to
substituting the theory of the omnipotence of weapons for Marxism"
and proceeds through a justification of the Soviet position with
argumentation which is largely pragma.ticbutmanages to cite Engels
(as far back as the end of the last century concluded that
militarism contained the seeds of its own destruction) and Lenin
5 (#10 Chronology Continued)
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(as his widow; Krupskaya, testified in her memoirs, foresaw that
the Progress of military armament could make war so devastating
that it would become Impossible). On the same day, Izvestiya
carries an "Observer" article, "The Dark Glasses of Peking News-
papers," lambasting the Chinese press for "beginning to apply the
discredited imperialist (sic!) technology of the great lie, seek-
ing to smear Soviet reality, to distort and misrepresent facts
concerning our life and to fool poison o s an er
minds of the Chinese readers."
August 13 - Top news in the Chinese press is the Peking mass rally
in support of the American negro, at which Xuo Mo-jo attacked the
"self-styled Marxists" who are trying to make the oppressed nations
and peoples "coexist peacefully" with imperialism and the reaction-
ary ruling class.
August 13 - The Japanese Socialist ?arty decided that, although
they could not decide whether the Soviet or Chinese position was
correct from a Marxist4,eninist point of view, they would support
the Soviet stand and the test-ban treaty because it is closer to
their stand than that of the CCP. However, they agreed to "under-
stand benevolently" the position of Communist China in the light
of the current international situation and of the current stage
of its development as a socialist country.(Tokyo Kyodo)
August 14 - The North Vietnam Party organ Nhan Dan again..expresses
dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of the test-ban treaty but
ulticism of the Soviet role is very indirect.
August 15 - Pravda publishes "materials of the International Peace
Institute" which had been published by the "editors of The
Information Bulletin of the World Peace Council' Noting fliFf "a
letter ofthe Chinese Peace Committee vilifying the world Peace
movement is circulating in many countries of the world," and "at
iaternational meetings Chinese delegates use foul invective against
the World Peace Council -- WPC -- and make crude, unworthy attacks
on the Chairman of its Presidential Committee, well-known scientist
Professor John Bernal, and other leaders of the movement," "the
International Peace Institute believes it to be its duty to expose
the methods of falsification used in Peking." The 3,000-word
article then cites a number of passages in which various Chinese
had endorsed the banning of nuclear tests in the past, including
even the unilateral Soviet decision to end nuclear tests in 1953.
Much of the attack is directed at the person of Kuo Mo-jo, who is
cited as "openly demanding a continuation of the nuclear arms race"
at a meeting in ?eking on 26 July 1963. It concludes in tune with
the Soviet line: "One cannot believe that such adventurist rantinas
about 'monopoly' were Promoted by concern for the security of the
peoples."
August 15 - All Peking press gave top prominence to a 7,503-word
CM Government statement commenting on the USSR Government statement
of 3 August, the text of which is also published. After a brief
introduction, which declares that the Soviet statement "is a poor
defense, ramblingly hpphazardi_ full of pointless talk, and ITCETTiz
any reasoned arguments, 'I the -Chinese work over old ground through
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in the 11th and conclude arrogantly in the 12th. Among the few
passages of particular interest in the first 13 sections is the
rejectiowas "insolent" of the Soviet inference that they, as the
nuclear power of the socialist community, are better qualified-T3
judge orrsuch matters than those whose knowledge is derived from
literature: "It appears that the Soviet leaders want to have a
monopoly not only of nuclear weapons but also of the right to speak
on the question of nuclear weapons," The Chinese state that as
late as 9 June 1963 the Soviet Government notified the Chinese
Government that the position of the Western powers on the halting
of nuclear tests could not serve as a basis for agreement, and ask:
"Why is 14 tat what was unacceptable on 15 June became acceptable
on 25 July, anvery useful in the barpin? What changes took
place within'theSe 40 days? Why did you not provide a little
explanation? ?, Von were either insincere then or you are deliber-
ately decelviryi people now.
The only reterence to "Marxist" concepts in the entire state-
ment is a speciouP reference to "class"; "nth regard to preventing
nuclear proliferation, the Chinese Government has always maintained
that the arguments of the US imperialists must not be echoed, but
that class analysis must be made. Whether or not nuclear weapons
help Peace depends on who possesses them"? It must not be said
indiscriminately that the danger of nuclear war increases along
with an increase in the number of nuclear powers."
With section 11, the Chinese launch a new offensive: "It is
not o17a present that the Soviet leaders have belun to coMIN
with erialism and attemOt-fo manacle China. As far back as
23 June 359, when there wati-not'yet the slightest sign of a treat
on stopping nuclear tests, the goviet Government unilaterally tore
up th, weement on new technolegy"for national defense concluded
between-Chiqa and the Soviet Unign on 15 October 1957, and refused
to provide China with-ami*Iii of in atomic bomb and technical
data coneprning its manufadture. This was done as a presentation
gilt at the time the Soviet/ leader went to the United States for
talks with Bisenhower in September." The Chinese state that, as
Soviet talks with the US and Britain on a test-ban treaty continued
over the past year, they sent three memoranda to the Soviet Govern-
mePt* 8 September and 20 October 1962 and G June 1963, "solemnly
stoing that we would not tolerate the conclusion, in disregard of
China's opposition; of any sort of treaty between the Soviet Govern-
ment an the United Stateswhich aimed at depriving the Chinese
people of their ri ht to tam* Ste g f6-Felist the nuclear threats
o *- per a sm, an a we wou d issue statements to make our
position known. We hoped that after such earnest counsel from us
the Soviet leaders would rein in before reaching the precipice
and would not render matters irretrievable,"
In the final section 12, the Chinese return to several passages
of the Soviet statement. Answering a rhetorical question, "We
can tell them frankly that we are not taking too much upon ourselves
at all it is our prolefarian internationalist duty fo point
out that they have no betrayed the interests of the Soviet people
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and the entire socialist camp. If indeed anyone has gone out of
his mind, it is definitely not the Chinese people, who have con-
sistently maintained a correct stand; it is the Soviet leaders
who have betrayed their own position midway. If the Soviet leaders
consider that betrayal of the interests of thi-UW5T-F36gTira----
within Soviet st057-treET-of course,
?eeitY-----itille-d-ta say so. ttlrA-0yarri9RtifiTIZi gag us on the pre-
text of non-interference in internal-Maim, you will not succeed."
August 15 - The Albanian Government rejects the test-ban treaty,
with a new charge: "the Moscow treaty of 5 August 1963 has been
concluded in flagrant violation of the Warsaw Pact (chapter and
verse are cited) and hence this treaty is intrinsically illegal
and must be rejected." Therefore, "the Albanian Government calls
upon the socialist states to repudiate the treaty of 5 August 1933;
it proposes that those socialist countries which have signed it
should not ratify it, and that this treaty should be rejected by
all members of the Warsaw Pact and the entire Socialist camp."
Further, it "suggests that, following the rejection by all signa-
tories of the Warsaw ?act of the treaty of 5 August 1963, a meeting
should be called of the WP's Political-Consultative Committee"to
restore the correct policy on nuclear arms and disarmament and
"halt and condemn the dangerous course of N. Khrushchev's group."
August 15 - Japanese CP organ Akahata editorial criticizes the
Japanese Socialist Partyrs "decision to persist in its erroneous
line with regard to the movement against atomic and hydrogen bombs."
August 16 - Pravda publishes a 4,000-word article, "Left of Common-
sense" by KaLITE617, the title taken from Lenin, who, "speaking
about the leftist loudmouths in our Party who posed as 'arch-
revolutionary' revolutionaries,.., characterized them as persons
who took a position left of commonsense." It is largely a defense
of Soviet policy on the test-ban treaty, but spells out some
previous Soviet points a little more bluntly. Referring to the CC?
leaders' "striving to have their own nuclear weapons at any cost,"
the article says that this is "one more evidence of the fact that
it is not internationalist but directly opposite strivings that
are more and more gaining the upper hand in The policy of
Chinese leadership. Be then reaches out to Ienin for support:
"Lenin gave us an infallible criterion for testing the internation-
alism of Communists. To be an internationalist, he taught, one
must think not only of his awn nation but place the interests of
all, their universal freedom and equality, above it." Further,
the article states that, "having started on the road of struggle
against the USSR lend CPSU, the CCP leadership in point of actual
fact is stabbing world socialism in the back...."
August 16 - All Chinese papers publish on front pages statements
issued on the 15th by the All-China Youth Federation and the All-
China Students Federation supporting the Chinese Government's
statements of 31 July and 15 August and denouncing statements
endorsing the test-ban treaty which had been issued by the WFDY
(World Federation of Democratic Youth) and IUS (international Union
of Students), respectively. The attack on the WFDY Bureau says that
its members "have arbitrarily made the WFDY serve the Soviet Govern-
ment's foreign policy." Moreover, "they have taken a grave step to
a e iKa.alOWbililett14-94151118Y616104; ,7P ; ;94111garg
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CRONOLOGIA DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS
10 3-16 Agosto 1963
Agosto: En el ndmero 8 de la revista editadu en Praga, "Problemas de
la Paz y el Socialism " (la edicion en inglds se titula "World
Marxist Review") , se suprimi6 la edicift en lengua coreana, indicio
de que Corea del Norte, como China comunista, se ha retirado de este
mensuario que se hacfa passar com el organo central dnico del
movimiento comunista mundial.
3 Agosto et seq.: El "Mario del Pueblo" de Pekfn y otros diurios de
primera linea dedican atencion principal a su vatalla con los "dirigentes
sovidticos," publicando textos de declaraciones chinas, del Gobierno y
de directores de periddicos e individuos; citas del apoyo "mundial"
a China (ahora la querrela es casi exclusivamente nacional en vez
de partidista) e informes condenatorios de ataques sovidticos o
prosovidticos contra China. El dfa 3, por ejemplo, el "Mario del
Pueblo" dio realce a un editorial inflamatorio titulado "Esto es
traicionar al pueblo sovidtico," con este virulento pasaje: "Mientras
fraternizan con el imperialism? sovidtico en los tdrminos rods Intimos,
los dirigentes sovidticos y la prensa sovidtica han rechinado los
dientes en su odio feroz contra China socialista. Emplean el mismo
lenguuje que el imperialism norteamericano para lanzar emproperios
a China. Esto es pura y simplemente una alianza entre EE.UU. y la
Union Sovidtica.'T Concluye:95?ero los imperialistas norteamericunos
y sus compadres no deberdn regociajarse demasiado pronto. . . . El
pueblo sovidtico es un gran pueblo con una gloriosa tradici6n
revolucionaria . . . . Con el tiempo, cualquier negociado que traicione
? la Uni6n Sovedtica, traicione al pueblo sovidtico y traicione al
PCUS indudablemente terminard en el fracaso." El mismo dia la
prensu china dedic6 dos pis a informaciones y comentarios sobre
el asunto, bajo titulares de opinion tales como: "Dirigentes pdblicos
juponeses apoyan declaraciones del Gobierno chino"; "La inconnovible
verdad est d del ludo de China"; "/Lamentables y estdpidas historiets!
Cargos de prensa sovidtica contra PC chino t6rnanse nds y mds
fantdsticos"; etc.
Lebido al amplio volumen de material semejante--y las repeticiones
en que incurre--en la prensa china, describiremos solo algunos
de los artfculos mds importantes en lo que restu de esta entrega
de la Cronologfa.
3 Agosto: Un informe de la agencia Tanyug procedente de Pekln describe
la "indignaciorP de los diplomdticos socialistas en dsa ocasionada por
la dec1araci6n de la Repdblica Popular China (RP Ch) de 31 de julio
y los editoriales subsiguientes del "Mario de Pueblo," declarando que
"las embajadas bi1gara sovidtica y polaca devolvieron la declaracift
china el dfa que la recibieron." Otras la devolvieron al di:a siguiente.
El ministerio chino de Relaciones Exteriores protest6 por las
devoluciones.
3 Agosto: Una declaraciOn del CC del Partido bagaro apoya al PCUS
en todos los puntos de la cart a abierta de 3-7?de julio; el 6rgano
del Partido "Rabotnichesko Delo" publica un articulo de 5.000
palabras "Contra el doctrinarism? y aventurismo 'de izquierda' de los
dirigentes chinos."
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3-4 Agosto : El drgano "Nepszabadsag" del Partido hdngaro el dfa 3
condend la crftica chinocomunista de la "dgal3n internacional del
trabajo"; el da 4 inform6 una "reuni6n ampliade del CC del Partido el
da 2 que "unenimemente acept6 y aprober el informe de al delegacidn
encabezada por Kadar a su regreso de la URSS, su opinidn sobre los
vfnculos hdngaro-sovidticos en todas las cuestiones de polftica,
incluyendo el CAEM, las principlaes divergencias en la disputa
ideoldgica con los chinos y la polftica exterior sovidtica.
3-7 Agosto: El da 3 el Gobierno rumAno eipid una Aeelaracidn
satisfaccidn con el tratado suprimiendo los ensayos nucleares y su
intencidn de suscribirlo. Un editorial del drgano del Partido, "Scinteia,"
el dfa 7 apoy6 el tratado, expres6 "gran sorpresa y profundfsino pesar"
ante el rechazo chino y, en lenguaje fuerte para los rumanos, declard
que semejantes acusaciones y calumnias eran "completamente inadmisibles."
5 Agosto: En un artfculo en "Pravda" sobre el vigdsino aniversario de
la victoria sovidtica de Kursk, el =risco.' Malinovsky, jefe de las FF
AA sovidticas, abrid un pardntesis para. condenar "la posicidn de los
dirigentes chinos," que "equivale a una virtual complicidad con aquellos
que propugnan la guerra mundial nuclear y se oponen a la solucidn de los
problemas internacionales en disputa sobre la mesa de conferencia."
5 Agosto: Una declaracidn del Gobierno mogol aprueba cono "genuino
tratado contra les ensayos.
5 Agosto: En nota editorial al pie de un inforne de prensa sobre la
llegada de Rusk en Nosed, los albaneses dicen: "Nikita Kruschev estd
enloquecido de gozo.... SueEa con llevar a cabo la alianza imperialista-
revisionista contra la RPCh.... Sin embargo, ... 'quien rfe dltimo
re mejor.' El pueblo sovidtico, clue tiete elevadas tradiciones
revolucionarias, no permitird que se jueguen a costa suya estos juegos
peligrosos.? (Radio Tirana, cadena domdstica)
5 Agosto: La Radio de Nosed diftipdid un interesante "unforne de
Blagoveschensk, que se halla en las fronteras mismas de la RloCh."
Declard que el despachador fluvial Tarasov habfa dicho que "las
cosas han llegado al extremo de que las embarcaciones chinas que
navegan en el Amur ni siquiera responden a los saludos de nuestros
barcos cuando pasan.... Lo que hemos ofdo del Gobierno sovidtico es
tan inesperado que es diffcil de creer.... Lo que est d diciendo el
Gobierno chino es pura locura: semejante polftica no puede sino llevar
a la muerte de millones de gente."
5 Agosto: El secretario general Papaioannu del Partido Progresista
de Trabajadores Chipriotas (comunista) felicita al Gobierno sovidtico
y al CC del PCUS y condena la declaracift de la RPCh sobre el tratado
contra los ensayos y el camino de la dirigencia del PC chino, "que
en fin de cuentas es antimarxista y antileninista." (ss)
5 Agosto: Un editorial de &gam del Partido polaco "Trybuna aide
se refiere a una declaracidn de 2 de agosto del ministerio polaco
de Relaciones Exteriores en aprobacidn del tratado contra los ensayos
e informando la intencidn de Polonia de acceder inmediatamente; expresa
su indignacidn por el rechazo chino del tratado como fraude.
6 Agosto: Un editorial en "izvestiye celebra la firma del tratado
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contra los ensayos nucleares "Los frutos de la polftica de
coexistencia pacffica" y denuncia la "vergonzose declaraci& del
Gobierno de la RPM, advirtiendo: "El pueblo sovidtico rechaza con
Ira e indignaci& las invenciones de los dirigentes chinos que estdn
tratando de meter una cuna entre los pueblos y el Gobierno de la
Uni& Savidtica. El pueble savidtico firmemente anuncia: no se
enganen; no se hagan ilusiones. El pueblo sovidtico jamds ha estado
ms unido, tan estrechamente agrupado alrededor de su Gobierno y su
Partido como ahora. Tomen nota y recuerden...."
6 Agosto: Pekfn anuncia la publicacidn de un "nuevo libro" que
contiene la carta del EC chino de 14 de junio y lleva el tftulo,
"Froposicidn acerca de la lfnea general del moviniento comunista inter-
nacional." En lo que debe ser un grueso volumen, los chinos han incluido
tambidn los textos de declarationes de 2, 5 y 10 de Julio y media
docena de artfculos del "Mario del Pueblo," ademds de un apdndice
conteniendo los textos de la carte del PCUS de 30 de marzo, declaraciones
del PCUS de 18 de junio y 4 y 9 de julio, la declared& del PCUS de
21 de junio y la carta aderta del PCUS de 14 de julio. (Este libro
no deberd confundirse con el folleto anterior de Pekfn del mismo
tftulo, circulado ampliamente, que inclufa solo la carta del PCUS
de entre las que se mencionan mds arriba.)
6 Agosto: La delegacidn del pc japonds a la Conferencia de Hiroshima
contra las Bombes A y H condena al PS japonds y al Sohyo por sus
actividades escisionistas, y especialmente la declared& del PS
,japonds de su intenci& de organizar un nuevo movimiento. (Agenda
Nueva China)
6 Agosto: El ndmero 11 del &gam tedrico "Kommunist" del PCUS
publica una crftica en detalle de "las errdneas opiniones ideoldgicas
y polfticas de la dirigencia del PC chino" (sen informa la agencia
Tess; adn no se ha recibido ejemplar). Declara: "Claramente, la actual
lfnea de los dirigentes chinos se debe a dificultades que se hen
presentado en anos recientes en China como resulted? de ... un
ndmero de preconcepciones errMgarigl PC chino. Los dirigentes del
PC chino estdn tratando de distraer de la atencidn de las masas las
verdaderas causas de los reveses de la vida interna de China."
Fief, "empezaron asegurando al pueblo que la salida de la situacidn
estaba en incrementar y azuzar la revolucidn mendial.... Con tales
fines empezaron a &venter el nacionalismo en China y a predicar el
exclusivismo nacional y luego racial. Proses de bombo han salido
acerca del Occidente o Septentridn 'podrido' o 'impotente' y el Oriente
'joven' y 'poderoso.'ll
6-8 Agosto: El &gen? del Partido indonesio "Harlan Rakjat" publica
comentarios en el sentido de que el tratado contra los ensayos no es
garantfa contra la guerra nuclear y no satisface or lo tanto las
reivindicaciones del PKI, que aboga por la total proscripci& y
destrucci& de las armas nucleares. Parecen sin embargo evitar hacer
mencidn de la batalla que Sc libra sobre el asunto entre China y la URSS]
(Agenda Nueva China)
7 Agosto: Un editorial de "Pravda" de 4.000 palabras apoya la ayuda
sovidtica al movimiento de liberaci& nacional. En conclusidn se
dirige a las "monstruosas" actuaciones de los dirigentes chinos, que
"estdn prosiguiendo la lfnea de enajenar de los passes socialistas y
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el movimiento obrero internacional el movimiento de liberacidn nacional,
aventando prejuicios nacionalistas y hasta raciales." "Pero no importa
qpd trucos empleen los dirigentes chinos, es clato que su posicidn
nada tiene en comdn con el cuidado por el movimiento de liberacidn
nacional." El mismo da un artfculo de "Observador" en el semanario
multilingte moscavita "Nuevos Tiempos" condena "el aventurismo y
la demagogie de la dirigencia china.
7 Agosto: La Federacidn Sindical Mundial, con sede en Praga, expide
una declaracidn elogiando el tratando contra los ensayos. El
Comitd de Paz checoslovaco tambidn saluda el tratado y denuncia al
Comitd de Paz Chino y especialmente las actuaciones chinas en
Biro8b4nr4.
7 Agosto: El drgano albands "Zen i I Popullit' prosigue con un artfculo
titulado "El grupo de Kruschev ha puesto el sello en su traicidn." "Ve
usted, setor Rusk; mi ventana da al occidente," dijo Gromyko, segdn el
citado diario, al recibir al secretario Rusk en su despacho. "Zeni
Popullit" comenta: "Cualquier a puede entender que no se refer/a
a la posicidn geogrdfica de su despacho sino a su propia orientacidn
politica hacia el Occidente."
8 Agosto: "Izvestiye exalta el tratado contra los ensayos y condena
a los chinos en su editorial principal, "Un triunfo del curso leninista,"
y un artfculo de Korneychuk yVasilevskaya, "Creemos en la humanidad."
Ambos fustigan la declaracidn china por su desfachatez, diciendo el
segundo: "es diffcil saber de qud tiene mds, de altanerfa desfachatada
o de envidia de la siempre creciente autoridad de la Unidn Sovidtica
por todo el mundo. Esos son sentimientos malos y muy peligrosos."
El diario "Rusia Savidtica" el mismo dfa publica un art/culo, "Vida
y Dogmas Muertos," por el doctor en filosoffa Momdzhyan, que declara
entre otras cosas que tras el "espfritu revolucionario" de los chinos
"se ocultan el is vulgar dogmatism?, la pereza de pensamiento,la
pasidn por repetir citas aprendidas de memoria y el miedo a considerar
situaciones nuevas y a encontrar soluciones nuevas que lleven a la
victoria de la revolucidn socialista," Y el dfa 8 el 6rgano juve nil
"Komsomolskaya Pravda" de Moscd tambidn arremete contra los chinos
en un artfculo sobre el seminario en Salvador (Brasil) de estudiantes
de los palses subdesarrollandos, condenando los fdtiles esfuerzos de
los representantes chinos de desviar el seminario de su rumbo correcto
y aEadiendo que luego, cuando "comprendieron que era invosible imponer
su lfnea errada a todoa los estudiantes, hicieron esfuerzos verdaderamente
titdnicos por producir una escisidn." Luego el artfculo condena la Agencia
Nueva China por "falsear intencionalmente puntos de vista,""escoger
citas intencionnimPnte," etc. Despuds que los delegados habrali
"fracasado en la presentacidn de negro como blanco," la Agencia Nueva
China "se impuso esta tare a indecorosa."
p Agosto: "Pravda" pub1ic6 un artfculo de Kliszko, miembro del
CC polaco, dando scald? apoyo al rumbo del PCUS de coexistencia
pacIfica y a la contestacidn del Gobierno sovidtico a la declaracidn
de la RPCh sobre el tratado contra los ensayos, tachando de "demagogie
la postulacidn china de "todo o nada." (El ndsmo artfculo fue
publicado en el drgano polaco "Trybuna Ludu" al da siguiente, junto a
otro artfculo de Kowalawski sobre el asunto, que concluye: "El
Gobierno de la URSS estd cien veces en lo correcto cuando dice que
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la declaracidn de la RPCh fue dictado 'no or la preocupacidn or
el potencial defensivo del campo socialista.'") El mismo dfa un
artfculo de Ulyanov en "Pravda," "Metodos indignos," cita un ndmero
de ejemplos recientes en los cuales la prensa china ha publicado de
manera alterada y falseada trozos de articulos de la prensa interna
sovietica en que se denunciaban ausos econdmico-sociales aislados,
;era aparentar que son crdnicos y tfpicos. "4 No fue por despistar
al pueblo chino y opultarle el verdadero estado de cosas en nuestro
pals?"
10 Agosto :Un artfculo de Kntsobin y Pastukhov en "Pravda," "Las maniobras
de la reaccidn en India," exalta las "fuerzas progresistas" de India
y condena los ataques chinos contra el PC indio y los esfuerzos por
dividirlo. "Pravda" publica taMbidn una declaracidn del secretario
general Mikunis del PC israelf que "confirm6 la completa unanimidad
de opinifin" con el PCI-17717.73orosamente condena los ataques falsos, in-
fundados y calumniosos de la dirigencia del PC chino." Un artfculo.
de Pomazanov en "Estrella Raja" critica a los chinos por intentar
obstaculizar la cooperacidn econdmica y la ayuda mutua de los paSses
socialists, Y Tass comunica que Krusehev y esposa llegardn a
Yugoslavia de visita el 20 de agosto.
10 Agosto: El "Edario del Pueblo" publica un artfculo de "Observadoe
de 5.000 palabras titulado, "Por qud tiene el tratado tripartita todos
los perjuicios y ningdn beneficio?" Aparte de repetir crfticas
chinas anteriores, denuncia que el Gaierno sovidtico "hace todo lo
posible por impedir clue otros pufses.:satialistae y tados los parses
oprimidos adquieran armas atdmicas.."
10 Agosto: Un articulo en el "Vjestnik" del corresponsal en Bucarest
de la agenda Tanyug, Djurica, describe el cauteloso mdtodo
"indirecto" de los rumanos de decirle "no" a los conceptos chinos,
que son "contrarios a las convicciones rumanas, los deseos rumanos
y la psicologfa rumana."
11 Agosto: El 6rgano "Neues Deutschland" de Alemania Oriental publica
un artfculo de Hansen denunciando a la dirigencia del PC chino por
"sembrar la semilla de la desuni6n y del rompimiento en todas las
organizaciones que luahan por la paz," con sus ataques contra el
tratado contra los ensayos.
11 Agosto: Entre las diversas expresiones de apoyo citadas por la
prensa de Pekfn estdn un artfculo del "peri6dico mexicano 'Atisbos'"
que critica al diario sovidtico 'Pravda' por calumniar a China, " y "el
semanario londinense "Itibune'm que "dijo que el tratado tripartita no
era un verdadero tratado y que Kruschev y Kennedy 'compiter entre sf
en vilipendiar a China.'"
13 Agosto: En un artfculo de Ii.. 000 palabras en "Pravda" titulado
"La guerra termonuclear y las masas," Arbatov declara que la posicion
china "equivale a sustituir al marxismo la teorfa de la omnipotencia
de las armas" y sigue'con una justificacidn de la posici6n sovidtica
con argumentacift en su mayor parte pragmdtica pero que se las arregla
para citar a Engels (que ya en las postrimerfas del siglo pasado
declard Gape el militarism? contenfa la simiente de su propia
destruccidn) y Lenin (clue, camo su viuda Krupskaya atestigu6 en sus
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menorias, previd que el progreso del armament? nilitar podrfa hacer la
guerra tan devastadora que data se harfa imposible). El misno
da "Izvestiya" publica un artfculo de "Observadoe'titulado "Los
lentes ahumados de los diarios de Pekfn," azotando la prensa de Pekfn
por "enpezar a aplicar la desacreditada tecnologfa inperialista (sic) '
de la gran mentira, tratando de manebar la realidad sovidtica,
deformar y desvirtuar hechos acerca de nuestra vida y engaEar con el* ,
veneno de la malicia las nentes de los lectores chinos."
13 Agpsto: La noticia principal de la prensa china es la nanifestacidn
de masas en Pekfn en apoyo de los negros de los Estados Unidos, en la cual
Luo Mb-jo atac6 a los "sedicentes naxxistas" que estdn tratando de
hacer que las naciones y pueblos oprinidos "coexistan pacfficamente" con'.
el imperialism? y la clase gobernante reaccionaria.
13 Agpsto: El Partido socialista japonds resolvid que aunque no
consegufa decidir Si la posicidn sovidtica o la china era corecta desde
un punto de vista narxista-leninista, apoyarfa la posicidn sovidtica
y el tratado contra los ensayos porque se acerca oda a su propia
posicidn que la del PC chino. Sin embargo, resolvieron "comprender con
benevolencie la posicidn de China comunista a la luz de la actual
situacidn internacional y de la presente etapa de su desenvolvindento
como as socialista. (Kyodo, Tbkfo)
14 Agosto: El drgano "Nban Dad' del Partido de Vietnam del Norte
nuevamente se declara insatisfecho con lo inadecuado del tratado contra
los ensayos, pero su crftica de la Unidn Sovidtica es muy indirecta.
15 Agpsto: "Pravda" publica "natcriales del Instituto Internacional de
PET-571Elicado or los "editores del 'Bloetfn de Informacidn del
Consejo Mundial de la Paz.'" Tbmando nota de que "una carta del
Comite de la paz chino vilipendiando el moviniento mundial de la paz
estd circulando en muchos pafses del mundo," y "en reuniones internaeionales
los delegados chinos enplean sucias invectivas contra el Consejo Mbndial
de la Paz-- CMP--y dirigen burdos, indignos ataques contra el jefe
de su comitd presidencial, el conocido cientffico profesor John Bernal,
y otros dirigentes del moviniento, " "el InstitutOnternacional de
la Paz considera su deber develar los mdtodos de Alseamiento utilizados
en Pekfn." El artfculo de 3.000 palabras cita entonces trozowen los
cuales diversos chinos se habfan adherido en el pasado a la proscripcidn
de los ensayos nucleares, incluso hasta la decisidn unilateral
sovidtica de poner fin a los ensayos nucleares en 1953.. Gran parte
del ataque va dirigido contra Kuo Mo-jo personalmente, de quien se
dice que "abiertanente demand6 la continuacidn de la carrera
armamentista nuclear" en una reunidn en Pekfn el 26 de Julio de 1963.
Concluye de acuerdo con la lfnea sovidtica: "lino no puede creer
que senejantes locuras aventuristas sobre imonopolio' fueron impulsadas
por la preocupacidn por la seguridad de los pueblos."
15 Agosto: Tbda la prensa de Pekfn dio lugar prominente a una
declaracidn de 7.500 palabras del Gobierno de la RPCh comentando la
declaracidn del Gobierno de la URSS de 3 de agosto, de la cual se,
publica tambidn el texto. .Luego de una breve introduccidn, que
expresa que la declaracidn sovidtica "es una pobre defensa, Ida sin
cuidado por las ramas, llena de conversacidn sin tema y carente de
argumentos razonados," los chinos repasan terreno trillado nen diez
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secciones numeradas, introducen nuevas sensacionales en el unddcimo
y coneluyen con arrogancia en el duoddcimo. Entre los pocos pasajes
de especial interds en las primeras diez secciones estd el rechazo como
"insolente" de la inferencia de los sovidticos de que ellos, como la
potencia nuclear de la comunidad socialista, es-ben mds calificados
para juzgar en tales asuntos que aquellos cuyos conocimientos provienen
de la literature: "Parece que los dirigentes sovidticos pretenden
tener un monopolio no solo de las ernes nucleares sin? tambidn del
derecho a expresarse sobre la cuesti& de las armas nucleares." Los
chinos declaran que en fecha tan reciente como el 9 de Juno de 1963
el Gonierno sovidtico inform6 al Gobierno chino que la posicidn de las
potencies occidentales no podfan servir de base pare un acuerdo, y
preguntan: "4C6mo es que lo que era inaceptable el 15 de junio se
hizo aceptable el 25 de julio, y muy dtil para completer? Otud
cambios ocurrieron en esos 40 dies? Poi- qud no dieron ustedes jun
explicacioncita? ... 0 fueron ustedes faltos de sinceridad entonces
o estdn ahora intencionalmente engallando a la gente."
La dnica referencia a conceptos "morxistas" en toda la
declared& es una especiosa referencia a "clase": "Con respect? a
la prevencidn de la proliferacidn nuclear, el Gobierno chino sienpre
ha mantenido que no se debe hacer eco de los argumentos de los
imperialistas norteamericanoa, sino que se debe hacer un andlisis de
clase. Si las armas nucleares ayudan o no a la paz depende de
quidn las posee.... No se debe dicir sin son ni ton que el riesgo
de guerra nuclear aumenta con el incremento en el ndmero de potencies
nucleares."
Con la seccidn unddcima los chinos lanzan una nueva oftensiva:
es solo actualmente que los dirigentes sovidticos empiezan a estak
en colusidn con el imperialism? norteamericano pare maniatar a China.
Yendo atrds haste el 20 de junio de 1959, cuando no habfa ni el
menor iedicio-ede un tratado para detener los ensayos nucleares, el
Gobierno sovidtico unilateralmente destroz6 el acuerdo sobre nueva
tecnologfa pare la defense nacional concerted? entre China y la
Uni& Sovidtica el 15 de octUbre de 19571 rehus6 suministrar a China
una muestra de una bombe atdmica y datos tdcnicos sobre su fabricacidn.
Esto se hizo como regal? de visite cuando el dirigente sovi t co fue
a los Estados Unidos para tener conversaciones con Eisenhower en
septiembre." Los Chinos declaran que, segdn prosiguieron durante el
pasado alio las conversaciones sovidticas con los EE.UU. y Gran
Bretafla sobre un tratado de proscripcidn de ensayos nuclesres, ellos
enviaron al Gobierno sovidtico tres memorando el 3 de septiembre y
20 de octubre de 1962 y el 6 de judo de 1963, "declarando solemnemente
que no tolerarfamos la concertacidn, sin tener en cuenta la oposicidn
de China, de ninguna close de tratado del imperilismo norteamericano,
y que publicarfamos declaraciones pare dar a conocer nuestra posicidn.
Confidbamos que despuds de tan sincero consejo de nuestra parte los
dirigentes sovidticos tamarfan riendas antes de llegar al precipicio
y no harfan las cosas irremediables."
En la seed& 12 y final los chinos vuelven a varios pasajes de
la declared& sovidtica. Contesttndo una pregunta retdrical "podemos
decirles francamente que de ninguna manera nos estamos atribuyendo
demasiado.... es nuestro deber proletario internacionalista apuntar
que ellos ahora han traicionado los intereses del pueblo sovidtico y
del campo socialista fntegro. Si alguien en verdad ha perdido el
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sem), no es sin duda alguna el pueblo chino, que consecuentemente ha
mantenido una posicidn correcta; son los dirigentes &ovedticos los
que ban traicionado su propia posici/Sn a medio camino. Si los
dirigentes sovidticos consideran que la traicion a 2os intereses del pueblo
sovietico est d dentro de los derechos soberanos?Nrestado ebvidtico
tienen por supuesto el derecho a decirlo. Pero si se pretende
amordazazros so pretexto de la no intervencidn en asuntos internos, no
lo conseguirdn.
15 Agosto: El Gobierno albands iechaza el tratado contra los ensayos,
con una nueva denuncia: "el tratado de Nosed de 5 de agosto de 1963
ha sido concertado en flagrante contravencidn del Pacto de Varsovia
(se dan capftulo y verz/culo) y por lo tanto dicho tratado es
int::!nsecomente ilegal y debe ser rechazado." Por lo tanto "el Gobierno
albands solicita a los estados socialistas que repudien el tratado de
5 de agosto de 1963; propone que aquellos pafses socialistas que lo
han firmado no lo ratifiquen, y que dicho tratado deberd ser recha-
zado por todos los miembros del Pacto de Varsovia y todo el campo
socialista." Ademds, "sugiere que, despuds del rechazo por todos los
signatarios del Pacto de Varsovia del tratado de 5 de agosto de 1963,
deberfa convocarse una reunidn del Comitd consultivo del Pacto de
Varsovia" para restablecer la politica correcta sobre las armas nucleares
y el desarne y "detener y condenar el peligroso rumbo del grupo de
N. Kruschev."
15 Agosto: Un elitorial del drgano "Akahata" del PC japonds critica
la decisidn del Partido socialista japonds "de persistir en su errada
linea con respecto al movimiento contra las bombs at6micas y de
hidr6geno."
16 Agosto: "Pravda" publica un artfculo de 4.000 palabras de
Korionov, "A la izquierda del sentido comdn," titulo tornado de
Lenin, el cual, "hablando de los bocones izquierdistas de nuestro
Partidos que se hacfan aparecer COE0 revolucionarios 'arquirrevolucionariost
... los caracteriz6 como personas que tomeban posicidn a la izquierda del
sentido comdn." Es mayormente una defensa de la pol/tica sovidtica
sobre el tratado contra los ensayos pero deletrea algunos puntos
sovidticos anteriores con un poco ms de dureza. Refiridndose a que
los dirigentes del PC chino "se esfuerzan por tener sus propias armas
nucleares a cualquier costo," el artfculo dice que ello es "un
indicio mods del hecho de que no son los esfuerzos internacionalistas
sino lo directamente contrario lo que estd ganando mds y mds la
primacfa en la polftica de los dirigentes chinos. Entonces apela
a Lenin como apoyo: "Lenin nos dio un element? de juicio infalible para
comprobar el internacionalismo de los comunistas. Para ser inter-
nacionalista, nos enset61 uno debe pensar no solo en su propia
naci6n sino poner por encina de ella los intereses de todos, su
libertad e igualdad universales." Ademds dice el artfculo que, "habiendo
entrado en el camino de lucha contra la URSS y el PCUS, los
dirigentes del PC chino en verdad estdn apuflalando al sovialismo
mundial por la espalda...."
16 Agosto: Tbdos los diarios chinos publican en primera plana
declaraciones hechas el 15 por la Pederacidn juvenil de toda China
y la Federacidn estudiantil de toda China en apoyo de las declaraciones
del Gobierno chino de 31 de Julio y 15 de agosto y condenando las
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declaraoiones en apoyo del tratado contra los ensayos que habfan
sido hechas por la Federaci6n Mundial de la Juventud Democrdtica
y la Uni6n Internacional de Estudiantes. El atave contra el bur6
de la FMJD dice que sus miembros "arbitrariamente han hecho a la
FNjD servir a la polftica exterior del Gobierne sovidtico." Ademds,
wEan dodo un paso grave para evividir la FMJD publicando declara-
Ciones que vilipendian y calumnian a los dirigentes chinos..." etc.
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CHRONOLOGIE -- DISSENSIONS COMMUNISTES
No 10 3-16 watt 1963
Aoet - Le numdro 8 de la revue qui vient de Prague, "ProblAmes de la
Paix et su Socialisme" (dont l'ddition anglaise seule porte le titre de
"World. Marxist Review") a laissd timber l'ddition en langue cordenne, indi-
quant ainsi que la Corde du Nord s'est jointe Ala Chine et comme elle a
rompu tout lien avec cette revue mensuelle qui posait A la revue centrale
par excellence du mouvement cammuniste mondial.
^,
3 aout et Jour suivants - Le "Quotidien du Peuple" de Pain et d'autres
journaux importants accordent beaucoup d'attention A leur bataille avec
les "chefs sovidtiques", publiant le texte de ddclarations du gouvernement
chinois, de rddacteurs de journaux et d'individus, parlant avec citations
A l'appui du sentiment "mondial" favorable a la Chine (la lutte est main-
tenant presque exclusivement une affaire nationale plutet qu'une affaire
de parti), et dtalant un reportage ddnonciateur des attaques sovidtiques ou
pro-sovidtiques contre la Chine. Le 3 adtt, par exemple, le "Quotidien du
Peuple" publiait un dditorial incendiaire intituld "C'est la trahison du
peuple sovidtism" et contenant ce passage virulent: "Tout en fraternis-
ant avec l'impdrialisme amdricain de la facon la plus intime, les chefs
sovidtiques et la presse sovidtique out grincd des dents du fait de
leur haine acharnde contre la Chine socialiste. Ils se servent du meme
langage que l'impdrialisme amdricain ,our injurier la Chine. C'est tout
simplement une alliance amdricano-sovidtique.IT L'article conaari?Tals
les impdrialistes amdricains et leurs partenaires ne doivent pas se
rdjouir trop vite . . . Le peuple sovidtique est un grand peuple avec une
glorieuse tradition rdvolutionnaire . . . Un Jour ou l'autre, tout marchd
qui trahit l'Union Sovidtique, trahit le peuple sovidtique, et trahit le
P.C.U.S. va certainement finir par un dchec." La meme jour, la presse chin-
oise consacrait deux pages A des rapports et A des commentaires d'actualitd
sous des en-totes A tendances dditoriales come: "Les leaders du Japon
appuient les declarations du gouvernement chinois" ; "La vdritdindbran-
ldble est du cetd de la Chine"; "Histoires lamentables et stupides !
Les accusations que la presse sovietism fait contre le P.C.C. sont de
plus en plus fantastiques"; etc.
Comme le materiel dans la presse chinoise est considdrable --
et consiste en un grand nambre de rdpdtitions -- nous tie
ddcrirons dans cette chronologie que quelques-ups des
articles les plus importants.
3 aeut - Un rapport de l'agence yougoslave Tanyug venant de Pdkin ddcrit
1.f79?'.ndignation" des diplomates socialistes A Pekin causde par ddclara-
tion de la R.P.C. en date du 31 juillet et par des dditoriaux publids
par la suite par le "Quotidien du Peuple" ; le rapport alt que "les ambas-
sades bulgare, sovidtique et polonaise out revoyt la declaration chinoise
le Jour meme ob. elles l'ont reque." D'autres l'ont renvoyde le lende-
main. Le ministere des Affaires dtrangeres chinois a protest d contre les
renvois.
3 aatt - Une ddclaration du P.C. de Bulgarie appuie le P.C.U.S. sur
taus les points de la lettre ouverte du 14 juillet; l'organe du parti
"Rdbotnichesko Delo" comporte un article de 5.000 mots "Contre l'esprit
doctrinaire et l'aventurisme de 'l'aile gauche' des chefs chinois."
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3-4 aoat L'organe du parti hon5rois wNepsmanivisale' le 3 aoat con-
damne la critique que les communistes chinois font de la "division inter-
nationale du travail" ; le 4 aoat ii annonce qu'une "importante rdunion"
du comitd central du parti a eu lieu deux jours auparavant et qu'elle a
"acceptd et approuv & l'IlnAnimitd" le rapport de la ddldgation mende
par Kadar et qui vient de revenir de l'U.R.S.S., sea vues sur les liens
hongrois-sovidtiques sur toutes les questions de politique, y compris
sur les principales questions de is dispute iddologique avec les
Chinois, et stir is politique dtrangere sovidtique.
3-7 edit - Le gouvernement roumain exprime le 3 aoat sa satisfaction du
trait d de l'arrdt des essais et son intention de signer. Le 7 edit, un
editorial de l'organe du parti "Scinteia" appuie le traitd et exprime
"tine grande surprise et un profond regret" des ddnonciations chinoises,
et, dans des termes vigoureux pour les Roumains, dit que ces accusations
et ces diffamations sont "completement inadmissibles".
5 edit - Dans un article publid par "Pravda" et consacrd au 20e anni-
versaire de la victoire sovidtique a Koursk, le mardchal Malinovsky,
chef des forces armdes sovidtiques, sidcarte du sujet pour condemner is
position des chefs chinois "qui revient en somme A de la complicitdavec
ceux qui sont partisans de is guerre thermonucldaire et s'opposent a ce
que les problemes internationaux soient rdsolus A. is table de confi-
ence."
5 aoat - Une declaration du gouvernement mongol approuve le traitd de
l'arrOt des essais come dtant "un sacces veritable".
5 twat - Ajoutant leur commentaire Ala fin d'un rapport d'actualitd
annoncant 14arrivde de Rusk a Moscou, les Albanais ajoutent: "Nikita
Khrauchtchev ne se sent pas de joie . . . Ii rave de rdaliser
liance des impdrialistes et des rdvisionnistes contra la Republique
Populaire Chinoise . . . mais . . 'rira bien qui rira le dernier'.
Le peuple sovidtique qui a de grandee traditions rdvolutionnaires ne vs
pas permettre que l'on joue ces jeux dangereux a leurs depens." (Emis-
sion de Radio Tirana pour l'intdrieur du pays)
5 aoat - Radio Moscou a un rapport intdressant venant de Blagovechtchensk
"qui es pour ainsi dire A is frontiere de la R.P.C. ." L'expdditeur du
port, Tarasov, aurait dit que "la situation est telle que les ravines
chinois qui circulent sur l'Amour ne rdpondent meme pas aux salutations
de nos bateaux quand us pas sent. . . Ce que nous avons apprix par is
declaration du gouvernement sovidtique est tellement inattendue que nous
avons peine a y croire . . . Ce que le gouvernement chinas dit est de
la folie pur et simple: cette politique ne peut qu'aboutir a la mort
de millions dfe gens."
5 aoat - paioannu, secretaire general du Parti Progressiste (commun-
TiEW)-des T vailleurs Cypriotes fdlicite le gouvernement sovidtique et
le comitd central du P.C.U.S. et condamne is declaration du gouverne-
ment de la R.P.C. Bur le traitd concernant l'arret des essais; ii
condamme aussi l'attitude des chefs du P.C.C. "qui en fin de comte est
anti-marxiste et anti-ldniniste." (Tess)
5 aoat - Un organe du parti polonais "Trybuna Ludu" public un edi-
torial aa il est question de is declaration du ministere des Affaires
dtrangeres polonais en date du 2 aoat approuvant le traitdsur l'arret
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des essais et dnoncant l'intention de la Pologne d'y accdder immediate-
ment; il exprime son indignation que la Chine ait ddnoncd le traitdcomme
dtant une fraude.
6 aoat - Lidditorial d' "Izvestiya" qui se rdjouit de la signature du
trait d de l'arret des essais "Les fruits de la politique de coexist-
ence pacifique" -- se poursuit en ddnoncant la ddclaration "honteuse" du
gouvernement de la R.P.C. et lance un avertissement: "Le peuple sovidt-
ique courroucd et indignd rejette les inventions des chefs chinois qui
sont en train d'essayer de dresser l'un contre l'autre le peuple et le
gouvernement de l'Union Sovidtique. Le peuple sovidtique dnonce ferme-
ment: ne vous leurrez as; tie prenez as vos ddsirs pour des rdalitds.
Le peuple sovidtique n'a jamais auparavant dtd si uni, si dtroitement groupd
autour de son gouvernement et de son parti . . . qu'il est a l'heure
actuelle. Regardez bien et souvenez-vous. . . "
6 aollt - Pdkin annonce la pUblication d'un "nouveau livre" dont la
piece de resistance est la lettre du P.C.C. du 14 juin et qui porte le
titre: "lUne proposition concernant la Ilene de conduite gdndrale du mouve-
ment cammuniste international." Dans un volume qui doit etre dnorme, les
Chinois ont inclu dgalement le texte des declarations du P.C.C. des 2, 5
et 10 juillet et une demi-douzaine d. 'articles du "Quotidien du Peuple,"
plus un appendice contenant le texte de la lettre du P.C.U.S. du 30 mars,
les ddclarations du P.C.U.S. du 18 juin, et du 4 et 9 juillet, la rdsolu-
tion du P.C.U.S. du 21 juin et la lettre ouverte du P.C.U.S. du 14 juillet!
Mote: ce livre tie doit pas etre confondu avec une brochure d'une date antd-
rieure que Pdkin a fait largement circuler sous le me me titre et qui de
tout ce qui est dnumdrd ci-dessus contenait seulement la lettre du P.C.U.S.
du 30 mars et la lettre du P.C.C. du 14 juin.)
6 aciat - La ddldgation du P.C. japonais dla confdrence d'Hiroshima contre
les bombes atomiques et dhydrogdne condamne le parti socialiste japonais
et Sohyo pour leurs activitds divisoires, et en particulier la ddclara-
tion du P.S.J. qu'il a l'intention d'organiser un nouveau mouvement.
(Agence d'Informations de la Nouvelle Chine).
6 aoat - Le numdro 11 de la revue thdorique du P.C.U.S. "Kammunist"
pUblie une critique ddtaillde des "vues politiques et iddologiques errondes
des chefs du P.C.C. " (d'apres SASS; la revue n'a pas encore dtd:reque iC1).
La critique d4clare: "Il est clair Que l'attitude actuelle des chefs
chinois est due a des difficultds qui out fait leur apparition en Chine
au cours de ces dernieres anndes du fait . . . d'un certain nombre de
preconceptions errondes du P.C.C. Les chefs du P.C.C. essaient de distraire
l'attention des masses des vdritsbles causes des dchecs qui affectent la
vie a l'intdrieur du pays." C'est ainsi qu'ils out commencd a affirmer au
peuple que la facon de sortir de cette situation dtait d'inciter A affir-
mer au peuple que la facon de sortir de cette situation dtait d'inciter
a la revolution mondiale. .. Avec cet objectif en vue us ont commencd
A exciter le nationalisme en Chine et a precher l'exclusivisme national
puis racial. On a vu apparattre des phrases ampoules au sujet de l'Ouest
ou du Nord "getew." et "impotent" et de l'Est 'jeune' et 'puissant'.
6-8 eclat - Le 6 aoat, les Bulgares expriment leur appui de Moscou par
reTWITEoriaux dans "Rabotnichesko Delo" faisant lidloge du traitd pour
l'arret des essais et dans "Trud" s'opposant au principe chinois qu'il
faut "campter sur ses propres forces". Le 8 aoat l'agence officielle BTA
fait une ddclaration dans le meme sens.
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6-9 aoet - L'organe du parti indondsien "Harian Rakjat" pdblie des
commentaires remarquant que l'arret des essais n'est pas une earantie
qu'il n'y aura pas de guerre nucldaire et par consdquent ne satisfait pas
les exigences du P.K.I.; ii prdconise une interdiction totale et la des-
truction des armes nucldaires. Ii semble toutefois qu'il ait dvitd de
mentionner la be:tame qui rage entre la Chine et l'U.R.S.S. au sujet de
cette question. (Agence d'Informatious de la Nouvelle Chine).
7 aaet - Un dditorial de 4.000 uots dans "Pravda" se ddclare partisan
de l'aide sovidtique au mouvement de libdration nationale. Pour conclure,
ii mentionne les actions "monstrueuses" des chefs chinois "dont la ligne
de conduite dloigne le mouvemert de liberation nationale des pays social-
istes et du mouvement international des ouvriers, attisant les prejlidices
nationalistes et mrime raciaux." Quels que soient les maneges des chefs
chinois, il est clair qu'ils ne s'inquietent aucunement du mouvement de
libdration nationale." Ie meme Jour, un article de "l'Observateur" dans
l'habdomadaire "Temps Nouveaux" que Moscou pdblie en un grand nombre de
langues ddnonce "l'aventurisme et la ddmagogie" des chefs chinois.
7 aoet -- La Fdddration Syndicale Mondiale qui a sa base a Prague publie
une ddclaration saluant le traitd de l'arret des essais. Le Comite
tchdcoslovaque pour la Paix salue le trait d lui aussi et critique le Comitd
chinois pour la Paix et surtout la facon dont les Chinois se sont conduits
a Hiroshima.
7 aoet - L'organe aibanais "Zen i Popullit" poursuit sa politique
habituelle avec un article intituld : "Le groupe de Khrouchtchev a mis
son sceau sur sa trahison." paratt que Gromyko aurait dit en recevant
le secrdtaire d'Etat amdricain Rusk dans son bureau: "Vous voyez, M. Rusk,
ma fenetre donne d 3.'Ouest4" "Zeri I Popullit" ajoute: "N'importe qui
peut voir qu'il ne faisait pas allusion a la position gdographique de son
bureau mais & son orientation politique vers l'Ouest."
8 aoet - "Izvestiya" exalte le traitd de l'arre t des essais et condamne
les Chinois dans son principal dditorial: "Un triamphe pour la line de
conduite ldniniste", et dans un article: "Nous croyons a l'humanitd" par
Korneychuk et Vasilevskaya. Tous deux sten prennent a la ddclaration du
gouvernement chinois pour son impudence, et le second des deux auteurs dit:
est difficile de dire ce qu'elle contient le plus abondament: l'org-
ueil impudent ou l'envie de l'autoritd de plus en plus grande de l'Union
Sovidtique dans le monde entier. Ce sont le de mauvais sentiments et tres
dangereux." Le meme Jour "Aussie Sovidtique" pane un article intitdir-
La vie et les domes daunts" par le Dr. Momdjyan qni dit entre autres
choses que derriere" l'esprit rdvolutionnaire" des Chinois se caChaient
"le dogmatisme le plus vulgaire, la yaresse de la pensdep une passion
pour rdpdter des citations apprises par coeur, et une crainte de consid-
drer de nouvelles situations et de trouver de nouvelles solutions amen-
ant a la victoire de la revolution socialiste." Le 8 aoe t, l'organe de
la jeunesse de Moscou, "Kamsamolskaya Pravda" s'attaque lui aussi aux Chi-
nOis dans un article sur un groupe d dtudiants venant de pays sous-ddvel-
oppds rduni a Salvador, Brdsil; l'article condamne les veins efforts des
reprdsentants chinois pour orienter le cycle d'dtudes dans une direction
autre que celle qu'il dtait cense suivre. "Quand us se scat rendu campte
qu'il leur dtait impossible d'imposer leur attitude erronde a taus les
dtudiants, Us out fait des efforts vraiment titanignes pour manigancer
une rupture." Ensuite l'article attaque l'Agence d'Informations de la Nou-
velle Chine pour avoir "ddlibdrdment falsifier les points de vue","ddlib-
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"essayant de faire prehdre des veasies pour des lanternes", l'Agence
d'Informations de la Nadvelle Chine "a ddcide de se charger de cette
ta che."
9 acdt - "Pravda" publie un article par Kliszko, membre du coati
central polonais, se declarant tout a fait partisan de la doctrine de ?
coexistence pacifique du P.C.U.S. et de la reponse du gouvernement sov-
ietique & la diclaration de la R.P.C. au sujet du traiti de l'arret
des essais, disant que le postulat chinois "tout au rien" n'itait que
du "demagogiame." (Le meme article a iti publii le lendemain dans l'organe
p21pnais "746=a Luba" en m@me temps qu'un autre article sur le sujet
par Komalawski qui conclut: "La gouvornement de l'U.R.S.S. a cent fois
raison quand ii dit que la diclaration de la R.P.C. n'a pas et4 dictde
"par le souci de la defense potentielle du camp socialiste.0' Le meme jour,
un article de "Pravda" intituld 1Methode8 Indignes" par Ulyanov cite un
certain nombre d'exemraes ricents dans lesquels la presse chinoise a
rublid des extraits d'articles tires de la presse sovietique et destines
a etre lus & l'intdrieur du pays exposant des abus isoles iconomiques et
sociaux sprigs leur avoir fait adbir des modifications de facon a dormer
l'impression qu'il s'egit de conditions chroniques et typiques. "West-ce
pas la induire le.yeuple chinois en erreur que lui cacher l'?t veritable
de notre pays.''
10 aoOt Un article de "Pravda", *Les manoeuvres de la riaction dans
=id= par Kutsobin et Pastukhov exalte les "forces progressistes" dans
l'Inde et dinonce les attaques chinoises contre le P.C.I. et les efforts
pour effectuer une rupture. "Pravda" pdblie aussi une declaration de
Mikunis, secretaire general du P.C. dfIsrael qui confirme que son parti
est "completement d'accord" avec le P.C.U.S. et condamne dnergiquement les
attaques fausses, calomnieuses et depourvues de fondement des chefs du
P.C.C." Un article de Pomazanov dans "L'Etoile Rouge" critique les
Chinois pour essayer d'entraver la coopdration iconomique et lfaide mut-
uelle des pays socialistes. Et Tess annonce que Khrouchtchev et sa
femme vont arriver en YougoslaviFie.20 edit pour y faire la visite pre-
vue.
10 aoet - Le *Zuotidien du Peuple" pdblie un article long de 5.000
mots fun "Observateur" intituld "Pourquoi le traiti tripartite a-t-il
taus les difauts et aucun avantage?" En plus de Apdter diverses crit-
iques chinoises dija entendues U. accuse le gouvernement soviitique de
faire tout son possible pour empecher les autres pegs socialistes et
taus les pays opprimes deacquirir des armes nucliaires.
10 aoet - Dans le journal Njesnik" de Zagreb, un article de Djurica, cor-
respondent de *Tanyug" de Bucarest, ddcrit la prudente mithode "indirecte"
des Roumaine lorsqu'ils disent "non" a des principes chinois qui sont "con-
traires aux convictions roumaines, aux disirs roumains et a la psychologie
roumaine."
II aodt - L'organe de l'Allemagne de l'Est, *Neues Deutschland" pdblie un
article de Hansen dinongant les chefs du P.C.C. pour "semer les graines
de la disunion et de la scission dans toutes les organisations qui lut-
tent pour la pat:" par leurs attaques contre le traits de l'arret des
essais.
11 edit- Parini les divers articles citis par la presse de Pekin comme
lui apportant leur appui ii y a un article du journal mexicain "Atisbos"
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qui "critique le journal sovidtique "Pravda" pour avoir calomnid la
Chine" et U. y a l'hebdomadaire de Londres "Tribune" qui "dit que le
traitd tripartite n'est pas un vrai traitd et que Khrouchtchev et Ken-
nedy "rivalisent l'un avec l'autre dans lours efforts pour avilir la Chine."
13 aoet - "Pravda" dans un article de 4.000 mots, "La guerre thermonu.-
c daire et les masses" par Arbatov dit que la position chinoise" consists
substituer au marxiame la thdorie de la toute puissance des armee" et
continue en justifiant la position sovidtique avec des arguments qui sont
surtout pragmati(ues, mats s'arrange pour citer Engels (qui des la fin du
dernier si?e arrivait & la conclusion que le militariame contenait les
graines de sa propre destruction) et Ldnine (qui avait prdvu, d'arres
ce que dit sa veuve dans ses mdmoires, que les progres des armes militaires
pourraient rendre la guerre tellement ddvastatrice qu'elle deviendrait tine
impossibilitd). Le meme Jour, "Isvestiya" publie un article de "L'Obser-
vateur", "Les lunettes noires des journaux de Pdkin", fustigeant la presse
chinoise pour "commencer it appliquer la technologie impdrialiste dis-
creditee (sic !) du grand mensonge, essayer de salir is rdalitd sovi-
dtique, pour fausser et travestir les faits concernant notre vie et souil-
ler l'esprit des lecteurs chinois avec le poison de la calomnie."
13 aoet- La nouvelle la plus importante dans la presse chinoise est le
grand rassemblement de Pekin en faveur du Beare amdricain; & ce rassem-
blement Kuo Mo-jo a attaqud "les soi-disant marxistes" qui essaient de
forcer les nations et les peupaes opprimds & "coexister en pat:" avec
l'impdrialisme et la classe dirigeante rdactionnaire.
13 aoet - Bien que ne pouvant pas ddcider laquelle des deux positions,
sovidtique ou chinoise, dtait correcte du point de vue du marxisme- ldn-
inisme, le part/ socialiste japonais s'est ddclard pour l'attitude sow:.
idtique et pour le traitdde l'arret des essais parce que ceci se rap-
proche plus de sa facon de voir que l'attitude du P.C.C. Toutefois, le
parti socialiste consent b. "regarder avec bienveillance" la position de
la Chine communiste en tenant compte de la situation internationale actu-
elle et de retain oe elle en est dans son ddveloppement de pays social-
late. ("Kyodo" de Tokyo)
14 atet - "Shan Dee, l'organe du parti du Nord exprime una
roTerTe plus son mdcontentement de l'imperfectian du traitd de l'arret
des essais, mais critique le rele sovidtique de fag= tires indirecte.
15 aoet - "Pravda" pane "certaines choses venant de ].'Institut Inter-
national de la Paix" et qui avaient dtd publides par les directeurs
du "Bulletin d'Informations du Conseil Mondial de la Paix". Etant donnd
qu'une lettre du Comitd chinois pour la paix ddcriant le mouvement mondial
pour la paL; circule dans un grand nambre de pays et qu'aux rdnions
internationales les ddldgud chinois injurient le Conseil Mondial de la
Paix et lancent des invectives grossieres et indignes contre le prdsident
du comitd prdsidential, le professeur John Bernal, homme de science bien
connu, et contre d'autres chefs du mouvement, l'Institut International
de la Wax juge qu'il est de on devoir d'exposer les mdthodes de falsifi-
cation dont Pdkin se sert. L'article de 3.000 mots cite alors un certain
nodbre de passages montrant que divers Chinois avaient aureravant approuve
l'interdiction des essais nucldaires, y comptis mem la decision sovietique
unilatdrale de mettre fin aux essais nucldaires en 1958. Une grande
pertie de l'attaque s'adresse A. la personne de 10.10 Mo-jo qui est citd
come ayant "ouvertement demand d ume continuation de la course aux armes
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nucldaires" ft une rdunion qui a eu lieu ft Pdkin le 26 juillet 1963. Il
conclut, d'accord avec is ligne sovidtique: "On ne petit croire que
ces ddclamations aventuristes protestant contre le 'monopole' soient dues
an sauci de is sdcirutd des peuples."
15 scat - Toute is presse de Pdkin accorde la premiere place ft une declar-
ation, du gouvernement de la R.P.C.? longue de 7.5000 mots, et qui commente
sur is ddclaration du gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S. en date du 3 aoet; le
texte de is declaration sovietique est egalement publie. Axes une breve
introduction qui dit que is ddclaration sovidtique est une "pietre ddfense,
vagabondant al'aventurej pleine de choses n'ayant aucun rspport avec is
question et manquant d'arguments raisol421diyles Chinois rabechent les
memes vieux arguments en dix sections inu3rotdes, introduisent un reseigne-
ment sensationnel dans is lie section et concluent avec arrogance dans is
12e. Parmi les quelques passages prdsentant un intdret particulier dans
les dix premieres sections il y a celui ot est rejetde comme dtant "insol-
ente" is conclusion sovidtique disant que dtant la puissance
nucldaire de is communautd socialiste, est mieux qualifide pour juger de
ces choses que celles dont les connaissances sont purement thdoriques:
"Il semble que les chefs sovidtiques veuillent avoir non seulement le
monopole des alines nucldaires male aussi du droit de /Grier sur la ques-
tion des armes nucldaires." Les Chinois ddclarent qu une date aussi
rdcente que le 9 juin 1963, le gouvernement sovidtique avait fait savoir
an gouvernement chinois que is position des puissances occidentales au
sujet de l'arre t des essais nucldaires ne pouvait servir de base t un
accord: us demandett: "Que s'est-il pass pour que ce qui dtait inac-
ceptable le 25 juillet, et tree utile par dessus le march ? Quel change-
Mt77st fait dans ces quarante jours? Pourquoi n'avez-vous pas fourni
quelques explications? . . . Ou bien vous n'dtiezjas sinceres a. ce
moment-lh ou bien vaus trompez le peuple maintenant de propos ddlibdrd."
Dans toute is declaration, is seule allusion aux principes "marxistes"
est une allusion spdcieuse a. is question de is lutte des classes: "Pour
ce qui est d'empecher is prolifdration nucldaire, le gauvernment chinois
a toujours affirm qu'il no faut pas faire echo aux raisons des impdr-
ialistes amdricains, mais quell faut tenir compte des principes marxistes
de la lutte des cclasses. La question de savoir si les armes nucldaires
contribuent ou non t la pix ddpend de qui les possede . ne faut -
pas dire t tort et a. travers que le danger que comporte is guerre nucld-
sire augmente proportionnellement au nombre des puissances nucldaires."
Avec is section 11, les Chinois lancent une nouvelle offensive:
"Ce n'est pas seulement bier que les chefs sovidtiques ont commence t
etre de meche avec l'impdrialisme americain et ont essayd d'emmenotter
is Chine. Des le 20 4uin 1959, alors qu'il n'y avait pas is moindre
trace d'un traitd pour arreter les essais nucldaires, le gouvernement
sovidtilue a de lui-mine ddchird l'accord concernant in nouvelle tech: -
nologie pour is ddfense nationale conclut entre is China et l'Union
Sovidtique le 15 octdbre 1957, et a refuse de fournir a is Chine un
dchantillon d'une bombe atomique et les donndes techniques concernant sa
fabrication. C'etait lb, le cadeau que le chef sovidtique apportait
quand il est alld aux Etats-Unis pour confdrer avec Eisenhower en sep-
tembre." Les Chinois ddclarent qu'h mesure que se poursuivaient les
entretiens avec les Etats-Unis et is Grande-Bretagne an sujet d'un traitd
sur l'arret des essais au cours de l'annde passee, ils ont envoyd trois
mdmemorandums au gouvernement sovietique, le 3 septembre, le 20 octobre
1962 et le 6 juin 1963, "declarant solennellement qu'ils n'accepteraient
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pas que soft conclu, malgrd ilopposition de la Chine, n'iuporte vale
sorte de traite entre le gouvernuent sovidtique et les EtatsAlnis
ayant pour objet de priver le peuple chinois du droit qu'il a de
prendre des dispositions pour rdsister aux uenaces nucldaires de l'impdr-
ialiaae audricain, et qu'ils pliblieraient les ddclarations voulues pour
faire connat tre leur position. Nous avions espdrd qu'aprbs avoir re9u
un conseil aussi convaincu que le ne tre, les chefs sovidtiques s'arrate-
raint avant d'arriver au prdcipice et ne rendraient pas les choses irrdv-
?cables."
Dans la douziene section qui est la derniere, les Chinois revien-
nent N plusieurs passages de la ddclaration sovidtique. Rdpondant dleur
comuunication, "nous pouvons leur dire francheuent que nous ne prdsunons
pas trop de nous-naues. il est de notre devoir de proldtaires interna-
tionaux d'attirer l'attention sur le fait qu'ils out unintenant trahi les
intdrats du peuple sovidtique et de taut le camp socialiste. 5' ii y a un
insensd dans l'affaire, ce n'est certaineuent pas le peuple chinois qui
a toujours conservd une attitude correcte; cc sont les chefs sovidtiques
qui ont trahi leur propre position b. noitid chenin. Si les chefs sovi-
etiques qui out trahi leur propre position N noitid chenin. Si les chefs
sovidtique fait partie des droits souverains de l'Etat sovidtique,fait
partie des droits souverains de l'Etat sovidtique, il est bien entendu
qu'il est de leur droit de le dire. Male si vous essayez de nous bail-
lonner sous prdtexte que =US ne devons pas nous ingdrer dans vos af-
faires, vous ne rdussirez pas.'
15 aoat - Le gouvernement albanais rejette le traitd de l'arra t des
essais avec une nouvelle accusation: "le traitd de Moscou du 5 adit
1963 a tdconclu en violaut de fa9on scandaleuse le pacte de Varsovie
(chapitre et article sont citds) . . . et par consdquent cc trait
est intrinsdquement illegal et dolt atre rejetd ." De cc fait:7E7 gou-
veraement albanais fait appel aux Etats socialistes pour qu'ils rdpudient
le traits du 5 aoat 1963; il propose que les pays socialistes qui l'ont
signd ne le ratifient pas et que cc traitdsoit rejetd par tous les nenbres
du pacte de Varsovie et par tout le caup socialiste." En outre, ii
nsuggere qu'N la suite de la rejection par tous les signataires du
Pacte de Varsovie du traitd du 5 twat 1963, on devrait convoquer une
reunion du cauite consultatif-politique des nations qui conposent le
Pacte de Varsovie "pour restaurer la politique qui convient au sujet
des arms nucldaires et du ddsarneuent et pour narrater et condauner la
dangereuse ligae de conduite du groupe de N. Khrouchtchev."
15 aoat - '%salmta", l'organe du P. C. japonais, dans un editorial,
critique "la ddcision du parti socialiste japonais de persister dans
son attitude erronde en cc qui concerne le nouvement contra les
boubes atouiques et N hydrogbne."
16 aoat - "Pravda" public un article de 4.000 mots, 'A gauche du bon
sens , par Korionov; le titre est eupruntd a Lenine qui parlant des
braillards gauchistes de notre parti qui posaient aus rdvolution-
naires"
. . . disait que c'dtaient des gens qui s'dtaient places a.
gauche du bon acne." L'article est surtout une defense de la politique
sovidtive en cc qui concerne le traitd de l'arrat des essais, nais
insiste aussi sur certains points de la politique sovidtique enter-
ieure un peu plus carrdnent. Paisant allusion aux chefs du parti
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communiste chinois "qui essaient de se procurer leurs prores armes
nucleaires coete que coate", ])article (lit qu'il y a la "encore une
autre preuve du fait que ce ne sont pas des efforts internationalistes
mais des efforts directement opposes qui sont en train de l'emporter
dans la politique des chefs chinois. Ii s'adresse alors d Leine pour y
trouver un appui: "Lenine nous a donne un critere infallible pour juger
de l'internationalisme des cammunistes. Pour etre un internationaliste,
nous a-t-il enseigne, ii faut penser non seulement a sa propre nation,
mais aussi placer les interets de tous, leur liberte universelle et
leur egalite, au dessus." Plus loin, l'article alt que"s' etant lance
sur le chamin de la lutte contre l'U.R.S.S. et le P.C.U.S., . . .les
chefs du P.C.C. poignardaient de fait le socialiame mondial dans le
dos . . . "
16 adat Torus les journaux chinois publient en premiere page des
declarations faites le 15 adat par la Federation de la Jeunesse de
Toute la Chine et par la Federation des Etudiants de Toute la Chine
l'appui des declarations du gouvernement chinois en date du 31 juillet
et du 15 aoet et denoncant les declarations approuvant le traite de
l'arre t des essais faites par la Federation Mondiale de la Jeunesse
Democratique et par l'Union Internationale des Etudiants. L'attaque
contre le bureau de la Federation Mondiale de la Jeunesse Democratique
dit que ses membres "ont force arbitrairement la F.M.J.D. a servir la
politique etrangere du gouvernement sovietique." En outre, "ils ont
fait une devarche serieuse en essayant d'aaener une rupture dans la
F.M.J.D. en pUbliant des declarations avilissant et calaaniant les
chefs chinois . . . " etc.
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ANALYSE DE LA LETTRE OUVERTE DU P.C.U.S. PUBLIEE LE 14 'MILLET 1963
La lettre declare que son objet est "dldtablir notre position
sur les questions fondamentales du mouvement communiste internatio-
nal relativement 4 la lettre du comitd central du parti communiste
chinois du 14 juin 1963". Elle parcoure toute la portee des diffe-
rences thdoriques avec les Chinois, en venant rarement aux prises
avec leurs arguments iddologiques de casuistes, accusant les Chinois
d'attribuer au P.C.U.S. des vues et des positions qui ne sont pas la
siennes -- et en mgme temps forcant les positions du P.C.C. jusqu'h
des extrgmes au delh de ce que le P.C.C. soutient en rdalitd. Elle
prdsente une longue hate de plaintes contre is. conduite des Chinois
depuis quelques anndes, leur renvoyant dans certains cas des accusa-
tions que les Chinois avaient deja faites au P.C.U.S.:. Elle nomme
Mao et d'autres chefs chinois dans un contexte qui permet par ddduc-
tion de les accuser d'indecision, de flottement et de changer du tout
au tout. Les Soviets accusent leurs adversaires de substituer la lut-
te des races h la lutte des classes, de propager le slogan "Le vent
d'est domine dans l'Ouest" au lieu de "Ouvriers du monde, unissez-
vous", et laisse entendre h plusieurs reprises que les Chinois ont
"d'autres buts qui n'ont rien h voir avec la revolution" ou l'aboli-
tion du capitalisme". Les Chinois sont accuses de vouloir entratner
l'U.R.S.S. et les Etats-Unis dans une guerre meurtriere l'un contre
l'autre. On peut facilement juger du ton de la lettre par les ter-
mea appliqu?aux Chinois: "actions franchement hostiles", "activi-
tes divisoires", camouflage de leurs vues errondes et de leurs posi-
tions incorrectes", "ont fait tout ce qu'ils ont Pu pour insulter
et attaquer l'Uhion Sovidtique", "jonglent avec les citations", "in-
vention et calomnie monstrueuses", "essaient de souiller le program-
me du P.C.U.S.", "leur impuissance complete", "discours pseudo-thd-
orique", "accusent d'une maniere arrogante et injurieuse", "se mo-
ouent des accords", "ont recours h un langage grossier", "s'abais-
sent h des insinuations", "absurditd", "se servent des chefs albanais
comme porte-parole", etc.
La lettre du P.C.U.S. (en six parties numerotdes) commence par
une revue longue de 1200 mots de la conduite provocante que les Chi-
nois "prenant notre reserve pour de la faiblesse" ont eu en juin et
juillet. Elle rappelle "pres d'un demi-si?e de direction sovidti-
qu_e_ dans la lutte pour le triompbe du marxisme-ldniniSEP et "l'aide
dEbime et desintdressde" apportde par les Soviets "a tous les peuples
qui luttent pour se libdrer du joug de l'impdrialisme", citant parti-
culierement l'aide h la Chine ob mgme maintenant elle aide h la cons-
truction de 88 entreprises et projets. La lettre cite Mao comme
ayant dit en 1957 que "le peuple Chinois n'oubliera jamais", et le
P.C.U.S. ajoute: "on ne peut que regretter que les chefs chinois
aient commencd par oublier eux-mgme."
La lettre attire l'attention sur la publication chinoise "Vive
le Ldninisme", qui date d'avril 1960 et est attribude h Mao, comme
dtant la premiere chose revelant ouvertement que les Chinois n'etaient
"pas d'accord avec le Nouvement Communiste Mondial". La lettre sou-
ligne d'autres mesures prises par les Chinois pour imposer leurs vues:
la sdance de la Confdddration Syndicale Mondiale de juin 1960 h Pd-
kin, le congres de Bucarest, et la conilrence de 1960 h Moscau.
Apres cette derniere, "us ont repris la propagande pour leur facon
de voir, se servant comme porte-parole des chefs du Parti des Ouvriers
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d'Albanie. Derriere notre dos, Us out lancd une campagne contre
le comit6 central du P.C.U.S. et le gouvernement sovietique". En
octobre 1961 le comitd central du P.C.U.S. "entreprit de nouvelles
tentatives pour normaliser les relations avec le P.C.C." et continua
pendant l'automne de 1962 par des efforts qui sont restes sans re-
ponse.
La lettre accuse ensuite les Chefs chinois de laisser les dif-
ferences ideologiques agir our les relations entre Etats, dormant
des chiffres pour montrer que depuis trois aria le commerce a diminue
enormdment "de l'initiative des Chefs chimois". Elle ajaute que
"les desaccords entre piRM fraternels ne sont qu'un episode tempo-
raire alors que les relations entre les peuples des pays socialistes
sont en train d'Otre dtablies pour tout le temps h venir".
Peasant en revue les "activitis divisoires" des Chinois h la
s?ce du Conseil Mondial de la Paix en acembre 1961 et aux seances
de 1962 de is. F6ddration Syndicale Mondiale, du Conseil Mondial de
is Paix, de l'Organisation de Solidarite des Peuples Afro-Asiatlques,
de la F4d6ration Mondiale de is Jeunesse Umocratique, et de is Fe-
ddration Democratique Internationale des Femmes, les Soviets se plai-
gnent que les Chinois les out kart& de is 3e Conference de l'Orga-
nisation de Solidarite des Peuples Afro-Asiatiques h Moshi: "le
chef de la deldgation chinoise a dit au representants sovidtiques
que "les Blanes n'ont rien h voir ici". Les Chinois out aussi emp0-
oil les Soviets de participer h la conference des journalistes h
Djakarta "sous prdtexte que l'Union Soviftique n'est pas un pays asi-
atique". Au recent congres de is Feddration Democratique Internati-
onale des Femmes, les Chinois out "accuse la majorite ecrasante de
se lancer dans des activies divisoires", alors Gape des 110 pays re-
present& au congres "seuls les repr6sentants de deux pays -- is
Chine et l'Albanie ont vote contre" is resolution.
Dans is deuxibme partie le P.C.U.S. en vient au "fond du diffe-
rend". "Le fond de is question est qu'ayant commencd uric offensive
contre les positions des partis marxistes-leninistes sur les atti-
tudes importantes d'aujourd'huil les camarades chinois out commence
ar attribuer au P.C.U.S. et h d'autres .artis marxistes-16ninistes
des opinions v Ils n'ont jamais exprin-es et ui leur sont trail-
Ores: en deuxilme lieu us out essay en reconnaissant verbalement
la formule et les positions egruntdes "aux documents du mouvement
communiste de camaufler leurs vues erio66es et leure.positions in-
correctes." Se declarer ouvertement contre la coexistence paoifique,
le ddsarmement, etc., reviendrait h devoiler leurs positions aux yeux
des communistes du monde entier et des peuples aids de la paix, ce
qui aurait pour effet de les rebuter." Par consequent, "plus la fai-
blesse des positions des chefs du P.C.C. devient apparente, plus us
out recours h cc genre de camouflage." Derriere cc camouflage "sco-
lastique" toutefois, ii y a les questions essentielles de is guerre
et de is paix, le role et le ddvelop emea du s stEFeocialiste
mondial, la lutte contre l'id ologie et le culte de la personnaliA,
la strategic et les tactiques du mouvement ouvrier mondial, et la
lutte de liberation nationale.
"Le comite central du P.C.U.S. pense qu'il est de son devoir
de dire au parti et au peuple en toute franchise" que les chefs du
ApP:'r:scoe'd f8nreterice
? 0 I - - - 0 ? ? ? ?
? ?I? fot? vans vs/ ? ?
? ? ? ?
tib6201666bcf-Te
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les problemes essentiels comme la possibilite d'eviter une guerre
thermo-nucleaire mondiale, la coexistence pacifique des Etats qui
ont des systbmes sociaux differents, et la correlation entre la
lutte pour la paix et le developpement du mouvement revolutionnaire
mondial." l'Qu'est-ce qu'il y a derri0i-iii-WgiraVolutionnaires
bruyantes des camarades chinois? Un manque de foi dans les forces
de la classe ouvrihre, dans ce qu'elle peut acccaplir au point de
vue revolutionnaire, etc. "Adopter le chemin propose par les cama-
rades chinois signifie s'aliener les masses populaires." "La bombe
atomiqueittplinnasle ?rinciedesclasses: elle de-bruit tout
ce-4-asetrouvedanonchampdaction.I1 est 6rident que les
Chinois sous-estiment le danger de la guerre thermo-nucleaire" quand
us soutiennent que "la bombe atomique est in tigre de papier mache."
"Des chefs chinois responpables out egalement declare qu'il etait
possible de sacrifier des centaines de millions de personnes dans
une guerre. 'Sur les ruines de l'lmpOialisme victorieux' affir-
me la collection 'Vive le Leninism& -- 'les peuples victorieux ore-
eront une civilisation mule fois plus haute alle sous le sisteme
pitaliste".
La lettre fait alors remarquer: "La facon dont les camarades
chinois posent la question pourrait faire nattre un soupcon bien jus-
tifie qu'il ne s'agit plus des classes dans la lutte pour l'aboli-
tion du capitalismai mais d'objectifs complbtement differents
Il est impossible de ne pas remarquer le fait qu'au lieu de penser
l'internatisesmeclassimedansl'al'Ouvriers
du monde, unissez-vousl, les camarades chinois propagent avec opi-
nigtrete le slogan depourvu de tout sens de classe: 'Le vent d'est
domine dans l'Ouest'".
Peasant la crise de Cuba en revue, la lettre dit que les"Cama-
rades Chinois out fait tout ce qu'ils ont pu pour insulter at atta-
quer l'Union Somietique". Elle conclut: "On en tire l'lmpression
ue les chefs du P.C.C. sant d'avis qu'il est de leur avantage de
preserver et d'intensifier les tensions internationales. surIgat_ta
ce QUi concerne l'U.R.S.S. et les Etats-Unis."
La troisibme partie de la lettre est consacree au "culte de la
personnalite; le P.C.U.S accuse les chefs du"P.C.C. d'avoir pris
le rtle de defenseurs du culte de la personnalite, de propagateurs
des idees erronees de Staline." Elle cite Mao, Liu et Teng comme
ayant tout d'abord approuve l'action du XXe congres du P.C.U.S.
"C'est h l'usage que l'on mesure le mieux la verite", dit la
lettre qui cite les progrbs faits depuis 10 ans. Male les chefs
du P.C.C. "font allusion h une sorte 'd'embourgeoisementl et de
idegenerescence' de la societe sovietique. Penser comme eux revient
h dire qu'on a le communisme si les gens portent des sandales faites
en fibres vegetales et mangent une soupe claire, mais que si un ou-
vrier vit bien et desire vivre encore mieux demain ii slagit pour
ainsi dire d'une restauration du capitalisme."
La lettre en vient alors h l'attaque du P.C.C. touchant h la
revendication sovidtique que "la dictature du proletariat" a fait
place en U.R.S.S. h "un Etat constitud par le peuple entier".
"Quiconque lit ce qu'ils racontent dans leur lettre ne peut
manquer de remarquer leur impuissance c.u.lbte et leur manque de
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oonnaissance en ce qui concerne le peuple sovietique. On nous ap-
prend que des classes hostiles existent encore dans is societe so-
viStique et que par consdquent on a encore besoin de la dictature
du proletariat." La lettre du P.C.C. cite comme etant des classes
hostiles "les parasites bourgeois et autres, les trafiqueurs du
march noir," etc. "Il taut admettre, disent les Soviets, que nos
camarades chinois ont une conception extrgmement originale des clas-
ses et de la lutte des classes. Depuis quad ces 616ments parasites
sont-ils considdres come une classe? Et de quelle classe s'agit-il?
Dans la quatribme partie, le P.C.U.S. traite des "moyens et des
m4thodes de la lutte revolutionnaire de la classe ouvriere dans les
:pays du capitalisme, de la lutte pour la liberation nationale, de
la favn de faire la transition de toute l'humanite au socialisme."
Les Chinois en parlent comme s'ils etaient pour la rdvolution mondir
ale et que le P.C.U.S. et les autres partis avaient oublie la revolu-
tion." En r6a1ite, dit le P.C.U.S., la division "se fait sur un plan
tout h fait different: certains h savoir les chefs du P.C.C. --
parlent de la revolution mondiale alors que d'autres -- precise-
merit ceux que les camarades chinois critiquent considbrent la
question de la revolution avec une attitude extrgmement serieuse et
au lieu de faire des phrases, travaillent dur h chercher les meil-
leurs moyens d'arriver h la victoire du socialisme, des moyens qui
concordent le mieux avec les conditions actuelles, et luttent de
toute leur force pour l'independance nationale, la democratie et le
socialisme." Par leur politique de paix, dit la lettre, les commu-
nistes soviStiques "apportent une aide inestimable h la classe ou-
vribre des pays capitalistes, remportant "des succes magnifiques."
La lettre cite Lenine sur le sujet de l'importance de la victoire
economive, "mais voilh maintenant qu'il y a des camarades qui pen-
sent que V.I. Lenine avait tort. Qu'y a-t-il? est-ce quism se
demande si les pays socialistes peuvent avoir raison du capitalisme
par la competition Sconomique? Cu de personnes qui, ayant
rencontr6 des difficu1t6s dans la construction du socialisme, se
sont decourE4es?
"Les communistes chinois d'une manibre arrogante et injurieuse
accusent les partis communistes de France, d'Italie, des Etats-Unis
et d'autres pays de rien moms que d'opportunisme et de reformisme,
de 'cretinisme parlementaire et mgme de glisser dans le 'socialisme
bourgeois' mais tout marxiste-ldniniste bien inform6 sait qulavan-
cer un slogan en vue d'un soulhvement arms quand ii n'existe pas de
situation revolutionnaire dans le pays equivaut h condemner la clas-
se ouvriere h la defaite."
Se tournant vers "les rapports entre la lutte de la classe ou-
vribre internationale et le mouvement de liberation nationale des
peuples d'Asie, d'Afrique et d'Amerique Latine," la lettre les ap-
pelle "les grandes forces de notre ?que", et ajoute que "la coor-
dination correcte entre elles represente une des conditions les
plus importantes h la victoire sur 1'imp6ria1isme." Mais la 'nou-
velle theorie" des Chinois, dit le P.C.U.S., est que la principale
contradiction n'est "pas entre le socialisme et l'impdrialisme mais
entre le mouvement de 1ib6ration nationale et l'imperialisme", et la
force decisive dans la lutte contre 1'imp6r1a1isme n'est pas le
systhme mondial du socialisme, pas la lutte de la classe ouvribre
internationale, mais encore une Lois le mouvement de 1ib6ration
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nationale. semble que les camarades chinois veuillent de cette
facon f4azner le plus facilement possible de la popularite chez les
peuples de l'Asie, de l'Afri ue et de l'Ameri ue Latine. Mais ne
nous laissons pas decevoir par cette th orie . Que les theoriciens
chinois le veuillent ou non, cette theorie signifie essentiellement
l'isolement du mouvement de liberation nationale de la classe ouvri-
bre internationale et sa progeniture -- le systbme mondial du soci-
alisme". "Derriere le vacarme au sujet de la 'revolution mondiale'
clue ftn% les cAmarades chinois ii y a d'autres objectifs qui n'ont
rien h voir avec la revolution."
La cinguibme partie de la lettre sovietique traite essentielle-
ment du theme que "les vues erronees des chefs du P.C.C. sont in-
separablement relides h leurs activites pratiques qui ont pour objet
de miner l'unite du camp socialisme mpadial et le mouvement communis-
te international." Et il est de nouveau question en detail du fait
qu'au cours des trois dernieres annees les Chinois ont diminue de
plus de la moitie leur commerce avec la communaute socialiste.
Plus loin, la lettre dit: "Les chefs du parti communiste
chinois organisent et appuient divers groues de renegats anti-parti
qui s'elevent contre les partis communistes aux ttats-Unii7-itrirrlall
en Italie, en Belgique, en Australie et dans l'Inde", elle entre dans
les details, parlant de la publication et de la circulation "en un
grand nombre de langues" d'articles discreditant ces partis, ayant
recours h des 'expressions grossibres' comme 'fourberiee, etc.
"Et dans leur lettre du 14 juin, les chefs du P.C.C. s'abaissent
jus?uth insinuer sue le P.C.U.S. lui aussi aurait ?arait-il ?rls le
r?le-dieuxiliaire de 1 imp rialisme.' Personne 1 exception de
Trots' n'avait encore os, tant donne l'absurdite evidente de la
chose, lancer de telles calomnies_au grandjarti de Lenine."
Cette section de la lettre se termine par une allusion h la
declaration du parti communiste chinois disant qu'il est "inadmissi-
ble qu'un parti se place au dessus des autres partis fraternels,
quill s'ingere dans les affaires interieures des partis fraternels
..." Pour donner un exemple, le P.C.U.S. cite l'excommunication'
de la Yougoslavie par les Chinois. La lettre cite "Le guotidipa du
Peuple" en 1955: "La Yougoslavie est dejh parvenue des succbs
remarquables dans la construction du socialisme", et des statisti-
ques sont donnees a l'appui pour montrer que le secteur socialiste
s'est encore affermi depuis. "Pourquoi alors les chefs chinois
ont-ils change si complbtement leur position sur la question yougos-
lave? Ii est difficile de trouver une explication si ce n'est qu'ils
ont vu lh un pretexte avantaeaux -- a leur opinion -- pour jeter le
discredit sur la politique du P.C.U.S. et autres partis marxistes-
leninistes."
La sixibme section est une recapitulation de mule mots sur un
ton de triomphe et de confidence. "Notre glorieux parti leniniste
a ete cuirasse et affermi dans cette lutte pour la purete du marxis-
me-leninisme, et ne craint pas les attaques de ceux qui aujourd'hui
provoquent la desunion et des opportunistes queue que soit leur
origine."
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Andlisis de la "carte abierta" del PCUS publicada el 14 de ju1io de
1963
La carte expresa el prop6s1to de "formular nuestra posicion
sobre la cuestiones fundamentales del movimiento comunista internaci-
onal con relaci6n a la carte del CC del PC chino de 14 de junio de
1963." Recorre la game de divergencies tedricas con los chinos, muy
pocas veces profundizando en la argumentaci6n ideologica casuistica
de estos, acusdndolos de atribuir al PCUS opiniones y puntos de vista
que este no mantiene y al propio tiempo exagerando las opiniones
del PC chino haste extremos que este mismo no defiende. Despliega
una extensa relacidn de quejas contra el comportamiento chino en egos
recientes, en muchos casos devolviendo contra los chinos acusaciones
que ellos ya habian lanzado al PCUS. Menciona a Mao y a otros diri-
gentes chinos en un context? que los acusa indirectamente de vacilar,
titubear y hacer virajes de 180 grados. Los sovieticos acusan a sus
contrincantes de practicer la lucha de raza en lugar de la de clase,
propagando la consigna de que "el viento de Oriente prevalece sobre
el de Occidente" en vez del de "Obreros del Mundo, unios," y varies
veces dan a entender clue los chinos tienen "otras metes que nada
tienen en comtn con la revo1uci6n" o "la abolici6n del capitalismo."
Acusan a los chinos de querer enredar a la USSR y los EE.UU. en guer-
ra mortif era entre sf. El tono de la carte se puede ver fdcilmente
en algunas de las erases contra los chinos: "actuaciones francemen-
te hostiles"; "actividades escisionistas"; "cermflan sus opiniones
erradas y posiciones incorrectas"; "hicieron cuanto pudieron por
insulter y atacar a la Uni6n Sovietica"; "escamoteando cites";
"diccide y calumnia monstruosas"; "tratando de embarrar el Programa
del PCUS"; "au absolute indefensi6n"; "discurso seudotedrico";
"altanera y abusivamente acusan"; "desprecio de los acuerdos";
"recurren al lenguaje soez"; "se rebaja a hacer insinuaciones";
"el absurdo"; "emplean a los dirigentes albaneses como sus porta-
voces," etc.
La carte del PCUS (en seis partes numeradas) empieza con una
revista ea 1.200 palabras de la provocative conducta china de junio
y Julio, "confundiendo con debilidad nuestra contencidn propia."
Rememora "casi medio siglo" de liderato sovietico en la lucha por el
triunfo del marxismo-leniniemo y la "tremenda y desinteresada ayuda"
sovietica "a todos los pueblos en lucha por liberarse del yugo del
imperialismo," citando especialmente la yuda a China, donde adn ahora
estd ayudando en la construed& de 88 empresas y obras. Atrieuye
a Mao la declaracion en 1957 de que "el pueblo chino jamds olvidard
todo esto," a lo cual affiade el PCU: "no puede uno memos que sentir
que los dirigentes chinos sf hayan empezado a olvidar esto."
La carta sefiala la publicaci6n china "Viva el Leninismo," de
abril de 1960, atribuida a Mao como la primera en haber reveled? las
"divergencies con el movimiento comunista mundial" que tienen los
chinos. La carte Beala otras medidas de los chinos por imponer sus
opiniones: la reuni6n de la FSM en Pekln en junio de 1960, el con-
greso de Bucarest, y la conferencia de Moscd en 1960. Despues de
eta dltima, "volvieron a la propaganda de su curso, empleando como
portavoces a los dirigentes del Partido Albans de los Trabajadores.
A espaldas nuestras lanzaron una campaa contra el CC del PCUS y el
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Gobierno sovietico." En octubre de 1961 el CC del PCUS "inici6
nuevas tentativas por normalizar las relaciones con el PC chino,"
y despues de ellas hizo esfuerzos bevsta el transcurso del otono
de 1962 que no recibieron respuesta.
La carta luego acusa a los dirigentes chinos de llevar las
divergencias ideolOgicas a las relaciones entre estados, presentando
cifras que comprobaban drdsticas reducciones en los intercambios co*
merciales en los dltimos tree agos "a iniciativa de los dirigentes
chinos." Declara ademAs que "los entre
no son ms que episodio pasajero, mientras que las relaciones
entre los pueblos de los pafses socialistas estdn ahora siendo esta-
blecidas por siempre jamds."
Pasando en revista las "actividades escisionistas" de los chinos
en la reuni6n del Consejo Mundial de la Paz en Estocolmo en diciembre
de 1961 y en las reuniones de 1962 de la FSM, CMP, OSPAA, FMDJ y FDIM,
los sovidticos se quejan de que los chinos les cerraron las puertas
a la Tercera Conferencia de la OSPAA en Moshi: "el lider de la de-
legaciOn china declar6 a los representantes sovieticos que 'los blan-
cos nada tienen que bacer aquf." Los chinos tambien impidieron a
los sovieticos tomer parte en la conferencia de periodistas en Ja-
karta "aduciendo que la Union Sovidtica no es pais de Asia." Y en
el reciente congreso de la FDIM los chinos "acusaron a la inmensa
mayoria de dedicarse a las actividades escisionistas", cuando "solo
los representantes de dos praises -- China y Albania -- entre los
110 pafses representados en el congresos votaron en contra" del lla-
mamiento.
En la segunda parte el PCUS se dirige al "quid de las divergen-
cias." "Los esencial del asunto es que, babiendo lanzado una ofen-
siva contra las posiciones de los partidos morxistas-leninistas
sobre las posiciones cardinales de boy, los csmAradas chinos primero
atribuyen al PCUS y a otros partidos marxistas-leninistas opiniones
que estos nunca ban expresado y que les son extranas; segundo, tra-
tan por el reconocimiento verbal de la fOrmula y posiciones tomadas
a prdstamo de los documentos del movimiento comunista de camuflar
sus opiniones errOneas y posiciones incorrectas." Oponerse abierta-
mente a la coexistencia pacffica, el desarme, etc., "seria dejar al
desnudo sus opiniones ante los ojos de los comunistas del mundo en-
tero y los pueblos amantes de la paz y repelerlos." Por lo tanto,
"cuanto mAs clara se hace la debilidad de las posiciones del lide-
rato del PC chino, tanto ms celosamente recurre a semejante camu-
flaje." Detrds de este camuflaje "escoldstico," sin embargo, se
hallan las vitales cuestiones de la paz y la guerra, el papel y el
desenvolvimiento del sistema socialista mundiai; la lucha contra
la ideologia y la prdctica del "culto a la personalidad;" la es-
trategia y tdctida del Movimiento obrero mundial, y la lucha por la
liberaciOn nacional.
"El CC del PCUS considera deber necesario decirle al Partido
y al pueblo con toda franqueza" que el liderato del PC chino mira
"desde unlounto de vista diametralmente opuesto problemas vitales
tales como la posibilidad de evitar una guerra mundial termonuclear,
la coexistencia pacifica de los estados que tienen sistemas sociales
diferentes y la interrelaciOn entre la lucha por la paz y el desen-
volvimiento del movimient revolucionario mundial." %axe hay detrds
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de las ruidosas frases revolucionarias de los camaradas chinos?
Falta de fe en las fuerzas de la clase trabajadora, en su capacidad
revolucionaria," etc. "Echarse por la senda propuesta por los cama-
radas chinos significa enajenar las mesas populares." "La bombe
at6mica no se adhiere al principio clasista: destruye a todos los
que se encuentran dentro del alcance de su potencia devastadora."
Los chinos "evidentemente subestiman todo el peligro de la guerra
termonuclear" auando argumentan que "la bomba at6mica es un tigre de
papel." "Algunos dirigentes chinos responsables tambidn han decla-
redo que es p?sible sacrificer centenares de millones de gente en
la guerra. Sobre las ruinas del imperialism? destruid2, los pueblos
victoriososi -- declare la colecciOn "Viva el Leninism? Icreara
una civilizaciOn mil veces mds alta gae baja el sistema capitaligEg7r
La carta entonces apunta intencionadamente: "La presentaciOn
de la cuestion de este manera por los camaradas chinos puede engen-
drar una sospecha justificada de que va no se trata de una actitud
clasista en la lucha por la abrogaci6n del capitalism?, sino de una
con fines enteramente diferentes ... Es imposible dejar de notar el
hecho de que en vez del internacionalismo clasista expresado en el
llsmamiento iobreros del mundo,71=7-Di camaradas chinos tozuda-
mente propagan la consigna desprovista de todo sentido clasista:
el viento del Oriente prevalece sabre el de Occidente."
Examinando la crisis cubana, la carte manifiesta que "los cama-
radas chinos hicieron todo cuanto pudieron por insulter y atacar a
la Uni6n Sovietica." Llega a esta conclusi6n: "Surge la impresi6n
de que los dirigentes del PC chino consideran la conservaciOn e in-
tensificacion de la tension internacional, especialmente en las re-
laciones entre la URSS y los EE.UU., ventagoses para 81 mismos.7--
La tercera parte de la carta esta dedicada al "culto de la
personalidad," denunciando el PCUS que "los dirigentes del PC chino
se arrogaron el papel de defensores del culto de la personalidad y
propagadores de las defectuosas ideas de Stalin." Cita la aproba-
cion por parte de Mao, Liu y Teng de la acciOn del XX Congreso del
PCUS, originalmente.
"La practice es la mejor medida de la verdad," expresa la
carte, y menciona los adelantos de los dltimos diez ans. Pero los
dirigentes del PC chino "insindan alguna clase de Iaburguesamientot
y IdegeneraciOne de la sociedad sovidtica. De acuerdo con este ma-
nera de pensar, resulta que si la gente lleva sandalias de cuerda y
tome sopa aguada de una taza, eso constituye comunismo, y si un obre-
ro rive bien y quiere vivir aun mejor maEana, ello equivale a la
restauracion del capitalismo."
La carte entonces se ocupa del ataque del PC chino sabre la
pretensiOn sovietica de que la "dictadura del proletariado" ha sido
reemplazada en la Uni6n Soviatica por un "estado del pueblo entero."
"Cualqniera que lea los discursos en la carta de ellos notard
sin duda alguna su absolute indefensiOn y carencia de conocimientos
sobre la vide del pueblo sovidtico. Se nos esta enseEando que en
la sociedad sovidtica atm hay clases hostiles y por lo tanto, vera
usted, permanece la necesidad de la dictadura del proletariado."
La carte del PC chino menciona como clases a "haraganes burgueses,
pardsitos,
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los savidticos, "que esta es una idea imay original de lOs camaradaa
chinos sobre las clases y la lucha de claSed4 Oesde Cando 08 con-
sideran class dichOs elementos parasitarios? a qu4 clase?
En la cuarta parte la carta del PCUS trata sobre "las vias y
metodos de la lucha revolucionaria de la clase obrera en los patses
del capitalism?, la lucha por la liberaci6n nacion17,7111777a770i;
la transici6n de toda la humanidad al socialismo." Los chinos pintan
las cosas cOmo que ells propugnan la revoluci6n mundial y otros par-
tidos "ban olvidado la revoluci6n." En realidad, declara el PCUS,
la divisi6n "estd en un piano enteramente diferente: algunos o
sea los dirigente0 del PC chino -- hablan de revoluci6n mundial
mientras que otros precisamente aquellos a quienes los camaradas
chinos critican tratan el asunto de la revoluci6n con la mayor
seriedad y, en lugar de bordar fraseologia, trabajan fuerte, tratando
de encontrar las mejores vias a la victoria del socialismo, vias que
mejor se ajustan a las condiciones actuales, y luchan con fuerza por
la independencia nacional, la democracia y el socialismo." Con su
politica de paz, dice la carta, los comunistas sovi6tico6 "prestan
ayuda inestimable a la clase trabajadora" de los paises capitalistas,
apuntandose "magnificos dxitos." Cita a Lenin sobre la importancia
de la victoria econ6mica, "pero ahora resulta que hay camaradas que
creen qua V. I. Lenin estaba equivocado. &GM es esto falta de
fe en la capacidad de los paises del socialismo para derrotar al
capitalismo en la competencia econonica? -0 es la postura de gentes
qua., abocandose a dificultades en la construccion del socialism)
se ban desalentado ...?
"Los comunistas chinos altanera y abusivamente acusan a los
Partidos Comunistas de Francia, Italia, los EE.UU. y otros paises
nada menos que de oportuniimo y reformism?, de 'cretinismo parlamen-
tario' y basta de deslizarse basta el 'socialismo burguds," pero
todo marxista-leninista enterado sabe que adelantar una consigna
por una revuelta armada cuando en el pais no existe una situaci6n
revolucionaria quiere decir condenar a la clase obrera a is derrota."
Pasando a "18 relaci6n entre la lucha de la clase obrera in-
ternacional y el movimiento de liberacion nacional de los pueblos de
Asia, Africa y Amdrica Latina," is carta las denomina "las grandes
fuerzas de nuestra dpoca," alladiendo que "la correcta coordinacion
entre alias constituye uno de los principales requisitos para la
victoria sobre el imperialismo." Pero la "nueva teoria" de los
chinos, express el PCUS, es que la principal contradiccion radica
"no entre el socialismo y el imperialismo sino entre el movimiento
de liberaci6n nacional y el imperialismo," y que "la fuerza decisiva
en is lucha contra el imperialismo ... no es el sistema mundial del
socialismo, no is lucha de is clase obrera internacional, sino otra
vez el movimiento de liberaci6n nacional. De tab manera, los cama-
radas chinos parecen pretender ganarse de la manera ms facil la
popularidad entre los pueblos de Asia, Africa y Am rica Latina.
Pero que nadie se deje engaZar por esta Iteoria.1 Quigranlo o no
los te6ricos chinos, iesta teoria implica esencialmente el aislami-
ento del movimiento de liberaci6n nacional de la clase obrera inter-
nacional y su progenie -- el siitema mundial del socialismo" "Tras
el alboroto sobre 'revoluci6n alzado por los camaradas
chinos se enauentran otras metas que nada tienen en comdn con la
revoluci6n."
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La parte cinco de la carte sovietica enfoca el tema de que
"las erroneas opiniones de los dirigentes del PC chino ... est&
vinculadas inseparablemente con sus actividades practices diri idaS
a socavar la unidad del campo socia ista mundi y e movim ento
comunista internacional." La carte de nuevo se refiere a la reduc-
ci6n or parte de los chinos del comercio con la comunidad socialis-
ta en mos de un SO por ciento en los tltimos tres atos.
Ademas, declare la carte, "los dirigentes del PC chino organi-
zan y apoyan a various_grupos antipartidistas de renegados gue se
declaran contrarios a los Partiaos Comunistas en los EE. .1 Brasil,
Italia, Bdlgica, Australia, e India. Entre en algdn detalle, re-
firidndose a la publicacion y circu1aci6n "en muchos idiomas de ar-
ticulos en descredito" de dichos partidos, el empleo de "expresiones
soeces tales como 'doblez," etc. "Y en su carte de 14 de junio los
dirigentes del PC chino se rebajan a insinuar que tambidu el PCUS
segdn se dice 'sale on el papel de avudante del imperialismo.' Na-
die maii _sue Trotsky haste ahora se ha atrevido, en vista de lo ab-
surdo de ello, a dirigir acusaciones tan calumniosas contra el gran
Partido de Lenin.'
Esta secci6n de la carta concluye diciendo con relaci6n a la
declaracion del PC chino que es "impermisible que un partido se co-
love por encima de los otros partidos fraternos, intervenga en
los asuntos internos de partidos fraternos ... Como ejemplo el
PCUS menciona la "excomunidn de Yugoslavia por parte de los chinos.
La carte lleva una cita del "Diario del Pueblo" de 1955: "Yugos-
lavia ya ha conseguido notables axitos en la construcci6n del socia-
lismo," y las estadfsticas acusan una mayor cosolidacion del sector
socialista desde entonces. "4Por que, entonces, han canibiado los
dirigentes chinos tan drdsticamente su posici6n sobre la cuestion
de Yugoslavia? Es dificil encontrar explicacion que no sea que
vieron en ello uno de los pretextos ventajosos -- en opinidn suya --
pare desacreditar la politica del PCUS y otros partidos marxistas-
leninistas."
La secci6n seis es una recapitulaci6n en mil palabras con un
tono de triunfo y confianza. "Nuestro glorioso partido leninista
fue templado y fortalecido en esta lucha por la pureza del mar-
xismo-leninismo y no tiene temor alguno a los escisionistas y opor-
tunistas de cualquier lado que venga."
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690. Belated Help for Soviet Agriculture
BACKGROUND: This summer, the Soviet Union has reversed its
previous position and accepted the Anglo-A.Aerican proposals of
1353, 1961, and 1962 for a test ban treaty excluding underground
tests. This reversal is probably due to a number of inter-related
events, such as the outcome of last fall's Cuban crisis, the Sino-
Soviet rivalry, the consolidation of Khrushchev's position, and a
Soviet realization that the US cannot easily be outpaced in bomb
and rocket construction. Another factor, at first sight less
relevant but actually most pertinent, is the need to devote greater
resources to meeting the needs of Soviet consumers, especially
their need for a better diet. The Soviet rulers have long since
publicly committed themselves to raising the standard of living,
and they are now no longer able -- even if they might be willing --
to ignore public dissatisfaction. By contrast, and in keeping
with their hard-line dogmatic outlook, the Chinese Communists have
lately clamped down on private plots, after a temporary relaxation
of collectivization.
Soviet agriculture and the test ban treaty appear to be linked
in this way: agriculture in the USSR has reached a point where
an expensive new investment of resources is necessary, and in
general it is impossible to devote resources simultaneously to
agriculture and to rocket production. A lessening of international
tension, including a test ban treaty, reduces the need for arms
expenditure.
The expenditures for agriculture currently take the form of
building up a chemical industry, producing large quantities of
fertilizer and insecticides. By themselves, such expenditures will
not solve the problems of Bloc agriculture, which stem largely
from the collective system and from problems of climate. Neither
will the developing chemical industry serve purely agricultural
goals: some new plants will make synthetics for consumer use,
and ultimately a certain proportion of the output of new plants
(including refineries) will no doubt be used for military purposes
and for foreign trade and aid, supporting cold war moves. Communist
goals have not changed, and the non-Communist world should not
relax its vigilance. But in the short run, the Soviets seem to be
turning to peaceful development and peaceful economic competition.
(See attachment for unclassified discussion of Bloc agriculture.)
25X1C10b
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691. Red Flag Criticizes Chinese Communist Party Cadres
BACKGROUND: The entire July issue of Red Flag, the official
organ of the Chinese Communist ?arty Central Committee, is devoted
to the theme of cadre reform and correction through actual partici-
pation in physical labor. The Peking Peoples Daily and Radio Peking
are also carrying numerous editorials and articles on the same sub-
ject. The current campaign is the most vigorous one since 1957
d=ing which hundreds of thousands of cadres were sent into basic
production jobs in anticipation of the "Great Leap Forward." In
Communist usage, cadres (Chinese Communists use military terms
extensively for activities ordinarily labeled civilian elsewhere,
e.g. labor brigades) means any activist whether in the party, gov-
ernment or in industry. The Red Flag article, however, singles
out those party functionaries whose job it is to serve as a link
between the people and the party, to supervise the carrying-out of
?arty oolicy at the operational level.
Cadres are currently accused of putting their own personal
interests above those of the party and the State, of failing to
adhere to and carry out specific, concrete policies, of disdaining
political ideological work, misappropriating public funds and
embezzling, and of general disregard for the interests of the people
and the State. These are all taken as a sign that the cadres are
"divorced and estranged" from the people and that they often sit
around and act like "traditional magistrates who are above the
people." The reform-through-physical-labor campaign is designed
to recreate "Socialist consciousness" among the cadres and restore
their revolutionary fervor. The masses will benefit from the
cadre-labor campaign because the cadres will be able to arouse "the
initiative of the masses for labor and to reform bad-labor habits
by 'Personal example."
The following quotations typify the viewpoint expressed in the
Red Flag editorial:
"Mien the cadres have sweated in production they will nurture
a greater love for the fruits of labor, which will make them become
good, frugal administrators of the socialist economy."
"When cadres work along with members, the dust on their faces
and the dirt on their bodies can be clearly seen by the people who
will help wash them up."
"Without participation in labor, revolutionary cadres will
soon forget their poor brothers and will not be able to stand firm
in the course of the class struggle."
"An iron rake will rust if it is not used; cadres will retro-
gress if they do not take part in labor. To us, taking part in
labor is a test."
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"Some cadres, if they constantly divorce themselves from
labor, may fall into the evil habits of despising labor, not
part in labor, being extravagant and wasteful, and mis-
appronriating public funds; and even go so far as to feel con-
tempt for physical labor ...thus walking the road that leads to
degeneration."
"Some of the cadres are fond of showing off by having an
inflated and overstaffed office which is low in efficiency and
wastesconsiderable manpower, material and funds. Some of them
whose revolutionary will has degenerated loaf around all day
long and have no sense of responsibility.... Some of them
indulge in idleness, chase fame and position, put on bureaucratic
airs, and have no concern for the weal and woe of the people or
the interests of the state."
Red Flag, July 10, 3_053 editorial (official organ of the Chinese
Communist
25X1C10b Party
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TPTPIONIM4041.1. 26 August 1963
692. AF, NE, g. Iraq: Communist Blueprint for Subversion
25X1C10
BACKGROUND: An unsuccessful early July coup d'etat in Iraq
uncovered widely ramified Communist efforts to destroy a Middle
Eastern revolutionary government. The methods used add up to a
blueprint for subversion and revolution which may be typical of
similar efforts any place in the underdeveloped world. The
combination of an alert security service and somewhat clumsy
Communist action revealed the pattern of the coup and the details
of Communist machinations.
History: The Iraqi government of Communist-supported
Premier Abd-al-Karim Kassem which overthrew the monarchy in 1958,
was itself overthrown on February 8, 1963 by military forces led
by the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (Beath). The new
government promptly outlawed the Communist party and jailed or
executed many of its members for "criminal acts." Diplomatic
ties with Communist countries were retained; the new government
declared itself nonaligned but determined to resist internal
subversion. The USSR almost immediately set out to overthrow
the Beath and to obtain a more friendly government in this oil-
rich area. The reduction of Soviet influence in this country at
the head of the Persian Gulf undo.lbtedly also upset Russia's old
dream of warm water ports. A Soviet-inspired four-pronged
attach, using weapons of diplomacy, propaganda, aid and subversion,
was directed against Baghdad to get rid of the Beathis without
losing the friendship of the Arab Middle East.
Kurds Misused by Soviets. The nomadic Kurdish tribesmen of
Northern Iraq have sought autonomy from each succeeding Iraqi
regime since World War I. Negotiations with the new Ba'athist
government broke down in June when the government resumed fight-
ing because of what it termed the Kurds "outrageous demands,"
which it feared would ultimately include independence. Moscow
had long supported the cause of the Kurdish minority and encour-
aged the idea of an "independent" Soviet-influenced Kurdistan
(to include Kurds of Syria, Iran and Turkey as well) but played
down the issue while Kassem was attempting to suppress these
rebels, often with Soviet weapons. Immediately following renewal
of the fighting in June, Moscow publicly announced its support of
the Kurds, although the principal Kurdish leaders did not seek
it. The Soviet Union is exploiting the Kurdish rebellion as the
key factor in its anti-Iraq propaganda campaign, calling for the
Kurds and the Communists to join hands in the revolt against
Baghdad and attempting to give this Iraqi problem an interna-
tional status. While Radio Moscow was denying that the call
for Kurdish revolt constituted interference in internal Iraqi
affairs, the Soviet government was issuing a statement to Syria,
Iran and Turkey which
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(692 Cont.)
4 'Isimird6,6041.ffmr. 26 August 1963
draws attention to the menace created in the Middle
East as a result of interference by external forces
in the present events in North Iraq. These Soviet
warnings are actuated not only by humane feelings
toward the Kurdish people but also by a desire to
prevent the present situation from being exploited
by imperialists in their constant search for an
excuse to interfere in the Middle East. /-July 17
New Times, a Soviet world affairs wee1y.7-
At the same time Mongolia, the Soviet Union's ally in Asia, has
charged Iraq with genocide in the campaign against the Kurds and
will ask the United Nations General Assembly to take up the charge
at the 18th session starting September 17th.
Propaganda. Soviet and satellite propaganda immediately
following the February 1963 revolution relied heavily on clandes-
tine radios such as Peyk-e Iran, the voice of the Iranian Tudeh
(Communist) Party, presumably transmitting from Bulgaria, and the
Voice of the Iraqi People program from the same source. When it
became evident that the new Iraqi government would renounce the
Kassem government's reliance on Moscow, all Soviet and satellite
media joined the attack. Baghdad is accused, among other things,
of secret alliances with CENT? "imperialists," and of "Nazi"
tactics against the Kurds.
Foreign Aid. Four years of extensive economic and military
aid had put Moscow in a strong position with Kassem, but the
Ba'athist government, wary of any such dependence, cancelled some
long-standing agreements for military yb.:Ica:1 ct
Soviet technicians be withdrawn. For months the Soviets have
dragged their feet on removing personnel and insisted that
earlier contracts be honored and payment made. Buta Pravda article
of June 20th threatened to stop all military aid to -Nara the
government did not stop its fight with the Kurds. It made no
mention, of course, of the fact that the Soviets had supplied
arms to Kassem who had used them against the Kurds. Iraqi MinisteT
of Interior, Hazim Jawad, commented publicly on the threat:
The Pravda article has caused great surprise not only
in Iraq but among all neutral and non-aligned states.
The aid the Soviet Union has been extending to Iraq
is based . . . on noninterference in Iraq's domestic
affairs. Many neutral countries receive aid from the
Soviet Union and other states on the same basis. It
is regrettable that the Russians should believe that
their aid to Iraq should be dependent on any par-
ticular stand by the Iraqi government. If this is
true, the Soviets will be destroying an important
basis of relations between small and large states.
2
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(692 Cont.)
ailmamemRmemilm 23 August /963
Espionage and Subversion. On July 22nd Iraq declared five
BulgaFTEE-33-5T5iFfg-M-75-1175-2ist German trade mission officer*
personae non gratae and released details of a widespread agent
mechanism-Birected from the Bulgarian Embassy. Using their of-
ficial positions to make contacts, East Etaropean officials
attracted intelligence and action agents by use of large sums of
money and the favors of pretty women, according to testimony given
at subsequent trials of Iraqi agents arrested by the security
police. Iraqi agents were recruited to gather information for
clandestine radios, to plant false rumors, to supply doctored photo-
graphs for Communist media, to distribute the Communist antigovern-
ment literature, and to purchase military intelligence. TECHNO-
EXPORT, the office of Bulgarian aid, served as funding and recruit-
ing cover for the agent nets. The money to run the agent mechanism
was brought into Iraq ostensibly for an airport project which
Bulgaria was assisting. In some instances wives and daughters of
Bulgarian mission personnel acted as cut-outs between TECHNOEXP3RT
and Iraqi agents.
Major Jamil Sabri, Director-General of Security charged the
Bulgarian First Secretary with master-minding the July 3rd coup
attempt against the government which started as an uprisini-17-
the military Camp Rashid to free imprisoned Communist officers and
criminals of the Xassem regime to march on Eaghdad. After some
fighting, government forces put down the uprising before the plot
could be carried out. They found leaflets (apparently prepared
in the Bulgarian Embassy) at the Camp calling for a general upris-
ing and signed by the Communist Party as well as Seminov-make
Soviet guns and ammunition not generally available in Iraq.
Typical of the Iraqis involved was Abbas Shukur, described
as the top agent arrested after the uprising. Shukur said he
joined the Iraqi Communist Party in 1957 and had worked for the
Bulgarians for some time. After the overthrow of Xassem his Party
superior told him to invent stories of "criminal acts" undertaken
by the authorities and National Guardsmen. Later he discovered
that such stories were forwarded through the Bulgarian Embassy
to clandestine radio stations abroad. A week after the Camp
Rashid uprising he met his Bulgarian contact, Nikolov, who told
him that the Communists must continue to worn toward controlling
the government at any price, that he must double his efforts.* He
was promised money or whatever else he wanted. Nikolov told him
*Konstantin Nikolov, First Secretary, Bulgarian Embassy.
Xyril Ayankov Kyriakov, Trade Representative, Bulgarian Embassy.
Yordan Rusinov, Consular Service, Bulgarian Embassy.
Stefan Stefanov, Bulgarian Embassy.
Basil Xazarov, Exchange Department, Trade Attache, Bulgarian
Embassy.
Horst Hartmann, Employee of the GDR Trade Mission.
3
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(632 Cont.)
23 August 1963
that the Communist revolution in Iraq was bound to take place and
that all he had to do was "go on working."
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693 WEsa. Communism in Latin America
BACKGROUND: The truism that "Communism breeds on disconten-
appliTg-T6-afIn America, an area fraught with conditions which
foment discontent. Labor, intellectuals and youth -- groups ex-
pressing the greatest dissatisfaction with the status quo and
impatience for social cbange -- have been the major targets and
have supplied the principal leadership for Latin American Commu-
nist Parties. Following the European tradition, the area's
Communist strength has been built upon power within the trade
unions (in contrast to the Asian tradition where it has been
built upon rural elements).
Zowever, as the accompanying unclassified document "Communist
Strength in Latin America" testifies, while discontent is wide-
spread, the number of Communist Party members in Latin America is
small compared to the total population. But Communist success in
Latin America has never been based directly on the size of its
Communist Parties. It stems, rather, from the ability of the
Communists to associate themselves with popular socio-economic
causes and to exploit nationalist sentiments and individual
aspirations.
Communists in Latin America have incorporated the basic ele-
ments of a hemisphere-wide social revolution -- nationalism,
economic development, changes in class relationships and political
democracy -- into their Party platform. Exploitation of Latin
America's social revolution and close ties with the Soviet Union
have characterized the Communist movement in the area.
Soviet Link. It was sympathy with and admiration for the
Russian Revolution that led to the founding of Communist Parties
in Latin America. They were nurtured under Soviet tutelage; and
their leaders were trained in the USSR. Party orders emanated
from Moscow and ?arty policy was changed obediently whenever
Kremlin policy shifted. In June of 1941, for example, when the
Nazis invaded the USSR, Latin American Communists did an abrupt
about-face; the "imperialist" war they had been attacking was
suddenly transformed into a "war for liberation" worthy of their
full support. Capitalizing on the wartime spirit and the increas-
ing contacts and diplomatic ties Latin America had with the USSR
to establish their respectability, area CPs flourished. They
reached the zenith of their influence in the mid-1940s. CPs were
legal or at least tolerated in almost every country; they had
members sitting in the Congress or lesser legislative bodies in
at least half of the countries in the area and even in the Cabinets
of some.
But since that time, Latin American Communist Party strength
has declined. Postwar strains in Soviet-Latin American relations
were a factor leading to a break in diplomatic relations in many
countries and restrictions on CPs. In 1953 the Soviet Union re-
newed its trade expansion efforts and increased its propaganda
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activities recapturing some of its wartime respectability and
facilitating the development of local CPs.
"The one lodestar of the Communist ?arties of Latin America,
as of those the world over," wrote Robert J. Alexander in 1957
in Communism in Latin America (Rutgers University Press), "the
one thing that has never changed, is loyalty to the Soviet Union.
On this they never waver."
Chinese Ties. In spite of traditional Soviet ties the Chinese
Communists have been making inroads in the Communist movement in
Latin America. Younger elements of the movement resent the lack
of progress and achievement under "old-guard" (pro-Soviet) leader-
ship. A dissident faction -- rooted in local intra-party strife --
has been evolving for over a decade, its main strength drawn from
young professionals and students who are hostile to the unrespon-
siveness of right-wing governments and who favor the rapid changes
that accompany a successful revolution. The advent of Castro
accentuated the pace of their rebellion against Soviet-oriented
C? leadership and this trend has been manipulated by the Chinese.
Communist China has made aggressive use of propaganda to
make its presence felt in Latin America. It has diplomatic rela-
tions only with Cuba, but it has exchanged cultural and trade
missions with many others. The New China News Agency has outposts
in the area; radio broadcasts for Latin American audiences have
increased at a steady pace; troupes, films and exhibits have toured
the area. Binational cultural and friendship societies have been
developed and delegations and visitors to China encouraged and
financed. Scholarships are available and literature floods the
area. The net result has been increasing Latin American aware-
ness of the Chinese Communists and growing ties with them,
Chinese propaganda has not only increased, but also sharpened.
China has been trying to associate Latin American Communist groups
and fronts more closely with their counterparts in Asia and Africa
and especially with those which follow China in giving priority
to the "struggle against imperialism" over the campaign to safe-
guard peace. Racial appeals are increasingly used. China is also
trying to exploit Cuban eagerness to lead the Latin American
revolution and is suggesting Havana as the site for Afro-Asian-
Latin American meetings. It is within the context of broad Sino-
The Dilemma. Peking and Moscow are in agreement on basic 25X1C10b
objectIfiTal-ritin America: to destroy the power and influence
of the United States and to replace the present governments with
Communist-oriented regimes. They differ4_owever,inthetactics
to be used to accomplish these objeCTIVa.Wuethtt
armed revolts should be employed now; the Soviets favor the more
flexible strategy of "peaceful gr-Enalism." Latin American
Communists know that they must try to attain power by a combination
of violent and legal means. Although they must be ready to switch
quickly from one method to another as opportunities dictate, the
legal and peaceful methods stressed by Moscow restrict their scope
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A number of dissident groups are already active in fomenting
rebellion in Latin America. If the CP stands aloof from them
they risk losing support not only from their own members, but also
from advocates of radical action from whom they would hope to
draw support for a united front movement. If one of these groups
should attain power, the Communists might find themselves in
opposition as they did in Cuba when Castro took over.
Whatever the basis for Moscow's position -- fear of provoking
a confrontation by the US; avoidance of conflicts with the "peace-
ful coexistence" theme of current Soviet tactics; recognition of
the inability of Latin American CPs to make an effective bid for
power through violence and of the anti-leftist strength generated
by sporadic, ineffective violence; practical concern over the
drain on the Soviet economy created by the "violent entry" of
another socialist state in the hemisphere; etc. -- it has provoI:ed
increasing dissension within Latin American CS's.
The Chinese offer an alternative -- the first for the local
Communist who had to follow Moscow's line or quit. Crls hope to
win additional followers in Latin America by their intransigent
anti-US position -- their major theme in recent years -- especially
at a time when the Soviets are signing "peace treaties" with the US.
Prospects. The increasingly bitter Sino-Soviet dispute will
probably lead to at least two results in Latin America: the Soviet
Union and China will increase their competition to woo the left;
and, divisions within the CPs and other extreme left-wing elements
over the best means to achieve power will become more extensive
and intensive.
The Cuban call to arms still stands. It was restated by Castro
on 23 July when he emphasized that erViThat has happendd in Cuba could
happen exactly the same way in many Latin American countries." Ee
pledged that "all peoples who do what Cuba has done will have the
support of the Soviet Union." Venezuela's wave of terrorism was
endorsed on the 152nd anniversary of the country's independence
not only by Communist China and Cuba, but also the Soviet Union.
In short, revolution has not been abandoned as a weapon, it is
timing that is being debated. By the same token, the Chinese Com-
munists continue to support all means of subversion and intrigue
to attain power (see, for eii4701e, the attached unclassified paper
"Mao Tse-tung's Yenan Way").
Within this context, these developments are of special signifi-
cance or deserve special attention in coming months:
Argentina: A series of decrees authorizing strong action
a:ainsT: Communist subversion promulgated since the 7 July elections
may be negated by reported plans of president-elect Arturo Illia
to revoke Argentina's anti-Communtst laws. In anticipation of its
new status, fa Communist ?arty plans an overt conference in
November to plot new strategy and discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute
(While the CP officially supports the Soviets, a youth movement
sympathizes with the Chinese).
3
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Bolivia: The Bolivian press has reported a split among local
Communists into a pro-Peking faction, headed by young PCB members,
and pro-Soviet elements. A Party Congress scheduled for July did
not take place reportedly because of fear that the factions would
further split the Party. "How to Sieze Power Through a National
Liberation Movement" is reportedly a major topic of the Congress
which may be scheduled later this year.
Brazil: In an "Open Letter" in Pravda on July 14, Moscow
charged the Chinese with organizing and supoorting a factional
group in Brazil which had been barred from the Brazilian C? and
thus "threatening the unity of international Communism." The
dissident's publication, A Class Operaria, features Chinese arti-
cles on the Sino-Soviet dispute. Speaking on the 41st anniversary
of the CP (25 March), Luis Carlos Prestes, pro-Soviet, long-time
leader of the local CP, advocated an opportunist policy toward
the government although he criticized specific programs. The
essential thing, he maintained, was the ability to change tactics
rapidly.
Chile: In June C? spokesmen declared "it is lamentable and
painful to see the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party
habitually referring to Communist Parties :in terms that have
nothing to do with fraternity nor with the reality of things."
The CP endorsed the Soviet line and deplored Chinese attempts to
distribute propaganda in the country. However, more aggressive
action was urged at June meetings of the CP and the Popular Action
Front with which the CP is affiliated. Communist spokesman Jorge
Montes reiterated the Chilean Communists' hopes of achieving power
by peaceful means but also proclaimed his readiness to employ
more forceful means if opportunity occurs. "The peaceable way
does not mean passiveness or conciliation," he declared, "but
rather a real chance of winning power."
Colombia: Communists have tried to dissociate themselves in
the public mind from a series of savage and brutal terrorist acts.
The CP secretary general claims that the Communists do not preach
violence for its own sake and admitted that some revolutionaries
make mistakes "in good faith or bad." Ilowever, he urged the ?arty
not to help the government in suppressing violence and when the
militaryforces moved to control it, the C? appealed to peasants
to "unite in defense against official violence."
F.cuador: Dissensions over how best to propel the revolution
broke into the open in May when the arrest of several prominent
leftists revealed Chinese and other foreign Communist attempts
to support and guide individual revolutionaries. Jose Maria Roura,
a C? Central Committee member, was caught entering the country with
$25,000 in $500-bills and arrested. His reference to a "brief
visit to Peking" and explanations of where he got the money indi-
cated it came from the Chinese Communists. His exposure prompted
the C? to expel him and led to his blasts against CP leadership.
Another attack against the "senile bureaucrats" of the Moscow-
aligned CP came in a plan for a Communist terrorist plot discovered
in a tube of toothpaste carried by Captain Antonio Flores Benitez
4
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returning from Prague. (Flores had written an appeal for revolu-
tionary unity in March, arguing that both the Soviets and the
Chinese were sometimes right, but Fidel Castro was always right.)
A coup which installed an anti-Communist government has resulted
in the arrest of most CP leaders and halted, at least temporarily,
the formation of a pro-Chinese dissident party.
Mexico: Internal wrangling over the Sino-Soviet dispute
does not appearnear reconciliation. The Chinese reportedly
have offered financial aid to splinter groups in exchange for their
supnort. The CP Congress has been postponed from July to October,
Venezuela: Hailed by Castro and praised by-the Chinese Peace
Committee as a "brilliant example" demonstrating to the rest of
LatinAmerica how to combat "imperialist oppression," the militant
arm of the CP continued its wave of terrorism. Accounts of local
guerrilla activities are covered in the Moscow' press and the Soviet
World Marxist Review carried a tribute'whichstressed the militantts
"peace" Offers -- a set of impossible demands which are unacceptable
to the government. The Communists .have-announced their intention
of talting part in the national elections scheduled in December.
e,al.qual: Reports continue to.- circulate that a conference of
Latid7EFERTEEm-Communist leaders will be held in September in
Uruguay in an attempt to settle disputes.. Some observers maintain
a peace meeting" could actuallywiden the There are
also reports that the Chinese Communists_plan an international
meeting perhaps to establish closer organizational ties with
dissident elements. ..In the meantime, they are active propagating
their views and wooing dissidents throughout the- hemisphere. A
number of C2 Congresses have_ been postponed In Latin America
mainly
25X1C10b because of fear of widening internal _dissension.
25X1 C1 Ob
Unclassified Attachments:
1. "Communist Strength in Latin America," adapted from
World Strength of the Communist Party Organization, Department of
STET67-Brinfaira Intelligence and Research, January 1963.
2. "Mao Tse-tung's Yenan Wayr
6
SECRET (693.)
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Agriculture in the Soviet Bloc
Marx expected revolution to occur first in advanced in-
dustrial countries, and he never spelled out What socialism
would mean in agriculture. Inheriting Marx's lack of interest
in agriculture, Communists have had difficulty with it from
the beginning of Soviet rule. Russian peasants were naturally
resentful when their crops were requisitioned by the Bolsheviks;
as a result, they engaged in a producers' strike. Under the
New Economic Policy (NEP), the regime compromised with the
peasants, but with the launching of the first Five Year Plan,
Stalin reverted to a disguised form of requisition: collectivi-
zation. Probably he acted less to ensure food for the cities
than to check budding private enterprise and to increase his
political control. The result was famine, and to assure at
least some production, a new (if limited) compromise was made.
Peasants were permitted to retain small private plots of one
or two acres. Still, production in 1950 was only 13% above
1928; allowing for territory annexed after the war, production
had actually fallen. From 1945 to 1949, the production rates
of the last prewar years were recovered, but from 1949 to 1953,
Soviet agriculture almost completely failed to increase its
output. By contrast, the NEP system had permitted an increase,
by 1920, of 24% over 1913.
During the middle fifties, production increased as the Virgin
Lands were plowed up, and probably reached a high point in 1958.
After several poor years, 1962 figures were officially claimed
to be higher than 1958, but these figures are probably exaggerated.
The potato crop was a disaster in 1962 at 68.8 million metric
tons; since reporting of the potato crop began in 1950, the
previous low point had been 70 million tons in 1951, while the
high point had been 96 million tons in 1956. Since 1958, Soviet
agriculture has at best reached another plateau, as in the last
years of Stalin, while at the same time, the population continues
to increase. As a result of continuing food shortages and pr ce
increases, there were riots in the Novocherkassk, Voronezh, aid
Grozny areas in 1962. The food problem is a serious one for ,
the regime, especially in view of Khrushchev's past promises.
Other Communist countries show similar results. The
catataircohic failure of the Chinose agricultural communes is ?
well known: 1960 and 1961 outputs were officially 40% and 86%
respectively under the claimed 1958 level. The communes were
abandoned for all practical purposes in 1960, and private plots
were permitted in 1961; recently, however, taxes and quotas
have been introduced on the products of private plots, and the
current trend seems to be back to Stalinism. In Cuba, sugar
production has fallen one-fifth since Castro came to power,
the cotton crop is 30% below estimates this year, and the tobacco
harvest has been cut in half. In eastern Europe, only Poland,
Rumania, and Bulgaria have increased production over prewar levels.
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Even so, Bulgarian and Rumahlan agricultural output was not
sufficient to prevent rationing of certain staples in 1962,
and these countries may face a shortage of bread. Polish accom-
plishment is all the more outstanding, in that the country is
smaller than before the war. The explanation seems to be that,
in contrast to the other Bloc countries where collective farming
prevails, 86% of Polish farmland is in private hands. This
year, all of the European and Asian Communist countries (in-
cluding Poland) have suffered poor weather conditions--a severe
winter and drought in many areas--and a drop in production
is likely throughout the Bloc.
Khrushchev has successively tried a series of expedients.
Under Stalin, he advanced a grandiose and impractical proposal
for "agrogorods," or agricultural cities with apartment buildings
for workers. What was actually done was to move peasant huts
together into larger villages, making supervision easier.
After coming to power, Khrushchev's first major scheme was
the plowing of the Virgin Lands in Siberia and Kazakhstan.
Then he turned to corn as a panacea--it was the "sausage on
the stalk" which would furnish fodder for a vast increase in
livestock; in 1957 he promised that the USSR would overtake
the US in meat production by 1961 at the latest, a promise
deleted from the latest (1963) collection of his speeches on
agriculture. (In 1962, Soviet meat production was only 40%
of the 1960 target.) In 1958, Khrushchev disbanded the machine
tractor stations (MTS) and turned their equipment over to the
collective farms. He embraced the short-sighted policy of
plowing up fallow grass land in 1962, thus inevitably and
urgently increasing the need for fertilizer. In the past,
Khrushchev has tried to achieve sensational results at a minimum
cost in current investment. The results have been: the plowing
of land which is marginal from the point of view of soil or
climate; an accelerated exhaustion of the soil; and a lowering
of the water table in semi-arid areas.
The unfortunate truth is that most of the Soviet Union
is not good farm country, and the farming of-poor land requires
more labor and investment than the farming of good land.
Khrushchev has now reached the point where he can cut corners
no longer. This explains the chemical fertilizer program,
now pursued in Khrushchevts usual campaign-fashion. According
to Voprosi Ekonomiki (Problems of Economics), no. 4, 1963, the
production of mineral fertilizers is ',c? be increased 9 to 10
fold by 1980. Komsomolskaya Pravda reported on 2 June that
147 new centers oi chemical production are to be placed in
operation in 1963. On 9 August, Pravda stated that fertilizer
production capacity had to be indFagga 50% during 1963 alone.
It is a good sign that the Soviet leaders are making a
genuine attempt to provide more food for their people, even at
the cost of other programs. For two reasons, however, this
emphasis on fertilizer is likely to have disappointing results:
2
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1. Much of this new effort represents an attempt to catch
'up with past deficiencies. In the first four years of
the Seven Year Plan, the fulfillment of completion targets
for chemical plants has lagged behind schedule. On 24
April, Khrushchev said that "the number of unfinished
sites, many of which are installations for the chemical
industry, continues to rise and by January 19631 had
already reached the value of 27,000,000,000 rubles."
Kommunist reported in its issue no. 4 of 1963 that the
equipment needs of plans for chemical plants were only
met 76% in 1960, 62% in 1961, and 68% in 1962. As to
plants specifically for fertilizer, matters were still
worse: only 47% of planned facilities were finished in
the first three years of the Seven Year Plan, though fulfill-
ment rose slightly above 50% in 1962. These construction
problems show why Khrushchev has recently bought complete
plants in the Netherlands and elsewhere.
2. Mere increased production of fertilizer will not solve
all problems. For one thing, equipment will be needed
for spreading the fertilizer, involving further investment,
about which little has been heard as yet. For another
thing, unless collective farmers can be trained and motivated
to a higher degree than has been the case, for example,
in handling machinery, there will be enormous waste and
even some damage to crops through misapplication. Thirdly,
the Soviet soil problem involves not only soil exhaustion,
but also, in many regions, a shortage of water, aggravated
by over-planting and the elimination of ground cover.
On the whole, the fertilizer program should help to remedy
past misuse of the land. Real advances, however, would require
political changes. On the one hand, the collective farm system
simply does not provide the necessary incentive and security
to induce the peasants to produce. An enterprising peasant
will leave if he can for the city, where he is better rewarded,
and where he even has some slight chance of acquiring some
worldly goods. In the collectives there is no personal induce-
ment to make improvements or genuine (as opposed to to?cen) efforts,
and there are not enough reliable supervisors to make the farms
the factories they are supposed to be. The planting of crops
and spreading of fertilizer is decreed from distant Moscow,
without concern for local conditions or experience. A freer,
more flexible system is needed, but is ruled out on ideological
grounds. On the other hand, the shortcomings of Russian soil
and climate might logically lead to trade with more favored
areas, some of which have problems with food surpluses. But
the Kremlin is unwilling to open the Soviet Union to genuine
foreign trade, and prefers to maintain an isolated, autarchic
economy, for political reasons. In the world of dialectical
materialism, politics have priority over material needs.
3
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Background Reading:
Naum Jasny, The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR (Stan-
ford, 1949)
Otto Schiller, Das Agrarsystem der Sowjetunion (Taingen,
1930)
David Mitrany, Marx Against the Peasant: A Study in Social
Dogmatism (Chapel Rill, 1951)
4
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Mao Tse-tung's Yenan Way
"People who serve us, through greed, through fear, inferi-
ority, vengeance, what have you, but who serve us. Serve the
party, serve the designs of the Comintern, serve the cause of
the revolution....the very essence of the Yenan Way....
"There are social sectors, there are countries which have
real party politics, a democratic life, real civil liberties.
In such places one adopts the Popular Front, to attract the
leftwingers and the leftist groups, good or bad, sincere or not.
Tempt them, each through his particular weakness, as the devil
tempts. You understand? Help them to get what they want; put
pressure, first with offers, later with threats. Compromise
them if you can, so that they can't get away. And this every
day, without respite, one after the other with as deep a
psychological study of each as possible....
"Now as to your dictators ... If you give tacit support
to the dictator, he will give you political jobs in exchange.
He may launch terrible diatribes against communism; he may even
outlaw the party and legislate against it. But if you have
been his friend, he will not touch a hair of your head. You
can work away quietly. He will use you against his enemies
and as your support in critical times; he may even get you to
call a strike somewhere that will hurt his enemies. And if you
are useful to him in these ways he will give new positions to
the party. What else matters?
... The workers will be with you if you get something for
them. They will abandon you if you do not, however lofty your
principles. Get the dictator to give them advantages at your
request and they will love you. Push them persistently to
attack the well-off, and for the most part the dictator will
conceal your demands and even satisfy them to gain popularity."
--MAO Tse-tung, Circa 1934, quoted by Eudocio Ravines,
The Yenan Way, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951.
Ravines describes MAO as an "unconditional slave of Stalin"
and his "Yenan way" as "severely free from any doctrinaire
principle or moral evaluation."
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