Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 8, 1998
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 7, 1963
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4.pdf3.42 MB
25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1 : A-RDP78-0106fA66H0MB 004-4 Briefly iloted Erosion of Czech Stalinisra In a further effort to cope with internal pressures for political liberalization and economic reform, Czechoslova louts Stalinist President Novotny on 21 September dismissed or re- assigned a number of leading official's who were identified with political oppression and economic stagnation, replacing them with representatives of a younger and more moderate generation of Communists. :?remier Siroky, two hard-line deputy premiers and four ministers were dropped. Two Slovaks were appointed ministers without portfolio and four new central committee con- -issions were created, three dealing with economics and one with ideology. Josef Lenart, a 40-year-old Slovak who has been a member of the party presidium since December 1962 and who is untainted by Stalinism, was appointed premier. However, in order to circumscribe the influence of his more liberal appointees and safeguard his own position, Novotny has kept his own lieutenants in Ley positions; viz. the appointment of Jiri siendrych, long a Novotny supporter and heir apparent, as cha:r- man of the new agricultural commission. Despite these maneuvers, iTovotny is unlikely to placate Slovayt regional discontent, popular dissatisfaction with political and economic conditions or his political opposition within the Czechoslovakian C?, al- though his actions may serve to defer slightly the agony of his 25X1C1Ob own decline. 25X1C10b WM& (Briefly Noted) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1 -RDP78-03021%%MV0AVb14-4 DATES 25X1C10b 23 Oct 77un3arian revolution fails under force of Soviet brutal military repression. 23 Oct-4 Nov 23 Oct Leon Trotsky expelled from CPSU Politburo in 1926. 7 Nov October Revolution. Lenin and Trotsky seize power from the Provisional Government, 1917. 13 Nov World Louth Day (Communist). 13 Nov Games of the New Emerging Forces (GAN3O), Djakarta 10-17 Nov 1963. 11 Nov International Student V)eek 11-17 November, concluding with International Students Day on the 17th (International Union of Students, Communist), 12 Nov Leon Trotsky expelled from the CPSU, 1927. 14 Nov (China-Russia) Treaty of Peking cedes Chinese "Great Northeast" to Prussia, 1560. 15 Nov Bolsheviks proclaim "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," affirming principle of self-determination to peoples of the former pire, lsl7. 30 Nov USSR attacks Finland, 1939. December Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Co-operation, 4th AAOOC, scheduled for Karachi, 1963. 5 Dec USSR adopts new "Stalin" constitution providing for universal sufferage, freedom of speech, press and assembly, 1936. 239 Dec UIT issues second call for Tibetan freedom, 1953. 27 Dec Joseph cardinal Hinds,.enty arrested, Hungary,.1943. 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 A RR9 nVor Release 1 q9 /98/24 dA-RDP78-03061 A000200030004-4 COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #13 14-27 September 1963 Commentary Principal Developments: 1. The most important development in this period was the Soviet government's statement of 21 September. This statement replied to the inese official statement of 1 September (sea Chronology #12), and argued that in their very denials, the Chinese shooed both their indifference to the costs of nuclear war and their ardent desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Another part of the Soviet statement, apparently answering the 6 Septem- ber People's Daily-Red Flag article's charge of subversion in Sinkiang, e had been 5000 Chinese violations of the Sino-Soviet border in 1962. The Soviets did not, however, publish either the 1 September Chinese statement or the 6 Sept- ember article; audiences in the USSR know of the 1 September statement only in Soviet paraphrase, and are officially unaware that the 6 September article (or the violently anti-Khrushchev 13 September article) even exists. (Peking's earlier statements (31 July and 15 August) were published along with the Soviet replies, on 3 and 21 August.) 2. The end of the above-mentioned 21 September Soviet state- ment hinted at a possible resumption of the CCP-CPSU meetings held in July, but made this dependent on"ernding open polemics." On 16 September, a British CP statement, largely pro-CPSU an:. anti-CCP, had ihaiuded a proposal for a world conference; Moscow omitted this detail in early TASS reports, u Moscow Radio reported it to domestic audiences two days later, and on 24 September Pravda published, in "trial balloon" fashion, an appeal by the Portuguese CP for a world conference. 3. On 19 September, the Soviets published an editorial in Pravda on the Sino-Indian dispute, clearly indicating that the 757 was the aggressor in the con lists of 1959 and 1962, and stressing the bad impression Chinese aggression makes on Afro- Asian countries. The editorial deplored frontier quarrels and violations generally, including by implication the Sino-Soviet border. 4. Among non-bloc CP's, a pro-Chinese faction of the Swiss Party of Labor (Swiss CPT was disclosed on 16 September to have split away, claiming contacts with similar splinter groups in Belgium and Italy. (Switzerland houses an unusually large number of Chinese diplomats, who apparently have been working to some effect.) On the other hand, a leader of the Colombian CP (Jose Cardona Hoyos) claimed (according to Pravda, 17 September) that "the Chinese Communists have no influence in our rands," the Chairman of the Swedish C? accused the Chinese of revisionism (?xavda, 16 September , and the Finnish CP plenum (14-15 Septembeo) passed-a resolution rejecting the inese position (TASS). Approved For Release 1996110 W-0 R[3`a8-0(3(A't)d0) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: I -RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (#13 Commentary Cont.) A clandestine "Voice of Iraqi People" broadcast accused the Chinese and Albanians of trying to divide the Iraqi Communist movement. On 22 September, TABS reported that the Peruvianfg Political Committee supported the Moscow Treaty, bu'tT the did Committee's statement condemned French atomic testing, not condemn Peking. 5. At the UN, on 17 September, Albania submitted a proposal for the "restoration of the lawful rig s o the people's Republic of China," to admit the CPR to the UN. Such resolutions have always been submitted y e in the past. 6. On 20 September, after missing a week, the series of Chinese articles resumed with ,Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" In this article, the Chinese use quotations from the Yugoslav press to support their own argument that Tito has turned Yu slavia into a fascist dictatorship subordinate to the United States. Khrushchev , w o -should repudiate Tito, follows instead in Tito's footsteps. The Soviet statement of 21 September suggests in is no longer a flatly that "socialist" " country; ; this 3hrushchev has abandoned Marxism-Leninism. Significance: During the last period covered by this series, the Chinese statement took the propaganda initiative withf ththe eir d11 sSSeptember be on Stalin and their articles on the history (6 and 13 September); the main Soviet effort was their agitation on the Naushdi incident (first reported 9 September). But in the two weeks now under review, the roles were reversed: the Soviet leaders appeared to feel that they were getting the best of the dispute -- their "peaceful coexistence" line had the widest appeal, and had not been satisfactorily countered by the latestvulnerability Chinese was also Co 1 yptrmstatement. publBut ishSoviet shhown n b by theiheir failure Soviet treatment of the British and Portuguese CP state- ments suggests that Moscow, in its present mood of confidence, may be considering a call for a new intra-party meeting. I little the present state of the dispute, the Soviets probably have interest in further private meetings with the Chinese alone, but they might be interested in a new world conference of CP'sisolate under their own control. Presumably they would expect the Chinese if they attended, or else, if the Chinese refused to outoccasion thto reaffirm e movement the pure come, theo2~eo use the Moscow line Soviet criticism of Chinese policy in the Sino-Indian border conflict (expressed in the 21 September statement as well as in the 13 September Pravda article) may reflect a Soviet case, expectation of further aggression in the Himalayas. the Soviets on their own account are concerned over Chinese irredentism. 2 (#13 Commentary Continued) Approved For Release 1999 I - DP78-03061A000200030004-4 ? Approved For Relese 199910?1 RDP78-03061 A000200030004-4 (#13 commentary Cont.) While the official party organizations are lining up with the Soviets, it is becoming clearer than ever that the Chinessee intend to create their own subsidiaries wherever they can. must remember that the Sino-Soviet rivalry may often result in a competition to see who can attack the United States most sharply -- on the pattern of a 29 September Pravda, article con- demning what is called "The Rampage of Racism n the United States. 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #13 14-27 September 1963 September 14-16 - Both Soviet and chicom propagandists continue discussion of the Naushki incident. On 16 September, the Chinese publish their governmen s note on the affair, along with Soviet government's notes of 7 and 9 September. Other stories describe the reception the and s passengers in (NCNA) and deplore September 14-15._ - National Conference of the Swiss Part of Labor (Swiss UT) meets in Geneva. Wes ern readers earn on ep em er that a pro-Chicom faction has s lit off from the main body of the SPL, under the ea ers p of Lucien onnet, and Monnet claims to be in touch with similar factions in Belgium and Italy, as well as with the Chinese Communists. Although Tass covered the conference, it makes no reference to the split un$-il 18 September, when it circulates to Eastern Europe a report ridiculing the faction. Also on 14-15 September, a Finnish CP plenum rejects the Chinese position. September 16 - The British CP publishes a statement (according to Tass) saying that "British communists categorically reject the objections of CCP and CPR government leaders to the Moscow partial nuclear test-ban treaty." Pravda summarizes an article by the Chairman of the Swedish CP, Hiic ng Hagberg, accusing the Chinese leaders of rev s on ism, and complaining of attacks from Chinese quarters on the eve of the Swedish CP's 20th Congress. September 17 - Assuming a task previously shouldered by the USSR, U e Albanian UN delegation subffiits a proposal for the "restoration of the law l rights of the People's Republic of China," that is, to give Peking the UN seat now held by the Chiang Kai-shek govern- ment-.-X-clandestine a c broadcast of station Peyk-e Iran, the "Voice of the Iraqi People," accuses the Chinese and Albanians of trying o v e the Communist movement in Iraq "and to create confusion in the ranks of the Communists and democrats." naa publishes Pravda Hoyos, claiming bthat l"The rChinese dogmatists have no of the Colombian CP, os e rdo rdo Y influence in our ranks." September 16 - A Pravda story indicates that the British CP state- ment of September - see above) included a request a all CP s study the question of calling a new international conference. General -51 Tass also carries a Daily or er accoun o a spee Y ecretary of the British , o n Gollan, denouncing the CCP leaders, and saying: "We have never herd such language before except from the Trotskyites." NCNA reports that 13 members of the agency's Prague office have returned to Peking, rece v ng a warm we come by more an 500 government officials. Chiang Lien- chung, leader of the returnees, says: "The Czechoslovak Government (#13 Chronology Cont. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (#13 Chronology Cont.) tried by every means to blockade the correct views of the CCP and government and of other fraternal parties persevering in Marxism- Leninism, but it could not shut out th." One Embassy official and one student returned with the/ . In Pyongyang, the visiting Chairman of the CPR, Liu Shao-chi, delivers a militant speech, denouncing the Soviet doctrine of division of labor: "They are merely using this so-called international division of labor as an attractive cloak to cover their own practice of profiting themselves at the expense of others, a practice characteristic of relations among the capitalist countries, so as to obstruct the efforts of the economically under- developed socialist countries to develop an independent national economy and to make these countries economically dependent on them and politically come under their control" Liu charges that the "modern revisionists" are smearing the revolutionary struggle as a "movement for piling up corpses" and "promising the peoples freedom after death," while they themselves blindly worship nuclear weapons: "They recklessly brandish their nuclear weapons to blackmail other countries. With the sure knowledge of meeting no oppo- nent, they speculate in that situation and then ascribe the achievements of the revolutionary struggle of the peoples to the credit of their policy of nuclear blackmail. But once confronted by an opponent, they capitulate, at the expense of the interests of the revolutionary people, to the nuclear blackmail of the opponent, sliding from adventumism to capitulationism. When they engage in speculations, they boast about their nuclear weapons in superlative terms; when they capitulate, they allege that nuclear war is imminent and that their capitulation is 'in obedience to the imperative call of the time' and has 'saved world peace." Liu claims that, while yielding to imperialist nuclear blackmail, "the modern revisionists continue to practice nuclear blackmail toward the people of the socialist countries and the revolutionary people of the whole world," trying to frighten them with nuclear horror stories. However, the Korean speaker who welcomes Liu, a local official, makes only a cursory attack on "the modern revisionists." She tember 19 - A Pravda editorial, "Serious Hotbed of Tension in Asia." scusses a Sino-Indian border question, indicating that the CPR has looked for a quarrel, and has re used to accept the proposals of the Colombo conference of non-aligned countries. Chinese policies are causing great anxiety in Asia and Africa, and are helping reactionary politicians in India. The Sino- Indian conflict is used to disrupt conferences, as at Moshi and the Moscow women's congress1showing the severity of the conflict: 2 (#13 Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (#13 Chronology Cont.) "Particularly alarming in this connection is not only the absence of any real efforts to solve the conflict, but also increasing evidence that the conflict may again be aggravated." The editorial hints that there is concern for Soviet boundaries as well: "On the question of frontier quarrels we hold Leninist views and are convinced that there are no questions which cannot be solved by peaceful means, by means of talks, without bloodshed.... As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its attitude to those countries which border on it is one of respect," N C NA notes bitterly on 21 September that "India's official prop- aganda machine" has given this editorial maximum publicity. 25 September, People's Daily reprints the editorial in full, and promises to comment on ater, saying meanwhile: "The article totally disregards facts, perverts the truth, slanders China as wanting to settle its border dispute with India through war, and maliciously attempts to poison the relations of Afro-Asian coup:., tries, the Colombo conference countries in particular, with China." September 20 - iiomsomolskaya Pravda carries stories of Chinese persecution ecution from our recent escapees from Sinkiang. In Pyongyang, Nodong Sinmun publishes an article by three Korean scholars, criticizing a Soviet World History for its treatment of Korean history. The Soviet history tie eans claim, overlooks the glorious ancient culture of Korea, fails to follow the Marxist principles of artiynost and historicism, and mechanically Hcopies from the works o Japanese and other imperialist writers. t among the faults of the Soviet work (the Koreans say) are its repetition of a legend that the first tribal confederacy was the founded by an exile from China in the 12th century B.C., allegation that the Korean natives learned handicrafts and the culture of sill: and of various grains from China. September 21 - The Soviet government publishes an official state- ment replying to the Chinese September statement; this statement discusses the Chinese attitude on the nuclear test ban treaty, er, on the possession of nuclear weapons, on the no- ov a or, on the ri-no-Ind an conflict, and on the eo e s communes. oscow notes that-more than 90 countries have gned the test ban treaty, and points out that recent Chinese disarmament proposals are copied from two different Soviet proposals. Friedrich Engels is quoted to show that, even in 14C;3, "broad sections of the popula- tion /ere7 calling for disarmament," with Engels' full support. As for the Chinese denial in their 1 September statement that they are seeking their own nuclear weapon at any cost, the Chinese state- ment "actually confirms the conclusion we have drawn and proves once again that the negative position of the CPR Government toward the nuclear test-ban treaty is explained precisely by their desire to make their country a nuclear power." Alleging that the Chinese say openly that they will have A-weapons if it takes 100 years, the Soviets point out that the Chinese are hardly in a position, economically speaking, to divert resources to building nucA o% or Release 1999/08/24 3CIA-RDP7@030@$ MU 30109#.4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (013 Chronology Cont.) "It is well known that China does not have surplus resources, and it takes enormous resources to produce nuclear weapons.... We do not consider ours a poor country, but even we have much to do to put an end to those material difficulties which still exist for the time being and about which we speak openly." Soviet weapons protect the whole camp, as Mao recognized in Septem- ber 1958, when he said that, in view of the Soviet capability, China "need not organize the production of such weapons, especially considering that they are very expensive." The attempt now to acquire an independent capability suggests that the Chinese "have developed some sort of special aims and interests which cannot be supported by the military force of the socialist camp": "For it is impossible to accord plans of developing nuclear weapons so as to increase, for instance, one's influence in countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, or to create for oneself 'a position of strength' in outstanding interna- tional issues, or to increase international tensions, with the peace-loving foreign policy course of the countries of the socialist system." The Soviet statement then adds, tongue in cheek: "We would not (like?) to thing: that the CPR government is guided by such motives." The Soviets turn against the Chinese their "full quotations" from Mao and "Long Live Leninism:": It... the Chinese leaders deliberate whether a half or 100 per cent of mankind would be destroyed in the flames of a new war.... /this is shown bq7 the pronouncement of Mao Tse-tung even in The altered form in which it is given in the statement of the Chinese Government of 1 September: '/7 Tass ellipsis7... if bad comes to worse half of humanity will perish, but hal'T will remain. But imperialism will be razed off the face of the earth and the whole world will go socialist.' No less eloquent in this sense is a quotation from Redl , which they are trying to deny, to the effect that n case of war the victorious peoples 'most rapidly will create over the ruins of destroyed imperialism a civilization a thousand times higher. t11 In a powerful bid for support from the CP's of small countries, the Soviets charge that, when a Czech journalist told Tao Chu, a member of the CCP Central Committee, that all the Czechs might be killed in a thermonuclear war, Tao replied: V'fIn the case of a war of annihilation the small countries belonging to the socialist camp would have to subordinate their interests to the interests of the camp as a whole."' It, (#13 Chronology Cont.) Apprroved-Fo- R-el-eas-e-1 /08124:-CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (#13 Chronology Cont.) In Chinese eyes, "The war variant of the development of events is inevitable and even more desirable than the peaceful variant." Every time a relaxation of tension has occurred in recent years, the Chinese have deliberately stirred up trouble, as in the case of the Sino-Indian conflict of 1959. They even stir up trouble on the Soviet border: "Beginning with 1960, Chinese servicemen?-and civilians have been systematically violating the Soviet border. In the single year of 1962, more than 5,000 violations of the Soviet border from the Chinese side were registered. Attempts are also being made to 'develop' some parts of Soviet territory with- out permission.... Chinese propaganda is making definite hints at the unjust demarcation of some of the sections of the Soviet-Chinese border allegedly made in the past. How- ever, the artificial creation today of any territorial problems, especially between socialist countries, would be tantamount to embarking on a very dangerous path." Somewhat surprisingly, the Soviet statement ends with a call to end polemics, and hints that the July CCP-CPSU talks might be resumed, as it was then agreed to continue them later. The Soviets state their readiness to take "all the steps we can to achieve unity with China," but add that if the Chinese misinterpret this good will and continue their slanderous and factional activ- ities, "they must clearly realize that the most resolute rebuff from the CPSU and from the Soviet people awaits them on this road." Also on 21 September, an award ceremony and a state banquet were held in Ulan Bator on the occasion of the departure of 309 Chinese workers for na, Mongolian officials expresse gratitude far the contribution of the Chinese workers, functionaries and students, but it appears that the departure closed out Chinese aid programs in Mongolia. The returnees were given the now-- customary welcoming reception when they arrived at the Chinese border on 23 September. September 22 - Tass reports that the political Committee of the Peruvian Cr? endo sr es the "Moscos?r" test ban treaty, and condemns the ench Government for its intention to persist in testing. September 23 - A Moscow Radio broadcast in French to Africa ridicules Chinese claims that they abstain from the Third World Meeting of Journalists because is not held n Africa an ecause Is to deal w professional and not political matters; Algiers (where the journalists' ship is to touch) is in Africa, and the struggle for peace, against reaction, and for national independence and social justice will be broached at the meeting. In Ulan Bator, the Mongolian Montsame news agency transmits an "observers commentary, endorsing a 21 September Soviet statement. 5 (#13 Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (#13 Chronology Cont.) September 24 - Pravda publishes a statement by the Central Committee of the oar uguese "co munist Party, saying that Chinese policies are dangerous, and it coa en ons that the CPSU imposes a "peace course" on parties in capitalist countries are deplorable; no one is imposing a "peace course" on the Portuguese CP, which must overthrow a fascist government by force. The statement urges "the earliest convocation of a meeting of all communist and workers parties which, in a on to discuss ng ideological pro ens, wou work out the standards regulating relations between fraternal parties." Tass and Moscow Radio circulate this story to domestic and European audiences. September 2.5- - Leninskaya Smena of Alma Ata carries a story by r Vakhidov, a former member of the Chinese Komsomol Central Committee and Secretary of the Sinkiang Komsomol, who has fled from China. VaZzhidov, a Uip-hur by nationality, state; that hundreds of his fellow-countrymen are languishing in "so-called a or training camps, w ch are in fact concentration camps." "We were branded as 'traitors,' 'cosmopolitans,' an oviet spies' and dismissed from our jobs," Va!.hidov says; "People who for any reason got in touch with the Soviet Consulate were submitted to questioning," According to a Tan ug item of 26 September, a similar story appears in the currLiteraturnaya Gazeta, written by a Kazach writer, Bukhara Tis _an eyev, formerly living in Sinkiang. September 26 - After a pause of two weeks (the first two articles appeared-a week apart), People's Daily and Red Fla publish the third in their series of articles answering a Central Committee's Open Letter of 14 July 1963: "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" Not too surprisingly, the Chinese answer to the titlews question is "No." They claim that capitalism and usury flourish in Yugoslav cities, kulaks wax fat in the Yugoslav countryside, and the dictatorship of the proletariat has been turned into a "dictatorshi. of the bureaucrat-comprador bourgeoisie, a category which sounds faintly reminiscent o as s New Class. "U.S, aid has been the mainstay of Yugoslavia's finances and economy"--thanks to Tito's having concluded a series of traitorous treaties with the United States: "Because of the conclusion of these treaties and agreements and because the Tito clique has made Yugoslavia dependent on U.S. imperialism, the United States enjoys the following rights in Yugoslavia: 1) to control its military affairs; 2) to control its foreign affairs; 3) to interfere in its internal affairs; 4) to manipulate and supervise its finance; 5) to control its foreign trade; 6) to plunder its strategic resources; and 7) to collect military and economic intelli- gence." Under Tito, state power has degenerated from the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; "the (#13 Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (#13 Chronology Cont.) dictatorship of the bourgeoisie not only exists, but is a brutal fascist dictatorship at that. The Tito regime has set up many fascist prisons and concentration camps where tens of thousands of revolutionaries have been tortured to death by every kind of inhuman punishment." On the other hand, counterrevolutionaries are pardoned. 8hrushchev, however, fraternizes with the Tito clique "not because it has corrected any of its errors but because he is following in Tito's footsteps." Khrushchev and Tito "both want to liquidate the socialist camp," and Khrushchev "has abandoned Marxism-Leninism, scrapped the 1960 state- ment, and wallowed in the mire with the renegade Tito clique, in complete violation of the interests of the Soviet Union., the Soviet people, and the people of the whole world. This will not be tolerated by the great Soviet people, the over- whelming majority of the CpSU members, and cadres at various levels, all of whom have a glorious revolutionary tradition." The article contains numerous quotations from the Yugoslav press, which cannot however be regarded as a guarantee of its factual accuracy. Although the article contains at the end an incongruous call to the Soviet leaders to turn back before it is too late, its publication appears to constitute a resounding refusal to end the open polemics. Se tember 27 - Moscow Radio broadcasts domestically a Pravda summary a the John Gollan 14 September speech (see under eptember 18 above), now including a passage appealing for a world conference of CP's, on the basis of the 1957 declaration and the l960 state- ment, 7 (#13 Chronology) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 CHRONOLOGIE -- DISSENTIONS COMMUNISTES No. 13 14-27 septembre 1963 14 - 16 septembre: Les propagandiates sovietiques at ch iino con inuent a disouter de ].'incident de Naushki. Le 16 septembre, lea Chinois publiaient?une note de leur gouvernement concernant ].'incident an meme temps que des notes du gouvernement sovietique datees du/7 at du 9 sep- tembre. D'autres articles parlent de la reception a Pe- kin du personnel at des passagers du train Chinois (Agen- ce de presse do la Chine nouvelle) ou deplorent cette reception (Izvestiya, 16 septembre) . 14 - 15 septembre: La Conference nationale du parts tra- vailliste suisse (par communists su sse s est r unie a Geneve. Les lecteurs des pays occidentaux apprenaient le 16 septembre qu'un groups pro-chinois sous la direction de Lucien,Monnet weat separe du gros do 1'organisation; Monnet pretend qu'il eat an contact avec des groupements analogues an Belgique at an Italia, at qu'il hest egale- ment avec lea communistes chinois. Bien que 1 agence TASS sit ate representee a la conference, elle n'a pas mentionne la separation jusqu'au 18 septembre, date 'a la?cuelle ells a fait circular an Europe Orientale des ar- ticles tournant au ridicule le groupement dissident. Ega- lement le 14 - 15 septembre, un pl6num du parti communis- te finlandais s'est e1eve contra la position chinbise. 16 se tembre: Le anti oommuniste britanni ue publie une d claration (salon le TA qui dit qua: Lea communistes britanniques rejettentcategoriquement lea objections du parti communists chinoiB at du gouvernement de la Repu- blique Populaire de Chine a 1'egard du traite de Moscou interdisant lea essais nuoleaires.11 La Pravda donne une resume d' un . article du president du arts communiste sue- dois Hilding Hagberg, qui accuse lei leaders chinois de% sionnisme et'se plaint d'attaques emanant de Chine a la veille du 20e Congres du parts communiste suedois. 17 se}tembre: Assumant la tache precedemment d6volue a l 'Union So ietique, la delegation albanalse aux Nations unies soumet une proposition pour la restauration des droits legitimes de la Republique Populaire chinoise" au- trement dit, pour accorder a Pekin le sse a aux Nations unies que detie nt heure actuelle le gouvernement do Chiang Kai-shek. Une radio clandestine arabe, "La voix du peuple de}1'Iraq", accuse les Chinois at lea lbanass do chercher a provoquer des dissentions dans le mouve- mont communiste on Iraq, "et de Greer la confusion parmi les rangs des communistes et des deimocrates". La Pravda public un article du leader du parts communiste de la Colombie, Jose Cardona Hoyos, qui pretend que "les dogma.. tiates chinois n'exercent aucune influence parmi nos Appro17G d'rRelease 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4, lgtembr?: Un article de Pravda fait savoir que la de- clarat ion du parti communists britannique du 16 eeptembre (voir plus haut) contenait une requite que toua lea par- tis communiptes etudient la question de convoguorr uno nou- velle conference Internationale. TASS rep odult egalemont un comp a-rendu du Daill worker du scours du secr6taire- genoral du parti commun ste ritannique, John aollan, qui denonce les'leaders du parti comun18te chinois et ecla- ro:"None n'avons jamais entendu de langage pareil, sauf do la part des trotakistea". L'Agence de presse do la Chine nouvelle fait savoir que 13 membres de son a ence a Prague sont retourn(s a Pokin e t qu ils ont to chaleureu- sement re9ua par plus de 500 fonetionnairesouvvernemon taux. Chiang Lion-Chung, leader du groupe do P d6clare:"Le ouvernement tchEcoslovaque a eesay6'par tour los moyena d empecher 1'expreaaion des vises correctes du parti communists chinois, du gouvernement chinois at des autres partis fraternels qui perB6verent Jana le marxisme- leninisme maisil n'est pas parvenu 'a empecher la ve`rita do so rdpandre." Un fonctionnaire de l'ambassade et un y etudiant sont rentr6s aver le groups. A Pyongyang, le pre sident de la Republique Populaire chinoise, Liu Shao-chi, fait un diecours agresaif dana lequel it dehonce la doctri- ne soviotique de la division du travail: "Ila ne font qu'utiliser la soi-disant division Internationale du travail comme un voile attrayant destine" a couvrir lour propre habitude de tirer profit pour eux-memos aux d4pens des autres, une habitude caracteriatique dana lea relations entre pays capitaliates, qui eonaiste a empecher lea ef- forts dos pays socialiates esonomiquement sous- doveloppes et tendant a developper une economie nationale rodep endante, pour rendre cea pays eco- nomiquement ddpendants et places du point de vue politique sous lour controle". Liu pretend que lea "revisionnistea modernea" calomnient la lutto ravolut ionna ire en pretendant que c' eat "un mouve- ment pour entasser des eadavrea," et qu'ils"promettent aux peuples la liberte apmes la mort", cependant qu'eux-memos adorent aveugldment lea armes nucleaires: Its brandiasent leurs armes nucleaires comme noyens de chantage contre lea autres pays. Certains do no trouver aucune opposition, ils apeeulent dens cetto situation et ensuite pr(:ftendent quo lea resultats obtenus dans la lutte revolutionnaire des peuplos font dta grace a lour politique de chantage nue1o airs. Mats une fois mis en pr6aence dun adversai- re, ils capitulent, aux dens des interets du1pou- ple ravolutionnaire, au chantage nucleaire de 1 ad- versaire, glissant de l'aventurisme au capitulation- nisne. Lorsqu'Ils s'engagent dans des sp6culations, ils se vantent do leurs armes nucleaires on tenses superlatifs; lorsqu'ils capitulent, Us pretendent quo la guerre nuclea ire 6t a it inmpinIIent o et quo ifleur Approved Fe" R ' i1 9?0 /1eV' OR '78-63061X000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 1 ' a poque' et qu'elle a 'sauve la pa ix mond ial a' . Liu protond qua tout an codant au ehantage nucleaire des inp6rialistoa, "les reurisionnistes moderns continuant a pratiquer le ehantage nueldaire'a 1'egard des pouplos dos pays soc ialtates et des peuples revolutionnaires du monde entier", cherchant a lea terroriser par des histoires do boabos nueleaires. Cependant, l'oratour cordon qui a sou- haite la bienvenue h Liu, un fonctionnaire locales n'a di- rige qu'une attaque superf ieielle contra "les revisionnis- tos moderns". 19 septembre: Un editorial do Pravda "Foyer de tension so rieuse an Asie", discute do la cation do frontiere sino- ind_ ie~, indlquant que la Repiub ique Popu sire c inoise avast cherche quenelle, et qu e11e avast rejete' lea propo- sitions de la conference des pays non-aligner do Colombo. La politique chinoiso cause de granda soucis an Asie at an Afrique, at aide lea politicians reactionnaires de 1'Indc. Le conflit sino-indien eat utilise "a d6sagreger lea confer rences, comma a Moshi ou au C,ongres mondial des ferns a Moscou, co qui montre la severite du conflit;"Ce qui eat particulierement allarmant sous cc rapport cc n'eat pas sou- lomont, l'absonce de tout effort r3el de reaoudre le conflit, ma is egal?ment la preuve croiasante qua cc eonflit risque encore une foss do Be trouver a rave". Ldito vial fait allusion au fait qu i n resse egalement lea frontiores sovi6tiques: "Au sujet do la question do querellea de fron- tieros, noun partageons lea vues leninistes at nous sommes convaincus qu'il n'y a pas do ques- tions qui no puissant etre resolues par des moy- ens pacifiques, par des entretions, sans faire coulor le sang,.. En cc qu concerns 1'Union So- vietique, son attitude a 11egard des pays avoc lesquels elle a une frontiere commune eat une attitude de respect". L'Agence do presse de la Chine nouvello souligne aigrement lo 21 septembre que "la machine off icielle do propaganda do l' Inde" a donne a cat editorial une public its maximum. Le 25 septembre, le Quotidian du Peu le reproduisait l'sdi- torial on entier, et promettai de donnor plus tard des com- mentaires, soulignant entretemps:"L'article Be raoque tota- lonont des faits, alters la v6rite", calomnio la Chine on prbtcndant qu'elle veut regler sa querelle do frontiers avec 1'Indc au moyen d'une guerre, of chercho avec malveillanco d'eupoisonner lea relations entre la Chino of lea pays afro- asiatiquos, on particulter ceux ayant participe' a la Confcr- ronco do Colombo." 20 septembre: La KonsomolekaIa Pravda fait paraitre des histoires de pers cum chi-noise contdes par quatre par- sonnes echappdes recenment du Sinkiang. A Pyongyang, le Nodong Sinmun public un article par trots savants careens critiquant 1THistoiro nondiale publide par lea Soviets, pour la fad on ont a trait5o 1'histoire do la Cor6c. 3 -e-1t999/08/24 : -CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 L~histoire sovietique, protendont lea Coreens, oubliO' 1 ancienne culture glorieuso do la Cordes neglige do sui- vro lea principes marxistes do arti post at d'historicis- mo, of copio necaniquament lea travaux auteurs japonais at autros impdrialistos. TMiais, d'aprbs les Cordes parni los orrours do l'oeuvro sovi6tiqu~deratiou e une rWpatifonn do la legende quo la premiere conf doe par un exile' de Chine au coura du 120 siecle avant no- tre 'bre, ainsi quo lea affirmations quo les indigbnes co- roons avaient appria on Chine lea travaux d'artisans, la culture do la sole et cello des diverses ce'reales. 21 sopte bro: Le ouvernenent sovieti ue public une decla- ration offieielle on r pone a la declaration chinoise du^ preiaior septenbro; cette declaration discute do 1 attitude chinoise a 11egard du traite nucleaire, de la possession dos arms nucldairesi e a ron to sine-sov quo, u con 1it i-no---Ind n ion, Iot des communes opu a res. ,1 con sou gne quo p us a 90 pays an a ne a ra e nucleaire, of quo les propositions rocentes des Chinois concernant le dcsarmament sont lea copies de deux propositions sovicti- ques differentes. Friedrich Engels est cite pour nontror quo none on 1893, "de largea sections de la population do- :.andaient le dasarnofient", avec un soutien sans roatrictions do la part do Engels. En ce qui concern une den(gation chinoise contenue dana lour den6gation du premier septeribre, ils cherchent a tout prix df.avoir lours propres arr/es nu- cloaires, la declaration chinoise "confirme actuellenent la conclusion a laquelle nous somnes arrives at prouve unc f ois de plus quo la position negative du gouvernenent do la Republique Populaire chinoise a 1'egard du traite nucle sire s'oxpliquo precisenent par leur de'sir de faire do lour pays uno puissance nucleaire". Pretendant qua los Chinois disent ouvertenent qu'ils auront la bombe atoniquc uoae s'it lour fallait cent ans pour l'avoir, les Soviets soulignent quo du point de vuc e'cononique lea Chinois sont loin d'etro an position do detourner des ressources pour la construction d'armes nucleaires: "C'ost un fait bien connu quo la Chine ne pos- sede pas de ressources exe dentaires, of ii fadt, dos rossources enormes pour produire des arses nucleaires... Nous no considerons pas notre pro- pre pays comma itant un pays pauvro, main nous- rienes avons de grands efforts a faire pour faire cosser lea difficultes rlatdriellea qui existent encore pour 1'instant, at dont nous parlons ouver- tenent". Los arses sovietiques protbgent le camp tout ontior, ainsi quo Mao 1'a reconnu an soptonbre 1958, lorsqu it dit qu on raison du potential sovi6tique la Chine "n'avait pas bosoin do creer une production do cos armes, on raison particulib- reront do cc qu'ellos content". Le desir do le faire 'nain- tenant montre qua les,,Chinois "se sont cr66 quelques objoc- tifs at quelques interets spdciaux qui no peuvent etro sou- tenus par la force nilitaire du camp sooialiste": Approved For Release 1999/08/24: dIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 "Car 11 eat impossible d'harmoniser lea plans do de'voloppenent d'arnes nucleaires pour augmen- tor par example l'influence d'un pays daps lea pays do 1'Asio, de 1'Afrique ou do 1 Amerique Latino, ou do crier pour ce pays une position do force dans lea problemes intornationauX, au d'augmenter lea tensions intornationales, avec la politique Arangbre pacifique des pays du sys- teme socialiste". Et lea Soviets ajoutent avec malice-."Noun n'aimorions pas ponsor que lo gouvernement do la Chine Populaire snit guide par dos motifa pareils". Los Soviets tournent contre lea Chinois leurs "cita- tions integrates"de Mao et do "Vivo le leninisme!". "...lea leaders chinois deliberant pour savoir si la moitie ou la totalit6 de 11humanite serait d6trui- to dans lea flanmes dune nouvelle guerre...Los declarations de Mao Tse-tuff rte iiontrent ] memo dans la version modifies qu en donne la declara- tion du gouvernement chinois du ler soytembro: mais ' pare la moitie de 1'humanite perirait, la moitie survivrait. Mais 1'imperialisme so trou- vorait balaye de la face de la terre et to monde entier deviendrait socialiste.' Non moins eloquent on co sons eat un extrait du Drapeau rouge, decla- ration qu'ils cherahent a renier, et qui veut qu'on cas de guerre lea peuples victorieux aillont 'rapi- dement sur lea ruiner de '.1'?impe'rialisme dStruit crier une civilisation mille fois supe'rieure". Dans un effort gigantesque pour le soutien du parti co:lnu- nisto pour lea petits pays, lea Soviets pretendent que To Chu, moiabre du eomite central du parti communists chinois, aurait repondu ce qui suit a un journaliste tch6que qui lui disait quo tour lea Tchbques risquaient d titre turfs dans une guerre thereto-nucl6aire: "'Dana le cas de guerre d'annihilation, lea pe- tits pays appartenant au camp socialiste auront 'I subordonner lours interots aux intereta du camp tout entier'." Do Pavia des Chinois:"La variante do guerre dans le cours dos eveneronts eat considerde... come (:rtant inevitable at Chaquo noMo plus souhaitable quo la variante pacifique. fois qu'i1 y a eu un rolAchement do tension au tours do cos dornibres annees, lea Chinois ont fait expres do crier dos onr~!uis, come dans le cas du conflit sino-indien de 1959? Its cre'ont Memo des ennuis sur la frontiore sovietiquo: "Cori-iencant on 1960, lea militaires et lea ci- vils chl.nois ont viola systematiquouent la fron- tioro sovicstique. En la seule annee 1962, % i1 y a ou plus do 5.000 violations do la frontiers so- Approved jjAal9/i4 d0ACk U3019k 0tbe1t00030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 ont ate faites egalonent do 'r:,ettro on valour' corta inns parties du torritoire soviotique sans obtonir do po ruisaion... La propaganda chinoise fait dos allusions precises au fait quo lea doiaarcations sot-disant faites dins lo pas E dans ecrtaips soctours do la fontid- ro sino-soviotique otaiont injustos. Copon- dant, la creation artificielle aujourd'hui do tout lo problene territorial, on particulier antra pays socialist's, roviondrait a s'emb r- quer sur une voce tros dangereuse." Fait assoz surprenant, la declaration soviotique so tornino par un appal a torninor lea polbEniques, et fait allusion co quo lea entretiens do juillet entre le parti co raunisto chinois of le parts conriuniste do 1'Union Sovietiquo pour- raiont etre repris, ainsi quo cola fut entendu. Lee Sovicts dcclarent qu'ils sent prrts ~a prendre "touter acs uosures quo nous pouvons pour parvenir a une entente avoc la Chino," -2ais ils a joutent quo si lea Chinois donnaient a sotto prcuve do bonne volontdune interpretation orroneo of con- tinuaient lours calounies et lour attitude do discordo, "ils doivont coiaprendre clairemont qu'.une rebuffade la plus resolue de la part du parti communisto do 1'Union Sovie'tique of du peuple soviotique lea attend le long do la route". Egalenent le 21 eeptenbre, uno corcrionio do distri- bution do recompenses et un banquet d'Etat ourent lieu Ulan Bator a 1'oecasion du de art a destination do la Chi- no de 302 ouvriers chinois. Los officials mongols oxpri- r nt lour gratitude pour la contribution faito par lea ouvriers, lea fonctionnaires of lea 6tudiants chinois, mass it somble quo co ddpart riot un terms au programme d'aido chinoise la Mongolic. Los repatrie's furont ac- cuoillis par uno rdception do bionvonue, bionvenue cou- tu:icro, lorsqu'ils arriveront a la frontiers chinoise lo 23 soptoubro. 22 septoimbre: TASS fait savoir quo lo Comite politiquc du parts eomnuniste peruvien approuvo le traits "do Mos- cou , intordisant lea essais nucloaires, et condaune lo ouvornenont franj ass pour on intention do poursuivro lea essais. 2 se ter_,bro: Uno radio do Moscou, en languc franjaise, dostin6o a i'.ifriquo,tourno on ridicule lea affirmations chinoises ue coux-ci s a a iennont do art ci er au 3 Congr s :rondia desJournalisto. parce qu it n 'a pas lieu on Afrique et parce quo le congres allait traitor do questions prof essinnnellos ct non pas do questions po- litiques; Alger (ou lo navire des journalistos va faire escale) se trouve on Afrique, at la lutte pour la paix, contre la reaction, et pour l'indopondance nationals at la Justice socials soront des questions trait6es la reunion. A Ulan Bator, l'agenco do prosso .iongole .iont- sau:c fait passor un cor:ientairc signd "Obsorvatour",app- prouvant la declaration sovidtiquo du 21 soptcr_ibro. -Approved For Release 1999/08/24& CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 24 soptombro: La Pravda public unc declaration du Conito central du parti conmunisto portugais, qui declare quo la politique chinoise oat dangerouse, at qu'il at qu'i1 otait deplorable do lour part do prdtendre que le parts connu- nisto do 1'Union Sovi6tiquo imposalt aux partis des pays capitalistos "uno politique de paix; Personne n'inpose do politique do paix au parti connuniste portugais, qui doit ronvorsor par la force un gouverneuent fasciate. La declaration fait appal "d une convocation urgente do tons los artis communistes et qui, on plus do a discussion dos problenes eeononiques, etablirait dos roglos pour les relations centre lea partis fraternele," TASS at Radio-Moscou font circular oette declaration a 1Tntontion dos audiences sovietique at europe'ennes, 25 $optenbrel Leninskaya Stena do Alua Ata public un ar- ticle do Asir Vakhidov, aneien membre du Comite'central do la Jeunesse eommuniste chinoise at secr6taire do la Jou- nosso cor uniste de Sinkiang, qui s'est eehappe de Chino. Vakhidov, qui ost do nationalite uigur, declare quo dos container de sea con atriotes so trouvent dans "do soi- disant carps do preparation au travail, qui an fait no sont quo dos campa,?de concentration." "On nous qualif io do traltros, de cosmopolites at d espions sovietiquos at on nous licencie do nos eraplois, declare Vakhidov; lea Bons qui pourquolque raison ont.et6 on rapport avoc lo consulat sovietique sont sounis a des intorrogatoiros." D'apres un article du Tan u du 26 septembre, une histoiro analogue parait dans Literaturnaya Gazeta, sous la signa- ture d'un eerivain kazakh, Bukhara Tishkanboyev, ancion resident de Sinkiang. 26 septembro: Apres uno pause do deux senaines (lea deux proriiors articles ont etd publics 'a une seraaino de dis- tance l'un de l'autre), lo Quotidian du peu le of lo Dra- poau rouge ant public le troisiene de lour s to d'arti- clcs repondant a la lettre ouverte du 14 juillot 1963 adrossce par le Coriite central du parti corjn-unisto do 1'Union Sovietiquo:"La Yougoslavie est-elle un parti so cialisto?" Il n'y a rion do tres surprenant quo la re- ponse dos Chinois a eetto question eat "Non:" Its prow tondont quo le capitalisre ot.l'usuro prosperent dans los villas yougoslaves, lea koulaks s'ongraissont dans la canpagne yougoslave, at quo la dictature du prol(fta- riat a dtdr tranforuee on uno dictature do la bourgooi- sic burcaucr, tc-conprador", catcdorie qui rappelle quol- quc nou la Nouvelle classe de Djilas. "L'aido dconoui- quo dos Etats-Unis a etc to soutien dos finances at do 1'econonio yougoslaves", grace a Tito qui a conclu uno sorie do traitc(s porfides avec los Etats-Unis: "Grwce a la conclusion do cos traitos at do cos accords at parce quo la clique do Tito a fait quo la Yougoslavee d6pendo de 1'i,:iporialismo dos Etats-Unis, les Etats-Unis jouissent dos droits suiv:nts on Yougoslavie: 1) le controle do sea affaires uilitairos; 2) le controle de sea af- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 faires Qtrangaros; 3) le droit d'ingorence dana sea affaires intorioures; 4) le droit do mani- pulor,~at do diriger sea finances; 5) le droit do controlor son commerce oxtorieur; 6) la possibi- lite do pillor sea rossourcos atratdgiques, at 7) la faculta d'obtenir dos renseignenents d'or- dro nilitaire at oconomique." Sous Tito, le pouvoir d'Etat a dogene ro d'une dictaturo de proletariat on uno dietaturo do la bourgeoisie; "la dictaturo de la bourgeoisie non souloment exists, Lacs cue oat par-dessus le marche uno dictaturo faseieto bru- talo. Le r6gime Tito a or6e do nor~breuses prisons fascis- to? at dose amps do concentration, ou des dizainos do mil- liars do revolutionnaires ont 6td tortures a mort at sou- mis e toutos sortes do punitions inhurnaines". D'un autro cote, 1es contrerevolutionnaires aont pardonn6s. Khrouch- tchof cop~ondant fraternise avec la clique de Tito "non pas parse qu it a corrigo aucune do sea orreurs mais parco qutil suit lea traces do Tito". Khrouchtchof at Tito "voulent liquidor tous lea deux le camp socialists"; jthrouchtchof do son cat6: "a abandonne to rnarxisne-lelinissmo, a mis au lea dcsclarations do 1960, et il s a dans la bouo avec la clique du traitre Tito, al- lant a l'oncontre des int'r6ts de itUnion Sovie tique, du peuple sovidtique at du peuple du mon- do entier. Cots no sera pas tole're par le grand pouplo sovietique, par la grande rnajoritd dos mombres du parti comrwuniste do 1'Union Sovie'ti- quo, par lea differonts cadres, qui tous posso- dent uno tradition glorieuse do la revolution". L' article contient des passages nornbreux certains es do lappnos-'atre se ougoslave sans quo 1 on puisse dc.nt do lour cre'dibilitd'. Bion qu' a la fin l' article contionno un appol incongru adresse aux leaders sovi6ti- ques, qui lour dit de faire marehe arriere avant qutil no soft trop tard, sa publication semble constituor un refus rotontissant do mettre un torus a la polenique ouvorto. 21 septa oubre: Radio-Moscow transmot localement un r6surad donne dana Pravda du diseours do John Gollan du 14 sep- tenbro (voir- i-dessus le 18 septembre); co rdsuud con- tiont un passage demandant la convocation d'uno confo- ro ce nondiale des partis comuunistes, sur la base do la declaration do 1957 at do cello do 1960. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: 9A-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 CROLOLOGIA -- DISENSIONES CCK)NISTAS No 13 14-27 Septiembre 1963 14-16 Septiembre: Los propagandistas tanto sovi6ticos como chinocomu- nistas prosiguen la discusi6n del incidents de Naushki. El 16 de sep? tiembre los chinos publican la nota de su Gobierno sobre el asunto, asi comp las notas del Gobierno sovi6tico de 7 y 9 de septiembre. Otros relator describen el recibimiento en Pkin de la triplulaci6n y los passajeros chinos (Agencia Nueva China) y deploran dicho recibi- miento ("Izvestiya" 16 septiembre). n5, 5a re: La Conferencia National del Partido Suizo del Tra- o i. ?0 wlAo) se R;Ee- en Ginebra. Los lectores de la prensa occidme.1 se enteran el 16 de septiembre que una facci6n pro chino- comunista se ha escindido del cuerpo principal-&-l-M, bbajo la direc- ci de Lucien Monaet, y Este declare estar en contacto con factions semejantes en B6lgica e Italia asi como con los comunistas chinos. Tass se ocupa de la conferencia pero se abstiene de mencionar la esci- si6n hasta el 18 de septiembre, fecha en que envia a Europa Oriental un informe poniendo en ridiculo dicha facci6n. El 14 y 15 de septiem- bre tambi6n, un pleno del PC finlandds rechaza la posici6n china. 16 Septiembre: El PC britdnico publica, segdn informs Tass, una decla- raci n en el sentido de qu ~"e~e los comunistas britdnicos categ6ricamente rechazan las objeciones de los dirigentes del PC chino y del Gobierno de la RP china al tratado de Moscd contra los ensayos nucleares." "Pravda" resume un articulo de Hilding Hagberg, presidente del PC sueco, acusahdo a los dirigentes chinos de revisionismo y quej dose de ataques de origen_.chino en la vispera del ViOsimo.Congreso del PC sueco. 17 Septiembre: Tomdndose ima tares que antes habia sido de Is. URSS, la de agaclbn albanesa a la ONU somete una propuesta pare "la restau- raci6n de los leg imps derechos de la Repdblica Popular China", o sea dar a Pekin la banca en la ONU que ahora ocupa el Gobierno de Chiang -shek. na emisi clandestina en firabe de la estaci6n Peyk-e Iran, la "Voz del Pueblo Iraki", acusa a los chinos y albaneses de intentar dividir a movimiento comunista en Irak y "crear la con- fusi6n el las filas de los comunistas y dem6cratas". "Pravda" publica un articulo de Josh Cardona Hoyos, dirigente del PC colombiano, decla- rando que "los dogmiticos chinos no tienen influencia alguna en nues- tras filas". 18 SSeptiembre: Un articulo de "Pravda" indica que la declaraci6n del PC--brit node 16 de septiembre (vea mss arriba) incluy6 el pedido de que todos los PC estudiaran la cuesti6n de convocar una nueva con- ferencia international. Tars tambidn publics un relato del Daily Worker"- or er sobre un art culo de John Gollan, secretario general del PC britainico, repudiendo a los dir gentes del PC chino y declarando: "Nunca habiamos escuchado semejante lenguaje excepto de parte de los trotakistas". La Agencia Nueva China informa que 13 miembros de la oficina de Praga de la antis ban regreee a P , si ndoles pro- digado un c ido recibimiento por mks de 500 funcionarios del Gobierno. Chiang Lien-thong, lider de be regresados, declare: "El Gobierno checoslovaco tratd por todos los medios de bloquear las correctas opi- nions del PC y Gobierno chinos y de otros Partidos fraternos que Approved For Release 1999106/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 I*eu* dnF&r ~e1 9 fl$d~ P"DB7&QW1AW8fd.QWW004-4 verdad". Un t cicrario- "Oda y un estudiante regreseron con el grgpO de is Ageaci&, China. En Pyongyang de visits, Liu Shao-cbi, presidents t i~ thine, prcnuncia un discurso militante rep*i$i.E do - le doctribs, iO4 ittict de la divisi6u del traba jo : ?Tia1b& peucil'Pmarate o leando ester dedicente divisi6n in-reraacienal del tre a jo camp atray+ente caps para cubrir su-propia prdtica de bejeficiaree a expenses do otros, prdtica que caracteriza?lea relaciones entre loo pafses capitalist8s, pare obot ix, los esruerzos de los passes so- cialistas eeondmicamente subdioserrolladoa por desarroller uaa economfa nacional indepeadiente y pacer que dichos passes queden sujetos a ellos econdmicaeente y caigan poifticamente bajo el control de ellos". Liu denuncie que los "revisionistss conteeor&e0s" estdn desacrediten- do la lucha revolucionaria como "movimiento pars emwtonar ceddveres" y que "promete a los pueblos la libertad despuds de muertoe", mientras que ellos ziamos adoran ciegamente las arenas nucleares: "Bianden sin cautela alguna sue arms nucleares pera chantaiear. a otros paises. Con el seguro conocimiento de no encontrar oposici6n, especulan en dicha situaci6n y lvego atribuyen las realizaciones de la lucha revolucionaria al crbdito de su polf- tica de chantaje nuclear. Pero una vez se les encara un opo- sitor, capitu].an, a expenses de los intereses del pueblo revo- lucionario, al chantaje nuclear del opositor, deslizdndose del aventurismo al capitulacionismo. Cuando se dedican a las es- peculaciones, se jactan de sus arenas nucleares en t6rminos superlativos; cuando capitulan, alegan que is guerre nuclear estd inminente y que su capitulaci6n es 'en obediencia J. llamado imperativo de la bpoca' y he 'salvado is Paz Ur'lndial'". Liu declare que, en tanto que as rinden ante el chantaje n%zclear im- perialists; ".os revisionietas cantempordneos continban practioando le chantaje nuclear hacia-el -paebi.o 4e los passes socialistsa y el pueblo revolucionario del mundo enterb", tratando de ei &*eberloa con espeluznantes cuentos nucleares. Sin embargo, el..,orador coreano que da a Liu is bienvenida, un funcionario local, hace un ataque rutinario contra "los revisionistas contempordneos". 19 Se tiembre: Un editorial de "Pravda", titulado "Grave hervidero de tensi6n en Asia", trata de la cuesti6n fronteriza entre India y China, indicando que la RP china ha buscado querella S se ha negado a acepter las propuestas de la conferencia de Colombo de naciones no aliueadas. Las lineas de conducts, de China estdn causando grave ansiedad en Asia y Africa y estdn ayudaado a los politicos reacciona- rios de India. El conflicto chino-Indio se emplea pars desbaratareon- fereacias, como la de Mosbi y el congreso femenil de Masco, demoetran- do la dad del conflicto: "EspeciaimeuYe Victrdar es so solamente lap.ansencie. de todo verdadercr esfuerzo .por der eoluci6n a' onflicto lino la crec a de que el conflicto puede volver a a sell EP preoccapeeci por las froaberae-eovi6ticas: "En materia de querellee Pronterizas~mentenemoe ideas leninis- tas y eetamos conveneidoe de que no hay cuestionesque no puedan Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 App ro ] ems3&c 9tQ8t24cbgI `[RMOWfm $ 88?P04-4 sin derramamiento de Sangre... Ppr,lo que concierne a 4.a Uni6n Sovidtica, su actitud tespeetd & loi passes fronterizos a ella es de respeto": La Agencia Nueva China apunto con acritud el 21 de septiembre que "la maquinaria oficial de propaganda de India" ha dado maxima publi- cidad a d4.cho editorial. El 25 de septiembre el "Diario del Pueblo" reproduce integramente el editorial, prowtiendo coinentar mks tarde, y dice entretapto: "El articulo hate caso omiso totalmente de los hechos, trastrpca is. verdad, ca].umnia a China en el sentido de querer decidir su dispute fronteriza can India por la.ggerra, y r*Jiciosamen- te trata de emponzo$ar las relations de los paises afroasidticos, en particular los passes de la conferencia de Colombo, con China". 20 Septiembro: "Komsomolskaya Pravda" publics relatos de cuatro in- divi uoa evacidos recientamente de Sinkiang sobre la persecuci6n china. En Pyongyang, "Nodong Sini n" publics un articulo or tree estudiosos chinos criticando la "Historic Mundial"-sovidtica por is. forma en que trata la historia de Corea. La histori.a sovidtica, declaran los core- anos, pass por alto la gioriosa culture antigua de Cores, deja de se- guir los principios merxistas de partiyrnost e historicism y copia mecdnicamente de las obras de escritores imperialistas tales como los japoneses y otros. Pero entre los defectos de la obra sovidtica, di- cen los coreanos, estdn is. repetici6n de una leyenda que dice que la primera confederaci6n de tribes rue fundada por un exiliado de China en el siglo 12 a.J., y is. pretensi6n de que los naturales de Cores aprendieron de China el cultivo de is seda y de varios cereales. 21 Septiembre: El Gobierno sovidtico blica una declaraci6n oficial en contestaci6n a la de los chinos de 1 de septiembro; dacha decla- raci6n comenta la actitud china sobre el tratado contra los ens M8 nucleares, sobre la posesi6n de arenas nucleares, sobre is. ontera chino-sovidtica, sobre el onflicto chino-indio y sobre las co win pow es. Moses apunta que mAs de 90 seas an suscrito ci tra ado contra los ensayos nucleares y sefiala que las propuestas chinas reci- entes sobre el desarme estdn copiadas de dos propuestas sovidticas diferentes. Cita a Friedrich Engels para demostrar que ya pars, el 1893 "atnplios sectores de la poblaci6n reclamaban el desarme", con of eompleto apoyo de Engels. En cuanto a is negativa china en su declaraci6n de 1? de septiembre de ester procurando su propia arms nu- clear a cualquier precio, is. declaraci6n china "realmente confirms, la conclusi6n a que hemos llegado y comprueba una vez ends que is. posi- ci6n negativa del Gobierno de is. RP china sobre el tratado contra los ensayos nucleares se explica precisamente por su desec de pacer de su Pais una potencies nuclear". Alegando que los chinos dicen abiertamen- te que van a tener arenas nucleases aunque les tome cien egos, los so- vi6ticos seffalan que los chinos dificilmente estdn en condiciones de desviar recursos pars, la fabricaci6n de arenas nucleares: "Es bien sabido que China carece de un superdvit de recursos, y se requieren enormes recursos pare fabricar arenas nucleares... Nosotros no consideramos e]r nuestro un pass pobre, pero noso- tros mismos tenemos mucho que hater pare poner fin a las difi- cultades materiales que atn existen por ahora y de las hablamos abiertamente". Las arenas sovi6ticas protegen 3 todo el campo socialists, como Mao Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Apps Fiorsl3 l el &9t9 2&uegM1EM-Q1 64A44WAQ3)04-4 capacidad sovidtica, China "no necesita organizer la producci6n de tales arenas, especialmcnte viendo que son muy costosas". La tenta- tiva actual de adquirir une capacidad independiente sugiere que los chinos "han desarrollado alguna, clase de prop6sitos e intereses es- peciales que no pueden ser apoyados por is fuerza militar del cameo socialists". "Ta que es imposible emparejar planes de desenvolvimiento de arenas nucleares pare aumentar, por ejenplo, is influencia propia en passes de Asia, Africa y America Latina o pare crearse una 'posici6n de fuerza' en cuestiones internaciona- lea sobre salientes con el derrotero pacifico de is politica exterior de los passes del sistema socialists". Made la declaraci6n sovidtica, burlonamente: "No quisidramos pensar que al Gobierno de is RP china lo animsn semejantes m6viles". Los sovieticos vuelven contra los chinos sus "citas integras" de Mao y "Viva el Leninismo": " .. los dirigentes chinos debaten si el 50 6 el ciento por ciento de is humanidad quedaria destruido en las 11 ss de una nueva guerra ... [Esto to demuestral el pronunciamiento de Mao Tse-tung sun en is forma alterada en que to presents is declaraci6n del Gobierno chino de 1? de septiembre: '[elipsis de Tass] ... en el peor de los casos media humanidad perecerd, pero quedard is mitad. Pero el imperialismo serd barrido de is faz de is tierra y el mundo entero pasard a ser socialists'. No menos elocuente en este sentido es una cita de 'Benders Ro,ja', que tratan de desmentir, en el sentido de que en caso de guerra los pueblos victoriosos 'con is mayor rapidez creardn sobre las ruins del imperialismo derruido una civilizaci6n mil veces superior''. Solicitando poderosamente el apoyo de los PC de passes pequeffos, los sovidticos denuncian que, cuando un periodista checo le dijo a Tao Chu, miembro del CC del PC chino, que en caso de guerre nuclear todos los checos podrian morir, Tao replic6: "'En caso de una guerra de aniquilaci6n los passes pequeffos que pertenecen al campo socialists tendrian que subordinar sus intereses a los intereses del campo en general`". En opini6n de los chinos, "La variante bdlica del desarrollo de los acontecimientos se considers ... inevitable y hasta mds de desear que la variante pacifica". Cads vez que en afos recientes se ha producido una distensi6n los chinos intencionalmente han provocado el malesta comp en el conflicto chino-indio de 1959. Rasta en is frontera sovi- dtica crean dificultades: "Comenzando en 1960, militares y civiles chinos han estado sistemdticamente violando is frontera sovietica. Tan solo en 1962 se registraron mds de 5 mil violaciones de is frontera sovidtica desde el lado chino. Tambidn se hicieron tentativas de 'desarroliar' algunas pastes del territorio sovidtico sin permiso ... La propaganda china estd baciendo claras alusiones a is demarcaci6n injusta de algunos sectores de la frontera -4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Appro W & fg%u%9 %?QUA2#ab4qj P&PPhZ i6 4 &j0030004=4 Sin embargo, la creaci6n artificial boy de problemaa ter- ritoriales, especialmente entre paiaes socialistas, equi- vaidria a lanzarse a un cemino pelogrosisimo". Un poco sorprendentemente, la declareci6n sovidtica terming can un llen do a poner fin a las pot eas y deja entrever que lee conver- saciones de Julio entre el PC chino y el PCtS podrian ser reanudadas, ya que se convino entonces que serian centinuadas mis tarde. Los so- vigticos manifiestan su disposici&n a der "to4oa los pesos que pods- moe por conseguir is unidad con China", pero :Haden que si los chinos malinterpretan eats buena voluntad y persisten en sus actividades ea- lumniosas y facciosas "deberda comprender claramente que ea ese camino lea aguards el as resuelto recbazo del PCUS y del pueblo sovidtico". Tambi6n el 21 de septiembre se celebraron el Ulan Bator una cere- monia de premio y un banquete de estedo en ocasi6n de 1is partida de 309 trabajadores chinos pare China. Puncianarios mongoles expresaron an gratitud por la contribuci6n de los trabajadores, funcionarios y estudiantes chinos, pero parece que is partida de 6stos clausur6 los programas chinos de ayuda en Mongolia. Los regresados recibieron la ya acostumbrada manifestaci6n de recibo cuando liegaron a la frontera china el 23 de septiembre. 22 Septiembre: Informs Tass que la comisi6n politics, del PC 21ruano se suscribe el tratado "de Moscd" contra los ensayos nucleares y de- nuncia al Gobierno Frances por su intenci6n de proseguir sue ensayos. 23 Septiembre: Una emisi6n de la Radio de Nosed en frances pare Africa ridiculiza los asertos chinos de a se abstienen de tomar par- te en la rcera Reunidd dial de eriodistas porque no se celebt'a en Africa y porque tratar de asuntos de la profesi6n y no politicos; Argel (donde tocard el barco de los periodistas) estd en Africa, y is lucha per is paz, contra la reaccidn y per is independencia nacio- nal y la justicia social serd tratada en is reunion. En Ulen Bator, is agencia noticiers mongols Monteame transmite un comeatari de ob- servador" apoyando la declaracitn sovietica de 21 de septiembre. 24 Se tiembre: "Pravda" publica una declaraci6n del Comit6 Central del PC ortuguCs que declare que las linens de conducta de los chinos son peligrosaa y sus argumentos de que el PCJS impone un "rumbo de paz" a los partidos en los paises capitalistas son deplorables; nadie le estA imponiendo un "rumbo de paz" al PC portugu6s, que tiene que derrocar a un Gobierno fascists por la fuerza. La declaraci6n sugiere "la me.s pronta convocatoria de una reun-i6nde todos los tidos comu- nistas obreros que,-ademfis de discutir probiemas ideal icon, elabo- rar a las normas que gobernaran lea:relaciones entre los.partidos fra- ternos". Taos y la Radio de MoscdTdif n el relato a sus au$itorios del interior y de Europa. 25 Se tiembre: "Leninskaya Smena" de Alma Ate, publica un articulo de Asir V idov, ex miembro del comit? central del Komsomol chino y secretario del Komsomol de Sinkiang, evadido de China. Vakbidov, de nacionalidad uigur, declare que centensres de sus compatriot" langui- decen en "los ilamados campos de entrenamiento obrero, que eon en rea- lidad cameos de concentracidn". "Be nos march como 'traidores', Approved For Release 1999/88%24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 ApqfiBOj tP Ie .19I42 &v P389 1&QS AQ 4-4 tros empleos", express, Vakhidov. "Las personas qua por cual) ier n- tivo se pusieran an contacto can el consuiatIo savietico eran inter- rogadas". De acuerdo con un articulo de is Agenda Tanyug de 26 de septiembre, un articulo parecido aparece en is edici6n actual de is "Literaturnaya Gazeta", escrito por Bukhara Tishkanbeyev, escritor kazaj que anteriormente vivi6 en Sinkiang. 26 Septiembre: Despuds de ups pause de dos sem.. nas (los primeros dos art~os aparecieron con una semana de separaci6n), el "Diario del Pueblo" y "Benders Roja" publican el tercero de su aerie de ar- ticulos en contestaci6n a la Carta Abierta del Comite Central del PCUS de 14-de Julio de 1963: "&Ea Yuou~os__1avia a socialists?" La resppesta china, que no sorprende macho, es que no. Dicen ellos que el apitalismo y is usury florecen en is ciudades yugoslavas, los kulaks se engordan en los campos yugoalavos y is dictadura del prole- tariado se ha convertido en una "dictadura de.ia burguesia burocrdti- co-compradora", una categoria que suena un poco coma Is, Nueva Clase de Milovan Djilas. "La ayuda de los Estados Unidos ha aido el soaten de las finanzas y is economia de Yugoslavia" -- gracias a hater Tito concertado una aerie de tratados traicioneros con los Estados Unidos: "Debido a is concertaci6n de dichos tratados y acuerdos y por hater is camarilla de Tito puesto a Yugoslavia en sujeci6n al Imperialism norteamercano, los Estados Unidos gozan de los siguientes derechos en Yugoslavia: 1) a controlar sue asuntos militares; 2) a controlar sus relaciones exteriores; 3) a inmiscuirse en sus asuntos interns; 4) a manipular y super- visar sus finanzas; 5) a controlar au comercio exterior; 6) al despojo de sus recursos estrat6gicos; y 7) a recoger inteiigencia militar y econ6mica". Bajo el gobierno de Tito, el poder del estada ha degenerado de is dictadura del proletariado a is dictadura de is burguesia; "la die- tacura de ].A burguesia no solo waste sino que pasta es una brutal dictadura fascista. El regimen de Tito ha establecido mucbps cameos de concentration y prisiones fascistas donde--decenas'de millares de revolucionarios pan sido torturados a muerte con toda clase de casti- gos inhussnos". Al mfsmo tiempo se parlous a los contrarrevolucionarios. No obstante, Kruscbev fraternize con is caciarilla de Tito "no porque hays. corregido alguno de sue errores sino porque e1 estd siguiendo los pesos de Tito". Kruschev y Tito "ambos quieren liquidar el cameo so- cialista" y Kruschev "%a abandonado el marxismo-leninismo, descartado is declaration de 1960 y hozado an el lodo con is camarilla de Tito, en compie- ta violaci6t de los intereses de la Uni6n Sovietica, el pueblo sovt tico y el pueblo de two el mundo. Esto no nerd tolerado por el- gran pueblo sovietico, Is, aptaat me ice miem- broa~lel PCUS y cuadros a varios ntveI s, todos cuslea tienen una gioriosa tradici6n revolucionaria". El articulo contiene numerosas cites de is prensa yugoslava, lo que no obstante no puede considerarse garantia de su exactitud de hecho. Aunque el articulo contiene al final una incongrea invitation a. los dirigentes sovieticos a der marcha atrds antes que sea demasiado tarde, su publicaci6a parece constituir una resonante negativa a poner fin a -6 - Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 ees lAppprooved For Ulr azi 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Se' iembre : Ls Redo de Mosca aaxuwa +.? ??o. - - de Jots Wu. de 1 de septie~"e(cout&se pids iun a diacvr'so trozo que de uu 18 Se tieznbre), em inclusi a de Y 1 1957 c ia7, tie PCs a b"e de las JW declaraciones ? Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release IA-RDP78-0106C1i8a610ddig004-4 731. Crisis in Communist Agriculture 25X1C10b BACKGRO flD: The gravity of the Communist agricultural fail- ure in 1363 became known in September when the Soviet Union pur- chased tremendous quantities of grain -- upward of 8 million metric tons -- from free world countries to feed itself and its satellites, including Cuba. The full extent of the failure is not yet known: the Soviets may dip into their presumably large grain reserves (mown to be kept in event of war) or may attempt to fulfill all of its needs and commitments through purchases. xperts_ at Ws time estimate the crop failure to be a minimum of 13% loss with the possibility that it could be more than 33%. ?YI. The crop now appears to be about the level of the 13 and 1363 crops -- an 13% decrease from 1362 when the program called for a 21% increase.? In spite of failure to increase its overall agricultural production in recent years, the Soviet Union has been a net ex- porter of grain: in 1962 it imported only 45 thousand tons while exporting 4.3 million metric tons (hereafter referred to si:iply as tons), three-fifths of it" to 3astern Zurope. The USSR claimed a production of 70 million tons in 1962, but it was prob- ably closer to 55 million tons. Current purchases suggest that this year's crop is well under 53 million tons. That the Soviets reach exceeds their grasp is notable in the fact that their over- all farm pros -ction has not yet reached its 195? level while their wand 7-year plan (1959-1935) called for a 73% increase. In the meantime, the Soviet population has steadily increased, which means less food per capita year by year. The devastating 1963 failures in the USSR and the Bloc, largely brought on by drought, demonstrate more dramatically than ever their basically unrealistic agricultural policies, farm systems and planning /See BIG #123, item #693 "Belated .elp for Soviet Agriculture" and unclassified attachment "Agriculture in the Soviet Bloc."7 In his speeches, Khrushchev has railed at farm officials for their inefficient management, and talked about bureaucratic administrators who did not 'snow good farm procedures. Lt the same time he has stressed the need for using greater quan- tities of fertilizer, and the need for irrigation. These latest remedies are largely unavailable to the managers and bureaucrats Who have to make do with what they have. Typical of Khrushchev's off-the-cuff interference was a hint (13 September) that he would force V.D. 3eliayev, Chairman of the lower Volga Lconomic Council, to replace outmoded machinery in spite of Beliayev's expressed opinion that production loss during a changeover would ;name it unprofitable. (701. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4.. (701 c pprIDved For Release 1$J DP78-030919ko 0~b'M4-4 Speeches made by Khrushchev earlier this year criticizing agricultural officials might have suggested that the Soviet Union as aware tb_are would be a serious crop setback. For example, in response to a March 12, 1963 proposal he made in a speech, five of the largest Soviet Republics -- the RSFSR, the U'.traina, the Kazakh the and the Tadzhila (as well as the Moldavian and Byelo-Russian) -- passed laws reducing the number of cows which could be privately owned and placing a penalty of up to three years of corrective labor for any owner feeding bread to coves. It is the practice in many parts of the USSR, where grain is not available to private households, for farmers to buy bread for their cows. Bread, a staple supplying about one-half of the Russian diet, Is heavily subsidized by the state, its sale is con- trolled by the state, and prices are very low-7 But sthrushchev's speeches evidently were concerned only with continuing low production (four successive years of mediocre crops before 13S3) and with serious reductions in the winter wheat output. The devastatyng -fail-,ire of the summer-fall crops in the satellites and the USS: were evidently not foreseen, nor was there any provision for such emergencies in Communist planning: only six months ago the USSL had sold 4::~3 million bus a3]a of grain to Brazil; only eight onths ago they negotiated a tremendous sale to Japan; and just before the massive purchase of wheat,from Canada, the Soviet - purehased nearly 4 million bushels from 3uropean countries an-VA were negotiating to buy back what they had sold to Great Britain. Soviet purchases of grain in September were made in several steps. In the early part of the week of September S the Soviets :,)ought 11million bushels from Canada; on September 16th they made the history-rdar~ ng purchase of 227.5 million bushels (103 of wheat and 23.5 of wheat flour or a.2 million tons) rob an =da; on September 13th another agreement was signed,-'This time with kustralia, for 53.5 million bushels (or 1 million tons) all in wheat flour, with an option for another or 6 mil =ion bushels. T La Canadian sale, it is reportedt would have been even larger if Canada's transporation facilities had been sufficient to Feet the deadline delivery date set by the USSR. It was reported in Ceptember that Soviet officials were negotiating; with private U.S. producers for the purchase of some 100 to 203 million bushels of wheat; with Italy and West Germany for something around 3) thousand tons; and had cancelled sale of grain to Finland* The purchase off large quantities of wheat flour suggests that the Soviets waiter! so long to recognize the critical nature of their need that their milling plants were Inadequate to make grain available for use. In spite of its own calamity, the USSR is fulfilling its comaitment to Cuba, whose needs have increased from 292 thousand to 465 thousand tons as a result of drastic failures in all of its own crops. the Canadian sale ~astcontingent ntnuupon rthelwillingban, ness of that Country to ship the 4Part of t7--e lame Soviet purchases are intended to fulfill commitfaents to satellites, but: Poland has already asked to buy 2 (701. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (731 rbubd For Release 1 DP78-030%19E 0 4-4 a million tons from the U.S.; it is reported that a Bulgarian mission is in Cana ;a; and the Czechoslovakian goveraraent has inquired into purchases in the U.S. China. At the time the Soviet purchases were announced, negotiations by Comtuaunist China for 107 million bushels (or 533,333 tons)of wheat from Canada for delivery before the ens, of 1963 were cisclosed -- six months before the expiration of their earlier 3-year contract. Their full agreement calls for a maxi- mum of 5 million tons and a minimum of 3 million tons during the 3-year period 1 August 1963 to 31 Jul, 1966. Approximately three ;,tears ago the CCP had largely phased out its Commune program on the heels of countrywide chaos resulting from this half-conceived, misdirected and poorly administered monstrous effort. In 1359- i33, Chinese officials discovered that, over the years, agrcul- tural production figures had consistently been inflated by regional and local officials. Unrealistic production goals, wherefore, were in part caused by the inaccurate base throughout the country provided by officials intent on protecting themselves by claiming successes they had not achieved. But disclosure of these facts (a.e. failure of the Communes and the practice of inflating production figures) and the promise to institute realistic agricultural programs, have apparently not produced better results. The population continues to suffer and the CPR is forced to purchase food in some attempt to maintain its massive population at a subsistence level. Recent economic decisions of the CC? involve further depriva- tion for the Chinese people. In their anger at the Soviet Union, the CPR is engaged in a strenuous effort to repay, at an unnec- essarily fast rate, the earlier loans made by the USSR. Further, they have launched a campaign for self-sufficiency in an effort to enhance their political prestige. Advocating "self-reliance" in socialist economic development, they are attacking the USS#. ,-enuncation of this principle, primarily with respect to CPSU policies toward the Satellites in Comecon (CEMA). In its "go-it- alone" policy, the CC? is attempting, in competition with the CPSU, to create an image of its own strength as the (Co m ni st) nation to be imitated and followed. Xhrush.chev has admitted, in a parenthetical reference in a speech published on 33 September, that "a difficult situation has arisen in 1953 and we shall not be able to harvest the a.aount of bread grain we had reckoned upon"; he also disclosed the USSR's purchases from Canada and Australia (8.8 million tons, according to hfs statement), and the allocation of 43,033 tons from Rumania, Informal restrictions have been placed on the purchase of bread in Moscow stores, and bread and flour are some- times simply unobtainable. The Xremlin is clearly trying to take the shod, out of the hard facts of the situation, to lesson the food deficit by spending hard cash for foreign grains, and to control the reactions of the ;,people to this latest failure in the production of consumption goods. 3 (731. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (701 CoA p1oved For Release A-RDP78-03061RblW~bb0r-Ob' 4-4 For six on seven years Khrus1Schev has been telling toe nussian people that his agricultural policies would lead to immense increases in all types of food production. In addition to concentration on expanding grain and corn acreage (especially in the new lands program), meat and dairy products were promised in the near future. One of these promises was made as follows: "The leading collective farms and state farms, ... have made a pledge ... to catch up with the United States in the next few Years in the production of meat, milk, and butter per capita of the population." (Khrushchov in Moscow radio broadcast November S. 1957 on the 40th 25X1 C10b anniversary of the BolsheviL::revolution. ) 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 199 DP78-03g66A@QQgPOQ?@904-4 702. Games of the New Emerging Forces 25X1C10b BACTGB,OUND: Games of the New Emerging Forces (GAT FO) will be he=in Indonesia from 10 to 22 November 1063. The decision eras announced by Indonesian Sports Minister Maladi on 13 February 1`363 and has been reaffirmed inter alia in resolutions adopted at subsequent "fro-Asian conferences. In February 1963, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) suspended Indonesia for an indefinite period as a disciplinary measure following Indonesia's failure to allow athletic teams from Taiwan and Israel to participate in the Asian Games held in the late summer of 1962 in Djakarta under IOC auspices. This action was taken in accordance with IOC rules that all eligible participants must be allowed to participate. On 9 February 1963 the Department of Sports of the Republic of Indonesia denounced the action of the IOC as having been prompted by arrogance and lust for power by elements in the IOC who were a:com-olices of Taiwan and Israel, the imperialists, capitalists and colonialists. Their statement said that, far from being isolated by the IOC's action, Indonesia would be freer to realize its ideals of organizing new games free from imperialist and colonialist elements. Claims of the sponsors. Indonesian officials, including Sukarno, portray UANEFO as eiag inspired by Olympic ideals merged with the Bandung spirit (which is attributed to the first governmental-level Afro-Asian conference of 1955). They say GANEFO is the logical growth of the present world order, a world of the aviaLening of the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America, preceded -- as stated in an Indonesian ANTMA broadcast by the birth of the socialist countries. The sponsors of GANEFO say that the political changes of the world are not sufficiently reflected in the present structure of international sports, because reactionary elements and those with vested interests have deliberately sought to maintain the status quo. The sponsors say that just as the freedom of Asia, Arica, an Latin America and the establishment of the socialist countries were the result of hard struggles, so will the transformation of the world of international sports require relentless struggle to conform with the new world order. In the words of Sukarno "sports cannot be separated from politics . . . (indeed) sports must be based on politics." Political, religious and all types of (702. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (702AW1W.c fl For Release 19 P78,q3,q&t1 02"0004-4 fraternal societies have long organized sport groups as organi- zational adjuncts to encourage a mass following; and countries have encouraged participation in international sports events to improve their image and cultural contacts throughout the world. Communist countries, however, have at times sponsored inter- national events excluding committed. free countries in an attempt to capture prestige for themselves as the center of world sports. Sukarno is following this tactic in an a emp o destroy any true international sports organization which encourages world-wide participation in the spirit of free competition and is, in this sense, apolitical. GANEFO sponsors claim that they are not against the Ales of the existing international sports movement as represented by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). This claim is con- tradicted, however, by the implication that IOC's principles do not really apply to the new family of nations, i.e. ICC has not taken proper cognizance of the "breakdown of the old order." Some sponsoring elements make this explicit, saying that GANEFO is fully in accord with the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. Position of International Olympic Committee. In an ICC circular, dated August, to members of the , National Olympic Committees, and International fEmateur Athletic? Federations (IA&Fs), ICC President Avery Brundage stated inter alia that IOC has no information about GANEFO and "no conned o with them." The circular says that if the games "are not sanctioned by the International Federations /TAAFs7, participants will be liable to suspension, since most inter- national federations have rules that prohibit members from participating in unsanctioned events. If they are sanctioned by the international federations, only members of those federations will be eligible to participate, since most inter- national federations have regulations against the participa- tion of non-members. (Obviously there is no reason for being a member of a federation if participation in its event is open to non-members)." Participants. According to available reports 52 nations have been invited to the Games. In August, Indonesia announced that with the New Emerging Forces alone GANEFO would not be com- plete and the sponsors have agreed to include all progressive forces in other countries. Just which nations are cons ere eligible for GAP?CFO has never been made clear. Since the nations of the emerging areas and the Communist countries add up to con- siderably more than 52, and there is conflicting and only partial information on the invitees, an accurate list of the participants cannot be given at this time. Presumably South Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, Union of South Africa and areas still under colonial rule will not be invited. 2 (702. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (702. Cont.) 7 October 13663 According to 4 .report of last April the Soviet Union advised Indonesia that it will not participate in the Games, because IOC members are not allowed to take part in games organized by non- members. Eowever, a recent report states that the Soviet Union is planning to send 300 athletes and the Chicoms a 350-man team. Reportedly, several African countries as well as Burma are re- luctant to participate in the Games since they have learned that the Chicoms have agreed to defray expenses for all countries which cannot pay their own way. The Chicom subsidization presumably is to be channeled through the Indonesian government. The Burmese, it is reported, do not want to put themselves in the position of "being dominated by Peking." NCNA reported on 13 September the Indonesian Minister of Sports' statement that 20 countries had accepted invitations to the Games and that those countries opposed to GANEFO will leave no stone unturned in their attempts to undermine the Games. In an apparent reference to the IOC circular, Maladi is reported also to have stated that some international sports associations have warned their member nations not to take part in W013373, and to have added: "Do not take notice of them, we need not ask 25X1 C1 Jeir permission." 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1 9 / 4 ? lA-RDP78-0.3Q%jjggP29 g30004-4 703 WK,a. Dissensions Among Latin American Communists BACKGROUND: New evidence of Sino-Soviet competition in Latin America an a effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute upon Latin Ameri-. can Communist Parties (as discussed in Bi-Weekly Pro agenda Guidance No. 633, Wli,a, "Communism in Latin America," 6 August) appears daily. Among the recent developments: 1. Four prominent Soviet Communist Party officials arrived in Montevideo (ideological and propaganda expert s nclud- ing the chief editors of the official CP journal, Konimunist, and the CP propaganda journal, Agitator, and the deputy iea of the International Department of the antral Committee) to attend the celebrations of the 43rd anniversary of the Uruguayan Communist ?arty (?CU). The celebrations were originally planned for 21 September, the day the PCU was founded, but were postponed until 5 October. A secret meeting of Latin American Communist Part 2 . officials in Montevideo in early October con Hues to be reported from a variety of sources. The arrival of Soviet Party officials and the postponement of the PCU celebrations lend credence to these reports. The agenda reportedly will feature discussions of the Sino-Soviet conflict, plans to create political and eco- nomic chaos in Latin America, general sabotage strategy including specific programs for Brazil and Argentina, and an analysis of communism on the continent. 3. The Chinese Communists plan to create a "new Communist International" according to a report in Rome s pro- ek- ng ommu- nis newspaper Ritorniamo a Lenin (Let Us Return to Lenin). Among the Communis Parties supporting the Chinese, according to the paper, are those in Venezuela and Puerto Rico. (See Washington Post and Press Comment, 4 September.) 41. Peking is stepping up attempts to win supporters nese communist trade officials repor e told Lain er ca . a recent meet ing of Uruguayan pro-Chinese leftists that similar splinter groups were springing up everywhere and that Peking was ready to help them in every way possible. One element of the Ecuadorean Party is reported to be receiving funds from both the Chinese and the Cubans. In Peru young pro-Chinese leaders are reported to constitute a serious challenge to the old guard of their OP and sharp dissension. has forced postponement of the CP plenum. Latin America's best organized pro-Chinese group -- the Communist Party of Brazil which broke away from the pro-Soviet (703. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 AVp~oved For Release 19908/24 ~.CIA-RDP7870%O61 Or0?i8gg30004-4 ,703 Con -Brazilian Communist Party -- -reportedly has formed an alliance with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues and other extreme leftists and established combined political and military directorships to consolidate "all Brazilian revolutionary forces." Cuba continues its !Sgressive attempts to foment rebellion. President ermo n Valencia o om a charged on 26 September that "today the fight is with Fidel Castro." Ee declared that he had documentary proof of open Castro intervention in Colombia and called Castro-supported terrorists and guerrillas "wolves in sheep's clothing" which pose "the greatest danger ever to threaten the country." There is reason to believe that the Cubans see in the Sino- Soviet dispute new opportunities to re-assert their claim to lead the Latin American revolution and for Castro to regain lost stature. After considerable silence on the subject, they have renewed their exhortations for rebellion and violence in Latin America. "Violence," declared Cuba's Minister of Industries Ernesto "Che" Guevara in the September issue of the Cuban Commu- nist theoretical journal, Cuba Socialista, is "the midwife of new societies." He said: "We had predicted that the war would be continental... Will its vortex be in Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, or icuador? /Note the designation of countries where violence, pro-Chinese factions and/or Cuban- supported guerrillas exist? . . . . Will these present skirmishes be only manifestations of an unrest that does not bear fruit? It does not matter . . . . What counts is the decision to struggle that ripens day by day; the awareness of the need for revolutionary change, the certainty of its possibility." Cuba's support of dissident elements in Latin America and its encouragement of rebellion have aroused not only legally- constituted governments, but also local Communist Parties. The latter object to Cuba's financial and material aid to dissidents without the prior knowledge and approval of the local Parties. More than one old-guard leader has been upset to find his opposition within the CP financed by Cuba. 6. Yugoslavia President Tito has acted as a catalyst to precipitate or exacerbate-dissension on his -four of n America. Catholics in Brazil, for example,, launched a campaign protesting his visit, publicizing the fact he had been excommunicated by Rome and calling him the "torturer" of Archbishop Stepinac. They were joined by Brazil's far left. Classe Operaria, the weekly news- paper of the pro-Chinese CPB, denounced he visit of "the temporary president of Yugoslavia" as an imperialist plot (with the notation that his request to join President Goulart on a big game hunt revealed his "aristocratic tendencies"). "Tito and his gang," the paper concluded, "call themselves socialists but in reality they yield to North American monopolies in exchange for dollars and weapons." Approved For Release 1 061401a DPJ6=O fk8~g30004-4 (703 fcved For Release 1999!08/24 C1A-RDP78-0~08jt40%%2Q~W004-4 Conservative political leaders in Brazil restricted his itinerary, reduced the length of his stay and limited his con- tacts. His reception in Chile was indifferent and threats on his life severely limited his contact with the public. The conserva- tive press had a field day. Manama pabers called him a "slippery neutralist" with "zig-zagging politics" and suggested: "Paint him as a classic acrobat who walks the edge of a razor." But the most significant effect of Tito's visit was among the leftists. Comments ranged from effusive welcoming editorials to scathing attacks on the so-called leader of "independent" communism. The Communist Party of Bolivia reportedly resolved to adopt a neutral position using the Party paper to a:irnowledge his presence but omitting any praise. Bolivian CP leaders felt it was impossible to ignore his visit and designed his strategy to prevent stimulating ideological disputes within the Party. It is reasonable to expect that the Sino-Soviet dispute will increase tensions within the Communist Parties of Latin America and coupled with the developments described above will contribute to more fractionation of the Communist movement in this area. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1 . A-RDP78-03091.Rbbb~bbOibbb4-4 704 EE,WE,a. Stalinist and Pro-Chinese Dissidence in the 25X1 C 1 Ob 3uropean Communist : ar es BACKGROUIND : Italy. In January 1963 a splinter group from the ?CI established -the "Associazione d'Amicizia tra Italia e Cif," (Italo-Chinese Friendship Association), dedicated to the vio- lent overthrow of the bourgeois state and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, The group has its head- quarters in Padua and branches in a number of Italian cities. It is composed for the most part of Trotskyites and militants expelled from the PCI, i.e. of dispvate extremist groups work- ing outside of or on the fringes of the Italian Communist and Socialist parties. It publishes a monthly magazine entitled Italia-Cron, The Association is recognized, officially endorsed and presumably funded by the Chinese, although it may receive additional funds from a variety of sources which see in it an instrument to weaken the PCI. At present, the Italia-Cina or- ganization is going through a period of disagreement and dis- orientation,,a phenomenon usually experienced by Communist groups which break with the party organization and then attempt to reconcile divergent interests and ideas and to agree on some form of organized protest. The Association -- which is without a leadership of national stature and whose cadre is formed basi- cally from dissident sections of the Padua provincial Communist Federation -- has succeeded in publishing a number of booklets attacking the embour eoisement of Togliatti, Nenni,, accusing the leadership o the by-now-familiar heresies of "reformism," "constitutionalism," "demobilizing the working class" etc., while advocating a return to Marxist-Leninist purity and revolutionary action. The PCI, while publicly ignor- ing the group or insisting that the hard-line trend is negligible, is disciplining party members in contact with the factionalists. For the present, Togliatti, fresh from successes in the Italian elections won on a program of moderate parliamentary reform (i.e. the opposite tactic to that advocated by Italia-Cina) is in a very good position to maintain party discipline and isolate the left-winZ factionalists. In fact, the PCI appears -- in a sense -- to be exploiting the Italia-Cina Association by con- trasting the radical program of the latter with its own "peaceful" and "democratic" efforts. Nonetheless, the appearance of a rival group of dedicated militants, supported and funded by Communist China, is a phenomenon which he cannot afford to ignore. In addition to Italia-Cina, which at the moment is the chosen instrument of Peking, there are other independent mani- festations of Chicom activity in Italy which reflect radical, abstract or anarchist currents and appeal largely to an extremist fringe. (704. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (704 9 3raked For Release RDP78-030761OA*~1&0 0?04-4 Belgium. Factionalism in the Belgian Communist ?arty, on the other hand, is capable of posing a significant challenge to party leaders. When Jacques Grippa, Secretary of the Brussels Federation, politburo and central committee member, was expelled from the Party at the XIVth BCP Congress in April 1963, together with three other prominent members of the Brussels Federation, for "engaging in factional activities incompatible with the party constitution...," he took with him an estimated 25-4 per- cent of the Brussels Federation. Grippa's dissident "Brussels Federation" held its own Congress 23 June, "dissolved" the regu- lar party organization and demanded an extraordinary national congress. The dissidents receive funds and polemical propaganda from the Chinese who recognize in Grippa an important tactical asset in their campaign to develop pro-Chinese support anon the 3uropean CPs. Grippa, long an advocate of greater militancy, has steadfastly attacked Khrushchev's "moderate" policies and opposed the Belgian CPs endorsement of them since the 22nd CPS1J Congress in 1961. At the XIVth BC? Congress, he and his followers culated to al the delegates a document reiterating their dissi- dent views. In August Grippa, who had already spent most of July in Albania, made a visit to Communist China. In late August the dissidents attacked Moscow and the Belgian C:o in a statement characterizing the Moscow group as revisionists and scissionists. On 27 September, five members of tZe party's youth association in 3russels were expelled for "deliberately attempting to create a split within the Brussels Federation of the young Communist organization." The Belgian CP is the first in Europe in which a significant splinter party has been formed. France. While there are a number of left-wing Communist groups otscyite, dissident Trotskyite etc.) in France which oppose the French Communist Party and favor greater militancy (some of which have helped spread Chinese propaganda), an organ- ized, Chinese-backed opposition group is still only in the formative stage. Indications exist, however, that the Chinese have selected certain individuals to engage in extensive propa- ganda activities on their behalf in the hope of creating factions and gaining support in the traditionally conservative but docile and Moscow-oriented French CP. United Kin dom. While there appears to have been little ?eft-w ng opposition at the British CP Congress in April 1563, where a dozen or so delegates criticized the party's refusal to publish the Sino-Soviet exchanges and called for public debate of the issues (they also criticized Yugoslav revisionism), in August and September 1963 the correspondence columns of the gaily Worker indicate that pro-Chinese sentiment exists even in the ranks of the British CP. The fact that these letters, many of which are strongly militant and sympathetic to the Chinese stand, were allowed to be published in the official party organ, is an indication both of party reluctance to take sides in the quarrel and of the difficulty in convincing the conservative and orthodox British Communist rank and file of the wisdom of Khrushchev's policies. For the present, the Chinese Communists e% C. (704. Continued) I" offl" Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 (704A tAd For Release 1 . A-RDP78-0306610'bbb$03bbb4-4 seem to be v:or!zing largely through the Britain-China Friendship Association which is responsive to Chinese direction and supports China on major points of difference with the Soviet Union. Switzerland. In mid-September 1963, dissident members of the Parte der rbeit, the Workers (Communist) Party, formed a new "Communist Party of Switzerland" in opposition to the auto- cratic and unrepresentative methods of the present Partie der Arbeit leaders in suppressing the Chinese point of view and ordering party members to follow the Moscow line. The new party is in contact with the Chinese and is receiving and disseminating Chinese propaganda. It is in contact also with Italian and Belgian dissidents. The Swiss dissidents are mostly from Vevey in the Canton of Vaud. The new party is led by GArard Buillard, "Secretary General;"formerly Secretary of the Vevey Section of the Worker's ?arty, recently expelled for distributiong Chinese propaganda pamphlets. The public emergence of a dissident faction in Switzerland is basically a reaction against the uninsp king policies of Secretary General Edgar Woog who has maintained traditional Swiss CP subservience to Moscow and to the Italian Communist Party. In regard to Chinese activities in Switzerland, the NCNA office in Geneva is expanding to accommo- date the NCNA officials recently expelled from Prague. General. There have been recurrent rumors throughout the summer of 033 that the Chinese Communists intend to establish a new Communist international which would promote revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and be responsive to Chinese direction. Evi- dence indicates that the Chinese are attempting -- at the least - to coordinate activities of the revolutionary factions of the various European Communist Part as. Jacques Grippa, and three other Belgian dissident leaders were in Tirana between 14 July and 5 August 1963, together with a{ranco Molfese, and other Italian leaders of the Italia-Cina Friendship Association. G yard Buillard, leader of the Swiss dissidents,appears also to have been to Albania in August. Subsequently, the Belgian leaders visited Peking. A militant Communist publication entitled E.evolution has recently appeared in Paris in Spanish, English and Prencfi. The publication may be intended as a link among the 25XlC10brevolutionary Communist factions in Europe. 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 CPYROWroved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 CPYRGHT .. September 9, 191:3 1 G 1 'Zed Farms Soviet. A(riculture F: u s Fifth Straight 1eImv-Par Harvest Wearer Woes Shrink Grain Output; Scarcity of Feed Spurs Slaughter of Animals Bosses Score Inefficiency By JOE WESTERN Staff Rrrortcr of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WASHINGTON-With harvest time at hand, U. .,L fifth straight year of embarrassing below-par farm production. U.S. ana'?,?sts are now convinced of that prospect. By sifting Russian agricultural sta- tistics, weather reports and Communist con- cessions of error, they're piercing some of the fog veiling the current facts about life down on the soviet farm. The findings include these: This year's crops of badly needed livestock feed grains, vital wheat for bread making and all-important potatoes promise to sag below last year's none too great results. By the Communists' own admission, plantings of these crops actually shrank from 1962 acreages, some of them by over 10r. Since planting time, they've suffered from extreme cold and heat and from drought. In one major grain- raising region, rainfall this year has been less than half of normal. Shortages of feed are forcing Russian farm bosses to trim their herds of cattle, hogs, sheep and goats and send to slaughter hun- dreds of t'touaands of skinny, often underage a n ma'is. R;.'13 scanty Soviet meat supplies may thus be swelled temporarily, the longer- range effect will be to prolong or worsen Rus- sia's chronic meat scarcities. For lack of cattle fee`, too, Soviet milk production prom- ises to slip below last year. Even before this year's ba~i news came in, the Moscow daily Pravda surveyed the feed situation and com- plained: "Hooves and tails increase, but pro- duction remains almost on the same level." Less Food Per Capita? Though output of cotton and some lesser crops may top i962, these increases may not be enough to offset "other shortcomings. At best, by Free World reckonings, the USSR's total farm output this year probably won't rise significantly above last year's showing; that was about 5% short of record 1955. More- over, because the Soviet Union's population may rise by about 1.5% to an estimated 226 million in 1963, per-capita food and fiber pro- duction may we!; fall to alu;iit S7cJ of 1958's levels from 88% in 1962. No one expects anythin; approaching famine to result, of course. But the lack of more meat and milk alone indicates Premier Khrushchev's regime is faliin', dow,vn on a promise to better the lot of liis pcoplo and to catch up to U.S. farm r.hui:-., r ee. The US:;A's current sv ii-v,,., ia.. ,:r! dy en- visioned a total lt;i't-tin rough-11,r,,, ..i pro- duction increase of 76";, ~iti: e~pec ly steep, in ?, and mii'c. T..i vcu?y year so far, Russ ::in farmers have failed even to match record 195.3. What's more, total Soviet farm output continues to lag more than 30 %o behind the U.S. even though Rta:,ia'. 1583 planted acreage of 5,',9 .million acre:. is n rly 7,% larger than this country's. This uni:;s;)iring ex- an.l,le, compared to griculturaI abt:n,dd rce, threatens to hamper export of the Red r , ith to developing nations. Ag .in this year as last, the Russians are blamin;, bad weather for most of their agri- cult,:rs: woes. i,1ut officials continue also to excor.a_e irnver.cchclon bureaucrats and farmers I 1 r inefficiency, ignorance and ir-ortia. In fact Western analysts find, the Commu- nist syste 1 of tight state control, with limited incentive or producers, is heavily to blame.. Even spe iai production bonuses and 1963's in- creases i prices for farmers have not been enough, it's believed, to spur them to dawn- to-dusk 1 ors. Still another brake has been Russia's ost-1058 slowup in growth of invest- ment in griculture, affecting spending on farm mac inery, fertilizer and other essentials. Freeman Detoured Admittedly, separating Communist farm fact from fancy continues to defy precise anal- ysis; any conclusive on-the-spot investigation is impossi Ie. Indeed, Russian reluctance to let prying V'c=tetn eyes see serious crop damage may liavc been behind an unexpected and still unpubliciz d switch made in the travel plans of Agricu Lure Secretary Freeman and his party oft chnicians touring Iron Curtain lands this sumo er. On Jul 15 in Moscow, Russian Agriculture Minister I P. Volovchenko handed the Amer- icans a sc edule conspicuously lacking a long- scheduled trip: A two-day trek through the heart of the famed wheat-growing "New Lands" ar and Tselindgrad, some 1,400 miles east of M (scow; the region, formerly prairie, was plow (d up for crops beginning only in l9$4. Instead the Soviets had substituted a short- er jaunt Orenburg, 750 miles east of the Russian c pita.l. After listening to Mr. Volov- chenko's M convincing explanations, Mr. Free- man abre d to the change because Orenburg is at least n the fringe of the New Lands, and because h was reluctant to make trouble just as the nuc ar test ban negotiators had reached agreement a few blocks away in the Kremlin. Adding to Free World suspicions of Red farm fail es this year is that both Pravda and Izves a, Russia's leading dailies, have fallen sile t of late about agricultural pros- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4 CPYRGHT space in m,).-c- promising past years. "If things were tur_Zi::y out well in the current harvest," says a WLc tern specialist, "they'd be bragging about it." Annly~, Ciirs Potential \onc;aclcss, many U.S. farm specialists are to warn against any Western h?nd- n, . ,agn;tt.?d suwt, 19Sti, says a 11 analyst, "and we flank a major rea- son is _-,at they cut bac1 in capital investment growth." But if the test ban accord and any s!;bsequcnt tt mziorrea iiq should lead Russia's rulers to c vert big money from armaments to farm machinery, fertilizer and other pro- duction aids, this analyst contends, a jump in fan:: output would surely result. But at least until Russian plant breeders develop plants more resistant to frost, heat and drought, it's agreed the Soviet Union's generafv inhospitable weather will continue to plague Moscow's farm planners most years. As compared with American weather, Russia's climate tends to be dry and subject to tem- per Lure extremes; it is not moderated by l warm, moisture-laden winds blowing off oceans or large lakes. Because the USSR lies much farther north than the U,S., the average grow- ing season is short, much like that of Canada's prairie provinces. For 1963 crops, U.S. onlookers agree, ex- tremes of cold and heat. plus lack of moisture have stunted. per-acre yields of key Soviet farm cornmofi,~tes, se. (-re Winter Hurt Crops The past winter was unusually long and cold. In the Ukraine, long-time bread basket of the USSR, fall-planted crops, mostly wheat and barley, were badly hurt. Then spring 1 came late, and it was dry and hot. So was ne summer that followed, damaging spring- planted corn. Eastward in the "New Lands," wheat and other grains have suffered lately from scanty rainfall and extra-high temperatures. So far in 1963, precipitation in this semi-arid area, which has sometimes produced as much as 25'0 of Russia's wheat crop, has been less than half of normal and average thermometer read- ings have run sev'ral degrees above even the region's scaring norms. Coming on top of reduced plantings of some basic crops, this buffeting by nature assures punier output of certain vital farm products. The Communists themselves admit this year's plnntin;;s of major livestock feeds, in- clndin, corn, oats, hay and sugar h,cis grown for forage, are down to around 136 million, acres this year from over ::):!lion in 1962. With feed scarcer, Soviet milk output is ex- pected to shrink somewhat below last year's U.S.-estimated 116 billion pounds, a showing roughly 10 billion short of the 1962 U.S. total and even farther behind in per-capita terms. Even with a temporary bulge in livestock slaughter, Soviet farms are expected to pro- vide no more than 70 pounds of meat per citizen this year, only slightly above last year's 67 pounds, and far less than the expected rec- ord 167 pounds per capita going to American dining tables this year. Not only has the Soviet wheat crop suf- fered weather damage, but planted acreage of this basic bread grain admittedly slipped below 166 million acres this year, down 2 mil- lion from 1962. Outlook: Production some- what lower than last year's, which was reck- oned by Free World analysts at about 2 billion bushels. Potato Pl:uttin;;. I)ec.linc Plantings of potatoes, a staple in Russian diets, at only 21 million acres are off by 500,- 000 acres from the 1962 total. The USSR . al- ready is suffering acute spud shortage, stem- ming from last year's shrunken output; U.S. experts estimated it at only about 68,200 tons, far below ]961's more normal crop of about 83,600 tons. It's true that Russia reports i163 plant- ings of protein-rich field peas and beans used mostly for livestock feed jumped to 31.6 mil- :ion acres from 20,5 million in 1962, that cot- ton moved up to 6 million acres from 5.7 mil- lion and that oilseeds, mostly from sunflowers, at 15.6 million acres were up from 14.8 mil- lion. Oil pressed from the seeds is used mostly in cooking. But because of this year's siege of rough weather, actual harvests of these crops may not climb in step with planted acreage, And increases could be overshadowed by setbacks elsewhere on the farm front. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030004-4