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November 18, 1963
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25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/6-8/2M" : A-RDP78-030V1X8ff62&664(NH-5 DATES Od PROPAGA14DA INT3R.3ST December Afro-Asian Organization for 'Economic Co-opera- tion, 4th AAOEC, scheduled for Karachi, 1933. 1 Dec Assassination of KIROV, CPSU leader in Leningrad, gives Stalin pretext to start great purge, 1934. 5 Dec USSR adopts new "Stalin" constitution providing for universal suffrage, freedom of speech,press and assembly, 1936. 9 Dec VJFDY executive committee meeting, Djakarta, Dec. 9-15. 21 Dec Stalin born (1379). 26 Dec Mao Tse-tung born (1393 - 70 years). January International Conference of Youth and Students for Disarmament (t?FDY-sponsored); scheduled for Florence, Italy, January 1934. 2 Jan Fidel Castro assumes power in Cuba, 1959. 15 Jan "Trial of the 12* first show trial of Stalinist purge, including Zinoviev and Kamenev (initial members Stalin ruling triumvirate during Lenin's physical decline), 1935. 21 Jan Lenin dies, 1924 (born 22 April 1?70). 26 Jan Second Congress of Soviets meets: Stalin swears allegiance to Lenin's policies, 1924. 31 Jan Leon Trotsky banished for life, 1929. 31 Jan Cuban Marxist-Leninist Government excluded from participation inter-American system by Foreign Ministers American Republics at Punta del Este, 1932. 1 Feb UNGA adopts resolution charging Chinese Communist aggression in Korea, 1951. 2 Feb Estonian-Soviet Peace Treaty signed: Soviet Government "forever renounces sovereign rights over people and territory of Estonia," 1920. 14 Feb USSR and CPR sign treaty of alliance (Sino- Soviet Friendship Pact) repudiating Soviet Nationalist Treaty (14 August 1945), 1950. 14 Feb Khrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech at CPSU 20th Congress, 14-25 Feb. 1956. C r n T " PA Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 25X1C10b k Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 "own PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSZNSIONS #16 28 October-S November 1963 Commentary Principal Developments: 1. The Chinese fired another major blast at the Soviets, a 10,000 wor People's Daily editorial on 2 ovem er, e Truth About How e Lea ers of the CPSU Dave Allied Themselves with India Against China," in reply to the 19 September Pravda editorial on the subject. They bluntly accused the Soviet`-' leadership of conjuring up Sino-Indian tension in order to ex- ploit the boundary issue to sow dissension between China and Asian-African countries. The highly tendentious version of the "facts" of the d#Mpute and the chronology of Sino-Soviet rela- tions regarding it strikingly illustrate the ultra-nationalistic sense of self-righteousness which characterizes the Chinese out- look. The Chinese taunt the Soviets with phrases such as "muni- tions merchants" and "running a joint stock company with the US imperialists," brand Soviet statements as "ludicrous" and "a plain lie," and warn: "The Soviet leaders have betrayed the re- volutionary cause of the Indian people; this account will be settled sooner or later." The editorial concludes by asserting that the Soviets no longer consider the imperialists to be their enemy: now it is "the Marxist-Leninists, ... and China in par- ticular." In a classic "pot-calling-kettle-black" final para- graph, the Chinese charge: "Your Achilles heel is your lack of respect for truth.... Those who have no respect for truth will fail in the end!" The Chinese press also carried two full pages (31 Oct. - 1 Nov.) of extracts from recent Soviet attacks on China with a shrill editorial comment on the Soviet campaign (which has in- cluded 430 items from 1 September to 27 October, for a total of 716 since 15 July!) 2. The only other major polemical tract of the period was also on the Chinese side, a 16,000 word North Korean Nodong Sinmun editorial on 20 October, "Let Us Defend a oc a ist gip," which effectively -- and relatively dispassionately -- argued the Chinese case as applied to a smaller nation. It be- gan by exhorting all Communists not to join in any Soviet move to isolate the Chinese, -- and ended by calling on all to iso- late the revisionists. 3. The Soviet Party, engrossed in the celebration of the 46th anniversary of its "October Revolution" on 7 November (and perhaps reacting to the refusal of a number of pro-Soviet parties to join in a move to isolate the Chinese, see below), contributed very little to the war of words, beyond the replay of a few supporting statements by representatives of relatively (016 Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 A roved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 (# Commentary Cont.) unimportant parties (Colombia, Portugal, U.S.A.). The anniversary celebration accentuated the positive -- i.e., fraternal friend- ship and mutual assistance -- in all messages and speeches, with the conflict ignored or dismissed optimistically (except for the Albanians and, to a much less extent, the North Koreans). 4. The latest public references to the prospect of a con- ference of all parties coming to our attention -- on both sides (Rumanian, E. German', and New Zealand) -- emphasized the neces- sity for careful preparations, inferentially over a long period of time. There has been no information regarding possible dis- cussions in Moscow at the time of the celebration. 5. A Japanese CP resolution pegged to the general elec- tions not only outlined an "independent" line in full harmony with the Chinese -- but went on to define "modern dogmatism" in such a way as to apply it implicitly against the CPSU and the Soviet-aligned bloc. Significance: Despite the enormously favorable conditions provided by the 46th anniversary of the "October Revolution," celebrated by all Communists as the greatest step in the development of world Communism, with pilgrimages to Moscow by representatives of all major parties, the Soviets seemed to lose the initiative in the conflict to the Chinese side during this period. Certainly the battle of polemics was pushed vigorously only by the Chinese side, and the bulk of available evidence indicates that the Soviets have given up -- in the face of lack of support by im- portant parties -- their effort to call an early conference of the parties to force the Chinese into self-excommunication. However, the picture is far from clear and it seems possible that the Soviets are marking time pending the outcome of inter- party discussions now going on in Moscow. 25X1 C10b 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #16 26 October-8 November 1963 October 22 - The Japanese CP, in a CC plenum resolution on "The resent Situation and the Party's Tasks Centering on the General Elections" (not picked up in time for last issue of Chronology), acknowledges the repercussions in Japan of the "bitter disputes over the divergence of view on basic principles in the international Communist movement" and establishes an "independent" line which is in full harmony with the Chinese. Calling for "struggle against modern revisionism, which is the primary danger as was pointed out by the Moscow statement," and also "fight against modern dogmatism, which has the character- istic of arbitrarily giving a eneral po cy line for other raterna parties. and-a-1-so o blindly o ow ng the policies of other raterna parties," the implicitly turns the label o mo ern dogmatism" as well as "modern revisionis W against the CIPBU and the ov et-aligned bloc. (Akahata) (E.g.,the 11fd1l'ow other par es blindly- passage n the 28 October Nodong Sinmus editorial reviewed below, section 3). October 27 - Peking press features the above JCP resolution; ex ens ve quo es rom an attack on the Tito reactionary revision- ists in the Hanoi organ Nhan Dan (10 October?); and a 23 October statement by M. H. Williams, a ional Committee Chairman of the New Zealand C? stressing the CPNZ's "considered opinion that any meeting o e world parties without adequate preparations in conformity with the statement of the 81 parties ... would be premature, and would almost certainly be abortive." October 28 - People's Daily uses extensive extracts from the 20,Wword Ada"' nT-an -attack on Khrushchev described in Chrono, Octo er ravda on 1 November indignantly reports Peking publication ofttack.) Leading East German propagandist Gerhard Eisler, Chairman of the State Radio Comm tee, answers the letter of a listener who refers to FCP boss Thorez's call for an international Com- munist conference (Chrono, October 6): suggesting postponement, he says cDnvocation of such a conference "naturally depends on whether such a conference holds any prospects for reducing or even removing the differences of opinion," and therefore "the parties must clarify their positions by mutual consultations." October 28 - North Korean Party daily Nodong Sinmun features a -word ea' or a eaded "Let Us Defend the Socialist Camp," which comprehensively presents the North Korean views on the conflict: -- essentially the Chinese position, somewhat tailored to represent a smaller nation. It exhorts all Communists not to be a part of any Soviet move to isolate the Chinese, defends the Chinese side of the main issues, and ends by calling on all to "revolutionize and unite," -- and to isolate all revisionists! 1 (#16 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 October 30 - Indonesian CP organ Haria Itakjnt,,in an editorial suppor ing Sukarno 'S 'oufh Oath may speech- concludes in tune with the C P: "It is no longer necessary to explain why a revo- lutionary line can strengthen the, canse of Asia, Africa and Latin America and boost the emerging forces, because through, such a zLevQlutionary line all the anti-imperialist forces can be organized and deal heavy blows to imperialism." October 30 - West German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine carries a sprom its Moscow correspondent repor ng unconfirmed rumors" that the Kremlin had received a Chinese invitation to resume their bilateral discussions in Peking. (To date, we have seen no other report of such a development.) October 31 - The Soviet Congress of the All-Union Central Council o ra a J'nions m-e ng in Moscow adopts a resolution which emphasizes that "Soviet trade unions angrily reject the clumsy and groundless attacks by the CCP leadership on the CPSU, the Soviet Government and our people." People's Daily under the headline "Anti-China Outbursts in the Soviet Press Become More Nasty and Fantastic," devotes an entire page to extracts from recent Soviet press articles attack- ing China, announcing that more will appear on the next day. e s'r ditorTS note" comments that extracts of earlier attacks had been printed two months ago. "Since then, instead of exercising any restraint, the Soviet press has been attacking China in a more aggressive and disgusting manner. According to incomplete statistics, attacks on the CCP between 1 September and 27 October in national newspapers and Journals alone number 430. The 286 items published between 15 July and 31 August, brings the total to 716, not including Soviet press reprints of fraternal party attacks on the Cam. The editor tells his readers that "Their abuses and lies mount higher and higher.... The language they use becomes still more foul and scurrilous." They "malign Comrade Mao Tse-tung" more wantonly than before, lash out at his Marxist-Leninist theories, China's line for building socialism, and China's for- eign and domestic policies. Alleging that Chinese statesmen have a slogan "Down with the whites;" they "even use such names as 'the Peking renegades' and 'wild duelists,' and talk about 'the conscience of the Peking leaders being like sewage,' etc." November 1 - People's Daily again publishes extracts from Soviet attac iks, and prints T~ "fu-_r1-=-e-xr of the 29 September Djakarta speec y PIUI Chairman Aidit (Chrono, September 29). November 2 - Peking press publishes a 10,000-word People's Daily editor Jaenti a "The Truth About How the Leaders o e 10, aIve A3lied Themselves with India Against china,," replying y ng to the Sept em er rav a e or a I "A Serious Hotbed of Tension in Asia" (publis e y People's Daily on 25 September) and the 21 September Soviet Governmen s a ement on same subject. Within the framework of a transparently tendentious version of the "facts" of the elease 19 border uAtlqnlltiQ &1WRia m ,~, 1;~~ fte" Approved For Release 19 9/02 I ~' 6R Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 "the Asian-African countries which maintain strict neutrality") the Chinese charge that the Soviet leaders (who "ignore the facts' and who "have degenerated so far as to flout elementary logic") are "sparing no effcrts to sow discord" and "working even harder than the U.S. imperialists in supporting the Indian reactionaries:' What Is their "real aim in conjuring up tension?"' "To be blunt, the Soviet leaders are doing so because they want to e - oviet boundary question to sow ssension a weep na and other Asian- African coun r es, divert a peop e In Asia and Africa from e s rugg a against imperialism, and cover up the U.S. imperialists' aggressive and warlike activities. This is a betrayal of the anti-imperialist revolutionary cause of the people of Asia, and, indeed, of the whole world." The article includes a 16-point resume of Sino-Soviet exchanges over the Sino-Indian border conflict; brands Soviet statements as ludicrous or just "a plain lie"; taunts the Soviets with phrases such as "munitions merchants" and "running a joint stock company with the U.S. imperialists"; accuses Soviet leaders of betraying the Indian people, warning that "this account will be settled sooner or later',; and finally charges them with using "inter- national mass organizations" such as the World Congress of Women in Moscow and the AAPSO conference in Moshi to "try to break up the anti-imperialist united front." The editorial concludes: "It is becoming clearer and clearer that the Soviet leaders no longer consider the Imperialists ea e y the United States an he reactionaries o all coun- tries to a their enemy. is the Marx s - n nists, he revolutionary people, and China n par cu ar w o are her enemy .. . "We would like to advise the Soviet leaders not to rejoice too soon. Revolutionary China can never be isolated. The more brazenly you collaborate with all imperialists and reactionaries, the more you isolate yourselves. China cannot be discredited, for the truth is on China's side. Your Achilles heel is your lack of respect for truth. More an 90 percent of the people of the worTff heed the truth. ... Those who have no respect for truth will fail in the end." All Chinese papers also carry an NCNA report on increased Soviet economic and military support to India in opposition to China: People's Daily captions this "The More Soviet Aid to India, t e ore Fran c Its Anti-China Campaign." A Yugoslav Tanyug report from Peking on "the appearance of this est extremely bitter anti-Soviet document" says that "?eking observers" have given it special attention as "one of the severest attacks against the Soviet leadershi ." Tanyu contiA'bved For Release 1999/08/24: CC11D"7~E3ofl3Q6~08~QQQ~Q~12-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 "It is held to have two main aims: on the domestic ? scene to further anti-Soviet activity in a matter which touches national sentiment; on the foreign scene, a fresh effort to discredit the Soviet Union among the newsy liberated, underdeveloped, and still unliberated countries." Tass reports from Bogota that the 29th plenary meeting of the Co om ian C? "uraanimousiy -adopted a resolution condemning the splitting activities of the CCP leaders," which "have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism." NCNA reports from Rangoon that "Burmese public leaders in their statements today s eirnly denounce the Indian overnment's rejection of a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.,, were: "Secretary General of the Burma National United Front Bo Mya Thwar"; "Member of the Politburo of the Burma United Workers Party U Ba Hla Aung"; and "Member of the Executive Committee of the All-Burma World Peace Committee U Aing Ze." November 3 - Pravda carries an article by Portuguese C? Secretary ienerai Alvaro n al pegged to the SovietRevolution anniversary wTh c escribes the "surprise and indignation" among Communists of all countries at the "anti-Soviet campaign... supported by the CC-0 leaders." However, he optimistically believes that the friendship of the fraternal peoples will be unbreakable. The Chinese press carries an NCNA report from Brussels that "the Belgian Communists who uphold Marxism-Leninism Piave published a sem -mon y, a eop e s oice, 77 Two i ssues were put out in October. November 4 - The Rumanian Party daily organ Scinteia publishes an article by RumanI.in_Louncil of Ministers Chairman and Polit- buro member Maurer (article also appeared more or less simultane- ously in the October issue of theoretical journal Lupta de Clasa and the November issue of Problems of Peace and Soc a sm World Marxist Review) devoted to t e 3r anniversary of the Moscow el-party con erence which condemns polemical attacks, insults, and distortion of positions, and the imposition of the line or decisions of one party on others. Maurer goes on to state that the Rumanian party welcomes the CPSU's earlier proposal for cessation of polemics and "supports persistent, patient work to create the conditions for holding a new conference of Communis _,7_ Fot t and workers pa, ;; es si r_a a ex3:ing di_ f'e:8&ence ' of views can be discussed among the leaderships of the parties." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: OAR D1N&838@#A0MM40902 -5 A rov d Fo Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200040002-5 1ovenpbe - A Pravda article on the 46th anniversary by American Lommuun. , s,enry " inston (a Negro) condemns those in Peking o are try-Ing to speak on behalf of the 'colored peoples,"' of the world, who '{undeistand that such an approach by the Chinese leaders, Which smells of 'racism from a long way off, is the purest demagogery intended t o c (i, siTve "the inhabitants of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America." Winston asserts that the Chinese "will not succeed in deceiving the peoples of the colored continents," who "have become convinced that it is precisely the Soviet Union that is the best friend of the oppressed peoples." November 6 - A North Korean Nodong Sinmun article pegged to the anniversary a Occ offer- evo u. ion, "Revolutionary Ideas of October -- Banner; f Struggle for National Independence and Liberation," emphasizes the role of revolution. "Some people are spreading an absurd theory that today .. the main task of the national liberation struggle in colonies has shifted from a political problem to an economic one.... This will only serve the neocolonialist policy of the imperialists." November 7 - The 46th anniversary of the Soviet "October" Revo- -o-n--rd-celebrated roug ou the Communist world as e greatest revolution in the history of mankind" (Peking's words), with the usual meetings, speeches, messages and editorials, The emphasis was on the positive achievements of the Communist world flowing from that Revolution, and (with the exception of the Albanians and, to a much less extent, the North Koreans -- see below) the great dispute was generally ignored or glossed over. Even the People's Daily, which naturally introduced the Chinese revolution as a con nuation of the October Revolution," emphasized that the Chinese people "will always remain the most dependable brothers o t e soviet people. No ma ter what storm may re in the world and what incident the imperialists and reactionaries may provoke, they will never hesitate to unite and fight shoulder to shoulder with the great Soviet people." Not so with the Albanians, however. Zeri I Popullit's editorial only paid tribute to the CPSU's achievements when ''led by J. V. Stalin," while it repeats the usual Albanian con- demnation of "the Khrushchev group" which is attempting "to darken the name and great work of J. V. Stalin in order to revise Marxism-Leninism";which "is plunging ever deeper into the morass of opportunism"; which has betrayed the Soviet people, etc.; which is "brutally trampling on the revolutionary principles of the Moscow documents," etc. In North Korea, the Nodong Sinmurx editorial verged on the polemical as it stressed tha e triumph of the October Revolution confirmed the complete victory of Lenin's theory on proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship and announced the final bankruptcy of the oppor- tunism of the Second International which refused revolution and preached re orm srn. In Yugoslavia, the weekly Komunist carries an article entitled ugo9Tav zeality and CEine policy" in reply to the 26 September Chinese People's Daily/Red Fla"Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" The nese a acts -on-socialist Yugoslavia, Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : 'CIA-RDP78_~31~fl'Od4Ub1btped) AP roved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 i't says, "uncover the untenability, irresponsibility, and harm- fulness of the methods of Chinese 'polemics,' which even street brawlers would not deign to employ." The article again makes much of the fact that the Chinese once recognized Yugoslavia as socialist and since 1956 .Rave reversed themselves despite Yugo- slavia's further prcgrsE=c in strengthening socialist relations. 6 (##16 Chronology) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 CHRONOLOGIE -- DISSEPITIONS CGY4IUNISTES Numero 16 26 octobre - 8 novembre 1963 22 octobre: Le PC japonais, Bans une resolution du plenum du CC sur La situation presente a les t9ches du parti relatives aux elections generates" (information non parvenue a temps au tours de la dernibre edition de la Chronologie), reconnait les repercussions au Japon "des disputes violentes au sujet des divergences d'opinion sur les princi- pes fondamentaux du mouvement communiste international", et definit une lipne "inddpendante", qui se trouve en pleine harmonie avec celle des Chinois. Faisant appel en faveur "d'une lutte contre le r6vision- nisme moderne ui est le danger principal ainsi ue la d6claration de Moscou le soulignait , et en faveur galement dune lutte contre le dogmatisme moderne, dont le trait est d imposer arbitrairement une ligne de politique g n rate aux autres partis fraternels , ainsi que de suivre aveuglement les politiques d'autres partis fraternels", le PC japonais accuse implieitement de dogmatisme moderne et de"_"revi- sionnisme moderne le PC de 1'Union Sovi tip et le bloc pro-sovie- ticlure. (Akahata). (Voir passage "suivre aveuglement les autres par- tis qui se trouve daps 1'Lditorial du 18 octobre du Nodong Sinmun et examine plus bas, section 3). 27 octobre: La presse de Pdkin publie en manchette la rdsolution ci- dessus du PC japonais; nombreuses citations dune attaque contre le revisionnisme reactionnaire de Tito h Hanoi daps le journal Nhan Dan (10 octobre ?); et une declaration du 23 octobre de M. H. Williams, president du Comite national du PC neo-zelandais qui souligne que ce parti "etait d'avis que toute convocation des partis mondiaux sans preparation suffisante conformement aux declarations des 81 partis... serait prematuree, et serait presque certainement sterile". 28 octobre: Le ruotidien du peuple donne de nombreuses citations d'un article de 20 000 mots du ZIP albanais, attaquant Khrouchtchev, arti- cle mentionne daps la Chronologie du octobre. (La Pravda du ter no- vembre parle aver indignation de la reproduction par Pekin de l'atta- que du ZIP). Gerhard Eisler, propagandiste important de 1'Allemagne de 1'Est, president du Comit6 d'Etat de la radio, repond a. la lettre dun au- diteur qui parle de 1'appel fait par le chef du PC francais Thorez en faveur dune conference communiste internationale (Chrono, 6 octobre): en suggerant un ajournement, it declare que la convocation dune telle conference "depend naturellement du fait de savoir si cette conference possMde des chances de reduire ou d'eliminer les differences d'opinion", et par consequent "les partis doivent preciser leurs positions au moyen de consultations mutuelles". 28 octobre: Le quotidien du PC nord-coreen Nodong Sinmun publie un dit~ torial de 16 000 mots intitule D fendons le camp socialiste" qui presente 1'ensemble des vues des Nord-Coreens concernant le conflit: essentiellement la position de la Chine, quelque peu remaniee pour representer un petit pays. Elle exhorte taus les counistes de ne particiier b. aucun mouvement sovietique tendant a isoler les Chinois, h defendre le point de vue chinois sur les questions principales, et Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 termine par un appel h tous de "pratiquer la revolution et s'unir" -- et h isoler taus lee rdvisionnistes! 30 octobre: L'organe du PC indonMsien, Harian Rakjat, dens un edito- rial approuvant le discours de Soukarno, "Journde, du serment de la jeunesse", conclut a 1'unisson avec le PC chinois: "I1 West plus nd- cessaire d'expliquer pourquoi la lime Wvolutionnaire pent renforcer la cause de l'Asie, de 1'Afrique et de 1'Ammrique Latine, et de ravi- ver lea forces qui dmergent, car a 1'aide de cette politique r6voluti- onnaire toutes lee forces anti-impdrialistes peuvent 9tre organisees et peuvent porter des coups solides a l'imperialisme". 30 octobre: Le quotidien de 1'Allemsgne de 1'Ouest Frankfurter Allge- meine publie un communique de son correspondant a Moscou mentionnant "dens curs non confirmees" que le Kremlin a recu 1'invitation des Chinois de reprendre leurs discussions bilat6rales a Pdkin. (A ce jour, noun n'avons vu aucun autre communique a ce sujet). 31 octobre: Le Congrbs sovieti ue du CC des Syndicats professionnels se se rdunissant h Moscou a adopt une resolution qui souligne que "lee syndicate sovidtiques rejettent avec core lea attaques naladroites et non fondCes des leaders du PC chinois contre le PC de 1'Union So- vidtique, contre le gouvernement sovietique et contre notre peuple". Le'Quotidien du peuple, sous le titre "Les explosions anti-chi-- noises dans la presse sovi6tique deviennent plus udchantes et plus fantastiques", consacre une page entiere a des passages d'articles Scents de la presse sovittique attaquant la Chine, et annonce que d'autres passages seraient public jour suivant. Une "note de 1'editeur" commente que des passages d'attaques faites precederirnent ont AS publids it y a deux mois. "Depuis lors, an lieu de faire preuve de moderation la presse sovietique a attaqud la Chine dune manibre plus agressive et plus d go tante encore". D'aprbs des statistiques incomplhtes, lee attaques dirigees con- tre le PC chinois entre le ler septembre et le 27 octobre daps lee journaux et periodiques seulement se montent a 130. Les 286 articles puali6s entre le 15 juillet et le 31 aoft ambnent ce total a 716, sans compter lee reproductions faites par la presse sovidtique des attaques par lee partis fraternels dirigdes contre le PC chinois. L'Lditeur dLclare h see lecteurs que "leurs abus et leurs menson- Ges s'accumulent de plus en plus haul ... Les expressions qu'ils em- pioient deviennent de plus en plus grossibres". Its "attaquent le camarade Mao Tse-tung dune manibre plus impudence que par le passe, s'en prennent . see theories marxistes-1dninistes, a la yolitique chinoise your construire le socialisme, et aux po__itiques intdrieure et 6trangbres de'la Chine. Pretendant que lee hommes d'Etat chinois pr6conisent le slogan "Abet lee Blanca!", ils ont "meme recours a des expressions teller que 'renQats de Pekin', 'duellistes sauvages', et parlent de 'la conscience des leaders de Pekin qui est comme un egout', etc..." 1 novem re: Le Quotidien du peuple publie de nouveau c_es extraits con- tenant lee attaques sovi tiques et reproduit en entier le texte du dis?? tours fait le 29 septembre a Djakarta par le prdsident du PC indon&- sien Aidit (Chrono, 29 septeuuore). Approved For Release I 999/08/2' : -CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200040002-5 AppSoved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 novembre: La presse de Pekin publie un editorial de l0 000 mots du Cuotidien du peuple intitule "La, vvrite au sujet de la maniere dont les leaders du PC de 1'ilnion ovi ti ue se soot alli s avec 'In- de contre la Chine , en r ponse a 1' ditorial du 19 septembre de ravda P piniere de tension en Asie", (reproduit Bans le Quotidien du -peuple le 25 septembre), ainsi que la declaration du gouvernement sovi tique du 21 septembre sur le me`me sujet. Dans le cadre dune version clairement tendancieuse concernaiit "faits" de la dispute de frontiere entre 1'Inde et la Chine (faits "respectes" par les pays afro-asiatiques qui maintiennent une neutralite stricte"), les Chi- nois accusent les leaders sovietiques (qui "iioreiit les faits" et qui ont "dLgenere au point de se moquer de la logique e16mentaire"), ne mena-ent aucun effort pour semer la discorde" et "travaillent avec -1us d'ardeur rn ie que les imperialistes americains a soutenir les re- actioniiaires indiens". ~?uel est leer but reel b, chercher a faire dis- parai"tre la tension? "Pour titre francs, les leaders sovietiques le font car ils cherchent exploiter la question de froiUbre sino-sovietique en rue de seiner la dissen~ tion entre la CYiine et 1es autres pays alro-as1 ati ues, de tour?le 1.e peuple en Asie et en i ague de la lutte contre 1'imperialisme, et de cs.cher les activates agressives et bellidueuses des.imperialistes americains. Ceci est une trahison de la cause rLvolutionnaire aiiti-imperialists du peuple de !'Asie, et certainement du monde tout entier". L'article comporte uii resume en 16--point des Echanges sino-sovi- etiques au sujet du conf1it de frontiere entre la Chine et 1'Inde; declare que les declarations des Soviets sont .grotesques ou "de sim- l4les mensonges"; attaque les Soviets a !'aide de phrases telles que "marchands de munitions" et "operent une societe par actions co-rairme avec les imperialistes amLricains"; accuse les leaders sovietiques de trahir le peuple indien, declarant que "ce compte sera regle tot ou tard; et finalement les accuse de se servir "des organisations interiiationales de masse" telles que le Congres mondial des femraes a lvioscou et celui de irOrganisation de la solidarite des peuples afro- asiatiques a i'ioshi pour "t&cher de desagreger le front anti-imperia-- liste uni". L'editorial conclut: "I1 devient de plus en plus clair que les leaders sovietiques ne considerent plus en tazt u'ennemis les imp.rialistes avec les Etats-Unis a leur t to et les r actionnaires de tons Les pays. Ce sont les marxistes-leninis-es, les peuples revolu- tionnaires, et la Chine en particulier qui sont leurs ennerais... "Nous voudrions conseiiler aux leaders sovietiques de ne )as se~ejouir trop t3t_. La Chine revos.ucionnaire ne pourra j amais ere isol e. Plus sera impudente vote collaboration avec les iraperialistes et les reactionnaires et plus vows vous isolerez vous-me^mes. La Chine ne peut titre discreditee, car la vErite est du cote de la Chine. Votre talon d'Achilles est votre marque de respect envers la verit . Plus de 90 Dour-cent des peuples du iioide s'irclinent devant la verite... Ceux qui n ' ont was de respect pour I n verite subiront un echec a la fin" . Approved For Release 1999/083/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Tous les journaux chinois publient egalement un communique de 1'Agence-presse La Chine nouvelle sur l'aceroissement du soutien mi- litaire et economique sovietique h 1'Inde en opposition a la Chine: le ^uotidien du peuple le publie sous le titre: "Plus it y a d'aide sovi tique 'a 1'Inde et plus la campagne anti-chinoise devient force- nee". Un communique yougoslave dans le Tanyug emanant de Pekin sur "l'apparution du dernier document anti-sovietique dune violence ex- treme" declare que "les observateurs de Pekin" lui ont attribue une attention speciale en tant que "Tune des attaques les plus violentes contre les leaders sov16tiques". Le Tanyug poursuit: "On croit qu'i1 poursuit deux buts principaux: sur la schne locale, poursuivre 1'activite anti-sovietique dans one question qui atteint le sentiment national; sur la sc6ne etranghre, un nouvel effort tendant a discrediter 1'Union Sovietique parmi les pays nouvellement liberes, sous-developpes et parmi ceun qui ne sont pas encore liberes". Tass communique de Bogota que le 29e reunion plenibre du PC de la Co_ornbie "a adopte unanimement une resolution qui condamne les ac- tivates destructives des leaders du PC chinois", qui "n'ont rien de common avec le marxisme--1eninisme". L'Agence-presse Chine nouvelle fait savoir de Rangoon que "les leaders pubics birmans oat violemment denonce dens leur declaration d'au~ourd'hui le gouv(irneraent de 1'Inde pour avoir rejete un reglement pacifique de la question de frontibre sino-indienne". Se trouvaient mentionnes: "le secretaire-general du Front national uni de la Bir- manie Bo Mya Thz?iar"; "le membre du Politburo du Parti uni des travail- leurs de la Birmanie, U Ba Hla Aung"; et "le membre du Comite execu- tif du Comite pan-birman de la paix, U Aing Ze". 3 novembre: La Pravda publie un article du secretaire-general du PC portugais Alvaro Cunhal, 'd l'occasion de la r volution sovi tique, qui d creit 'la surprise et 1'indi3nation" des communistes de tous les pays au sujet de "la campagne anti-sovietique... conduite par les leaders du PC chinois". Cependant, it estihie avec optimisme que 1'amitie des peoples fraternels restera indestructible. La presse chinoise reproduit un co-unnunique de 1'Agence-presse "Chide nouvelle" Ganant de Bruxelles selon sequel "les commun.istes be].ges qui soutiennent le marxiste-1 ninisme pullient un journal a- raissant deux fois par mois, la 'Voix du people". Deux num6ros ont paru au mois d'octobre. 4+ novembre: Le quotidien du parti rouraain Scinteia pu11ie un article du pr sident du Conseil des ministres roumain et membre du Politburo Maurer (cet article est pare aussi plus ou moms simultaneuent Bans le numero d'octobre du journal theorique Lupta de C1asa et dans le nu- rnero de novembre des "ProblUes de la pair et du socialism "I revue marxiste mondiale) consacr au 3e anniversaire de tta pie Conference du parti a Moscou, qui condamize les poi miques agressives, les insul- tes, les defor:iations de positions et 11imposition de la ligne ou des decisions d'un parti aux autres partis. Maurer va jusqu'a declarer Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 que le parti roumain acceuille la proposition faite a une date ante- rieure par le PC de 1'Union Sovietique de teaser lea polemiques et it approuve le travail persistant et patient de creer lea conditions pour organiser une nouvelle conference des partis de travailleurs et de communistes afin de permettre de discuter des divergences de vues qui existent entre lea leaders de ces partis." 5 novembre: Un article de Pravda sur le 46e anniversaire par un comp muniste americain Henry Winston un Nbgre) condamme ceux h Pekin qui "cherehent h parler au nom des peuples de couleur qui "comprennent qu'une pareiile attitude des leaders chinois, qui sent le racisme de loin, eat de la pure demagogie dont le but est de tromper lea habitants des pays de 1'Asie, de 1'Afrique et de 1'Am6rique Latine". Winston affirme que lea Chinois "ne parviendront pas a tromper lea peuples des continents de couleur" qui "sont devenus convaincus que c'est precise- ment 1'Union Sovietique qui eat le raeilleur ami des peuples amis". 6 novembre: Un article de Nodong Sinmun de la Core du Nord a 6gale- ment , h 1=occasion du 46e anniversaire de la r volution d octobre, intitule "Idee revolutionnaire d'octobre -- Banniere de la lute pour l'independance et la liberation nationales", souligne le rule de la revolution. "Certaines personnes propagent une theorie absurde selon laquelle aujourd'hui ... 1'attache principale Bans la lutte de libe- ration nationale des colonies est passee d'un probleme politique h un probleme economique... Ceci ne sert qu'aux fins de la politique neo-colonialiste des imperialistes". 7 novembre: Le 46e anniversaire de la revolution sovietique d'octo'bre est c 1 bre dans le monde comuniste en tant que la plus grande r vo- lution dans 1'histoire de 1'homnne" (selon Pekin), avec sea reunions habituelles, sea discours, sea messages, sea Lditoriaux, L'accent etait place our lea resultats positifs obtenus dans le monde coniuniste et emanant de cette revolution et (a l'exception des Albanais et, h un moindre dere, des Nord-Coreens -- voir ci-dessous) la grande dis- pute restait en general ignoree ou deguisee. Mme le Quotidien du peuple, qui evidemment presenta la revolution nationale en tant que ur"= econtinuation de la revolution d'octobre", souligna que le peuple chinois "restera toujours le frere le plus fidele du peuple sovique. Quels que soient lea orages qui puissent clater dans le monde et quels que soient lea incidents que lea imperialistes reactionnaires puissent provoquer, it n'hesitera jamais h s'unir et h combattre epaule contre epaule avec le grand peuple sovietique". Cependant, it n'en est pas de m6me pour lea Albanais. Zeri i Popullit, Bans son editorial, ne salue la tache accomplie par le PC de l'Union Sovietique que lorsqu'elle "se trouvait sous la direction de J. V. Staline", tout en reptant les accusations habituelles des Albanais du "groupe derouchtchev" qui cherche "h noircir le nom de J. V. Staline et le grand travail qu'il a accompli, dans le out de fai- re reviser le marxisme-1eninisme"; qui "s'enfonce plus profondGment encore daps le marasme et dans 1'opportunisme"; qui a trahi le peuple sovietique, etc...; qui "pietine brutalement lea principes revoluti- onnaires des documents de Moscow", etc. En Core du Nord, 1'editorial du Nodong Sinmun soulignait sur un ton tie politique que "le triomphe de la r voles d'octobre confirme la victoire complete de la theorie de Lenine sur la revolution proletarienne et sur la dictature proleta- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 rie_nne et annonce la banqueroute definitive de 1'opportunisme de la deu:dhme internationale qui rejeta la revolution et precha le r for- misme . En Yougoslavie, l'hebdomadaire "Komunist" publie un article in- titule "RCalit,6 yougoslave et politique chinoise" en r6ponse h P ar- ticle du 26 septembre des journaux chinois le Quotidien du peuple et le Drapeau rouge: "La Yougoslavie est-elle un pays socialiste?" Les attaques chinooiises dirig6es contre la Yougoslavie socialiste, declare Particle, "font voir que les methodes de polemique chinoise sont intenables, irresponsables et nuisibles, et que mAeme les voyous qui se battent dans les rues ne stabaisseraient pas h les employer". L'article souligne de nouveau le fait que les Chinois avaient dans le passe reconnu la Yougoslavie comme pays socialiste et que depuis 1956 its ont adopt6 l'attitude opposee malgr6 les progrbs faits par la Yougoslavie pour renforcer les relations socialistes. - 6 - Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 CRONOLOGIA - - DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS No 16 26 Octubre - 8 Noviembre 1963 22 Octubre: El PC japones, en una resolucion del Pleno sobre "La situacj actual y las taras del partido alrededor de las elecciones" (recibido demasiado tarde pars la edici6n anterior) reconoce las re- pereusiones que han tenido en el Jap6n "las amargas disputas sobre la divergencia de opiniones sobre principios bd.sicos en el movimiento comunista internacional" y establece una linea "independiente" que armoniza enteramente con la de los chinos. Demandando la "lucha con- tra el revisionismo contempordneo, que es el peligro primordial seen fue apuntado por la declaraci6n de Moscil", y tambi6n la "lucha contra el dogmatismo contempordneo a tiene la caracterfstica de arbitra- riamente sentar la 1 nea general de p of tics pars otros partidos fra- ternos, y tambi n de seguir ciegamente las pol ticas de otros partidos fraternostt, El PCJ indirectamente reciproca contra el PCUS y el bloque alineado con los sovi6ticos ponidndoles la etiqueta del "dogmatismo contempor eo as como del "revisionismo contempordneo". (Akahata) V.-g. el trozo sobre "seguir ciegamente a otros partidos", en el edi- torial de 28 de octubre de "Nodong Sinmun", comentado mds abajo, sec- ci6n 3). 27 Octubre: La prensa de Pekin destaca la referida resolucion del PCJ; extensos trozos de un ataque contra los revisionistas reaccio- narios titistas en el 6rgano "Khan Dan" de Hanoi (10 de octubre?); y una declaraci6n emitida el 23 de octubre por M. H. Williams, pre- sidente del comit6 nacional del PC neozelandds, en el que subraya la "meditada opini6n't del PCNZ "de que cualquir asamblea de los partidos del mundo sin preparativos adecuados de conformidad con la declaraci6n de los 81 partidos ... seria prematura y casi seguramente se malograrfa". 28 Octubre: El "Diario del Pueblo" utiliza extensos trozos del ataque en 20.000 palabras del "Zeri I Popullit" albanes contra Kruschev, des- crito en la Cronologfa de 4 de octubre. Pravda" el 10 de noviembre imforma indignado la publicacibn en Pekin del referido ataque). El principal propagandista germanoriental Gerhard Eisler, presi- dente del Comit6 Estatal de Radio, contesta la carta de un radioyente que se refiere al ilamado emitido por el cabecilla Thorez del PC fran- c6s porque se ceIebre una conferencia comunista internacional (Crono- logfa, 6 Octubre): sugiriendo una posposici6n, declara que la convo- cac16n a una conferencia "naturalmente depende de si tal conferencia ofrece perspectival de reducir o aun eliminar las diferencias de opini6n", y por tanto "los partidos deberan esclarecer sus puntos de vista en consultas mutuas". 28 Octubre: El 6rgano "Nodong Sinmun" de partido norcoreano destaca un editorial de 16.000 palabras titulado "Defendamos el campo socia- lista", en el que presenta inclusivamente las opiniones norcoreanas sobre el conflicto -- esencialmente las opiniones de los chinos, adap- tadas hasta cierto punto para cenirlas a una naci6n mds pequefia. Ex- horta a los comunista a no formar parte de nunguna maniobra para aislar a los chinos, defiende el lado chino en las cuestiones princi- pales, y termina llamando a todos "r v o e rt App ~e~F~a~~a~as~ I li a lA-RDP78-u sub1A0 uu04(10u2-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 30 0 ctubre: El organo "Harian Rakjat" del PC indonesio, en un edito- rial en apoyo del discurso de Sukarno sobre el dam' is del juramento juvenil", concluye en armonia con el PC chino: "Ya no es preciso explicar por qu6 una Linea revolucionaria puede fortalecer la causa de Asia, Africa y Latinoam6rica y dar impetu a Las fuerzas emergentes, ya que a trav6s de tal Linea revolucionaria todas las fuerzas antim- perialistas se pueden organizar y propinar fuertas golpes al imperi- al.ismo . 30 Octubre: El diario germanoccidental "Frankfurter Allgemeine" pu- blicsun despacho en el cual su corresponsal en Moscs informa "rumores sin confirmaci6n" de que el Kremlin ha recibido invitaci6n de los chinos en el sentido de reanudar sus conversaciones bilaterales en Pekin. (Hasta la fecha no hemos visto ningdn otro informe de tal cosa). 31 0ctubre: El Congreso del Consejo Central de Sindicatos de toda la Uni Sovidtica reunido en asamblea en Mosed adopta una resoluti6n que subraya que "los sindicatos sovidticos airadamente rechazan los burdos e infundados ataques de los dirigentes del PC chino contra el PCUS, el Gobierno sovi6tico y nuestro pueblo". El "Diario del Pueblo", bajo el titular de "Los exabruptos anti- chinos de la prensa sovi6tica se tornan mds asquerosos y fant6sticos", dedica una Plana Integra a trozos tomados de articulos de prensa so- v16ticos atacando a China, anunciando que otros aparecer6n al dia si- guiente. La "nota del editor" comenta que extractos de ataques ante- riores habfan sido publicados hace dos meces. "Desde entonces, en lugar de ejercer algdn comedimiento, la prensa sovi6tica ha estado atacando a China de una manera mAs agresiva y as uerosa . De acuerdo con datos estadisticos incompletos, los ataques contra el PC chino entre 10 de septiembre y 27 de octubre en diarios y otra prensa nacional solos ascienden a 430. Los 286 publicados en- tre 15 de Julio y 31 de agosto llevan el total a 716, sin incluir los reproducidos en la prensa sovi6tica de los partidos fraternos contra el PC chino. El editor informa a sus lectores que "sus abusos y mentiras se acumulan mAs y mds ... El lenguaje que emplean se vuelven aun mds sucio y procaz". "Calumnian al camarada Mao Tse-tung" con mds per- versidad que antes, dan zarpazos a sus teorfas marxistas-leninistas, a la Linea china para la construcci6a del socialismo y las pautas chinas de conducta exterior e interior. Alegando que los estadistas chinos tienen una consign de "Bajo los blancos", utilizan hasta epf- tetos como los renegados de Pekin' y 'duelistas salvajes', y hablen de 'la conciencia de los dirigentes de Pekin como semejante a las aguas negras', etc." 1? Noviembre: De nuevo publics el "Diario del Pueblo" selecciones de ataques sovi tiicos e imprime el texto completo del discurso de 29 de septiembre pronunciado en Jakarta por Aidit, presidente del PKI (Cronologia, 29 septiembre). 2 Noviembre: La prensa de Pekin publica un editorial de 10.000 pala- bras del Mario del Pueblo", titulado "La verdad de c6mo los diri- gentes del PCUS se han aliado con India contra China en contestaci6n Approved For Release 1999/0a/2,4: A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 al editorial de "Pravda" de 19 de septiembre titulado "Grave semil- lero de teesi6n en Asia" (publicado por el "Diario del Pueblo" el 25 de septiembre) y la declaraci6n del gobierno sovi6tico de 21 de septiembre sobre el mismo tema. Dentro del marco de la versi6n nitidamente tendenciosa de log "hechos" de la querella fronteriza entre India y China (hechos "respetadoe" por "log passes afroasiati- cos que mantienen estricta neutralidad") log dirigentes chinos acu- san a log dirigentes sovidticos (que "hacen caso omiso de log hechos" y que "tanto se han degenerado que se burlan de la 16gica elemental") de "no economizar esfuerzos por sembrar la discordia" y "esforzarse sun mds que los imperialistas norteamericanos en apoyo de log reac- cionarios indios". LCudl es su "verdadero prop6sito al concitar la tensi6n?" "Para hablar can franqueza: log dirigentes sovi6ticos lo estdn haciendo porque quie~explotar la cuesti fronteriza Para sembrar is disension entre China otros alses afro ass t cos, des ar al pueblo de Asia y Africa de la lucha contra el imperialismo y encubrir las actividades agresivas y belicistas de log imperialistas norteamericanos. Esto constituye traici6n a la cause revolucionaria y antimperia- lista del pueblo de Asia y, de hecho, de todo el mundo." El articulo incluye un resumen de 16 puntos de log intercambios chino-sovi6ticos con motivo del conflicto fronterizo chino-indio; de- nuncia las declarations sovi6ticas comp ridiculas o "sencillamente mentiras"; se mofa de log sovi6ticos con frases tales como "merca- deres de municiones" y "empresarios de una sociedad an6nima con log imperialistas norteamericanos"; acusa a log dirigentes sovi6ticos de traicionar al pueblo Indio, advirtiendo que "dicha cuanta va a arreglarse tarde o temprano"; y finalmente log acusa de emplear "or- ganizaciones internacionales de masa" tales como el Congreso Mondial de Mujeres en Moscd y la conferencia de la OSPAA en Moshi para tratar de desbaratar el frente unido antimperialista". Concluye el editorial: "Se hace cada vez mds claro que log dirigentes sovi6ticos ya no consideran como su enemigo a log imperialistas enca- bezados por log Estados Unidos y a log reaccionarios de todos log passes. Son log marxistas-leninistas, log revo- lucionarios, y China en particular, log que son su enemigo... "Quisi6ramos aconsejar a los dirigentes sovi6ticos no re o cijarse demasiado pronto. China revolucionaria jamds puede ser aislada. Mientras mds descaradamente colaboren ustedes con todos log imperialistas y reaccionarios, Canto mds se aislan a si mismos. China no puede ser desacreditada, pues la verdad estd de parte de China. El tend6n de A uiles de ustedes es su falta de respeto por la verdad. s del 90 por ciento de log pueblos de la tierra se atienen a la verdad... Los que no tiene respeto a la verdad fracasarfn por fin". Todos log peri6dicos chinos publican tambi6n un informe de la Agencia Nueva China sobre el incremento en la ayuda econ6mica y mi- litar sovi6tica a India en oposici6n a China. El "Diario del Pueblo" lo titula: "Cuanto mayor la ayuda sovi6tica a India, tanto m6s fre- Approved For Release 1999/08124 t CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 nLtica su crpafia anti-China". El informe de la agencia goslava Tanyug desde Pekin sobre "la aparici6n de este ditimo documento antisovi6tico, de estremada amargura", dicen que los "observadores en Pekin" le han prestado especial atenci6n como "uno de los ataques r6s severos contra los dirigentes sovi6ticos". Continda Tanyug: "Se dice que tiene dos fines: en el escenario dom6stico avanzar la actividad antisovi6tica en una forms que toca al sentimiento national; en el escenario exterior, un nuevo esfuerzo por desacreditar a la Uni6n Sovi6tica entre los passes reci&n libertados, subdesarrollados y todavia por libertar". Tass informs desde Bogota que le XXIX Plenaria del PC colombiano "undn.imememte adopt6 una resoluci6n condenando !as actividades es- cisionistas de los dirigentes del PC chino", que "nada tienen en co- radn con el marxismo-leninismo". La Agencia Nueva China informs desde Rangdn que "dirigentes pdbli- cos birmanos en sus declaraciones boy severamente condenaron el recha- zo por parte del Gobierno indio de una soluci6n pacifica Para la cuesti6n fronteriza china-india". Cita las de "el secretario general del Frente Unido National de Birmania, Bo Mya Thwar"; el "miembro del politbur6 del Partido Unido de los Trabajadores de Birmania"; y el "miembro del comit6 ejecutivo del Comit6 pro Paz Mundial de toda Birmania, U Aing Ze". 3 Noviembre: "Pravda" publics un articulo del secretario general del PC portugu6s Alvaro Cunhal con motivo del aniversario de la Revoluci n sovi tica describiendo "la sorpresa e indignaci6n" entre los co?iunistas de todos los passes ante la "campafla antisovi6tica... apoyada por los dirigentes del PC chino". Sin embargo, 61 cree con optimismo que la amistad entre los fraternos ser6, inquebrantable. La prensa china publics un informe de la Agencia Nueva China desde Bruselas en el sentido de que "los comunistas belgas que apoyan el marxismo-leninismo ban publicado un semiinensuario, La Voz del Pueblo y en octubre publicado dos editions. 4 Noviembre: E1 6rgano "Scinteia" del PC rumano publica un articulo del presidente del Consejo de ministros rumano y miembro del polit- bur6, Maurer (el articulo aparec16 m6.s o menos simult9neamente en el ndmero de octubre del 6rgano te6rico "Lupta de Clasa" y el numero de noviembre de "Problemas de la Paz y el Socialismo", la "Revista Nnm- dial Marxista") dedicado al tercer aniversario de la conferencia de 81 partidos celebrada en Moscd, condenando los ataques- pol6raicos, in- sultos y tergiversaci6n de opiniones y la imposici6n de las decisiones de un partido sobre los dem6.s. 1viaurer declara a continuaci6n que el partido rumano ve con agrado la propuesta anterior del PCUS por el cese de las pol6micas y "apoya el trabajo paciente y persistente or crear las condiciones pars la celebraci6n de una nueva conferencia de partidos comunistas y obreros para que puedan ser debatidas las actuales divergencias de opini6n entre las dirigencias de los parti- dos". Approved For Release I 999/08%2 : CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 S Noviembre: Un articulo en "Pravda" sobre el 46? aniversario escri- to por el comunista norteamericano Henry Winston (un negro) condena a los que en Pek est tratando de hablar a nombre de los 'pueblos de color'" del mundo, que "entienden que tal punto de vista de los dirigentes chinos, que huele a racismo a gran distancia, es is. mds Pura demagogia can intenc ion de engarlaar a los habitantes de Asia, Africa y Am6rica Latina". Declara Winston que los chinos "no consegui- r6n engaBar a los pueblos de los continentes de color", que "se ban convencido que la Uni6n Sovi6tica es precisamente is. menor Amiga de los pueblos oprimidos". 6 Noviembre: Un articulo de "Nodong Sinmun" de Corea del Norte con motivo del 6? aniversario de la Revoluci6n de Octubre titulado "Ideas revolucionarias de octubre -- bandera de lucha por la liberaci6n e in- dependencia nacional", destaca el papel de la revoluci6n. "Algunas gentes estan difundiendo una absurda teoria de que hoy... la principal tarea de la lucha por la liberaci6n nacional en las colonial ha pasado de un problems politico a ser uno econ6mico ... Esto servird solamente a la politica neocolonialista de los imperialistas". 7 Noviembre: Se celebra el 46? aniversario de la Revoluci6n sovi6tica de OctubreI Como "la mds grande revoluci n in la historic de la humaniclad (palabras de Pekin) con las asambleas, discursos, mensajes y editoriales de costumbre. El 6nfasis recay6 sobre las realizaciones positivas en el mundo que emanan de dicha Revoluci6n y (excepci6n he- cha de los albaneses y, a un grado mucho menor, los norcoreanos -- v6ase mAs adelante) la gran querella fue generalmente pasada por alto completa o parcialmente. Hasta el "Diario del Pueblo", que por su- puesto present6 la revoluci6n china como "continuaci6n de la Revolu?. ci6n de Octubre", recalc6 que el pueblo chino permanecer6 como el amigo mAs digno de confianza del pueblo sovi tiro. No imports qu6 tormenta se desencadene ni qu incidents puedan provocar los imperia- listas y reaccionarios, nunca titubear6 en unirse al gran pueblo sovi6tico y luchar bom:uro a hombro con 6l". No asi los albaneses. El editorial de "Zeri I Popullit" rindi6 tributo a las realizaciones del PCUS cuando estaba "dirigido por J. V. Stalin". repitiendo entretanto la acostunforada condena albanesa del "grupo de Kruschev" que est6 tratando de "oscurecer el nombre y la gran obra de J. V. Stalin para reviser el marxismo-leninismo"; que "se est6 hundiendo m6s y m6s en el pantano del oportunismo"; que estd brutalmente pisoteando los principios revolucionarios de los documentos de Mosed", etc. En Cores del Norte, el editorial de "Nodong Sinmun" se aproxim6 a los pol6mico en su 6nfasis de que "el triunfo de is. Revoluci6n del Octubre confirm6 is completa victoria de la teoria de Lenin de is. revoluc16n proletaria y la dictadura del proletariado y anunci6 la bancarrota definitiva del oportunismo de la Segunda Internacional que rechaz6 la revoluci6n y predic6 el reformis- mo . En Yugoslavia, el semanario "Komunist" publica un articulo titulado "La Realidad yugoslava y la politica china", replicando al articulo de 26 septiembre en el "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Rota" titulado "Es Yugoslavia pals socialista?" Los ataques chinos contra Yugoslavia socialists, expresa, "desencubren lo insostenible, irres-? ponsable y darlino de los m6tados de las 'pol6micas' chinas, que ni Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 siquiera los pendencieros de calleja no se dignarian emplear". El articulo otra vez presta gran atenci6n al hecho de que una vez los chinos reconocieron a Yugoslavia como socialists y desde 1956 se han renegado a pesar del mayor Progreso de Yugoslavia en el refuerzo de las relaciones socialistas. -6- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200040002-5 18 November 1963 711. International Fronts Afflicted by Sino-Soviet Dissensions 25X1C10b BACKGROUND: Since December, 1962, the Sino-Soviet ideo- logical a e as erupted openly whenever the representatives of Communist front organizations have gathered. From about that time until shortly before the announcement of the US-UK-USSR agreement on a partial nuclear test ban, the Chicoms had for several months successfully disrupted international assemblages of established front organizations. With some initial success, they had also launched a drive to counter Soviet influence in the underdeveloped world through the ex- ploitation of established groups and attempts at establishing new Chicom-dominated front organizations. The Soviets were clearly unprepared at first to cope with the Chicom methods of competing for leadership of the fronts. Soviet strategy vis-a-vis the Chicom offensive in the fronts shifted into high gear after the massive acrimonious attacks from the Chicoms at and after the Fifth World Congress of Women (WIDE, Moscow; 24-29 June). Apparently anticipating that Chicom reaction to the test ban treaty would intensify quarreling within the fronts, the CPSU's "Open Letter" (14 July) to the Chicoms denounced the latter's disruptive tactics in the "international democratic organizations" from the time of the WFTU General Council meeting in Peking in June, 1960 up to the June WIDF Congress. International front gatherings s i n c e the publication of the "Open Letter" suggest that within the existing fronts the Soviets have regained the initiative and are outmaneuvering the Chicoms with a consider- able measure of tactical success. For the moment the Chicomst position is further isolated because the momentum in their campaign for the take-over of existing Afro-Asian fronts or the creation of additional competitive ones has apparently slackened. In carrying the dissension into the fronts the Chicoms have exposed, of necessity or by design, more clearly than Tito did in 1949, these front organizations as Soviet- controlled propaganda organizations in which polycentric ideo- logical diversity cannot be tolerated. Because the fronts, including and particularly AAPSO and its offshoots, have become fully drawn into the Sino-Soviet conflict, they have been seriously hampered for months in carrying off the mission for which they were conceived: to "front" for the World Communist Movement (WCM), as represented by Communist Parties, in winning over to a variety of propa- ganda causes the masses of workers, women, youth and students, Approved For Release I 9 P78-063ilAO%l Sb2-5 (?ilApproved For Release IA-RDP78-01M6AMMM046662-5 scientists, "peace seekers," etc. Indeed, there is now suffi- cient evidence that at least since the beginning of the year the exploiting of neutrals, various shades of leftists, paci= fists, fence-sitters, intellectuals and all the rest who are susceptible to Communist blandishments, particularly in the underdeveloped world areas, has per force been relegated to secondary priority. This is not to mean that the fronts have abandoned their basic missions -- not at all. The Sino-Soviet conflict has taken its toll *ithin the fronts and the battle for their proper Communist orientation has assumed top priority, absorbing a major por on of the planning, scheming and activi- ties within both contesting camps. This phenomenon offers great opportunities for (overt and) covert exploitation. The Sino-Soviet conflict has a particularly profound effect on AAPSO and its affiliates. AAPSO's future depends in large measure on whether the Chicoms are prepared to continue their attempts to gain influence through this organization or whether they will prefer to concentrate their efforts on Afro- Asian conferences and organizations which they sponsor themselves to the exclusion of the Soviets. In all probability the Chicoms will continue to seek the second course, but for reasons of prestige as well as re-insurance it is most improbable that they will abandon AAPSO altogether. In any event, AAPSO's image has not been enhanced by the exposure of its Communist exploitation and its display of lack of solidarity. /Yee unclassified attachment for details of front conflict7. 25X1C10b 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 10 November 1963 712 AF,1' , cIH. Castro's F i.litary Aid to Algeria Backfires LACI'P'P'CU~'~f: From the moment Fidel Castro assusaed power in Cuaa, ilea five yea'. s ago, he has sought to p 2i.ny the role of s_3iritual leader' of all leftist revolutionary forces in L .t :n America. At t:~e same time, CKba has not only become the ba t.a for the training of r^vciutio_,as.y cadres brought in from other Latin ATaar. scan countries but h:a.s also served as tiha, pc.hnt of origin for clande vine eipc:Y Cation of small arras, a=u- n i tion, and e~.piosives to be used in guerrilla oper.ticns else- where on the continent. Normally, the country on the receiving end of this type of export considers such activity an unwarranted inter: i'ence in is internal of arrs and can be erpe:'I`;"ad t;, take c'ra is diplomatic action. Tor this and other reasons, all but 5 of the 21 Amer 4 can republics have in f .,,.--t severed diplomatic re- lations with Cuba since the end of 1959. Now, hoviever, Castro has expanded his subversive exports beyond the 17estern Hemisphere, by shipping tanks and other material to Algeria and was caught in flagrant intervention in the border dispute between that country and Morocco. Morocco swiftly retaliated by severing diplomatic relations. Cuban Military Aid to Algeria. As early as 13 October, the Cuban ship Aracelio Iglesias was observed in the port of Havana loading a large quantity of arms and ammunition covered with sacks of sugar. At the time it was suspected that the cargo was destined for Algeria. On 14 October, Cuban refugees arriving in Madrid on a special Cubana flight which traveled via Algiers stated-that their plane carried cases of munitions which were off-loaded in Algeria. During the week of 21 October, two Cubana planes car- ried 170 Cuban military personnel to Algiers. Some of these were jet pilots, others were ordnance specialists. By the end of October, three Cuban ships had unloaded supplies in Algeria, which included at least 20 Soviet tanks an' unspecified quantities of rifles, machine guns, field guns, bazookas, mortars and ammunition. In addition to the 179 tech- nicians mentioned above who arrived by plane, one of the ships, according to an Associated press despatch dated 31 October, brought 333 Cuban technicians, who were issued Algerian battle dress as soon as they left the ship. Morocco, One of Cuba's Biggest Sugar Importers Severs Relations. was no surprise, ere ore, that-Moroccan Yor- ei n 11 mister, Ahmed Balafrej, announced on 31 October that his Approved For Release 1 w -RDP78-03061`RO?02O004G002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 (712 Cont.) 18 November 1963 country had brolzen off diploiatic relations with Cuba because "premier Fidel Castro had shipped Soviet arms to Algeria dur- ing the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict." Whether he acted on E4oscow's orders or on his own impulse, Fidel Castro has alienated, politically and psychologically, one of the best customer's of Cuba's perennially mismanaged economy. In spite of this, Morocco has not and probably will not cancel its trade agreement with Cuba. In 1930, with 161,000 metric tons, Morocco ranked third among free world importers of Cuban sugar. In 1961 and 1932, it moved up to second place. As of 30 June 1963, Morocco had already imported 120,003 tons, and there are now indications that it may, during the current year, import more sugar from Cuba than any other country in the 25X1 C1 Obnon-Communist world. 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 1C November 1963 713 A ,FE,WH. Communist China's Trade with Non-Bloc Countries BACKGROUND: The Chinese Communist attitude toward trade, particularly wi h non-Communist countries, is first that it can only be tolerated until internal self-sufficiency can be achieved, and second, that maximum political and propaganda capital must be extracted from the conduct of foreign economic relations. The latter purpose is demonstrated by the CPR's conduct of trade relations with countries of the Near East, Africa and South America, where the value of the potential commercial exchanges does not warrant the degree of formali- zation (e.g. delegations back and forth, negotiation of terms, etc.) involved. The prime motive appears to be the expansion of Chinese influence on a world-wide basis with a concentra- tion on those countries which have or may be encouraged toward a pro-Communist or anti-Western bias. Examples are the trade agreements made with Egypt following the attack on the Suez Canal and with Cuba when its conflict with the United States led to the cessation of the sugar-purchase agreement. In Southeast Asia, Communist China has on several occa- sions offered to supply newsprint to local newspapers at considerable reductions in price. After the terms and con- tracts are arranged and the local newspaper finds itself dependent on the Chinese Communists for supplies of newsprint, they also find themselves at the mercy of Red China on the question of what they do or do not print in their newspapers. In Africa, China has made trade agreements or arrangements with Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Morocco and Tunisia. (Offers of substantial trade and aid to the newly born African na ions have impressed the representatives of some of them who have found it difficult to differentiate between Communist China's political as against its professed humanitarian motives.) In the Middle East, China has trade agreements with Syria, Iraq, the Yemen, and in South America with Brazil and Chile. Most of these arrangements provide for the establishment in the countries concerned of Chinese personnel as diplomatic offi- cials, trade representatives or technical experts. When non- Communist nations establish trade relations, permit the open- ing of trade agencies and sanction visits from Red China's trade delegations, these openings are used to engage in political subversion and to strengthen ties with local Communist parties and front organizations. In the past, Communist China has channeled its trade with non-Bloc countries as far as possible through firms, individuals or agents which were Com- munist-controlled or pro-Communist; the profits from such trade agencies were frequently used to finance Peking's political and subversive activities in the country of the trading agency. Approved For Release 1 P7#1Q?06PPA99~0002-5 A proved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 (71 Cont.) 1C November 1963 Trade Shift to non-Communist Countries? The Sino-Soviet dispute has roug about fairly su s an a reductions in trade between the CPR and the rest of the Communist orbit. China has subsequently initiated efforts to improve its trading position with non-Communist countries. In 1962 and 1963 Com- munist Chinese delegations visited various Japanese and Western equipment firms; although few contracts have been signed, the delegations collected technical data and market information and expanded contacts with Western manufacturers. These dele- gations have supplemented China's regular sources of technical and market information but it is questionable whether there was any urgent need for data. Even in 1957, the CPR began to make inquiries and solicit offers from non-Bloc suppliers of machinery and equipment, including exporters of equipment for complete Plants. Communist China has had the mechanisms to know about market conditions and technical developments in the free world to such an extent that its buyers have gained a reputation for shrewdness, knowledgeability and for driving a hard bargain. Against this background, the many shopping delegations that China has sent to Western Europe and Japan since 1960, in addition to acquiring useful trade information, appears to be part of a deliberate Chinese campaign to nurture a climate of expectation of markets among free world businessmen. A clamor for Chinese orders will strengthen Peking's bargaining position when the time comes to negotiate contracts and permit China to play off one supplier against another. It is also likely that the Chinese Communists want to encourage Western businessmen to bring pressure to bear on their own governments to loosen the restrictions on trade in strategic commodities. Actually, any sudden growth in orders placed with Western suppliers would require intense efforts on the part of the Chinese to expand the production of products for export to the free world. China would probably find it extremely difficult to market enough exports to balance any large increase in imports. The ac- quisition of medium-term credits from Western suppliers would have to be relied upon but only moderate amounts of such credits seem likely to be available in the next two or three years. Large-scale diversion of Chinese trade from Bloc to non- Bloc countries would also involve initial costs to the Chinese in developing new markets for their exports and new sources for their imports, and in making costly and time-consuming adjustments to Western specifications for most machinery im- ports. Such a diversion of trade would also presumably place restraints on Chinese Communist foreign policy, including sub- ordination of certain political goals and willingness to supply technical data to foreign businessmen, to accept non-Bloc technicians in China and to send her own technicians outside China for training. The Chinese Communist attitude has been that only if the need is urgent enough, is it proper as a temporary expedient to cooperate with the capitalist enemy. (For example, when the Chinese decided to buy complicated non-Bloc machinery, Approved For Release 199- 'TA -r-~-RDP78-Q~4?1A~QgpffRSe9902-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 (713 Cont.) 1C November 1963 this decision included the acceptance of technicians -- the use of technicians was included in the deals for French electric locomotives, British airplanes, and French textile equipment.) Status and Prospects of the CPR's foreign trade. The low level o na s agricultural an industrial production and the decision to prepay certain obligations to the USSR were the major factors that caused a decline for the third consecutive year in the total value of Chinese Communist foreign trade. Almost all of the 1362 decline was accounted for by decreased trade with other Communist countries. As the Sino-Soviet rift developed, China has initiated policies preparing reorientation of its foreign economic relations. As a result, trade with non-Communist countries now accounts for about 50 percent of total foreign trade, whereas in 1959 it accounted for only about one third of the total. Assuming a continuation of present Party and State relations between the USSR and Communist China, dramatic changes in the level, direction and composition of China's foreign trade are not expected in the next two years, although the long-term prospect is for a gradual shift of Communist China's trade away from the USSR and toward non-Bloc countries. Chinese Communist Trading Practices. Under these circum- stances is mpera ve that nation-s-,ms and individuals acquaint themselves in some detail with Chinese Communist trading practices to protect their own economic interests but also to minimize the extent to which Communist China can exploit commercial and economic contacts to its own political advantage. In the first place, it should be understood that the Sino- Soviet rift is the major factor in Communist China's efforts to seek economic relations with non-Bloc countries, and economic relations between Communist China and the USSR was one of the earliest areas of discord in the dispute. It is apparent that if two Communist countries cannot trade on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis, it is highly unlikely that a non- Communist country will achieve a satisfactory trading relation- ship with them. Perhaps the outstanding example of the use of trade as a political weapon is in relations between China and Japan. Trade between the two countries declined sharply during the Korean War but thereafter began to increase and by 1057 pro- duced a useful surplus in China's favor. The trade was fos- tered by a series of unofficial trade agreements between Chinese state-trading corporations and groups of Japanese companies. Prior to the Japanese elections in the spring of 1558, the Chinese Communists conducted an intensified drive for trade with Japan and a contract was drawn up in Peking for some $2CO million worth of industrial goods. However, imple- mentation of the agreement was made subject to official approval and ratification of the Japanese government, a proviso that would involve de facto recognition of the Peking regime. When official Mapanese ratification was not forthcoming, the Approved For Release 199W8/41, -RDP78 ~1_C 0OZ0 ued)002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 (713 Cont. ) 18 November 1963 Chinese Communists broke all direct trade relations with Japan and immediately cancelled all outstanding contracts without notice. Many Japanese firms were left with serious financial losses by this CPR maneuver. A large Canadian import firm recently announced that its interest in trade with Communist countries had virtually disappeared because conditions of trade were so unsatisfactory. The firm reported that it had received food shipped in rusty cans, perfumes with unacceptable fragrances, typewriters with foreign keys, crooked skis, light fixtures with misfitting sockets, substandard textile goods and machines with damaged couplings. It was also reported that Communist pricing prac- tices were unacceptable. Products were generally priced lower than those quoted on comparable goods by Western producers in order to penetrate the market. However, on repeat orders prices are raised, often without any advance notice to the importer. Such actions are costly to Western businessmen who determine their prices on the basis of quotations and who are obligated to supply goods to their own customers on the basis of the quotations. The importer in effect finds that he is paying his customer to buy his goods! Many international trading firms find that the Chinese Communist state trading corporations insist on using their form of contract for both buying and selling. There is a striking difference between the wording of their contract forms for purchase and for sale: the former binds the foreign seller very tightly; the latter is, in effect, little more than a general statement of intent. Further, changes are made unilaterally giving maximum protection to the Chinese Communists. In 1952, traders who held contracts with the Chinese Communists for the delivery of agricultural produce suffered another kind of default. After severe crop failures, Commu- nist China not only failed to make shipments of agricultural produce on the due date but also ignored requests for informa- tion regarding shipping dates. Although they finally admitted that they could not meet the contracts to supply goods, they refused to say so in writing or to claim force majeure, which would in turn have allowed many buyers to cance con racts with their customers with little or no loss. Communist China's trading partners in this case suffered financial losses simply because the CPR could not admit that a Communist country had not met its production quotas. Communist China's poor record as a trading partner stems not only from the fact that her trade is conducted, naturally, from a Communist point of view, but also from the fact that one of China's valued traditional assets was her large class of reputable and knowledgable businessmen and merchants. Com- munist China's own purges destroyed that class and with it they destroyed much of China's historical capacity and facility for international trade. A Approved For Release - DP78 -b1 M002-5 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 b 18 November 1963 714 NE,W$. Iran's "White Revolution" 25X1 C10 BACKGROUND: Iran's so-called "white revolution," directed by the ruler of a 2500-year old monarchy who is dedicated to agricultural and industrial reform, is a modern leap forward for this feudal society. Contrary to revolutionary patterns among most underprivileged nations today, this is a revolution- by-law, conceived by the Shah and implemented by cabinet-level government officials. Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi's goal is to pull his four- teenth century kingdom into a twentieth century world. The drastic task requires drastic means. /Tee unclassified attach- ment "Reform Program in Iran" for a description of reform plans and problems. Also Press Comment 31 October for New York Times article, magazine section, .ober.7 Rich in unexplored---- resources but suffering from an archaic agricultural and social structure, Iran could not afford to await gradual enlightenment and economic stimulus from increasing contacts with the outside world. The Shah undoubtedly has also recognized that the reign of the modern monarch is secure only if it rests on a solid 25X1C10b economic base and enjoys broad popular support. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT WITHIN INTM-NATIONAL Fa= The Polemic Exchange LL Peking's hostile attitude to a nuclear test ban is the culmination of the generally negative approach of the Chinese leadership to problems of the peoples' struggle for dis- armament and peace. ("Against Falsification") An editorial article published in Pravda (August 15) re- , portedly based on an issuance ("Against L?alsi3'ication") of the World Peace Council's Secretariat, traces the intransigence of the Chicom stand on nuclear testing and on easing international tensions from 1958. The WPC claims that, "... at the 1962 Con- gress for General Disarmament and Peace the Chinese delegation voted ... for the prohibition of nuclear tests ... and on its return to Peking ... began to decry the results of the Congress." However, apparently not until the WFFU Conference on the Common Market (Leipzig, Dec. 14-17, 1962) did the Chicoms refuse to end an international front meeting without a compromise, Disagreement over the Soviet handling of its part in the Cuban crisis and over Soviet policy on the Sino-Indian border dispute undoubtedly helped provoke the Chicoms to maintain throughout that conference an all-out attack on the "imperialist" Common Market. Their "hard line" conflicted with the Soviet position. The Chicoms replied to the Pravda article of August 15 saying that "... modern revisionists. dare not offend US imperialism." "It is indeed painful for us to find that the Secretariat of the WPC under the baton of the modern revision- ists should have sunk so low as to become an organ propagating the line of capitulation." - (Speech at 24 August 1963) Since December, 1962 the Chicoms have constantly repeated that eventual completion of the "socialist revolution" is threatened while imperialist nations maintain nuclear armaments and while the proponents of the socialist struggle do not have a nuclear capability. Hence, nuclear disarmament must be com- plete; half-way measures preserve the great power monopoly of nuclear weapons. The Chicoms condemn the Soviet Union's great power chauvinism for its espousal of "peaceful coexistence" and its agreement to cease nuclear testing in only three spheres (air, water, space). Over and over again in 1963 the intensity of their opposition to these policies has been illustrated, inter alia, through the medium of the international fronts; Peaceful coexistence refers to relation- ship between States with different social systems, and must not be extended to cover the relationship between oppressed and Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved F?p w 1fij { 4.:.g4A j&-OaR5 gg j00040002-5 and oppressor classes. At no time is it possible for the oppressed nations and peoples to coexist peacefully with the imperialists... To ask the oppressed nations and peoples to coexist peacefully with imperialism is to force them to give up their struggle and to keep them for ever in the position of being oppressed and enslaved. To tell the oppressed nations and peoples to coexist peacefully with the imperialists in order that one can enter into a compromise of 'co-operation' with the imperialists is tantamount to sacri- ficing the fundamental interests of these countries and peoples and serving the interests of imperialism... (WIDF, Fifth World Congress of Women, June, 1963) This /partial nuclear test ban7 treaty allows the aggressor the right of massacre and denies the victims the right of self defense. (Ninth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, August 1963) The Chinese Trade Union Federation called the WFTU Secre- tary General Saillant's favorable reception of the partial test ban treaty representative of his personal views rather than of WFTU. The day after the Chicoms had denounced Saillant's approval of the treaty, Pravda defended the views he had ex- pressed. ... Chinese leaders are ready -b sacri- fice the health of millions of people and that of generations to come. ...Their sole concern is to justify the policy of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic which is doing everything it can to join in the nuclear arms race. ("Against Falsification") The Pravda article quotes the WPC as saying that the Chicom de ega e s speech at Malmo in March, 1963 (convocation of WPC Presidential Committee) is sufficient evidence to support this allegation. Chong Shen-yu spoke of "the right of all States to possess nuclear weapons and demanded 'action against a monoply of nuclear weapons."' The Chicom response at Hiroshima was not a denial. Rather they attacked a Soviet Vice President of the WPC, a Pravda writer active in the peace movement, and a former Soviet Secretary in the WPC Secretariat, to whom they attributed the opinion "that under the threat of destructive thermo-nuclear war, national liberation movements should not be attempted," and further stated that Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Releaigge1 p?a` is 6-VDtPh7e8 a61 orOk0200040002-5 under the baton of the modern revisionists, has been giving less and less support to the national liberation movement, and even damaging it. The Chicoms express the belief that liberation of all national groups suppressed by colonialism or neo-colonialism must be militantly pursued. They are dissatisfied with the leadership that the existing fronts are providing, At the Afro-Asian Lawyers Conference in Conakry (Oct. 15-22, 1962), the Chicom delegate called to task those who use the "need for breadth in the composition of the peace movement" as a shield to hide their neglect of the national liberation movement. The Soviets suggest that the Chicoms would like to liquidate the peace movement, unified under the auspices of the VIPC, and replace it with a "militant worldwide movement for peace on the basis of the unity and militant spirit of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." That the Chinese want a militant, anti-imperialist WPC is true. That they will give up the effort to win European "peace fighters" to their side is much less clear. Chicom Tactical Moves in International Front Organizations: A Bogge - own ens ve, in their a rugg e to wrest rom e ov e s e r 1ea era p of the international communist move- ment, the Chicoms are placing emphasis on persuading Asia, Africa and Latin America to align with them. The Chicoms are seeking support for their more militant policy lines from, inter alias the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization DSO) as well as roug other newly-created an proposed A o Asian front organizations. To accomplish these aims, the Chicoms are attempting to bloc the growth of Soviet influence in the new groups and to make Soviet participation in them impossible, and also to reduce the Soviets' power in those groups in which they are already members. Plans conceived more than three years ago to bring Latin American organizations into the AAPSO complex now figure prominently in the Sino-Soviet jockeying for position. The Soviets and Chicoms have hereto- fore agreed that AAPSO should embrace Latin American groups. Disagreement on how a 'lines should be implemented and on what the main themes of this joint effort should be has impeded actual accomplishment of such a merger. The Soviets have sought to dominate the "Three Continent" solidarity alliance by having Latin American organizers come in through the pro-Soviet YIPC affiliates, whereas the Chicoms insist that the WPC, in spite of its cooperation with AAPSO since that group's inception, should not participate in "Three Continent" planning. Chicom opposition to including the Soviet-dominated WPC in the "Three Continent" project dates back at least to the HC's 1961 Disarmament Conference in Stockholm. In February, 1933 at the Third AAPSO Conference in Moshi, Tanganyika -- which proved to be a predominently pro-Chinese affair -- WPC representatives were not allowed to speak and were excluded from the"Three Continene'solidarity committee work which pro- posed that a"Three Continent"peace conference be held in Havana. 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 It i prated liff A99A 9en%AfiQF7 i~3 i~icgme2used0002-5 appeals with racist overtones vis-a-vis the Africans, playing themselves up as "dependt.?3le" in contrast to the Soviets whose basic affinity, they claim, is with the imperialist "whites." In fact, after the conference, the CPSU Open Letter of 14 July accused the Chicoms of having stated to Soviet delegates at Moshi that "whites have no business here." Meanwhile, in the WPC itself, the Chicoms have withdrawn their representatives from the secretariat and ceased to render it financial aid, in reaction to the WPC's outright backing of the test ban treaty. However, to assure that WPC counter- measures do not isolate the Chicoms from the Afro-Asian and Latin American WPC affiliates the Chicoms have persisted in participating in the WPC's policy making meetings and inter- national congresses. Working on Indonesian soil, under the guise of Indonesian sponsorship, the Chicoms repeated their Moshi performance with success at the Afro-Asian Journalists Conference (AAJC) in Djakarta (24 Apr - May) and a the Afro- an Writes Con- ference (AAWC) in Djakarta/Danpasar, Bali (12-20 July). ie C,- h representatives of the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) and of the Soviet Union were accorded observer status only, despite their vehement protests. Thus, with Indonesia playing the willing tool, the Chicoms relegated the traditional leaders to the role of "outsiders," and limited the Soviet ability to manipulate the proceedings to fit their own objectives. Indeed, the conference called into being an Afro-Asian Journalists' Organization and an Afro-Asian Journal- ists, ureau, o ase in Indonesia,, which were to work n epen entl'y of the IOJ. In other words, the Chicoms created a parallel body and laid the groundwork for splitting of a Soviet-controlled international front. On this occasion, they also reiterated plans for a'Three Continent" link-uP of journal- ists. The AAVTC made little reference in its proceedings to its AA.?S0 parentage. Communist exploitation of its proceedings revealed the same pattern as was displayed at the AAJC, with the same pronounced Chicom slant and the same Indonesian support for the position of the Chicoms. The Moshi Conference recommended the convening of an Afro- Asian trade union conference without specifying where and w should e held. eanw e, Indonesian trade unions, with obvious backing of the Chicoms had proposed a similar meeting in Djakarta from which the Soviets apparently were to be ex- cluded. But this scheme ran into problems. The Soviets persuaded the AAPSO Executive Committee meet- ing in Nicosia (9-12 September) to call for the holding of an Afro-Asian trade union conference in Africa under the sponsor- ship of the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat. The Indonesians and Chicoms were opposed to this decision, declaring that they would not feel bound by it. After long hesitation, the Indonesians, under pressure from the Soviet Government and trade Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 un4K0V. R.HJ?,le1?e4d9 9/ff2 n gg AtfpP'7unal~Cgnec~'QO overnments and trade unions, at the last minute admitted the Soviet trade unions as co-sponsors of the preliminary Afro-Asian Labor Confer-3-ace (AALC). The invitation extended to the Soviets for the Djakarta conference reportedly was based on conditions that AAPSO abandon its plan adopted at Nicosia and that the ''; U cease its opposition to the Djakarta Conference. These condi- tions could hardly be made binding on AA_PSO or WFTU; apparently, they were a face-saving gesture to the Indonesian sponsoring unions. The preliminary AALC, meeting from 20" October to 2 November, resolved to hold the full conference in Spring of 1963 with the Soviets as co-sponsors. The meeting announced that delegations to the full conference will be representatives of labor organi- zations regardless of their political or religious convictions. However, participating labor organizations must be against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. All international organizations which support the aims of the conference will be allowed to attend. In the meantime, at the 13th Soviet Trade Union Congress attended by trade union representatives from some 90 countries, which opened in Moscow also on 20 October, both W 'U Secretary General Saillant and Soviet Congress chairman Viktor Grishin implicitly condemned the Chicom attempts to form separate Afro- Asian international organizations under Chicom control. Grishin stated he favored international labor meetings as long as they were based on the principle of proletarian internationalism (i.e. based on class rather than race) but he cannot support such conferences if they are organized on national distinctions and without the participation of the trade unions of other (i.e. non-Afro-Asian) countries, the Soviet trade unions and the WFTU. Grishin added that otherwise such a conference will only harm the international trade union movement, the interests of the workers, and the Afro-Asian trade unions themselves. Although still avidly pursuing their tactics of confronta- tion with the Soviets the Chicoms have made slow progress in setting up their rival organizations. In addition to the establishment of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Organization, they founded a so-called "Peking Center for the World Federation of Scientific Workers (W' W)" in September, but its first con erence, a Symposium o beat en ed by Asians, Africans and Latin Ameri- cans will not be held until August 1964. Soviet counter-offensive in the fronts. With its control over the interne onal fronts challenged, t e Soviet Union has shed the mask which usually hides that control. The USSf has blatantly exhibited an array of Leninist tricks conceived to counter Chicom incursions in the fronts and to stave off the threat of Chicom-sponsored rival fronts. The Soviet-directed fronts have taken steps which can only be construed as a direct bid to prevent the Afro-Asian (Latin American) Solidarity Movement from succumbing to Chicom influence. 5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 RA13006dpR=Re JJAWl0W klfyDQr7 $A4;q~? Aqpg2PR$J$? a ica, have been initiated to asz3rt the WPC's right to wave "the banner for progressive nuclear cLsarmement" on those continents. In reaction to the Indonesian proposal to hold an Afro-Asian Labor Conference, the VI10 assembled its Afro-Asian affiliates at a conference in Prague (July 27-25, 1963); and the Soviets used diplomatic pressure vis-a-vis the Indonesian government (Also see coverage under "Chicom Tactical Moves"). Upon the announce- ment that Afro-Asian student and youth fronts would be formed, the WErDY sent a delegation to tour Southeast Asia. Measures to divert Afro-Asian attention from the "new fronts" have been undertaken concurrently with moves to mitigate Chicom "splitting activities" in the established international fronts. The Soviet leaders in the fronts have resorted to post- poning conferences to eliminate immediate opportunities for the Chicoms to flaunt at front conferences their refusal to accept the current Soviet interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The WPC Executive Committee Meeting, which had been scheduled for Warsaw in June, was suddenly cancelled at the last moment, in spite of the advanced stage that preparations had reached in many countries.' Countless other events have been rescheduled again and again (e.g.: Latin American Youth Conference, planned for August in Santiago, Chile, postponed according to latest reporting until March 1964; Women Workers (VIFTU) Conference, Bucharest, planned well in advance for 14-19 October, etc.). At those conferences that were held the Chicoms have been outmaneuvered by the unrestrained use of Soviet power. The Chicoms have accused the Soviets, not without some justification, of using vote rigging and "heavy-handed" parliamentary procedures to silence them at the WIDE Conference in June and at the AE.PSO Executive Committee Meeting in Nicosia in September. When it seemed that J'-JSP disagreement over the test ban treaty would obstruct the convening at Hiroshima (5,7 August) of the Ninth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, the WPC delegation submitted what NCNA (August 6) termed a "scheme ... to deprive overseas delegates of their status as delegates." The WPC officials proposed that the International attendees participate as observers. NCNA pointed out that the TPC state- ment was issued after the arrival of the Soviet delegation, whose leader, G. Zhukov, demanded that the international session of the World Conference not be hold, saying that the Soviet Union would not participate in a conference in which it was being tried as an "enemy of the people." NCNA concluded that the JPC is merely a Soviet "puppet",since (prior to the Soviet ac?ical Retreat -- after the Chicom exhibition at the WPC's Executive Committee Meeting in March, the next meeting had been designated for Warsaw, the first time since 1954 that a Council meeting had not been convened outside the Bloc. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 arr*V rbv F`cR19~.8A~liv.718&t2&W-5 "United World Conference" get underway ay soon as possible. Although Coviet efforts to prevent the convening of the inter- national conference failed, the USSR's representatives did not hesitate to abandon their earlier stand in order to defend their position on the test ban treaty against the verbal barrage of the Chicoms. The final resolutions of the conference did not mention the treaty. Perhaps, partially in protest against the expulsion of PNCNA correspondents from Prague (IOJ Headquarters), the Chicoms boycotted the ICCJ's (International Committee for Cooperation of Journalists -- an IOJ front) "luxury" Mediterranean cruise as a further example of Soviet capitulation to the ways and demands of "imperialism" (the more important example of such behavior on the Soviet side being the test ban teeaty). To make this same point they cited the fact that the conference was to be "concerned only with pro- fessional matters" and "devoid of political content." Mean- while, Khrushchev's son-in-law, Izvestiya's editor, A.Ahdzubei, and other Soviet figures, prominent in the-field of journalism, took advantage of the Chicoms' absence and attended the session aboard the Soviet vessel, the Litva. The most decisive Soviet victory was at the AL'PSO Execu- tive Committee Meeting, Nicosia, Cyprus (10-12 September). In the spring at Moshi, the Chicom success seemed to trigger the formation of a rival set of fronts under Chicom control. How- ever, intensive Soviet preparations for the Nicosia meeting paved the way for a successful Soviet come-back and there seems little doubt that the Soviet line won most effective support. The Soviet delegation was supported by observers from East Europe and from international fronts, including the WPC and WIDF. (TABS reported that the Chinese had tried to prevent these observers from attending). Although the agenda had included an item on the association of Latin American countries with AAPSO, there was,,a conspicuous omission of any reference to the"Three Continent conference which had recioved the support of the Moshi Conference. It seems likely that, for the time being, this project fall victim to the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Nicosia certainly dimmed Chicom hopes of reading the Soviets out of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. One indication that the Soviets are trying to press home the advantage gained over the Chicoms at Nicosia is Moscow Radio's new series of programs in its Arabic service describing the aims and activities of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Featuring the importance of and more actively engaging the Soviet affiliates in international organizations' work may well signify a new trend toward reasserting Soviet influence in the fronts. The attendance of the many foreign delegations at the Soviet Trade Union Congress would seem to point in this direction, especially since the Congress highlight- ed the Droner arrangements which should govern the convening of ttooting$ of international organizatcns. 7 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Reform ?rogram In Iran The Iranian reform program aims to: increase efficiency and productivity in all fields; break up the archaic agricul- tural landholdings system; shift to industry some of the four- fifths of the Iranian population now in agriculture; exploit natural resources and raise the national literacy levels. To .ccomplish these fundamental changes in the tradition-bound social, economic and political life of Iran, attacks are being made on five important sectors. Land distribution is the most significant and controversial of the re o'-".s. mits individual private ownership of land to one village (defined as a center with less than 5,000 popu- lation) in a country where nearly 50,000 villages are owned by approximately 1,000 families. All land in excess of one village must be either sold to peasants, to the government for resale to the peasants or leased under specific conditions. Nearly two-thirds of the 21 million population are peasants who have traditionally share-cropped the land for one-fifth to four- fifths of the harvest -- the share depended on whether the land- lord furnished seed, fertilizer or farm animals. The new peasant land-owner must join an agricultural co- operative which will guide and assist him in planning and market- ing his crops and assume certain of the former landlord's functions until the small owner is self-sufficient. Lack of trained personnel to establish the cooperatives and to plan for current crops may result in a general decline of productivity for the immediate future. Approximately 2,300 cooperatives have been formed to date and approximately 10% of the one-owner vil- lage lands have been redistributed. ?ayment to the landlords is to be completed within ten years but the peasants are allowed fifteen years to pay off their mortgages. The financial gap is to be partly overcome by permitting landlords to buy shares in government owned fac- tories. Industrial reform laws of November 1962 provide for public sale of governmen -owned factories (the proceeds are to support the land reform program),collective bargaining, and worker profit-sharing. Since Iran's economy is primarily agricultural, the industrial program affects far fewer individuals, although many of these are urban dwellers with greater political leverage and sophistication. Electoral reform has three main aims: to reduce tradi- tions an or an government influence in election supervision; to establish a modern voter registration system. and to speed up elections. Charges of election rigging following a 1961 elec- tion led the Shah to dissolve the Majlis (parliament) and to rule by decree for 21 years. September 1963 elections of a new Majlis (which reopened October 6 ) were freer under the new laws Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 but not entirely open. Totally without precedent was the election of eight w o m e n. The Literacy Corps plan is the least controversial of the reforms an is generally well received. It proposes to recruit high school graduates for training and for teaching peasants in rural areas, under army aegis. The first group of some 1500 went out to the villages in April, 1963. Forest Nationalization, a plan approved in January 1963, is essentially a conserve on measure to protect Iranian for- ests which have suffered uncontrolled depletion for centuries and now cover about 12% of the land. Public approval of the reforms was demonstrated by a referendum vo a in January w ich gave the program 512 million "aye" votes against some 4,000 "nays." The reforms were presented as a total package to be accepted or rejected by public vote. Women were permitted to vote but their votes were not counted -- a compromise with clerical objections that votes for women violated Islamic law. Financing. The general popularity of the reforms does not assure t eir implementation. Financing such far-reaching efforts in a country with an average annual family income of $175 is a staggering problem. The cost of land distribution alone has been estimated at some 70 billion rials ($930 million). The factory-share scheme to pay landlords for their former holdings has not proved popular. Receipts from new peasant owners are slow and large expenditures are necessary to estab- lish and equip the farm cooperatives. Iran is turning to all sources for assistance. The USSR, for instance, granted a $38.8 million credit and cooperation program -- the first time any bloc country has done so. US economic assistance to Iran continues at the rate of about $130 million per year. Opposition to the reforms comes from several groups. The ultra-co nsrva~ive Shia Moslems and their mullahs (clergy)fear the loss of their consider a le power over the poorer class Persian who will benefit most from the reforms. Their exploi- tation of religious fanaticism led to violent riots in June 1333, protesting women's suffrage and land reform. Government security troops forcibly put down the riot. Nearly 200 were killed and Teheran's bazaar area suffered widespread property damage. The result was a temporary setback for the reform program. Nomadic tribal groups in the southwest, whose range lands are falling under a an distribution program, are using guerrilla tactics to resist further encroachment. A govern- ment order for forced disarmament and the threat of resettle- ment have brought military clashes. The one million Kurdish Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5 tribesmen living in Iran are traditionally separatists and resist central government control. If the Barzani Kurds in neighboring Iraq obtain greater autonomy in their fight with Baghdad, the Iranian Kure:-:7 might be encouraged to further as- sert their independence. Landlords dispos-es;-P ; of their villages and losing their feudal pravilees also c..-im that reimbursement for their pro- perty is insufficient. Tie government counters that the tax assessment base of the pert three years has been used -- if the landlords failed to c~.ject to a low tax evalution, they cannot now object to the use of the same evaluation as a purchase price. ?olitical opposition centers around the National Front party, a loose grouping of educated urban dwe ers and tel- ligentsia who concede the need for reform but object to the Shah's authoritarian methods. Merchants subject to profit- sharing plans and city workers who are chronically underemployed are also drawn into this group. The illegal Tudeh (Communist) ?arty objects to the whole program because its success will de- prive them of their major exploitable issue. The prospects for increased living standards, growth of a middle class and the defeat of illiteracy -- all accomplished under a pro 17estern monarchy -- threaten nearly every tenet of communism and weaken its appeal to peoples of underdevloped countries everywhere. 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