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December 2, 1963
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25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1k999IQ8/pd,? r. A-RDP78-03061 A000200040003-4 3riefly Noted Rumanians split ~'ith Soviets to Supper- Nuclear-Free Latin America On is November, the UN General Assembly voted Sa to a, with 14 abstentions, for a study to make Latin America a de- nuclearized zone. `.7o points were notable about this vote: 1. Despite a history of espousing denuclearized zones, and especially a denuclearized zone in Europe (apac'.>' ?Ian), neither the Soviet Union nor _=oland voted for the measure : they abst? ined. . For the first time in UN history, the Rumanian rep- resentative did n o t follow the Soviet exa:mp?e, but voted: 2 o r the measure. Most of the Bloc abstained out of (Soviet) regard for Cuba. Castro claims that there can be no Latin American nuclear-free -one unless the US formally promises not to base nuclear teapons in the Canal Tone, '7uerto Rico and elsewhere in Latin America, and unless the US returns Guantanamo to Cuba. The US position is that we will support and abide by any nuclear-free zone, pro- viding it embraces the whole region in quest.-1on, does not upset the m litary balance of power (this is one major weakness of to Faoacki plan), is supported by all area nations, and provides for verification that there are no nuclear weapons. These pro- visos, and especially verification, are what Cuba really objects to. The :''krem?in is more anxious to caopease Castro (for fear he may turn to '?eking) than it 9 s to follow its old policy on de- ~zuclearized zones. Actually, the Kremlin's old policy has been merely a disguised diplomatic attempt to break down the NATO position in Europe and win sympathy on other continents. The Rumanian delegation expressed support for Cuba's posi- tion, but their government felt it more important to abide by the old policy than to follow Moscow's shift. u. an .a has re- cently had differences with the USSR over C31,,A and other matters, but unlike Alban-12,, she is not merely exchanging one master for another. The Rumanian vote mar 1_-s a new step in the weakening of Communist discipline and in the emergence of independence in the Bloc. 25X1C10b 25X1C10b 'b ~:: i;bese c..0'l::l~.,:n 5t?'3a.CtiOil to resident ibe?li2ediJ t 5 Death. In rude contrast to the world's spontaneous tributes and mourning at the tragic death of '?resident ;'Cennedy, an official of the Chinese people's !republic said, "That's good news. e , '17 r Or: ea ., r, a:,ly c. car- was a very _yed _ CTr., wd is ' a carried a c ^i ~" The v.-. l . 5 toon Stith a cast on rea ding "I.ennedy B_1 ing the =rust, tt and de- p:ictin : the .:'r esi dent in a position of grueso::_Se distortion. In ` .:arta the ,.. ._ t ^?_lt:i ' nu5~a~ c, alone) and d i n i ~ srt. sr- n r of f ti'e ~~. d Indonesian 3-Overnment is proclamation, flew its x1a from the top of the flagpole as usual. In Africa, the seven-man a- tion to the Afro-Asian attorneys conference in Cona':ry, Guinea, :ralhec out, al cne, when the Chairman asked members to stand for one minute in silent tribute to the slain '?re: dent. At the o= 71 Peace Council meeting in 17arsaci the S,--man Chinese Corn- munist delegation protested an rily and refused to join in the cta a ing ho 'a,ge to ?resident ienne 1y . On April 12., 1045 Jose73h Goeabe1s received the ttuladtt sews of the pass" n of :7resident Roosevelt with the words "This is ` ? bean qn',:.i3V fO" call for. In a eto ~".itl3r he :dG'tVc.. s,,l c1 "~:Ty s_,..tyeah ? rar, .~ ., congratulate you. Roosevelt is ead . ;'c^.?te G '_as laid low your greatest enemy. God has not abandoned us. P. miracle has hao',ened. It is written that the second half of April will be the turning point for us. This is (note) :.'riday, A-3ril E2. It is the turning point." 130:t little more than two tiee'hs later, ? - tler any. his lieutenants were dead, by their own ihaands, and the "Thousand Year L Bich" came to an and. As appropriate to selected audiences, we compare the r eac- 'tions of the ascists and the Chinese Communists, -- pointing Out their anat ci5_a, their self-imposed isolation from all civilized nations -- and we note the end to iTazis:a F hich followed upon a tragic event m e:' ret3d by then as a good omen In the i r a zg:ression against civilized humanity. Throughout the year 1903, the government of 1~umulo Betancourt and the Venezuelan people have been the objects of a -oamDa_gn of violence and sabotage without parallel in Latin A::_er' hate also the theatrical, even e..'bibitionist, manner ?ca. in which it has been carried out. The activists of the 1-1IXT (1 iarzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional) are said to number less than 539. They are stwt,ported by Fidel Castro, as evidenced by the arms cache discovered early in November in eastern Venc ? ala., but it is equally certain that they are under the discipline of (Briefly Noted Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release ',Q2& AS2"-4-RDP78-03061 A000200040003-4 the official Co:n:ainist '?arty of Venezuela. The pur ose of this spectacular ca a,ma-i a has been to b?beep:) the elections fro', to-,-.inn- place: 1) by sabotaging public con- fidence in the viability of democratic governiient; 2) by pro- Vo'' President Betancourt into taking repressive measures so severe as to alienate public support; 3) by tempting the mili- tary to stage a coup d'etat; and 4) by frightening the voters, , at the last moment, into staying home on election day. I-oEjever, over 90% of the voters went to the polls Sunday, 1 Decenber; the FALIT has failed utterly to achieve any one of its objectives. All it has achieved is the senseless murder and maiming of hun- dreds of innocent people and the equally meaningless destruction of millions of dollars of property, representing a net -loss to Venezuela. Regardless of who is elected, we point out the lesson to be drawn from recent events in Venezuela: that the rule of lace can be maintained and orderly political succession achieved if the responsible e' events in the government shoey enough deter--mina- ti on. .hat .any democratic governments do not realize is that of all subversion is i n_i tiated: and carried out by a fraction of one per cent of the copulation. :?resident Betancourt a,:r)ar- catjy realized this and consequently refused to be intimi, ated. 7a warn other Latin American countries that Castro night now focus his subversive exports upon their territories. '"e use the case of V. for our continuing campaign against Castro. ?O?aJLAL./UI L ~ :...01P YS An authoritative Communist state-.lent of the "why and Doti!" of the popular front tactic. "?arty Policy and the ?arty Branch" by the French C'- is reprinted from the .7crld I.Iarxist L eviec~ of April 1033 with e.:p an ;,ory comments juxtaposed to rev'aaling ,passages of Co muni st objec- tives in ; collaboration with non- Communist forces in free countries. A'J? livable to the range of Communist ssub- VersiV3 ac ~,iV? t-? es in widely d f f e r I ng country si tu ioils. In asbing for copies, re.Za r to C'_?A ? A 110T313 (?IT) 27. 3 (Briefly Voted) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1 -RDP78-q,3g@J"Q20003-4 DATES OF ?RO'?AGANrDA IN ER30T December Afro-Asian Organization for 3conomic Cooperation, 4th AAO:C, scheduled for Xarachi, 1033. 21 Dee Stalin born (1370). 23 Dec i'lao Tse-tung born (1333 - 73 years). January LbA.Trade Union Fed. Constituent Cong. (VIFTU sponsored) Rio de Janeiro, Jan. 1964. 2 Jan Fidel Castro assumes power in Cuba, 1959. 4 Jan XXVItb Internl. Cong. of Orientalists, New Delhi Jan.4 1', 1334 15 Jan "Trial of the 12" first show trial of Stalinist purge, including Zinoviev and Xamenev (initial members Stalin ruling triumvirate during Lenin's physical decline),131". 21 Jan Lenin dies, 1924 (40th anniu) (born 22 April 1370). 26 Jan Second Congress of Soviets meets: Stalin swears al- legiance to Lenin's policies, 1924. 31 Jan Leon Trotsky banished for life, 1923 (35th anniv.) 31 Jan Cuban Marxist-Leninist Government excluded from partici- pation inter-American system by Foreign Ministers at ?unta del 3ste, 1962. 1 Feb UNGA adopts resolution charging Chinese Communist gression in T,orea, 1951. 2 Y b 3stonian Soviet ?eace Treaty signed: Soviet Government "forever renounces sovereign rights over people and territory of 3stonia," 1920. 14- Feb USSR and C?r sign treaty of alliance (Sino-Soviet Friend- ship ?act) repudiating Soviet Nationalist Treaty (14 August 1W), 1950. 14 Feb 'Chrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech at C?SU 23t: Congress, 14-25 Feb. 195G. 23 Feb Kronstadt Uprising begins by supporters of Oct. 1317 Revolution against "three-year-old atuocracy of Communist Commissars" (1321) 25 Feb Soviets imprison leader of Smallholders' ?arty, Bela Kovacs, in campaign to destroy major anti-Communist op- position, hiung. 1947. 26 Feb Internl. Conf. of Youth and Students for Disarmament, ?eace and National Independence (NFDY-sponsored),X'lorence, Italy, 26 Feb-1 Mar 1963. 27 Feb Mao Tse-tung delivers "Hundred Flowers" speech, 1357. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release aA~ngI34 r~o-RDP78-03061 A000200040003-4 ?ROPAGAITDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DI3SINSIONS # 17 0-22 November 1963 Commentary `Principal Developments: 1. Only one major contribution to the Great Feud appeared during this period, a 19 November 10,003-word, joint People's Daily/ ed Flag diatribe entitled "Two Different Lines one - ues on of ar and ?eace." Designated as the fifth in the series of such joint Chinese articles replying rectly to the 14 Sul CPSU open letter, it is probably the most extreme oTTIl authoritative expressions by either of the protagonists to date, in its political/theoretical formulathns, its derisive denunci- ation of C?SU views, and its insulting personal attacks on x.hrushchev. (See extensive review in Chronolog=y, November 10.) 2. The Albanians published another 7,030-word tirade against Tito which struck at Xhrushchev in passing, but a, did not equal in intensity some of the previous Albanian attacks. (November 90 The North Vietnamese monthly theoretical journal Zoe Tap carried a 5,003-word article ponderously defending "the 1.avo u ionary Principles of the Two Moscow Statements, " '711 h not only denounced the "Yugoslav revisionist clique" but also criticized "a number of persons (w-ho) are claiming that the analysis of the Tito clique by the 1360 statement is wrong." (November 16.) 3. We have seen no reports of polemical materials in Soviet or pro-Soviet or;ang: during this period, although the Chinese claimed on the 15th that "the Soviet press is vigor- ously keeping up its anti-China campaign," publishing more than attacks, Soviet as well as foreign, from 23 October to 13 November. The few examples cited appeared before 3 November. 4. Meanwhile, various sources reported that the C71SJ had taken the initiative in exploring with the Chinese the prospects for holding a second round of bilateral talks between delegations o:' the two parties. . mes Moscow correspondent Tanner reported (Chrono, November 20). n-ormed sources" as saying that consult- ations of this nature were taking place with members of the Chinese 3mbassy in Moscow, and that "it now appears that such a conference will take place in ?eiing.... early next yeas." Other reports regarding discussions in Moscow during and following the October tevolution celebration have been conflicting. epresenta- tives of several minor parties have returned home reporting that t .he Soviets made no attempt to draw them into any meetings. A secret report tells of a 13 November meeting of top Belgian and r'rench C? leaders who agreed to issue a joint resolution reject- ing the Chinese line and expressing hope for an all-Parties con- ference as soon as possible. ()f#17 Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 (fl?oea y 1999/D8424,: PP78-03061A000200040003-4 5. Meanwhile, the important Japanese C? restated its "independent attitude toward the disputes in the international Communist movement" in terms attuned to the Chinese line and emphasized its views that "an international conference must be held only after necessary conditions are sufficiently provided through prior consultation." (November 10) Rumania further de- monstrated her "independence" by voting in opposition to a USSR position (on a resolution barring nuclear weapons in Latin America) in the UN for the first time in history (November 19), while boss Georghiu-Dej decided to take up a long-standing in- vitation to visit Yugoslavia (November 22). S. Among the smaller parties, the trends toward independ- ence and split continued. The recent soul-searching in the Swedish Cl::- produced an amazing article in the Party's daily organ Ny _,agBy'prominent leader Landin categorical) y rejecting the i7=oscow Declaration and advocating complete autonomy in polm-7. with a reconstitution of the warty, goes o y in e form of a "socialist peoples party." (Described in Chronology under Novem- ber 23, but the date has subsequently beem.determined to be Nov. J: please make correction to your copies.) In Britain, a nets pro-Chinese "Committee for Communist Unity" issued-'''-a manifests signed by 1S CPGB members appealing to all members to defeat the pro-Soviet "revisionists" in the Party leadership a nc_-es ab. sh a genuine :_ ar y . November 11 Significance: Available evidence (neither clear-cut nor reliable) seems to indicate that the Soviets have now decided to undertake to schedule another round of W.ateral discussions with the Chinese and are unilaterally refraining from further polemics while the effort is being made. It seems most likely, however, that the Soviets do not expect to achieve any resolution of the conflict by this effort, but are making it primarily as another step in avoiding the onus for further deterioration in relations and as further preparation for a possible excommunication move. tdean- cwhile, the Chinese and their allies' have shown no sign of retreat from their extreme positions. There has been no reported shift- ing in allegiance among the parties of the world, but evidence indicates some further growth in "independence" and splitting to dencies. 25X1 C10b 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #17 9-22 November 1963 November 9 - The Albanian Zeri I Popullit publishes another 7,000--w-o-rZ tirade,erAcs o Treachery by the Renegade Tito," also denouncing "the hostile splitting activity of the N. Khrushchev group, which supports the Tito gang and follows in its footsteps." November 10 - The Japanese CP Sunday weekly Akahata carries an anonymous question---a-0--answer-type feature g v ng the Party's views on "the so-called 'international dispute."' It affirms that "the JCP takes an independent attitude toward disputes in the international Communist movement," and "does not state which party is right, who is right, or who should be supported for the advantage of the JCP." However, it does answer "some people (who) contend that the CCP wants war" by stating "we believe that such a view is utterly unfounded" and that "the Japanese people . . . could not believe that the CPR Government and CP are warlike," and it expresses dis- approval of "the leaders of certain Communist parties" who started "open criticism of those parties which had not agreed with them" at the 1960 Moscow conference, specifically, criticism of the Albanian Workers Party and the Cam. The feature concludes by maintaining "that an interna- tional conference must be held only after necessary co nn itions are su c en y provided through prior consultation between- fraternal parties ..." (The text was reprinted in -full in all Peking papers on the 12th.) November 11 - The British press reports that "a campaign to overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party of Great Britain began over the weekend." 2,000 cop es o a 5-page manifesto signed by 14 Communists who claim they represent "cadres" throughout Britain were mailed to leading Party workers: it bitterly criticizes Soviet views and supports the Chinese, appeals to all Party members to "defeat the revisionists" in the Party leadership and establish a "genuine" C?. It accuses Khrushchev of "outright betrayal" and attacks General Secretary Gollan, and Daily Worker editor Matthews for supporting him. Secretary proem of the new British Com- mittee for Communist Unity is 34-year-old Michael Mccreery. November 12 - The Peking correspondent of the Yugoslav agency Tanyug reports on the meeting of the Chinese R nat-People's congress due to open in Peking 17 November, noting that the pre-congress atmosphere is dominated by the Sino-Soviet dispute. 'The general impression among observers in Peking, based on a whole series of facts and documents made public there, is that the only alternative which might be accepted by the CCP is the full and unconditional capitulation of the other Side," (#17 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 'November 14 - Peeking People's Daily gives the full text of an article from the Malayan Monitor ndon) commemorating the October Revolution anniversary which counterposed Lenin to the old and new revisionists. "Lenin did not say: 'we are surrounded by world imperialism, therefore we must not start an insurrection lest we provoke a world holocaust'. . . Lenin did not say of the revolutionary movements then in being: 'fold it up, you are creating tensions; a single fire may start a worldwide confla- gration." It predicts: "The great Soviet land which saw the establishment of the first socialists to will shine again when the clouds have cleared." November 15 - The Chinese press features a "Joint statement by the - na Youth Federation and the Ceylonese Federation of Commun s an ogress ve You es re ease in PRO g on e 14th. NCNA says that e ocumen , "ratified recently by the two federations;"and signed by the vice president of the All- China federation and by two members of the Ceylon federation1.e Central Committee who "paid a friendly visit to China from 1S to 20 July at the invitation of the All-China Youth Federation," declares agreement by both on "further consolidating and devel- oping the relations of friendship, unity, and cooperation between the two organizations, on the present international situation, and on major questions of the present world movement." November 16 - The November issue of the North Vietnam Party's eoreEical monthly Hoc Tap features a ponderous 5, 0-word editorial entitled "Let Us Resolutely Defend the Revolutionary Principles of The Two Moscow Statements." Making the "attitude toward the Yugoslav revisionist clique" the touchstone of "Lenin- ism or revisionism," the article denounces the persons who "are claiming that the analysis of the Tito clique by the 1960 statement is wrong. They eulogize the Tito clique.. ...Mean- while they seek every means to isolate a number of true Marxist- Leninist parties . . . . To say that dogmatism is the main danger for the present international Communist movement is to contravene completely the spirit of the two Moscow statements." November 16-17 - All Chinese papers on the 16th featured an NCNA report of the 15TE-To the effect that "the Soviet press is vigorously keeping up its anti-China campaign . . . . A total of more than 2 000 articles and other ftems have so far been published for a purpose. Since 27 October, Soviet papers have given great publicity to what they call Khrushchev's appeal to China to discontinue open polemics, but their wanton attacks on China continued as usual after the so-called appeal was made. Incomplete figures show that from 28 October to 10 November the Soviet press published more than 80 editorials, Soviet as well as foreign articles, 'reader's letters,' caricatures and other items, all attacking the Chinese leaders and the Chinese people." On the occasion of the 30th annivers of the establishment of diplomatic relations be weep the USSR and the US, the Chinese press reports on the 17th, that the Soviet papers published "a good number of articles advocating alliance with the U.S. in opposition to na. They also report a arg oorn, a U.S. spy arrested by USSR security organs, was released without trial because of the 'concern' of high U.S. officials." Approved For Release 1999/0024: ClW-bl8C0N1M06$2&6W03-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 November 18 - A Cuban diplomatic mission arrives in Tirana, the Albanian capital, o open a cuba4 Embassy. An Albanla-h-Iffibassador has been in Havana almost two yearsbut the Cubans have hesitated lest such a move undermine Cuba's 'neutrality' in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Observers saw the present move as a "slap at Moscow." November 19 - After a lapse of almost a month, the Chinese pub- lished the fifth in their drawn-out series of joint People's Dail/Red `Tag commentaries a ed to the 14 July (WSU open letter: a 10,000-word article en titled o eren nes on the ques- tion of War and Peace." (see Chrono ogy, September 6, 13t 26j, and October or earlier articles in series). it employs some of the most extreme formulations and insulting derision -: direerteca at Khrushchev by name -- yet to appear in any polemics. The first section, "The Lessons of History," details the "pack of lies on the question of war and peace" spread by "the renegade Kautsky" and his fellow "revisionists of the Second International," in whose footsteps Khrushchev is following. The gist of the second section, headed "The Greatest Fraud," is in its opening sentence: "There is no bigger lie than the designa- tion of the arch-enemy of world peace as a peace-loving angel.... Yet the leaders of the CPSU hold that the chief representatives of U.S. imperialism love peace." Turning to the CPSU open letter's question addressed to them{ "Do they really think that all bourgeois governments lack'all reason in everything they do7" the Chinese reply: "In a class society there is no reason that can transcend class." ey conclude a : the U.S. imperialists have not become beautiful angels in spite of MrushiffievTs tible-reach and psalm-singing; the nave not erne Into-compassionate Buddhas sn ep e o rus ev s prayers and ncence- urn ng. owever hard ru c ev tries to serve the S. imperialists, ..e they continue to slap Nhrushchev in the face and reveal the bankruptcy of s ridiculous theories prettifying imperialism.... In the third section, "The Question of the Possibility of Preventing a New World War," the Chinese cite Mao, Lenin and Stalin (Stalin: "To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism.") to show how wrong Khrushchev is. They go on to Mao's 1938 "famous thesis" that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," which the enders have cited as evidence is a is warlike": "slanders like yours were refuted" by Mao, who 25 years ago noted that "some people ridicule us as advocates of the 'omnipotence of war " and answered "Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of revo- lutionary war; that is good, not bad; s r "What is wrong with Comrade Mao Tse-tung's remark? ... With their guns, the Chinese people have created a socialist political power. All except imperialists and their lackeys can readily understand that this is a fine thing...." The Chinese characterize as "nuclear fetishism and nuclear blackmail" the Approved For Release 1999/08/24 ?CIA(IbT'*-NbMSMOblZ4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Soviet charge that they are hoping for a "head-on clash" between the Soviet Union and the United States: "Our answer is: no, friends. You had better stop your sensation-mongering cal The is !ME - rm y opposed to a -head-on clash" etween the Soviet Union and the United States, and not in words only. In deeds, too, it has worked hard to avert direct armed conflict between them. Examples of this are the Korean war against U.S. aggression, in which we fought side by side with the Korean comrades, and our struggle against the United States in the Taiwan Strait. We ourselves preferred to shoulder the heavy sacrifices necessary and stood in the first line of defense of the socialist cam so that e Soviet non might stay on the second line. ave the ea ers o e CzSU any sense of pro etarian morality when they concoct such lies?" The fourth section, "Fight or Capitulate," continues in the same vein. "Tit-for-tat struggle" is "the correct fighting policy put forward y M e ales communists. 11 "The CPSU leaders assert that a tit-for-tat struggle aga ns era sm wITT lead to International tension. Actually, ru c ev s wrong app roams to `negotiations is itself harmful to negotiations. The more Khrushchev retreats before the imperialists and the more he begs, the more the appetite or e roper alas s will grow. Khrushchev, who poses as the greatest devotee of negotiations in history, is a ways at unrequ ted over and too often a laughing stock.... The fifth section, "The Road in Defense of Peace and the Road Leading to War," is a brief summary of the features of the Chinese line on war and peace, juxtaposed against "the line pursued by the leaders of the CPSU (which) is diametrically opposed to our line, to the common line of all Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people." November 19 (cont.) - The UN General Assembly's Political Com- m ee approved a tin American resolution aimed at barring nuclear weapons from Latin America by a vote of 89 to 0, with 14 abstentions. After delegates of the USSR Bulgaria, Czech- oslovakia Poland an Belorussia 7713 en against the reso u- on, all members of the Communist bloc abstained in e vo ng -- except Albania and Rumania. This was said to be the first time a Rumania has ever acted in opposition to a Soviet position in the UN. November 20 - The NYTimes carries a report by its Moscow corres- pondent Tanner who cimes "informed sources" to the effect that Soviet and Chinese Communist representatives (members of the nese Embassy) have been "conducting consultations here with a view to holding a conference o their two parties on eo Tog - cal Issues.- The meeting may a expected early next year in 4 (#17 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Peking, "unless the consultations fail." Tanner goes' on to say that "some observers here believe that the Russians agreed to another meeting with the Chinese because they wanted to avoid being blamed for bringing about a showdown at a world conference, not because they held any hope for success in the talks." November 20 - Swedish CP daily Dag carries article by promi- nen leader Lan n e aandiugamputonomy in "forming policy and judging tendencies, occurrences and events abroad." He categorically rejects the Moscow Declaration of 1960 and advo- cates that e be reorganized and reconstItuted, possibly in the form of a "socialist peoples party." Urges that CP acknowledge democratic character of Swedish Government, repudiate utilization of. the trade union movement for Party purposes, etc. (Note: report of this article received here was not specific on date; November 20 is assumed) November 21 - The Chinese press reports that, following the return. o "ylon CF-Chairman wickremasinghe from Moscow, the Party's w issued a statement attacking the CCP and the Albanian Workers Party to keep time to the baton of the Soviet CP leaders" and took punitive measures against two of its Politbureau mem- bers. However, these measures "have met with opposition from many of its party organizations and members, as well as mass organizations," People's Daily devotes more than a page to "the full text of a statement issued by 10 members of the Ceylon CP CC on 27 September in refutation of" the CC statement of the 26th. (See Chronology, October 8, for earlier reference to the Ceylon CP resolution.) November 22 - Rumanian Party/State boss Gheoghe Gheorghiu-Dej arrives-"'in Ie gra es' at the head of a state delegation in response to a long-standing invitation to make a state visit. Welcoming the visit, Belgrade Politika anticipates that "luestions of the international workers movement, international relations,, and bilateral relations will dominate the talks " (in addition to the construction of tire on a es y oe ectric power system), and points out that "no disputed problems exist in Rumanian- Yugoslav relations that would make understanding and mutual cooperation impossible." 5 (#17 Chronology) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 CRONOLOGIA -- DISENSIONES CCMLINISTAS No 17 9-22 Noviembre 1963 9 Noviembre: El "Zeri I Popullit", de Albania, lanza otra andancda- en 7.000 palabras, Otros actor de traici del renegado Tito", denando tambi6m "la hostil acci6n escisionista del grupo de N. Krus- chev, que apoya a la camarilla de Tito y sigue sus pasos". 10 Novieniare: "Akabata", 6rgano dominical de PC 'a~ pon6s,publica un articuloen forma de preguntas y respuestas expresando los puntos de vista del partido sobre "la llamada 'querella international' ". Afir- ma que "el PCJ toma una actitud independiente bacia las rencillas en el movimiento comunista international", y "no declara qu6 partido tiene la raz6n, qui6n tiene la raz6n ni a qui6n se debe apoyar pars ventaja del PCJ".. SI contesta, no obstante, a "algunos (que) creen que el PC chino quiere la guerra" declarando que "creemos que semejante opini6n est6 completamente infundada y que "el pueblo japon6s... no podria creer que el PC y el gobienro de la RP china son belicistas", y expre- sa su desaprobaci6n de "los d.irigentes de ciertos partisco istas" que iniciaron "criticas abiertas de aquellos partidos qUe no Partidoade conferencia elpre- estado cjs ne to las ellos" en cisamen PC chino. El articulo concluye sosteniendo que "una conferencia interna- cional debe celebrarse solo despu6s que las conditions necesarias han rids suficientemente creadas por la consu!ta previa entre p ti- dos fraternos..." (El 12 fue reproducido el texto completo en toda la prensa de Pekin). 11 Noviembre: La prensa britgn.ica informa que "este fin de semana co- menz una caipana para derrocar la direcci6n del Partido Comunista de Gran Bretaffa". Por correo fueron despachados a los principales tra- bajadores del partido 2.000 ejemplares de un manifiesto de 5 paginas firmado por 14 comunistas que dicen representar a "cuadros" en toda Gran Bretana. El manifiesto critics acerbamente los puntos de vista y apoya a los chinos, llamando a todos los miembros del partido a "derrotar a los revisionistas" en la dirigencia del partido y esta- blecer un PC "genuino". Acusa a Kruschev de "abierta traici6n" y ataca al secretario general Gollan asi como al director Matthews del "Daily Worker" por apoyarlo. Michael McCreery, de 34 ai'fos, es el se- cretario interino del nuevo Comit6 Brit6nico por la Unidad Comunista. 12 Noviembre: El corresponsal en Pekin de la agencia Zugoslava Tanyug informa sobre la reuni6n del Congreso National del Pueblo Chino a ini- ciarse en Pekin de noviembre, apuntando que la atm6sfera precongresal est6 dominada por la querella chino-sovi6tica. "La impresi6n general entre los observadores en Pekin, a base de toda una serie de documen- tos dados alli a la publicidad, es que la unica alternativa que series tal vez aceptada por el PC chino es la ca itulaci n completes a incom- dicional del lado opuesto". 14 Noviembre: El "Diario del Pueblo" de Pekin publica el texto com- pleto de un articulo del "Malayan Monitor e-Londres en courrnemoraei6n Approved For Release 1999/08/24. CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 del aniversario de la Revoluci6n de octubre contraponiendo a Lenin a los antiguos y los nuevos revisionistas, "Lenin no dijo: 'estamos cercados por el imperialismo mundial, no podemos pues lanzar una in- surrecci6n so pena de provocar un holocausto'.... Lenin no dijo del movimiento revolucionario entonces en ciernes: 'a clausu- rarlo, est6is creando tensiones; un solo incendio puede iniciar una conflagraci6n mondial' ". Predice: "La gran tierra sovi6tica que vio el establecimiento del primer estado socialista brillard otra vez cuando se hayan disipado las nubes". 15 Noviembre: La prensa china destaca una "declaraci6n conjunta de la Federaci n Juvenil de 7oda China y la Federacibn Ceilanesa de Li as Juveniles Comunistas V Progresistas" becha blica el a fa 1 en Pekin. La Agencia Nueva China dice que el doeumento, 'Tratificado reciente- mente por ambers federaciones y suscrito por el vicepresidente de la federaci6n de toda China y por dos miembros del comit6 central de la federacibn ceilanesa que "hicieron una visita amistosa a China del 18 al 20 de julio a invitaci6n de la Federacibn Juvenil de Toda China", declara el acuerdo de ambos sobre la "ulterior consolidaci6n y desen- volvimiento de las relaciones de unidad, amistad y cooperaci6n entre ambas organizations, sobre la actual situaci6n international y sobre cuestiones del actual movimiento mundial". 16 Noviembre: La edici6n de noviembre de "Hoc Tap", mensuario te6ri- co del partido de Vietnam del Norte, destaca un pesado editorial de 5.000 palabras bajo el ep grate de 'Defendamos resueltamente los prin- cipios revolucionarios de las dos Declaraciones de Moscf.". Haciendo de la "actitud hacia la camarilla revisionists yugoslava" la piedra de toque del "leninismo o el revisionisto", el articulo condena a las personas que "estdn pretendiendo que el an6lisis de la cams ills, de Tito en la Declaraci6n de 1960 est6 equivocado. Elogian la cama- rilla de Tito... Entretanto buscan todos los medios de aislar los verdaderos partidos marxistas-leninistas... Decir que el dogmatismo es el principal peligro Para el actual movimiento comunista interna- tional es contravenir completamente el espiritu de las dos Declara- ciones de Moscd". 16 - 17 Noviembre: Toda la prensa china destac6 el 16 un informe de la Agencia Nueva China del 15 en el sentido de que "la prensa sovi6tica est6 vigorosamente sosteniendo su camp ana antichina... Con tal fin un total de m6,s de 2.000 articulos y otras pietas han sido publicados hasta la fecha. Desde el 27 de octubre, los diarios sovi6ticos han dado gran publicidad a lo que denominan el llamamiento de Kruschev a China a suspender las pol6micas abiertas, pero sus ata- ques desenfrenados contra China continuaron como siempre despu6s de hecho el sedicente llarnamiento. Cifras incompletas com'prueban que del 28 de octubre al 10 de noviembre la prensa sovi6tica public6 mAs de 80 editoriales, articulos sovi6ticos asi como extranjeros, 'carters del lector', caricaturas y otras piezas, todas atacando a los diri- gentes chinos y al pueblo chino". En ocasi6n del 30? aniversario del establecimiento de relaciones diplomdticas entrela URS y los EE.UU., informa la prensa china el 17, los diarios sovi6ticos puoli- caron "un buen nt'imero de articulos abogando por la alianza con los EE. UU. en oposici6n a China'. Informan adem s que F.C. Barghoorn, es- Pia norteainericano detenido por los 6rganos de seguridad de la URSS, fue puesto en libertad sin ser procesado debido a la 'inquietud' de altos funcionarios norteamericanos". Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 18 Noviembre: Una misi6n diplomdtica cubana ilega a Tirana, capital de Albania, para inaugurar una embajada cubana. Un embajador alban6s ha estado hace casi dos affos en La Habana, pero los cubanos ban duda- do por temor a que una acci6n semejante socave la 'neutralidad' de Cuba en Is. querella chino-sovi6tica. Los observadores consideraron este paso de ahora como un "bofet6n a MoscCt". 19 Noviembre: Luego de un lapso de casi un mes los chinos publicaron el quinto en su prolongada serie de comentarios conjuntos del "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja con base a la carte abierta del PCUS de 1 de juiio, un art culo de 10.000 palabra ttitulado Dos lineas di- vergentes sobre la cuesti6n de Is. guerra o la az". (Vea la Cronolo- gia en 6, 13 y 2 de septiembre y 21 de octubre, en cua"to a los ar- ticulos anteriores de la aerie). Emplea a1gunas de las formulations m6s extremas y la burla mds insultante -- dirigida a Kruschev por su nombre -- que haya aparecido hasta lafecha en pol6mica alguna. La primera secci6n, "Las lecciones de la bistoria," detalla "el mont6n de mentiras sobre la cuesti6n de la guerra y la paz" difundi- das por "el renegado Kautsliy" y sus co "revisionistas de la Segunda Internacional", cuyospasos sigue Kruschev. La esencia de la segunda secci6n, titulada "El mayor fraude", est6. en su oraci6n primera: "No bay mentira mayor que la designaci6n del archienemigo de la paz mundial como angel amante de la paz... Sin embargo, los dirigentes del PCUS mantienen que los principales representantes del imperialism norteamericano amen Is. paz". En respuesta a la pregunta dirigidales en la carta abierta del PCUS, "Se imaginan que los gobiernos burgueses todos estdn totalmente desprovistos de raz6n en todo cuanto hacen?" contestan los chinos: "En una sociedad de clases no hay raz6n que ue: n l q uye pueda trascender la clase . Conc 1istas norteamericanos no se ban convertido i a Los imper en hermosos neles pese a la lectura de la Biblia y el canto de sa mos por parte de Kruschev, no se ban conver- tido en Budas compasivos pese a las preces y Las ofrendas d.e Iruschev de servir a los imperialistas norteamericanos... 6stos siguen abof eteando a Kruschev y revelando la ban- carrota de las ridiculas teor as de Este embelleciendo el imperialismo... En la tercera secci6n, "La cuesti6n de la posibilidad de preve- nir una nueva guerra mundial", los chinos titan a Mao, Lenin y Sta- lin (Stalin: "Para eliminar la inevitabilidad de la guerra, es pre- 71-so abolir el imperialismo") Para demonstrar c6mo se equivoca Krua? chev. Pasan luego a la "f amosa tesis" de Mao de 1933 de que "el po- der politico crece del caMn de un arms de Fuego", la cual los diri- gentes del PCUS ban citado comp prueba de que China es "bicuala": ba- "calumnias como las de ustedes fueron refutadas por Mao, el ce 25 atos apunt6 que "aigunos nos ridiculizanomropmosadores d0re5 na- de;_la 'omnipotencia de la guerre'" y replic6 quc "Si, Bores de la omnipotencia de Is. guerra revolucionaria; eso es bueno, no malo; es marxista . "4Qu6 tiene de malo la observaci6n de Mao Tse-tung? ??? Con sus armas el pueblo chino ha creado un poder politico socialista. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Todos menos Los imperialistas y sus lacayos pueden fdcilmante com- prender clue eso es la gran coca..." Los chinos denominan "fetichis- mo nuclear y chantaajenuclear" is acusaci6n sovi6tica de que estAn contando con u n directo- entre la Union Soviitica y las Be- tados Unidos: "Nuestra respuesta es: No, amigos. Major dejen su ca- lumnia sensacionalista. El PC chino se opone irmemente a un 'choque directo entre la Union Sovi6tica y los Es- tados Unidos, y no en palabras solamente. En los hechos tambi&n ha hecho ardua labor por evitar el conflicto arma- do directo entre ellos. Ejemplos de esto ban sido la guer- ra coreana contra la agresi6n de EE.W., en la que luchamos bombro a hombro con loo camaradas coreanow, y nuestra lucha contra be EE.UU. en el Estrecho de Taiw6n. Nosotros mi$mo preferimos arrostrar loo fuertes sacrificios necesarios y estuvimos en la primera linea de defensa del campo La euarta secci6n "Pelear o capitular", prosigue en la misma segunda 1 ea. y ienen Los dirigentes del PCUS sentido g o de la. moral proletaria cuando fabrican semejantes mentiras?" cuerda. "La lucha de ojo por ojo" es la "correcta politics de lucha propuesta. por los comunistas chinos". "Los dirigentes del PCUS afirman clue la lucha de ojo por ojo contra el imperialism llevar6 a la tensi6n interna- tional. En realidad, la actitud equivocada de Kru s evch hacia las negociacLones es en of nociva a las negociacio- nee. Cuanto m6s Kruschev ceda ante los imperialistas y cuanto imp ore, tan to mds crecer el apetito de los imperialistas. Kruschev, a pose como el ma or devoto de las negociaciones an la his ria, es siempre amante no correspondido y machas ve ec s objeto de burles..? La quinta secci6n, "El camino en defensa de is paz y el camino que lleva a la guerra", es un breve resumen de los puntos sobresalien- tes de la lines china sobre la guerra y la paz, yuxtapuestos contra "la Linea perseguida por los dirigentes del PCUS (que) es diametral- mente opuesta a nuestra Linea, a la linea comdn de todos los marxis- tas-leninistas y gentes revolucionarias". 19 Noviembre (cont.): El Comit6 Politico de la Asamblea General de la ONU apro a una resoluci6n latinoamericana tendiente a proscribir de Latinoam6rica law armas nucleares, por voto de 89 a cero, con 14 abstenciones. Luego ue los delegados de is URSS, Bulgaria, Checos- lovakia, Polonia e]orussia hubieron intervenidocontra la resolu- ci n, t os los mienbros del bloque se abstuvieron de votar -- salvo Albania y Rumania. Se dijo que ester habla sido la primers vez que Kam- i-'a iab a actuado en oposici6n a una posici6n sovi6tica en is oNU. 20 Noviembre: En "New York Times" publica una informaci6n de Tanner, su corresponsal en Mosed, que cite a "fuentes enteradas" en el senti- do de que representantes comunistas sovi6ticoe y chinos (miembros de Approved For Release 1999/08/24 :-CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 la embajada china) han estado "llevando a cabo aqua consultaciones en vista a celebrar una eonferencia de amboe tidos sobre cuestio- nee ideol ices reuni ptiede espererse a principios del pr - ximo afto en Pekin, "a menos que fracasen las conaultaciones". Tan- ner continda diciendo que "algunos observadores aqua creen que los erSan evitar rusos aceptaron otra reuni6n con los chinos porque qu que se les culpara de producir un encuentro decisivo en una confe- rencia mundial y no porque tuvieran esperanza alguna de 6xito en las conversations". 20 Noviembre: El diario del PC sueco "Ny Dag" publics un articulo por el prominsnte dirigente Landin exigiendo completa autonomta en "la formnlaci&n de politics y el juicio de tendencies, acontecimien- tos y suceeoe en el extranjero". Categ6ricamente rechaza la Decla- raci6n de Moscd de 1960 y aboga porque se reorganize y se reconsti- tuya el , posiblemente en forma de "partido socialista del pueblo". Pide que el PC reconozca el cardcter democrdtico del gobierno sueco, repudia el empleo del movimiento sindical para fines del partido, etc. (Nota: la informaci6n sobre este articulo no precisaba la fecha del mismo; se presume ser el 20 de noviembre). 21 Boviemtre: La pensa china informs que despuds del regreso de Moscift del presidente Wickremasinghe del PC de Ceildn, el CC del par- tido "expidi6 una declaraci6n atacando el PC chi no y el Partido de los Trabajadores de Albania pare, ester al compels de la batuta de los dirigentes del PC sovi6tico" y tom6 medidas punitivas contra doe de los miembros de su politbur6. No obstante, dichas medidas "han en- carado la oposici6n de gran ndmero de las organizations y mienbros del partido asi comp organizaciones de mesa". El "Diario del Pueblo" dedica mds de una plena al "texto integro de una declaraci6n hecha pdblica por 10 mienbros del CC del PC ceilands el 27 de septiembre refutaado" la declaraci6n del CC del 26. (Vea Cronologia, 8 octubre, con referencia a la resoluci6n del PC ceilands). 22 Noviembre: El jefe del partido y el estad.o _, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, liege a Bel ado encabezando una delegaci6n de estado en respuesta a una invittci hace tiempo en ese sentido. En bien- venida a la visita, el diario "Politika" de Beigrado predice que "cuestiones del movimiento obrero ternacional, relaciones inter- nacionales y relaciones bilater es dominar las conversaciones" (ademds de la construcci6n del sistema hidroel ctrico de Puertas de Hierro) y apunta que "no existen problemas en dispute en las relaci- ones rumano-yugoslavas que imposibilitaran la conprensi6n y la coo- peraci6n mutua." Approved For Release 1999/08/,24 :-CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 CHRONOLOGIE --- DISSENSIONS COMMUNISTES Numero 17 9 - 22 novembre 1963 9 novembre: Le Zeri i Popullit al'uanais publie une nouvelle tirade de 7000 mots "Actes de trahison aaditionnels par le renegat Tito" denoncant ?galement "1'activit6 hostile du groupe de Kbrouchtchev, qui soutient la bande de Tito et la suit sur sea traces". 10 novedxe: L'hebdomadaire du dimancbe du P.C. japonais Akaata publie un article anonyme sous forme de questions et de reponses qui donne 11opinion du parti sur "1a soi-disant dispute internatio- nale". Il affirme que le "P.C. japonais prend une attitude ind6pen- dante h 1'egard des disputes dans le mouvement comnuniste intern- tional", et "ne declare pas quel parti a raison, qui a raison, ou qui devra,it etre soutenu h 1'avantage du P.C. japonais". Toutefois, it repond bien h "certaines gene qui pretendent que le P.C. chinois desire la guerre". En declarant "Nous croyons qu'une opinion de ce genre est totalement sans fondement", et que "le peuple japonais... ne peut croire que le gouvernement de la Republique populaire de la Chine et le parti communiste soient belliqueux", et ii exprime sa desapprobation "aux leaders de certains partis communistes" qui se sont livres "b. une critique ouverte de ceux des partis qui n16taient pas d'accord avec eu;:" h la conference de Moscou de 1960, et notam- ment avec lea critiques du parti ouvrier albanais et du P.C. chinois. L'article conclut en affirmant "qu'une conference internationale ne devrait etre r&unie qu'aprbs que lea conditions n&cessaires soient suffisarmnent assurees au moyen de consultations prealables entre lea partis fraternels..." (Le texte fut reprcduit en entier dins tous les journaix de Pekin du 12.) 11 novembre: La presse britannique fait savoir "qu'une campagne pour renverser lea leaders du P.C. de Grande-Bretagne a debut? au cours du weekend". Deux mille copies d'un manifeste de 5 pages si- En6 par 14 corcrosunistes qui pretendent representer "lea cadres" en Grande-Bretagne furent adressees aux principaux travailleurs du par- ti. I1 critique violemment lea opinions sovietiques et soutient lea Chinois; lance un appel a tous lea membres du parti pour "vaincre lea revisionnistes" parmi lea leaders du parti, et pour creer un parti connnuniste "veritable". 11 accuse IShrouchtchev "de trahison v4ritable" et attaque le secretaire-general Gollan, et 1'editeur I:~ ttl~e-,'s du DLily ','or'.:er -.-.cur =' c:voir sou:,,.:._u. Lc seer ftc:ire intdri- uc.ire lu nouveau co,.At6 ri c_.._~.inuc our 'unit6 corramuniste est Mi- chel McCreery, aoL~de""3 T Sens': - 12 novembre: Le correspondent p6kinois de 1'Agence yougoslave Tanyug fait rapport au sujet d'une r4union du Congrbs populaire national chinois qui doit s'ouvrit b. Pekin le 17 novembre et sou!_igne que 1'atmosphbre avant le congrbs est dominee par la dispute sino-sovi6- tique. "L'impression generale parmi lea observateurs h Pekin, basee sur toute une serie de faits et de documents rendus publics ici, est que la seule alternative qui puisse etre acceptee par le P.C. chinois serait une capitulation complete et sans conditions du parti oppo 14 noverriare: Le Quotidien du peuple de Pekin donne le contexte com- Approved For Release 1999/08/24 :CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 plet dun article du Malayan Monitor (Londres) cormorant 1'anui- versaire de la R6vol_ution d octobre of opposant Lenin aux nouveaux et aux anciens revisionnistes. "Lenin n'a pas dit: Nous sommes entourds par i'imperialisme mondial, par consequent noes ne devons pas commencer une insurrection pour ne pas provoquer de holocauste mondial... LAnine n'a as dit des mouvements r6volutionnaires qui existaient alors: 'repliez-vows, vous allez cr?er des tensions; un seul incendie risque de dormer lieu b. une conflagration mondiale' . Lenin a predit: "La grande terre sovi6tique qui a vu la creation du premier Etat socialiste brillera de nouveau lors ue les nudges se seront dissippes". 15 novembre: La presse chinoise publie "une declaration commune de la d ration pan-chinoise de la jeunesse et de la F6d4ration ceyla- naise des ligues de eunesse communistes et progres fives tionnee a Mkin le 14. L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle declare Clue document "ratifi6 recemment par deux federations" et sign? par le vice-president de la Fed?ration pan-chinoise et par deux membres du Comite central de la federation ceylanaise qui "ont rendu une visite amicale b, la Chine du 18 au 20 juillet h 1'invitation de la Federatioi pan-chinoise de la jeunesse", declare que les deux organisations sont d'accord "pour continuer b. consolider et 'a developper les relations d.'amitie, d'unite et de cooperation entre ces deux organisations, au sujet de la situation internationale presente et au sujet des ques- tions rincipales interessant h 11heure actuelle le mouvement mondial' 16 novembre: Le numero de novembre de Hoc Tap, publication mensuelle th orique du P.C. du Nord Viet-man , donne ndditorial de 5 000 mots intitule "DLfendons r s~ olument les principes revolutionnaires des deux declarations de Moscou". Faisant "de l'attitude envers la clique revisionniste yougoslave" la pierre angulaire du "leninisme ou revi- sionnisme", Particle condamne les personnes qui "pretendent que l'a- nalyse donne par la declaration de 1960 de la clique de Tito... en- tretemps, ils cherchent 'd isoler par taus les moyens un nombre de partis marxistes--1eninistes veritables... disent que le dogmatisme constitue le danger principal pour le mouvement communiste interna- tional actuel et de se mettre enti2?rement b, l'encontre de l'esprit des deux declarations de Moscou." 16 - 17 novembre: Taus les journaux chinois du 16 donnent un article de 1'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle dat6 du 15 qui d&clare que "la presse sovi?tique attire vigoureusement sa campagne anti-chinoise un nombre total de plus de 2 000 articles et autres publications ont ete publi6s 'd eet effet. Depuis le 27 octobre, les journaux so- vi6tiques ont donn6 une publicite considerable a ce qu'ils appellent l'appel de Khroucbtchev a la Chine pour cesser les pol?miques ouver- tes, mais leurs attaques sans fondement contre la Chine se sont pro- duites comme d'habitude apres que le soi-disant appel ait ete fait. La presse sovidtique publia plus de 80 editoriaux, des articles so- vi6tiques et strangers, des 'lettres de lecteurs', des caricatures, etc., tous attaquant les leaders chinois et le peuple chinois". A l'occasion du 30e anniversaire de 11etablissement des relations di- plomatiques entre 1'Union sovi6tique et les Etats-Unix, la presse chi noise a fait savoir le 17 que les journaux sov16tiques ont publ16 "un bon nombre d'articles preconisant l'alliance avec les Etats-Unix en opposition la Chine . Its font savoir galement que 'F.C. Bari, Approved For Release 1999/08/24-: IA-RDP78-03061 A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 boom, espion am4ricain arrete par lea organismes de securite de l'Union Sovietique, a 6t6 rel the sans jugement en raison du "souci" des hauts fonctionnaires americains". 18 novembre: Une mission diplomatique cubaine eat arrivee h Tirana, capitale de 1'Albanie, pour y ouvrir une ambassade cubaine. Un am- bassadeur albanais se trouvait 'a La Havane depuis presque deux ans, mais lea Cubains avaient besit6 pour que cette mesure ne sape pas la neutralit6 cubaine dans la dispute sino-sovietique. Les observateurs considerent que la decision actuelle constitue one "giffle donnee h Moscou". 19 novembre: Aprbs un delai de pros d'un mois, lea Chinois out public le S article de leer serie donnee en commun par le Quotidien du people et lele Deauap rouge, article con-tenant des cowmen ires stir la lettre ouverte du P. C. de 1'Union Sovi tique date du 1 juillet. L article de 10 000 mots est intitul : Deux lignes di.fferentes sur la question de guerre at de paix". (Voir Chronologies, 6, 13 et 26 septembre et 21 octobre, sur lea articles precedents de cette serie). Le language le plus extreme y eat employe ainsi que des plaisanteries insultantes, dirigdes contre Ktirouchtchev personnellement et bL un degre encore ja- mais atteint au cours dune polimique. La premiere section, "Les lecons de l'histoire , donne en detail "les de mensonges sur la question de guerre et de paix" re- pandus par "le renegat Kautsky" et par sea camaradea "revisionnistes de la 2e Internationale" dont Khrouchtchev embotte le pas. L'essen- tiel de cette deuxibme partie, intitulee "La grande fraude", eat con- tenu dans sa phrase d'introduction: "I1 n'y a pas de mensonge plus grand que de qualifier d'ange pacifique cet archiennemi de la paix mondiale... Cependant, lea leaders du P.C.U.S. pretendent que lea principaux representants de l'imperialisme americainn soot pacifiques". Reprenant alors la question de la lettre ouverte du P.C.U.S. qui leur fut adressee: "Pensent-ils reellement que tons lea gouverne- ments bourgeois manquent de raison dans tout ce qu'ils font?" Les Chinois repondent: "Dana une societe de classe it n' a pas de rai- son qui 1.'emporte sur, la class -.Its concluent que: . lea imperialistes americains ne sont pas devenus des anges magnifiques en d6 it de la lecture de la bible at des chants de psaumes auxquels se livre Khrouchtchev, ils ne sent pas devenus des boudhas pleins de compassion en d pit des pribres que dit Khrouchtcbev et de liencens u'' i1brile . Khrouchtchev aura beau s' vertuer a. servir lea imperialistes americains... ceux-ci continueront L lui donner des giffles et a faire connattre 1'echec de sea th ories ridicules qui embellissent 1'imperialisme... Dana la 3e section, "La question de la possibilite d'empecher one nouvelle guerre mondiale", lea Chinois citent Mao, Lenine et Staline (Staline: "Pour eliminer l'inevitabilite de la guerre, it est-ncessaire d'abolir 1'imperialisme ) dans le out de montrer 'a quel point Khrouchtcbev a tort. Its reviennent 'a la "these fameuse" de Mao de 1938 qui vent "que le "pouvoir politique emerge d'un ton- neau de poudre", que lea leaders du P.C.U.S. ont cit comme preuve que la Chine etait "belliqueuse": "des calomnies come lea v8tres Approved For Release 1999/08124 -CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 ont 6t6 refutees" par Mao qui, ii y a 25 ans, soulignait que "quel- ques Bens nous tournent au ridicule disant que noes prechons 'l'om- nipotence de la guerre' " et ii repondit: "Oui, nous prechons l'om- nipotence de la guerre r6volutionaaire; cela eat o t non pas mau- vais; cela eat marxiste". "Qu'y a-t-il de mauvais dans la re marque du camarade Mao Tse- tung?... Avec leurs armes, lea Chinois ont cr66 une puissance poli- tique socialiste. Taus h 1'exception des imperialistes et de leurs laquais peuvent se rendre compte facilement que cela eat une bonne chose..." Les Chinois qualifient de "fetichisme nucleaire et chan- tage nucl6aire" 1'accusation sovietique selon laquelle ils espbrent quit y aura une collision frontale" entre l'Union Sovietique et lea Etats-Unis: "Notre reponse eat: Non, coma a. Vous feriez mieux d'arreter vos calomnies a sensation. Le P.C. chinois eat fermement oppose des collisions frontales" entre l'Union Sovietique et lea Etats-Unis, et non seulement en paroles. En action egalement, it a travaill? pour 6viter tout conflit arme direct entre ces deux pays. Cawme exemple, it y a la guerre de Coree contre 11agres- sion americaine Bans laquelle nous avons combattu cite a c8te avec lea camarades cordens, ainsi que notre lutte contre lea Etats-Unix dans le detroit de Taiwan. Person- nellement nous avons prefere d'assumer lea lourds sacri- fices qui Ltaient necessaires et nous nous sommes tenues en premiere ligne de defense du camp socialiste afin que 1'Union Sovi tique puisse rester en deuxieme ligne. Les leaders du P.C. de 1'Union Sovi tique ont-ils aucun sens de moralite proletarienne lorsqu'ils fabriquent des men- songes pareils`?" La 4e section, "Combattre ou capituler", continue sur le meme ton. "Lutte coup pour coup" eat "la politique de combat correcte preconns a par lea comrnunistes chinois". "Les leaders du P.C.U.S. affirment qu'une lutte coup pour coup contre l' imp rialisme conduirait a une ten- sion internationale. En r alit , la position erron e de Khrouchtchev a 116gard des negotiations eat elle- meme nuisible pour lea negotiations. Plus X rouchtchev battra en retraite devant lea imperialistes et plus it mendiera, plus 1 ap tit des imp rialistes augmentera. Khrouchtchev, ui se pose en tant que 1'homme le plus d you aux n gociations de 11histoire, reste toujaurs ~~ ? un amant inassouvi et trop souvent un objet de rise.. La 5e section, "La route pour la defense de la paix et la route menant a la guerre", est un resume succinct des caraeteres principaux ~^ de la ligne chinoise sur la guerre et sur la paix, compares a "la ligne poursuivie par les leaders du P.C.U.S. qui diam6tralement op- posee a notre ligne, h la ligne commune de tous lea marxistes-1eni- nistes et des Sens revolutionnaires". 19 novembre (suite): Le Comit4 politique de 1'Assemolee gen6rale des Nations unies a approuve une resolution de l'Amerique Latine Approved For Release 1999/08/241 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 tendant a interdire les acmes nucleaires en Ammrique Latine par un vote de 89 a 0, avec 14 abstentions. A ras ue les deldgues de ltUnion Sovi6ti ue de is Bul arse de la Tch coslava uie de la Pologne et de la Belo-Russie eussent parl contre la resolution, tous lea membres du bloc communiste s abstinrent de voter a 1'excep- tion de 1'Albanie et de la Roumanie. Il a et6 dit que c'etait pour la premiere fois que la Roumanie ait agi en opposition a 1'Union Sovidtique aux Nations unies. 20 novembre: Le Nev York Times donne un article de son correspondant a Moscou Fanner qui cite des sources informees" selon lesquelles les representants communistes soviets ues et chinois (membres de l'ambas- sade chinoise auraient eu des consultations a Moscou dens le but d'organiser une conference de leurs deux artis sur les questions id ologiues . La r union se tiendrait au d but de 1 ann a prochaine a Pekin moins que les consultations n'aboutissent a un echec". Tanner ajoute que "certains observateurs estiment que les Soviets ont accept6 une nouvelle rdunion avec les Chinois parce qu'ils veulent 6viter le bl0me pour avoir provoque une discussion ouverte lore d'une conf6rence mondiale et non pas parce qu'ils aient espoir que ces en- tretiens puissent r6ussir". 20 novembre: Ny Dag, Quotidien du P.C. suedois, publie un article du leader en vue Lasidin demandant une autonomie complete dens "ltelabo- ration de la politique et dens les jugements port6s sur,les tendances, les faits et les 6venements a 11etranger". Il rejette cat6gorique- ment la declaration de Moscou de 1960 et demande que le parti commu- niste soit r organis et reconstitud, sous la forme sans doute "de partis socialistes veritables". Ii insiste pour que le P.C. recon- naisse le caractlre democratique du gouvernement suedois, qu'il repu- die 1'usage des mouvements syndicalistes pour les besoins du parti, etc. (Le rapport concernant cet article recu ici ne sp6cifie pas la date; la date presumee est le 20 novembre). 21 novembre: La presse chinoise fait savoir qu'a is suite du retour de Moscou du president du P.C. du Ceylan Wiekremasinghe, le Comite central du parti "a fait paraitre une declaration attaquant le P.C. chinois et le parts travailliste albanais afin de conserver la Mesu- re sous la direction des leaders du P.C. sovi6tique" et qu'il prit des mesures de represailles contre deux des membres de on politburo. Cependant, ces mesures "se sont heurtees a 1'opposition d'un grand nombre d'organisations et de membres du parti, ainsi qu'a celle des organisations de masse". Le Quotidien du peuple consacre plus dune page "au texte complet de la d claration publi pax 10 membres du C.C. du P.C. du Ceylan le 27 septembre oti ii refute la declaration du C.C. du 26". (Voir Chronologie, 8 octobre, au sujet des references prece- dantes a la resolution du P.C. de Ceylan). 22 novembre: Gheoghe Gheorghiu-Dej, chef du parti et de 1'Etat roar :gains, est arrive a Belgrade a la tete dune del6gation d'Etat r6 pondant a une invitation d ja ancienne de faire une visite d'Etat. Saluant la visite, Politika de Belgrade prevoit que "les uestions du mouvement international ouvrier, des relations internationales, et des relations bilatdrales domineront les pourparlers". En plus de la question de construction du systeme hydroelectrique des Portes de fer", et souliFne que "aucun differend n'existe daps lee relations Approved For Release 1999/0.8 4 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 entre la Roumanie et la Yougoslavie qui serait de nature h rendre impossible la cooperation et la comprehension reciproques entre les deux pays". -- 6 -- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1 -RDP78-030B1 4M-4 715 (not for FL). Covertly Promoting Greater Stability in 25X1 C1 Ob T ee or Governments EACKGROUND: Recent coups d'etat in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have focused world attention upon an important phenomenon in the underdeveloped countries of the world: instability in government has come to be a sort of vicious circle. It is one of the causes of the poverty and ignorance of the masses, and, at the same time, it encourages and facilitates violent action on the part of irresponsible groups, including the frequent seizure of power by the military. We define a stable government as one that can assure Its citizens and inter interested nationals of other governments that its policies will not change suddenly or radically over an extended period of time. Totalitarian governments achieve a maximum degree of domestic stability by the arbitrary application of force. Democratic, representative governments seek to achieve a sufficient degree of stability through popular support and conciliating the oftentimes conflict- ing demands and interests of all sectors of the population. The fact of instability has come to be more and more the number-one pro elf the underdeveloped countries of the world: and the former colonies of Asia and Africa, now inde- pendent nations, have only served to swell the ranks of the chronically unstable governments. The countries of Latin America, having been independent for 150 years, have a long history of instability. In the matter of military coups alone, the casual observer has the impression that Latin American nations prefer to solve the problem of presidential succession violently rather than constitutionally. Indeed, during the 34-year period beginning in 1930 and ending in 1C3, there were 103 changes of heads of state in Latin America by violent or illegal means. In Mexico, the only exception to the general rule during this period, presidents have been elected and inaugurated in an orderly manner and according to the Constitution of 1917, the oldest constitution in force today in Latin Lmerica. If Eomulo Betancourt is able to finish his constitutional term as president of Venezuela, it will be the first time in the history of that country that a legally elected president has been able to do so. Dictatorship, or the seizure of power by military force has not provided the answer to stability, especially in a world increasingly convinced that sovereignty resides in the people. The dictator at first offers advantages in efficiency and promise of stable government. The so-called oligarchy of many countries of Latin America has traditionally had recourse to the dictator to protect itself against the masses. But they a0-7N^ r, : i ^^ (715. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/ P78-03061A000200040003-4 (7lkRhrexl For Release 199 DP78-030510 04 -4 forget the implacable process by which, according to Lord Acton, "?ower tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." In addition, and by a logical dialectic, dictatorship generates an opposition composed of many decent elements, both in and out of the country, which becomes more and more popular, more and more respected. The danger is not only that disruption accompanies the removal of a dictator, but that a respectable opposition may be captured by Communists and converted into a Castro-type force. The succeeding government may bring something far worse than the repressive administration of the military dictator it overthrew. Just as Simon Bolivar saw clearly the need for a balance between libertad y orden, the desire for stability should not be translated into an emphasis on order to the detriment of liberty. Few of the countries in the underdeveloped areas have been free from other chronic types of violence, such as: mass demonstrations against the government; deliberate attempts to provoke the police to use clubs, tear gas, sabers, and even fire- arms; attempts by crganized labor to control the government through work stoppages or general strikes; seizure of private lands by armed peasants; indiscriminate planting of bombs in public places; senseless destruction of the property of both foreign-owned and domestic enterprises; the constant threat of nationalization that hangs over many foreign-owned properties; and the continual plotting by elements of the military for the illegal seizure of the apparatus of government. United States concern over instability in governments in Latin America was underscored by President ,ennedy in the address which he delivered on 1C November 1963 before the Inter-American press Association at its meeting in Miami Beach. Giving voice to some long overdue truths about the Alliance for progress, he said: "Nor can the failure of some to meet the goals of the charter be placed wholly on the shortcomings of the Alliance. No amount of external resources, no stabilization of commodity prices, no new Inter- American institutions, can bring progress to nations which do not have political stability and determined leadership. No series of hemispheric agreements or elaborate machinery can help those who lack internal discipline; who are unwilling to make sacrifices, and renounce privileges. No one who sends his money abroad, who is unwilling to invest in the future of his own country, can blame others for the deluge which threatens to overcome him." The causes of instability should not be sought exclusively in the cover y, hunger, ignorance, or generally depressed condi- tions of the masses. These are as much a result as a cause of instability. poverty leads to dissatisfaction, agitation, dis- order and violence. In turn, chronic instability alienates 2 Approved For Release I 999 : P78-0361~'AbO?e0V3-4 (71ApFOBVeil For Release 19 - DP78-0390AMM0 M3-4 foreign and domestic capital, stifles initiative, makes for corruption in government and inefficiency in industry and agriculture. A vicious circle is set in motion. Nor is a high per capita income such as in Prgentina and Venezuela, any guaranieability. Venezuela has one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America but the indiscipline of erem ggroups threatens the stability of this government perhaps more than anywhere else in the ;Western Hemisphere. en so, in most parts of the world, the submerged masses are easy marks for agitators and demagogues who promise land to the landless, bread to the hungry. Injustice has come to be so much the rule rather than the exception that there is a widespread tendency for groups to prefer direct action to legal appeal. Regardless of the righteousness of their cause, they have no faith in the governing authorities. Thus, if the students of a university can be persuaded that the government is not giving their school enough money, or that the rector is incompetent, or that they should have to pay only half-fare on all public transportation, or that certain professors should be fired, -- then they will go on strike and physically occupy the campus until their demands are satisfied. Sometimes the students are justified and sometimes they are not. rut where stability -- law and order -- suffers is that most issues are never legally decided one way or the other. A clever Communist agitator may be able to persuade a community of half-starving peasants to seize the lands and stock of a wealthier, more progressive farmer. The needs of the many are so real and the possessions of the few so obvious that it is difficult in such cases for those in authority to take measures necessary to maintain public order. This situa- tion has brought about an attitude of tolerance toward arbitrary and illegal acts, which, when generalized, signifies the virtual abdication of the rule of law. Where the state permits one group to break the law because it has some semblance of moral right on its side, other groups are encouraged to do the same thing though they may have no moral justification whatever. The apparatus of justice in a given country is normally concerned with whether an act is objectively legal or illegal, not whether it is subjectively moral or immoral. To argue, as many presumably intelligent Latin Americans do, that it is moral, therefore should be legal, for the needy to take what they need by force is to encourage a subjective, ad hoc interpretation of objective, positive law. In such an atm-ospere, more and more people will tend to taste the law into their own hands, which will result in a breakdown in law and order, an end to stability. The advantages of stability among democratic governments thus become self evil t; Countries with stable governments will have fewer problems of public order and hence less danger 3 000 (71E. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 (7lAp h'w 1 For Release 19 !t-RDP78-03961 0 3-4 from the inroads of Communist subversion. They will offer at- tractive investment conditions for foreign and domestic capital. They will generally have an expanding economy and a high growth rate in the national income. The people and their leaders will tend to be friendly because, being more prosperous, they will be less envious of others and less liable to be infected by the virus of nationalism. 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1 -RDP78-0306 Oa3-4 25X1C10b 716 EE,VZ. Poland: Lard-Line Trend BACKGROUND: Party chief Gomulka since his advent to power in 1755 has more or less unswervingly pursued his own peculiar policy line during an era of tortuous change of direction among other Communist states in fast Europe. His goal for Poland is a national Communist welfare state with limited individual liberties and limited free enterprise. Me recognizes that the Poles could be brought to accept such a system only through slow persuasion but he is determined that the system will be ultimately accepted by them. In following this road he has fluctuated between responsiveness to popular pressures for greater freedom, particularly freedom of expression, and insistence by hard-line Communists on stricter regime controls. Gomuiha was swept into his ;resent )osition in 1956 by the impact of an anti-Russian and revisionist (at least potentially anti-Communist), nationalist surge. He was accepted, despite initial Soviet disapproval, by other Polish Party leaders as the only alternative to internal chaos, and the threat of consequent Soviet military intervention. wit of the historic meeting of the Central Committee of the United Polish "Jorkers Party (PZP,) in the autumn of 1956 came relaxation of police rule, an end to forced collectiviza- tion of agriculture, reaffirmation of the right of peasants to own land and a truce with the Roman Catholic church. These reforms earned for Poland the reputation of being the relatively most liberal country in the Soviet Bloc. However, -- as liberalization was gradually curtailed over the follow- ing years -- it has become evident that much of the relaxation was owed to the weaknesses and not to the designs of the Party leadership. Currently the Gomulka regime appears to have accelerated the curtailment of what still remains of the "Cctober gains" and finds itself now moving counter to new trends toward liberalization among other East European states of the Soviet Bloc. While there is no proof that this hardened policy comes from other than party leader Gomulka, it may be attributable in part to diehard dogmatists who Gomulka has reinstated in certain key posts. At the same time, unful- filled promises of more consumer goods have fostered growing bitterness among the people. In a vicious circle of cause and effect, the productivity of labor has declined to a point bordering on sabotage and the country's economic stagnation has been deepening. If Gomulka continues to impose harsher controls, he will place in jeopardy all of the public support and economic gains that have accrued to the regime as a result of the 19'56 reforms. The pattern of tightening is ??11^ ntinued Approved For Release 1 P781-03~~1A00020004 003-4 ro el For Release 19.991 08I~d Xri-RDP78-030%1459@gipg~?4gy@?-4 (71~pponY. ) evident in the realms of public expression and religion as well as in security. Freedom of Expression. The Poles' strongest desires for emancipation are in this field and it is here that the Gomulka regime has most sharply curtailed earlier concessions. The highly popular and revisionist weekly, Po Prostu, was closed only one year after the Polish October, signalling the regime's return to a more rigidly repressive policy. The once flourish- ing discussion clubs of the young intellectuals have been closed. Distributors of offending books or periodicals have been jailed and prize winning plays, critical of the regime, have been banned by censors. Progressive writer and editor Henryk Holland died in police custody in 1962, officially reported as a "suicide, but apparently in reprisal for having had close con- tacts with foreign journalists. The freedom of writers to travel abroad has been severely restricted. Finally, Warsaw's two influential literary weeklies, Nowa Nultura and Przeglad Kulturalny, were closed in 1963 and were replaced by u ura, the stated mission of which was to "serve the cause o many-faceted developments of socialist culture, stressing the achievements and perspectives of the cultural revolution in Poland." Or, as Gomulka put it to the Thirteenth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee in summer of 1963, "We do not and will not allow the propagation of ideas hostile to socialism, ideas that are harmful from the point of view of our educational work." With the closure of these two weeklies, the Party has closed an era of outstanding Polish achievement in the creative fields of literature, art, theater and the cinema. The editorial content of the new Kultura, while less dogmatic than feared, has reflected the emptiness of the socialist "cultural model." Creative talents and the deep desire for freedom of expression are still very much alive but they are silenced in Poland by the growing control of hard-line Party functionaries over the entire field of culture. For broader coverage of this subject, see "Eclipse of the Polish October," from Problems of Communism, ^ept-Oct 1963, included in Press Comment ov1363. Religion. Gomulka saw the church-state agreement of Detober 1956 only as establishing a modus vivendi based on the status quo. Thus, in violation of the agreement concluded between Gomulka and Cardinal Wyszynski just prior to the parliamentary election of January 1957, religious instruction in public schools was subsequently curtailed. During an interview with the Le Monde editor-in-chief in 1931, Gomulka replied to the question of whether religion was to disappear with the older generations under Poland's "own road" course by saying, "Religion is deeply anchored in the greatest part of our population. It would be senseless for us t4 try to force changes and convictions of faith by administrative means. . . . It is difficult (716. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 (7lAlMrvejd For Release 1 - DP78-0306' d604A;QW-4 to say how long religious belief will continue to exist in Poland. Certainly for decades, possibly still longer. . . . The only thing we do not want is for the Church to be used in opposition to us and to socialism . . . .17 GomulLka naturally failed to mention that he used pseudo-Roman Catholic political groups in an effort to weaken the influence of the church. Nor has the regime by any nneans forsaken "admin- istrative means" against the church. In 1963 a pattern of operations has emerged for regime seizure by force of property belonging to Roman Catholic religious orders, with geographic coordination of seizures apparently effected carefully in Vlarsaw. By the end of August 1963 all but one of the minor seminaries, devoted to the training of future clergy at high school level, had been closed by the State and harassment of major seminaries had begun. Nuns have been driven out of work in most of the former church hospitals, which were first made state property, and today nursing nuns operate only in sanatoria for the hope- lessly ill and for retarded children. However, despite the regime's unacknowledged campaign against the church as an institution, individual religious freedom in the narrow sense of the term does continue to exist, both for religious minorities and for the Roman Catholic majority. Agriculture. Agriculture has remained a major problem despite the fa-e-f-that it has been relatively more successful in Poland than in most Communist states. It is notable that polish agriculture, among the most productive in the Soviet Bloc, has always been the least collectivized. Added to this, the 1956 uprising impelled the regime to permit a mass dissolution of collectives and additional incentives were given to farmers in the form of higher delivery prices or lower quotas of forced deliveries. Production increases followed. Extremely adverse weather and crop conditions have recently hurt polish agricul- tural production just as in the rest of Europe. Official pro- nouncements express concern over production levels. These pronouncements bring to mind the consistent reiteration by Gomulka and other regime officials that the polish peasantry '5X1C10b must ultimately be led to agricultural collectivization. 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 2 December 130 717 ",'iE, a. An Italian C"-, "Declaration of Independence" UACXG OUND: The 28 October issue of the PCI daily organ L'Unita carried a 12,000-word statement adopted by a CC plenum ,e day before, entitled "'or a New Advance and or the Unity of the International Communist Movement," which is the strong- est and most effective presentation to date of their "creative development in Marxist thinking" in accordance with the "new situation (which) has grown up to face the Communist movement." It presents persuasive arguments for revisionism, reformism and polycentrism. Ac'hnowledging that "the Communist movement as a whole has been slow to grasp the real meaning of the changes that have come about," the Italian Communist leaders again praise the 20th CPSU Congress, which "constituted a first giant step toward making up for lost time, . . . hailed by Communist `arties throughout the world as the beginning of a grand reformation of the entire movement." Throughout the text they condemn a Chinese for their "dogmatic approach, closed and sectarian" views, and their "attach=, pushed to the point of exasperation and in fact to the limits of endurance, against the CPU and other Communist oar,.ies.' Along with their general rebuttal of the Chinese line, however, the Italians subtly take advantage of the situation to reinforce their demand for independence for their party, for other parties and for the international front organizations, from Soviet (as well as Chinese) om na on or interference. Translating their concept of independence into action, the Italians opposed an apparent Soviet plan to convene an early conference of world parties to force the issue with the Chinese (most observers believe that the C^'1 action was a major factor in stopping this Soviet move), emphasized their own conviction that bilateral relationships should be principal form of contact, de ate and collaboration among parties." and a "considerable benefit can be derived" from such collaboration "among parties working in the same part of the wor c, where all ace certain major issues and problems in the common struggle." They declare: "Insofar as we our- selves are concerned, we shall go on working to get such channels established, to serve the European Common Market Prea, and all of capitalistic :3urope.11 On the specific issues in dispute in the Communist world today (war and peace, revolution and national liberation, transition to and building of socialism), the Italian state- ment sets forth views so "reformist," even "democratic," that they could be said to verge on the platforms of some of the free wor s socia ist par~l`es~~t does not mince words in Approved For Release 19 r-M P78-0PWAVAMQ 03-4 (71*p woo For Release 19 DP78-03081 PuO8 84DO?3-4 calling for "the total liquidation of those illegal restrictions on and violations of the principles of democracy and socialist legality which for too long have tarnished the socialist ideal and hampered economic construction and democratic growth, both in the Soviet Union and in the other socialist countries." eir arguments are on a far more intelligent and persuasive (from a free world view, at least) level than those of the Soviets or the Chinese. The full text of this highly significant statement in English translation was published in No. 523 if the series Translations on International Communist Developments, JT-S: No. 21,771C, dated 7 November 1363. Selected passages are quoted in an unclassified attachment to this guidance. 25X1 C10b 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1 -RDP78-03(% Q040=-4 5X1C10b 710 N JThe 70th Birthday of Mao Tse-tung BACKGROUND: Mao Tse-tung was born on December 26, 1993 in the village of Shao Shan, Hunan Province. His parents were poor peasants who, as Mao grew into boyhood, gradually improved the family status and became rather well-to-do. Mao was given the usual formal education but early in life turned his interest to Marxism and to revolutionary activity. Ie was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party and has devoted his entire life to it. In 1931 he became Chairman of the Soviet Republic of China and in 1934 he led the famed "Long March" from 1:iangsi Province to Yenan (61,000 miles). After V!orld ViarII he led the Communists in their civil war against the government, ending in the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's Euomintang. Mao, long the central figure in the Chinese Communist Party, has dominated it and the government of the Chinese People's Republic since it came to power on October 1, 1949. Law prohibits celebration of leaders' birthdays. Mao's upcoming birthday will probably be the occasion of at least some celebration in spite of the fact that the CCP Central Committee in 1949 passed a resolution prohibiting celebrations of the birthdays of living Party leaders. Regardless of how the Chinese Communists choose to mark the occasion, it provides an excellent opportunity for reviewing and evaluating Mao's contribution to the Chinese people as well as to Marxism-Leninism and the International Communist Movement. Granted that Mao was a great revolutionary leader and a highly skilled general in guerrilla warfare, he is nevertheless vulnerable for the dismal failure of Chinese Communist domestic policies and their disas- trous results on the living standards of the Chinese people. Similarity to Stalin. Mao, like Stalin as soon as he had consolidated his authority, initiated a period of terror the extent of which will never be fully known. Like Stalin's purges, Mao's reached down into the remotest villages effecting the lives of nearly everyone on the Chinese Mainland. Mao may have had his differences with Stalin but he imta?- him quite delib- erately in choosing terror as his weapon for ensuring the permanence of the Communist revolution. Even the tactics chosen were similar: The Communist cadres aroused the villages and set class against class, group against group until thousands of people had been wiped out. The purges stopped as soon as Mao wanted them stopped -- and he wanted them stopped when in their wake they had created an all-pervasive environment of fear. Mao himself has said that 000,000 people were "liquidated"; Po Yi-po later raised the figure to two million, and Kuomintang officials put the figure at nine million. No one will ever know how many died; all that is known is that there was a bloodletting of Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08 - DP78-0306iA000200040003-4 (71 AMm e)d For Release 1 -RDP78-030510&00MM04 -4 monstrous proportions and that the innocent suffered along with the guilty as the Communists relentlessly stamped their imprint on the country and its people. Mao's domestic economic policies. Each of Mao's new policy pronouncements seems to lead to a new cycle of failure and is abandoned just in time to avert total disaster. In the Spring of la53 Mao decided on the wildly unrealistic goal of a 150- percent increase in agricultural production within 12 years. In the Autumn of 1057 he set out a new course of socialist con- struction in China which was to rely on unprecedented organiza- tion and exploitation of human resources -- the formation of ^eople's Communes as part of the Great Leap ~orward. The attempt to:establish communes with their quasi-military discipline envisaged a state of control over the lives of the peasants that even Stalin did not consider possible. It has been said that Mao tries to rule the vast empire of China in the same way that he ruled a small valley in Yenan where meal and clothing tickets largely took the place of money -- i.e. by a single authoritarian dictatorship. A single store in Y'enan catered to the needs of the whole population on the basis of tickets signed by Communist officials. Such a primitive system magnified several thousand times and applied to the whole of China has only compounded the troubles and difficulties that the Chinese people have had to face. Regarding Mao's contribution to Marxism-Leninism and the International ~:ommunis movement., for many years a was applauded for having "adapted Marxism-Leninism to the conditions and situ- ation in China" with the implication that the original tenets of Marxism-Leninism were inadequate and required adjustment or revision before they were applicable to Chinese conditions. But now that Mao has charged Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders with Revisionism, Mao is no longer the adaptor but rather the most ardent and strictly orthodox follower of the purest form of Marxism-Leninism. Fie is, of course, not the first nor the last Communist leader to change his definitions and his position on Marxism-Leninism to suit the needs and demands of the moment. Chinese propagandists try to portray Mao as a great origi- nal thinker and as an accomplished ideological theoretician in the tradition of Marx and Lenin. They have tried, with Mao's help to weave Mao's successes in the tactics of guerrilla warfare into doctrine on "the strategy of waging revolution from self- sustained rural bases." They also base their claim of 1.lao's worth as a Marxist philosopher on his "On Practice" and "On Contradictions," alleged to have been written in 1937 but not published until 1950 and 1952 respectively. Actually, "On Practice" is a paraphrased selection of portions of Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks and Materialism and 23mpirio-Criticism. n Con rac.ic ions is a similar rehash o what others have said about the unity of opposites. Mao's real role as a philosopher has been not as an originator or even as a skillful adaptor, but rather as a vulgarizer and a plagiarist. Approved For Release MANIA DP78- 1Agg9AqqQ 03-4 - &'T RDP78-03081 4 -4 (71Ar eb For Release 198F. The question of "peaceful coexistence" has played a crucial role in the Sino-Soviet rift, for which Mao bears a large part of the responsibility. Years ago in Yenan, in an interview with Robert Payne, in response to Payne's question regarding what the Chinese Communists would do if they were confronted with modern tan';s, Mao answered that "they would tear them to pieces with their bare hands." Mao today is still the victim of his own experience; he thinks in terms of guerrilla warfare and is unable to deal with questions related to the power of modern weapons and thermonuclear destruction. At the time when other Communists are beginning to concede that not even Lenin, let alone Marx, could have foreseen the nature of thermonuclear war, Mao still adheres to outmoded concepts. Mao honors Stalin. Ironically, in view of the fact that China was the arena of-some of Stalin's most monumental blunders, (failure to recognize the importance of the peasantry and will- ingness to use the CC's as a pawn in his own international strategy) Stalin is more honored as a prophet in China than in Russia. ^talin's words, spoken in 1945 when the Soviet Union -- li'-e China today -- still did not have atomic weapons, form the basis for Mao's current concepts of nuclear war. Stalin said: "I do not believe the atom bomb to be so serious a force as certain politicians are inclined to regard it. Atomic bombs are intended for intimidating weak nerves." Another irony is that Mao is Stalin's staunchest defender and imitator today, although Tiao disagreed with Stalin on many occasions and even instituted policies against the specific advice of Stalin, most notably the Chinese Communists' intensive and vigorous pursuit of the civil war against Chiang Kai-shek. The supreme irony is that Mao defends Stalin while -pursuing policies more closely akin to the ideas of Stalin's arch enemy, Leon Trotsky; All of these conflicting and confusing aspects of Mao's loyalties, conceptions, and his policies are consistent with the interpretation that Ilao's primary motivation and inter- est is in retaining his own position of power and authority over 700 million Chinese people and in furthering the age-old national 25X1C10baspirations of the Chinese race. 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 19 DP78-036 9Q2gQ904QQg3-4 713 A ,I ,f. Co:i.Lunist Wducation of Foreign Students BAC'NGROUI ; The Soviet Union and her European satellites continue to expand educational opportunities for students from uneardeveloped countries despite public criticism of strict Com- mun,_st control over foreign students, despite the numbers of dis- satisfied students who have fled Communist schools and revealed the political nature of their training. Riots against repressive treatment have ta>:en place in several of the satellites, most re- cently in Bulgaria during February 1333 when African students loudly voiced their protests against being forbidden to form their o*.wn foreign students' organization and against tory treatment. Bone of the criticisms and revelations has slowed the Com- munist education program which has roughly trebled in size since 1333. Accurate statistics are difficult to obtain. Approximately EE,330 students from Africa alone are believed to be studying in the Communist bloc and a total of approximately 20,030 foreign students in all of the Communist countries. Although this does :ot compare with the nearly 2001000 foreign students from under- developed countries now enrolled in the United States, France, Great Britain and :lest Germany, it represents a tremendous in- vestment in foreign youth elites by communist countries which need funds for capital investment themselves. Expansion of this increasingly expensive program is positive evidence of its im- portance to co=, unism. Some clues to why it is important may be found in the treatment and use of the dents during their years of schooling. privileged Students. Not all foreign students studying in the bloc are ban a in the same fashion. Students recently returning to African countries have reported that there is a privileged group among than. Some receive special allowances; some are able to travel abroad even though they have no pass- ports; some are accorded far better grades than their academic achievements warrant. Fellow students believe this special treatment represents payment for services rendered such as parti- cipation in propaganda broadcasts or interviews for publication; attendance at, Communist front conferences as representatives of their home country; participation in "spontaneous d;e: ons::ra- trons" against Waste-_"n actions; leadership of associations of fellow students, from the homeland; and even informing on fellc:i students. Students Foe turn. The impact of lame numbers of students returning horse after several years of Communist education will not be felt for another few years, but a few returnees have spent several of their impressionable years with their Communist hosts. Ito consistent pattern emerges as to their political at- titudies or the roles they will play in the community but some 1 Approved For Release . l P78-03OM 6 X240003-4 Approved For Release 1 P78-03061 A000200040003-4 co=on features do appear. Mcst of those who return are see'Xing jobs with their own -rovern_. ents who need and welcome trained' personnel. /flnost all current leaders of Nast 2uropean satel- lites were tfai ned in ,he UCSI" in the K-33s and 1940c. See Wolfgang Leonard) "Child of the Revolution".7 Others seek posi- tions in Maass media, youth organizations and labor groups. 2 or example, trade union activity absorbs many of the graduates, particularly from those ;last European schools which require that the student return to his own country after a year any: ?gut his ::noviledge to war':. Some students have found posi- tions with Communist front organizations. Paul Sekasi, a Ugandan who became the Uganda secretary for the Afro-Asian ?eop?es Solidarity Organization, was educated at Earl Marx Uni- versity in L,einzig. Two Congolese (Brazzaville) who studied variously in !:ussia, ?vague and Budapest, were prominent in the overthrow of ?resident Youlou in August 1003. It is no accident that returning students seek positions with mass media. A new anti-?estern Brazzaville weekly, Binanda, is edited by two former students from Moscow; the cc anan of the Tanganyika 25X1C10b Broadcasting Corporation was trained in Prague and Leipzig. 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 FOR, A EMU A.. VAITC" AIM FOR '2171i WI'I" ?a I17231 about a peaceable and .democratic wa*,;, vie are tarsi ng about a -3 'Jr'. a y Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 pLrfiWf -Qj e999/ wor~aiag' c ass and its allies i0004 003-4 nto the seats o political power, and do so w ou recourse To -guer- rilla warfare or to c vii war. Vie are a U n; about some n; alive and v a .... a are -ring about a many-sided struggle, one that hits the class enemy from every angle, one that builds a unified movement -,;:hich, under the leadershir.3 of the working P)6 T will be able to step in, in the shop-and in the social clam, in tha pre-election scramble and in the government office, and a it s y s may. it is through struggles line these that we have workked, rally to its standard the great masses of the people, push through reforms in the economic structure and in the political establis ent designe to improve a liven conditions o he masses an at the-same me strike a ow , , a the pa ern o owners ip (through agrarian reform, nationali- zation, democratic economic planning and the like) and at the , organization of the State. This strategy is the direct opposite of the do-nothing policies the Chinese comrades would attribute to us; it is a strategy that will, as of now, build up a strug- gle for political power, and for the advent of the rule of the working class. ...(The) Chinese view arbitrarily lumps together, and thereby confuses situations in which parliamentary inst-ffut#on s elected ass b i em es and orma r t libt h:- soeryave never e or have a only a -marginal existence my' o ers in which such convent ons an institutions are d f eep y roote in the consciences,--in the struggles-, and in the experience o t f great masses .... Cie emphatically affirm that today, in very many advanced capitalist countries, the attack on the mastery of monopoly capitalism, the drive to win over a majority of the people and to build a new society, can and must develop through the insti- tutions of representative democrat the elective political assemblies and the rights to liberty that are I nkfed with them- as well as along other lines. ,__ The sum total of the changes, both objective and subjective, that have occurred in the ad-- vanced capitalist countries, have led in turn to major changes in the arrangement and in the structures of the State. There has been an enormous growth in the public share of the economy, in direct E-fite intervention in the economy and in production, an:~ in State capitalism. The re ationship between politics and economics has drawn very close indeed. There is a whole body of popular pressure building up behind political demands that will affect the entire sphere of the economy, and an imposing array of new gains that will materially affect both politics and the economy. In western 3urone, a socialist solution that would destroy the basis of the economic and political power of the big capi- talist bourgeoisie must-not only arantee food and jobs. It 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 List so s ~.anci ready to ;uarantee a fast-paced grovith in pyoC a ion, to i-,?Ianent an econoiic tan viit j i.nceaitives for in ividual in'? tip tiv3, to rule society by . aranteeing a broad u _ "ante Ol c^.;?tonoriy an:' o o1i 1c 1 Jee y, a M2 c 3:Os Gi`~3 ter-- _ free Sur su! t OT .-ern1-n7 ant the con in a exchan4C of 3as. p Hoy .aoving, as os right now, in this di ection an vri this prospec ct before us, can vie -"ully respond to the surging demand fro_.l the very hart Of the masses; only so can we vin to us and unite the :.aajori ty of the wor.Lin class and of the people. ':e 'gave suf er3C too much in the east from narrov7 :li:l s that could not understand this need .... It is time vie re- ile~ a bit on the objective causes an,-", tie subjective 1i ai- tationly that. have lea the ior. er s' move-=ent into serious le- feats in the advanced capitalist countries. . . . Ue cannot ova-loo'-7: the power and the death or the so- a1i s an", Catholic ':3oveElents in rl3stern Europe even W ___s the r,or'. ng class. without fa and prey to that ingantl le eztre-m!s u rt .ich Lenin, reflecting on the experience o:. t Ee izi- ~:ac :ate post-war j~eiIod, so harshly criticized.... It is no accident that the Chinese corm nc;es' position re- s hits in a line that is prefoun_i1y .,als - a':en on one issue vital to the F,2tion o-: the vior~,ers I ::1oven ent : the issue of the unity, the nature, and the o:)jectives of the mass organizations on the i 7on G7i:.e level. :e must guar against any t3fl ency to con- sider tine world mass or=an_2a' ions s ;tlerely proJectlons and tools of part policy. The Chinese co ira:ses do to le this v3.evi c1' these organizations; furtherrlore, of recent years they have v or':ef to ua.ze thei7 the tools of the pa'p' ti cuia r political 1-Jr-3 they v:ould im-pose on all Cozraunistu, thus "imperilling our unity. The Italian Co.,~_:lunists stand ready to fi ht for the au- tonc_Uy* of C-11 such organizations. The recognition and respect of the autonomy of the vior1!, mass organiza t, ons, on everyone's part, is an essential condition if these or anizations are to extend their scope and their united capacity for action, and therefore if they are to conduct a successful struujle for the specific Coats _3rcper to each of them, and for the overall o-- jective s Of peace an't'! progress, to vlhicb the crept masses of the people aspire.... III -- TE: ? OBI2P.Tw 01 BUiL IiTG SOCIALISLI The The abolition of capitalism, and the liquidation of the old e,:~lo tang classes, lead to the and of the conflicts pe- culiar to class societies.... And yet, even the new socialist so_- sties shove acute and deep-rooted conflicts.... .'hen, just for example, the USSn decides to begin the dif- fi--ult transition to a hioLer phase of socialism, its decision Approved For Release 1999/08124: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 is derived from an objective necessity, from the very forces that the builciin C of soc9 a 11s i sat in motion, from a ripening of the entire Soviet society, not to mention the demands of competition with capitalism. This drive of the Soviet peoples towards greater veil-being is born of new needs that have slowly ri2ened, of the awareness that the uasses have of these needs, and of a desire for ?rogres that cannot be frustrated. It is ridiculous and impossible to tell the Soviet people to v'ait. We should instead as! the Soviet people to move forward with courage and with vigor, because their new achievements will provide a new drive and new enthusiasm for the whole so- cialist camp, which will ial:e it possible, step by step, to achieve the coupler and fair equilibrium among the varying re- quirements of development for each country, in the interests of the common strug,le and the common cause. Of primary importance, not only for economic progress, but for the continue? advance of the socialist countries and of the entire workers' and Communist movement throughout the vicrld, is the abolition and the total liquidation of those il- legal restrictions on and violations of the princis3les of de- mocracy and socialist legality, which for too long have tarnished the socialist ideal and hampered economic construction and ?a_ 1ocr atic 7rov,th both in t hl Sovief Union and in t e other socialist countries. These grave distortions have seriously impeded the spread of socialist influence throughout the world, and have been, as they are to this day, a potent weapon for our enemies. The advance of our ideals in the countries still sub- ject to capitalist domination will be the surer anti wifter, the more closely progress in economic construction in the socialist countries is followed by the growth of a richly democratic life, evidenced in every facet of society. This is why it is so wrong and so harmful for the Chinese comrades to try to defend the methods associated with the cult of personality.... IV -- UHIT-1 ITT T"M I11a '71TATI0NAL COMMUNIST L'IOVEM NT: THE ISSET S The current debate among the Communist ?ar;;ies is inevitable and' necessary .... a,ny position which, starting from the difficulties, tie ..'ivergent views, and the differentiations existing today, reasoned to the abandonment of the job and the struggle for lc'eoioCica1 and political unity in the Communist movement on the international scale, would perforce be a mista%en one. Therefore, the schismatic anc: sectarian activities pursued by the Chinese comrades today are to be rejected, as a genuien threat to this unity. There is no contradiction between the need for unity in our movement ani the need for autonomy and independence or every party. What does it really mean, in fact, this autonomy Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 fob` l ea Q8/? Ce1~4u~t Pto8:03061AP~,Q 000s4p ct3-4 PYpf he principle of non-interference by any party in the in- ''L~.; of f cair s of Other parties, even in the necessary debate and comparison of opinions. It mean: that every party is re- sponsible only to its own people for its own policy, and for the contribution it rzahes to the general orientation and to the progress of the mover.ent as a whole, and that no ?arty need feel itself responsible for every position of every indi- vidual act of other parties, in whose decisions it has no part, and wh . ~h nay, in addition, be in conflict with the general principles that motivate our movement.... It is on the basis of this concept of unity in diversity and in autonony that we believe the problems of the patterns of contact and - collaboration among Corziunist ?arties, and the issues involving the method and tone of debate within: our move- nent ought to be approached. Our ?arty believes that the principal form of contact, debate and collaboration among parties should consist of closer bilateral relft-:Anships.... Our party has done some intensive wool, c~ recent years on the level of exchange of delegations an bilateral relations ....':'e shall peep trying, i x this way as in others, to establish broader contact with revolutionary arties and movments outside 2urope as we par icu_ar y those in Latin Arica ano ::n racy , whose problems and needs we thins require special study, and which may possibly profit by a ~bnowledge of our experiences. We also believe that considerable benefit can be derived (witness the early experiments made in western Europe, With the Conference of the 1? ')artles in 131: ) from contacts, meetings, and collaboration among arties working in the sage part ca he world, where all of then face certain major issues and problems In the common struggle. In this field, it T11-11 probably be found necessary to establish some formal channels for regular consultations and coordination. Insofar as we ourselves are concerned, we shall go on working to get such channels estab- lished to serve the :~uropean Common L arke area, and a o capitalist Europe. F'Te are fully aware of the special value, at certain tines, of international conferences attended by the entire Communist movement. They enrich and deepen our joint appreciation of the international situation, clarify the major lines of our global strategy, and even help us in our approach to specific problems. The essential condition for their convocation, however, is an examination of the real chances they afford for furthering an analysis of the situation and, working out a common orientation, for reaching clear-cut conclusions, and, for achieving progress towards unity in the movement. Important requirements for such conferences, if they are to be useful and effective, are good timing, adequate preparation, and a clear and realistic idea of the topics to be discussed and of the jectives that can and should ae achieved. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4 Our ::'arty is called upon to express some reservations as to t1_e advisability of calling a notier international con- ference of th Communist and cioryer s' :`artier to discuss the situation currently existing in the Cortiunist zioveY_ent. Such a conference might Cell, if summoned today, find itself faced 'sit.' a choice between two solutions equally prejudicial to the Communist movement : eit :era halghtenin' of the present dif- farances, with a possible schism, or a completely formal and unsatisfactory compromise.... Certainly it t;ou!c1 be a truly starry-eyed innocent who wouli fail to see that, under today's conditions, the debate over current differences and the argument over the proper poli- tical line cannot but be both heated anted wrathy. Eovever, very particular condemnation is cue the insults, the anathemas, the clao Zes of betrayal that the Chinese comrades were the first to hurl at the other Com=aunist 'sarties, and in particular at the O_ C J....A very different thing from legitimate polemics is the agitation, the sch?smatic action, and the intolerable factional activ'ties in CLich the Chinese comrades are engaged; a very M's":ar ent ti:.?ng, and equally eprecable, is the casual way in which tLe Chinese couraces twist and distort the views an the lines of the otLar arties as a standard procedure in tii it re- pertoire of _'.ebate; ...Ls molly, there is crounz s for serious concern in the way the growing heat of the debate has hared State relations between socialist countries. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4