BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 20, 1964
• Content Type: BRIEF

25X1C1Ob
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20 April 1964
Briefly Noted
The Chinese Comraunists, despite their frantic efforts, are
still far from successful in their attempts to integrate peace-
ful Tibet into the Chinese Peoples Republic. China's bloody
suppression of the 135 uprising forced the Dalai Lama and thou-
sands of followers into exile and installed the puppet Panchen
lama in his stead. Evidence recently reaching the outside world
indicates that despite harshly repressive measures against the
Tibetans (the Dalai Lama's brother Norbu wrote an article in
which he estimated that a half million had been executed),
Chicom troubles in the area are increasing. Armed rebellion,
especially in southern Tibet, is increasing and requires the
use of even larger numbers of Chinese troops. The Chicoms ap-
plied their inimitable agricultural practices in Tibet with the
usual results: many crop failures despite widespread use of
Chinese and Tibetan soldiers in agriculture. The resulting
food shortage is aggravated by continuing exports of food to
China. Severe restrictions on religious practice in this for-
raorly theocratic state have added to Tibetan hatred of the
Chinese.
A March 23 Foreign Ministry note to India protesting the
Dalai Lama's commemoration of the anniversary of the Tibetan
rebellion reflects China's failure to subdue and win the Tibetan
Populace over to communism. The Chinese note charges "Indian
interference in Chinese internal affairs by continuing to sup-
port Tibetan rebels wbo take refuge in India." People's Daily
of r,2arch 27 goes further: "The Indian government has not ony
allowed the Tibetan rebels to conduct open anti-Chinese activi-
ties in India as an emigre government but has also been actively
directing them to conduct similar activities in other countries
in the same capacity." Additional confessions of frustration
are found in recent Chinese Communist broadcasts which urge
Tibetan refugees to return to their homeland and promise them
immunity from punishment and from collectivization of private
25X1 C10Broperty.
(Briefly Noted)
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20 April 1964
DATES 25X1C1Ob
5 May Karl Marx born 1818 (dies 14 March 1803).
11 May WFTU - 2nd International Conference on Problems of Women
Workers (WFTU) Bucharest, 11-16 May, 1964.
11 May Soviet Bloc Warsaw Pact concluded, including Albania.
11-14 May 1955.
15 May Third International (Comintern) dissolved. 22 May announce-
ment declares autonomy of CP's outside USSR. 1943.
16 May First of China-USSR "Unequal Treaties" (Aigan) signed.
/Second(Tientsin) on 14 June? 1858.
21 May All-Africa Trade Union Federation Conference (AATUF)
21-24 May 1964, Bamako.
26 May Khrushchev arrives Belgrade, blames errors for 1948 break
on Beria. 1955.
June Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, Preparatory Meeting,
Djakarta, 1964--full conference in late 1964 or early 1965.
5 June Secretary George Marshall proposes the European Recovery
Program ("Marshall Plan") in Harvard speech. (Soviets
prevent Poland and Czechoslovakia from participating). 1947
11 June Marshal Tukhachevsky and 7 other top Red Army Generals
arrested, tried secretly and executed. 1937
15 June USSR occupies Lithuania 15 June 1940, Estonia and Latvia
17 June 1940
17 June German Day of Unity (West Germany) commemorating East Ger-
man riots of workers/youths 16-17 June 1953 quelled by
Soviet troops.
17 June Hungary announces trial, execution of Imre Nagy, 1958.
19 June Tibet: International Commission of Jurists charges Chicoms
with genocide, 1960.
28 June Rumania bows to USSR's ultimatum, cedes Bessarabia,
Bucovina and Hertza District, 1940.
2
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**
If you have articles
**
**
from newspapers or periodicals
**
**
suitable for reprinting in
**
**
PRESS COMMENT
(i.e of more than local interest and valid for
weeks to come),
send HQ an o r i g i n a l clipping --
thermof ax or photostate copies not useable --
marked with
name and date of publication.
If the latter not widely known, add brief
identification, such as "Conservative weekly"
or "dissident Communist monthly."
Give also place of publication, if not obvious
from title.
If article neither in English nor in French,
add translation, if possible -- preferably
typed single-spaced with black ribbon, to
permit direct reproduction.
A i r m a i 1 to known accommodation
address, if no classified information
attached.
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25X1C10b AL9
GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#26 23 March-13 April 1964
Commentary
principal Developments:
1. The Soviet "moratorium on polemics" with the Chinese
was broken on 3 April with the publication in Pravda of the mas-
sive (35,003 word) Suslov report to the closed session of the
February CPSU plenum, accompanied by the brief plenum "decision"
seconding the report and by a Pravda editorial. a evening,
Khrushchev, at a commemoration o Hungary "s national liberation"
holiday in the Budapest opera house, struck out sharply at the
"CCP leaders," referring to their 'open revis on or the main line"
and their splitting as detailed by the materials published in
Pravda and speaking of the "hard struggle to be fought against"
them. An advance text released by the Hungarian news agency in-
cluding 8 additional hard-hitting paragraphs similar to the
Suslov charges was withdrawn in favor of a softer version (which
still served Soviet purposes through its reference to Pravda),
but Hungarian newspapers used various versions in between K.
continued to hit at the Chinese during the remainder of his
Hungarian visit, with doctoring of the reported text on at least
one other occasion. And by the time he gave his radio-TV re-
port to the nation (back in Moscow) he was promising other par-
ties that the CPSU would always treat them all as equals and
never try to impose policy on them. (Chrono, May 31 April 12).
The Suslov diatribe is a detailed indictment of the CCp poli-
cies and actions in contrast to the success-proved genera ne
of the movement"" (Soviet style) and exemplary conduct in
the familiar Soviet manner 'Tough it amp i es on and extends
previous charges and adds some new information -- such as con-
firmation that "the Molotov-Kaganovich-Malenkov anti-Party group"
have been "thrown out of our Party." However, it gives no clear
indication of Soviet plans or intentions, winding up with incon-
clusive passages such as: "Soviet Communists will not be silent
while the Chinese leaders wage an unbridled attack on our great
cause of building Communism, on the Leninist course of our Party,
on the positions of the ICM. We shall have to explain for all
to hear the essence of the anti- arx s neo- o sky a position
of the Chinese leaders. Now, in all its sharpness, there stands
the task of defending M-L from distortion by the Chinese lea ers
Asserting that "the present positions of the CCP leadership
do not reflect the genuine national interests of the Chinese
people," Suslov adds: e will do everythi ng necessary to re-
turn relations between the Soviet 115ion and e C-PH o the path
corresponding to the fundamental n erests" of ou peoples. "We
fully take into account the _da~nger presented by the present po-
sition of the Chinese leaders Facts show that there lies ahead
(Commentary Cont.)
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(Commentary Cont.`7
a serious and ... prolonged struggle ... (for) it is now fully
clear ta CCY leaders Intend to continue stubborn defense
of their erroneous line and intend to develop their splitting
activity even further...."
Regarding a possible world conference, Suslov merely says:
"Our Party supports the calling o another conference of fra-
ternal parties to discuss the basic problems o our times" and
that "a collective effort by all the fraternal parties would be
the appropriate way to determine the ways and means essential
to preserve and consolidate M-L unity....It is quite clear to
the CPSU that the conferelpce must serve this aim."
I
The 1*000-word plenum decision "considers" that the situation
"demands the ideological exposure of the anti-Leninist stand of
the CCP leadership and the decisive repulsion of their split-
ting actions", approves of the po ca and practical activity
of the Presidium and First Secy N.S.X., and entrusts them to
carry on, but it follows this by expressing "its readiness to
continue efforts to normalize relations between the CPSU and
the The Pravda editorial,, written 7 weeks and numerous
Chinese attacks-1-are-7. likewise fails to mention a conference.
(Details in Chrono, Marc - pr , and en um
All Soviet assets were thrown into the campaign in support
of the new counter-offensive. Top CPSU figures were reported
addressing widely-spread meetings of Party elements, and the
press and radio were full of editorials and reports of rallies,
statements and letters (including two signed by groups of Old
Bolsheviks) from all parts of the USSR, -- and a new "heretofore
unpublished Lenin document" supporting Soviet "peaceful coex-
is enc po cy. Numerous "statements of support" from other
party groups throughout the wor were also publicized y oviet
media,
2. In fact, however, a world round-up ten days later in-
dicates more hesitation and disagreement than unity and whole-
hearted support. The East Germans, Bulgarians and Hungarians,
o vious y primed for the occas on, launched their attacks simul-
taneously with the CPSU on the 3rd, -- but the Hungarians,
w.a e a ar joined ihrushchev in public attacks on the Chinese,
have still failed to endorse the call for a conference. Czech
chief Novotny followed with full-support on the 5th,, but the
Poles waited until the 9th (though Pravda had falsely reported
an earlier reaction) and then explicitly shied away from "ex-
communication." Tass finally reported suppor y the Mongolian
?arty organ nen on the 11th, including the call for a confer-
ence,
2
(Commentary Cont.)
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The Yugoslavs on the 5th thoughtfully criticized both parties
and seemed to oppose a conference. The remarkable zuman ans
have still not reported or commented on the offensive, -- and
unconfirmed reports say ha they have regues a ov et ap-
proval of another effort at mediation.
In the free world, the French Cp rushed in with immediate,
strong support, beginning on-the 4th. The Italian C? continued
its comments critical of the Chinese but opposed to a conference
at this tine, and the Norwegian C? joined -them, while e
Swedish C? urged the two to resume their bilateral talks. The
Pinnis , Danish, Austrian, F1est German, Cyprus, Indian, Ceylonese,
Chilean, :: e avian, Sou n African and G, were rep eddy ass -
as in full support, most of them presumably including the con-
ference.
3. None of the Chinese-aligned ruling parties (Chinese,
H. Korean, 17. Vietnamese, Albanian) has yet mentioned the new
Covie campaign, -- nor, as far as wwe know, have any others of
the Afro-Asian groupan , except for the Indian an ey onese,
as mentional. in facts we have seen no polemics at all from the
Chinese camp during this period (except for Chinese commentaries
on the recent IADL and IUS meetings and a report on pro-Chinese
Communists in Chile).
4. Polish chief Goraulka led a delegation to Moscow after
the period en ed (Chrono April 9, and en um, Apr 13),
obviously for the primary purpose of discussing this situation,
but no further information is available at this time. There is
no information as to what kind of a gathering there may be to
celebrate Khrushchevts birthday on April 17.
5. Marshal Malinovsky returned from his 10-day visit to
last germany, apparently Having avoided the problems of the ICM.
(Chrono, April 1-10.)
G. The high-level Japanese CL delegation which had visited
Moscow early March and Peking I a March, departed from
Pyongyang on the 3rd and returned to do some more visiting in
China Chrono, April 3 and continuing).
7. A preparatory meeting for the 2nd Afro Asian (Bandung)
Conference opened in Djakarta on the last day of the period,
with a powerful Chinese delegation in attendance. Indonesian
Foreign Minister Subandrio predicted that the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute may be discussed (Chrono, April 10).
Significance:
The long awaited Soviet counter-offensive has been launched,
-- but after the smoke of the opening barrage cleared away, it
seemed to be far less than the kind of well-planned, coordinated,
determined drive needed roll back the Chinese attack. Although
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Suslov said at the February plenum that the CPSU "supports"
the calling of a conference and Pravda publishes the time-table
proposed by the C? U letter of 7-'arcl to the CCP, there is no
indication in the Pravda editorial or in Z'hrushchev's remarks
that the CPSU is prepared to push ahead with it in the fore-
seeable future, Moreover, whether as cause cr effect, support
for a conference seems to be further declining among other
parties. Tie believe vie detect several increasingly influential
factors: (a) an opportunistic appreciation, particularly by
the larger parties, of the increased independence and leverage
which has accrued to then through the continuing rivalry; (b)
an increasing inability to decide which of the adversaries is
lij.ely to win out in the long run; and (c) a strong feeling that
the Chinese are far too important to be excommunicated; that al-
though they are too rambunctious and difficult to get along with
now they should be treated indulgently like hulking, obstreperous
boys who can ventually be quieted down and civilized (the Togliatti
and Tito view, probably).
Our attention is drawn to those passages of the Suslov report
where he asserts that the positions of the CCP leadership do not
reflect the genuine national interests of the Chinese people (if
ever there ware a case of the not calling the kettle black?)
and goes on to state that "we will do everything necessary" to
return relations between the two states to a situation which
corresponds to the fundamental in eres s of the two peoples.
Me acknowledges awareness of the danger in this, because it is
clear that the CC? leaders will not yield. Should this not be
read as a Soviet declaration of intent to doeverything necessary
to remove the CC? leadership? In fact, the us ov report ough:.-
out -- and the Pravda editorial -- attribute Chinese policies
and actions tompower chauvinism" which "have nothing in com-
raon with the struggle for socialism," emphasizing the national
power struggle more than any previous document.
At any rate, Ithrushchev -- after months of silence in Moscow
-- has finally been forced to reply to Pekcing's insistently in-
creased series of provocations: his reply is strong in words,
but inconclusive and half-hearted as to future courses of action.
Uhether this behavior (highlighted by the several "softenings"
of texts) is due to uhrushchev's weaknesses, to domestic op-
position and difficulties with the other CPs -- or whether this
is a deliberate policy of giving the Chinese so much rope that
they will finally hang themselves -- is still too early to de-
cide. "saving;; seen IQ's complete failure to do away with the
heretic leaders of little Albania, neither the CC? nor we ought
to take vague hints at "decisive action" against the Peking regime
very seriously.
Treatment:
1. The developments of this period give new urgency to the
task we have been stressing over recent months: to undermine
the efforts of the various Party leaderships to gloss over "tie
4
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true nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict and patch up some kind
of a modus vivendi in the name of unity; to promote a world
conference o par ies which would formalize the sp it, provoke
all parties to take sides, and spur fur er splitting within
national parties and international fronts, o~ end:
a. We make new efforts to disseminate the ex-
ceptionally harsh Chinese joint articles of 4
February and 31 Marc or excerpts or extra-
po aT Lions from em , especially to Soviet and
pro-Soviet audiences, but also to all but con-
vinced Chinese supporters. The continued Soviet
references to articles described in the fore-
going and Chronology show how much they hurt,
-- but no Soviet-aligned party or organ has
publishedr or permitted dissemination of them:
in fact, as far as we know, only the Chinese
themselves have published these two, poss y
inn Cca ng that even parties sympathetic to the
Chinese line realize that their extreme for-
mulations might be counter-productive. Our
dissemination operations should, of course, be
attributed to the Chinese or their lackeys.
b. We eN^ploit fully the detailed Suslov charges
of Chinese anti-Soviet activities,-disseminating
them to audiences who will not be reached by
the extensive Soviet-aligned media. 25X1C10b
output to Soviet and Soviet-aligned au ences,
vie add to them, emphasizing the danger in fur-
ther toleration of such tactics and the need
for vigorous counter-action, not just words.
Such output can be in ee-rentially attribu ethic to
"Old Bolshevik" types in various parties im-
patient with the continuing indulgence of the
Chinese attacks.
25X1C10b
5
(Commentary Cont.)
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#25 23 March - 10 April 1964
March 29 - The Beirut CorsL`? :unist weedily Al Akhbar carries full
page ar icle, ' hep y to the Lies of the Chin esse Leaders.
The Soviet Union and the National Liberation Movement," rebut-
ting directly the 4 Feb. Chinese "Splitter" article published
on 27 Feb. in Al Jarida, reportedly ordered and paid for by
the Chinese.
March 29-31 - See Addendum to last Chrono for: Peking announce-
ment of the formation of a pro-Chinese Communist Party of
Australia (Marxist-Leninist); Pravda reports of Canadian and
Dutch CP support for convening a world conference; description
of 31 March joint People's Daily/Red Flag article, "The Pro-
letarian Revolution an us zc ev s mev sionsim," the eight
in the series of Chinese "replies to the 14 July CPSU open
letter."
March 31-5. April - The Budapest EighthCongress of the Inter-
national Association of Democra c Lawyers (ILL) broug t - as
e Chinese press termed it - a fierce s oruggle" between the
Soviet and Chinese forces, "The Soviet de ega on, ae Chi ese
say, "steamrollered rough the meeting a draft general resolu-
tion shielding U.S. imperialism." The Chinese introduced their
own version of a resolution, which 11CHA said was voted for by
delegations from Albania, Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Ceylon,
Togoland, and Dahomey, while 30 voted against, 7 abstained and
11 were absent. The other (Soviet) resolution was adopted with
33 votes for, 9 against, 6 abstaining and 4 absent. (See also
last Chrono for March 29 pre-Congress Chinese press statement.)
March 31-April 12 - Khrushchev's visit to Hungary set off, on
the it da3Fs--TUng-expected iet counter-attack against the
Chinese CP. The initial exchanges concerned only the- solidarity
off the moo. On April 3, the campaign was launched simultaneously
by both parties. In Moscow, Pravda published Suslov's 35,000-
word 14 February report to the Gf plenum, the "decision" of
that plenum, and an editorial describing a Chinese onslaught
which has made this counter-attack necessary. (See Addendum
for analysis of these documents.) The Hungarian daily
Nepszabadsag matched ?ravda by publishing a resolution of the
Iiungar an Wrty's plenum of 20-22 February denouncing Chinese
erroneous policies and disruptive activities, with special at-
tention to the 4Fob.Chinese attack on the C?SU. That evening
(after Khrushchev had awarded Kadar the title of "Hero of the
Soviet Union" and the Order of Lenin), at the opera house com-
memoration of the 4 April "national liberation day," Radar
referred to the Chinese attacks on lungarian (and Soviet)
policy and the Hungarian plenum's resolution rejecting them.
Following Radar, Khrushchev spoke of the need to "find the
most suitable form for fraternal cooperation among the socialist
parties." and of a experience o col ectTV
,ely pondering ways
to perfect a constant flow of exchange of opinions and coordinate
(Chronology Cont.)
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foreign policy among the C AA countries, the countries of the
Warsaw ac
"This is of particular importance under
present conditions when the CCP leaders have
openly come out with their splitting attitude.
This attitude is an open revision of the main
line of the international Communist movement,
a revision of the line which was jointly
evolved by the Marxist-Leninist parties at
their Moscow consultations in 1957 and 1960.
Pravda today published the materials of the
el*'bru`ary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee
concerning the struggle waged for the unity of
the international Communist movement. These
materials make known our party's attitude, pro-
vide a political assessment in principle of the
anti-Leninist line of the CCP leaders, and show
what a serious danger their undermining activity
is in the socialist camp and the international
Communist movement.
We can be assured that in the hard strug-
gle to be fought against the splitters,
Marxist-Leninist parties will forge an even
stronger unity under the lofty banner of Marx-
Engels, and Lenin...."
(Actually, an advance copy of the speech released by the
Hungarian agency MTI included 8 hard-hitting paragraphs in the
vein of the Suslov speech between the two paragraphs quoted
above, but it was withdrawn in favor of the softer version
which still served Soviet purposes through its reference to the
materials in Pravda. However, the Hungarian press published
various versions between the two.)
On an April 5 visit to Miskolc, Hungary's second largest
city, Khrushchev used the strongest language of his visit.
'17hoever loves Stalin can take him if the-y--Tike the shell of
corpses,' he sa , referring to people "who want to re:iy on
the ax and the knife" rather than the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.
He went on to shout that "they have invented charges against
me," and "try to incite the people against me." Citing a par-
au le to demonstrate the need for Communist unity, he added:
"Only a complete idiot could pretend to prove that it is easier
to build Socialism alone.,.." (These quotes come from reports
of Western correspondents: the official Hungarian report omitted
all but the last, which is rendered as: "Only people who have
completely lost all reason....")
The talks ended on the 8th, and the Hungarian statement
stressed "the complete identity of views of the two parties on
all questions discussed." In a long speech to a "Hungarian-
Soviet friendship rally" on the 9th, however, Ehrushchev went.
beyond his previous castigations of the Chinese -- and the
2 (Chronology Cont.)
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Hungarians reported him intact. "In the persons of the Chinese
leaders we face people who will hide behind protestations of
leftwing ultrarevolutionary Phrases and oaths of loyalty to
Marxism-Leninism, while in many questions they are increasinly
.
sinking into the mire of Trotskyism and eat-China a auv.n~g
They -bave extended their ideological erences to relations
between states...-.,,
"....By going left, you can arrive at the right.
Thus the Chinese sectarians, in their struggle
against the Leninist line of the ICI, cover
themselves with ultrarevolutionary slogans
and hurl enraged slanders.... meeting up with
the forces of reactionary imperialsim....
....They are replacing the Marxist-Leninist
principle of uniting the proletariat with a
reactionary and incorrect thesis under which
color, race and continent would be the basis
for unification....
....irresponsibly playing with the fate of mil-
lions of people, (they) are trying to hamper
the struggle of the peoples against the danger
of an thermonuclear war..." The leaders of the
CCp resolutely defend symptoms alien to the
spirit of M-L, such as the Stalin personality
cult....
....they wish to foist on their sister parties
their anti-Leninist, adventurist line; they
want to establish their own hegemony in the ICM.
What can vie say in view o such absurd aspira-
tions? Only that the desperate efforts of the
Chinese...vzill end in shameful failure."
As Khrushchev arrived in Moscow on the 11th, a joint com-
munique on the talks, dated the 9th, was released: it "resolutely
con emns the CC? leaders who are pursuing fractional activity,"
who have drawn away from the Leninist guideline jointly evolved
at the Moscow conference on every fundamental question of T7C1,1
strategy and tactics," and who "on numerous issues have slipped
into an essentially Trotskyite stand."
Reporting on his trip to the Soviet people by TV and radio
on the 12th, Khrushchev repeated his "slipping into Trotskyism"
charge and said that the two parties "believe that it is im-
perative in the obtaining situation to giv' a resolute rebuff
to the anti-Leninist concepts and subversive ac ons of t e
Chinese leaders." He made no mention o a wor meeting and
talked only of bilateral meetings such as that just completed.
He also included a strong statement aimed at dispelling any
uneasiness in the lesser parties over Soviet pressures:
3 (Chronology Cont.)
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"We have banished forever from our relations
all elements of inequality, of imposing the ex-
perience and policy of one country on other
fraternal countries. In the great community of
socialist nations, there should be no great nations
and small, no infallible teachers and submissive
pupils."
April 1 - In an editorial pegged to the Chinese conduct at the
Algiers AAPSO session (Chrono, March 22-26), Mario Alicata,
editor of the Italian C?? daily L'Unita, denounced he inese
in perhaps the sstrongest language ye used by the CPI, accusing
them of "wretched distortion of principles," "concrete action
to split the alliance," inadmissible methods of political strug-
gle," and saying: "we must not allow ourselves to be intimi-
dated by the accusations, pressure and slanders of the leacers
of re CCP." He reiterated the CPI's call for "recognition of
the autonomy of each party," and stated that "only if conditions
are thus prepared can one thin: of a possible convocation of an
international conference...."
April 1-13 - Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky com-
pleted rt1I "official friondship visit" to East Germany without
becoming involved in problems of the ICM -- as far as is known.
April 3 and continuing - Publication of the CPSU plenum materials
ins a av a was accompanied and followed in Soviet media by a
flood o communications demonstrating full support of the C?CU
position (presumably including the call for a world conference)
by Party elements in the USSR and around the world. Organs of
other Soviet-aligned parties have also given general support
but without endorsing -- some even opposing -- the convening
of a world conference. The most significant of this large
volume of statements are:
-- Top CPSU members Brezhnev, Ilyichev, ICosygin, Podgorny,
Shelest, Xirilen:o, Satyukov, were reported addressing meetings
of C?SU organizations in all parts of the USSR.
-- Pravda on April 5 printed a letter of support signed by Old
(19 tury) Bolsheviks Petrov, Alekseyev, Narpinsky, Stasova,
Voyevodin and others. Izvestiya on the 4th carried a letter
signed by less famous veteran Leningrad Bolshevil.s.
-- Ko munist comes out with two editorials on the subject: one
emphasizes -That "the C~-CJ is still ready to search for ways to
overcome existing difficulties and to eliminate differences."
-- 3ast German daily Neues Deutschland gives strong support in
editorials on 3rd and 5th, endorse world conference.
Bulgarian media on 3rd, 4th, and 5th give large portion of
space to full texts Soviet materials and text of 21 March BC?
plenum resolution giving full support, including convening a
world conference "this fall."
4 (Chronology Coat.)
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(Chronfjl1,R,c
-- Czech President iTovotny expresses full support in speech on
5th (ublished Rude- raavo on 3th) preceded by chief ideologist
Koucky on 3rd. A C st a ement on the 11th specifically calls
for a conference "before long."
-- Polish Tryb_~una Luiu on the 9th endorses the Soviet and rejects
the inese Tines but pleads for unity and cautiously shies
away from "all forms of excommunication."
-- Mongolian Party daily t'nen on the 10th strongly supports the
Soviet pos ion, includin a convening of a conference.
-- French C? reiterates its support of CPSU and its call for a
wor meeting in L'Eh nantte articles on 4tth and 5th, France
Nouvelle on 0th, and ::ol taro statement on 9th.
-- Italian C? daily L'Unita comment on 4th and interview with
,ono'- ?n Uth still b dge`on convening world conference.
-- Among the smaller parties, Tass and/or Pravda report support
from Danish C? organ Land og Folk (Ath), Aus -Tian CP organ .
Vo1ks (4th), Finnish c' organ I,ansan utise (5th), Chilean
C? organ E 1 Siglo 5th), Peruvian CP-organ nidad (6th).. West
German I{.: i.n -orn of press conference by ax R5--Imnn in Prague
Eve Ceylon Cl' in form of interview with GenSecy Peter
I~euneaa.n ) , CPIJSA in form of Gus ball statement (9th),
Cyprus A! L in i-n-f-e F iecr with Deputy Secy Genl Andreas Fantis
, South African C? in statement published in The African
Co: m nisi (Gtll)t etc.
No mention of the new Soviet offensive has yet been made
by any Lanese--inclined party or organ. Interestingly, the same
is sue of the uma: a~ sn, although Scinteia announced on the
4th that the CC wou ~vene in a plena on the 15th to hear
reports on the ?arty delegation's to cs w h tie Chinese. Korean
and Soviet parties on "the problem of unity of the international
Communist and woraers movement."
In another interesting development, the Belgrade Politika,
in an article on the 5th described by Tanyug as compre iensive"
and "noted," thoughtfully criticized both parties to the dis-
pute, demanded "democratization" of relations as the only real
menus of conquering Chinese dogmatism, and seemed to oppose
convocation of a world conference. The Norwegian Frihetan
opposed a world conference without adequate prepara ions (6th).
April 3 and continuing - The Japanese C? delegation led by
y aI:auuia a which _a conducted talks with the C?SU in Moscow
February 23-March 12 and with the CC? in Peking March 21-25 and
flown to ?yongyang on the 27th (see Chrono, march 25), departed
from Pyongyang April 3 "after completing its itinerary" (no
further comment). On the 6th, the Peking press gives front-
page prominence to the arrival of the delegation in Pekin, on
the 5th "front northeast China." On the 9th, the CCP/CC gives
5
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a "farewell banquet" attended by Liu Shao-chi, Chou n-lai and
others, and on the 10th they leave "by special plane to visit
South China."
April 7 - Italian Cp daily L?Unita carries a column by its
oYscowcow -7ndont. Boffa pegged to press conference by Soviet
delegate Gafurov after his return from-the Algiers AA:'SO ses-
sion in which he says: "...today in Moscow the idea is wide-
spread that for the Chinese the :lumber one adversary, who must
be beaten at all costs is no langer the United ates but the
Soviet non.... -,; villLIL be advisable to remember this to un er-
s an oscocrts reaction to their attacks .... It is Chinese
nationalism that strikes the Soviets most...."
?eking press features a report from Santiago on a January
meeting of 60 pro-Chinese Chilean Communis to denounce the
PC-Ch leadership for toeing the rev sion s ine of the CPSU
and to appeal to all parties to struggle against revisionism.
April 9 - Moscow announces that a polish party-government do-
elg tion headed by First Secretary Gomulka and premier
Cyrankiowicz "will arrive in the Soviet union soon on a friendly
official visit at the invitation of the CPSU/CC and the Soviet
Government." (They arrived on the 13th for talks scheduled to
last through the 13th,1
Western correspondents report that, according to "cast-
Bloc sources in Budapest," Rumania is trying to mate a now ef-
fort to mediate and has propose o the Russians that they he
Rumanians send a second peace mission to ?eking.
April 10 - The Poking press features the departure of the
Chinese delegation headed by Foreign Minister Chen Yi for
Djakarta to par is pate in the preparatory meeting for the
Second Afro-Asian Conference. also gives prop nonce to a
statement ay a Chinese a egation to the executive meeting of
the International Union of Students (IUS) in Budapest 15-22
February, at which e Soviet delegate sought to impose an
erroneous line on the I W and create a split." a said at the
Soviet delegate, 'wielding the baton had tried to "reduce the
IUS to a tool for the foreign policy of a certain countr-` and
use the oor to 'v lift' the Chinese delegation an spl t the
world students movement." The Chinese delegate had "sternly do-
nounced these splitting activities of the Soviet delegate."
In a televised interview with Via Indonesian press in
Djakarta last night, Foreign Minister Subandrio said that the
fro-Asian prenarator,- Mete n~ i h ~cTid^u5 Yie Gino-Soviet
dispute, that some Afro-Asian nations intend to bng up the
question in the hope of suggesting ways of a settlement of the
controversy. (AF? Singapore)
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A. After-deadline items
publishes
April 11 - Izvestiya/another "hitherto unpublished Lenin docu-
me in w c he reportedly supports "peace u coexistence."
"contains instructions for the Soviet delegation to the first
international diplomatic conference ever attended by Soviet
representatives, at Genoa in 1922. Izvestiya's comment shows
how current Soviet foreign policy continues to be presented as
Leninist policy.
April 13 - Speeches by Xhrushchev and Gomulka at the welcoming
nner n Moscow stresse "unity o the international workers
movement". There has been no precise announcement as to the
purpose of the Poles' visit.
B. Chinese joint People's Daily/Red Fla, article dated 31
HardVIOUT _e Proletarian Revolution an hrus chew s e-
vis oonis -- Comment on -the pen er o27-the Central Committee
of the
A review of this full 18,030 word text reveals that the
NCITA summary which we had in hand two weeks ago was a faithful
distillation, and our brief comments in the Addendum to the
last Chronology present the essence of this generally familiar
re-run of the Chinese line on revolution. Therefore, we will
here add only a few useful quotations. The general line of
attack is indicated by the headings of its tan (un-numbered)
sections:
(1) A Disciple of Bernstein and Kautsky
(2) Violent Revolution Is a Universal Law of Pro-
letarian Revolution
(3) Our Struggle Against Khrushchev's Revisionism
(4) Sophistry Cannot Alter History
(5) Lies Cannot Cover Up Reality
(6) Refutation of the "Parliamentary Road"
(7) Refutation of "Opposition to Left Opportunism"
(8) Two Different Lines, Two Different Results
(9) From Browder and Tito to Khrushchev
(10) Our Hopes
Under (2), the Chinese quote Lenin on "civil war, without
which not a single great revolution in history has yet been
able to get along, and without which not a single serious
Marxist has conceived of the transition from capitalism to
socialism" ("Prophetic Words"), and conclude the section by
adding solemnly: "It is on this most important question that
Khrushchev betrays Marxism-Leninism.''
Under (6), they stress that half of the Communist parties
in capitalist countries are still illegal and cannot possibly
win a parliamentary majority:
(Addendum to Chronology
Cont.)
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"cor ex:a:ple, the Communist ?arty of Spain
lives under white terror and .gas no oppor-
tunity to run in elections. It is pathetic
and tragic that Spanish Communist leaders
lice Ibarruri should follow Khrushchev in
advocating 'peaceful transition' in Spain."
Under (S), they list "the main lessons of the successful
proletarian revolutions in the countries extending from China
to Cuba after World tar II.":
"1 -- Violent revolution is a universal
law of proletarian revolution. To realize
the transition to socialism, the proletariat
must wage armed stru:,;gle, smash the old state
machine, and establish the dictatorship of
the proletariat.
"2 -- The peasants are the most dependable
allies of the proletariat. The proletariat
must closely rely on the peasants, establish
a broad united front based on the worker-
peasant alliance, and insist upon proletarian
leadership in the revolution.
"3 -- U.S. imperialism is the arche seriy
of people's revolution in all countries. The
proletariat must hold high the national banner
of opposition to U.S. imperialism and have the
courage to fight with firm resolve against the
U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in its own
country.
"4 -- TLe revolution of the oppressed na-
tions is an indispensable ally of the pro-
letarian revolution. The workers of all coun-
tries must unite, and they must unite with all
the oppressed nations and all the forces op-
posed to imperialism and its lackeys to form
a broad international united front.
"5 -- To make a revolution, it is es-
sential to have a revolutionary party. The
triumphs of the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat are impossible without a revolution-
ary theory and style of Marxism-Leninism, a
party which is irreconcilable towards revision-
ism and opportunism, and which takes a revolu-
tionary attitude toward the reactionary ruling
classes and their state power."
They ad: "Conversely, all those parties which adopted a
non-revolutionary, opportunist line and accepted Ihrushchev's
line of 'peaceful transition' are doing serious damage to t:.e
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revolutionary-cause and turning themselves into lifeless and
reformist parties, or becoming completely degenerate and serv-
ing as tools of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. There
is no lack of such instances," and they describe the parties
of Iraq, Algeria, Cuba, France and Italy.
In (9), just before demanding r-3pudiation and liquidation of
K'nrushchev's revisionism, they castigate him personally:
"The revisionist Khrushchev is also scared out
of his wits by the hysterical war cries o le
U.S. taper alists, and he thinks that this
"Noah's ark, " the earth, is threatened with
destruction at any moment and has completely
lost confidence in the future of ma:i :d. Pro-
ceeding from national egoism, he fears that
revolutions by the oppressed classes and na-
tions create trouble for him and implicate him.
Therefore, he tries to oppose ever revolution
by all means and, as in he case or he Congo,
does not scruple to take joint action with U.S.
imperialism in stamping out a people's revolu-
tion. No thinT.ks that by doing so he can avoid
risks and at the same time conspire with U.S.
imperialism to divide the world into spheres
of influence, thus ., ng two irc.s With one
stone. =this only goes to show that Kharu-
shchev is the greatest capitulationist in
history. The enforcement o x thrush c ev s
perm c ous policy will inevitably result in in-
$=
estimable damage to the great Soviet Union 1
sd
C. Materials from Pravda, April 3 1034. Note: the
Soviet press has announced that all iiree eats (described be-
low) have been published in a p mplllet entitled The Struggle of
the CPSU for the Cohesion of the Vorld Co sunist I oveiien in
Bng sn, rench, Span sz, German, Italian, In onesian, Japanese
and I-rabic by the Novosti news agency and are available at booyk-
stores connected with the I;Iezhdunarodnaya IIniga (Soviet Inter-
national Book) organization. The full te..t of the Pravda edi-
torial and a 7, 003word summary of the Suslov report, as nL fie
available in English by Tass, were also published in the N.Y.
Ti :ies of 4 April and reprinted in Press Comment dated 6 Ab. ri3.
SUSLOV r" ?OU?T TO EB UARY PI$NUM - This 35, 000-word docu-
,lent is an a-part, detailed indictment of the policies, actions
and motives of the CC? leadership, juxtaposed with a defense of
the C?SU line and conduct. The ground covered is familiar,
but Suslov adds some new information_ chile amplifying and ex-
tending some of the previous charges.
A 2503word introduction distills his case. ;ere is 110y' it
all began, according to Suslov:
3 (Addendum Cont.)
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"...The entire progress of world development
fully reaffirms the correctness of the general
line of the WCM drafted at the conferences of
fraternal parties in 1957 and 1960 and the
vitality of the conclusions and principles of
the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses and the
Leninist Program of the CPSU.... iIowever, our
successes could have been even more significant
but for the serious difficulties which occurred
within the socialist camp and the Communist
movement as a result of the schismatic activity
of the CCP leaders....Beginn ng w e 19
Moscow conference, (the -Chinese leaders.) nav-
ng begun w the revision of certain tactics
and principles of the VJCM, went on step by step
to deepen their differences with the CPSU and
other fraternal parties on the most important
contemporary problems. Finally, running counter
to the general course of the WCiI, they put for-
ward their own special line, in which they re-
vised Fie basic principles of the declaration
and statement from positions of big-paver I
chauvinism and petty bourgeois a venturism....
They have` in fac c1eve ope into d sagreement
on all fundamental questions."
The CPSJ undertook numerous measures to surmount the dis-
agreements and normalize relations, but the CCP leaders,
"blinded by nationalist arrogance,...rejected our initiative
and embarked on the road of open political struggle...: Chinese
propaganda "is coming even closer to joining the ranks of anti-
Soviet and anti-Communist organs of reactionary imperialist
circles," Suslov says, and he points specifically to the 4
r, ebruary article which "is an insult to our entire Party and
the entire Soviet people" with its e iri.ous arse: ions.
1 a_v_inZ roadone heiZ attack from Soviet foreign policy to
dom stic affairs, they "have gone so far that the Chinese press
and radio appeal to Soviet people to fight against the CPSJ/CC
and the Soviet v ....'
"...the real plans of the Chinese leadership
have nothing in common with Pl-L and the in-
erests o.: word socialism .... VadUnder the guise
of revolutionary phrases an slogans, the CCP
leadership is now mounting a furious attack
on the achievements of world socialism, con-
centrating its main fire not on the imperial-
ists but predominantly on the C?sU and other
M-L parties .... xho rnai w.irn...lies in using
all sorts of political splinter groups -- rene-
gades of Communism, anarchists, Trotskyites,
and the li%e -- to split the united front of
Communists, hammer together a bloc of pro-
Chinese factions and groups, and subordinate
C?'s to their own influence....The scheme...
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amounts to an intention to foist their ad-
venturist conceptions and methods onto the
poeples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America,
to set peoples against one another according
to racial distinctions, to tear apart the
union between the na on al liberation and
workers movements....
...The main strategic principle of the
Chinese leadership: to subject, regardless
of the consequences, the Communist and na-
tional liberation movements to their own
great-pourer narrow, egotistica Interests. -
is precisely for is pairpose that p: inci-
pies of proletarian internationalise are being
flagrantly violated....Marxist-Leninist teach-
ing; is being redesigned and distorted....(and)
the worst traditions of petty-bourgeois na-
tionalism and the most shameless demagogy and
slander are employed as weapons."
An outline of the body of Suslov=s report follows:
(1) Two Epproac:es to the Issue of the Role of the World Social-
ist System. s is toe familiar Soviet argu::ien a ion, se
fortE in o 14 July open letter and other statements.
(2) Questions of War, ?eace,and Revolution. In over 6,333 words,
(t 1longest section), Sus ov follows the "Traditional Ithiu-
shchevian line on these important questions, but in stronger
language than any previous official statement. Be says that
"the CCP leaders have come to maintain that war constitutes an
acceptable -- and in essence the sole -- meads of solving the
contradiction between capitalism nn socialism," and that they
"even boast about being prepared ...to agree to the annihilation
of half of mankind," citing some old and some new Chinese te-
men s denonstra ng their ruthless attitude. He adds, "every
timo it has been found possible to normalize a situation and
avert a military conflict, Pelting has not been able to conceal
its irritation and regret." Suslov contrasts Chinese behavior
in attempting "to e;;pand the armed conflict on the Sino-Indian
frontier" where "there had been no armed classes between China
and .India for centuries," with their "showering flattery on the
reactionary ?a1istan regime before the eyes of the en ire
world"" and ""virtually entering into a pact" with that member
of the imperialist S3ATO and CLNTO niliTary alliances. Further
evidence of CCP hypocracy is their "feverish efforts to improve
relations with Britain, France, Japan, West Germany and Italy,"
and they would do the same with tip U.S. "but they cannot see
suitable conditions for it at the moment.''
(3) The CC? Leaders' Policy of Isolating the National Liberation
na
Movement roil i23 international or tin` ass. Also traditio
5 (Addendum Cont . )
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argumentation, but stronger. In developing his charge that
"the CCP leadership is obviously striving to assume control of
the forces of the national liberation struggle in order to turn
them into tools for realization of its own clans for hegemony,"
Suslov expands on the previous accounts of the Chinese an -
white" comments at the Uoshi AAPSO conference, and also on the
"secret intention behind ~e Chinese slogan" --'The East Wind
Will prevail over the West Wind" -- which is "nothing more or
less than an ideological and political expression of the he;emo-
nic strivings of the Chinese leaders."
(4) Soviet-Chinese Relations. This 3,000-word section gives
the Soviet picture of Their great aid to China, drastically re-
duced on CCp initiative, and adds:
'At present, the Chinese propagandists
are positively bursting out of their skins
to prove that there was no Soviet aid to China
and that only the usual trade operations took
place. In an effort to destroy the peoples'
memory of Soviet aid, they are even going so
far as to remove factory trade marks from
Soviet tools and machines and are slandering
the Soviet Union by saying that it supplied
China with obsolete equipment."
They also "attempt to justify the failure in the development
of the CPR national economy resulting from the 'great leap for-
ward' policy" on "the issue of Soviet experts.".... "The Chinese
leaders are striving to fence their people off from the Soviet
pion. '
Q) Attacks by CCn Leaders on the C?SU Program. 3000-word
justification of Program line on evolving from the "dic-
tatorship of the proletariat" to a "people's rule".
(6) The Splitting Activity of the Chinese Leaders in the World-
vita Mmunist Movement. Anguished 4,300-word complaint, in-
c ludino protest against new Chinese "pseudo-theoretical" dia-
lectical law on inevitability of split in 4 Feb. article. "The
whole Chinese propaganda machine -- NCITA, the information
centers, various bulletins and radios -- is now enlisted in the
struggle against U -L parties." He admits that the "ultra-
leftwing revolutionary phraseology with which the Chinese leaders
coat their adventurous concepts might find a certain response
among the hundreds of millions of people unversed or inexper? ?.
enced in politics...."
(7) On the Danger of petty-bourgeois Nationalist Neo-
Trotshyite Deviation, In this , -vrord sections Suslov ex-
emits Soviet arguments even more than on other subjects: The
CC? leaders "have fallen so low that they now borrow many of
their ideas and concepts from the ideological luggage o
ots.:yism, she ""petty bourgeois trea6s d eiea a by ninism
on; agog'' including "the fractional, schismatic methods of
6 (Addendum Cont.)
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struggle," the "theory about the regions of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America being the main zone of world revolution," and
even the "repetition in new conditions of the old Trotskyite
slander about the rebirth of the USSR into a Thermidorian state."
In support, he quotes on.; of e leaders of o s kyism in
Latin America, Posadas," who said last July:
"Co?:rade Chinese, you cannot assert that
all the questions put forward by you as re-
volutionary conclusionsare the exclusive re-
sults of your own theoretical and political
work alone. These are the conclusions of the
Fourth International."
Suslov then turns to nationalism, which
"is gaining the upper hand more and more in
the overall policy of tW nese leadership
and is becoming the mainspring of their ac-
tivity. MIS became apparent even 'in the
period of the great leap forward....This found
its expression in such acts by the Chinese
Govt. as the artificial inflation of national-
istic passions concerning or er questions,,
the behavior of the CCP leaders during the
Caribbean crisis, and the position of the
Chinese Govt. on the nuclear question.
All these and other facts expose the total
split between the words and deeds of the nese
ers, is becoming increasingly clear at
she a tciing phrases and formulas are designed
for export, for imposition on the :. s of
other countries. The C leaders ,aemse ves,
when the su j eat is prac cal steps in the
international arena, prefer to act not at all
from poe4tions of revolutionary s rugg a with
imperialism. 3xtreme bewilderment is caused
by the fact that Chinese propaganda boils down
its struggle with imperialism to a struggle
with the U.S., by-passing its allies -- Ja-
panese, West Germans and French imperialists.
Are they not really looking for partners in
the monopoly circles of these countries in
their struggle with so-called modern revasion-
sm
He concludes: "The nationalistic course of the CCP leaders
has nothing in common with the genuine interest of the fraternal
Choi nese people.," and then turns to the "negative influence on
the activity of theCC?" of "Mao Tse-tung's personality cult."
Suslov says "our party smashed the Molotov- aanovich-
Ma.len icov anti-party group" because they opposed elfin nation of
the personality cu, -- and also because some were responsible
7 (Addendum Cont.)
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for part of the mass repressions. "Is it for the restoration
of such inhuman methods that the Chinese leaders feel concerned?
Is this why they display sympathy for people who have been
thrown out of our Party?"
(3) For the Unity of the V1CPd on the ?rinciplas of Marxism-
Len nism. us ov begins its 2, -word concluding sec on by
relating 1how "viie have done and are doing everything necessary
to overcome the disagreements between and restore cooperation
between the ^C? and th4o CPSU, " but the CCP leaders only launch
increasin.- attac2ts.
"They have concentrated their fire largely on
IIikita Ser ;eyevich, who has headed the remark-
able processes cihich have begun in our Party
and our country since the 20th Congress and
have guaranteed the successful advance of the
Soviet people toward Communism. This is why,
with their undermining aims in view, they would
li'.e to isolate T . .~ . rom the CC and to sat
our CC aga ns e2ar y anc oviet people.
But this Typo sanempty, hopeless
adventure. It is doomed to a complete and
sharseful failure. The Chinese leaders, and
not only they, Liust note and firmly remember,
that our CC headed by that loyal Leninist N.S.:;.
is united and monolithic as never before."
(Ode to K. con inues.
Suslov stresses that it was the Chinese who "announced the
suspension" of the bilateral talks last July. It became clear
that they "regarded our self-discipline, our desire for unity,
as a manifestation of weakness."'and even "started saying that
they V7111 not accept an raprovement of relations with the CPSU
except on the condition of unconditional surrender on our part."
"In their nationalistic self--1 ove, they oaste i.n their 4 Feb.
article) that they wi continue attacks o C?SU in order to
disorganize the activity of the par y created by the great
Lenin."
"For Soviet communists, tine sons and
daughters of the October Revolution, the pio-
neers of the new communist world, to whose lot
such. heavy tests have fallen, it is simply
ridiculous to listen to these threats. Soviet
Coi:ir.iunists will not be silent while the inese
load e~?s wage an unbridled a tac%. on our great
cause of building Communism, on the Leninist
course of our party, on the positions of the
international Communist movement. We shall
have to explain for all to hear the essence
of the anti-Marxist neo- otskiyite position
of the Chinese lea ers. 11ovit in a its sL:arp-
ness, there stands the taswc of defenc3irlr ~ifarxisn-
Leninism from distort-ion by the nese lea ers.
(Addendum Cont.)
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The interests of preserving the purity of
Marxist-Leninist teaching, the interests of
the world communist movement, and, most im-
portantly, the interests of the Chinese people
themselves demand rota us open an cec s ve op-
position to the incorrect views an dangerous
actions of the CCP leadership....
We are sure that m one will ever be able
to undermine the basis of friendship between
the great peoples of the Soviet Union and China,
that the present positions of the leadership
of the CC do not reflect a genu ne national
interests of the nese peop e. e s a o
everything necessary to return relations between
e Soviet Union and the CPR to the path cor-
responding-to-the fundameal interests of the
working class and all w or ing people o our
countries.
Facts show that there lies ahead a serious
and, judging from everything, a prolonged
struggle for strengthening the unity o all
socialist st forces, for friendship and coopera-
tion between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.
It is now fully clear that the CCP leaders in-
tend to continue to be stubbornOT-H of
their erroneous line and intend to develop
even further their fractional activity in the
world communist movement....
Our party supports the calling of another
conference of fraternal parties to discuss
the basic problems of our times and for hold-
ing during this conference the broadest pos-
sible exchange of views in the interests of
overcouing the difficulties in the communist
movement. These difficulties have been caused
by the differences between the CCP leadership
and the international communist movement. There-
fore, a collective effort by all the fraternal
parties wou be the appropriate crag to e er-
mine a ways and means essential to preserve
and consolidate Marxist-Leninist unity in the
communist ranks....
T"2 DECISION Or T} PENH ADOPTED OTd 15 FEBURAPY 1934 - A very
brief (1,003 words) document seconding the Suslov report, Ee-
garding future action, however, it says only:
"The CLSU/CC plenum considers that the
fundamental interests of the world socialist
systeti and tbo Communist moveint, =s voll
as the defense of the purity of Marxism-
Leninism, demand the ideological exposure of
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the anti-Leninist stand of the CCP leadership
and decisive repo lion of their splitting
actions, ?
Fully and unanimously approving the po-
litical and practical activity of the CPSU/CC
Presidium and of First Secy Comrade U.S.K.
directed toward ~t-uildin; a Communist society
in the USSR; insuring the victory of the cause
of peace, democracy, national independence,
and socialism; and strengthening the cohesion
of M-L parties, the CPSU/CC plenum entrusts
the CC Presidium with the task of continuing
to defend firmly the general line of the VICM
and to strive to-strengthen the unity of all
present-day revolutionary orces.t'
There is no mention of any concrete measures for political ac-
tion, but the decision adds:
"In spite of the fact that the Chinese
leaders have gone far in their splitting ac-
tions, the CPSU/CC plenum, putting the interests
of the unity of the i7CM above all else, ex-
presses its readiness to continue efforts to
normalize re ations between the C? 5U an the
PR`VDA EDITORIAL - A brief (1,500 words) distillation of the
Suslov report, with no specific call for a conference. It does,
however, describe the recent exchange of letters, including
the CPSU letter of 7 March which proposed a time-table for
steps leading up to a world conference in autumn 1964. The
entire text can be found in Press Comment April 6.
10 (Addendum)
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imam
25X1C1gkf2? Further Sino-Soviet Clashes in Front Organizations
BACKGROUND: The Eighth Congress of the International Associa-
tion of m cratic Lawyers (IADL) opened in Budapest on 31 March
wi 4GO-500 participants, representing some 60 member organiza-
tions. The participants came from 13 bloc, 13 European, 9 Latin
American, and 7 Asian countries, and from Africa, the US and
Canada. Despite the broad geographic representation at the Congress
and efforts to mute the Sino-Soviet dispute, the polemics between
the Soviet and Chinese delegations dominated the Congress, just as
they did the preliminary work on the Congress agenda in 1963.
The large 30 member Chinese People's Republic (CPR) delegation
came prepared for an anti-Soviet campaign. In a press statement on
29 March the delegation blamed the Soviets in advance "for the
grave consequences which may ensue at the 8th Congress." The state-
ment said further:
"It is to be regretted that certain responsible
members of the IADL have taken an extremely un-
democratic attitude to monopolize everything in
regard to the agenda of the eighth congress, the
reports, and the way the congress is to be con-
ducted for the purpose of pushing through the
erroneous line of the foreign policy of a certain
country."
The Chinese again attacked the legitimacy of the preparatory
work for the Congress in a statement issued after the Council of
the IADL had met on 30 March to give final approval to the agenda
for the Congress:
"The voting conducted by the council on the
agenda is null and void and its result is not
binding on the Chinese delegation, which re-
serves the right to advance its own opinion."
The leader of the Chinese delegation, Mrs. Han Yu-tung, con-
tinued the attack on the practices of the Soviet Union and its
followers in the IADL in a speech during the opening day of the
Congress. She accused "certain persons" of "manipulating and using
the IADL to propagate the general line of so-called peaceful co-
existence." In an obvious appeal for support from the underdevel-
oped nations, Mrs. Han said:
"Those who talk loudly about subordinating
everything to the general line of 'peaceful
coexistence and to universal and complete
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disarmament' have adopted a passive, scornful,
and negative attitude toward the national inde-
pendence movement in Asia, Africa and Latin
America."
Mrs. Han's speech concluded with a presentation of 7 proposals to
the Congress.
When the leader of the Soviet delegation, Lev N. Smirnov,
replied to the Chinese attack (Mrs. Han's speech "has no connection
with international law; it only attacks the policy now supported by
all the world"), Mrs. Han demanded the right to speak in rebuttal
and after some argument was given the microphone but her speech
could not be heard over the catcalls and other noise. Pierre Cot,
President of the IADL, then adjourned the session and said that
the Congress would adhere strictly to the agenda. The next general
session of the Congress was not scheduled until the last day, April
5th, with the intervening days devoted to work in the commissions.
Very little reporting has appeared so far concerning the work
of the comm.ssions or the final resolutions. The Chinese evidently
continued their opposition in the commissions and presented their
own draft resolutions on the closing day. Reportedly, when this
resolution -_ which inter alia represented the partial nuclear test
ban agreement as a fraud against the peoples and called "US
imperialism the most ferocious and most arrogant aggressor in human
history" -- was rejected by the political bureau of the Congress
(31 to 9 with 7 abstentions), the Chinese delegation walked out.
This clearly pointed up the weakness of their minority position.
The Congress voted instead for a resolution drafted by the presidium
which called for "coexistence between countries with different social.
and political systems."
Attempting to paper over these disruptive Chinese actions,
Pierre Cot and the Secretary General of the IADL, Joe Nordmann,
stated on 6 April after the concluding Congress session that "des-
pite the arguments and differences of opinion, the general atmos-
phere of the Congress had improved during the week it was in session
The Congress was very successful." The IADL officers also stated
at this press conference that they considered the CPR still to be a
member of the international association -- which means that if the
Chinese wish to split the IADL formally they must take further
initiatives. It also means, however, that under existing conditions
and in the absence of any official censure by the IADL, the Chinese
and their followers are free to continue their regional recruiting
efforts in the recently organized Afro-Asian Lawyers Organization,
where the Chinese were able to get the Soviets excluded from the
permanent secretariat established in November 1963. That the
Chinese splitting attempts will continue is clearly indicated by the
fact that Mrs. Han stated her concern over Soviet control of inter-
national front organizations very explicitly: "They stop at nothing
to control and use a number of international mass organizations as
an instrument for the pursuance of this erroneous line."
2
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In Algiers, 200 delegates from 71 nations watched the feud
between the Chicoms and their Soviet brethren rage throughout the
Sixth Council Session of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organ-
ization (AAPSO). The verbal battle began even before the mee ing
opened on 22 March and lingered on after the closing session on
27 March. This marks the t h i r d successive AAPSO meeting that
has been disrupted by the Sino-Soviet quarrel. When the public
dispute made its AAPSO debut in February, 1963, at Moshi,the
Chinese stole the show from the apparently unsuspecting Russians.
The following September,a forewarned Soviet delegation firmly
controlled the proceedings at the Nicosia executive committee
meeting. Meanwhile, some Africans and Asians have become exasper-
ated with Sino-Soviet antics in AAPSO and their impatience came to
the fore at Algiers. Supported by such Afro-Asians, the Algerian
Chairman of the Council Mohammed Ba Yazid acted as chief mediator
and saved the March AAPSO Meeting from further ideological mud-
slinging.
The Chinese attacked Soviet foreign policy on the grounds that
it is "appeasing imperialism" and "vacillating," decisively support-
ing only strong and tested revolutionary moveFnents. At various
times during the six day conference, the CPR e egation, led by
Mrs. Kuo Chien, applied these criticisms to USSR relations with the
United States, Israel, Cuba, the Congo, India and Algeria. As a
result, said the Chicoms, the Soviets are "traitors to the prin-
ciples of Leninism"; the gist of the Soviet reply on all counts --
"All the Chinese have said is lies." To bolster their charge the
Soviets cited extensive aid, particularly in Africa, suggozted that,
"If not for Soviet aid, China would have collapsed" and concluded
that the Chinese harassers were the "traitors to Lenin."
The vehemence of Sino-Soviet debate in public and closed
sessions prevented the Council from completing much of e business
at hand.
(1) The Chinese objected to Soviet proposals that an Afro-
Asian Economic Seminar and Afro-Asian conferences for women, youth
and writers be held in Moscow in 1964.
(2) Of seven committees scheduled to be chosen, only the
Organization, General Declarations, and Political Committees were
selected. Significantly, membership on the Political Committee
was evenly balanced between Chicom and Soviet supporters.
(3) Neither the Fund Committee (mechanism for funding revolu-
tions in Africa) in Conakry, the Three Continent Committee (device
for extending AAPSO membership to Latin America), relations with
the Organization for African Unity (OAU), labor conferences, nor
organizational changes were discussed to any useful degree, although
all represent priority AAPSO problems, The failure to do so can be
tied to points of dissension in the Sino-Soviet argument. /Discussion
of these and other controversial issues was to be resumed within
the secrecy of the AAPSO Secretariat in Cairo on 8 April./
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The 37 resolutions (almost identical to those of last year)
issued in the Council's final communique embodied the one over-
riding element of unity in the entire meeting. Every delegation
opposed imperialism, notably in South a nam an anama.
That the Council managed to proclaim the regular battery of prop-
aganda-laden resolutions and also decide on dates and places for
the next two AAPSO confabs can be attributed to Afro-Asian
mediators.
In evidence since the Gaza meeting of 1961, certain Africans
emerged in Algiers as the arbitors and disciples of Afro-Asian
unity:
(1) Mohammed Ba Yazid, the Algerian Chairman of the Council
and elected head o the itical Committee, suspended and closed
sessions when debate grew heated, at one point ejected the press,
and generally objected to the Sino-Soviet exhibition of attrcking
solidarity. He referred discussion of key and controversial ques-
tions to the Secretariat, and was largely responsible for drawing
the delegations together to accomplish the usual amenities and
formalities, including the passage of resolutions. Yazid undoubt-
edly derived his strength from Ben Bella's backing. Yazid's state-
ment that, "Only African and Asian issues are proper subjects" for
AAPSO consideration echoed declared sentiments of the Algerian
head of state.
(2) Yazid's All-African supporting cast included Mahdi Ben
Barka, an exiled oroccan revolutionary (W96-makes his headquarters
in geria) and Chairman of the Organization Committee. The Chair-
man of the important Fund Committee, Guinean Abdoulaye Diallo was
selected to head the General Declarations Commi ee. Egyptian
Secretary General Yusuf Sibai was faced with lesser struggles,
(e.g., India vs. Pa stan over Kashmir, admittance of Malaysia,
etc.) some directly (-e.g., two Ceylonese delegations, four Chicom-
backed delegations from the Camerouns) caused by the more spectac-
ular Sino-Soviet rift.
Although Chicom and Soviet camp followers were present and
discernible, AAPSO's traditional "a pox on both your houses" group
endures. When the Soviets and Chinese agreed, for once, on seating
a new delegation from Zanzibar, the Arabs opposed it because Arabs
had been slaughtered there. At times, the Arabs (particularly the
Egyptians) even talked of throwing both the hrcoms and Soviets
out of AAPS . 25X1 C10b
4
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25X1C1&?3. Recent Revisionist Voices: Looking Beyond Marxism-Leninism
BACKGROUND: Current news headlines describe the conflict
between Moscow and Peking over who shall be the leader of world
Communism. Peking charges that the Soviet leaders are revision-
ists and splitters who have abandoned the goal of revolution.
Moscow accuses the Chicom leaders of factionalism, petty bourgeois
nationalism, adventurism, and racialism. Although each claims to
be the true heir to Marx and Lenin, their differences appear to be
unbridgeable; therefore, both cannot be right in terms of doctrine,
and it does not take a very skeptical mind to suspect that neither
is doctrinally in an entirely sound position. For someone who
believes in economic determinism, it might be natural to infer
that the ideological conflict is based on the fundamental economic
and political problems and aims of China and the Soviet Union, or
in other words, that Khrushchev and Mao are following their con-
flicting personal and national interests. Marx s - n n s s n
other areas may we conclude that they have unique interests as
well, corresponding with neither the interests of Moscow nor the
interests of Peking. This seems to be the conclusion reached,
for example, by the government of Rumania.
Common interests: removal of dogmatic restraints. Governments
and po cans, however, are not the on y ones -to have interests.
Other people play prominent roles in modern society too: writers,
scientists, teachers, and critics, for example. No first-class
representative of any of these groups can be happy with a rigorous
system of state or party control; their activities are best pursued
with imagination, in an atmosphere of free discussion. All of
them, but especially the scientists, are indispensable to a modern
society, and they contribute most to it when they are free. Their
interest inevitably lies in the removal of dogmatic restraints.
The Sino-Soviet conflict and the Soviet denigration of Stalin have
undermined the moral authority of any official doctrine, and the
concept of a single world-wide monolithic movement following the
dictates of the First Secretary of the CPSU has been proven im-
practical. Communist and leftist intellectuals are taking advantage
of the situation to claim new freedoms for themselves and their
fellow citizens, and to advance new theories to modify those of
classic Marxism-Leninism. Particularly interesting for us, and
no doubt particularly alarming for the Stalinists, are the indica-
tions that the revisionists in the various Bloc countries draw
support and encouragement from eac other, and are not Isolate d by
the barbed wire which separates ese countries from each other as
well as from the West.
Marxism: its several aspects. MLny ''?ecterners believe that
Marxism, let alone Leninism, is basically and irremediably in con-
flict with intellectual freedom. Marxism deals in unmeasurable
abstractions, and its supporters refuse to admit that the doctrine
could be proven false, thereby making it a matter of faith and not
of fact or science. Marxism fosters the tyranny of concepts over
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(773 Cont.) 20 Apr
the mind by classifying everything in broad value-loaded categories,
like Procrustean beds, so as to discourage hritical thought and
mobilize the masses for action. Ideally, we would like to see the
Bloc throw off Marxism-Leninism altogether. But this is not a
practical goal at present.
Or practical reason is that anyone arguing for a total rejec-
tion of Marx would be considered, in the Bloc and in some circles
outside it as well, as an agent of Western imperialism, and appro-
priate action would be taken to silence him. But more important,
many intellectuals honestly believe that Marx had a vision of truth.
Some who were brought up inside the system are unable to throw off
all they were taught; Marxism is a crutch to which they are accus-
tomed. Others who became Marxist-Leninists in a capitalist society
still consider Marx's insights into and criticisms of that kind of
society a liberating influence. The revisionists have discovered,
correctly, that Marx himself was inspired by humane impulses, by a
detestation for the real suffering, bourgeois hypocrisy, and personal
unhappiness--due to the isolation or alienation of the individual
from any satisfying, human social life--which e saw in capitalist
society. The humane ideas of Marx, which are obviously as counter
to Stalinist society as they were to the society of 19th century
England, are more likely to win acceptance among Communists and
leftists than any blanket condemnation of Marxism.
For many--those who are not expert theoreticians--the fine point
of Marxist thought, whether Stalinist or that of the Young Marx, are
a somewhat academe matter. They are more concerned to affirm cer-
tain intellectual or a cal ideas which are really independent of
Marxism, and which are important in themselves; they try to relate
these to Marxism, but often somewhat as an afterthought, apologeti-
cally. Such ideas include demands for: free investigation, open
discussion, the review of Stalinism, free access to Western litera-
ture, a turn away from the parrotting of Marxist-Leninist texts, and
even an appreciation of the spiritual element. These proposals con-
stitute a rejection of Stalinism, and to say the least, a radical
change in the direction of Marxism-Leninism, yet the-proposals are
advanced as obvious and self-evident. Only the party and state
officials with a vested interest in a Stalinist system, try to stifle
such statements; the officials often succeed where they still control
the instruments of repression, but they are weak in terms of argu-
ments.
The new currents might almost be described as "liberalism"
rather than as "revisionism," since their authors are rea y con-
cerne with ideas outside, if not hostile to Marxism, and not with
changing the content of Marxism. Yet most of those who state these
views would hotly deny that they are outside the Marxist-Leninist
framework. The following are characteristic revisionist figures;
quotations from their writings or speeches are contained in an
attachment:
1. Robert Havemann. Havemann is an East German
c em s , and a veteran Communist who escaped
a Nazi death sentence because his scientific
2
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(773 Cont.) 4M V.4 ^ I&S66WIbs 20 April 1964
talents were needed in war research; in the
post-war years he got into trouble with West
Berlin authorities (including the US mili-
tary) because he attempted to conduct Commu-
nist organizational activities. In recent
years he taught at the Humboldt University in
East Berlin, and kept up a wide correspondence
within the Bloc and with Western scientists
like Linus Pauling. Since Havemann believed
that secrecy and conspiracy were wrong, and
also since he expected to be able to defend
himself with references to Soviet conditions
and Soviet friends (such as the chemist and
dialectician B.M. Kedrov), he delivered some
remarkable lectures on the relation of dialec-
tical materialism to natural science, particu-
larly in the last months of 1963. The Stalinist
SED leadership was alarmed and suspected that
Havemann was conspiring with liberal intellec-
tual Czechs and with dissident elements in the
GDR, and when Havemann granted an interview to
a West German journalist, this was used as a
pretext for dismissing him from his professor-
ship. Havemann has particularly sought the
elimination of bureaucratic and arbitrary
control, and has argued for open and free
discussion.
2. Georgy Lukacs. Now eighty years old, Luk1cs
was involved in controversy in the late '40s,
and in the middle '50s he advocated "unfalsi-
fied Marxism" to Hungarian students. A
Stalinist has accused him of hailing the
Hungarian revolt of 1956 as a "democracy
under which the traditions of the Hungarian
revolt could unfold," and after the revolt was
crushed he was deported to the USSR. Perhaps
because of his age, Luka.cs was later permitted
to return to Budapest, where he has been quietly
working on a book on aesthetics. On 18 January
1964 the Czech literary journal Literarni Noviny
(Literary News) published an interview with
Lukacs, quoting him as urging a complete
elimination of "Stalin's disfigured Marxism"
and advocating that young people he permitted
to see for themselves what the West produces.
Such stories as this explain why Rude Pravo
(the Czech equivalent of Pravda) has now (early
April) published a strong en ral Committee
attack on major Czech and Slovak literary pub-
lications, including Literarni Noviny. (The
Polish regime is using the subtler and perhaps
more effective tactic of restricting the paper
supply.)
3
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(773 Cont.) 20 April 1964
3. Leopold Sedar Senghbr. Senghor, the President of
Senegal, is a different sort of figure from the
dissident bloc intellectuals, in that he is an
African political leader and a Catholic. But he
is also a man of real intellectual stature, a
poet educated at the University of Paris, and a
student of Marxist theory. Senghor is interested
in the humanist strain of Marx, but believes that
the French Jesuit philosopher, Pierre Teilhard de
Chardin, has largely superseded Marx with a
broader, more profound analysis, regarding spirit
rather than matter as the basic reality.
Senghor also advocates the integration of Negro-
African cultural values into socialism, creating
an African socialism.
4.
Predrag Vranicki. Vranicki is a professor
at
Zagreb
University (Yugoslavia) who in 1961
pub-
lished
a controversial History of Marxism.
The
History
stated that Soviet theorists were
wrong
25X1C10b
n e r attacks on both revisionism and dogma-
tism because their clumsy ideological machinery
was itself burdened with both faults. At a
conference with young people in Novi Sad on
4 March 1964, Vranicki made some highly original
remarks: he suggested that Soviet and Chinese
theoreticians were searching the works of Marx
and Lenin for quotations when they should be
thinking for themselves; he remarked that since
Marx's most important idea was that of the
liberation of man, socialists "should extol the
personality cult, but a cult of all personalities,"
rather than merely of one personality; and he
said that it was an illusion to suppose that an
omnipotent state monopolism might be the chief
force in the fight against dogmatism. The only
solution to existing problems, Vranicki maintained,
was workers' self-management. In answer to a
question about the foundations of Marxism under
present conditions, Vranicki answered that "today
Marxist thought has to base itself on everything
which now represents the most valuable in science,
philosophy and culture in general. The Marxist
idea has to turn toward the present rather than
toward the past."
4
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774 Two Indian Communist Parties?
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: The largest Asian Communist party not now
dominates y ~e Chinese Communists may be on the verge of a
formal break-up along the lines of an historic split. In late
1962 the CPI breached international Communist solidarity by
denouncing Communist China's invasion of India's borderlands.
Many members of the so-called "leftist" CPI group strongly ob-
jected, arguing that Communist countries do not commit aggres-
sion, therefore the guilt must be India's. Differences between
and within the two groups have increased since that time and
are again being fought out in public.
Two press disclosures of Party matters have sparked the
current crisis but the underlying issue is the one besetting
many Cps today: whether their political allegiance shall belong
to Moscow or ?eking. In the Indian party there are also many
who urge independence from both.
Since the Chinese invasion of India in October 1962, the
CPI has maintained a pro forma unity under the leadership of
Chairman S.A.Dange who'TraveTs regularly to Moscow for advice
and assistance. Nominally the Party supports Prime Minister
Nehru's defense against Chinese aggression, as does Moscow.
During the same time, the leftists (many -- but not all -- of
whom look to Pelting for leadership), have established independent
regional offices and publications to purvey their own more mili-
tant views. But they have been unable to agree among themselves
on whether to secede from the CPI and try to overthrow the
government as a rival party, as has been done in Burma and
Ceylon, or to work within the party to overthrow Dange and gain
control.
Public Disclosures. Two new divisive elements increased
the discord in March. -A right-wing Bombay weekly, Current,
printed on March 7 a letter allegedly written by Range from
prison in 1924, offering his services to the British colonial
regime in return for his release. Some press treatment has im-
plied that Range may still be acting for the government. The
Range-dominated Party Secretariat immediately denounced the
letter as a forgery. Thereupon a leftist group spokesman, M.T.
Basavapunniah, called a press conference to insist that the
letter was genuine and to issue an unprecedented attack on Dange
as a "traitor to the party." A.I. Gopalan, the Communist op-
position leader in the Loh Sabha (lower house of parliament)
said publicly that Dange should resign as Chairman and, referring
to the letter, that "even if it was 40 years back, [Dange] can-
not lead a revolutionary party." Another spokesman, E.H.
Idamboodiripad of the moderate-leftists, has castigated both
groups for taking the case to the public rather than settling
it within the party. A government announcement that the alleged
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(za4 ~on`t.) ov
Range letter had been removed from the National Archives for safe
keeping, lends substance to its existence.
Also contributing to this disarray is a draft party program
allegedly drawn up by the leftists (apparently for presentation
to the party) and distributed by a group of non-Communist Marxists
The document praises China as "defender of peace," attacks India's
non-alignment policies and calls for overthrow of the Indian
government by "any and every means." The leftists have not denied
that they did draft a minority program but publicly claLiied that
the published version is distorted.
Future Prospects. Whether these differences will lead to an
open break may soon Be determined. On April 9th the National
Council, representing all state organizations, and the Central
Executive Committee convened an emergency ;Meeting. Thirty two of
the leftist and centrist party figures Yra1:ed out of the sleeting
to protest Chairman Range's refusal to vacate the chair for a
discussion of charges against him. The Council then "suspended"
the thirty two -- an apparent compromise with those who urged ex-
pulsion. A formal split and establisl:ient of a rival party ap-
pear al.?iost inevitable but each of the various factions is ma-
neuvering to put the onus :nor the final break on another. If con-
pr raise forces should succeed in patching up the appearance of a
unified party, it mould be at least a temporary victory for Mos-
cow. In any case, Range's leadership has been seriously weakened
and may be in jeopardy, one tray or another, before the party con-
gress in October.
For information on tactical and historic differences within
the CIS on other matters, including Soviet and Chinese machinations,
see:
25X1C10b
25X1C10b b. Continuing coverage in Press Comment
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775 WFI,a. CUBA: 17FAAT'S BEHIND Tr;" ROD IGUEZ TRIAL?
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: [For a summary of names, dates and facts, see
unclassified tachments in English and Spanish. These may be
passed to indigenous assets, but with the caution that they must
be used as fact sheets and u o t reproduced verbatim.}
The trial of Marcos Rodriguez Alfonso occupied the center
of attention in Havana during tthe last half of March and served
to illuminate, more than anything else has done to date, the dis-
sensions that agitate the ruling clique in Cuba. Rodri .uez,
who had been held incommunicado in La Cabana prison since Janu-
ary 1961, was accused of betraying to Batista's police the hide-
away of four of the survivers of the student underground group,
Directorio Revolucionario (DR), that attacked the presidential
palace on 14 March 1957. During the second year of his impris-
onment, Rodriguez wrote a complete confession, the volume of
which can only be guessed from the lengthy excerpts read at the
trial. Many details from the confession and trial proceedings
indicate that Rodriguez, who was a youth member of the Cuban
Communist party (Partido Socialista Popular - PSP), had been in-
filtrated into the DR by the PS?, was a regular informer for
Batista's police, and in all probability reported the whereabouts
of the "martyrs of 1rlunboldt 7" on orders of the high command of
the PSP.
The first phase of the trial was held behind closed doors,
and it was clearly Castro's plan not to let the public in on
this intra-party squabble. However, Faure Chomon, one of the
members of the DR and currently Minister of Communications, took
the opportunity to get even with the leaders of the old PSP
whom he had reason to believe were implicated in this and other
crimes against the resistance -movement. Either he or one of his
cohorts leaked out information, which as published in icevolucio:.z,
official organ of the Castroite wing of the united Cuban Communist
party (Partido de la Unidad Revolucionaria Socialista - PUPS).
The trial had begun 14 March, the seventh anniversary of the at -
tac't on the Presidential palace. Five days later, Rodriguez was
convicted as charged and sentenced to die before a firing squad.
On 21 March, Fidel Castro himself announced that the "con-
fusions and doubts" sown by "some intriguers" during the trial
necessitated a new trial, which should be "as public as a trial
can be." These pseudo-revolutionary intriguers," he charged,
would be satisfied with nothing less than "rolling the heads of
honest revolutionaries" and having the Cuban revolution "devour
its own sons, like Saturn." They must be taught a lesson, he
said.
(775 Cont.)
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The second trial, which was televised and broadcast, was
essentially a judicial review since no new material witnesses
were heard nor new evidence adduced, and the accused, though
physically present (according to televiewers in ;Zey West), took
essentially no part in the proceedings, only mumbling a barely
auidble answer to an occasional question. Castro, President
Osvaldo Dorticos, and other leaders appeared as "gitnesses" to
defend the old-line Communists against the "slander" directed
at them in the first trial. In a four-and-one-half-hour speech
on the night of 23-27 March, Castro criticized two prominent
members of his official family, one a "new" and the other an
"old" Communist. lZe charged :sure Chomon with a serious error
in implying, at the first trial, that the defendant had committed
the crime because of his Communist affiliation and not, as Castro
now claimed, in spite of it. Then he criticized Joaquin Ordoqui,
now a deputy minister of the armed forces, for taking steps to
have the prisoner released, thus forcing the government to bring
him to trial before it was adequately prepared -- this after a
full three years of detention!
Castro reserved his bitterest attack, however, for certain
Cuban newsmen and the newspaper Revolucion in particular for thej:.r
"lac% of revolutionary responsibility" n -sensationalizing the
case and converting it into a political trial. What these "false"
reporters had done, he charged, was to try to divide the revolu-
tion and provide ammunition to the enemy. Castro's repeated use
of the tern "sectarianism" in characterizing these attitudes,
revealed the existence of a schism within the Cuban PURS which
indicates that Castro, despite his desperate efforts to keep
aloof from the Sino-Soviet conflict, has not been able to es-
tablish internal unity either.
On 1 April, the Cuban Supreme Court upheld the sentence of
death. By sacrificing 'Rodriguez, Castro may hope to appease his
regime's "new communist supporters. At the same tine, the de-
fendant was technically cleared of the charge 1) that he was a
regular informer of the police, and 2) that he was doing what he
did on orders of the PS?. While this does not make the old guard
entirely happy, they can be considered to have come off light.
Thus the government of Cuba has been able to eat its cai.e and
have it too.
Cuban radio broadcasts, heard in Miami, have announced that
Rodriguez was executed Saturday, 18 April. Even though Castro
intervened in the trial for the purpose of defending the PS?,
he did not attempt to save the life of one of its members.
Rodriguez, a disciplined Communist, was used by the ?arty as an
instrument and, as such, was sacrificed.
On balance, it can be concluded that Castro did not feel
strong enough to oppose the old PS? leaders: he was venting his
fury on the "nev" Communists for having put him in an embarras-
sing situation.
Toro leading voices of official Communist opinion have ex-
pressed satisfaction over the cutcone Of the trial: Rude Pravo,
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of Prague, on 3 April, referred to the correctness of the death
sentence and reported that lying statements of the defendant
had been used to introduce divisions within the ?'S. An article
in Pravda, 29 March, emphasizes criticism of Faure Chomon and of
the newspaper Revolucion and congratulates Castro for defending
"Comrade" Edith arcia ?achaca. Most remarkable, however, is
Pravda's version, 2 March, of Rodriquez' affiliation with the
youth sector of the old ?:
They [old ward communist] refuted testimony
alleging that Marcos Rodriguez was a member of the
organization of Socialist youth. In particular,
the assistant director of the paper 1oticias do
Hoy, Raul Valdez Vivo, who earlier at 3e univer-
s y was the leader of the section of Socialist
Youth, declared that the statement of Faure Chormion
in the first trial to the effect that Marcos
Rodriguez was a member of the Socialist Youth
was wrong. Marcos Rodriguez, he observed, is the
product of anti-Communism.
In spite of the Soviet version, we know that Rodriguez was
a member of the Communist Youth. Much of the evidence adducer
at the trial indicates that he was acting, as an informer, on
the orders of an older member of the PS?. It could not !Ave been
either Edith Garcia Buchaca or her husband Joaquin Ordoqui: they
were both out of the country for a year before the event. That
is probably why theirs were the only PS? names brought out in
connection with the betrayal of Humboldt 7: they have a perfect
alibi. But Rodriguez was in prison for three years, plenty of
time for the "new" Communists to find out the identity of the
"old" Communists who controlled him. Castro undoubtedly knows,
25X1C1bBe he is protecting them on orders from Moscow.
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776 AF,NE,WH. Current Attempts to Expand the international Role
25X1 C10b of M_ Soviet ccup a one o rmany
BACKGROUND: The Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany (also
referred T'o as'`East Germany," the "Deutsche Demokratische Re-
publik" or the "GDR") has sought persistently to gain interna-
tional acceptance as a respectable, sovereign power within the
framework of the Communist "two Germanys" design. Taking ad-
vantage of the politico-economic unrest among neutralist and
developing countries, the SOZG has had certain successes in its
quest for some form of official recognition and influence, de-
spite the threat of West German sanctions against countries
which recognize the SOZG. The countries where the Ulbricht
regime now has some form of representation number 49, ranging
from so-called "unofficial trade missions" through "official trade
missions" to consulates, consulates general and full diplomatic
recognition (embassies), all but one of the latter being in Com-
munist countries. The SOZG has succeeded in gaining full diplomatic
relations with only one non-Communist country, Zanzibar, and
consular or other lesser relations with eight others. As
diligent subordinates of the Soviets, the SOZG representatives
at "trade missions" in 27 Free World countries are intent on
converting these to diplomatic rank, while expanding both the
scope and effectiveness of their propaganda, espionage and sub-
version mechanisms.
The SOZG's increased stature in the eyes of certain less
sophisticated peoples -- including governments of some newly
independent countries -- has enabled it to assume a growing role
in promoting Communism in those circles. Pankow's* most con-
spicuous recent success came in the wake of the Zanzibar revolt.
Almost before communications had been restored, Pankow "recog-
nized" the revolt leaders and hurried one Guenter Fritsch to
Zanzibar as "Ambassador," thereby heading the recognition rush
and establishing Fritsch as "Dean of the Diplomatic Corps."
Pankow now has full diplomatic relations with Zanzibar and has
built up there an inflated Embassy comprising some 25 persons,
thus matching in size the Chicom mission and setting a kind of
precedent for the establishment, or the diplomatic upgrading,
of SOZG representations in other African countries. Pankow was
also quick to send housing and agricultural advisors and a good-
will deputation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Wolfgang
Kiesewetter. The former Chief of the Trade Dept. in Pankow's
Finance Ministry, Martin Gentsch, has actually become an official
within the Zanzibar Finance Ministry, serving in the same govern-
ment with Foreign Minister Babu, who happens also to be on the
editorial staff of Jacques Verges' pro-Chicom journal, Revolu-
tion, published in Paris and Lausanne (see Prop Note 40B
T'Revolution," 6 Jan 64).
the as rlin suburb where originally all SOZG offices
were located.
MAERMSEdwdbo"M (776. Continued
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20 April 1964
The pattern of the current Pankow expansionist effort is
further evident in politburo member Bruno Leuschner's January
1934 tour of Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, India and Ceylon. In
the course of this excursion he persuaded Colombo to elevate
Pan?.ow's Trade Mission there to Consulate General status, and
he appears to have laid the groundwork for long-term economic
cooperation with Cambodia, where the SOZG established a Consu-
late General in 1063. The SOZG's Consulate General in Burma
grew from a Trade Mission. SOZG Consulates General also exist
in Indonesia, Iraq, Yemen and Egypt, the latter being headed by
an "Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Arab
States." Syria has a Consulate. The SOZG classifies its trade
missions abroad as "official" or "unofficial," the distinction
being based on whether a given mission includes personnel from
the Foreign Ministry (Ministerium fuer auswertige Angelegenheiter.
-- MAA). Where FAA personne are present, the senior employ-*
ee is usually the chief of the mission. "Official" trade mis-
sions are found in Algeria, Austria, Finland, Ghana, Guinea,
India, Lebanon, Laos, Mali, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. "Unof-
icial" trade missions are those which do not (yet) have any
personnel from the L'IAA and are controlled by the SOZG Chamber of
Foreign Trade (I;ar mer fuer Aussenhandel - KFA, a creature of the
SOZG Foreign Trade Ministry) . Examples are found in Belgium,
Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, Turley, the UK, Uruguay and West Germany.
Augmenting expansionist efforts abroad, Pankow long has made
a practice of bringing Afro-Asian personnel from the ranks of
students, journalists and labor unions to the SOZG for training.
A recent example of this is the so-called training course for
African journalists, the "School of Solidarity" at Buc'.ow, near
Berlin, opened in November 1933. 22 African student journalists
are now enrolled there from Basutoland, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,
N. Rhodesia, South Africa, South-West Africa, and Tan,anyika.
With one exception, the students for this school were recruited
by :?ankow entirely from countries where Pankow does not yet have
even an unofficial trade mission. The professed purpose of the
school is to "assist newly independent Afro-Asian states and
render support to the independence struggle." Actually the stu-
dents are indoctrinated to expound malicious anti-Western propa-
r-anda in Africa and otherwise promote Communist objectives.
25X1 Cl Ob
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777 AF,FE,NE,WH. Communist China's Real Attitude toward Colonialism
25X1C10b and the Non-white Peoples
BACKGROUND: Communist China poses, both in its quarrel with
the Soviet non and its hostile belligerence toward the Free World,
as the foremost opponent of "white imperialism and colonialism" and
as the self-appointed saviour of the non-white peoples of the world.
The facts are that the Chicoms are not only guilty of aggression
against their non-white neighbors in India and Southeast Asia, but
they persecute the national minorities within their own borders and
are arrogant toward other colored races. The Han people, the
dominant race of mainland China, have a long record of arrogant and
overbearing treatment of the 40-50 million non-Han national minori-
ties living in China -- the Mongolians, the Uighurs in Sinkiang, the
Yi people in the Liang Mountains of Szechuan province, the Thai
people in Yunnan province, the Miao people in western Hunan province,
the Tibetans in southern Kansu province and the Koreans in Kirin
province of Manchuria. Chinese Communist treatment of these minor-
ity groups today is similar to the worst examples of the 19th
century imperialists toward their subject peoples.
In theory, these minorities are administered as "autonomous"
regions; in fact, they are subjected to Han chauvinism, which is
admitted indirectly by the Chinese Communist press. The People's
Daily, the foremost Chicom paper, has admitted on numerous occ sons
that is common practice for minorities not to be consulted by
the government officials who rule them and that government organs
at a higher level often ignore the desires of the "autonomous" areas
under their jurisdiction. These government officials are Han Chinese
whom the Communist Party has sent to the "autonomous" areas for the
dual (and contradictory) purpose of subjugating the minority groups
and of winning them over to the central government. In a 1957
address to the Supreme State Council, Mao Tse-tung spoke of the
national minorities, saying:
"Less than five percent of the people in China
occupy more than half of our territory. They
are tribesmen, once not regarded as part of the
Chinese race. We must convert them and convince
them that they are Chinese."
The problem is that these peoples do not want to be "Chinese" and
Han arrogance is unable to comprehend it. The minority group harbor
strong suspicions justly based on centuries of subjugation and
oppression, savage reprisals, and Chinese colonization; they have
learned by bitter experience that the present rulers in Peking are
the greatest colonizers of all. They realize full well that they
occupy the outlying parts of China that Mao spoke of because they
have been pushed there by the Han Chinese. The fact that their
children are forced to learn Mandarin Chinese in the schools rather
than their own national languages does nothing to ease or erase
their antipathy toward the Han race.
777. Continued
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This history of highhanded colonialism by the Han people not
only reminds the national minorities that their own interests are
subordinated to the interests of the "sons of Han,"' in some extreme
cases it stirs them to open revolt. Tibet provides an outstanding
case of how China's minorities react to Han Chinese imperialism
and, in turn, how the Chicoms quell resistance with military action.
(For an excellent summary of the International Commission of
Jurists' condemnation of China's aggression against Tibet, see
Denis Warner's "Hurricane from China," p. 56, the MacMillan Company,
New York, 1961. Also, see the Briefly Noted in this issue.) But
Tibet is not the only example of how Chicoms use wanton force
against national minorities. Among their own minorities, for example,
Peking wants to subjugate the Chinese Moslems (the Hui's)
just as it does all other groups under its rule. The Chicoms have
admitted that in Kansu Province between April and July 1952, some
20,000 Moslems staged open rebellion, killed over 3,000 cadres and
seized three districts before the Chicom Peoples Liberation Army
mercilessly stamped out the revolt.
Communist China's attitude toward her neighbors in the Far East
and Southeast Asia is identical to her attitude toward the ill-fated
minorities within her own borders. Her neighbors in Southeast Asia
understand this perfectly and they live in fear of Chinese oppres-
sion. India's leaders have also come, although more recently, to
understand the meaning and nature of Chinese imperialism. Prime
Minister Nehru has said:
"The Chinese look down upon every country other
than their own. They consider themselves the
Middle Kingdom, a celestial race, a great country."
This is a frank evaluation by an Asian neutralist who was at one
time the Chicoms' chief apologist.
On the eve of China's second Five Year Plan, Chou En-lai said:
"We always say that our nation is large in area,
rich in materials and has a large population.
However, all the large areas and rich materials
are in the national minority areas and the Han
people have only the densely populated areas."
The national minorities know by now the meaning of this atti-
tude for them and their natural resources, just as Southeast Asians
know that the Chinese Communists are envious for example, of the
rice bowl of South Vietnam, the rubber of Malaya, and particularly
Indonesia's untold natural wealth in oil, rubber and tin. In the
Chinese provinces the inexorable process of colonization from
the densely populated areas has been going on for several years
according to Party plan. The administrative and military control
of Peking reaches out with the settlers and the minority peoples,
once free and unique, become more and more lost to view and absorbed
by the increasing concentration of this new population.
2
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VOICES OF REVISION:
Professor Robert Havemann
/Following are excerpts from lectures given by Prof Dr. Robert
Havemann under a heading of "Natural Science Aspects of Philosophi-
cal Problems" between 18 October 1963 and 7 February 1964 at the
East Berlin Humboldt University. These extracts were published in
Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 25 March 1964, pp 51-52.
The life source of our cultural development, the blood in the
veins of human culture, is the many-sided and increasingly compre-
hensive dissemination of information to all members of society
regarding all knowledge, all problems, and all questionsof our time
Reactionary regimes have always striven to keep the people
ignorant. They followed their own experience which held that "what
I do not know does not hurt me." They counseled their people: "what
you do not know will not hurt you." Thus, they attempted to keep
the people in ignorance regarding the true state of affairs and,
furthermore, closed their own eyes in order not to have to see that
which, after all, everyone else could see....
A government can only succeed in its important mission when it
can rely on the active participation of all members of society. This
support, however, can only be attained when the broad masses of the
people are constantly informed about all the events and problems
of their lives....
One must not deceive people with ready-made answers and subject
them to officially sanctioned views, since this only misleads them
into schematic and superficial thought. Through voluminous informa-
tion we must make people more and more qualified to comprehend mattam
We must sponsor a broad debate regarding all questions of the times.
This is the only way in which the tremendous force of the popular
masses becomes productively creative not dissipating itself in
destructive disagreements.
Whosoever fears the results of a generally unlimited attempt at
informing /the people7 and consequently hinders it, thereby creates
the precise conditions for an unhealthy development. This proves an
old thesis of Greek tragedy which states that man brings about his
own fate in attempting to avert it.
The concept of freedom is of fundamental significance for
humanity. Freedom, as Hegel said, is the recognition of necessity.
This phrase has frequently been interpreted in a very one-sided,
very mechanical, and very mean-spirited manner. It then has the
character of scholarly presumption. We are told, condescendingly:
if you do not recognize that which is necessary -- and this
necessity has usually been determined by those who say this -- then
freedom is just what you cannot have, and you are therefore to be
locked up.
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In other words, one could purchase freedom by doing voluntarily
that which one must do although one does not at all want to do it.
With unequaled cynicism, the Nazis wrote above the gates of their
concentration camps: "work makes one free." I have formulated this
as sharply as possible because this is not the content of /TTegel's7
precept. It is, rather, a dreadful distortion. Any implication of
such a meaning in connection with /Regel's7 precept is a crass falsi-
fication. This derives from the way of thinking according to which
it is possible to command man's history and then to have it carried
out. Fortunately, this does not work.
And in this method of thinking, there finally emerges only that
mechanical-materialistic causal form of thought which, unfortunately,
not only dominates the thinking of reactionary circles but also that
of many well-meaning progressives....
Freedom is only worthy of striving for, is only moral, when it
is not the freedom of /gome7 individuab but the freedom of all; free-
dom for every man is that which leaves each the opportunity to decide
according to his will and according to his wishes. That is freedom.
Freedom is not a recognition of necessity in the sense that at
a certain time one can only do a single necessary thing. On the
contrary, we only have true freedom when there is a broad choice of
opportunities for us to pursue or leave aside. The more one is not
allowed to do, the less freedom there is. We want to create a world
in which all human beings have more and more opportunities so that
each can act completely according to his individual aspirations, un-
hindered and unrestricted by regulations, orders, and "principles."
The French Revolution was followed by Napoleon Bonaparte. Bona-
partism is a danger for every revolution. In the final years of his
life, Lenin had already recognized the danger of Bonapartism for the
Soviet Union and had consequently warned against Stalin's excessive
power. Revolution, which fights for freedom, always undergoes a
change once it has attained power. Its principal goal is then to
secure the revolution. Constantly threatened from within and without,
it fights to maintain and strengthen its power; and this, in concrete
terms, is the power of the revolutionaries. From this situation
arises Bonapartism. The militant methods of fighting of the pre-
revolutionary and revolutionary periods as well as during the revolu-
tion are carried over into the postrevolutionary era. Thus, it is
possible that the battle against the oppressor may temporarily turn
into a new oppression.
In the contradiction between socialism and capitalism, which
appears in the foreground today as if there were nothing else, there
also lies a unity. The historical process which we have undergone
in this century does not mean only: "there is a world in decline and
here a world on the rise." No, both parts of this world exert an
influence upon the other -- not only through disruption; in a sense,
they need each other, and not only depend upon each other historically,
but their development and their further transformation is a single
total process....
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A constant and intensive interaction between these two parts of
the world, rather than isolation and separation from each other,
will hasten the transformation. Herein I see the deeper meaning of
peaceful coexistence. Naturally, this should not mean that the
revolutionaries should give up their party stand. On the contrary,
it is exactly on the intellectual level that they must measure their
forces. However, a world can never be transformed if the revolution-
aries close themselves off and isolate themselves from the remainder
of the world. Truly revolutionary ideas do not stop at any border.
Modern materialism differs from all past philosophies in that
it does not design in the mind an absolute and unshakable system
of all world events and then demand that science drag in all manner
of proof to support the correctness of the philosophical system.
Unhappily, this errone~-ts attitude has occasionally appeared... even
among Marxist philosophers....
An expert in all d-?.alectic categories and teachings, be he ever
so per-f- ct, %ould never it down and say: "There, now I am absolutely
prepared; eery }iell! Mess .curs the physicists may now come. I will
solve their :.^ ? ? i :ms if they simply tell me where the shoe pinches!"
And if, such a super-dialectician still attempts to do
this, in t: ir.^.1 analysis, it results only in displeasure and
anger on all sides; and science will not have been assisted. This
procedure is completely nonsensical.
As long as man is exploited, oppressed, and robbed of freedom,
as long as people are prevented from freely developing their per-
sonalities -- we 'shall?not be completely free of these fetters for
hundreds of years -- these limitations and restrictions on human
dignity will give rise to impulses to act against society. The
impulse to attain power in a society in which man is dominated by
man is the source of all immorality, stemming from the immorality
of the social structure. This striving upward, this urge to subju-
gate others and to oppress them for personal advantage, is most
reprehensible. Nevertheless, it is the normal, completely pervasive
goal of the overwhelming majority... in societies which have a social
hierarchy.
We Germans have developed this effort to strive upwards to per-
fection. It is the system of the "bicycle rider" -- to step down-
ward and bend the back upward. It is the system of the careerists
and bootlickers, the coward and the sycophant. That this phenomenon
still appears on such a large scale is not, say, a result of this
reprehensible tendency being a part of a man's nature, but rather
because he lives in a society in which such strivings give a prospect
of success and he is constantly surrounded by people who achieve suc-
cess in this manner.
Such "morals" basically contradict our inner feelings. Our
hopes are directed toward a society of equal rights, toward the dis-
solution of this stratification of society. We seek a society of
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free and equal people. As long as a utopian moral society is not a
fact we shall always have a conflict. Even in our efforts for a
free, democratic, and moral society we shall find ourselves acting
against our own principles. Woe unto us if we should rise to the
top! We suddenly become people of significance and responsibility,
men who point the way, and various other ridiculous things of this
kind. The more one rises the more one experiences contempt for
everything beneath one's station. This is not a human but rather a
prof_,undly inhuman weakness.
With a tremendous expenditure of effort, we are building for
our future and not for the present. The revolutionaries of this era,
the leaders of states, must always strive to attain their goals as
rapidly as psssible. For as long as the standard of living does
not correspond to general production, the people will be dissatis-
fied because they feel themselves cheated in comparison with other
industrial countries.
The leaders of a socialist country find themselves in a com-
plicated position. The more rapidly they advance toward their goal
the less they can give their people. The less they give the people
the more resistance to their policies arises and the more difficul-
ties will they encounter. It is a kind of vicious circle. If one
slows down the development of socialism because one accumulates less
and consumes more, this will make the people more satisfied. However,
if one wishes to speed development, the people will be dissatisfied.
In order to overcome this dissatisfaction and to facilitate
rapid development one must do everything in one's power to foster
enthusiasm among the masses....
The fact that /oapital7 accumulation can only be purchased
through the personal' sacriTice of millions can easily lead to a
situation in which anyone who, for the lack of conviction, is not
prepared for such sacrifice is regarded as an enemy of development.
Thus, an animosity arises toward everyone who...is not prepared
without question to adopt the principles of socialist construction.
Whoever does not enthusiastically participate in this construction
is finally suspected of being a lackey of enemy ideology or even an
agent of western capitalism. All of these things are naturally
basic phenomena which are foreign and contradictory to true socialism.
But it is very difficult to escape this danger.
When in addition there is at the top a man like Stalin, who
becomes a dictator and considers himself to be absolutely wise and
all-knowing; when there is a man whose words are constantly being
broadcast like a gospel; and when a multilithic hierarchy is formed,
a large political bureaucracy which exercises absolute control over
the individual, then it is virtually unavoidable that careerists
and hypocrites without being personally convinced, should gain
advantage by constantly mouthing big words in order to ingratiate
themselves at the top.
4
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In a tremendously effective manner, an extraordinarily tenacious
and persistent hierarchical system takes form. It is difficult to
overcome this hierarchy, even after the necessary insight has been
gained, even when the system has really already begun to topple and
more and more people have grasped the fact that it must be overcome.
The reason it is so difficult to overcome the system is that,
naturally, under such a system, many people have gained their posi-
tions and functions not on the basis of real ability but simply on
the basis of this loathsome ability to be able to...attain such
positions.
Nevertheless, the problem is not primarily one of personalities.
True, personnel changes will be inevitable. But they are not the
primary problem, they are the secondary problem. The thing which
must change is the internal structure. That which is necessary,
that which is vital to socialism and which was lost during the period
of Stalinism, is democracy, Without democracy, socialism cannot be
attained,
What I have said here, Lenin said again and again with great
sharpness and clarity, He warned that democracy was being destroyed
and he pointed out the dreadful consequences which the destruction
of democracy must have on the creation of socialism. Only through
democracy can we convince the masses of the need to conduct a battle
for socialism and to win them for this battle.
One can command and prescribe many things for people but one
cannot prescribe for them what they should think. Human thought is
the only thing which is actually and completely outside the realm
of any kind of command. One can only exert an influence upon
thinking when one is prepared to subject one's viewpoint to criti-
cism at any time, when one is constantly prepared to argue objec-
tively and to recognize every objective argument. Maximum patience
with those who think differently, objectivity in political argumen-
tation and a readiness to recognize and admit one's own errors are
the basic principles of all political work in socialism; without the
voluntary preparedness of the masses we can attain little.
I am an absolute and decided opponent of capital punishment.
The death sentence is a very bad thing. I believe that in several
hundred years there will hardly be any understanding for the fact
that in the middle of the 20th Century, progressive nations still
resorted to this type of punishment. It will be considered barbarism
which will evoke just as much horror as the thought of cannibalism
does today....
In the final analysis, capital punishment is only demanded in
order to be able to murder political opponents. In olden times it
was indeed the right of the dukes and kings to execute persons who
rebelled against their state and their power personally with the
sword. Basically, this condition still prevails wherever the death
sentence exists today.
5
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I myself was sentenced to death. I managed to elude it. But I
saw my best friends executed. This experience made me an uncondi-
tional opponent of capital punishment. Nor can I recognize this
form of punishment if I am told that, after all, there were dreadful
war criminals, heinous barbarians in human guise, like, for example,
the supervisors in the concentration camps and prisons, who murdered
and tortured prisoners. A modern state must not soil its hands with
blood simply because others have done so,
/NOTE: according to this same issue of Der Spiegel, p.40,
T66 persons were sentenced to death in the rom 1949
to 1962; 108 of these were for political crimes.?
But in the whole development up till now...what has hampered us
most has been the tendency -- which came to the fore during the
period of the personality cult and which is so alien to socialism --
to eliminate democracy. Man was being educated to be a hypocrite and
to be untruthful. Constantly, political avowals were being demanded
of him which did not stem from an honest heart. We must completely
overcome all of this. We must openly and unashamedly call it by
name. We must espouse socialism precisely by standing up against
these phenomena of political hypocrisy
The socialist revolution has consolidated and stabilized itself.
It has expanded extraordinarily in the economic sphere. It now has
the opportunity of dealing with these evils which have developed
during the first phase. The revolution has already taken the new
path -- the path of democratic socialism.
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Georgy Lukacs
/Following are excerpts from an article in the Czech-language
perio-dical Literarni Noviny (Literary News), 18 January 1964,
pp. 8-9, reporting an-interview with Georgy Lukhcs in Budapest. The
excerpts quoted are from Lukacs's answers to questions asked by the
reporter .7
In practice we can note a two-fold movement. In the West,
alienation continues to grow and is reflected in literature, even
though the connections are very complicated. It certainly is not
a uniform process, and western art is simply loaded with antitheses.
This also is the reason why we cannot react to it either wholly
positively or wholly negatively. As a result of the Stalinist epoch
we have slept through fifty years of capitalist development, when
otherwise it would have been possible to carry out an analysis of
its antitheses persistently, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist
methods. It is thus completely logical that, because the windows
are opened today, youth is embracing everything western. Of course,
it would be a terrible mistake if we were to try to keep them from
it. Blind, unlimited admiration is a children's disease and will be
overcome only if youth has complete freedom to observe everything,
even if it is only the latest fashion. Intelligent young people will
recognize, within two years, what is good and what is bad. First
we need thorough information about the West. The rest will follow.
Today we are faced with a long period of peaceful coexistence,
and for this reason it certainly is of consequence how the litera-
ture of the western world will come to terms with its own problems.
Here, I think, we can again be served by the great example of Thomas
Mann. Doctor Faustus contains the whole problem of a fascist world,
and thus is boo w 1 remain one of the great novels of our time.
Today there exists a fashionable literature in the West which tries
to demonstrate that this whole alienated world which they reject is
something artistically interesting at the same time. Thus, for
example, there appeared writers in West Germany who have become a
sort of non-conformist support of the Adenauer regime. At the same
time, however, there are also writers who have taken a serious stand
against the alienated world. At one time, Sinclair Lewis in his
Babbitt revealed this alienation in a very sharp satirical form
which in his day was of gigantic importance. Twenty years later,
however, this could not have been done in the same manner. There
appear tragicomical works where this struggle against alienation
rises again (T. Wolfe, O'Neill), and we are often witnesses of a
tragic, dramatic battle against personal alienation. Such as Styron,
in his novel Set This House on Fire,who points out dialectically
that the cause or estrangement-71-ha rich man is his wealth, in a
pauper his poverty,until there is finally a Raskolnikov-type explo-
sion. We must not overlook this.
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The great socialist novel will be created, but it will take a
while until the socialist writers free themselves from all restraints
and inner censorship. They rust seek their allies in the great
literature of the past and a:.:$o within the whole current of western
literature, the stz-ucturo of which I have indicated; they must ob-
serve how the best struggle against alienation. In time we will
also find among them political allies. I'd like to say that this is
not an exception to Sartre's attitude nor disagreement, but rather
a supplement, a complement.
The task of literature is to provide a picture of the gigantic
alienation which was the product of the Stalinist epoch, and to
help overcome it. At the same time, something extremely new had
been suppressed in that epoch, something that appeared, for instance,
in Makarenkov's Pedagogic Poem, and it is our duty to bring it back
to life. And if It is true at it is possible to eliminate a
world-wide armed conflict, and I am convinced that this is true,
just as I feel that even the cold war will gradually disappear, then
in the period of peaceful coexistence there will continue a very
sharp class struggle in new forms, and then our allies will be all
those who are struggling against estrangement in the capitalist
world -- not only writers but also sociologists, for example, such
as the prematurely deceased Wright Mills. There are sectarians who
deny the possibility of coexistence, and others, again, hope that
the class struggle will cease in the period of peaceful coexistence.
I insist, however, and have insisted as early as 1956 (in an article
published in the East-German periodical Aufbau /1econstruction7) on
"tent ium datur": a new form of class struggle.- Of course, i!' we
are to understand this we must return to Lenin and place him face to
face with Stalin. Even during World War I in 1916 Lenin said of
sectarians that these are people who imagine that they will create
two large camps which will scream at each other: We are for
socialism! We are for imperialism! People who imagine things in
this manner, said Lenin, will never understand the revolution.
Matters are much more complicated, individual tendencies intertwine
with one another, fronts change continuously.
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L4opold Sedar Senghor
/Following are excerpts from two speeches by I,6opold Sedar
Senghor, "The African Road to Socialism" and "Senegalese Socialism,"
published in a collection of Senghor material, On African Socialism
(New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 76-79 and 139-140.1
From: The African Road to Socialism
As for Marxian humanism, which we now propose to discuss, I wises
first of all to recall its strength and its weakness. Its strength
is that, starting from concrete facts, it elaborated the sociological
realities which the analysis of European society in the mid-nineteen3
century revealed: the priority of the economic factor and the class
struggle. Its strength is also that it pointed out and renewed the
notion of alienation. Its weakness is that it did not carry the
economic analysis far enough: It neglected statistics, albeit the
embryonic statistics then existing. Its weakness lies above all in
the fact that, as Marx proceeded in his writing of Capital, he in-
creasingly stressed materialism and determinism, praxis and means, to
the detriment of dialectics and ethics -_ in a word, to the detriment
of man and his freedom. I shall no longer say, as I did in my Report
to the detriment of philosophical thought; for, rejecting the spite`
of his Philosophical Works, Marx surreptitiously and paradoxically
reintroduced metaphysics in the conclusion. But it is a terribly
inhuman metap ysics, an atheistic metaphysics in which mind is
sacrificed to matter, freedom to the determined, man to things. This
is no doubt what Engels called Marx's "subjective whims."...
What should be our attitude toward this Marxian humanism? I
answer, first, that we should not betray its fruitful contributions
when faithfulness to it can only lead to lucid transcendence. But
West Africans are prone to betray it in both theory and practice,
through blind allegiance.
In theory, one betrays Marx by using Marxian dialectics as it
stands, without changing a comma. For this is reasoning twice in
abstraction, the surest way to miss reality. We must not tire of re-
peating: Dialectical materialism is born of history and geography;
it was born in the nineteenth century in Western Europe. Conceived
in th,.t milieu, it was essentially designed to analyze and transform
it. Marx often affirmed this. The proof is that today, in those
same countries, scientists and philosophers, writers and artists,
while assimilating Marx's methodological contributions, have gone
beyond, shaded, and enriched them to penetrate realities no longer
of the nineteenth but of the twentieth century.
And what of Asian or African realities? The Israelis, like the
Chinese ,have been able to find their Asian road to socialism adapted
to the spirit and realities of their native soil. Theirs are exem-
plary efforts to inspire us. West African realities are those of
underdeveloped countries -- peasant countries here, cattle countries
there -- once feudalistic, but traditionally classless and with no
wage-earning sector, They are community* countries where the group
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holds priority over the individual; they are, especially, religious
countries, unselfish countries, where money is not King. Though
dialectical materialism can help in analyzing our societies, it can-
not fully interpret them. It did not even do so (nor does it now)
in Europe, where we are witnessing a vigorous religious reawakening.
Even in "Holy Russia," there is a resurgence of spiritual forces,
with the defeat of false "socialist realism," which, provided peace i
is preserved, we can anticipate in the near future.
Therefore, we would betray Marx by applying his method like a
veneer to West African realities. We would betray him even more if
we were to apply but not integrate European political, economic,
social, and cultural organizations here, whether that of West or
East, of liberal parliamentarianism or "peoples' democracy." This
would strangely betray Man, as well as Negro-African -- I mean
Negro-Berber -- humanism.
From a false theory, from a methodology which is inapplicable
to the object, only im-materialism can result, insofar as matter is
identified with the concrete: y an in-humanism can result. In
fact, the double abstraction just noted lea s us n the first place t
to consider man sub specie aeternitatis. And man of all times and al
places is no longer man u simply a mental image. For one can
grasp man's permanent features only through his historical, geographi
cal, and ethnic background. And the Negro, like the Berber, did not
appear during the prehistoric era, not until the Neolithic Age, about
the fifth millenium B.C. In the second place, the abstraction con-
sists in seeing, under a black or copper skin, Marx's man in Africa,
the European in the Negro or Berber -- and classes struggling to
conquer purchasing power in a mercantile world presented as an ideal
of civilization.
How can one fail to realize that, in these conditions, aliena-
tion, far from being corrected, will be singularly aggravateU7-For
T Realienation of the Negro Berber does not stem from Negro-Berber
capitalism, nor even from European capitalism. Nor does it stem
from the class struggle. Rather, it results from the domination of
one country over another -- or rather, of one ethnic group over
another. Here, political and cultural domination, colored by racism,
is fused with economic domination.
Hence, for us, Man is not without a country, nor is he without
a color or a history, a fatherland or a civilization. It is West
African man, our neighbor, exactly defined in time and space. He is
Malian, Mauritanian, Eburnian, Wolof, Targui, Songhai, Hausa, Fon, or
Mossi. He is a man of flesh and blood, nourished on milk, millet,
rice, and yams. He is a man humiliated for centuries, less perhaps
in his nudity and hunger than in his skin and civilization, in his
dignity.
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From: Senegalese Socialism
But, ..., what has become of the Marxist theory of the class
struggle? In Teilhard's opinion, this is merely one aspect --
pecu ar to capitalism -- of a much more general phenomenon: the
process of socialization. I refer you to Volume V of the works of
Teilhard, entitled L'Avenir de 1'Homme (The Future of Man) and, in
Volume III, to the article "Les ni s humanines naturelles" ("The
Natural Human Unities"), As concerned with international life as
Marx and Engels but more concerned than they with problems of race
and nation, Teilhard shows us that conflicts between human groups --
techni oc professional groups or "classes," nations, races -- are
natural facts; moreover, that they are necessary steps in the proces.:
of socialization; that we are today, with the Cold War, with class,
national and racial conflicts, in an age of extreme divergence; but
that already a movement of pan-human convergence has been set in
motion by the very tension and the power of our technical means --
peaceful and military. From this movement, the planetary civiliza-
tion will emerge, a symbiosis of all particular civilizations; and
the scientist invites us, the underdeveloped peoples, to help con-
struct the Civilization of the Universal. Marx and Engels did not
know us. Teilhard restores our dignity and invites us to the
dialogue. He writes: "Before the last upheavals that awakened the
earth, peoples were only superficially alive; a world of energies wal
still asleep within each of them. Well, I imagine that these powers,
still dormant within each natural human unity, in Europe, Asia,
everywhere, are stirring and trying to come to light at this very
moment; not to oppose and devour one another, but to rejoin and
interfecundate one another. Fully conscious nations are needed for
a total earth." This is justification for our nationalism and our
Negritude, all the more so because, according to the paleontologist,
it was in Black Africa that Homo sapiens first appeared about 30,000
years ago.
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Predrag Vranicki
following are excerpts from answers given by Professor
Vranicki of Zagreb University to questions asked him at the Novi Sad
(Yugosl:,via) "Tribune of Youth"; this is from material published in
Vjesnik (Zagreb), 8 March 1964.7
"Stalinism is still one of the important and essential problems
of contemporary Marxism. In its crudest form it has now moved to
China. We can analyze Stalinist dogmatism in view of its relationsh
to the most vital question of the contemporary world, to the questionf
of coexistence. We see that in their polemics, Soviet and Chinese
theoreticians have been waging a war over coexistence, although both
of them refer to Lenin. It is really true that each side has found
in Lenin's books quotations which support its position. However, in
the fifties a new era in international relations emerged, while Lenii.
who spoke from a platform valid in his lifetime, could not have anti-
cipated the present-day situation. Instead of analyzing contemporary
capitalist society, the real distribution of power in the world,
instead of facing squarely a completely new dilemma -- coexistence
or the annihiliation of mankind -- the contemporary dogmatists are
searching in the works of the classics of Marxism for ready-made
recipes. Such a non-creative attitude toward the Marxist heritage
means the abandonment of revolutionary Marxist methodology in deal-
ing with reality, which inevitably results in serious practical and
political consequences. There are situations where the Marxist idea
cannot be applied by way of analogy. The responsibility for the
present-day situation is not borne by the classics of Marxism but
rather by ourselves."
Marx did not absolutize the dictatorship of the proletariat as
a form of working class rule. As the next
step in the process of the socialization of authorities, Marx foresav
the withering away of the state. In other words, Marx anticipated
the disappearance of coercion from social life. Eo ipso, any dogmati.
uniformism and isolation of ideas, any Petting of free om of opinion,
was alien to Marx. And what is dogmatism? This is the mastication c
ideas coming from the supreme political form. What is opportunism?
This is the fear of people to think with their own heads. And what
are apologetics? This is when people say 'yes' to everything coming
from above.
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Facts1 dates, and persons
1957: -- The attac > on the palace and the
massacre at Humboldt
7. On 14 Marc -E. a group of university students of the so-
jai lec re rio Revolucionario (DR), in an effort to help
Fidel Castro, who was already operating in the Sierra
Laestra, made a suicidal attack ontbo presidential palace
in Havana, in order to assassinate the dictator-president
Fulgencio Batista. The attack failed. Of the survivors,
four went into hiding in an apartment at no 7 Humboldt Street:
Juan Pedro Carbo Servia, Fructuoso Rodriguez, Joe T7estbroo?.,
and Jose Machado,
20 April: In the early morning, a friend of theirs,
r1arcos Rodriguez Alfonso, 19 years old, a member of the
youth organization of the Partido Socialista Popular (PS?
-- the Cuban Communist party), telephoned to one of Batista',
police officers, steban Ventura, that he had some important
information that could only be transmitted personally. Ac-
cording to Rodriguez' confession, Ventura arranged for then
to meet at three o'clock that afternoon in an apartment in
Carlos Tercero Street. During the interview, Rodriguez told
him where he could find the fugitives. A few hours later,
they died in a hail of gunfire from Batista's agents.
23 April, or three days after the massacre at Humboldt
7, z took up asylum in the Brazilian mbassy, osten-
sibly from fear of Batista's police. In reality, however,
the surviving members of theDR already suspected him of in-
forming, and he was afraid they were going to "execute" him.
During his stay of a month and a half in the Brazilian
3;ibassy, he recieved several large sums of money, some say
as much as 2,000 pesos (dollars), although during the trial
he swore that he only received $500 from his father. Also
while in the embassy, he struck up a close friendship with
the Brazilian Ambassador, Vasco Leitao ea Cunha and with
his wife Virginia. About the middle of June, he departed
for Costa Rica and afterward went to Mexico and several
other Latin American countries.
1~5g; During this period, before the fall of Batista, one of
the leaders of the DR, Faure Chomon, currently Minister of
Transport in the Castro government, tried to seek out I.arcos
Rodriguez in order presumably to execute him, but was never
able to catch up with him. In Mexico, Rodriguez was in
contact with 3dith Garcia Buchaca, who lived there with her
husband Joaquin Ordoqui, both hard-core Cuban Communists
and members of the Central Committee of the PSP. According
to his confession, published in part as a result of the
trial of March 1964, Rodriguez talked to her about his role
as a police informer in the Humboldt 7 case. (During the
trial, incidentally, she denied having received this con-
fidence and he retracted this detail of his written confes-
sions.)
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and Fidel Castro ascended to power as the supreme chief.
A few weeks later, Rodriguez returned to his country. In
February, or almost as soon as his presence in the country
was known, he was arrested by Castro's police and inter-
rogated in the prison of La Cabana. In spite of the evi-
dence of his guilt, he was set free, it is assumed as a re-
sult of secret influence within the W. whose leaders were
already beginning to occupy important posts in Castro's
government.
But Marta Jimenez, widow of Fructuoso Rodriguez; one
of the victims of Humboldt 7, was carrying out her own in-
vestigation: she interviewed two of the agents of 3steban
Ventura who had some knowledge of the case, but both were
executed a few hours later, before being able to confront the
accused informer. %Text, she was able to show a photograph
of Rodriguez to another of Ventura's agents, Francisco
Idirabal. The latter identified the person as the informer
of Humboldt 7. Later on, when he was brought face to face
with Rodriguez, he refused to identify him, hoping, perhaps,
to save his own life. This he did not succeed in doing:
Mirabal was tried and sentenced on 22 February and executed
before a firing squad the next day.
Meanwhile, in May of 1959, Rodriguez went to Prague, on
an official mission, to study philosophy. For almost two
years, he studied, traveled to other iron-curtain countries,
corresponded with friends in Cuba (among them Ordoqui), and
made contact from time to time with Cuban visitors, among
them Juan Marinello, old guard leader of the W.
1901: One day, in ':?ague, Rodriguez was visited by a Brazilian
student who told him the Brazilian ambassador wanted to spea'h
with him. The ambassador told him that he had a letter from
his colleague Vasco Leitao da Cunha, requesting that he warn
Rodriguez that his life would .be in danger if he returned to
Cuba. Leitao offered him asylum in Brazil. Apparently
Rodriguez did not attach too much importance to the warning.
On 10 January 1951, he was arrested by the Czech security
police. From Prague, he was transferred to Havana, to the
prison of La Cabana, where he was kept incommunicado until
the trial, which began 14 March 1964the seventh anniversary
of the attack on the pres en a palace,
1934: The Trial: During these three years, it is assumed that
the veterans of the DR and of the "2G July' movement sought
to bring the informer of Humboldt 7 to justice, and that
the Communists of the old ?3p made even greater efforts to
prevent it. It is known, from Fidel Castro himself during
his four-anal-a- a f-hour harangue in the second trial, that
Joaquin Ordoqui went to ?resident Osvaldo Dorticos to ash
that the prisoner be released.
During the five days that this phase of the trial lasted,
Revolucion semi-official organ of the Castroite faction of
the ?ar do de la Unidad Revolucionaria Socialista (PUBS, the
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detailed reports of the trial, while Hoy, the newspaper of
the Communist old guard, said nothing until the last day,
when it published a very brief account, stating that Marcos
Rodriguez had been accused of informing in the well-known
Humboldt 7 case and condemned to die before a firing squad.
The sentence was appealed, and Fidel Castro himself
recommended a judicial review, castigating, at the same
time, his old comrades of the "26 of July" movement for the
excessive publicity that had been generated during the trial.
This new trial, which lasted from 23 to 30 Larch, was tele-
vised and broadcast via radio so that, according to Castro,
nothing should be rent secret. Castro spoke for over four
hours, explaining all the involved complexities of the case,
acting at tidies almost like a supreme judge, or a referee
between two rival factions. On 1 April 1934, the Supreme
Court denied the appeal. As this is being written,
Rodriguez' execution has not yet taken place, and may or
may not be carried out depending on the secret inf luences of
the Communist old guard within the government of Cuba.
Conclusion: Three facts stand out in this extra-
ordinary trial-f
a) Rodriguez was declared guilty as charged
and condemned to suffer the extreme penalty.
Only this could avenge the victims of Humboldt
7 and satisfy the survivors who, We Faure
Chomon, were thirsting for vengeance.
b) All facts presented in the second trial
were handled to make it appear that the action
of the accused was spontaneous, personal, an
isolated instance, that he had no permanent
connection with Batista's police. Thus the
trial proceedings nowhere show that Rodriguez
was a Communist agent who had been infiltrated
among the students of the DR and that he had
betrayed them on orders of the ?S?.
c) Iievertheless, it is easy to glimpse in
more than one place in Fidel Castro's lengthy
discourse, as well as among the facts that
came to light in the first trial, that Marcos
Ridriguez Alfonso was collaborating with
Batista's police in the same manner that the
p3? was collaborating with the government of
the dictator, while Castro and his bearded cot-
rades were in the Sierra Laestra.
The betrayal of Humboldt 7 was not, therefore, an iso-
lated instance. Rodriguez felt under some obligation to
talk personally with police agent 3steban Ventura. If he
was not already known to Ventura, why did he not give him
the information by telephone? In this manner the identity
of the informer would have remained unknown.
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LAST GE MA1T USJ O TPAD3 MI$SIOI104 FOP. ESPIONAGE POSTS
For years the Soviets and their Satellites have been engaged
in a massive espionage effort against the non-Communist coun-
tries of the world. In this espionage offensive the Soviet and
Satellite countries ualte use not only of the classic tools of
espionage, i.e. agents, couriers, codes, secret writing and
photography, but they also make extensive use of their diplo-
matic and other missions in the "target countries". It is a
well-established fact that Trade Missions are a favorite device
of the Soviets and Satellites for infiltrating espionage agents
anc: intelligence officers who ferret out the information desired
by the Communists.
While attempts by the East German regime to gain even de
facto diplomatic recognition abroad have been largely unsuccess-
i, it has been able to establish a number of official and
ouasi-official Trade Missions and Trade Delegations in various
non-C,ounist countries, sometimes under the guise of providing
economic assistance to less-developed countries. As one of the
most subserviant Satellites of the Soviet Unions East Germany is
actively engaged in promoting the cold war and is dedicated to
furthering Soviet Comunist objectives in the non-Communist
areas. While it has been well--ISnov:n for some time that Soviet
ant Catellite Trade 'Hissions abroad are extensively misused for
the conduct of espionage and related act >vity, information fro_i
an office: of the "wst German intelligence service who c:efected
to lost Germany has provided dramatic evidence on the riagnitucde
and insidiousness of these activities by the Nast Germans.
Guenter UAL, T1NJ L, the defector from the cart German Intel-
n Trade Liss ons
1 Service who verified that East Germ C4 -
are @.:tensively engaged in espionage, was in an excellent posi-
tion to Ianow; he was an officer of the section which directed
such activities. Until his defection he was ti member of the
forei.gn espionage dod art gent of the:'ast Gern an Ministry for
State Security, the Liain Administration or Intelligence (:;:,CIA).
i. EiTU?F stated that the WA was part11L;icul