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April 20, 1964
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25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 20 April 1964 Briefly Noted The Chinese Comraunists, despite their frantic efforts, are still far from successful in their attempts to integrate peace- ful Tibet into the Chinese Peoples Republic. China's bloody suppression of the 135 uprising forced the Dalai Lama and thou- sands of followers into exile and installed the puppet Panchen lama in his stead. Evidence recently reaching the outside world indicates that despite harshly repressive measures against the Tibetans (the Dalai Lama's brother Norbu wrote an article in which he estimated that a half million had been executed), Chicom troubles in the area are increasing. Armed rebellion, especially in southern Tibet, is increasing and requires the use of even larger numbers of Chinese troops. The Chicoms ap- plied their inimitable agricultural practices in Tibet with the usual results: many crop failures despite widespread use of Chinese and Tibetan soldiers in agriculture. The resulting food shortage is aggravated by continuing exports of food to China. Severe restrictions on religious practice in this for- raorly theocratic state have added to Tibetan hatred of the Chinese. A March 23 Foreign Ministry note to India protesting the Dalai Lama's commemoration of the anniversary of the Tibetan rebellion reflects China's failure to subdue and win the Tibetan Populace over to communism. The Chinese note charges "Indian interference in Chinese internal affairs by continuing to sup- port Tibetan rebels wbo take refuge in India." People's Daily of r,2arch 27 goes further: "The Indian government has not ony allowed the Tibetan rebels to conduct open anti-Chinese activi- ties in India as an emigre government but has also been actively directing them to conduct similar activities in other countries in the same capacity." Additional confessions of frustration are found in recent Chinese Communist broadcasts which urge Tibetan refugees to return to their homeland and promise them immunity from punishment and from collectivization of private 25X1 C10Broperty. (Briefly Noted) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 20 April 1964 DATES 25X1C1Ob 5 May Karl Marx born 1818 (dies 14 March 1803). 11 May WFTU - 2nd International Conference on Problems of Women Workers (WFTU) Bucharest, 11-16 May, 1964. 11 May Soviet Bloc Warsaw Pact concluded, including Albania. 11-14 May 1955. 15 May Third International (Comintern) dissolved. 22 May announce- ment declares autonomy of CP's outside USSR. 1943. 16 May First of China-USSR "Unequal Treaties" (Aigan) signed. /Second(Tientsin) on 14 June? 1858. 21 May All-Africa Trade Union Federation Conference (AATUF) 21-24 May 1964, Bamako. 26 May Khrushchev arrives Belgrade, blames errors for 1948 break on Beria. 1955. June Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, Preparatory Meeting, Djakarta, 1964--full conference in late 1964 or early 1965. 5 June Secretary George Marshall proposes the European Recovery Program ("Marshall Plan") in Harvard speech. (Soviets prevent Poland and Czechoslovakia from participating). 1947 11 June Marshal Tukhachevsky and 7 other top Red Army Generals arrested, tried secretly and executed. 1937 15 June USSR occupies Lithuania 15 June 1940, Estonia and Latvia 17 June 1940 17 June German Day of Unity (West Germany) commemorating East Ger- man riots of workers/youths 16-17 June 1953 quelled by Soviet troops. 17 June Hungary announces trial, execution of Imre Nagy, 1958. 19 June Tibet: International Commission of Jurists charges Chicoms with genocide, 1960. 28 June Rumania bows to USSR's ultimatum, cedes Bessarabia, Bucovina and Hertza District, 1940. 2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2 -RDP78-03061 A000200070001-3 ** If you have articles ** ** from newspapers or periodicals ** ** suitable for reprinting in ** ** PRESS COMMENT (i.e of more than local interest and valid for weeks to come), send HQ an o r i g i n a l clipping -- thermof ax or photostate copies not useable -- marked with name and date of publication. If the latter not widely known, add brief identification, such as "Conservative weekly" or "dissident Communist monthly." Give also place of publication, if not obvious from title. If article neither in English nor in French, add translation, if possible -- preferably typed single-spaced with black ribbon, to permit direct reproduction. A i r m a i 1 to known accommodation address, if no classified information attached. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2 / 7.? A-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 25X1C10b AL9 GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #26 23 March-13 April 1964 Commentary principal Developments: 1. The Soviet "moratorium on polemics" with the Chinese was broken on 3 April with the publication in Pravda of the mas- sive (35,003 word) Suslov report to the closed session of the February CPSU plenum, accompanied by the brief plenum "decision" seconding the report and by a Pravda editorial. a evening, Khrushchev, at a commemoration o Hungary "s national liberation" holiday in the Budapest opera house, struck out sharply at the "CCP leaders," referring to their 'open revis on or the main line" and their splitting as detailed by the materials published in Pravda and speaking of the "hard struggle to be fought against" them. An advance text released by the Hungarian news agency in- cluding 8 additional hard-hitting paragraphs similar to the Suslov charges was withdrawn in favor of a softer version (which still served Soviet purposes through its reference to Pravda), but Hungarian newspapers used various versions in between K. continued to hit at the Chinese during the remainder of his Hungarian visit, with doctoring of the reported text on at least one other occasion. And by the time he gave his radio-TV re- port to the nation (back in Moscow) he was promising other par- ties that the CPSU would always treat them all as equals and never try to impose policy on them. (Chrono, May 31 April 12). The Suslov diatribe is a detailed indictment of the CCp poli- cies and actions in contrast to the success-proved genera ne of the movement"" (Soviet style) and exemplary conduct in the familiar Soviet manner 'Tough it amp i es on and extends previous charges and adds some new information -- such as con- firmation that "the Molotov-Kaganovich-Malenkov anti-Party group" have been "thrown out of our Party." However, it gives no clear indication of Soviet plans or intentions, winding up with incon- clusive passages such as: "Soviet Communists will not be silent while the Chinese leaders wage an unbridled attack on our great cause of building Communism, on the Leninist course of our Party, on the positions of the ICM. We shall have to explain for all to hear the essence of the anti- arx s neo- o sky a position of the Chinese leaders. Now, in all its sharpness, there stands the task of defending M-L from distortion by the Chinese lea ers Asserting that "the present positions of the CCP leadership do not reflect the genuine national interests of the Chinese people," Suslov adds: e will do everythi ng necessary to re- turn relations between the Soviet 115ion and e C-PH o the path corresponding to the fundamental n erests" of ou peoples. "We fully take into account the _da~nger presented by the present po- sition of the Chinese leaders Facts show that there lies ahead (Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For elease 2000L08/27 _C1A RDP78-03061 A000200070001-3 (Commentary Cont.`7 a serious and ... prolonged struggle ... (for) it is now fully clear ta CCY leaders Intend to continue stubborn defense of their erroneous line and intend to develop their splitting activity even further...." Regarding a possible world conference, Suslov merely says: "Our Party supports the calling o another conference of fra- ternal parties to discuss the basic problems o our times" and that "a collective effort by all the fraternal parties would be the appropriate way to determine the ways and means essential to preserve and consolidate M-L unity....It is quite clear to the CPSU that the conferelpce must serve this aim." I The 1*000-word plenum decision "considers" that the situation "demands the ideological exposure of the anti-Leninist stand of the CCP leadership and the decisive repulsion of their split- ting actions", approves of the po ca and practical activity of the Presidium and First Secy N.S.X., and entrusts them to carry on, but it follows this by expressing "its readiness to continue efforts to normalize relations between the CPSU and the The Pravda editorial,, written 7 weeks and numerous Chinese attacks-1-are-7. likewise fails to mention a conference. (Details in Chrono, Marc - pr , and en um All Soviet assets were thrown into the campaign in support of the new counter-offensive. Top CPSU figures were reported addressing widely-spread meetings of Party elements, and the press and radio were full of editorials and reports of rallies, statements and letters (including two signed by groups of Old Bolsheviks) from all parts of the USSR, -- and a new "heretofore unpublished Lenin document" supporting Soviet "peaceful coex- is enc po cy. Numerous "statements of support" from other party groups throughout the wor were also publicized y oviet media, 2. In fact, however, a world round-up ten days later in- dicates more hesitation and disagreement than unity and whole- hearted support. The East Germans, Bulgarians and Hungarians, o vious y primed for the occas on, launched their attacks simul- taneously with the CPSU on the 3rd, -- but the Hungarians, w.a e a ar joined ihrushchev in public attacks on the Chinese, have still failed to endorse the call for a conference. Czech chief Novotny followed with full-support on the 5th,, but the Poles waited until the 9th (though Pravda had falsely reported an earlier reaction) and then explicitly shied away from "ex- communication." Tass finally reported suppor y the Mongolian ?arty organ nen on the 11th, including the call for a confer- ence, 2 (Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (Com. }ff cbEj?j .5eIease 200 - P78-03061 A000200070001-3 The Yugoslavs on the 5th thoughtfully criticized both parties and seemed to oppose a conference. The remarkable zuman ans have still not reported or commented on the offensive, -- and unconfirmed reports say ha they have regues a ov et ap- proval of another effort at mediation. In the free world, the French Cp rushed in with immediate, strong support, beginning on-the 4th. The Italian C? continued its comments critical of the Chinese but opposed to a conference at this tine, and the Norwegian C? joined -them, while e Swedish C? urged the two to resume their bilateral talks. The Pinnis , Danish, Austrian, F1est German, Cyprus, Indian, Ceylonese, Chilean, :: e avian, Sou n African and G, were rep eddy ass - as in full support, most of them presumably including the con- ference. 3. None of the Chinese-aligned ruling parties (Chinese, H. Korean, 17. Vietnamese, Albanian) has yet mentioned the new Covie campaign, -- nor, as far as wwe know, have any others of the Afro-Asian groupan , except for the Indian an ey onese, as mentional. in facts we have seen no polemics at all from the Chinese camp during this period (except for Chinese commentaries on the recent IADL and IUS meetings and a report on pro-Chinese Communists in Chile). 4. Polish chief Goraulka led a delegation to Moscow after the period en ed (Chrono April 9, and en um, Apr 13), obviously for the primary purpose of discussing this situation, but no further information is available at this time. There is no information as to what kind of a gathering there may be to celebrate Khrushchevts birthday on April 17. 5. Marshal Malinovsky returned from his 10-day visit to last germany, apparently Having avoided the problems of the ICM. (Chrono, April 1-10.) G. The high-level Japanese CL delegation which had visited Moscow early March and Peking I a March, departed from Pyongyang on the 3rd and returned to do some more visiting in China Chrono, April 3 and continuing). 7. A preparatory meeting for the 2nd Afro Asian (Bandung) Conference opened in Djakarta on the last day of the period, with a powerful Chinese delegation in attendance. Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio predicted that the Sino-Soviet dis- pute may be discussed (Chrono, April 10). Significance: The long awaited Soviet counter-offensive has been launched, -- but after the smoke of the opening barrage cleared away, it seemed to be far less than the kind of well-planned, coordinated, determined drive needed roll back the Chinese attack. Although Approved For Release RDP78-019@*A?o VO7OOt4)3 (Co. &WWe&t29 teIease 2400108/27 :-G.IA-RDP78-03061 A000200070001-3 Suslov said at the February plenum that the CPSU "supports" the calling of a conference and Pravda publishes the time-table proposed by the C? U letter of 7-'arcl to the CCP, there is no indication in the Pravda editorial or in Z'hrushchev's remarks that the CPSU is prepared to push ahead with it in the fore- seeable future, Moreover, whether as cause cr effect, support for a conference seems to be further declining among other parties. Tie believe vie detect several increasingly influential factors: (a) an opportunistic appreciation, particularly by the larger parties, of the increased independence and leverage which has accrued to then through the continuing rivalry; (b) an increasing inability to decide which of the adversaries is lij.ely to win out in the long run; and (c) a strong feeling that the Chinese are far too important to be excommunicated; that al- though they are too rambunctious and difficult to get along with now they should be treated indulgently like hulking, obstreperous boys who can ventually be quieted down and civilized (the Togliatti and Tito view, probably). Our attention is drawn to those passages of the Suslov report where he asserts that the positions of the CCP leadership do not reflect the genuine national interests of the Chinese people (if ever there ware a case of the not calling the kettle black?) and goes on to state that "we will do everything necessary" to return relations between the two states to a situation which corresponds to the fundamental in eres s of the two peoples. Me acknowledges awareness of the danger in this, because it is clear that the CC? leaders will not yield. Should this not be read as a Soviet declaration of intent to doeverything necessary to remove the CC? leadership? In fact, the us ov report ough:.- out -- and the Pravda editorial -- attribute Chinese policies and actions tompower chauvinism" which "have nothing in com- raon with the struggle for socialism," emphasizing the national power struggle more than any previous document. At any rate, Ithrushchev -- after months of silence in Moscow -- has finally been forced to reply to Pekcing's insistently in- creased series of provocations: his reply is strong in words, but inconclusive and half-hearted as to future courses of action. Uhether this behavior (highlighted by the several "softenings" of texts) is due to uhrushchev's weaknesses, to domestic op- position and difficulties with the other CPs -- or whether this is a deliberate policy of giving the Chinese so much rope that they will finally hang themselves -- is still too early to de- cide. "saving;; seen IQ's complete failure to do away with the heretic leaders of little Albania, neither the CC? nor we ought to take vague hints at "decisive action" against the Peking regime very seriously. Treatment: 1. The developments of this period give new urgency to the task we have been stressing over recent months: to undermine the efforts of the various Party leaderships to gloss over "tie 4 Approved For Releas -RDP78-03MOMW 0(1M*0O11-3 (Comnop gye8&n~elease 2000/O&27 ~CJA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 true nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict and patch up some kind of a modus vivendi in the name of unity; to promote a world conference o par ies which would formalize the sp it, provoke all parties to take sides, and spur fur er splitting within national parties and international fronts, o~ end: a. We make new efforts to disseminate the ex- ceptionally harsh Chinese joint articles of 4 February and 31 Marc or excerpts or extra- po aT Lions from em , especially to Soviet and pro-Soviet audiences, but also to all but con- vinced Chinese supporters. The continued Soviet references to articles described in the fore- going and Chronology show how much they hurt, -- but no Soviet-aligned party or organ has publishedr or permitted dissemination of them: in fact, as far as we know, only the Chinese themselves have published these two, poss y inn Cca ng that even parties sympathetic to the Chinese line realize that their extreme for- mulations might be counter-productive. Our dissemination operations should, of course, be attributed to the Chinese or their lackeys. b. We eN^ploit fully the detailed Suslov charges of Chinese anti-Soviet activities,-disseminating them to audiences who will not be reached by the extensive Soviet-aligned media. 25X1C10b output to Soviet and Soviet-aligned au ences, vie add to them, emphasizing the danger in fur- ther toleration of such tactics and the need for vigorous counter-action, not just words. Such output can be in ee-rentially attribu ethic to "Old Bolshevik" types in various parties im- patient with the continuing indulgence of the Chinese attacks. 25X1C10b 5 (Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 ApprovQWVbY9ase 2N: VAA3061A000200070001-3 #25 23 March - 10 April 1964 March 29 - The Beirut CorsL`? :unist weedily Al Akhbar carries full page ar icle, ' hep y to the Lies of the Chin esse Leaders. The Soviet Union and the National Liberation Movement," rebut- ting directly the 4 Feb. Chinese "Splitter" article published on 27 Feb. in Al Jarida, reportedly ordered and paid for by the Chinese. March 29-31 - See Addendum to last Chrono for: Peking announce- ment of the formation of a pro-Chinese Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist); Pravda reports of Canadian and Dutch CP support for convening a world conference; description of 31 March joint People's Daily/Red Flag article, "The Pro- letarian Revolution an us zc ev s mev sionsim," the eight in the series of Chinese "replies to the 14 July CPSU open letter." March 31-5. April - The Budapest EighthCongress of the Inter- national Association of Democra c Lawyers (ILL) broug t - as e Chinese press termed it - a fierce s oruggle" between the Soviet and Chinese forces, "The Soviet de ega on, ae Chi ese say, "steamrollered rough the meeting a draft general resolu- tion shielding U.S. imperialism." The Chinese introduced their own version of a resolution, which 11CHA said was voted for by delegations from Albania, Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Ceylon, Togoland, and Dahomey, while 30 voted against, 7 abstained and 11 were absent. The other (Soviet) resolution was adopted with 33 votes for, 9 against, 6 abstaining and 4 absent. (See also last Chrono for March 29 pre-Congress Chinese press statement.) March 31-April 12 - Khrushchev's visit to Hungary set off, on the it da3Fs--TUng-expected iet counter-attack against the Chinese CP. The initial exchanges concerned only the- solidarity off the moo. On April 3, the campaign was launched simultaneously by both parties. In Moscow, Pravda published Suslov's 35,000- word 14 February report to the Gf plenum, the "decision" of that plenum, and an editorial describing a Chinese onslaught which has made this counter-attack necessary. (See Addendum for analysis of these documents.) The Hungarian daily Nepszabadsag matched ?ravda by publishing a resolution of the Iiungar an Wrty's plenum of 20-22 February denouncing Chinese erroneous policies and disruptive activities, with special at- tention to the 4Fob.Chinese attack on the C?SU. That evening (after Khrushchev had awarded Kadar the title of "Hero of the Soviet Union" and the Order of Lenin), at the opera house com- memoration of the 4 April "national liberation day," Radar referred to the Chinese attacks on lungarian (and Soviet) policy and the Hungarian plenum's resolution rejecting them. Following Radar, Khrushchev spoke of the need to "find the most suitable form for fraternal cooperation among the socialist parties." and of a experience o col ectTV ,ely pondering ways to perfect a constant flow of exchange of opinions and coordinate (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (Chro weebfvoReIease 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 foreign policy among the C AA countries, the countries of the Warsaw ac "This is of particular importance under present conditions when the CCP leaders have openly come out with their splitting attitude. This attitude is an open revision of the main line of the international Communist movement, a revision of the line which was jointly evolved by the Marxist-Leninist parties at their Moscow consultations in 1957 and 1960. Pravda today published the materials of the el*'bru`ary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the struggle waged for the unity of the international Communist movement. These materials make known our party's attitude, pro- vide a political assessment in principle of the anti-Leninist line of the CCP leaders, and show what a serious danger their undermining activity is in the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. We can be assured that in the hard strug- gle to be fought against the splitters, Marxist-Leninist parties will forge an even stronger unity under the lofty banner of Marx- Engels, and Lenin...." (Actually, an advance copy of the speech released by the Hungarian agency MTI included 8 hard-hitting paragraphs in the vein of the Suslov speech between the two paragraphs quoted above, but it was withdrawn in favor of the softer version which still served Soviet purposes through its reference to the materials in Pravda. However, the Hungarian press published various versions between the two.) On an April 5 visit to Miskolc, Hungary's second largest city, Khrushchev used the strongest language of his visit. '17hoever loves Stalin can take him if the-y--Tike the shell of corpses,' he sa , referring to people "who want to re:iy on the ax and the knife" rather than the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. He went on to shout that "they have invented charges against me," and "try to incite the people against me." Citing a par- au le to demonstrate the need for Communist unity, he added: "Only a complete idiot could pretend to prove that it is easier to build Socialism alone.,.." (These quotes come from reports of Western correspondents: the official Hungarian report omitted all but the last, which is rendered as: "Only people who have completely lost all reason....") The talks ended on the 8th, and the Hungarian statement stressed "the complete identity of views of the two parties on all questions discussed." In a long speech to a "Hungarian- Soviet friendship rally" on the 9th, however, Ehrushchev went. beyond his previous castigations of the Chinese -- and the 2 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RD 78-03061A000200070001-3 (Chronol41rQ Fpr Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200070001-3 Hungarians reported him intact. "In the persons of the Chinese leaders we face people who will hide behind protestations of leftwing ultrarevolutionary Phrases and oaths of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, while in many questions they are increasinly . sinking into the mire of Trotskyism and eat-China a auv.n~g They -bave extended their ideological erences to relations between states...-.,, "....By going left, you can arrive at the right. Thus the Chinese sectarians, in their struggle against the Leninist line of the ICI, cover themselves with ultrarevolutionary slogans and hurl enraged slanders.... meeting up with the forces of reactionary imperialsim.... ....They are replacing the Marxist-Leninist principle of uniting the proletariat with a reactionary and incorrect thesis under which color, race and continent would be the basis for unification.... ....irresponsibly playing with the fate of mil- lions of people, (they) are trying to hamper the struggle of the peoples against the danger of an thermonuclear war..." The leaders of the CCp resolutely defend symptoms alien to the spirit of M-L, such as the Stalin personality cult.... ....they wish to foist on their sister parties their anti-Leninist, adventurist line; they want to establish their own hegemony in the ICM. What can vie say in view o such absurd aspira- tions? Only that the desperate efforts of the Chinese...vzill end in shameful failure." As Khrushchev arrived in Moscow on the 11th, a joint com- munique on the talks, dated the 9th, was released: it "resolutely con emns the CC? leaders who are pursuing fractional activity," who have drawn away from the Leninist guideline jointly evolved at the Moscow conference on every fundamental question of T7C1,1 strategy and tactics," and who "on numerous issues have slipped into an essentially Trotskyite stand." Reporting on his trip to the Soviet people by TV and radio on the 12th, Khrushchev repeated his "slipping into Trotskyism" charge and said that the two parties "believe that it is im- perative in the obtaining situation to giv' a resolute rebuff to the anti-Leninist concepts and subversive ac ons of t e Chinese leaders." He made no mention o a wor meeting and talked only of bilateral meetings such as that just completed. He also included a strong statement aimed at dispelling any uneasiness in the lesser parties over Soviet pressures: 3 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (ChroA1aretbE6rRelease 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 "We have banished forever from our relations all elements of inequality, of imposing the ex- perience and policy of one country on other fraternal countries. In the great community of socialist nations, there should be no great nations and small, no infallible teachers and submissive pupils." April 1 - In an editorial pegged to the Chinese conduct at the Algiers AAPSO session (Chrono, March 22-26), Mario Alicata, editor of the Italian C?? daily L'Unita, denounced he inese in perhaps the sstrongest language ye used by the CPI, accusing them of "wretched distortion of principles," "concrete action to split the alliance," inadmissible methods of political strug- gle," and saying: "we must not allow ourselves to be intimi- dated by the accusations, pressure and slanders of the leacers of re CCP." He reiterated the CPI's call for "recognition of the autonomy of each party," and stated that "only if conditions are thus prepared can one thin: of a possible convocation of an international conference...." April 1-13 - Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky com- pleted rt1I "official friondship visit" to East Germany without becoming involved in problems of the ICM -- as far as is known. April 3 and continuing - Publication of the CPSU plenum materials ins a av a was accompanied and followed in Soviet media by a flood o communications demonstrating full support of the C?CU position (presumably including the call for a world conference) by Party elements in the USSR and around the world. Organs of other Soviet-aligned parties have also given general support but without endorsing -- some even opposing -- the convening of a world conference. The most significant of this large volume of statements are: -- Top CPSU members Brezhnev, Ilyichev, ICosygin, Podgorny, Shelest, Xirilen:o, Satyukov, were reported addressing meetings of C?SU organizations in all parts of the USSR. -- Pravda on April 5 printed a letter of support signed by Old (19 tury) Bolsheviks Petrov, Alekseyev, Narpinsky, Stasova, Voyevodin and others. Izvestiya on the 4th carried a letter signed by less famous veteran Leningrad Bolshevil.s. -- Ko munist comes out with two editorials on the subject: one emphasizes -That "the C~-CJ is still ready to search for ways to overcome existing difficulties and to eliminate differences." -- 3ast German daily Neues Deutschland gives strong support in editorials on 3rd and 5th, endorse world conference. Bulgarian media on 3rd, 4th, and 5th give large portion of space to full texts Soviet materials and text of 21 March BC? plenum resolution giving full support, including convening a world conference "this fall." 4 (Chronology Coat.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 ,9v or)Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (Chronfjl1,R,c -- Czech President iTovotny expresses full support in speech on 5th (ublished Rude- raavo on 3th) preceded by chief ideologist Koucky on 3rd. A C st a ement on the 11th specifically calls for a conference "before long." -- Polish Tryb_~una Luiu on the 9th endorses the Soviet and rejects the inese Tines but pleads for unity and cautiously shies away from "all forms of excommunication." -- Mongolian Party daily t'nen on the 10th strongly supports the Soviet pos ion, includin a convening of a conference. -- French C? reiterates its support of CPSU and its call for a wor meeting in L'Eh nantte articles on 4tth and 5th, France Nouvelle on 0th, and ::ol taro statement on 9th. -- Italian C? daily L'Unita comment on 4th and interview with ,ono'- ?n Uth still b dge`on convening world conference. -- Among the smaller parties, Tass and/or Pravda report support from Danish C? organ Land og Folk (Ath), Aus -Tian CP organ . Vo1ks (4th), Finnish c' organ I,ansan utise (5th), Chilean C? organ E 1 Siglo 5th), Peruvian CP-organ nidad (6th).. West German I{.: i.n -orn of press conference by ax R5--Imnn in Prague Eve Ceylon Cl' in form of interview with GenSecy Peter I~euneaa.n ) , CPIJSA in form of Gus ball statement (9th), Cyprus A! L in i-n-f-e F iecr with Deputy Secy Genl Andreas Fantis , South African C? in statement published in The African Co: m nisi (Gtll)t etc. No mention of the new Soviet offensive has yet been made by any Lanese--inclined party or organ. Interestingly, the same is sue of the uma: a~ sn, although Scinteia announced on the 4th that the CC wou ~vene in a plena on the 15th to hear reports on the ?arty delegation's to cs w h tie Chinese. Korean and Soviet parties on "the problem of unity of the international Communist and woraers movement." In another interesting development, the Belgrade Politika, in an article on the 5th described by Tanyug as compre iensive" and "noted," thoughtfully criticized both parties to the dis- pute, demanded "democratization" of relations as the only real menus of conquering Chinese dogmatism, and seemed to oppose convocation of a world conference. The Norwegian Frihetan opposed a world conference without adequate prepara ions (6th). April 3 and continuing - The Japanese C? delegation led by y aI:auuia a which _a conducted talks with the C?SU in Moscow February 23-March 12 and with the CC? in Peking March 21-25 and flown to ?yongyang on the 27th (see Chrono, march 25), departed from Pyongyang April 3 "after completing its itinerary" (no further comment). On the 6th, the Peking press gives front- page prominence to the arrival of the delegation in Pekin, on the 5th "front northeast China." On the 9th, the CCP/CC gives 5 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDd -DM~ f0 7)b001-3 (Chro r d bff6r teIease 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 a "farewell banquet" attended by Liu Shao-chi, Chou n-lai and others, and on the 10th they leave "by special plane to visit South China." April 7 - Italian Cp daily L?Unita carries a column by its oYscowcow -7ndont. Boffa pegged to press conference by Soviet delegate Gafurov after his return from-the Algiers AA:'SO ses- sion in which he says: " in Moscow the idea is wide- spread that for the Chinese the :lumber one adversary, who must be beaten at all costs is no langer the United ates but the Soviet non.... -,; villLIL be advisable to remember this to un er- s an oscocrts reaction to their attacks .... It is Chinese nationalism that strikes the Soviets most...." ?eking press features a report from Santiago on a January meeting of 60 pro-Chinese Chilean Communis to denounce the PC-Ch leadership for toeing the rev sion s ine of the CPSU and to appeal to all parties to struggle against revisionism. April 9 - Moscow announces that a polish party-government do- elg tion headed by First Secretary Gomulka and premier Cyrankiowicz "will arrive in the Soviet union soon on a friendly official visit at the invitation of the CPSU/CC and the Soviet Government." (They arrived on the 13th for talks scheduled to last through the 13th,1 Western correspondents report that, according to "cast- Bloc sources in Budapest," Rumania is trying to mate a now ef- fort to mediate and has propose o the Russians that they he Rumanians send a second peace mission to ?eking. April 10 - The Poking press features the departure of the Chinese delegation headed by Foreign Minister Chen Yi for Djakarta to par is pate in the preparatory meeting for the Second Afro-Asian Conference. also gives prop nonce to a statement ay a Chinese a egation to the executive meeting of the International Union of Students (IUS) in Budapest 15-22 February, at which e Soviet delegate sought to impose an erroneous line on the I W and create a split." a said at the Soviet delegate, 'wielding the baton had tried to "reduce the IUS to a tool for the foreign policy of a certain countr-` and use the oor to 'v lift' the Chinese delegation an spl t the world students movement." The Chinese delegate had "sternly do- nounced these splitting activities of the Soviet delegate." In a televised interview with Via Indonesian press in Djakarta last night, Foreign Minister Subandrio said that the fro-Asian prenarator,- Mete n~ i h ~cTid^u5 Yie Gino-Soviet dispute, that some Afro-Asian nations intend to bng up the question in the hope of suggesting ways of a settlement of the controversy. (AF? Singapore) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Rel4g%QM//M'578-03061 A000200070001-3 A. After-deadline items publishes April 11 - Izvestiya/another "hitherto unpublished Lenin docu- me in w c he reportedly supports "peace u coexistence." "contains instructions for the Soviet delegation to the first international diplomatic conference ever attended by Soviet representatives, at Genoa in 1922. Izvestiya's comment shows how current Soviet foreign policy continues to be presented as Leninist policy. April 13 - Speeches by Xhrushchev and Gomulka at the welcoming nner n Moscow stresse "unity o the international workers movement". There has been no precise announcement as to the purpose of the Poles' visit. B. Chinese joint People's Daily/Red Fla, article dated 31 HardVIOUT _e Proletarian Revolution an hrus chew s e- vis oonis -- Comment on -the pen er o27-the Central Committee of the A review of this full 18,030 word text reveals that the NCITA summary which we had in hand two weeks ago was a faithful distillation, and our brief comments in the Addendum to the last Chronology present the essence of this generally familiar re-run of the Chinese line on revolution. Therefore, we will here add only a few useful quotations. The general line of attack is indicated by the headings of its tan (un-numbered) sections: (1) A Disciple of Bernstein and Kautsky (2) Violent Revolution Is a Universal Law of Pro- letarian Revolution (3) Our Struggle Against Khrushchev's Revisionism (4) Sophistry Cannot Alter History (5) Lies Cannot Cover Up Reality (6) Refutation of the "Parliamentary Road" (7) Refutation of "Opposition to Left Opportunism" (8) Two Different Lines, Two Different Results (9) From Browder and Tito to Khrushchev (10) Our Hopes Under (2), the Chinese quote Lenin on "civil war, without which not a single great revolution in history has yet been able to get along, and without which not a single serious Marxist has conceived of the transition from capitalism to socialism" ("Prophetic Words"), and conclude the section by adding solemnly: "It is on this most important question that Khrushchev betrays Marxism-Leninism.'' Under (6), they stress that half of the Communist parties in capitalist countries are still illegal and cannot possibly win a parliamentary majority: (Addendum to Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (Adde9"r6k' F))r Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 "cor ex:a:ple, the Communist ?arty of Spain lives under white terror and .gas no oppor- tunity to run in elections. It is pathetic and tragic that Spanish Communist leaders lice Ibarruri should follow Khrushchev in advocating 'peaceful transition' in Spain." Under (S), they list "the main lessons of the successful proletarian revolutions in the countries extending from China to Cuba after World tar II.": "1 -- Violent revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolution. To realize the transition to socialism, the proletariat must wage armed stru:,;gle, smash the old state machine, and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. "2 -- The peasants are the most dependable allies of the proletariat. The proletariat must closely rely on the peasants, establish a broad united front based on the worker- peasant alliance, and insist upon proletarian leadership in the revolution. "3 -- U.S. imperialism is the arche seriy of people's revolution in all countries. The proletariat must hold high the national banner of opposition to U.S. imperialism and have the courage to fight with firm resolve against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in its own country. "4 -- TLe revolution of the oppressed na- tions is an indispensable ally of the pro- letarian revolution. The workers of all coun- tries must unite, and they must unite with all the oppressed nations and all the forces op- posed to imperialism and its lackeys to form a broad international united front. "5 -- To make a revolution, it is es- sential to have a revolutionary party. The triumphs of the dictatorship of the pro- letariat are impossible without a revolution- ary theory and style of Marxism-Leninism, a party which is irreconcilable towards revision- ism and opportunism, and which takes a revolu- tionary attitude toward the reactionary ruling classes and their state power." They ad: "Conversely, all those parties which adopted a non-revolutionary, opportunist line and accepted Ihrushchev's line of 'peaceful transition' are doing serious damage to t:.e Approved For Release 2000?08/27 : CIA-F f 9P63MCAGO000070001-3 (Adden-romrstl.5or Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 revolutionary-cause and turning themselves into lifeless and reformist parties, or becoming completely degenerate and serv- ing as tools of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. There is no lack of such instances," and they describe the parties of Iraq, Algeria, Cuba, France and Italy. In (9), just before demanding r-3pudiation and liquidation of K'nrushchev's revisionism, they castigate him personally: "The revisionist Khrushchev is also scared out of his wits by the hysterical war cries o le U.S. taper alists, and he thinks that this "Noah's ark, " the earth, is threatened with destruction at any moment and has completely lost confidence in the future of ma:i :d. Pro- ceeding from national egoism, he fears that revolutions by the oppressed classes and na- tions create trouble for him and implicate him. Therefore, he tries to oppose ever revolution by all means and, as in he case or he Congo, does not scruple to take joint action with U.S. imperialism in stamping out a people's revolu- tion. No thinT.ks that by doing so he can avoid risks and at the same time conspire with U.S. imperialism to divide the world into spheres of influence, thus ., ng two irc.s With one stone. =this only goes to show that Kharu- shchev is the greatest capitulationist in history. The enforcement o x thrush c ev s perm c ous policy will inevitably result in in- $= estimable damage to the great Soviet Union 1 sd C. Materials from Pravda, April 3 1034. Note: the Soviet press has announced that all iiree eats (described be- low) have been published in a p mplllet entitled The Struggle of the CPSU for the Cohesion of the Vorld Co sunist I oveiien in Bng sn, rench, Span sz, German, Italian, In onesian, Japanese and I-rabic by the Novosti news agency and are available at booyk- stores connected with the I;Iezhdunarodnaya IIniga (Soviet Inter- national Book) organization. The full te..t of the Pravda edi- torial and a 7, 003word summary of the Suslov report, as nL fie available in English by Tass, were also published in the N.Y. Ti :ies of 4 April and reprinted in Press Comment dated 6 Ab. ri3. SUSLOV r" ?OU?T TO EB UARY PI$NUM - This 35, 000-word docu- ,lent is an a-part, detailed indictment of the policies, actions and motives of the CC? leadership, juxtaposed with a defense of the C?SU line and conduct. The ground covered is familiar, but Suslov adds some new information_ chile amplifying and ex- tending some of the previous charges. A 2503word introduction distills his case. ;ere is 110y' it all began, according to Suslov: 3 (Addendum Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (Adde- IJr@1 Fpr Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 "...The entire progress of world development fully reaffirms the correctness of the general line of the WCM drafted at the conferences of fraternal parties in 1957 and 1960 and the vitality of the conclusions and principles of the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses and the Leninist Program of the CPSU.... iIowever, our successes could have been even more significant but for the serious difficulties which occurred within the socialist camp and the Communist movement as a result of the schismatic activity of the CCP leaders....Beginn ng w e 19 Moscow conference, (the -Chinese leaders.) nav- ng begun w the revision of certain tactics and principles of the VJCM, went on step by step to deepen their differences with the CPSU and other fraternal parties on the most important contemporary problems. Finally, running counter to the general course of the WCiI, they put for- ward their own special line, in which they re- vised Fie basic principles of the declaration and statement from positions of big-paver I chauvinism and petty bourgeois a venturism.... They have` in fac c1eve ope into d sagreement on all fundamental questions." The CPSJ undertook numerous measures to surmount the dis- agreements and normalize relations, but the CCP leaders, "blinded by nationalist arrogance,...rejected our initiative and embarked on the road of open political struggle...: Chinese propaganda "is coming even closer to joining the ranks of anti- Soviet and anti-Communist organs of reactionary imperialist circles," Suslov says, and he points specifically to the 4 r, ebruary article which "is an insult to our entire Party and the entire Soviet people" with its e iri.ous arse: ions. 1 a_v_inZ roadone heiZ attack from Soviet foreign policy to dom stic affairs, they "have gone so far that the Chinese press and radio appeal to Soviet people to fight against the CPSJ/CC and the Soviet v ....' "...the real plans of the Chinese leadership have nothing in common with Pl-L and the in- erests o.: word socialism .... VadUnder the guise of revolutionary phrases an slogans, the CCP leadership is now mounting a furious attack on the achievements of world socialism, con- centrating its main fire not on the imperial- ists but predominantly on the C?sU and other M-L parties .... xho rnai w.irn...lies in using all sorts of political splinter groups -- rene- gades of Communism, anarchists, Trotskyites, and the li%e -- to split the united front of Communists, hammer together a bloc of pro- Chinese factions and groups, and subordinate C?'s to their own influence....The scheme... Approved For Release 2060/08/27 : CIA-R -ib'b19ARb2bO070001-3 - (AddeAoQ@ dr Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 amounts to an intention to foist their ad- venturist conceptions and methods onto the poeples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to set peoples against one another according to racial distinctions, to tear apart the union between the na on al liberation and workers movements.... ...The main strategic principle of the Chinese leadership: to subject, regardless of the consequences, the Communist and na- tional liberation movements to their own great-pourer narrow, egotistica Interests. - is precisely for is pairpose that p: inci- pies of proletarian internationalise are being flagrantly violated....Marxist-Leninist teach- ing; is being redesigned and distorted....(and) the worst traditions of petty-bourgeois na- tionalism and the most shameless demagogy and slander are employed as weapons." An outline of the body of Suslov=s report follows: (1) Two Epproac:es to the Issue of the Role of the World Social- ist System. s is toe familiar Soviet argu::ien a ion, se fortE in o 14 July open letter and other statements. (2) Questions of War, ?eace,and Revolution. In over 6,333 words, (t 1longest section), Sus ov follows the "Traditional Ithiu- shchevian line on these important questions, but in stronger language than any previous official statement. Be says that "the CCP leaders have come to maintain that war constitutes an acceptable -- and in essence the sole -- meads of solving the contradiction between capitalism nn socialism," and that they "even boast about being prepared agree to the annihilation of half of mankind," citing some old and some new Chinese te- men s denonstra ng their ruthless attitude. He adds, "every timo it has been found possible to normalize a situation and avert a military conflict, Pelting has not been able to conceal its irritation and regret." Suslov contrasts Chinese behavior in attempting "to e;;pand the armed conflict on the Sino-Indian frontier" where "there had been no armed classes between China and .India for centuries," with their "showering flattery on the reactionary ?a1istan regime before the eyes of the en ire world"" and ""virtually entering into a pact" with that member of the imperialist S3ATO and CLNTO niliTary alliances. Further evidence of CCP hypocracy is their "feverish efforts to improve relations with Britain, France, Japan, West Germany and Italy," and they would do the same with tip U.S. "but they cannot see suitable conditions for it at the moment.'' (3) The CC? Leaders' Policy of Isolating the National Liberation na Movement roil i23 international or tin` ass. Also traditio 5 (Addendum Cont . ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (Adde pproveo t Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-0306.1A000200070001-3 argumentation, but stronger. In developing his charge that "the CCP leadership is obviously striving to assume control of the forces of the national liberation struggle in order to turn them into tools for realization of its own clans for hegemony," Suslov expands on the previous accounts of the Chinese an - white" comments at the Uoshi AAPSO conference, and also on the "secret intention behind ~e Chinese slogan" --'The East Wind Will prevail over the West Wind" -- which is "nothing more or less than an ideological and political expression of the he;emo- nic strivings of the Chinese leaders." (4) Soviet-Chinese Relations. This 3,000-word section gives the Soviet picture of Their great aid to China, drastically re- duced on CCp initiative, and adds: 'At present, the Chinese propagandists are positively bursting out of their skins to prove that there was no Soviet aid to China and that only the usual trade operations took place. In an effort to destroy the peoples' memory of Soviet aid, they are even going so far as to remove factory trade marks from Soviet tools and machines and are slandering the Soviet Union by saying that it supplied China with obsolete equipment." They also "attempt to justify the failure in the development of the CPR national economy resulting from the 'great leap for- ward' policy" on "the issue of Soviet experts.".... "The Chinese leaders are striving to fence their people off from the Soviet pion. ' Q) Attacks by CCn Leaders on the C?SU Program. 3000-word justification of Program line on evolving from the "dic- tatorship of the proletariat" to a "people's rule". (6) The Splitting Activity of the Chinese Leaders in the World- vita Mmunist Movement. Anguished 4,300-word complaint, in- c ludino protest against new Chinese "pseudo-theoretical" dia- lectical law on inevitability of split in 4 Feb. article. "The whole Chinese propaganda machine -- NCITA, the information centers, various bulletins and radios -- is now enlisted in the struggle against U -L parties." He admits that the "ultra- leftwing revolutionary phraseology with which the Chinese leaders coat their adventurous concepts might find a certain response among the hundreds of millions of people unversed or inexper? ?. enced in politics...." (7) On the Danger of petty-bourgeois Nationalist Neo- Trotshyite Deviation, In this , -vrord sections Suslov ex- emits Soviet arguments even more than on other subjects: The CC? leaders "have fallen so low that they now borrow many of their ideas and concepts from the ideological luggage o ots.:yism, she ""petty bourgeois trea6s d eiea a by ninism on; agog'' including "the fractional, schismatic methods of 6 (Addendum Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 -(Adder proved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 struggle," the "theory about the regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America being the main zone of world revolution," and even the "repetition in new conditions of the old Trotskyite slander about the rebirth of the USSR into a Thermidorian state." In support, he quotes on.; of e leaders of o s kyism in Latin America, Posadas," who said last July: "Co?:rade Chinese, you cannot assert that all the questions put forward by you as re- volutionary conclusionsare the exclusive re- sults of your own theoretical and political work alone. These are the conclusions of the Fourth International." Suslov then turns to nationalism, which "is gaining the upper hand more and more in the overall policy of tW nese leadership and is becoming the mainspring of their ac- tivity. MIS became apparent even 'in the period of the great leap forward....This found its expression in such acts by the Chinese Govt. as the artificial inflation of national- istic passions concerning or er questions,, the behavior of the CCP leaders during the Caribbean crisis, and the position of the Chinese Govt. on the nuclear question. All these and other facts expose the total split between the words and deeds of the nese ers, is becoming increasingly clear at she a tciing phrases and formulas are designed for export, for imposition on the :. s of other countries. The C leaders ,aemse ves, when the su j eat is prac cal steps in the international arena, prefer to act not at all from poe4tions of revolutionary s rugg a with imperialism. 3xtreme bewilderment is caused by the fact that Chinese propaganda boils down its struggle with imperialism to a struggle with the U.S., by-passing its allies -- Ja- panese, West Germans and French imperialists. Are they not really looking for partners in the monopoly circles of these countries in their struggle with so-called modern revasion- sm He concludes: "The nationalistic course of the CCP leaders has nothing in common with the genuine interest of the fraternal Choi nese people.," and then turns to the "negative influence on the activity of theCC?" of "Mao Tse-tung's personality cult." Suslov says "our party smashed the Molotov- aanovich- Ma.len icov anti-party group" because they opposed elfin nation of the personality cu, -- and also because some were responsible 7 (Addendum Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (Addendum opt Approve ForReIease 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200070001-3 for part of the mass repressions. "Is it for the restoration of such inhuman methods that the Chinese leaders feel concerned? Is this why they display sympathy for people who have been thrown out of our Party?" (3) For the Unity of the V1CPd on the ?rinciplas of Marxism- Len nism. us ov begins its 2, -word concluding sec on by relating 1how "viie have done and are doing everything necessary to overcome the disagreements between and restore cooperation between the ^C? and th4o CPSU, " but the CCP leaders only launch increasin.- attac2ts. "They have concentrated their fire largely on IIikita Ser ;eyevich, who has headed the remark- able processes cihich have begun in our Party and our country since the 20th Congress and have guaranteed the successful advance of the Soviet people toward Communism. This is why, with their undermining aims in view, they would li'.e to isolate T . .~ . rom the CC and to sat our CC aga ns e2ar y anc oviet people. But this Typo sanempty, hopeless adventure. It is doomed to a complete and sharseful failure. The Chinese leaders, and not only they, Liust note and firmly remember, that our CC headed by that loyal Leninist N.S.:;. is united and monolithic as never before." (Ode to K. con inues. Suslov stresses that it was the Chinese who "announced the suspension" of the bilateral talks last July. It became clear that they "regarded our self-discipline, our desire for unity, as a manifestation of weakness."'and even "started saying that they V7111 not accept an raprovement of relations with the CPSU except on the condition of unconditional surrender on our part." "In their nationalistic self--1 ove, they oaste i.n their 4 Feb. article) that they wi continue attacks o C?SU in order to disorganize the activity of the par y created by the great Lenin." "For Soviet communists, tine sons and daughters of the October Revolution, the pio- neers of the new communist world, to whose lot such. heavy tests have fallen, it is simply ridiculous to listen to these threats. Soviet Coi:ir.iunists will not be silent while the inese load e~?s wage an unbridled a tac%. on our great cause of building Communism, on the Leninist course of our party, on the positions of the international Communist movement. We shall have to explain for all to hear the essence of the anti-Marxist neo- otskiyite position of the Chinese lea ers. 11ovit in a its sL:arp- ness, there stands the taswc of defenc3irlr ~ifarxisn- Leninism from distort-ion by the nese lea ers. (Addendum Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (Adds ?0f Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 The interests of preserving the purity of Marxist-Leninist teaching, the interests of the world communist movement, and, most im- portantly, the interests of the Chinese people themselves demand rota us open an cec s ve op- position to the incorrect views an dangerous actions of the CCP leadership.... We are sure that m one will ever be able to undermine the basis of friendship between the great peoples of the Soviet Union and China, that the present positions of the leadership of the CC do not reflect a genu ne national interests of the nese peop e. e s a o everything necessary to return relations between e Soviet Union and the CPR to the path cor- responding-to-the fundameal interests of the working class and all w or ing people o our countries. Facts show that there lies ahead a serious and, judging from everything, a prolonged struggle for strengthening the unity o all socialist st forces, for friendship and coopera- tion between the Soviet and Chinese peoples. It is now fully clear that the CCP leaders in- tend to continue to be stubbornOT-H of their erroneous line and intend to develop even further their fractional activity in the world communist movement.... Our party supports the calling of another conference of fraternal parties to discuss the basic problems of our times and for hold- ing during this conference the broadest pos- sible exchange of views in the interests of overcouing the difficulties in the communist movement. These difficulties have been caused by the differences between the CCP leadership and the international communist movement. There- fore, a collective effort by all the fraternal parties wou be the appropriate crag to e er- mine a ways and means essential to preserve and consolidate Marxist-Leninist unity in the communist ranks.... T"2 DECISION Or T} PENH ADOPTED OTd 15 FEBURAPY 1934 - A very brief (1,003 words) document seconding the Suslov report, Ee- garding future action, however, it says only: "The CLSU/CC plenum considers that the fundamental interests of the world socialist systeti and tbo Communist moveint, =s voll as the defense of the purity of Marxism- Leninism, demand the ideological exposure of Approved For Release 2000/08/Pl : CIA-RDFW-6S69b0b70001-3 (Adele prcMudtE0)r Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 the anti-Leninist stand of the CCP leadership and decisive repo lion of their splitting actions, ? Fully and unanimously approving the po- litical and practical activity of the CPSU/CC Presidium and of First Secy Comrade U.S.K. directed toward ~t-uildin; a Communist society in the USSR; insuring the victory of the cause of peace, democracy, national independence, and socialism; and strengthening the cohesion of M-L parties, the CPSU/CC plenum entrusts the CC Presidium with the task of continuing to defend firmly the general line of the VICM and to strive to-strengthen the unity of all present-day revolutionary orces.t' There is no mention of any concrete measures for political ac- tion, but the decision adds: "In spite of the fact that the Chinese leaders have gone far in their splitting ac- tions, the CPSU/CC plenum, putting the interests of the unity of the i7CM above all else, ex- presses its readiness to continue efforts to normalize re ations between the C? 5U an the PR`VDA EDITORIAL - A brief (1,500 words) distillation of the Suslov report, with no specific call for a conference. It does, however, describe the recent exchange of letters, including the CPSU letter of 7 March which proposed a time-table for steps leading up to a world conference in autumn 1964. The entire text can be found in Press Comment April 6. 10 (Addendum) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000L08127 :-CIA--RDP78-03061480Rp202272001-3 imam 25X1C1gkf2? Further Sino-Soviet Clashes in Front Organizations BACKGROUND: The Eighth Congress of the International Associa- tion of m cratic Lawyers (IADL) opened in Budapest on 31 March wi 4GO-500 participants, representing some 60 member organiza- tions. The participants came from 13 bloc, 13 European, 9 Latin American, and 7 Asian countries, and from Africa, the US and Canada. Despite the broad geographic representation at the Congress and efforts to mute the Sino-Soviet dispute, the polemics between the Soviet and Chinese delegations dominated the Congress, just as they did the preliminary work on the Congress agenda in 1963. The large 30 member Chinese People's Republic (CPR) delegation came prepared for an anti-Soviet campaign. In a press statement on 29 March the delegation blamed the Soviets in advance "for the grave consequences which may ensue at the 8th Congress." The state- ment said further: "It is to be regretted that certain responsible members of the IADL have taken an extremely un- democratic attitude to monopolize everything in regard to the agenda of the eighth congress, the reports, and the way the congress is to be con- ducted for the purpose of pushing through the erroneous line of the foreign policy of a certain country." The Chinese again attacked the legitimacy of the preparatory work for the Congress in a statement issued after the Council of the IADL had met on 30 March to give final approval to the agenda for the Congress: "The voting conducted by the council on the agenda is null and void and its result is not binding on the Chinese delegation, which re- serves the right to advance its own opinion." The leader of the Chinese delegation, Mrs. Han Yu-tung, con- tinued the attack on the practices of the Soviet Union and its followers in the IADL in a speech during the opening day of the Congress. She accused "certain persons" of "manipulating and using the IADL to propagate the general line of so-called peaceful co- existence." In an obvious appeal for support from the underdevel- oped nations, Mrs. Han said: "Those who talk loudly about subordinating everything to the general line of 'peaceful coexistence and to universal and complete Approved For Release 200016-101-1530 P78-g3(A000W01-3 (772 Cakpp-oved For Release DP78-03( 114 Q20QAO001-3 disarmament' have adopted a passive, scornful, and negative attitude toward the national inde- pendence movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America." Mrs. Han's speech concluded with a presentation of 7 proposals to the Congress. When the leader of the Soviet delegation, Lev N. Smirnov, replied to the Chinese attack (Mrs. Han's speech "has no connection with international law; it only attacks the policy now supported by all the world"), Mrs. Han demanded the right to speak in rebuttal and after some argument was given the microphone but her speech could not be heard over the catcalls and other noise. Pierre Cot, President of the IADL, then adjourned the session and said that the Congress would adhere strictly to the agenda. The next general session of the Congress was not scheduled until the last day, April 5th, with the intervening days devoted to work in the commissions. Very little reporting has appeared so far concerning the work of the comm.ssions or the final resolutions. The Chinese evidently continued their opposition in the commissions and presented their own draft resolutions on the closing day. Reportedly, when this resolution -_ which inter alia represented the partial nuclear test ban agreement as a fraud against the peoples and called "US imperialism the most ferocious and most arrogant aggressor in human history" -- was rejected by the political bureau of the Congress (31 to 9 with 7 abstentions), the Chinese delegation walked out. This clearly pointed up the weakness of their minority position. The Congress voted instead for a resolution drafted by the presidium which called for "coexistence between countries with different social. and political systems." Attempting to paper over these disruptive Chinese actions, Pierre Cot and the Secretary General of the IADL, Joe Nordmann, stated on 6 April after the concluding Congress session that "des- pite the arguments and differences of opinion, the general atmos- phere of the Congress had improved during the week it was in session The Congress was very successful." The IADL officers also stated at this press conference that they considered the CPR still to be a member of the international association -- which means that if the Chinese wish to split the IADL formally they must take further initiatives. It also means, however, that under existing conditions and in the absence of any official censure by the IADL, the Chinese and their followers are free to continue their regional recruiting efforts in the recently organized Afro-Asian Lawyers Organization, where the Chinese were able to get the Soviets excluded from the permanent secretariat established in November 1963. That the Chinese splitting attempts will continue is clearly indicated by the fact that Mrs. Han stated her concern over Soviet control of inter- national front organizations very explicitly: "They stop at nothing to control and use a number of international mass organizations as an instrument for the pursuance of this erroneous line." 2 (772. Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (772 0qMVdNied For Release 2 P78-03061940 0 1-3 In Algiers, 200 delegates from 71 nations watched the feud between the Chicoms and their Soviet brethren rage throughout the Sixth Council Session of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organ- ization (AAPSO). The verbal battle began even before the mee ing opened on 22 March and lingered on after the closing session on 27 March. This marks the t h i r d successive AAPSO meeting that has been disrupted by the Sino-Soviet quarrel. When the public dispute made its AAPSO debut in February, 1963, at Moshi,the Chinese stole the show from the apparently unsuspecting Russians. The following September,a forewarned Soviet delegation firmly controlled the proceedings at the Nicosia executive committee meeting. Meanwhile, some Africans and Asians have become exasper- ated with Sino-Soviet antics in AAPSO and their impatience came to the fore at Algiers. Supported by such Afro-Asians, the Algerian Chairman of the Council Mohammed Ba Yazid acted as chief mediator and saved the March AAPSO Meeting from further ideological mud- slinging. The Chinese attacked Soviet foreign policy on the grounds that it is "appeasing imperialism" and "vacillating," decisively support- ing only strong and tested revolutionary moveFnents. At various times during the six day conference, the CPR e egation, led by Mrs. Kuo Chien, applied these criticisms to USSR relations with the United States, Israel, Cuba, the Congo, India and Algeria. As a result, said the Chicoms, the Soviets are "traitors to the prin- ciples of Leninism"; the gist of the Soviet reply on all counts -- "All the Chinese have said is lies." To bolster their charge the Soviets cited extensive aid, particularly in Africa, suggozted that, "If not for Soviet aid, China would have collapsed" and concluded that the Chinese harassers were the "traitors to Lenin." The vehemence of Sino-Soviet debate in public and closed sessions prevented the Council from completing much of e business at hand. (1) The Chinese objected to Soviet proposals that an Afro- Asian Economic Seminar and Afro-Asian conferences for women, youth and writers be held in Moscow in 1964. (2) Of seven committees scheduled to be chosen, only the Organization, General Declarations, and Political Committees were selected. Significantly, membership on the Political Committee was evenly balanced between Chicom and Soviet supporters. (3) Neither the Fund Committee (mechanism for funding revolu- tions in Africa) in Conakry, the Three Continent Committee (device for extending AAPSO membership to Latin America), relations with the Organization for African Unity (OAU), labor conferences, nor organizational changes were discussed to any useful degree, although all represent priority AAPSO problems, The failure to do so can be tied to points of dissension in the Sino-Soviet argument. /Discussion of these and other controversial issues was to be resumed within the secrecy of the AAPSO Secretariat in Cairo on 8 April./ _3- (772. Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (772 QkMr.qved For Release 20 DP78-030612%OQ4QO I-3 The 37 resolutions (almost identical to those of last year) issued in the Council's final communique embodied the one over- riding element of unity in the entire meeting. Every delegation opposed imperialism, notably in South a nam an anama. That the Council managed to proclaim the regular battery of prop- aganda-laden resolutions and also decide on dates and places for the next two AAPSO confabs can be attributed to Afro-Asian mediators. In evidence since the Gaza meeting of 1961, certain Africans emerged in Algiers as the arbitors and disciples of Afro-Asian unity: (1) Mohammed Ba Yazid, the Algerian Chairman of the Council and elected head o the itical Committee, suspended and closed sessions when debate grew heated, at one point ejected the press, and generally objected to the Sino-Soviet exhibition of attrcking solidarity. He referred discussion of key and controversial ques- tions to the Secretariat, and was largely responsible for drawing the delegations together to accomplish the usual amenities and formalities, including the passage of resolutions. Yazid undoubt- edly derived his strength from Ben Bella's backing. Yazid's state- ment that, "Only African and Asian issues are proper subjects" for AAPSO consideration echoed declared sentiments of the Algerian head of state. (2) Yazid's All-African supporting cast included Mahdi Ben Barka, an exiled oroccan revolutionary (W96-makes his headquarters in geria) and Chairman of the Organization Committee. The Chair- man of the important Fund Committee, Guinean Abdoulaye Diallo was selected to head the General Declarations Commi ee. Egyptian Secretary General Yusuf Sibai was faced with lesser struggles, (e.g., India vs. Pa stan over Kashmir, admittance of Malaysia, etc.) some directly (-e.g., two Ceylonese delegations, four Chicom- backed delegations from the Camerouns) caused by the more spectac- ular Sino-Soviet rift. Although Chicom and Soviet camp followers were present and discernible, AAPSO's traditional "a pox on both your houses" group endures. When the Soviets and Chinese agreed, for once, on seating a new delegation from Zanzibar, the Arabs opposed it because Arabs had been slaughtered there. At times, the Arabs (particularly the Egyptians) even talked of throwing both the hrcoms and Soviets out of AAPS . 25X1 C10b 4 Approved For Release 2000 - '78-63391A bbb b&"6o1-3 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000108!2fDP78-03061A00 2999. qOqW4 25X1C1&?3. Recent Revisionist Voices: Looking Beyond Marxism-Leninism BACKGROUND: Current news headlines describe the conflict between Moscow and Peking over who shall be the leader of world Communism. Peking charges that the Soviet leaders are revision- ists and splitters who have abandoned the goal of revolution. Moscow accuses the Chicom leaders of factionalism, petty bourgeois nationalism, adventurism, and racialism. Although each claims to be the true heir to Marx and Lenin, their differences appear to be unbridgeable; therefore, both cannot be right in terms of doctrine, and it does not take a very skeptical mind to suspect that neither is doctrinally in an entirely sound position. For someone who believes in economic determinism, it might be natural to infer that the ideological conflict is based on the fundamental economic and political problems and aims of China and the Soviet Union, or in other words, that Khrushchev and Mao are following their con- flicting personal and national interests. Marx s - n n s s n other areas may we conclude that they have unique interests as well, corresponding with neither the interests of Moscow nor the interests of Peking. This seems to be the conclusion reached, for example, by the government of Rumania. Common interests: removal of dogmatic restraints. Governments and po cans, however, are not the on y ones -to have interests. Other people play prominent roles in modern society too: writers, scientists, teachers, and critics, for example. No first-class representative of any of these groups can be happy with a rigorous system of state or party control; their activities are best pursued with imagination, in an atmosphere of free discussion. All of them, but especially the scientists, are indispensable to a modern society, and they contribute most to it when they are free. Their interest inevitably lies in the removal of dogmatic restraints. The Sino-Soviet conflict and the Soviet denigration of Stalin have undermined the moral authority of any official doctrine, and the concept of a single world-wide monolithic movement following the dictates of the First Secretary of the CPSU has been proven im- practical. Communist and leftist intellectuals are taking advantage of the situation to claim new freedoms for themselves and their fellow citizens, and to advance new theories to modify those of classic Marxism-Leninism. Particularly interesting for us, and no doubt particularly alarming for the Stalinists, are the indica- tions that the revisionists in the various Bloc countries draw support and encouragement from eac other, and are not Isolate d by the barbed wire which separates ese countries from each other as well as from the West. Marxism: its several aspects. MLny ''?ecterners believe that Marxism, let alone Leninism, is basically and irremediably in con- flict with intellectual freedom. Marxism deals in unmeasurable abstractions, and its supporters refuse to admit that the doctrine could be proven false, thereby making it a matter of faith and not of fact or science. Marxism fosters the tyranny of concepts over Approved For Release 2000/08?"^" ?"^"" 03-01-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (773 Cont.) 20 Apr the mind by classifying everything in broad value-loaded categories, like Procrustean beds, so as to discourage hritical thought and mobilize the masses for action. Ideally, we would like to see the Bloc throw off Marxism-Leninism altogether. But this is not a practical goal at present. Or practical reason is that anyone arguing for a total rejec- tion of Marx would be considered, in the Bloc and in some circles outside it as well, as an agent of Western imperialism, and appro- priate action would be taken to silence him. But more important, many intellectuals honestly believe that Marx had a vision of truth. Some who were brought up inside the system are unable to throw off all they were taught; Marxism is a crutch to which they are accus- tomed. Others who became Marxist-Leninists in a capitalist society still consider Marx's insights into and criticisms of that kind of society a liberating influence. The revisionists have discovered, correctly, that Marx himself was inspired by humane impulses, by a detestation for the real suffering, bourgeois hypocrisy, and personal unhappiness--due to the isolation or alienation of the individual from any satisfying, human social life--which e saw in capitalist society. The humane ideas of Marx, which are obviously as counter to Stalinist society as they were to the society of 19th century England, are more likely to win acceptance among Communists and leftists than any blanket condemnation of Marxism. For many--those who are not expert theoreticians--the fine point of Marxist thought, whether Stalinist or that of the Young Marx, are a somewhat academe matter. They are more concerned to affirm cer- tain intellectual or a cal ideas which are really independent of Marxism, and which are important in themselves; they try to relate these to Marxism, but often somewhat as an afterthought, apologeti- cally. Such ideas include demands for: free investigation, open discussion, the review of Stalinism, free access to Western litera- ture, a turn away from the parrotting of Marxist-Leninist texts, and even an appreciation of the spiritual element. These proposals con- stitute a rejection of Stalinism, and to say the least, a radical change in the direction of Marxism-Leninism, yet the-proposals are advanced as obvious and self-evident. Only the party and state officials with a vested interest in a Stalinist system, try to stifle such statements; the officials often succeed where they still control the instruments of repression, but they are weak in terms of argu- ments. The new currents might almost be described as "liberalism" rather than as "revisionism," since their authors are rea y con- cerne with ideas outside, if not hostile to Marxism, and not with changing the content of Marxism. Yet most of those who state these views would hotly deny that they are outside the Marxist-Leninist framework. The following are characteristic revisionist figures; quotations from their writings or speeches are contained in an attachment: 1. Robert Havemann. Havemann is an East German c em s , and a veteran Communist who escaped a Nazi death sentence because his scientific 2 Approved For Release 200- f"Wai MMi'DP78-0$'0'64A b1-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (773 Cont.) 4M V.4 ^ I&S66WIbs 20 April 1964 talents were needed in war research; in the post-war years he got into trouble with West Berlin authorities (including the US mili- tary) because he attempted to conduct Commu- nist organizational activities. In recent years he taught at the Humboldt University in East Berlin, and kept up a wide correspondence within the Bloc and with Western scientists like Linus Pauling. Since Havemann believed that secrecy and conspiracy were wrong, and also since he expected to be able to defend himself with references to Soviet conditions and Soviet friends (such as the chemist and dialectician B.M. Kedrov), he delivered some remarkable lectures on the relation of dialec- tical materialism to natural science, particu- larly in the last months of 1963. The Stalinist SED leadership was alarmed and suspected that Havemann was conspiring with liberal intellec- tual Czechs and with dissident elements in the GDR, and when Havemann granted an interview to a West German journalist, this was used as a pretext for dismissing him from his professor- ship. Havemann has particularly sought the elimination of bureaucratic and arbitrary control, and has argued for open and free discussion. 2. Georgy Lukacs. Now eighty years old, Luk1cs was involved in controversy in the late '40s, and in the middle '50s he advocated "unfalsi- fied Marxism" to Hungarian students. A Stalinist has accused him of hailing the Hungarian revolt of 1956 as a "democracy under which the traditions of the Hungarian revolt could unfold," and after the revolt was crushed he was deported to the USSR. Perhaps because of his age, Luka.cs was later permitted to return to Budapest, where he has been quietly working on a book on aesthetics. On 18 January 1964 the Czech literary journal Literarni Noviny (Literary News) published an interview with Lukacs, quoting him as urging a complete elimination of "Stalin's disfigured Marxism" and advocating that young people he permitted to see for themselves what the West produces. Such stories as this explain why Rude Pravo (the Czech equivalent of Pravda) has now (early April) published a strong en ral Committee attack on major Czech and Slovak literary pub- lications, including Literarni Noviny. (The Polish regime is using the subtler and perhaps more effective tactic of restricting the paper supply.) 3 Approved For Release 2000/ 8-0%1'A&&,MffOV01-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (773 Cont.) 20 April 1964 3. Leopold Sedar Senghbr. Senghor, the President of Senegal, is a different sort of figure from the dissident bloc intellectuals, in that he is an African political leader and a Catholic. But he is also a man of real intellectual stature, a poet educated at the University of Paris, and a student of Marxist theory. Senghor is interested in the humanist strain of Marx, but believes that the French Jesuit philosopher, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, has largely superseded Marx with a broader, more profound analysis, regarding spirit rather than matter as the basic reality. Senghor also advocates the integration of Negro- African cultural values into socialism, creating an African socialism. 4. Predrag Vranicki. Vranicki is a professor at Zagreb University (Yugoslavia) who in 1961 pub- lished a controversial History of Marxism. The History stated that Soviet theorists were wrong 25X1C10b n e r attacks on both revisionism and dogma- tism because their clumsy ideological machinery was itself burdened with both faults. At a conference with young people in Novi Sad on 4 March 1964, Vranicki made some highly original remarks: he suggested that Soviet and Chinese theoreticians were searching the works of Marx and Lenin for quotations when they should be thinking for themselves; he remarked that since Marx's most important idea was that of the liberation of man, socialists "should extol the personality cult, but a cult of all personalities," rather than merely of one personality; and he said that it was an illusion to suppose that an omnipotent state monopolism might be the chief force in the fight against dogmatism. The only solution to existing problems, Vranicki maintained, was workers' self-management. In answer to a question about the foundations of Marxism under present conditions, Vranicki answered that "today Marxist thought has to base itself on everything which now represents the most valuable in science, philosophy and culture in general. The Marxist idea has to turn toward the present rather than toward the past." 4 (773. Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08 : CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200070001-3 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release O001o8127 QA-RDP78-03QNAA%q,Q2i00i070~01-3 774 Two Indian Communist Parties? 25X1C10b BACKGROUND: The largest Asian Communist party not now dominates y ~e Chinese Communists may be on the verge of a formal break-up along the lines of an historic split. In late 1962 the CPI breached international Communist solidarity by denouncing Communist China's invasion of India's borderlands. Many members of the so-called "leftist" CPI group strongly ob- jected, arguing that Communist countries do not commit aggres- sion, therefore the guilt must be India's. Differences between and within the two groups have increased since that time and are again being fought out in public. Two press disclosures of Party matters have sparked the current crisis but the underlying issue is the one besetting many Cps today: whether their political allegiance shall belong to Moscow or ?eking. In the Indian party there are also many who urge independence from both. Since the Chinese invasion of India in October 1962, the CPI has maintained a pro forma unity under the leadership of Chairman S.A.Dange who'TraveTs regularly to Moscow for advice and assistance. Nominally the Party supports Prime Minister Nehru's defense against Chinese aggression, as does Moscow. During the same time, the leftists (many -- but not all -- of whom look to Pelting for leadership), have established independent regional offices and publications to purvey their own more mili- tant views. But they have been unable to agree among themselves on whether to secede from the CPI and try to overthrow the government as a rival party, as has been done in Burma and Ceylon, or to work within the party to overthrow Dange and gain control. Public Disclosures. Two new divisive elements increased the discord in March. -A right-wing Bombay weekly, Current, printed on March 7 a letter allegedly written by Range from prison in 1924, offering his services to the British colonial regime in return for his release. Some press treatment has im- plied that Range may still be acting for the government. The Range-dominated Party Secretariat immediately denounced the letter as a forgery. Thereupon a leftist group spokesman, M.T. Basavapunniah, called a press conference to insist that the letter was genuine and to issue an unprecedented attack on Dange as a "traitor to the party." A.I. Gopalan, the Communist op- position leader in the Loh Sabha (lower house of parliament) said publicly that Dange should resign as Chairman and, referring to the letter, that "even if it was 40 years back, [Dange] can- not lead a revolutionary party." Another spokesman, E.H. Idamboodiripad of the moderate-leftists, has castigated both groups for taking the case to the public rather than settling it within the party. A government announcement that the alleged Approved For Release DP78-03061201-3 ppred For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (za4 ~on`t.) ov Range letter had been removed from the National Archives for safe keeping, lends substance to its existence. Also contributing to this disarray is a draft party program allegedly drawn up by the leftists (apparently for presentation to the party) and distributed by a group of non-Communist Marxists The document praises China as "defender of peace," attacks India's non-alignment policies and calls for overthrow of the Indian government by "any and every means." The leftists have not denied that they did draft a minority program but publicly claLiied that the published version is distorted. Future Prospects. Whether these differences will lead to an open break may soon Be determined. On April 9th the National Council, representing all state organizations, and the Central Executive Committee convened an emergency ;Meeting. Thirty two of the leftist and centrist party figures Yra1:ed out of the sleeting to protest Chairman Range's refusal to vacate the chair for a discussion of charges against him. The Council then "suspended" the thirty two -- an apparent compromise with those who urged ex- pulsion. A formal split and establisl:ient of a rival party ap- pear al.?iost inevitable but each of the various factions is ma- neuvering to put the onus :nor the final break on another. If con- pr raise forces should succeed in patching up the appearance of a unified party, it mould be at least a temporary victory for Mos- cow. In any case, Range's leadership has been seriously weakened and may be in jeopardy, one tray or another, before the party con- gress in October. For information on tactical and historic differences within the CIS on other matters, including Soviet and Chinese machinations, see: 25X1C10b 25X1C10b b. Continuing coverage in Press Comment 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 200D/08/27_: CIA-RDP78-0306100002Q$012921-3 775 WFI,a. CUBA: 17FAAT'S BEHIND Tr;" ROD IGUEZ TRIAL? 25X1C10b BACKGROUND: [For a summary of names, dates and facts, see unclassified tachments in English and Spanish. These may be passed to indigenous assets, but with the caution that they must be used as fact sheets and u o t reproduced verbatim.} The trial of Marcos Rodriguez Alfonso occupied the center of attention in Havana during tthe last half of March and served to illuminate, more than anything else has done to date, the dis- sensions that agitate the ruling clique in Cuba. Rodri .uez, who had been held incommunicado in La Cabana prison since Janu- ary 1961, was accused of betraying to Batista's police the hide- away of four of the survivers of the student underground group, Directorio Revolucionario (DR), that attacked the presidential palace on 14 March 1957. During the second year of his impris- onment, Rodriguez wrote a complete confession, the volume of which can only be guessed from the lengthy excerpts read at the trial. Many details from the confession and trial proceedings indicate that Rodriguez, who was a youth member of the Cuban Communist party (Partido Socialista Popular - PSP), had been in- filtrated into the DR by the PS?, was a regular informer for Batista's police, and in all probability reported the whereabouts of the "martyrs of 1rlunboldt 7" on orders of the high command of the PSP. The first phase of the trial was held behind closed doors, and it was clearly Castro's plan not to let the public in on this intra-party squabble. However, Faure Chomon, one of the members of the DR and currently Minister of Communications, took the opportunity to get even with the leaders of the old PSP whom he had reason to believe were implicated in this and other crimes against the resistance -movement. Either he or one of his cohorts leaked out information, which as published in icevolucio:.z, official organ of the Castroite wing of the united Cuban Communist party (Partido de la Unidad Revolucionaria Socialista - PUPS). The trial had begun 14 March, the seventh anniversary of the at - tac't on the Presidential palace. Five days later, Rodriguez was convicted as charged and sentenced to die before a firing squad. On 21 March, Fidel Castro himself announced that the "con- fusions and doubts" sown by "some intriguers" during the trial necessitated a new trial, which should be "as public as a trial can be." These pseudo-revolutionary intriguers," he charged, would be satisfied with nothing less than "rolling the heads of honest revolutionaries" and having the Cuban revolution "devour its own sons, like Saturn." They must be taught a lesson, he said. (775 Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 (775 Q w oYed For Release 2 RDP78-0AQ61#9QQ2Q990001-3 The second trial, which was televised and broadcast, was essentially a judicial review since no new material witnesses were heard nor new evidence adduced, and the accused, though physically present (according to televiewers in ;Zey West), took essentially no part in the proceedings, only mumbling a barely auidble answer to an occasional question. Castro, President Osvaldo Dorticos, and other leaders appeared as "gitnesses" to defend the old-line Communists against the "slander" directed at them in the first trial. In a four-and-one-half-hour speech on the night of 23-27 March, Castro criticized two prominent members of his official family, one a "new" and the other an "old" Communist. lZe charged :sure Chomon with a serious error in implying, at the first trial, that the defendant had committed the crime because of his Communist affiliation and not, as Castro now claimed, in spite of it. Then he criticized Joaquin Ordoqui, now a deputy minister of the armed forces, for taking steps to have the prisoner released, thus forcing the government to bring him to trial before it was adequately prepared -- this after a full three years of detention! Castro reserved his bitterest attack, however, for certain Cuban newsmen and the newspaper Revolucion in particular for thej:.r "lac% of revolutionary responsibility" n -sensationalizing the case and converting it into a political trial. What these "false" reporters had done, he charged, was to try to divide the revolu- tion and provide ammunition to the enemy. Castro's repeated use of the tern "sectarianism" in characterizing these attitudes, revealed the existence of a schism within the Cuban PURS which indicates that Castro, despite his desperate efforts to keep aloof from the Sino-Soviet conflict, has not been able to es- tablish internal unity either. On 1 April, the Cuban Supreme Court upheld the sentence of death. By sacrificing 'Rodriguez, Castro may hope to appease his regime's "new communist supporters. At the same tine, the de- fendant was technically cleared of the charge 1) that he was a regular informer of the police, and 2) that he was doing what he did on orders of the PS?. While this does not make the old guard entirely happy, they can be considered to have come off light. Thus the government of Cuba has been able to eat its cai.e and have it too. Cuban radio broadcasts, heard in Miami, have announced that Rodriguez was executed Saturday, 18 April. Even though Castro intervened in the trial for the purpose of defending the PS?, he did not attempt to save the life of one of its members. Rodriguez, a disciplined Communist, was used by the ?arty as an instrument and, as such, was sacrificed. On balance, it can be concluded that Castro did not feel strong enough to oppose the old PS? leaders: he was venting his fury on the "nev" Communists for having put him in an embarras- sing situation. Toro leading voices of official Communist opinion have ex- pressed satisfaction over the cutcone Of the trial: Rude Pravo, Approved For Release 29 - DP78-030WVW0GW70001-3 (775 ftjtgged For Release anaiD.uM . rIARDP78-03Qp1QQQj0q%ZQ001-3 of Prague, on 3 April, referred to the correctness of the death sentence and reported that lying statements of the defendant had been used to introduce divisions within the ?'S. An article in Pravda, 29 March, emphasizes criticism of Faure Chomon and of the newspaper Revolucion and congratulates Castro for defending "Comrade" Edith arcia ?achaca. Most remarkable, however, is Pravda's version, 2 March, of Rodriquez' affiliation with the youth sector of the old ?: They [old ward communist] refuted testimony alleging that Marcos Rodriguez was a member of the organization of Socialist youth. In particular, the assistant director of the paper 1oticias do Hoy, Raul Valdez Vivo, who earlier at 3e univer- s y was the leader of the section of Socialist Youth, declared that the statement of Faure Chormion in the first trial to the effect that Marcos Rodriguez was a member of the Socialist Youth was wrong. Marcos Rodriguez, he observed, is the product of anti-Communism. In spite of the Soviet version, we know that Rodriguez was a member of the Communist Youth. Much of the evidence adducer at the trial indicates that he was acting, as an informer, on the orders of an older member of the PS?. It could not !Ave been either Edith Garcia Buchaca or her husband Joaquin Ordoqui: they were both out of the country for a year before the event. That is probably why theirs were the only PS? names brought out in connection with the betrayal of Humboldt 7: they have a perfect alibi. But Rodriguez was in prison for three years, plenty of time for the "new" Communists to find out the identity of the "old" Communists who controlled him. Castro undoubtedly knows, 25X1C1bBe he is protecting them on orders from Moscow. 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 200 P78-03061WO O 1-3 776 AF,NE,WH. Current Attempts to Expand the international Role 25X1 C10b of M_ Soviet ccup a one o rmany BACKGROUND: The Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany (also referred T'o as'`East Germany," the "Deutsche Demokratische Re- publik" or the "GDR") has sought persistently to gain interna- tional acceptance as a respectable, sovereign power within the framework of the Communist "two Germanys" design. Taking ad- vantage of the politico-economic unrest among neutralist and developing countries, the SOZG has had certain successes in its quest for some form of official recognition and influence, de- spite the threat of West German sanctions against countries which recognize the SOZG. The countries where the Ulbricht regime now has some form of representation number 49, ranging from so-called "unofficial trade missions" through "official trade missions" to consulates, consulates general and full diplomatic recognition (embassies), all but one of the latter being in Com- munist countries. The SOZG has succeeded in gaining full diplomatic relations with only one non-Communist country, Zanzibar, and consular or other lesser relations with eight others. As diligent subordinates of the Soviets, the SOZG representatives at "trade missions" in 27 Free World countries are intent on converting these to diplomatic rank, while expanding both the scope and effectiveness of their propaganda, espionage and sub- version mechanisms. The SOZG's increased stature in the eyes of certain less sophisticated peoples -- including governments of some newly independent countries -- has enabled it to assume a growing role in promoting Communism in those circles. Pankow's* most con- spicuous recent success came in the wake of the Zanzibar revolt. Almost before communications had been restored, Pankow "recog- nized" the revolt leaders and hurried one Guenter Fritsch to Zanzibar as "Ambassador," thereby heading the recognition rush and establishing Fritsch as "Dean of the Diplomatic Corps." Pankow now has full diplomatic relations with Zanzibar and has built up there an inflated Embassy comprising some 25 persons, thus matching in size the Chicom mission and setting a kind of precedent for the establishment, or the diplomatic upgrading, of SOZG representations in other African countries. Pankow was also quick to send housing and agricultural advisors and a good- will deputation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Wolfgang Kiesewetter. The former Chief of the Trade Dept. in Pankow's Finance Ministry, Martin Gentsch, has actually become an official within the Zanzibar Finance Ministry, serving in the same govern- ment with Foreign Minister Babu, who happens also to be on the editorial staff of Jacques Verges' pro-Chicom journal, Revolu- tion, published in Paris and Lausanne (see Prop Note 40B T'Revolution," 6 Jan 64). the as rlin suburb where originally all SOZG offices were located. MAERMSEdwdbo"M (776. Continued Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78- 3061A000200070001-3 (775 Anoroved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 20 April 1964 The pattern of the current Pankow expansionist effort is further evident in politburo member Bruno Leuschner's January 1934 tour of Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, India and Ceylon. In the course of this excursion he persuaded Colombo to elevate Pan?.ow's Trade Mission there to Consulate General status, and he appears to have laid the groundwork for long-term economic cooperation with Cambodia, where the SOZG established a Consu- late General in 1063. The SOZG's Consulate General in Burma grew from a Trade Mission. SOZG Consulates General also exist in Indonesia, Iraq, Yemen and Egypt, the latter being headed by an "Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Arab States." Syria has a Consulate. The SOZG classifies its trade missions abroad as "official" or "unofficial," the distinction being based on whether a given mission includes personnel from the Foreign Ministry (Ministerium fuer auswertige Angelegenheiter. -- MAA). Where FAA personne are present, the senior employ-* ee is usually the chief of the mission. "Official" trade mis- sions are found in Algeria, Austria, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, India, Lebanon, Laos, Mali, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. "Unof- icial" trade missions are those which do not (yet) have any personnel from the L'IAA and are controlled by the SOZG Chamber of Foreign Trade (I;ar mer fuer Aussenhandel - KFA, a creature of the SOZG Foreign Trade Ministry) . Examples are found in Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Nether- lands, Norway, Sweden, Turley, the UK, Uruguay and West Germany. Augmenting expansionist efforts abroad, Pankow long has made a practice of bringing Afro-Asian personnel from the ranks of students, journalists and labor unions to the SOZG for training. A recent example of this is the so-called training course for African journalists, the "School of Solidarity" at Buc'.ow, near Berlin, opened in November 1933. 22 African student journalists are now enrolled there from Basutoland, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, N. Rhodesia, South Africa, South-West Africa, and Tan,anyika. With one exception, the students for this school were recruited by :?ankow entirely from countries where Pankow does not yet have even an unofficial trade mission. The professed purpose of the school is to "assist newly independent Afro-Asian states and render support to the independence struggle." Actually the stu- dents are indoctrinated to expound malicious anti-Western propa- r-anda in Africa and otherwise promote Communist objectives. 25X1 Cl Ob 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2011 RDP78-030612%OQLQ, QQOj@A1-3 777 AF,FE,NE,WH. Communist China's Real Attitude toward Colonialism 25X1C10b and the Non-white Peoples BACKGROUND: Communist China poses, both in its quarrel with the Soviet non and its hostile belligerence toward the Free World, as the foremost opponent of "white imperialism and colonialism" and as the self-appointed saviour of the non-white peoples of the world. The facts are that the Chicoms are not only guilty of aggression against their non-white neighbors in India and Southeast Asia, but they persecute the national minorities within their own borders and are arrogant toward other colored races. The Han people, the dominant race of mainland China, have a long record of arrogant and overbearing treatment of the 40-50 million non-Han national minori- ties living in China -- the Mongolians, the Uighurs in Sinkiang, the Yi people in the Liang Mountains of Szechuan province, the Thai people in Yunnan province, the Miao people in western Hunan province, the Tibetans in southern Kansu province and the Koreans in Kirin province of Manchuria. Chinese Communist treatment of these minor- ity groups today is similar to the worst examples of the 19th century imperialists toward their subject peoples. In theory, these minorities are administered as "autonomous" regions; in fact, they are subjected to Han chauvinism, which is admitted indirectly by the Chinese Communist press. The People's Daily, the foremost Chicom paper, has admitted on numerous occ sons that is common practice for minorities not to be consulted by the government officials who rule them and that government organs at a higher level often ignore the desires of the "autonomous" areas under their jurisdiction. These government officials are Han Chinese whom the Communist Party has sent to the "autonomous" areas for the dual (and contradictory) purpose of subjugating the minority groups and of winning them over to the central government. In a 1957 address to the Supreme State Council, Mao Tse-tung spoke of the national minorities, saying: "Less than five percent of the people in China occupy more than half of our territory. They are tribesmen, once not regarded as part of the Chinese race. We must convert them and convince them that they are Chinese." The problem is that these peoples do not want to be "Chinese" and Han arrogance is unable to comprehend it. The minority group harbor strong suspicions justly based on centuries of subjugation and oppression, savage reprisals, and Chinese colonization; they have learned by bitter experience that the present rulers in Peking are the greatest colonizers of all. They realize full well that they occupy the outlying parts of China that Mao spoke of because they have been pushed there by the Han Chinese. The fact that their children are forced to learn Mandarin Chinese in the schools rather than their own national languages does nothing to ease or erase their antipathy toward the Han race. 777. Continued Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : - DP7B-03061A0002000 0001-3 (777 C prpved For Release 200 -QkURDP78-03061 -3 This history of highhanded colonialism by the Han people not only reminds the national minorities that their own interests are subordinated to the interests of the "sons of Han,"' in some extreme cases it stirs them to open revolt. Tibet provides an outstanding case of how China's minorities react to Han Chinese imperialism and, in turn, how the Chicoms quell resistance with military action. (For an excellent summary of the International Commission of Jurists' condemnation of China's aggression against Tibet, see Denis Warner's "Hurricane from China," p. 56, the MacMillan Company, New York, 1961. Also, see the Briefly Noted in this issue.) But Tibet is not the only example of how Chicoms use wanton force against national minorities. Among their own minorities, for example, Peking wants to subjugate the Chinese Moslems (the Hui's) just as it does all other groups under its rule. The Chicoms have admitted that in Kansu Province between April and July 1952, some 20,000 Moslems staged open rebellion, killed over 3,000 cadres and seized three districts before the Chicom Peoples Liberation Army mercilessly stamped out the revolt. Communist China's attitude toward her neighbors in the Far East and Southeast Asia is identical to her attitude toward the ill-fated minorities within her own borders. Her neighbors in Southeast Asia understand this perfectly and they live in fear of Chinese oppres- sion. India's leaders have also come, although more recently, to understand the meaning and nature of Chinese imperialism. Prime Minister Nehru has said: "The Chinese look down upon every country other than their own. They consider themselves the Middle Kingdom, a celestial race, a great country." This is a frank evaluation by an Asian neutralist who was at one time the Chicoms' chief apologist. On the eve of China's second Five Year Plan, Chou En-lai said: "We always say that our nation is large in area, rich in materials and has a large population. However, all the large areas and rich materials are in the national minority areas and the Han people have only the densely populated areas." The national minorities know by now the meaning of this atti- tude for them and their natural resources, just as Southeast Asians know that the Chinese Communists are envious for example, of the rice bowl of South Vietnam, the rubber of Malaya, and particularly Indonesia's untold natural wealth in oil, rubber and tin. In the Chinese provinces the inexorable process of colonization from the densely populated areas has been going on for several years according to Party plan. The administrative and military control of Peking reaches out with the settlers and the minority peoples, once free and unique, become more and more lost to view and absorbed by the increasing concentration of this new population. 2 (777. Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 VOICES OF REVISION: Professor Robert Havemann /Following are excerpts from lectures given by Prof Dr. Robert Havemann under a heading of "Natural Science Aspects of Philosophi- cal Problems" between 18 October 1963 and 7 February 1964 at the East Berlin Humboldt University. These extracts were published in Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 25 March 1964, pp 51-52. The life source of our cultural development, the blood in the veins of human culture, is the many-sided and increasingly compre- hensive dissemination of information to all members of society regarding all knowledge, all problems, and all questionsof our time Reactionary regimes have always striven to keep the people ignorant. They followed their own experience which held that "what I do not know does not hurt me." They counseled their people: "what you do not know will not hurt you." Thus, they attempted to keep the people in ignorance regarding the true state of affairs and, furthermore, closed their own eyes in order not to have to see that which, after all, everyone else could see.... A government can only succeed in its important mission when it can rely on the active participation of all members of society. This support, however, can only be attained when the broad masses of the people are constantly informed about all the events and problems of their lives.... One must not deceive people with ready-made answers and subject them to officially sanctioned views, since this only misleads them into schematic and superficial thought. Through voluminous informa- tion we must make people more and more qualified to comprehend mattam We must sponsor a broad debate regarding all questions of the times. This is the only way in which the tremendous force of the popular masses becomes productively creative not dissipating itself in destructive disagreements. Whosoever fears the results of a generally unlimited attempt at informing /the people7 and consequently hinders it, thereby creates the precise conditions for an unhealthy development. This proves an old thesis of Greek tragedy which states that man brings about his own fate in attempting to avert it. The concept of freedom is of fundamental significance for humanity. Freedom, as Hegel said, is the recognition of necessity. This phrase has frequently been interpreted in a very one-sided, very mechanical, and very mean-spirited manner. It then has the character of scholarly presumption. We are told, condescendingly: if you do not recognize that which is necessary -- and this necessity has usually been determined by those who say this -- then freedom is just what you cannot have, and you are therefore to be locked up. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 In other words, one could purchase freedom by doing voluntarily that which one must do although one does not at all want to do it. With unequaled cynicism, the Nazis wrote above the gates of their concentration camps: "work makes one free." I have formulated this as sharply as possible because this is not the content of /TTegel's7 precept. It is, rather, a dreadful distortion. Any implication of such a meaning in connection with /Regel's7 precept is a crass falsi- fication. This derives from the way of thinking according to which it is possible to command man's history and then to have it carried out. Fortunately, this does not work. And in this method of thinking, there finally emerges only that mechanical-materialistic causal form of thought which, unfortunately, not only dominates the thinking of reactionary circles but also that of many well-meaning progressives.... Freedom is only worthy of striving for, is only moral, when it is not the freedom of /gome7 individuab but the freedom of all; free- dom for every man is that which leaves each the opportunity to decide according to his will and according to his wishes. That is freedom. Freedom is not a recognition of necessity in the sense that at a certain time one can only do a single necessary thing. On the contrary, we only have true freedom when there is a broad choice of opportunities for us to pursue or leave aside. The more one is not allowed to do, the less freedom there is. We want to create a world in which all human beings have more and more opportunities so that each can act completely according to his individual aspirations, un- hindered and unrestricted by regulations, orders, and "principles." The French Revolution was followed by Napoleon Bonaparte. Bona- partism is a danger for every revolution. In the final years of his life, Lenin had already recognized the danger of Bonapartism for the Soviet Union and had consequently warned against Stalin's excessive power. Revolution, which fights for freedom, always undergoes a change once it has attained power. Its principal goal is then to secure the revolution. Constantly threatened from within and without, it fights to maintain and strengthen its power; and this, in concrete terms, is the power of the revolutionaries. From this situation arises Bonapartism. The militant methods of fighting of the pre- revolutionary and revolutionary periods as well as during the revolu- tion are carried over into the postrevolutionary era. Thus, it is possible that the battle against the oppressor may temporarily turn into a new oppression. In the contradiction between socialism and capitalism, which appears in the foreground today as if there were nothing else, there also lies a unity. The historical process which we have undergone in this century does not mean only: "there is a world in decline and here a world on the rise." No, both parts of this world exert an influence upon the other -- not only through disruption; in a sense, they need each other, and not only depend upon each other historically, but their development and their further transformation is a single total process.... Approved For Release 2000/08/27 2 CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 A constant and intensive interaction between these two parts of the world, rather than isolation and separation from each other, will hasten the transformation. Herein I see the deeper meaning of peaceful coexistence. Naturally, this should not mean that the revolutionaries should give up their party stand. On the contrary, it is exactly on the intellectual level that they must measure their forces. However, a world can never be transformed if the revolution- aries close themselves off and isolate themselves from the remainder of the world. Truly revolutionary ideas do not stop at any border. Modern materialism differs from all past philosophies in that it does not design in the mind an absolute and unshakable system of all world events and then demand that science drag in all manner of proof to support the correctness of the philosophical system. Unhappily, this errone~-ts attitude has occasionally appeared... even among Marxist philosophers.... An expert in all d-?.alectic categories and teachings, be he ever so per-f- ct, %ould never it down and say: "There, now I am absolutely prepared; eery }iell! Mess .curs the physicists may now come. I will solve their :.^ ? ? i :ms if they simply tell me where the shoe pinches!" And if, such a super-dialectician still attempts to do this, in t: ir.^.1 analysis, it results only in displeasure and anger on all sides; and science will not have been assisted. This procedure is completely nonsensical. As long as man is exploited, oppressed, and robbed of freedom, as long as people are prevented from freely developing their per- sonalities -- we 'shall?not be completely free of these fetters for hundreds of years -- these limitations and restrictions on human dignity will give rise to impulses to act against society. The impulse to attain power in a society in which man is dominated by man is the source of all immorality, stemming from the immorality of the social structure. This striving upward, this urge to subju- gate others and to oppress them for personal advantage, is most reprehensible. Nevertheless, it is the normal, completely pervasive goal of the overwhelming majority... in societies which have a social hierarchy. We Germans have developed this effort to strive upwards to per- fection. It is the system of the "bicycle rider" -- to step down- ward and bend the back upward. It is the system of the careerists and bootlickers, the coward and the sycophant. That this phenomenon still appears on such a large scale is not, say, a result of this reprehensible tendency being a part of a man's nature, but rather because he lives in a society in which such strivings give a prospect of success and he is constantly surrounded by people who achieve suc- cess in this manner. Such "morals" basically contradict our inner feelings. Our hopes are directed toward a society of equal rights, toward the dis- solution of this stratification of society. We seek a society of Approved For Release 2000/08/273: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 free and equal people. As long as a utopian moral society is not a fact we shall always have a conflict. Even in our efforts for a free, democratic, and moral society we shall find ourselves acting against our own principles. Woe unto us if we should rise to the top! We suddenly become people of significance and responsibility, men who point the way, and various other ridiculous things of this kind. The more one rises the more one experiences contempt for everything beneath one's station. This is not a human but rather a prof_,undly inhuman weakness. With a tremendous expenditure of effort, we are building for our future and not for the present. The revolutionaries of this era, the leaders of states, must always strive to attain their goals as rapidly as psssible. For as long as the standard of living does not correspond to general production, the people will be dissatis- fied because they feel themselves cheated in comparison with other industrial countries. The leaders of a socialist country find themselves in a com- plicated position. The more rapidly they advance toward their goal the less they can give their people. The less they give the people the more resistance to their policies arises and the more difficul- ties will they encounter. It is a kind of vicious circle. If one slows down the development of socialism because one accumulates less and consumes more, this will make the people more satisfied. However, if one wishes to speed development, the people will be dissatisfied. In order to overcome this dissatisfaction and to facilitate rapid development one must do everything in one's power to foster enthusiasm among the masses.... The fact that /oapital7 accumulation can only be purchased through the personal' sacriTice of millions can easily lead to a situation in which anyone who, for the lack of conviction, is not prepared for such sacrifice is regarded as an enemy of development. Thus, an animosity arises toward everyone not prepared without question to adopt the principles of socialist construction. Whoever does not enthusiastically participate in this construction is finally suspected of being a lackey of enemy ideology or even an agent of western capitalism. All of these things are naturally basic phenomena which are foreign and contradictory to true socialism. But it is very difficult to escape this danger. When in addition there is at the top a man like Stalin, who becomes a dictator and considers himself to be absolutely wise and all-knowing; when there is a man whose words are constantly being broadcast like a gospel; and when a multilithic hierarchy is formed, a large political bureaucracy which exercises absolute control over the individual, then it is virtually unavoidable that careerists and hypocrites without being personally convinced, should gain advantage by constantly mouthing big words in order to ingratiate themselves at the top. 4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 In a tremendously effective manner, an extraordinarily tenacious and persistent hierarchical system takes form. It is difficult to overcome this hierarchy, even after the necessary insight has been gained, even when the system has really already begun to topple and more and more people have grasped the fact that it must be overcome. The reason it is so difficult to overcome the system is that, naturally, under such a system, many people have gained their posi- tions and functions not on the basis of real ability but simply on the basis of this loathsome ability to be able to...attain such positions. Nevertheless, the problem is not primarily one of personalities. True, personnel changes will be inevitable. But they are not the primary problem, they are the secondary problem. The thing which must change is the internal structure. That which is necessary, that which is vital to socialism and which was lost during the period of Stalinism, is democracy, Without democracy, socialism cannot be attained, What I have said here, Lenin said again and again with great sharpness and clarity, He warned that democracy was being destroyed and he pointed out the dreadful consequences which the destruction of democracy must have on the creation of socialism. Only through democracy can we convince the masses of the need to conduct a battle for socialism and to win them for this battle. One can command and prescribe many things for people but one cannot prescribe for them what they should think. Human thought is the only thing which is actually and completely outside the realm of any kind of command. One can only exert an influence upon thinking when one is prepared to subject one's viewpoint to criti- cism at any time, when one is constantly prepared to argue objec- tively and to recognize every objective argument. Maximum patience with those who think differently, objectivity in political argumen- tation and a readiness to recognize and admit one's own errors are the basic principles of all political work in socialism; without the voluntary preparedness of the masses we can attain little. I am an absolute and decided opponent of capital punishment. The death sentence is a very bad thing. I believe that in several hundred years there will hardly be any understanding for the fact that in the middle of the 20th Century, progressive nations still resorted to this type of punishment. It will be considered barbarism which will evoke just as much horror as the thought of cannibalism does today.... In the final analysis, capital punishment is only demanded in order to be able to murder political opponents. In olden times it was indeed the right of the dukes and kings to execute persons who rebelled against their state and their power personally with the sword. Basically, this condition still prevails wherever the death sentence exists today. 5 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 I myself was sentenced to death. I managed to elude it. But I saw my best friends executed. This experience made me an uncondi- tional opponent of capital punishment. Nor can I recognize this form of punishment if I am told that, after all, there were dreadful war criminals, heinous barbarians in human guise, like, for example, the supervisors in the concentration camps and prisons, who murdered and tortured prisoners. A modern state must not soil its hands with blood simply because others have done so, /NOTE: according to this same issue of Der Spiegel, p.40, T66 persons were sentenced to death in the rom 1949 to 1962; 108 of these were for political crimes.? But in the whole development up till now...what has hampered us most has been the tendency -- which came to the fore during the period of the personality cult and which is so alien to socialism -- to eliminate democracy. Man was being educated to be a hypocrite and to be untruthful. Constantly, political avowals were being demanded of him which did not stem from an honest heart. We must completely overcome all of this. We must openly and unashamedly call it by name. We must espouse socialism precisely by standing up against these phenomena of political hypocrisy The socialist revolution has consolidated and stabilized itself. It has expanded extraordinarily in the economic sphere. It now has the opportunity of dealing with these evils which have developed during the first phase. The revolution has already taken the new path -- the path of democratic socialism. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Georgy Lukacs /Following are excerpts from an article in the Czech-language perio-dical Literarni Noviny (Literary News), 18 January 1964, pp. 8-9, reporting an-interview with Georgy Lukhcs in Budapest. The excerpts quoted are from Lukacs's answers to questions asked by the reporter .7 In practice we can note a two-fold movement. In the West, alienation continues to grow and is reflected in literature, even though the connections are very complicated. It certainly is not a uniform process, and western art is simply loaded with antitheses. This also is the reason why we cannot react to it either wholly positively or wholly negatively. As a result of the Stalinist epoch we have slept through fifty years of capitalist development, when otherwise it would have been possible to carry out an analysis of its antitheses persistently, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methods. It is thus completely logical that, because the windows are opened today, youth is embracing everything western. Of course, it would be a terrible mistake if we were to try to keep them from it. Blind, unlimited admiration is a children's disease and will be overcome only if youth has complete freedom to observe everything, even if it is only the latest fashion. Intelligent young people will recognize, within two years, what is good and what is bad. First we need thorough information about the West. The rest will follow. Today we are faced with a long period of peaceful coexistence, and for this reason it certainly is of consequence how the litera- ture of the western world will come to terms with its own problems. Here, I think, we can again be served by the great example of Thomas Mann. Doctor Faustus contains the whole problem of a fascist world, and thus is boo w 1 remain one of the great novels of our time. Today there exists a fashionable literature in the West which tries to demonstrate that this whole alienated world which they reject is something artistically interesting at the same time. Thus, for example, there appeared writers in West Germany who have become a sort of non-conformist support of the Adenauer regime. At the same time, however, there are also writers who have taken a serious stand against the alienated world. At one time, Sinclair Lewis in his Babbitt revealed this alienation in a very sharp satirical form which in his day was of gigantic importance. Twenty years later, however, this could not have been done in the same manner. There appear tragicomical works where this struggle against alienation rises again (T. Wolfe, O'Neill), and we are often witnesses of a tragic, dramatic battle against personal alienation. Such as Styron, in his novel Set This House on Fire,who points out dialectically that the cause or estrangement-71-ha rich man is his wealth, in a pauper his poverty,until there is finally a Raskolnikov-type explo- sion. We must not overlook this. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 The great socialist novel will be created, but it will take a while until the socialist writers free themselves from all restraints and inner censorship. They rust seek their allies in the great literature of the past and a:.:$o within the whole current of western literature, the stz-ucturo of which I have indicated; they must ob- serve how the best struggle against alienation. In time we will also find among them political allies. I'd like to say that this is not an exception to Sartre's attitude nor disagreement, but rather a supplement, a complement. The task of literature is to provide a picture of the gigantic alienation which was the product of the Stalinist epoch, and to help overcome it. At the same time, something extremely new had been suppressed in that epoch, something that appeared, for instance, in Makarenkov's Pedagogic Poem, and it is our duty to bring it back to life. And if It is true at it is possible to eliminate a world-wide armed conflict, and I am convinced that this is true, just as I feel that even the cold war will gradually disappear, then in the period of peaceful coexistence there will continue a very sharp class struggle in new forms, and then our allies will be all those who are struggling against estrangement in the capitalist world -- not only writers but also sociologists, for example, such as the prematurely deceased Wright Mills. There are sectarians who deny the possibility of coexistence, and others, again, hope that the class struggle will cease in the period of peaceful coexistence. I insist, however, and have insisted as early as 1956 (in an article published in the East-German periodical Aufbau /1econstruction7) on "tent ium datur": a new form of class struggle.- Of course, i!' we are to understand this we must return to Lenin and place him face to face with Stalin. Even during World War I in 1916 Lenin said of sectarians that these are people who imagine that they will create two large camps which will scream at each other: We are for socialism! We are for imperialism! People who imagine things in this manner, said Lenin, will never understand the revolution. Matters are much more complicated, individual tendencies intertwine with one another, fronts change continuously. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 L4opold Sedar Senghor /Following are excerpts from two speeches by I,6opold Sedar Senghor, "The African Road to Socialism" and "Senegalese Socialism," published in a collection of Senghor material, On African Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 76-79 and 139-140.1 From: The African Road to Socialism As for Marxian humanism, which we now propose to discuss, I wises first of all to recall its strength and its weakness. Its strength is that, starting from concrete facts, it elaborated the sociological realities which the analysis of European society in the mid-nineteen3 century revealed: the priority of the economic factor and the class struggle. Its strength is also that it pointed out and renewed the notion of alienation. Its weakness is that it did not carry the economic analysis far enough: It neglected statistics, albeit the embryonic statistics then existing. Its weakness lies above all in the fact that, as Marx proceeded in his writing of Capital, he in- creasingly stressed materialism and determinism, praxis and means, to the detriment of dialectics and ethics -_ in a word, to the detriment of man and his freedom. I shall no longer say, as I did in my Report to the detriment of philosophical thought; for, rejecting the spite` of his Philosophical Works, Marx surreptitiously and paradoxically reintroduced metaphysics in the conclusion. But it is a terribly inhuman metap ysics, an atheistic metaphysics in which mind is sacrificed to matter, freedom to the determined, man to things. This is no doubt what Engels called Marx's "subjective whims."... What should be our attitude toward this Marxian humanism? I answer, first, that we should not betray its fruitful contributions when faithfulness to it can only lead to lucid transcendence. But West Africans are prone to betray it in both theory and practice, through blind allegiance. In theory, one betrays Marx by using Marxian dialectics as it stands, without changing a comma. For this is reasoning twice in abstraction, the surest way to miss reality. We must not tire of re- peating: Dialectical materialism is born of history and geography; it was born in the nineteenth century in Western Europe. Conceived in th,.t milieu, it was essentially designed to analyze and transform it. Marx often affirmed this. The proof is that today, in those same countries, scientists and philosophers, writers and artists, while assimilating Marx's methodological contributions, have gone beyond, shaded, and enriched them to penetrate realities no longer of the nineteenth but of the twentieth century. And what of Asian or African realities? The Israelis, like the Chinese ,have been able to find their Asian road to socialism adapted to the spirit and realities of their native soil. Theirs are exem- plary efforts to inspire us. West African realities are those of underdeveloped countries -- peasant countries here, cattle countries there -- once feudalistic, but traditionally classless and with no wage-earning sector, They are community* countries where the group 'e 8-03061 A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 holds priority over the individual; they are, especially, religious countries, unselfish countries, where money is not King. Though dialectical materialism can help in analyzing our societies, it can- not fully interpret them. It did not even do so (nor does it now) in Europe, where we are witnessing a vigorous religious reawakening. Even in "Holy Russia," there is a resurgence of spiritual forces, with the defeat of false "socialist realism," which, provided peace i is preserved, we can anticipate in the near future. Therefore, we would betray Marx by applying his method like a veneer to West African realities. We would betray him even more if we were to apply but not integrate European political, economic, social, and cultural organizations here, whether that of West or East, of liberal parliamentarianism or "peoples' democracy." This would strangely betray Man, as well as Negro-African -- I mean Negro-Berber -- humanism. From a false theory, from a methodology which is inapplicable to the object, only im-materialism can result, insofar as matter is identified with the concrete: y an in-humanism can result. In fact, the double abstraction just noted lea s us n the first place t to consider man sub specie aeternitatis. And man of all times and al places is no longer man u simply a mental image. For one can grasp man's permanent features only through his historical, geographi cal, and ethnic background. And the Negro, like the Berber, did not appear during the prehistoric era, not until the Neolithic Age, about the fifth millenium B.C. In the second place, the abstraction con- sists in seeing, under a black or copper skin, Marx's man in Africa, the European in the Negro or Berber -- and classes struggling to conquer purchasing power in a mercantile world presented as an ideal of civilization. How can one fail to realize that, in these conditions, aliena- tion, far from being corrected, will be singularly aggravateU7-For T Realienation of the Negro Berber does not stem from Negro-Berber capitalism, nor even from European capitalism. Nor does it stem from the class struggle. Rather, it results from the domination of one country over another -- or rather, of one ethnic group over another. Here, political and cultural domination, colored by racism, is fused with economic domination. Hence, for us, Man is not without a country, nor is he without a color or a history, a fatherland or a civilization. It is West African man, our neighbor, exactly defined in time and space. He is Malian, Mauritanian, Eburnian, Wolof, Targui, Songhai, Hausa, Fon, or Mossi. He is a man of flesh and blood, nourished on milk, millet, rice, and yams. He is a man humiliated for centuries, less perhaps in his nudity and hunger than in his skin and civilization, in his dignity. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 From: Senegalese Socialism But, ..., what has become of the Marxist theory of the class struggle? In Teilhard's opinion, this is merely one aspect -- pecu ar to capitalism -- of a much more general phenomenon: the process of socialization. I refer you to Volume V of the works of Teilhard, entitled L'Avenir de 1'Homme (The Future of Man) and, in Volume III, to the article "Les ni s humanines naturelles" ("The Natural Human Unities"), As concerned with international life as Marx and Engels but more concerned than they with problems of race and nation, Teilhard shows us that conflicts between human groups -- techni oc professional groups or "classes," nations, races -- are natural facts; moreover, that they are necessary steps in the proces.: of socialization; that we are today, with the Cold War, with class, national and racial conflicts, in an age of extreme divergence; but that already a movement of pan-human convergence has been set in motion by the very tension and the power of our technical means -- peaceful and military. From this movement, the planetary civiliza- tion will emerge, a symbiosis of all particular civilizations; and the scientist invites us, the underdeveloped peoples, to help con- struct the Civilization of the Universal. Marx and Engels did not know us. Teilhard restores our dignity and invites us to the dialogue. He writes: "Before the last upheavals that awakened the earth, peoples were only superficially alive; a world of energies wal still asleep within each of them. Well, I imagine that these powers, still dormant within each natural human unity, in Europe, Asia, everywhere, are stirring and trying to come to light at this very moment; not to oppose and devour one another, but to rejoin and interfecundate one another. Fully conscious nations are needed for a total earth." This is justification for our nationalism and our Negritude, all the more so because, according to the paleontologist, it was in Black Africa that Homo sapiens first appeared about 30,000 years ago. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Predrag Vranicki following are excerpts from answers given by Professor Vranicki of Zagreb University to questions asked him at the Novi Sad (Yugosl:,via) "Tribune of Youth"; this is from material published in Vjesnik (Zagreb), 8 March 1964.7 "Stalinism is still one of the important and essential problems of contemporary Marxism. In its crudest form it has now moved to China. We can analyze Stalinist dogmatism in view of its relationsh to the most vital question of the contemporary world, to the questionf of coexistence. We see that in their polemics, Soviet and Chinese theoreticians have been waging a war over coexistence, although both of them refer to Lenin. It is really true that each side has found in Lenin's books quotations which support its position. However, in the fifties a new era in international relations emerged, while Lenii. who spoke from a platform valid in his lifetime, could not have anti- cipated the present-day situation. Instead of analyzing contemporary capitalist society, the real distribution of power in the world, instead of facing squarely a completely new dilemma -- coexistence or the annihiliation of mankind -- the contemporary dogmatists are searching in the works of the classics of Marxism for ready-made recipes. Such a non-creative attitude toward the Marxist heritage means the abandonment of revolutionary Marxist methodology in deal- ing with reality, which inevitably results in serious practical and political consequences. There are situations where the Marxist idea cannot be applied by way of analogy. The responsibility for the present-day situation is not borne by the classics of Marxism but rather by ourselves." Marx did not absolutize the dictatorship of the proletariat as a form of working class rule. As the next step in the process of the socialization of authorities, Marx foresav the withering away of the state. In other words, Marx anticipated the disappearance of coercion from social life. Eo ipso, any dogmati. uniformism and isolation of ideas, any Petting of free om of opinion, was alien to Marx. And what is dogmatism? This is the mastication c ideas coming from the supreme political form. What is opportunism? This is the fear of people to think with their own heads. And what are apologetics? This is when people say 'yes' to everything coming from above. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approves Fft E~l%~ y,,RC 61 A000200070001-3 Facts1 dates, and persons 1957: -- The attac > on the palace and the massacre at Humboldt 7. On 14 Marc -E. a group of university students of the so- jai lec re rio Revolucionario (DR), in an effort to help Fidel Castro, who was already operating in the Sierra Laestra, made a suicidal attack ontbo presidential palace in Havana, in order to assassinate the dictator-president Fulgencio Batista. The attack failed. Of the survivors, four went into hiding in an apartment at no 7 Humboldt Street: Juan Pedro Carbo Servia, Fructuoso Rodriguez, Joe T7estbroo?., and Jose Machado, 20 April: In the early morning, a friend of theirs, r1arcos Rodriguez Alfonso, 19 years old, a member of the youth organization of the Partido Socialista Popular (PS? -- the Cuban Communist party), telephoned to one of Batista', police officers, steban Ventura, that he had some important information that could only be transmitted personally. Ac- cording to Rodriguez' confession, Ventura arranged for then to meet at three o'clock that afternoon in an apartment in Carlos Tercero Street. During the interview, Rodriguez told him where he could find the fugitives. A few hours later, they died in a hail of gunfire from Batista's agents. 23 April, or three days after the massacre at Humboldt 7, z took up asylum in the Brazilian mbassy, osten- sibly from fear of Batista's police. In reality, however, the surviving members of theDR already suspected him of in- forming, and he was afraid they were going to "execute" him. During his stay of a month and a half in the Brazilian 3;ibassy, he recieved several large sums of money, some say as much as 2,000 pesos (dollars), although during the trial he swore that he only received $500 from his father. Also while in the embassy, he struck up a close friendship with the Brazilian Ambassador, Vasco Leitao ea Cunha and with his wife Virginia. About the middle of June, he departed for Costa Rica and afterward went to Mexico and several other Latin American countries. 1~5g; During this period, before the fall of Batista, one of the leaders of the DR, Faure Chomon, currently Minister of Transport in the Castro government, tried to seek out I.arcos Rodriguez in order presumably to execute him, but was never able to catch up with him. In Mexico, Rodriguez was in contact with 3dith Garcia Buchaca, who lived there with her husband Joaquin Ordoqui, both hard-core Cuban Communists and members of the Central Committee of the PSP. According to his confession, published in part as a result of the trial of March 1964, Rodriguez talked to her about his role as a police informer in the Humboldt 7 case. (During the trial, incidentally, she denied having received this con- fidence and he retracted this detail of his written confes- sions.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 1CSS : Apl vaec~ Ie O ~ ,~ ~I ~t ~B ~ Q 70001-3 and Fidel Castro ascended to power as the supreme chief. A few weeks later, Rodriguez returned to his country. In February, or almost as soon as his presence in the country was known, he was arrested by Castro's police and inter- rogated in the prison of La Cabana. In spite of the evi- dence of his guilt, he was set free, it is assumed as a re- sult of secret influence within the W. whose leaders were already beginning to occupy important posts in Castro's government. But Marta Jimenez, widow of Fructuoso Rodriguez; one of the victims of Humboldt 7, was carrying out her own in- vestigation: she interviewed two of the agents of 3steban Ventura who had some knowledge of the case, but both were executed a few hours later, before being able to confront the accused informer. %Text, she was able to show a photograph of Rodriguez to another of Ventura's agents, Francisco Idirabal. The latter identified the person as the informer of Humboldt 7. Later on, when he was brought face to face with Rodriguez, he refused to identify him, hoping, perhaps, to save his own life. This he did not succeed in doing: Mirabal was tried and sentenced on 22 February and executed before a firing squad the next day. Meanwhile, in May of 1959, Rodriguez went to Prague, on an official mission, to study philosophy. For almost two years, he studied, traveled to other iron-curtain countries, corresponded with friends in Cuba (among them Ordoqui), and made contact from time to time with Cuban visitors, among them Juan Marinello, old guard leader of the W. 1901: One day, in ':?ague, Rodriguez was visited by a Brazilian student who told him the Brazilian ambassador wanted to spea'h with him. The ambassador told him that he had a letter from his colleague Vasco Leitao da Cunha, requesting that he warn Rodriguez that his life would .be in danger if he returned to Cuba. Leitao offered him asylum in Brazil. Apparently Rodriguez did not attach too much importance to the warning. On 10 January 1951, he was arrested by the Czech security police. From Prague, he was transferred to Havana, to the prison of La Cabana, where he was kept incommunicado until the trial, which began 14 March 1964the seventh anniversary of the attack on the pres en a palace, 1934: The Trial: During these three years, it is assumed that the veterans of the DR and of the "2G July' movement sought to bring the informer of Humboldt 7 to justice, and that the Communists of the old ?3p made even greater efforts to prevent it. It is known, from Fidel Castro himself during his four-anal-a- a f-hour harangue in the second trial, that Joaquin Ordoqui went to ?resident Osvaldo Dorticos to ash that the prisoner be released. During the five days that this phase of the trial lasted, Revolucion semi-official organ of the Castroite faction of the ?ar do de la Unidad Revolucionaria Socialista (PUBS, the Approved For Release 2006/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 newAg3go~ttl lFOt~' ie?8 ~8 t A-R ,i 7M3Q6,4&~WQ 70001-3 detailed reports of the trial, while Hoy, the newspaper of the Communist old guard, said nothing until the last day, when it published a very brief account, stating that Marcos Rodriguez had been accused of informing in the well-known Humboldt 7 case and condemned to die before a firing squad. The sentence was appealed, and Fidel Castro himself recommended a judicial review, castigating, at the same time, his old comrades of the "26 of July" movement for the excessive publicity that had been generated during the trial. This new trial, which lasted from 23 to 30 Larch, was tele- vised and broadcast via radio so that, according to Castro, nothing should be rent secret. Castro spoke for over four hours, explaining all the involved complexities of the case, acting at tidies almost like a supreme judge, or a referee between two rival factions. On 1 April 1934, the Supreme Court denied the appeal. As this is being written, Rodriguez' execution has not yet taken place, and may or may not be carried out depending on the secret inf luences of the Communist old guard within the government of Cuba. Conclusion: Three facts stand out in this extra- ordinary trial-f a) Rodriguez was declared guilty as charged and condemned to suffer the extreme penalty. Only this could avenge the victims of Humboldt 7 and satisfy the survivors who, We Faure Chomon, were thirsting for vengeance. b) All facts presented in the second trial were handled to make it appear that the action of the accused was spontaneous, personal, an isolated instance, that he had no permanent connection with Batista's police. Thus the trial proceedings nowhere show that Rodriguez was a Communist agent who had been infiltrated among the students of the DR and that he had betrayed them on orders of the ?S?. c) Iievertheless, it is easy to glimpse in more than one place in Fidel Castro's lengthy discourse, as well as among the facts that came to light in the first trial, that Marcos Ridriguez Alfonso was collaborating with Batista's police in the same manner that the p3? was collaborating with the government of the dictator, while Castro and his bearded cot- rades were in the Sierra Laestra. The betrayal of Humboldt 7 was not, therefore, an iso- lated instance. Rodriguez felt under some obligation to talk personally with police agent 3steban Ventura. If he was not already known to Ventura, why did he not give him the information by telephone? In this manner the identity of the informer would have remained unknown. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070001-3 LAST GE MA1T USJ O TPAD3 MI$SIOI104 FOP. ESPIONAGE POSTS For years the Soviets and their Satellites have been engaged in a massive espionage effort against the non-Communist coun- tries of the world. In this espionage offensive the Soviet and Satellite countries ualte use not only of the classic tools of espionage, i.e. agents, couriers, codes, secret writing and photography, but they also make extensive use of their diplo- matic and other missions in the "target countries". It is a well-established fact that Trade Missions are a favorite device of the Soviets and Satellites for infiltrating espionage agents anc: intelligence officers who ferret out the information desired by the Communists. While attempts by the East German regime to gain even de facto diplomatic recognition abroad have been largely unsuccess- i, it has been able to establish a number of official and ouasi-official Trade Missions and Trade Delegations in various non-C,ounist countries, sometimes under the guise of providing economic assistance to less-developed countries. As one of the most subserviant Satellites of the Soviet Unions East Germany is actively engaged in promoting the cold war and is dedicated to furthering Soviet Comunist objectives in the non-Communist areas. While it has been well--ISnov:n for some time that Soviet ant Catellite Trade 'Hissions abroad are extensively misused for the conduct of espionage and related act >vity, information fro_i an office: of the "wst German intelligence service who c:efected to lost Germany has provided dramatic evidence on the riagnitucde and insidiousness of these activities by the Nast Germans. Guenter UAL, T1NJ L, the defector from the cart German Intel- n Trade Liss ons 1 Service who verified that East Germ C4 - are @.:tensively engaged in espionage, was in an excellent posi- tion to Ianow; he was an officer of the section which directed such activities. Until his defection he was ti member of the espionage dod art gent of the:'ast Gern an Ministry for State Security, the Liain Administration or Intelligence (:;:,CIA). i. EiTU?F stated that the WA was part11L;icul