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April 6, 1964
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25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08 061A000200070?Oij@ril 1964 Briefly Noted The Two Faces of Soviet Policy toward West Germany March brought a spate of new Soviet attacks on the "revanchist and militaristic policies" of the German Federal Republic, beginning with a 4,000-word March 7 Tass statement tied to Bonn's 1963 year-end progress report. Although this blast contained no new charges, it surprised the Germans (some of whom termed it "Stalinist") with the harsh language in which it rehashed the old accusations: i.e.; "The pre- sent tension in Europe ... stems from the revenge-seeking and militaristic policy of the same circles whic for over three-quarters of a century have brought-Europe five wars,... who now want to prepare a sixth., In the German Federal Republic the reins of power f e 1 into the hands of the same forces that in their time had nurtured Hitler-and are tr to continue the criminal policy of the e ch. (The Soviet Government punctuated its new hard lan- guage by expelling on March 10 German Embassy counsellor Naupert, apparently in reprisal for Bonn's January expulsion of equal-ranked Soviet diplomat Morosov who had grabbed the passport of a Soviet defector shown him by the Bonn Foreign Ministry and refused to surrender it.) Such tactics have not been used since Erhard took over from Adenauer, and observers saw the new attack as signifying that the USSR had little hope of enticing the new Bonn regime to veer to policies more favorable to Moscow: indeed, some saw it as specifically linked to Bonn's rejection of additional long-term credits for Moscow and certain embargoes. At the same time -- as broadcast by !rankfurt Radio on the 10th and reported from Moscow by Reuters on the 19th -- Krupp became the first Western industrial organization to be gran ed permanent representation in Moscow; its Hans- Juergen Meyer received a one-year residence visa, although all other Western industrial representatives are limited to three-month visas! The German press was not slow to recognize the duplicity in this preferred treatment of "the successors of the Krupp 'cannon kingst" (as the Neue Rhein-Ruhr Zeitung termed them in its editorial on the -- as contrasts with Moscow's simultaneous "principled" attack on Germany's democratically elected Government and its unidentified "revanchist and militaristic" ruling circles. The apparoat warm Moscow affinity for the giant firm of Krupp -- a name which almost symbolized the German heavy armaments industry during the first half of this century -- has been noted ever since Krupp General Manager Beitz made his first visit to Moscow in 1950. Although we do not in (Briefly No ed Continues' Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (Brig; v4Q1%f1F;Q PAte 1000/ 03061A00020(%7$$ J 1964 any way suggest that the present Krupp management is malevolent (:-rrupp has ceased armaments production), we lose no opportunity -- and the present is a good one -- to expose the duplicity of the reheated Soviet propaganda attacks depicting es rmany in thehands of"thie same circles which for over three-q.Ud.rters of a century have Brought rope five wars," "nurtured Hitler," etc. (as quoted above), while at the same time they are, for self-serving ends, cuddling up with the current day management of the best known industrial concern associated with Germany's former militaristic circles. Soviet Trade Cloaks Subversion London news stories of 26 March reported the expulsion of Vladimir Solomatin, a member of the permanent Soviet Trade Mission in the UI. He used business contacts to obtain speci- fications for secret defense equipment. One newspaper, the Daily Express, intimated that a British businessman had aided the au orities in collecting evidence in the case. In discussing Soviet foreign trade activities, as pro- posed in recent Guidances, we should where possible and appropriate point out that trade activities serve as cover for espionage and strong-arm activities. Aside from Solomatin, cases in point include Valerian pripoltsev, Soviet Trade Mission employee in Cologne, Germany, arrested in August 1961 and expelled in July 1962; Vladislav Sergeyevich Andreyev, Commercial Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Wellington, New Zealand, declared persona non grata in July 1962; and uergey Vasilyevich Shi yev, Commercial Attache at the Soviet Embassy at The Hague, declared persona non grata after he attempted to use force in preventing a defection. Persons dealing with Soviet trade officials may find themselves the objects of blackmail and attempted recruitment for Soviet intelligence services. Those who nevertheless do deal with Soviet officials, and who discover that the Soviets are out for something besides trade, should inform their security service. BusinessmG&a should also be told that, aside from spying against governments, Soviet trade officials often seek to obtain trade secrets. Thus in 1963, the Soviets held out promises to purchase $250,000,000 worth of oil refining equipment, on the condition, however, that they be permitted to "see for them- selves" that they were getting the most up-to-date equipment -- i.e., that they be given access to all the secrets of the British oil industry. This was more than any individual firm could agree to give them, even if it wanted to. The Soviet practice of buying single prototypes of advanced machines, and then copying them without any regard for patent rights, is well known. (For details of Solomatin's case, see press Comment, I April 1964) 2 (Briefly Noted Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 ($r i%o3e1,a tse }1000/ . 03061 A000041h2 P- G4 Czechoslovakia's Lagging Economy Many characteristics of Soviet society are those of a new economy emerging from bao! wardness. Friends of tho USSR try to present it as a -nodes. for less developed countries to follow; critics point out V1jAt t e high Soviet growth rates of the past were only possible hacau,e the economy was a young one. The question arises: what will Communism be able to do with an advanced economy? A living example of Communism in an advanced society is Czechoslovakia, an economy which in 1948 was quite comparable with the countries of Western Europe. East Germany was also once part of an advanced economy, but because of extraordinary war damage, separation from the rest of Germany, and drastic stripping of the economy by the Soviets, the GDR economy has suffered unusual handicaps. In Czecholsovakia, however, Communism has had a fair chance to show what it can do with an advanced society. As an unclassified attachment to this guidance shows, Communism has genera =y maw a mess of things. The western prediction that Communist growth rates will d e c 1 i n e when Communist economies are more mature--a pre- diction which recent Soviet developments have tended to confirm--is fully borne out by the Czech experience. The Czech case may be presented to the people of developed countries to show them that Communism has nothing to offer them except stagnation and decline. In less-developed nations, Czechos ovasia may be e up as demonstrating the results of Communism; the people of developing Communist countries can loo', forward to arriving, after years of deprivation, only at the position now achieved by the Czechs. 25XIC10b 10 February 1964). press Comment, 6 April, carries the complete text of an article on the nama riots which appeared in the 30 March issue of U.S. News and World Report. In spite of a few minor errors, quay ers considers this as comprehensive and truthful an article as any that have appeared in the U.S. 3 (Briefly Noted) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08!+27-i GIARDP7.8-03061A00020007WOi .il 1954 13 Ap Bandung Conference -- 29 Afro-t Sian countries call for sel -determi: aticn, 13-27 f 'il IS55. 22 Ap Ionia barn, 1071; Chicoms issue "long Live Leninism" Katements, challenging 3lhrushchev, 1930. 29 Ap India and Chinese People's Republic enter 8-year pact for "peaceful coexistence," 1954. 5 may Karl Marx born 1313 (dies 14 March 13344. 11 May WFTU - 2nd International Conference on Problems of Women Workers (!FTU) Bucharest, 11-16 May, 1964. 11 May Soviet Bloc Warsaw Pact concluded, including Albania. 11-14 May 1955. 15 May Third International (Comintern) dissolved. 22 May an- nouncement declares autonomy of CP's outside USSR. 1943. 13 May First of China-USSR "Unequal Treaties" (Aigan) signed. 13 53 . 21 May All-Africa Trade Union Federation Conference (AATUF) 21-24 May 1934, Bamako. 23 may Khrushchev arrives Belgrade blames errors for 1943 break on Beria. 1955. 31 May Premier Ferenc I1agy in Switzerland threatened with arrest if he returns to Hungary. 1347. 1 June DoGaulle becomes Premier of France. 1950. 5 June Secretary George Marshall proposes the European Re- covery Program ("Marshall Plan") in Harvard speech. (Soviets prevent Poland and Czechoslovakia from ac- cepting). 1947. 11 June Marshal Tukhachevsky and 7 other top Red Army Generals arreste-, tried secretly and executed. 1? June Second of China-USSR "Unequal Treaties" (Yientsin),1053. 15 June USSR occupies Lithuania 15 June 1940, Estonia and Latvia 17 June 1340 17 June German Day of Unity (West Germany) commemorating East German riots of workers/youths 16-17 June 1953 quelled by Soviet troops. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/0 - - 3061A000200070002-2 PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #25 14-27 March 1964 Commentary Principal Developments: 1. The Chinese drove on relentlessly with their all- fronts onslaught a~'~inst IM-rushchev and his followers. -M- spite pressure from "neutral" CPs as well as from the Soviet camp to withhold polemics, the Chinese NCNA news agency and press ostentatiously publicized polemical texts by their supporters daily since the departure o e Rumanian delega- tion from Pe ng, going back several months -- even into 1963 -- to pick up some of them (see Chrono, March 13 and continuing). This campaign was capped (after the end of our period, see Addendum to Chrono, March 31) with the publication of their own new major attack -- the eighth in their series tied o e 14 July .. open letterculminating in an open and direct call to all mmun sts, inside the CPSU as well as in other parties, to "repudiate and liquidate Khrushchev's revisionism." most significant is the clue to their tactical plans i n their "solemn declaration" that "it is necessary to amend the formulation of the question ("peace- ful transition" an a "parliamentary road" to socialism) in the declaration and the statement (documents of the 1957 and 1960 oscow conferences) roug joint consultation of Commu- nist and workers parties to conform to the revolutionary prin- ciples of Marxism-Leninism." 2. Prior to this new blast, the Peking press triumph- antly announced the formation of another pro-Chinese "national c", this time in Australia, headed by their avork e, E.F.Hillt Wo had been expo a from the old CPA last year for his pro- Chicom activities. Turbulent developments in India during the past couple of weeks indicate that the pro-Chinese faction may set up a new party there also in the near future. 3. The Chinese also thrust their fight against the Soviets aggressively and destructively inhree major inter- national front activities. Most spectacular was the bitter public battle before 71-national delegations at the 6th Session of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in Algiers (Chrond., March 22-2U), precipitated y nese chief legate's attacks on Soviet policy. A similar struggle was reportedly carried on behind closed doors at an executive session of the World Federation of Trade Unions (W ETU) in Sofia (Chrono, March IU-21). And after the end of the period, the Chinese started advance attacks on the forthcoming Budapest 8th Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) with a press release denouncing the undemocratic (#25 Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (025 Co $ o ~al 20 8-03061A000200070002-2 efforts of "certain responsible members" to monopolize the preparations to push "the erroneous foreign policy of a certain country** and blaming them in advance "for the grave consequences that may ensue at the Ctti Congress" (Addendum, March 29). In secret comment on the A"PBO events, the U.S. Embassy in Algiers says that the Sino-Soviet altercation was even worse in the closed sessions than in public, and that the Chinese refused to invite the Soviets, Mongolians and Indians to their reception for all delegates. The Chinese seemed to be backed publicly by at least one-third of the delegates, including the Asians (except for Mongolians and Indians) and a number of Africans, especially English-speaking, and Embassy concludes that the Chinese "may well increase their position within AAPSO." The Arabs, however, seemed to favor neither, and some (particularly Egyptians) talked about trying to get both the Chinese and the 25X1C1 riots thrown out of AAPSO. c. Khrushchev arrives in Budapest 31 March for visit-To`inclu e 4 April anniversary of Hungary's liberation from Nazi occupation. No other major Communist leader is known to be coming. He and Radar may or may not take advantage of the occasion to issue a statement on problems of the ICM. d. No hard information has become available re plans for Hhrushchev's 70th birthday celebration, April 17, or for the annual May Day rally. e. Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky will lead a military delegation on an "ofTTq"ial friendship visit" to East Germany (Orono; 'March 24). er can mission Berlin infers conf.) that visit planned more for political-psychological impact than for military motives: coming so soon after Mikoyan demonstrative attendance at the Grotewohl birthday (3g of last Commentary), it suggests a Soviet feel- ing of need to provide a public reminder of their relationship with SED during these times. f. The French CP called anew for a world conference without delay (Chronol, March , nouncing Chinese attitudes at the same time. Pravda also reports that Canadian CP General Secre- tary is and Dutch CP Secretary Kukster expressed new support for a world conference in the near future. (Addendum to Chrono, March 29-30). g. Rumania continues to demonstrate independ- ence: obvioussly` snubbing the Russians and other East European countries, it has invited the Albanian Army football team to participate as the "guest" team in the 20th anniversary celebrations of her national holiday on 23 August. Approved For Release 2000 - -030g1A9OQ&DI2 Cont. ) '-A25 Commentary ~ Approved For Release)2000 8 - 8-03061A000200070002-2 5. A number of Cps and other organizations in the West (French CP, CPUSA, Swedish Communist Youth) have strongly condemned a blatantly anti-Semitic book, Judaism without Embellishment, published in Kharkov, Sovie Ukraine, 6. The high-level Japanese CP delegation which had spent the first half of the month sc c pleted its talks in Peking and flew to Pyongyang (see Chroiio March 25). The release stated only that they had had "friendly talks on questions of common concern." 7. An apparent subversion case which may have far- reaching repercussions seeme be unfolding as the period ended. began on the 18th with the expulsion of an Albanian attache from Budapest and the arrest of a prominent Hungarian Stalinist, a n st, Sandor Nagy, for "suspec ed incitement." By ther , correspondents were reporting n orme sources" in Budapest as linking the two in an effort to overthrow the Hadar regime (one said assassinate a ar , and by the 29th i was reported that Nagy's group may have numbered several hundred, supported by the Albanian Party (Chrono, March"'I rland g . Significance: The Chinese could hardly have done more to back Khrushchev and his followers into a corner -- where they must launch an effective counter-attack or face gradual destruction -- than by their conduct--during this period, a er firm evidence indicates that as late as the end of February (and perhaps until the middle of March) Khrushchev -- under heavy pressure from the "anti-split" elements -- was still willing to go through the motions of further bilateral talks with the Chinese, despite the polemical pummeling he has taken from them, if they would refrain from future polemics. But they ruth- S-sl-y--a-n-d-o-ss-fee-nn-faa-tT ous y procee e to publish daily polemics, capped by the 31 March diatribe which not only adds further personal insults to juirushER-OV--but calls openly -for his qu a on. The new Chinese blast also implies Chinese thinking on future strategy and tactics: i.e., "through joint consul a ion o Communist an wor ers parties" (the parties and dissident groups attuned to the Chinese line) to work toward the formu- lation of a new document to succeed the 1957 and 1960 decTara- on and s a emen which will clearly wipe out "Khrushchev's revisionist" influence in favor of the nese concept o "revolutionary Marxism-Leninism " and wE1-cF-They believe will gradually win the adherence an support of "the international Communist movement" as a whole. How will Khrushchev and his supporters react? We suggest that he may s ry o procras na a -- but time seems to be running out on him! 4 (#25 Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #25 14-27 March 1964 (See also Addendum to Chronology #24 for items on March 14, 15, 16 and 17.) March 10-18 -- On "10 March Ulan Pator radio reported that, following heavy snowfalls and prolonged frost which caused serious difficulties with livestock, the USSR made available a column of 70 trucks and 3 helicopters for delivering fodder and other supplies to the stricken areas. On the 16th, NCNA reported a message from Chou En-lai to Premier Tsedenlal ex- pressing deep sympathy on Mongolian losses and announcing a Chinese donation of 10,000 tons of maize fodder and 200,000 yuan. On the 18th, Tass from Ulan Fator describes the Mon- golian difficulties and the at help" given "as always in a dark hour (by) the Soviet people, well-tried friends," with their "caravans of friendship." March 13 and continuing -- On March 13, the day after the departure of the Rumanian CP delegation from Peking (Chrono #24), Radio Peking resumes broadcasting the text of the 4 February joint editorial on "The Greatest Splitters," which had been suspended since before the Rumanian arrival. NCNA also begins the daily distribution of a series of delayed reports on polemical statements by Chinese-aligned parties or factions which are then published on the following day in all Peking papers, usually in full text in People's Daily. They are: -- 13 (14): The December plenum speech of N. Vietnamese First Secretary Le Duan, from February Hoc Tap. --- 14 (15): The resolution of the Indonesian CP's December plenum (published by HarlanRak'at on January 15), approving the Aidit report described in Chrono, December 23. 15 (16): An editorial from Japanese CP organ Akahata of February 11 quoting Mao approvingly and assailing revisionism. 16 (17): A February 18 speech by New Zealand CP boss Wilcox to a Canton Party School attacking Khrushchev and Suslov and paying tribute to Mao. 17 (18): A March 2 editorial from the N. Korean daily Nodong Sinmun marking the 45th anniversary of the founding of the Third International, condeming (though not identifying) the modern revisionists. 1 (#25 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (#25 Chronology Cont.) 18 (19): The appeal of the December 22 "national congress" of the Grippa-led Pro-Chinese Belgian dissident Communists, (Chrono, January 3), together with a Grippa editorial from La Voix d u Peuple of 13 March. --- 19 (20): A March 1 Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial entitl de~"Khrushchev Adulterates Lenin's Ideas to Pave the Way for His Pro-Imperialist Line." 20 (21): An article from the December 1963 issue of The Australian Communist, publication of the pro-Chinese "Australian Marxist-Leninists"which attacks "Khrushchev and his clique" while "refuting the slanders of the Australian CP against the CCP." --- 21 (22): An article from the March issue of Kulloja, a monthly organ of the N. Korean Party, which uses the "some people" formulation in attacking the modern revisionists. --- 22 (23): A February 8 speech at Medan by Indonesian CP second e chairman Njoto, from HariianRakjatFeb. 10.- Njoto faces a "ridiculous" charge that the PKI is ;anti-Soviet:" "It is decidedly not the PKI that is anti-Soviet, but those who are, in actual fact, indifferent to the fate of the first socialist country founded by Lenin. They allow the decadent culture of the West to infiltrate into the Soviet Union. Not in words, but in deeds, do they allow the tendency to- ward the restoration of capitalism to grow in socialist countries." --- 23 (24): An article from the January issue of the N. Viet- namese organ Hoc Tap entitled "The Correct Path to Defend World Peace," which challenges the views of the modern revisionists on this subject. --- 24 (25): Another article from the January issue of Hoc Tap entitled "Peace and Revolution." 25 (26): A 3-page article from the Japanese CP daily Akahat- a of March 10, under the banner headline "Thoroughly and Completely Smash Fallacies Advanced by the Modern Revisionists to Glorify U.S. Imperialism." --- 26 (27): An article from issue No. 23, 1963, of a N. Korean Party organ Keunroja (Toilers), which emphasizes that "the struggle against the Western bourgeois way of life is a very important aspect of the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism." 2 (#25 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (#25 Chronology Cont.) --- 27 (28): A speech by Albanian Politburo Member Ramiz Alia condemning modern revisionism, pus an editorial from Tien Phong (Vanguard), organ of N. Vietnamese Labor Youth Union, calling on youth to combat modern revisionism. March 18-21 -- An executive session of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Sofia saw another bitter battle between the Soviet and Chinese forces, according to reports leaking out. The Yugoslav Tanyug correspondent in Sofia reports (on the 27th) that the Chinese delegate, assisted by the Indonesian, N. Korean, N. Vietnamese and Ja anese, "availed himself of every opportunity to provoke a sharp polemic and to carry the positions of the Chinese Party and State leadership to the international trade union scene." "The Chinese and Indonesian representatives wanted first of all to have Vice President Mendis of Ceylon de- clared a private person in Sofia because the Ceylonese trade unions have split." The Chinese declared that the WFTU and its Secy Genl Louis Saillant were supporting the foreign policy of a big state -- "clearly an allusion to the Soviet Union." "In Sofia the Chinese pretended to have a monopoly on absolute truth, infallibility, and the right to lecture everyone. More- over, this is not the first time it has been possible to perceive that the Chinese want to create an international trade union center -- evidently outside the WFTU" -- lased on Chinese ideas. March 18 and continuing -- A brief Hungarian announcement on the 18th stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that day ex- pelled Vasil Tasellari, commercial attache of the Albanian Embassy, who, abusing his right to diplomatic immunity, in violation of the law, interfered in the internal affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic." An even briefer announcement, on the same day but apparently not connected, stated: "The Minister of the Interior has placed Sandor Nagy ... under preliminary arrest for suspected incitement." On the 20th, the Albanian Foreign Ministry denounced the expulsion -- "another hostile action in continuation of anti- Albanian activities carried out by the Hungarian leadership in past years with the intention of aggravating relations...." It went on to demand the withdrawal within 48 hours of an attache, Lajos Evy, at the Hungarian Embassy in Tirana. On the 21st, several correspondents in Fudapest reported tha "informed Hungarian sources" linked the Albanian ouster with the arrest of Nagy, a 1951 Stalin ize winner, one of the hard- core Stalinists who never accepted Kadar's moderate approach. Nagy was said to have circulated material calling for the over- throw of the Kadar regime (NYTimes' Underwood said it urged the assasination of Kadar) which had been printed in Albania 3 (#25 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (#25 Chronology Cont.) through Tasellari's complicity. A Reuters dispatch dated the 29th reported that "further details on the recent arrest of Sandor Nagy ... revealed that he was to head a 'new Communist Party' in Hungary in support of the Chinese.... A ccording to unconfirmed reports, several hundred supporters of Nagy ... were either arrested or investi- gated by the Hungarian police in the last ten days." Reuters adds that the group around Nagy "closely collaborated with the Albanian Party which ... provided funds and even a printing press, the sources said." March 20 -- _La Voix du Peuple, organ of Grippa's Belgian pro- Chinese dissidents, carries a long report describing the first (March) issue of Nuova Unita, subtitled, in translation, "For the Victory of Marxism-Leninism," a Chinese-line monthly publish- ed in Italy. The report contains long excerpts from its platform and reprints a map showing the centers of "true Marxist-Leninistd' in Italy. March 22 -- The London Sunday Times carries a Peking dispatch by Jacques Marcuse reporting that "foreign experts" there te- lieve that "a formal political break with Russia by China is now a very definite probability," and that "the occasion would be the international 'Marxist-Leninist' conference which would convene here at the CCP's invitation and would 'unmask' and condemn modern revisionism and Nikita Khrushchev." He writes that the Rumanians were told of China's intentions during their talks early this month. Khrushchev's forthcoming visit to Hun- gary is announced officially by Budapest. March 22-28 -- The 6th session of the Council of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization AAPSO), held in Algiers and chaired by Algerian Mohammed Yazid became the scene of a bitter Chinese-Soviet battle. It started with the March 23 speech of Mrs. Kuo Chien, leader of the Chinese delegation, who violently attacked Soviet policies. She was quoted as saying, when de- nouncing the rushchev proposal for peaceful resolution of border and territorial disputes as "the most absurd and reaction- ary reasoning: "Now if some people should ask the Afro-Asian people to capitulate unconditionally to the aggression of the imperialists and old and new colonialists under the deceitful slogan that no use of force is allowed to settle territorial disputes, the Chinese people will reply categori- cally 'No, a thousand times no,' and will tell these people: 'Your expansionism and national egoism have long made it difficult to draw a line between 4 (#25 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (#25 Chronology Cont.) you and the imperialists and colonialists, old and now.' As birds of a feather flock together, it is not at all strange that you should stand on the side of the imperialists and colonialists. But you will never succeed in deceiving us people of Africa and Asia." Soviet chief delegate Bibodjan Gafurov on the 25th, casti- gated the Chien speech, saying that other "delegations had asked him not to reply to the Chinese "calumnies." The Chinese and some Africans interrupted with protests and demand for right of reply. The Chinese again demanded the right to reply after the open sessions ended, but Yazid was reported as banning further Sino-Soviet clashes, declaring that: "Algiers, the capital of geria an the-Afro-Asian capital, must not become the capital of Afro-Asian disunity." Algerian President Ben Bella, at his reception in honor of the delegates on the 'h, re arked: "We want our debates to be, first and foremost, Afro- Asian. We will remain vigilant so that these de ates will say In tthe Afro-Asian sphere." The pro-Soviet Algerian newspaper Alger Republican on the 24th criticized the Chinese conduct under the heading: "The Only Discordant Note." On the 25th, Czech central organ Rude Pravo condemned the "reckless" Chinese conduct, saying that the Chien speech "met the gloomiest expectations," marked by "anti- Soviet h steria." "The Chinese delegate ridiculed the endeavor to build up developing countries economically and described any hope of averting war as.nonsensical and even fraudulent." Czech commentator Hochman also points out that "the delegates did not fail to notice that in her list of imperialist forces the Chi- nese delegate completely orgot France." Despite obvious public revulsion to their feuding, how- ever, Gafurov held a press conference to air his views more fully on the 27th, and uo Chen retaliated with her own press conference on the 28th to reply to the Soviet s an ers and distortions! March 24 -- The East Germans announce that a Soviet military delegation led by a ense Minister Marshal Malinovsky will pay "an official friendship visit" to the GDR at the invitation of the Party and Government. March 25 -- The Japanese CP delegation headed by Hakamada which had nducted talks with the CPSU in Moscow from February 28 to March 12 (see Chrono, March 13) completed "cordial and friendly talks on questions of common concern" with the C in Peking during the period March 21- . Liu Shao-chi and Chou 5 (#25 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (#20L. Chronology Cont.) were senior Chinese participants. On the 27th, they flew to Pyongyang "to pay a visit" ttnd landed "amid enthusiastic cheers." March 27 -- French CP daily L'Rumanite reports that at a meeting the previous day the CC reaffirmed its condemnation of Chinese dogmatic positions and schismatic activity and called for the convocation of a meeting of all Communist and workers parties without delay. 6 (#25 Chronology) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 ADDENDUM TO CHRONOLOGY March 29 -- The Peking press announces the formation of "the onist Party of Australia -- Marxist-Leninist" with E.F. Hill as Chairman. In Buda est, the Chinese delegation to the 8th Congress of the Internat onal Association of Democratic Lawyers L which is due there on the lst, issues a statement to the press which says: "It is to be regretted that certain responsitle members of the IADL have taken an extremely undemocratic attitude, attempting to monopolize everything regarding the agenda of the 8th Congress, the reports, and the way the Congress is to be conducted, for the purpose of pushing through the erroneous line of foreign policy of a certain country.... "The Chinese delegation solemnly declares: certain responsitle members of the I L, who are pursuing an erroneous political line, and who, while paying lip service to unity, are actually engaged in division, should tear full responsibility for the grave consequences that may ensue at the 8th ongress." March 29-30 -- Pravda on the 29th reports that Canadian CP General Secretary orris, speaking to the 18th Congress of the Netherlands CP, said that the situation in the international Communist movement demands that the Congress express views on convening a world congress, which should be in the near future. On the 30th, Pravda reported that Dutch CP Secretary Hukster supported the world conference proposal. (Pravda reports that representatives of Soviet, ulgarian, Hungarian, French, Finnish, Felgian and Danish Cps attended.) March 31 -- in publishes the eighth in its series of Joint sail , _ /~...,..7 s s -- - s _ : Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism."/Ve have _ave ~ oonlly an only , a NCNA summary on which to base the following trief comments, and will summarize the article more fully in the next issue-7 The article starts by declaring that "the betrayal of Marxism and of the proletariat by the revisionists has always manifested itself most sharply in their opposition to violent revolution and to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in their advocacy of peaceful transition from capitalism to social- ism. This is likewise the case with Khrushchev's revisionism. On this question Khrushchev is a disciple of rrowder and Tito as well as of Bernstein and Kautsky." 7 (#25 Addendum to Chrono Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 o ed For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 ~ddendum to Chrono. Cont.) The Chinese state that they had expressed themselves against Khrushchev's views on "peaceful transition" and "the parliamentary road" from the time he put them forward at the 1956 20th CPSU Congress, and that they made concessions to allow Soviet formulations to be incorporated into the 1 and 1960 Moscow documents. However, "the CPSU leadership has taken ad- vantage of these weaknesses and errors... and used them as an excuse for peddling Khrushchev's revisionism." The Chinese then "solemnly declare" that "it is necessary to amend the formulation of the question in the declaration and the statement through joint consultation of Communist and Workers parties to conform to the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism." Further taunting K., the Chinese say that "it is Khrushchev himself who has succeeded to the mantle of Trotskyism and who stands with the otskyites of today." And further, "K. is the greatest capitulationist in history." After citing the Communist leaders of Iraq, Algeria, France, and "the Dange clique" in India as bad examples and Comrade Fide]. in Cuta as a shining case, they call for action -- against Khrushchev: "Now is the time -- now it is high time -- to repudiate and liquidate Khrushchev's revisionism! Here, we would give the leading comrades of the CPSU a piece of advice: since so many opportunists and revisionists have teen thrown onto the ruttish heap of history, why must you obdurately follow in their wake? Here, too, we express the hope that those leading comrades of other fraternal parties will think this over: what have they gained b following the revisionist line of the leaders of the CCU? ... We believe that all those who are proletarian revolutionaries will eventually choose the revolutionary line and reject the anti-revolutionary line, will eventually choose M-L and reject revisionism. We entertain very great hopes in this regard." 8 (#25 Addendum to Chrono.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 CHRONOLOGIE - DISSENSIONS COWUNISTES Numdro 25 14-27 mars 1964 (Vois dgalement addenda a laChronologie numdro 24 pour articles dates des 14, 4, 16 et 11 mars. ) 10-18 mars: Le 10 mars, la radio d'Ulan Bator annoncait que, par suite de grosses chutes de neige et de gels prolongds, qui furent la cause de difficultds serieuses avec le betail, 1'Union sovidti- que a fourni 70 camions .t 3 helicopteres pour effectuer des livrai- sons de fourrage et d'autres produits dans lea regions atteintes. Le 16, l'Agence de presse Chine nouvelle parlait d'un message adres- se par Chou au premier ministre Tsddenbal, exprimant tin pro- fond regret au sujet des partes subies par les Mongols et annoncant tin don des Chinois de 10 000 tonnes de mdis pour la, nourriture du betail et de 200 000 Yuan. Le 18, Tass parle d'Ulan Bator des dif- ficultds qu'dprouvent les Mongols, et de "l'aide consi rable" ac- cordde "comma toujours Bans une pdriode sombre par le p uple sovid- tique - ami fiddle" au moyen de "leurs caravanes de I amitid", 13 mars et la suite: Le 13 mars, jour prdcddant le depart de la delegation du PC roumain (Chrono numdro 24), Radio-Pekin reprenait la transmission du texte de 1'editorial publid en commun le 4 fd- fr- vrier sur Les plus grands faiseurs de divisions" dont la dissgii- nation rut suspendue a la veille de 1'arriv a des Roumains. L'A- gence de presse Chine nouvelle commence dgalement la distribution quotidienne dune sdrie de rapports dont la partition flit retardde, ces rapports portant sur la poldmique conduite par les partis ou factions alignds sur la Chine. Ces rapports sont publids le jour suivant dans tous les journaux de Pekin, et leur texte complet est donne d'habitude Bans le "Quotidien du peuple". En voici la liste: -- 13 (14): Discours prononcd h la session pldnibre de ddcembre par le premier secrdtaire du parti nord-vietnamien Le Duan, repro- duit d'un article paru dans ltddition de fdvrier de "Hoc Tap". -- 14 (15): Resolution pe.ssde A la session pldniLre de decembre par le PC indondsien (publid par "Harlan Rakjat" le 15 janvier), approuvant le rapport d'Aidit mentionne dans la Chrono en date du 23 decembre. -- 15 (16): Un editorial de 11"Akahata", organ du PC ja nais en date du 11 citant Mao avec approbation et s'attaquant au r vi- sionnisme. -- 16 (17): Un discours du 18 fevrier par Wilcox, chef du PC de la Nouvelle-Zelande prononce a l'dcole du parti de Canton, s'at- taquant Khrouchtchev et A Souslov et faisant les louanges de Mao. -- 17 (18): Un editorial du 2 mars du Quotidien de la Coree du Nord "Nodong Sinmun", marquant le 45e anniversaire de la fondation de la 3e Internationale, et fletrissant (sans lea identifier)_.les revisionnistes modernes. - 1 - Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 -- 18 (19): Un appel du 22 decembre par "le congrbs national" des dissidents communistes belges de tendance pro-chinoise, dirigd par Grippe (Chrono du 3 janvier , ainsi qu'un editorial par Grippe daps "La voix du peuple" du 13 mars. -- 19 (20): Un editorial du ler mars du journal albanias "Zeri I Popullit", intituld: "Khrouchtchev porte atteinte aux id:des de Lenin pour paver la vole a sa politique pro-impdrialiste". -- 20 (21): Un article dune edition de decembre 1963, paru dans "The Australian Communist", publication des "marxistes-ldninistes australiens" de tendance pro-chinoise, qui attaque "Khrouchtchev et sa clique" et qui "refute lee calumnies du PC australien A 116- gard du PC chinois". -- 21 (22): Un article tire du numdro de mars de "Kulloja", organe mensuel du parti nord-corder qui se sert du langage de "certaines gens" en attaquant lea visionnistes moderns. -- 22 (23): Un discours du 8 fd'vrier A Medan, par N_jotto 2e vice- president du PC indonesien, tire du "Harian Rakjat" numero du 10 fdvrier. Njoto rdpond a l'accusation "ridicule" selon laquelle le PC indondsien serait anti-sovidtique": "Deciddment, ce n'est pas le PC indondsien qui est anti-sovidtique? mais bien ceux qui se trouvent ttre en it indiffdrents au sort du premier pays so- cialiste fondd par Ldnine. Its permettent la culture decadente de 1'0uest de s'infiltrer dens l'Union so- vidtique. Ce n'est pas en paroles, mais en actes qu'ils permettent a la tendance de restaurer le ca- pitalisme de se ddvelopper dans les pays socialistes", -- 23 (24): Dans le numdro de janvier de 1'organe nord-vietnamien "Hoc Tap", un article intituld "La facon correcte deed.fendre la paix mondiale", qui s'oppose aux opinions des rdvisionnistes moder- nes A ce sujet. -- 24 (25): Un autre article dens le numdro de janvier du "Hoc Tap" intituld "Paix et revolution". -- 25 (26): tin article de 3 pages dans le quotidien du PC aponais "Akahata" le 10 mars, sous grosse manchette "Ddtruire minutieuse- ment et completement les erreurs formulees par les rdvisionnistes modernes dens le but de glorifier 1'imperialisme des Etats Unis". -- 26 (27): Un article dens le numdro 23, 1963, de 1'organe du PC nord-corden "Keunroja" (Travailleurs), qui souligne que "la lutte contre le genre d'existence des bourgeois occidentaux constitue un aspect tree important de la lutte contre l'imperialisme et le rdvi- sionnisme modern". -- 27 (28): Un discours de Ramiz Alia, membre du politbureau alba- nais condamnant le rdvisionnisme modern, ainsi qu'un editorial du Tien Phong" (Avant-garde), organe du syndicat professionnel de - 2 - Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 la jeunesse nord-vietnamienne qui fait appel d la jeunesse pour combattre le visionnisme moderne. 18-21 mars: Session des dirigeants de la Federation syndicale mon- diale 6. Sofia, au cours de laquelle s'est livrde une nouvelle ba- taille violente entre lee forces chinoises et sovietiques, A en croire lee nouvelles qui transpirent a l'exterieur. Le correspondant du "Tanyug" yougoslave A Sofia cnique (le 27) que le ddldgud chi- nois, avec 1'a ides ddldguds indondsien corden du Nord, vietna- mien du Nord et ja nais "a profs de toutes lee occasions pour provoquer tine pot mique violente et pour affirmer sur la scene syn- dicale lee positions du parti et des leaders de 1'Etat chinois". "Les reprdsentants chinois et indondsien ddsiraient avant tout que le vice-president Menzies de Ceylan soit declare personne privde A Sofia en raison de la rupture survenue dens lee syndicate ceylenais." Les Chinois ddclarerent que la Federation syndicale mondiale et son secrdtaire general Louis Saillant appuyaient la politique dtrangere d'un grand Etat -- "allusion certaine a 1'Union sovidtique-Les Chinois p tendirent a Sofia de jouir du monopole de la vdritd abso- lue, de l'infaillibilitd et du droit de donner des lecons a. tout le monde. D'autre part, ce n'est pas la premiere fois qu'il a dtd pos- sible d'entrevoir le fait que lee Chinois desirent crder un centre yndical international -- en dehors de la Federation syndicate mon- diale dvidemment -- et base sur lea conceptions chinoises". 18 mars et la suite: Un bref communique hongrois le 18 annoncait que le ministere des Affaires dtrangeres await, e, ce jour, expulsd Vasil Tasellari, attache commercial de l'ambassade albanaise, 11 qui abusant de son droit d'immunitd diplomatique et en infraction a la loi, est intervenu dens lea affaires internes de la Rd blique - pulairehon roise . Un communique plus court encore, du m me jour, mais ce qu'il semble sans relation avec le precedent, ddclarait: "Le ministre de l'Intdrieur a place Sandor ... soupconnd d'ins- tigation, en dtat d'arrgt pr6liminai Le 20, le ministere des Affaires dtrangLres albanais fldtris- sait l'expulsion -- "nouvelle mesure hostile dans la suite des ac- tivitds anti-albanaises auxquelles les leaders hongrois se sont li- vrds au cours de ces dernieres anndes avec 1'intention de voir les relations se ddtdriorer ..." L'article continua jusqu'e reclamer le retrait dens lee 4+8 heures d'un attache, Lajos Evy, de l'ambassa- de hongroise e. Tirana. Le 21, plusieurs correspondents a Budapest out fait savoir que "des sources hongroises bien informdes" voyaient un rapport entre 1'expulsion de l'Albanais avec l'arrestation de Nagy, titulaire du prix Staline de 1951, 1'un des dur e, cuire staliniens n'ayant jamais accepte 1'attitude moddrde de Kadar. Nagy aurait fait circuler des documents rdclamant le renversement du regime Kadar Underwood du "New York Times" a ddelard qu'il r elamait l'assassinat de Kadar); ces documents auraient dtd imprimds en Albanie avec la complicitd de Tasellari. Un communique de Reuters date du 29 annonce que "des details supplementaires sur l'arrestation rdcente de Sandor Nagy ... rdvelent -3- Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 qu'il se trouvait a la tate d'un "nouveau parti communiste" en Hon- grie soutenant lea Chinois ... Salon des nouvelles non confirm s, plusieurs centaines de partisans de Nagy ... furent soit arrOtds, soit interrogds par la police hongroise au cours de ces 10 dernie3w fours". Reuters ajoute que l'entourage de Nagy "collaborait dtroi- tement avec le parti albanais, qui ... fournissait lea fonds et mime la pre see a imprimer, clarent lea sources . 20 mars: "La voix du peuple", organe des dissidents beiges d'orien- tation pro-chinoise dirigds par Grippa, publie un long cammuniqud ddcrivant le premier aumdro (mars) de "Nuova Unita" mensuel pro-Chi- nois publid en Italia, et qui portait la manchette "Pour la victoi- re du marxisme -ldnisme ". 22 mars: Le "Sunday Times" de Londres donne un connnuniqud de Pekin par Jacques Marcuse, qui fait savoir que "les experts dtrangers" a Pekin estiment "qu'une rupture officielle avec l'Union sovidtique par la Chine ne se prdsente pas actuellement avec une certitude ab- solue", et que "l'occasion pour le faire se prdsenterait al confd- rence internationals marxiste-ldniniste qui se rdunirait ici a 1 ns- tigation du PC chinois et qui squerait et condamnerait le rdvi- sionnisme modern et Nikita Khrouchtchev". Il dcrit que..les Roumains furent mis au courant des intentions chinoises au cours des entretiens qu'ils eurent au ddbut de ce mois. La visite prochaine de Khroucht- chev en Hongrie eat annoncde officiellement par Budapest. 22-28 mars: La 6e session du Conseil de l'Organisation de la soli- dari des peuples afro-asiatiques qui s'est tenue Alger sous la pr sidence de 1 rien Mohamed Yazid, a dtd la scene dune ba- taille violente entre Chinois et sovidtiques. Elie ddbuta par un discours le 23 mars de Mrae Kuo Chien, chef de is ddidgation chinoi- se, qui attaqua violement is politique sovidtique en s'attaquant a is proposition de Khrouchtchev de soudre pacifiquement lea dis- putes terrotoriales et de frontieres et que celles-ci dtaient le fruit "du raisonnement le plus absurde et le plus rdactionnaire": "Si quelque pays demandait maintenant aux peuples afro- asiatiques de capituler sans conditions devant 1'agres- sion des imldrialistes ainsi que des anciens et des nou- veaux colonialistes camouflds derriere le slogan trompeur que le recours a is force eat interdit pour rdgler lea disputes territorial-es, le peuple chinois rdpondrait ca- tAgoriquement: Non mille fois non', et ddclarerait ft ce pays" 'Depuis longtemps, votre expansionnisme et vo- te d disme national font qu'il eat difficile de faire une d arcation entre vous-mimes d'un c et lea imp ria- listes et lea colonialistes de l'autre, qu'ils soient an- ciens ou nouveaux'. Comme 'qui se rassemble s'assemble', it n'est pas dtonnant que vows vous trouviez du cis impdrialistes et des colonialistes. Mais vous ne parvien- drez jamais a nous tromper, noes, peuples de 1'Afrique et de 1'Asie". Le chef de la ddldgation sovidtique Bibodjan Gafurov critiqua violeinment le discours de Chien, declarant que lea autres ddldga- Approved For Release 2000/0$/ "CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 tions lui avaient demandd de ne pas rdpondre aux "calcaflnies" chi- noises. Les Chinois et certains Africaina interrompi,rent par des protestations et affirmbrent qu'ils avaient le droit 40 rdpondre. Les Chinois de nouveau exigbrent is parole aprbs la fin des ses- sions ouvertes, mass Yazid se serait opposd A d'autres disputes entre Chinois et sovidtiqLi2s, declarant que: Alger, capitale al- rienne et afro-asiatique, ne doit pas devenir is capitale de is ddsunion entre Africains et Asiatiques". Le 26, au tours de la re- ception en 11honneur des ddldguds, le president algdrien Ben Bella a remarque: "En premier lieu nous voulons a nos debats Solent afro-asiatiques. Nous veillerons ce que ces d6bats restent daps is sphere afro-asiati2m2". Le 24, le journal pro-sovidtique "Alger rdpubiicain" condam- nait is conduite des Chinois sous le titre: "La seule note discor- dante". Le 25, 1'organe central tchbcltw "Rude Pravo" condamnait is conduite imprudente" des Chinois,aec]arant que le discours de Chien "rdpondait aux previsions lea plus sombres" marquees par "1'histdrie anti-sovidtique". "La deldguLe chinoise s'est moqude du s r d f- fermir dconomiquement lea pays qui se developpent et a declare que tout espoir d'eviter is guerre constituait une absurditd et m@me une fraude". Le commentateur tcheque Hochman soulignait egalement que "lee ddleguds ne manquerent pas de remarquer que is ddlegude chi- noise avait eompletement oublie is France dans as liste de forces impdrialistes . Malgrd la reaction dvidente causee par leur querelle, Gafurov tenait le 27 une conference de presse pour exposer plus complete- ment sea vues. Kuo Chien convoquait A son tour une conference de presse le 28 pour pondre aux calomnies, aux mensonges des Soviets! 24 mars: Les Allemands de l'Est annoncent qu'une delegation mili- taire soviets ue ayant as to le mardcbal Malinovsky, ministre defense, fera "une visite officielle d'amitid" A la Republi- que ddmocratique allemande, repondant & une invitation du parti et du gouvernement. 25 mars: La delegation du PC japonais ayant b. sa tate Hakamada, qui avait dirigd lea entretiens avec le PC de l'Union sovidtique A Mos- cow entre le 28 fdvrier et le 12 mars (voir Chrono, 13 mara), a ter- mind "des entretiens cordieux et amicaux sur des questions d'intd- At coammun avec le PC chinois, entretiens qui eurent lieu P in du 21 au 25 mars. Liu Shao-chi at Chou En-lai etaient parmi lea principaux participants du c6td chinois. Le 27, ils se rendirent en avion A Pyongyang "afire d'y faire une visite" et atterrirent "parti des Cris d'enthousiasme". 27 mars: "L'humanitd", quotidien du PC franCais, fait savoir qu'au tours dune reunion tenue le jour precddent, le CC avait confirmd as condamnation des positions dogmatiques et de l'activitd schisma- tique des Chinois, et demandait is convocation sans delai dune r+ u- nion de tous lea PC et travaillistes. Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 ADDENDA A LA CHRONOLOGIE 29 mars: La presse de Pekin annonce la formation d'un "parti com- muniste -- mar cis- -14rdaiiste australien" avec E.F. Hill cornme p sident. A Budapest, la delegation chinoise au 8e congras de ,'Associa- tion internationale des avocats d orates, qui doit s'ouvrir dans cette ville le 31, fait la declaration suivante a, la presse: "Il est a. regretter que certains membres res nsables de 1'Association internationale des avocats deraocrates aient adopte une attitude extrnnement anti-d?mocrati- que, cherchant b. monopoliser tout ce qui concerne 1'or- dre du jour du 8e congras, lea rapports et la fawn de mener ce congrds, ceci dans ,'intention d'imposer lea theories errondes d'un certain pays en mature de poli- tique etrangere ... "La delegation chinoise declare solennellement: certains membres responsables de ,'Association internationale des avocats ddmocrates qui poursuivent cette politique erro- nee et qui, tout en prdtendant 9tre pour l'unite cherchent actuellement a, diviser, devraient prter la responsabilitd enti ere pour lea consequences graves qui pourrafent s'en suivre au cours du congras . 29-30 mars: Le 29, la "Pravda" communique que le secretaire general du parti communiste canadien Morris a declare au 18e congras du par- ti communique nderlandais que la situation dand le mouvement commu- niste international rdclamait que le congras exprima sea vises sur is. convocation d'un congrbs mondial, ce qui devrait se faire dens un avenir rapprochd. Le 30+ , Pravda" annonrait que le secrdtaire du PC hollandaisHukster soutenait la proposition de convoquer une conference mondiale. ("Pravda" fait savoir que lea reprdsentants des partis communistec de ,'Union sovidtique, de la Bulgarie, de la Hongrie, de la France, de la Finlande, de is. Belgique et du Dane- mark participarent au congras nderlandais). 31 mars: Pekin fait parattre le 8e de sea articles d'une sdrie - bliee en co mon par "Le drapeau roug e et ' Le uotidien du peuple en rdponse a la lettre ouverte du arti comrauniste de ,Union sovi- dtique, da tie du l juillet; eat une harangue de 15 000 hots in- titulee "La revolution proldtarienne et le rdvisionnisme de ICarou- chtchev". [Nous ne possddons q'un resume de 1'Agence de presse Chine nouvelle coame base des commentaires rapides qui suivent et nous donnerons un resume plus complet de cet article Bans notre nu- mero suivant]. L'article debute en declarant que "la trahison du marxisme et du proletariat par lea revisionnistes s'est toujours manifestee avec le plus d'acuite dens leur opposition A la revolution violente et A la. dictature du roletariat et dens leur soutien d'une transition pacifique du capitalisme au socialisme. Ceci est galement le cas du rdvisionnisme de Khrouchtchev. Sur cette question, Khrouchtchev - 6 - Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 eat un disciple de Browder et de Tito aussi bien que de Bernstein et de Kautsky . Les Chinois ddclarent qu'ils se sont prononcds contre lea vues de Khrouchtchev sur "la transition pacifique" et "la route parle- mentaire" des le moment col celui-ci a avancd ses idles au cours du 20e congres du PC de l'Union sovidtique qui eut lieu en 1956; lea Chinois disent qu'ils ont fait des concessions pour autoriser lea lea formules sovidtiques 'a tre incorpordes daps lee documents de Moscou de 1957 et 1960. Cependant, "les leaders du PC de l'Union sovidtique ont profit de ces erreurs et de ces faiblesses ... et s'en servirent comme excuses pour affermir le rdvisionnisme de Khrouchtchev. Les Chinois ensuite "ddclarent solennellement" qu'il eat "ndcessaire d'arnendar la rddaction de Is. question dans la ddcla- ration et dans 1'exposd, aprbs consultation des partis cormunistes et travaillistes, conformdment aux principes rdvolutionnaires du marxisme-16ninisme". Continuant A s'attaquer a Khrouchtchev, lea Chinois ddclarent: "C'est Khrouchtchev lui-me^me qui succede au trotskyisme et qui se range du c$td des trotskyistes d'aujourd hui . Et plus loin, "Khrou- clitchev eat le plus grand capitulationniste de 1'histoire". AprAs avoir citd en tant que mauvais exemples lea leaders com- munistes de l'Iraq, de 1'Algdrie, de la France ainsi que "la clique de Dange" en Inde, et le carnarade Fidel Castro de Cuba en tant qu'exemple dclatant, ils font ap ell a 1'action -- contre Khroucht- chev: --- "Ii eat temps, it eat grand temps, de rdpudier et de liquider le rdvisionnisme de Khrouchtchev; Nous don- nons ici un conseil aux camarades leaders du PC de l'Union sovidtique: dtant donnd qu'un grand nombre d'oppontunistes et de rdvisionnistes se sont ddjA. vu jeter dans la pile d'ordures de 1'histoire, pourquoi vous obstinez-vous a suivre leur chemin? Ici dgale- ment nous exprimons 1'epo~s ri que les camarades lea- ders des autres partis fraternels rdfldchiront a ceci: qu'ont-ils gaand a suivre la ligne rdvisionniste des leaders du PC de 1 Union sovidtique?... Nous croyons que tous ceux qui soot des proldtaires rdvolu- tionnaires choisiront dventuelleinent la ligne rdvolution- naire et rejetteront la ligne antirdvolutionnaire, qu'ils choisiront dventuellement le marxisme-ldninisme et rejet- teront le rdvisionnisme. Nous entretenons de grandes es- pdrances A. cet dgard". -7- Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 ? Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 CRON0LOGIA -- DISENSI0NES COMUNISTAS No. 25 14-27 Marzo 1964 (Ver materiales de los dfas 14, 15, 16 y 17 en el Ap6ndice.a Is Cronologfa No 24.) 10-18 Marzo: El 10 de marzo is Radio de Ulan Bator inform6 que a raiz de fuertes nevadas y heladas prolongadas que ocasionaron se- rias dificultades con la ganaderia, is URSS peso a disposici6n una columns, de 70 camiones y 3 helic6pteros pars entrega de piensos y otros suministros a las zonas afectadas, El 16, la Agenda Nueva China inform6 un mensaje de Chou En-lai al premier Tsedenbal expre- sando sentida condolencia por las p6rdidas mongolas y anunciando un donativo chino de 10 mil toneladas de pienso de malz y 200 mil Yuan. El 18,Tass describe desde Ulan Bator las dificultades de Mongolia y la "gran M!!8'1 prestada Como siempre en una hors, tris- te (por) el pueblo sovi tico, los canprobados amigos", con sus "ca- ravanas de is amistad". 13 Marzo et __s__eg El 13 de marzo, al dia siguiente de la partida de is delegaci6n del PC roman de Pekin (crono No 24), is Radio de Pekin reanuda is emisi6n del texto del editorial conjunto del 4 de febrero sobre "Los Mayores Escisionistas , que habia sido sus- pendida desde la llegada de los rumanos. La Agencia Nueva China tambidn empieza la distribuci6n de una serie de informaciones re- trasadas sobre declaraciones poldmicas de facciones o partidos alineados con los chinos, las cuales salen a is luz al dia siguien- te en cads caso en toda is prensa de Pekin , generalmente en texto Entegro en el "Diario del Pueblo". Son las siguientes: -- 13 (14): El discurso pronund;iado por el primer secretario viet- namita Le Duan en el pleno de diciembre, tornado de "Hoc Tap" de fe- brero. -- 14 (15): La decisi6n del pleno de diciembre del PC indonesio (publicada en "Harian Rakjat" el 15 de enero), en aprobaci6n del informe de Aidit descrito en la Cronologfa, 23 de diciembre. -- 15 (16): Un editorial del 6rgano "Akahata" del PC a nds el 11 de febrero citando a Mao con aprobaci6n y atacando el revisio- nismo. -- 16 (17): Un discurso pronunciado el 18 de febrero por el jefe Wilcox del PC neozelandds en una Escuela del Partido en Cant6n ata- cando a Kruschev y Suslov y rindiendo tributo a Mao. -- 17 (18): Un editorial de 2 de marzo del 6rgano norcoreano "Nodong Sinmun" en honor del 45? aniversario de fundada la Tercera Internacional, condenando (aunque sin identificarlos) a los revisio- nistas contempordneos. -- 18 (19): El llamamiento del "congreso nacional" de 22 de diciem- bre de los comunistas disidentes belgas prochinos encabezados por - 1 - Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Grippa (Cron, 3 de enero), con un editorial de Grippa publicado en "La Voix du Peuple" el 13 de marzo. -- 19 (20): Un editorial del 6rgano alban6s "Zeri 1 Popullit" de 1? de marzo titulado "Kruschev adultera las ideas de Lenin para abrir brecha a su linea proimperialista". -- 20 (21): Un articulo de la edici6n de diciembre de "The Austra- lian Communist", publicaci6n de los "marxistas-leninistas austra- lianos" prochinos atacando a "Kruschev y su camarilla" mientras "rebaten las calumnias del PC australiano contra el PC chino". -- 21 (22): Un discurso pronunciado el 8 de febrero en Meddn por el segundo vicepresidente Njoto del PC indonesio y publicado en el "Harian Rakjat" el 10 de febrero. Njoto hace frente a una "riddcu- la" acusaci6n de que el PKI es "antisovidtico": "Decididamente no es el PKI el que es antisovidtico sino aquellos que son, en realidad, indiferentes a la suerte del primer pals socialista fundado por Le- nin. Permiten a la cultura decadente del Occidente .infiltrarse en la Unidn Sovi4tica. No de palabra sino en los hechos permiten la tendencia hacia la restauraci6n del capitalismo crecer en los passes socialistas". -- 23 (24): Un articitlo de la edici6n de enero del 6rgano "Hoc Tap" norvietnamita titulado "La via corrects pare defender la paz mundial , en la cual se atacan las opinions de los revisionistas contempordneos sabre esa materia. -- 24 (25): Otro articulo de la edici6n de enero del "Hoc Tap" titulado "Paz y Revoluci6n". - 25 (26): Un articulo de 3 plans del diario "Akahata" del PC japon6s en su edici6n del 10 de marzo, bajo el titular "Minuciosa e integramente desbaratar las falacias adelantadas por los revisio- nistas contempordneos pars glorificar el imperialismo norteameri- cano". -- 26 (27): Un articulo de la edici6n 23 de 1963 del 6rgano "Keun- rojo" (Laboriosos) del PC norcoreano que hace enfdtico que "la lu- cha contra el modo de vida burguds occidental es un importantisimo aspecto de la lucha contra el imperialismo y el revisionismo con- temp6raneo". -- 27 (28): Un discurso del miembro Ramiz Alia del Politbur6 al- bands condenando el revisionismo contempordneo y un editorial del T en Phong" (Vanguardia), organ de la Uni6n de la Juventud Obre- ra norvietnamita, ilamando a la juventud a combatir el revisionis- mo contempordneo. 18-21 Marzo: Una reuni6n ejecutiva de la Federaci6n Sindical Mundial FSM) en Sofia fue teatro de otra ardua batalla entre las fuerzas aovidticas y chinas, de acuerdo con informaciones que se Approved For Release 2000/08/272 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 han colado. El corresponsal en Sofia de la agencia yagoslaya Tanyug informs el 27 que el delegado chino, apoyado pore indo- nesio, el norcoreano, el norvietnamita y el japon6s, "apiov hec 6 todas las oportunidades de provocar una agria poldmica y llevar las opiniones de: la direcci6n del Partido y el estado chinos al esce- nario sindical international". "En primer lugar los representan- tes chino e indonesio pretendieron hacer declarar al vicepresidente Menus de Ceilan persona particular en Sofia porque los sindicatos ceilaneses se han escisionado". Los chinos manifestaron que la FSM y su secretario general Louis Saillant estaban apoyando la E- litica exterior de un gran estado -- "aludiendo claramente a la Uni n Sovietica "En Sofia Jos chinos pretendieron tener un mono- polio de la verdad absoluta, la infalibildad y el derecho a sermo- near a todos. AdemAs, esta no es la pr nera vez que ha silo posible percibir que los chinos pretenden crear una central sindical inter- nacional -- evidentemente fuera de la FSM" -- basada en las ideas chinas. 18 Marzo et seq: Una breve noticia hdngara el 8 declar6 que el Mi- nisterio de aeR 1 ciones Exteriores habia ex sado aquel dia a Vasil Ta.sellari, agregado comercial de la Embajada albanesa, "el cual " abusando de su derecho a la inmunidad diplomdtica, en contravention a la ley, se inmiscuy6 en los asuntos interns de la Republica Po- pular Hiingara . Una noticia sun s breve el mismo dia pero en apariencia no relacionada manifestaba: "El Ministro del Interior ha puesto a Sandor Nagy ... bajo detention preliminar bajo sospecha de incitation . El dia 20 la Cancilleria albanesa denunci6 la expulsion -- 81 otro acto hostil en continuaci-Sn de actividades antialbanesas lle - vadas a cabo por la dirigencia hiingara en alos axteriores con in- tenci6n de agravar las relations..." Pas6 a exigir el retiro den- tro de las 48 horas de un agregado, Lajos Evy, de la Embajada hin- ara en Tirana. El 21 varios corres "fuentes poneales en Budapest informaron que hnngaras bien informadas" vinculaban la expulsion del albands con el arresto de Nagy, ganador del Premio de la paz de Stalin, uno de los stalinistas acorrimos que nunca hablan aceptado la actitud mo- derada de Kadar. Se decia que Nagy habia circulado material que demandaba el derrocamiento del r6gimen de Kadar (el corresponsal Underwood del "NY Times" declar6 que propugnaba el asesinato de Kadar) y que habia silo impreso en Albania por complicidad de Tasel- lari. Un despacho de Reuters fechado el 29 informaba que "otros de- talles del arresto reciente de Sandor Nagy ... revelaron que iba a encabezar un 'nuevo Partido Ccmunista' en Hungria en apoyo de los chinos... De acuerdo con informes sin confirmation, varios centenares de partidarios de Nagy ... fueron detenidos o pesquisa- dos por la policia h1ngara en los iittimos diez Bias". Reuters affade que el grupo que rodeaba a Nagy "colaboraba estrechamente con el Partido albands que ... suministraba fondos y hasta una im- prenta, declaraban las fuentes". -3- Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 20 Marzo: "La Voix du Peuple", 6rgano de los disidentes belgas prochinos de Grippa, publics un extenso informe describ endo la primera edici6n (de marzo) de "Nuova Unitd" mensuario itaiinao prochino que lleva el subtitulo "Por la Victoria del Marxismo-Le- ninismo . El informe contiene extensos trozos de su plataforma y reproduce un mapa demostrativo de los centros del "verdadero mar- xismo-leninismo en Italia". 22 Marzo: El "Sunday Times" de Londres publica un despacho de Pekin en el cual Jacques Marcuse informa que "peritos extranjeros" alli creen que "una reptura politica formal de China con Rusia es ahora muy definitivamente probable" y que "la ocasi6n seria is conferencia internacional 'marxista-leninista' que se reuniria aqua a invitaci6n del PC chino y 'desenmascarar a' y condenaria el re- visionismo contempordneo y Nikita Kruschev". Informa que a los ru- manos se les manifestaron las intenciones chinas durante sus con- versaciones a principios de este mes. Budapest anuncia oficialmen- te la pr6xima visits de Kruschev. 22-28 Marzo: La 6a asamblea del Consejo de la Organizaci6n de So- lidaridas de los Pueblos Afroasidticos (OSPA), celebrada en Argel bajo la presidencia del argelino Mohamed Yazid fue escenario de una violenta batalla chino-sovidtica. Etnpez6 con el discurso del 23 de marzo de Kuo Chien, jefa de la delegaci6n, que atac6 violentamente las pautas de conducts sovidticas. En su denuncia de la propuesta de Kruschev sobre soluci6n pacifica de las querellas territoriales y fronterizas como "el razonamiento mds absurdo y reaccionario", se dice que ella declar6: "Ahora bien, si alguna gente le pidiera a los pueblos afroasidticos capitular incondicionalmente ante la agre- si6n de los imperialistas y de los colonialistas antiguos y actuales bajo la engafiosa consigns. de que no se permite ningdn empleo de fuerza para resolver querellas territo- riales, el pueblo chino responderd categ6ricamente o mil veces no', y dird a esa gente: 'Vuestro expansionis- mo y egoismo nacional por mucho tiempo han-dificultado trazar una lines entre vosotros y los imperialistas y colonialistas, antiguos y nuevos'. Como que 'dime con quidn andas y to dird qui6n eres', no tiene nada de par- ticular que se pongan del lado de los imperialistas y colonialistas. Pero jamds conseguirad engafiarnos a no- sotros pueblos de Africa y Asia". El 25 el delegado sovidtico Bibodjan Gafurov fustig6 el discurso de la Chien, manifestando que otras delegaciones le habian pedido no contestar a las "calumnias" chinas. Los chinos y algunos afri- canos interrumpieron con protestas y demandando el derecho a replicar. Los chinos de nuevo demandaron el derecho a replicar despues de con- cluirse las reunions pdblicas, pero se informs que Yazid prochibi6 otros choques chino-sovidticos manifestando que: "Argel, capital de Argelia y capital afroasi tica, no debe convertirse en capital de la desun16n afroasidtica". El presidente argelino Ben Bella, en su recepci6n en honor a los delegados el 26, declar6: " Qu' ueremos que -4 - Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 nuestros debates sear, primero y ante todo, afroasidticos. Perma- neceremos vigilantes pars que estos debates se queden en la esfera afroasidtica". El peri6dico argelino prosovidtico "Alger Republicain" el dia 24 critic6 la conducta china, con el epigrafe: "La dnica nota discor- dante". El 25 el 6rgano central checo "Rude Pravo" conden6 la con- ducta "descabellada" china, declarando que el discurso de la Chien habia "cumplido las ads tenebrosas previsions," caracterizado por "histeria antisovi6tica". "La delegada china ridiculiz6 el esfuerzo por adelantar econ m~icaruente a los passes en desarrollo y caracteri- z6 de insensata y hasta fraudulenta toda esperanza de evitar la guer- ra". El comentarista checo Hochman indica tambidn que "a los dele- gados no les pas6 inadvertido que a la delegada china se le 'olvid6' incluir a Francis en su lista de fuerzas imperialistas'r. A pesar de la repulsa del pdblico a sus rencillas, sin embargo, Gafurov el 27 sostuvo una conferencia de pressa pare dar mayor ex- presidn a sus puntos de vista, is. Kuo Chien ripost6 el 28 con su propia conferencia de prensa pars contestar a ilas calumnias y ter- giversaciones sovidticas! 24 Marzo: Anuncian los germanoorientales que una delegaci6n militar sovi6tica encabezada por el Ministro de Defensa mariscal Malinovsky hara"una visita oficial de amistad" a la RDA a invitaci6n del Par- tido y gobierno. 25 Marzo: La delegaci6n del PC japonds encabezada por Hakamada que habia realizado conversaciones cnn el PCUS en Moscd del 28 de fe- brero al 12 de marzo (ver Crono, 13 de marzo), complet6 "conversa- ciones cordiales y amistosas sobre materias de interds comdn' con el PC chino en Pekin del 21 al 25 de marzo. Liu Shao-chi y Chou En-lai fueron los participantes chinos de mayor rango. El 27 volaron a Pyongyang a "hacer una visita" y aterrizaron "entre entusiastas vitores". 27 Marzo: El diario "L'Humanit6" del PC frances informa que en una reuni6n el dia anterior el CC reafirm6 su condena de las posiciones dogrndticas y actividad cismdtica y demand6 la convocaci6n sin demora de una asamblea de todos los partidos comunistas y obreros. - 5 - Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 29 Marzo: La prensa de Pekin anuncia la formation del "Partido Comunista de Australia -- Marxista-Leninis-con E.F. Hill de presidente. En Buda st, la delegaci6n china al VIII Congreso de is. Asociaci6n Internacional de Juristas Democ ticos AIJD~que comienza alli en 31, expide un comunicado a la prensa que declara: "Es de lamentarse que ciertos miembros responsable. de is. AIJD hayan adoptado una actitud extremadamente antidem6cratica, pretendiendo monopolizar todo to concer- niente a is. agenda del VIII Congreso, los informes y la manera en que ha de conducirse el Congreso, con el fin de imponer is. lines err6nea de politica exterior de cierto Pais ... "La delegaci6n china declara solemnemente: ciertos miembros responsables de la AIJD, que estdn pro- siguiendo una lines, politics errada, y que mientras rin- den tributo verbal a is. unidad se dedican en realidad a la escisi6n, deberdn llevar la Integra resonsabilidad por las graves consecuencias que puedan producirse en el VIII CongresoTt. 29-30 Marzo: "Pravda" informs. el dia 29 informa que el secretario general Morris del PC canadiense, hablando ante el XVIII Congreso del PC holandds, declar6 que is. situaci6n en el movimiento comunis- ta international demanda que el Congreso se exprese con respecto a convocar un congreso sundial, que deberd ser en un futuro pr6ximo. El dia 30 "Pravda" inform6 que el secretario Hukster del PC holand6s apoyaba is. propuesta por una conferencia mondial. (Informs Pravda que asistieron representantes de los PC sovidtico, biilgaro, hungaro, franc6s, finland6s, belga y dands). 31 Marzo: Pekin publica el nuiuero ocho de la serie de articulos juntos de "Randers Roja" y'DDiario del Pueblo" en contestacian con a la carta abierta del PCUS del 1 de julio: una arenga de 15.000 palabras titulada "La Revolution proletaria y el revisionismo de Kruschev". (Tenenos a mano solamente el resumen de la Agenda Nueva China como base pars los breves comentarios a continuation; resu- miremos el articulo en forma mds cospleta en nuestra pr6xiuza edici6n}. El articulo empieza declarando que "la traici6n al marxisrao y al proletariado por los revisionistas siempre se ha raanifestado con la mayor intensidad en su oposici6n a is. revoluci6n violenta y a la dictadura del proletariado y en su aoyo a la transition pacifica del capitalismo al socialismo. Este es tambidn el caso del revi- sionisrao de Kruschev. En este asunto Kruschev es discipulo de Browder y de Tito asi como de Bernstein y Kautsky". Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Los chinos declaran que ellos ya Be babian expresado en contra de las opinions de Kruschev sobre la "transici6n pacifica" y la "vid, parlamentaria" desde cuando 61 las expres6 en 1956 en el XX Congreso del PCUS y que hicieron concesiones para permitir que las corporadas en los documentos de 11 formulaciones sovidticas faeran Moscd de 1957 160. Sin embargo, "la dirigencia el PCUS ha apro vechado estas biiidadzs y errores ... y los ha utilizado como excusa pare mercar el revisionismo kruacheviano". Los chinos luego "solemnemente deelaran" que "es necesario enmendar is formulaci6n de is cuesti6n en ambas declaraciones por medio de las consultas con- juntas entre los partic?.os comunistas y obreros Para que se adhiera a los principios revolucionarios del marxismo-leninismo". En otra chufleta a Kruschev, declaran los chinos que "Krusehev mismo es el que ha heredado el manto del tratskismo y que se incor- pora a los tratskistas de hoy . Y m Kruschev es el mayor ca- pitulacionista en la historia". Luego de citar a los lideres cc nunistas de Irak, Argelia, Fran- cia y "la camarilla. de Dange" en India comp malos ejemplos y al ca- marada Fidel en Cuba como brillante muestra, demandan acci6n -- con- tra Kruschev: ",Ha llegado la hors, -- y con mucho retraso -- de re liar li uidar ei revisionismo kruscheviano; Aqu queremos dar a los cainaradas dirigentes del PCUS un buen consejo: en vista de que tantos oportunistas y revisionistas han sido echado al basural de la his- toria, Lpr que se obstinan en seguirles sus huellas? Aqui tambi n expresamos Is, esperanza de que los cama- radas dirigentes de otros partidos fraternos refle- xionen sobre esto: &qu les ha valido segur la lira revisionista de los dirigentes del PLUS? ... Creemos que todos los que son revolucionarios prole- tarios se decidirdn en dltimo caso por la lines, revo- lucionaria y rechazardn is lines antirevolucionaria; en ultimo caso escogerdn el marxismo-leninismo y re- chazaren el revisionismo. Abrigamos grandes esperan- zas en este sentido". -7- Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 200 - 8-03061A000~0082-~-6~ 25X1C10b767. Recognizing Communist China? DISCUSSION AND ACTION: 1. "Recognition will reform the Chicoms." This is an up-to-date version of yesterdays theme, no longer so widely repeated, that we should recognize Communist China and treat her with kid gloves in order to woo her away from Soviet Russia and make Mao Tse-tung a second Tito. It is said that recogniz- ing the Chicoms and bringing them into the United Nations will make them more moderate, cooperative, responsible and peace- loving. The advocates of this view contend that this approach worked in the case of the Soviet Union and therefore will work ep y a most countries recognized with Communist China. We reply- the Soviet Union in the Twenties (the U.S., one of the last, in 1933) and that most of Stalin's crimes -- the blood purges, the pact with Hitler, annexation of vast territories adjoining Russia, etc. -- were committed well a f t e r that time, not at all influenced by diplomatic ties with the civilized world. Even today, the Soviet rulers still want to "bury" us and whatever improvement in their international behavior may have occurred, is due to free-world strength and pressure and to the gradual internal development of the Soviet Union away from its one-time revolutionary aggressiveness. Mao Tse-tung himself recently predicted to a group of French parliamentarians that Khrushchev would be overthrown and that the Russian comrades would return to the true Marx-Lenin path of violent revolution. We point out that, given Communist China's point of view, granting recognition to her will be seen by the Chicoms as appeasement and can only confirm her leaders' erroneous and dangerous pre- conceptions regarding the effectiveness of hostile policies to- ward the rest of the world and the "inevitability" of Communist 25Xv~?~bory (the "wave of the future"). Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/ M8-03061A00020 7&62 i 1964 768 EE,WE. Nuclear-Free Zone for Scandinavia? What's Behind the 25X1 C10b Kekkonen Plan? BACKGROUND: Since the fall of 1957, Soviet leaders, and other leaders friendly to the USSR as well, have periodically proposed "peace zones" or atom-free zones for various parts of the world. For example, the Soviets suggested atom free zones in the Baltic (September 1957 and June 1959), the Balkans (January 1958 and May 1959) and Far East (March 1950 and Janu- ary 1959), while the most famous proposal of all, the Rapacki Plan, was first submitted by Poland in October 1957. The Soviets and their friends have suggested almost every area of the globe as a candidate for such a zone; the only significant exceptions are Western Europe, the United States, and the USSR itself. The Mediterranean, Antarctica, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America are all areas which have been nominated for this status. In the case of Antarctica, the Soviet, UK, and US govern- ments signed a treaty on I December 1959, banning tests and providing for a non-militarized status enforced by observers. The US is also sympathetic to nuclear-free zone proposals for Latin America and Africa, providing that they are effective (i.e., verified) and agreed to by all concerned. But proposals for atom-free zones elsewhere, and particularly in Europe, represent a disguised attack on Western political and strategic positions. As in the case of their general disarmament proposals, it is difficult to say whether the Soviets have the slightest belief that their nuclear-free zone schemes might be accepted by Western governments. Whether these schemes are adopted or not, they can be used against the West. Even if acceptance is im- possible, the Soviets can use the slogan of the "atom-free zone" to suggest that they are the peace-loving camp, and to put the West in the apparent position of rejecting proposals promoting peace. Many prominent Westerners, including George Kennan, the late Hugh Gaitskell, Jules Moch, and Paul-Henri Spam;, have suggested plans of their own for demilitarizing Central Europe, and the general concept of such a demilitarization evidently has a wide appeal. Unsophisticated people have been easily misled by the Rapacki version of this concept, which would virtually eliminate NATO bases in Europe (which are largely -in west Germany) while only pushing Soviet nuclear forces back to Brest-Litovsk--assum nngg that such a Soviet withdrawal ac ua y too p ace, a ma er by no means assured by - e apacki proposal, which not provide for inspection or verification. When such unsophisticated people see their governments reject the Rapacki or similar plans, they do not recognize these reasons--sometimes because no one has taken the pains to point the reasons out--and they think their governments are negligent in furthering peace, if not outright "warmongers" and "militarist` (768. Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (76i pA9 d Oor Release 2000/08/I, - 03061A000200000 X1.1 1964 On 28 December 1963, Polish Premier Gomulka announced in a speech that a new plan was being prepared, which instead of barring nuclear weapons would freeze them at their present strength. "Naturally," Gomulka said, "a proper system of con- trol should be agreed upon." The proposal appeared to recognize that NATO could not abandon its Central European positions, and that verification of the freeze would be necessary. Actually, however, the Gomulka proposal resembles the first stage of the old Rapacki plan, and seems to have the same basic faults: Soviet missiles in the USSR would not be controlled while NATO missiles would be; also, the plans for control would not (so far as we can tell at present) be effective. But there has not yet been much public discussion of this plan and little is known of it as yet. Much more in the spotlight is the Iiekkonen Plan for an atom-free zone in Scandinavia. At present, the plan for barring atom weapons is known byy- onents name because he was induced to propose it in May 1963. Despite Finnish denials of outside influence, the plan was originally Soviet, and apparently the Soviets decided to get IXekkonen to revive it, giving it less Moscovite overtones. The Communist parties in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark are making all the publicity they can for the plan, and they are supported by some left Socialists and pacifists. In mid-March, a conference on "Norden -- an !`.tom Pree Zone" met in Stockholm. This campaign is tied in with the I hrushchev visit next June; the Soviets have tried to prepare the way for him with visits by cosmonauts and by Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as by entertaining the Danish Prime Minister in Moscow. It would not be surprising if Inrushchev should use his visit to make propaganda speeches in favor of the Iekkonen Plan. When the Soviets made their proposal of a Scandinavian atom-free zone in 1959, the Scandinavian governments and public media replied that the proposal was one-sided, and that the Soviets should also remove weapons from parts of their own ter- ritory. Khrushchev at that time refused to consider this, stat- ing in a speech on 17 July 1959: "The proposal for an atom-free and rocket-free zone in part of Soviet territory has no practical meaning whatever under present conditions. If we take into account the long r~:nge and power of modern rocket and nuclear arms, O0 or 300 kilometers is of no real importance. Thus, the creation of a rocket- free and atom-free zone on a portion of Soviet ter- ritory would not be a guarantee for the Scandinavian countries." This frank statement must have made some people wonder just why the Scandinavians should ban weapons from their countries, un- less their policy was simply to be "Do anything Khrushchev asks." The Yekkonen Plan has met with some of the same reaction as its Soviet predecessor. On 20 January 1964, Norwegian Premier 2 Approved For Release 2000) 09 10. 1@ - - 3061A00026& 00f 2ntinued) (780p ryt f )r Release 2000/08/ 061A00020007000262April 1964 Einar Gerhardsen told a press conference that it did not seem reasonable to discuss a free zone unless it embraced parts of the USSR. At a meeting of the Nordic Council in Stockholm in the week ending 21 February (this is a semi-official conference devoted to trade matters, not to be confused with Norden), two speakers (Aksel Larsen of Denmark and Aarne Saarine -Finland) unexpectedly raised the issue of a nuclear-free zone. The Swedish Premier, Dr. Tage Erlander, replied that Sweden was only interested in nuclear free zones if they were on a larger scale and were part of a general disarmament program; Swedish proposals, such as the Unden plan for a "non-nublear club," were intended to involve services by the great powers in return for commitments by the smaller countries. However, the Swedish Coz.- munist paper Ny Dag argued on 6 March 1964 that the Swedish government shoulc"T_Ue flexible about the return it expected, and make new proposals, while on 3 February the Norwegian CP news- paper Friheten hinted that the Soviets might consider proposals for including some Soviet territory in the zone, and also sug- gested that the zone might include Iceland, Greenland, and northern parts of North America, Friheten stated: "Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen at his last press conference raised the idea of extending the area to include parts of Soviet territory also. This would seem to present a problem in thus involving one of the big nuclear powers for whom it is essentially a different matter; but it would no doubt be possible to get the Soviet Union to submit its views if con- tacted. We think it might be useful to discuss in ad- dition the question of whether the four Nordic coun- tries might also examine possibilities for further expanding the area: southwards, eastwards, and westwards as well. Besides sectors of the northern areas of the Soviet Union, Iceland and Greo Sand, as well as northern regions of American territory, could be brought up under such a discussion." Thus thn Communist are behaving quite flexibly in their campaign and sta:.tlin new proposals, for example from IU rrn,'zchev, may yet appa,:a:r. If the Soviets could evoke it, moot...] ist action by the f"ee S,:m nd-11aavian countries would not nnly 5eflect those countri fr:a.;A We; ern ties, but would also Evoke .ympathy and imitation in other areas. The barring of nuclear weapons in this area is probably in itself of little interest to the Soviets. There are not now any nuclear weapons in Scandinavia, and current NATO policy favors phasing out land-based nuclear rockets in favor of Polaris systems, rather than increasing the numbers and disper- sion of land-based rockets in Europe. There is no sign that the US government has any desire to place nuclear weapons in Norway or Denmark, the two Scandinavian members of NATO. Thus there is something a little unreal about this whole campaign, whose 3 Approved For Release 2000/0 3061A0002EQinued) (76Approvedlor Release 2000/08/2 : I - - 061A00020007000~2Arpi1 1964 purported aim is to make the present situation a permanent one. The Communist make a virtue of this apparent triviality, and suggest that there is nothing to be lost except the tempers of the warmongers. Yet this atom-free zone campaign has great strategic and political significance. The persistence with which the Soviets push their plan for an atom-free Scandinavia, inducing Kekkonen to lend his name to the project, mobilizing local communist parties, and organizing front groups and meetings, shows that they are out to do some- thing more than formalize an existing absence of nuclear weapons. '';e will not know precisely what Soviet objectives are until that unlikely time when all the Soviet leaders publish exhaustive memoirs and when they open the archives of the Kremlin. Yet certain Soviet intentions can be estimated from the known facts of the situation. It appears that the leaders of the USSR may have the following aims in mind: 1. The Soviets may seek to keep the Swedes from acquiring an indepen en nuclear capability. Like he Z:r ss, the Swedes have traditionally acted o safeguard their neu- trality by keeping their armed forces sufficiently strong and up-to-date to discourage any aggressor. In recent years, public discussion has taken place in Sweden on the question of acquiring an independent nuclear force. Swedes naturally hesitate to undertake the high costs of a nuclear weapons program, and they are in the fortunate position of being, in effect, defended by NATO without having to be- long to NATO. Yet if Sweden should embark on a nuclear armament program, it could probably have a primitive nuclear capability by the and of the decade. 2. The Soviets may wish to keep Polaris submarines out of the Baltic. The proposal to ma %e the Baltic a of peace" goes back to 1955. Baltic disarmament IF r;ometimes linked with Scandinavian disarmament, the chief "ifference being the involvement of the two Germanies. West Germany would probably refuse to join in barring nuclear submarines from the Baltic, both for defense reasons and because it would not join in any agreement with East Germany. Of course, even a refusal on these grounds would provide propa- ganda material for the Communists. 3. The Soviets probably wish to weaken NATO militarily by denying it auxiliary naval and early warning posts in or- way and Denmark. If the zone could be extended further, for example to Central Europe or (as Friheten suggested)to Iceland and Greenland, the effect on ITATU would be more serious still. 4. The Soviets almost certainly wish to weaken NATO's political unity; this has been shown for years past y their a ac:s on the "Bonn Revanchists," by the Rapacki- Goraulka plans, by propaganda against the Common Market, and recently by their efforts to encourage Cypriot intransigence The atom-free zone proposaAs which the Soviets have pursued (768.Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (7S8 CApproved For Release 2000/08 7 C - - 061A00020AAR6T4 1964 most energetically, including the Scandinavian free zone, have been those in some way affecting NATO, The Scandinavian free zone would in practice involve the withdrawal of Norway and Denmark from NATO; Soviet propaganda would hail this as the first step toward the downfall of the Western alliance and as a recognition by these countries of the aggressive and militarist nature of that alliance. To the extent that the atom--free zone campaign succeeds, it will encourage neutralism everywhere. 5. ID,rushchev may see Scandinavia as a fertile field for winning a prestige success, especially in competition with t e nese. nce the Cuban crisis, the only move the Soviets have made which has hurt the Chinese and helpbd. their own case within the movement has been to accept Anglo- American proposals for a limited test ban treaty, arranging to have that treaty signed in Moscow. Khrushchev's 31 December 1963 message to chiefs of governments, proposing a peaceful settlement of all disputes except those the Soviets wish to aggravate, was a transparent attempt to further his own claim to be chief Peacemonger. If an atom- free zone agreement could somehow be sold as a Kekkonen Plan, Soviet propaganda could later tie it up with Khru- shchev's Scandinavian visit and rename it the Khrushchev Plan. 6. Conceivably, Khrushchev may believe that in Scandinavia, he can prove his a y to exploit "peaceful coexistence" propaganda to-gain solid political influence* nand I already dangerously su sec to economic an political pres- sure from Moscow; no Finnish government can be formed if it contains what the Soviets consider "anti-Soviet" elements. Fear of Soviet displeasure has excluded the Finnish Social Democrats from office for years, and as recently as last February, Pravda indicated that despite the resignation last year of old Social Democratic Chairman, Tanner, the Soviets' "Worst enemy" in Finland, the SDP was still beyond the pale. What independence the Finns retain is due to the armed neutrality of Sweden, and the NATO ties of Denmark and Norway. Once they were all disarmed and severed from NATO, the Scandinavian countries would be exposed to peaceful penetration and domination; at best, they might enjoy the present status of Finland; at worst, that of Czechoslovakia. If Khrushchev could show his ability to make "peaceful coexistence" pay off in practical terms, he would be less exposed to Chicom criticism within the Communist movement. (Even if Moscow gains nothing else, Finnish advocacy of a Soviet plan tends to isolate Finland from the rest of Scandinavia.) Fortunately, the Scandinavian leaders have a rich fund of political experience, and they are not so naive as to be misled by mere slogans; as Erlander's remarks show, they expect to get something in return if they grant something. Unfortunately, however, some individuals in the Scandinavian countries are sus- ceptible to any program which calls itself peaceful. 5 Approved For Release 2000108J, 306(f7Of )tdOU 09) 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 . - 000200070002Q April 1934 269 EE,WE NATO's Multilateral Force Proposal BACKGROUND: During the winter of 1963-1964, a, working group, with representatives from Belgium, West Germany, Greece, Holland, Italy, Turkey, the UIK, and the US, met in Paris to discuss pro- posals for a multilateral nuclear force. It is possible that sometime this spring this working group may issue a report to the govornments represented, and if this should happen, public and parliamentary discussion of the MLF concept will probably become more active. Although France has already refused to join in any MI2, and has taken no part in the working group's discussions, French newspapers and other media will doubtless also join in any widespread debate on the merits of such a force. Purpose and Proposal. The plan for a multilateral force orb ina es in the esi :^e of the US government to tie co- hes.. of NATO, to keep NATO weapons systems up-to--Cates to iv'- hibit the proliferation of national nuclear forces, and to offer NATO governments (particularly the West German government) a satisfactory means of participation in NATO nuclear planning and operations within the framework of NATO itself. Specifically, the plan undo: :d?nsjderatU.on calls for a force of appro.cdmately 2..1 nac2cha .a.ti,; r - sh:_s..-v;, armed with sore 230 Poiar s, A-3 ra- es. This for(;:: v u~d be a in 'd, controlled and f.~?~:] :dpi by thos ? IAA 'O countries decic : ng to p:, ,ticip?te, under made up of representatives from tk e countries. NATO co4 '2ntries not joining at the outset would still be allowed to join later on. No member country would contribute more than 40% of the cost of the force, and each ship would be manned by personnel from at least three countries, with no country providing more than 40% of any crew Crews would be under 200 men each, and the total force, including the operating agency, would number less than 10,000 men. During the first five years, the average annual costs for participating European countries would be between 3/4 of one percent and four percent of their average annual defense outlays; for a European country assuming a tenth of the total cost, the average annual cost in the first five years would be $ 3 iillion, dropping to an average of $16 million in later years. (Costs would be 50 to 75 percent of the cost of building a sub- marine force with the same number of missiles, and virtually all the participants can share in building the ships; further, the building of this force would take less than three-fourths of the time required to build a comparable submarine force.) Any use of the missiles would necessarily be coordinated with US strategic forces, which are much larger and which have current intelligence any plans essential for effective operation; for the foreseeable future, the US would be a member of the force. US representa- tives have stated, however, that the MLF might possibly become a purely European force at some future time if Europe achieves the necessary degree of unity, with the British and French merging th ? (769 Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (7 re F9r Release 2000/08/27 : Cl Q0 -a'1nF1.an0200070002- sprit 1964 nuclear armament pro ;rams into a common European program. For the present proposal, US participation will be subject to the approval of the US Congress. Advantages. US representatives have never suggested that this plan was sacred, or above criticism, but so far it appears to be the best solution proposed for the problems involved; the Eisenhower, Iennedy, and Johnson administrations have all sup- ported it. NATO cannot work smoothly if there are two classes of members: a nuclear club and a remainder who provide infantry. An increase in the number of national nuclear forces means an increase in the danger that some future 17.itler (or Stalin) might touch off a nuclear holocaust. And under present conditions, European forces can only constitute credible deterrents to Soviet aggression if they are coordinated with the principal military forces in the West, those of the US. The MIX is designed to solve these problems. Its advantages include: 1. It gives Germany and Italy equality with- out arous ng any jus a ears. Germany and to y cannot be expected to-accept an inferior status, and refusal to permit West Germany to share in a nuclear force would encourage the tendency of Franz Josef Strauss and others to demand national nuclear forces -- which in turn would cause alarms in the West and perhaps provoke Soviet po- litical or military action. 2. It keeps nuclear armament in the ITATO frame- work. DeGaulle is disposed to beep +renc To-es as independent as possible. Ee Would like to enlist German support for the force de frappe, in effect splitting NATO. 3. It averts nuclear proliferation with its attendant evils. Every new nuclear power makes disarmament agreements more difficult and increases the danger of nuclear war. Only the wealthiest nations can bear the ex- pense of national nuclear weapons without im- posing hardships on their peoples. 4. It fills a real future defense need. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SAC UE) desires a counter to Soviet medium range ,missiles in Europe. C5 a r T+ 4+ &? (769. Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (7"4pp0rove'd'For Release 2000/ - -03061A00020%0 t]2 1964 The proposed MLF will have as much delivery power as the whole UK nuclear force and much more power than the force de frappe. 5. It will not be dangerous or provocative. The w e located at sea, and a no fixed point. It will not attract attack to populated areas. It will be a second- strike force, that is a force capable of surviving an enemy first strike, and there- fore not a force which must be used first if it is to be used at all. 6. It will provide a new US commitment to the de ense of rope. DeGaulle and o ers sometimes suggest that, at some future time, in a European crisis, the US might not use its weapons, in the hope that the Soviets would confine their attack to Europe. Actually, the Soviets would hardly dare to leave US strategic forces untouched while attacking NATO forces (including US forces) in Europe. At all events the MLF places warheads under joint control, prevents their withdrawal from Europe by the US, and more firmly involves the US in a nuclear association with European countries. Another advantage, of less apparent interest to Europeans, should also be mentioned: the establishment of an MILT' would spread the burden of NATO defense more widely, taking more of the weight off the shoulders of Uncle Sam. Actually, it would serve the long term interests of Europe itself if US balance-of-payment difficulties were eased. Attitudes toward MLF. Government leaders in Germany, Italy, _ ey, and reece favor the MLF. France, as noted, has already declined to participate. The UIK has not ruled out participation, but both the Conservatives and Labour have strong doubts about the concept. The Tories are more nation- alistic and wedded to tradition (including the Ro:al Navy), and they are committed to maintaining a UK national force. Labour opposes all non-US nuclear forces (includiv UKa and, -especially. West German), suggests an emphasis on conventional forces (which by itself would be welcomed by the US), and one of its sosesmen (Patrick Gordon Walker) has argued that European nations should share in planning and controlling US strategic nuclear forces by a directorate or consultative com- mittee. This last has not appealed to other Europeans, and the US Congress would hardly sanction such a proposal. Other NATO countries, particularly Holland and Belgium, will tend to follow the lead of the UK. 3 (769. Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (a69A For Release 2000/ - 3061A000200@7( D l 1964 Various arguments are advanced against the MLF. Informa- tion already given above serves to dispose of some of these arguments: e.g., that the force is strategically insignificant and was only proposed for political reasons; that the MLF would be prohibitively expensive; or that the US might take its missiles and go home. The Soviets and some West Europeans argue that sooner or later this MLF will help to give the West Germans nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how, and nuclear inde- pendence, thus promoting rather than blocking the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and indeed giving them to the "Bonn mil- itarists." Those impressed by such criticism should realize that, within the MLF, the division of crews and the use of Permissive Action Link controls will prevent national use of the weapons without outside (inter-allied) agreement, while in the long run technical knowledge is no significant barrier to a West German nuclear capability; aside from enlistment in something like MLF, the only long-term way to keep West Germany from independent nuclear armament is to carry out general disarmament, verified by inspection. It is foolish to think that Germany can be kept permanently in an inferior status. O,thhrs critics, like Lord Beaverbrockts Daily Express, try to make fun of the concept of a multi-nation force, considering the idea preposterously unworkable. They ignore the fact that, for centuries, merchant ships have been manned by sailors from many nations. Most criticisms of the MLF stem from ingrained habits of thought an a owe national traditions, rather than from rational analysis. ese habits an traditions are not to be pooh-poohed; we share them regarding our own country. Men are taught that their country is always right, that everything which tends to build up their country is good, and that they should be prepared to die for their country. Most people want their country to be a "Great Power"--especially if it has been one in the past--and today the possession of nuclear weapons is the main criterion of Great Power status. 77.1 fl7 pO sle in all wr as tend to distrust foreigners, considering them less than fully human; at present many individuals make a career of spreading distrust against West Germany and against the United States. Organizations with long names and initials, with committees and staffs, whose members speak in foreign languages or foreign accents, do not ovol:e enthusi Lsm. , There is nothing thrilling about them. Some of these organizations might be more popular if they went in more for bands, medals, flags, and ceremonies; if they enlisted more colorful personalities as leaders; if the prose they published was more hard-hitting and less bureaucratic; or if they could uncover some honorable historical antecedents. Precedents for international forces. Actually, there is nothing very revolutionary about the concept of an international force. Aside from mixed merchant crews, already mentioned, military organizations from the Roman Legions to the French Foreign Legion have enlisted aliens in their ranks. Multilateral forces have a precedent in the Peking (769. Cont.) Approved For Release 2000 - -03061A000200070002-2 (70 roltb-)Release 2000/08/27 : 00200070002-2 Relief Expedition of 1933 and in the various UN forces. National leaders are highly tempted to rationalize a national approach which makes themselves look supreme; yet no major modern wars have been fought without alliances, and peacetime plans for mili- tary cooperation involve a surrender of absolute sovereignty and a commitment to support allies, as all the major European powers discovered in 1914. Under today's conditions, peacetime alliance structures must necessarily be strong, if they are to have any value at all. In event of war, there will no longer be time to negotiate and set up organizations. Staffs, early warning radar systems, the exchange of intelligence, coimaon equipment patterns, and common supply systems must all be worked out in peacetime, The truth is that neither the US nor Europe can deter the Sovie s a one; each needs the other. Sovereign, independent action is an illusion when it comes to nuclear warfare. Simi- larly, the traditional military virtues of ardor in the attic`: or steadiness under fire have little relevance to nuclear war. There is still plenty of room for national pride and accomplish- ment, just as there is plenty of room for individual courage and initiative, in non-nuclear warfare as in peaceful activities. But nuclear warfare cannot be used to serve national policies 25) eth 'ifcannot be handled unilaterally. 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 00020007qq% .i l 1,964 770 AF Bow The Communists Subvert The African Press BACKGROUND: hacking the Communist parties which in other areas are Its principal carriers for propaganda, persuasion and subversion, international communism must rely on individuals and front organizations to do their work in Africa. The bur- geoning African press, newly independent, laclaing trained per- sonnel and equipment, ambitious for a political role and reflec- tive of the furious nationalism of its leaders is a logical and vulnerable target for Communist penetration. By playing on the anti-colonialist, socialist or neutralist sentiments of many Africans and displaying a strong instinct for putting their money where it will pay off, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have made inroads into Africa. Ghanaian and Algerian media, both dis- tributed beyond their own borders, are vociferously anti European, anti-capitalist supporters of the Soviet Communist line. (The Chinese effort does not yet equal the Soviet but is reportedly a priority effort and will unquestionably increase with expanded diplomatic and INCITA facilities in the area.) As other East Afri- can countries become independent, the familiar pattern of ex- ternal Communist influence and Communist-serving local extremism will undoubtedly be repeated. For a description of the Communist methods for infiltrating and influencing the African press, see the unclassified attach- ment of the same VtAC10b References:' 754 IJCJ A: Key Tool of Pa1cin ? (YTobal Ambiticns, 3 'larch 34 45 "International Communist Front Organizations", and unclassified at- tachment, 11 February 64 "Two Faces of TASS" Theodore I1ruglaL:, Unit of Minn. Press $5 "The New Image of Russia: The Role of The Press", Problems of Communism, Jan- Feb 1963 Approved For Release 2000/0841 0~ - F"061j(gff&,00 j ed) 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/2 61A000200%704--i 196E gflWE. Latin America's Role in the Alliance for Progress BACKGROUND: March 13 marked the third anniversary of the A.llianc for ogress. On that date in 1961, President Kennedy invited the Latin American ambassadors to the White House and called upon their governments and people to join with the United States in a... "vast effort unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools." The Charter of the Alliance, signed the following August at Punta del Este, Uruguay, was equally optimistic in its intent: ",Ye, the American Republics, hereby proclaim our decision to unite in a common effort to bring our people accelerated progress and broader social justice within the framework of personal dignity and political liberty." The Alliance, intended to bring about a "decade of progress" has., th'3 Pol'oC'ing pals (among ?o" ars) : a per capita economic growth rate of not less than 2.5%; "a more equitable distribution of national income"; "programs of comprehensive agrarian reform"; elimination of adult illiteracy; opportunity for six years of primary schooling for all children; increase of life expectancy by five years at birth; reduction of housing shortages; main- tenance of stable price levels and stable currencies; joint programs designed to prevent fluctuations in the prices of the Hemisphere's basic products. Even granting that some of these goals were optimistic, the results to date are disappointing to all concerned. The economic growth rate is the most objective indicator of progress: far from growing at an annual rate of 2.5q%, the gross national product of Latin America has barely been able to keep ahead of the birth rate. The attached table illustrates the slowness of the economic growth and the present tendency toward leveling off, or actually declining. It reflects that the per capita income has been increasing at approximately 1.1% per year, with an actual decrease of a fraction of 1% in 1962. Although figures are not yet avc.'lable for 1963, there are indications that the overall economy of Latin America may have suffered a greater decline than in 1962. This situation, coupled with the "revolution of rising expectations," and the feeling that the Alliance for Progress would work some sort of miracle, has created among practically all Latin Americans a sense of deep disappointment and frustrated hope. As a result of Communist propaganda and misguided national- ism, a great many, if not most, Latin Americans are now blaming the United States; few blame themselves. (7~1. Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 (771.Con~. Approved d Release 2000/08/27 : CIA- D 7 -0 061A0002000760( ?11 1964 It is generally agreed among U.S, economists that the most important immediate cause of the economic stagnation of Latin America is the flight of capital: native capitalists seek the security of U.S. and European banks and corporations; foreign investors find better investment conditions elsewhere. It has been estimated that between 5 and 25 billion dollars in Latin American money is invested abroad, certainly enough to Semen 'he investment program of the Alliance for Progress without any outside help. But although we isolate the flight of capital as the most important single cause of economic depression in Latin America, we must recognize that it, in turn, has its roots in prior causes, which are largely political: government instability, threat f s o nationalization, harassment of private enterprise, di scr m4 t y - - . . - - - - - na or laws Far too much emphasis has been placed on direct govern- ment-to-government aid and not enough on the enormous contribu- tion which private investment is capable of making. President Kennedy undoubtedly had this in mind during his last major foreign policy speech when he said in Miami, November 18, 1963: Private enterprise also has an important role in the Alliance for Progress. There is not enough available public capital, either in the United States or Latin America, to carry development for- ward at the pace demanded... If encouraged, private investment, responsive to the needs, the laws and the interests of the nation, can cooperate with public activity to provide the vital margin of success; as it did in the development of all the nations of the West, including my own. Therefore, the Alliance for Progress is not so much the central problem it would appear to be on this its third anni- versary. It has merely served to focus attention upon a con- tinuing, more fundamental condition: an economic problem that 25 "'Mres a political solution. 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 CZ CHOSLOVAXIA FALTERS : 1956-1963 1. Introduction Czechoslovakia is no longer a model Satellite. Rates of industrial growth, formerly close to the highest among the world's developed countries, have fallen, and an increase of merely 1 percent in industrial production was planned for 1963. The rapid buildup of investment begun in 1956 has given way to a contraction. plans for a further substantial expansion of Czechoslovakia's already large foreign aid program to countries of both the Bloc and the Free World are in jeopardy, and the government may even have asked for Soviet help. The population, which had seemed to accommodate itself increasingly to the sys- tem, has been expressing more openly its dissatisfaction with living conditions. And the Communist regime, which had given an appearance of unity, confidence, and unusual stability for a Satellite country, recently has shown signs of strain, inde- cesion, and division. In spite of the recent economic difficulties the Czecho- slovak Communist regime remains firmly in power, and its economic; policies and orientation have not basically changed. The dif- ficulties, however, have made the regime much more cautious in its economic policies, weakened the position of ?resident Antonin Novotny, impaired the image of Czechoslovakia as an in- dustrialized nation achieving rapid economic progress under Com- munism, and weakened Czechoslovakia's stature in the Soviet Bloc in comparison with countries such as ?oland and Hungary, which recently have been more successful in their economic policies. The rate of industrial growth, which averaged 9 percent per year during 1356-63, declined to 6 percent in 1932, and an in- crease of only 1 percent in industrial production was planned for 1363. Capital investments expanded rapidly and steadily between 1355 and 1930, increased only 7 percent in 1961, fell by 5 per- cent in 1332, ar_d w ere planned to decline again in 1953. Gross agricultural production, which had shown a slow upward trend since 1954, leveled off in 1961 and declined in 1962, reaching the lowest level in C years. On a net basis -- after deduction of the value of current inputs -- production in 1962 was esti- mated to be below any year since 1940-49. The growing economic difficulties have been reflected in foreign trade. The Czechoslovak export surplus, which amounted to between $103 million and $233 million in 1931. The surplus with the 17est 6ocliuod each year between 1956 and 1960, al- though Czechoslovakia was accumulating new credit commitments, and was replaced by a deficit in 1961. In 1362 a much larger surplus again was achieved, and the balance with the West was improved substantially 1)but at the expense of domestic invest- ment and consumption. But those statistics do not tell the whole story of the economic deterioration in Czechoslovalsia. Although total in- dustrial production in 1361-62 was not too far behind the goal Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 set in the Third Five Year Ulan (1951-65) -- an average annual growth of 9.3 percent 2)--the lags were large in branches (such as steel and heavy machine building) on which the regime counted most heavily for sustaining the rate of economic growth in the latter part of the Third Five Year Plan. These cumulating dif- ficulties consequently led the regime to abandon the Third Five Year Plan in mid-1932 and to try to evolve a more successful economic policy. Although investments had long been the principal basis for industrial expansion in Czechoslovakia, the use of reserves -- of labor, productive capacity, and organization of work --- also had played a role. By the late 1953's these reserves were near- ing exhaustion, but their exhaustion was neither sudden nor entirely unexpected. For some years the regime had realized that new ways of increasing economic efficiency would have to be found if the rate of growth was not to decline eventually. For some years also the hopes of the regime for an acceleration of technological change and a marked improvement in the quality and assortment of production had been disappointed, but it had been possible to postpone the day of reckoning. By 1952, how- ever, a further postponement was no longer possible. The Third Five Year Plan, which was first drafted in 1953 and was in many respects a 7-year plan or perhaps even a 3- year plan, based economic growth mainly on a massive investment program, especially in basic industries, and on the introduction of new technology at an accelerated rate not only in new plants but also through the reconstruction of old plants. The indus- trial plan relied only to a small extent on increased employ- meat, and only in the machine building industry was-it expected to uncover substantial reserves of unused productive capacity. Special emphasis was given to steel and machine building be- cause of the key importance of these industries in the Czecho- slova?k economy. (Czechoslovakia is one of the world's largest producers and consumers of steel on a per capita basis, and its machinery industry not only supports the bulk of domestic in- vestments but also supplies 45 percent of exports.) A partial decentralization of economic management was undertaken during 1953-33 with a view to stimulating technological change and making production more responsive to demand. In spite of a recognition by the Communist regime that new approaches to the economy were needed, however, the predominant policy was still to increase the volume of production as fast as possible by any means available. It was planned that past rates of growth in industrial production would be maintained ap- proximately, and the economic system continued to be geared to achieving good quantitative, but not qualitative, results. Bonuses for managers and workers continued to be based mainly on fulfillment of the production plan, and relatively small weight was given to quality, assortment, and technology. Sven more basically, no serious attack was made on a characteristic problem of all economies of the Soviet Bloc -- the lack of ade- quate criteria for making rational choices on the details on 2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 economic activity. Novotny himself, when discussing economic problems at a mid-November 1961 meeting of his ?arty's Central Committee, admitted this basic weakness in the following words 3): We do not yet know how to open the way to science and technology in our organizational and planning prac- tice, how to support materially and morally enterprises and institutes that achieve real successes in the im- plementation of new technology and in scientific work, how to give more advantages to plants fighting for the new as compared with all those which hold fast to bacl.- ward technology and technique. Cie have not yet been able to really guide the development of technology and decide on the direction of its development. Czechoslovakia appeared to be a model Satellite during the late 1953's, as the rate of industrial growth remained high, the growth of investment accelerated, the foreign aid program ex- panded, and even personal consumption increased. Under the sur- face, however, economic problems were multiplying. The apparent successes were achieved through favorable weather for agriculture in 1933, by using up some of the few remaining "reserves," and by postponing expenditures wherever possible. Because of increas- ing demands for nonagricultural labor and the effects of col- lectivization, the flight of labor from agriculture increased cconsiderably, averaging about 103,003 persons a year during 1957- "he postponement of investment expenditures in transporta- tion further increased the strain on existing facilities. The rate of retirement of fixed assets was not increased as planned but actually declined in 1059-G0 because of growing pressure on productive capacity. By these means the regime was able to cover up the failure of its pro,-ram to accelerate technological change. Investments were not completed on schedule, and growing amounts of resources consequently were tied up in unfinished projects. Uany new plants were out into operation during this period or soon afterwards -- for example, rolling mills with a capacity o- 3.4 million metric tons of steel were installed in the late 1353ts 4)--but the new facilities often had serious technical wea':nesses that could not be remedied quickly. In many instances, plans for obtaining or applying sophisticated technology were not men,. And the quality of products continued to be poor and their assortment ill-suited to the requirements of domestic and foreign users. By the end of 1033 it should have been clear to the regime that the rate of economic growth had to decline. The introduc- tion of new technology was far behind schedule. Moreover, the continued postponement of retirements and the continued large- scale transfers of labor from agriculture were bound before long to have a negative impact on the economy. Instead of recogniz- ing this fact, the regime actually raised the original goals for production and investments for 1965. The planned rate of in- dustrial growth of 9.3 percent per year for 1931-65 was the same Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : Cs A-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 as that achieved in the previous 5 years.* By pursuing an un- realistic plan for nearly 2 years, by trying to get by with ex- pedient solutions to developing problems, and by allowing ideo- logy to dominate agricultural policy, the regime made the coun- try's economic difficulties worse than they might have otherwise. III. Economic Policies and Developments in 1961-62 The regime contributed to Czechoslovakia's economic dif- ficulties mainly by overestimating the country's economic capa- bilities. Too much was expected of economic reforms carried out in 1958-60** as well as of various forms of exhortation and persuasion, and it was assumed too readily that the performance of agriculture would improve. No provision was made for con- tingencies. Another mistake was to make economic plans reflect the expected gains in efficiency; the new sources of efficiency that were sought couldzbt be developed by putting strong pres- sure on the producer to raise the volume of current output. In- deed, such pressure was almost bound to impede progress in tech- nology, quality, and assortment, just as it had in the past. By pursuing unrealistic plans the regime probably took away any chance that the decentralization of 1958-63 would stimulate eco- nomic efficiency. Indeed, under conditions of high pressure to increase output, the decentralization led mainly to a weakening of economic priorities and a consequent misallocation of re- sources. From the beginning of the Third Five Year Man, Czecho- slovakia had difficulty in meeting output goals. The plan for total industrial production was nearly fulfilled in 1961, but there were large lags in production of steel and heavy machinery and some lag also in investments, as is shown in the Table. These lags were especially serious because the phasing of the Third Five Year ?lan required a faster buildup of investments in the first part than in the latter part of the plan period. The immediate cause of the lags in production of steel (a growth of 14 percent was planned for rolled steel in 1961, but only 4 percent was achieved) was that planned improvements in tech- nology, especially the use of oxygen in existing plants, were not made. In turn, the shortfalls in steel affected machine building, where technological development also was lagging. Severe strain also was manifested in transportation during 1961, when the railroads found that they could no longer satisfy the increasing demands placed on them. Early in 1961, rail t:rano- port became an economic bottlemenck in Czechoslovakia for the first time since the Communist takeover and was itself disrupted further as a result of the very uneven fulfillment of the in- dustrial production plan. The lack of reserves in transportation --------------------------------------------------------------- * The regime claims that output increased by 13.7 percent per year in 1956-63, but this claim is believed to be inflated ** See VII, p. 24, below. 4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Czechoslovakia: Annual Percentage Increases in Plans and Plan Fulfillment 1961-62 1961 (5) 1962 (5) Plan Actual Plan Actual Total industry (gross) 9.3 3.9 9.3 6.2 Electric power 11 13.3 10 6.6 Hard coal -1 0.1 4 3.6 Brown coal 3 12 6 6.2 Steel 10.2 4.1 14 3.5 Rolled steel 14.2 4.3 15 3.4 Cement 10 5.^ 22 6.9 Heavy machine building 14.1 11.5 15 3.1 General machine building 11.0 12.2 N.A. 9.4 Chemical industry 11.4 12.9 11.3 10.4 Consumer goods 7.2 7.7 6.3 5.5 Foods 5.5 6.9 6.1 2 retail trade 4.2 3.3 5.6 3.5 Agriculture (gross production) 7.1 0 5 -6 Personal consumption N.A. 3+ 6.2 2.5 Fixed investments C 7 N.A. -4.3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 was revealed most clearly during the military mobilization measures of the fall of 1961 and again during the unusually severe winter of 1962-62. Another source of concern was the growing number of uncompleted investment projects, reflecting the inability of the construction industry to handle the grow- ing volume of investments efficiently and the inadequate control exercised over new rrr:,, Gross agri.cultu_?ai production did not change in 1961, and net production declined. Consequently, consumption of food stagnated while, for the first time in several years, there was only a very small increase in consumption of industrial goods. The economic strain was reflected in foreign trade as improts of machinery and industrial materials exceeded plan, and there was a large shortfall in exports of machinery and equipment. Imports from the West rose rapidly, partly because of a very large increase in imports of steel, coal, and wheat to compen- sate for part of the shortfall in domestic output. Exports of machinery were held down by the lag in output of heavy machine building, by the inadequate assortment of products, and by the sharp decline of trade with Communist China. These unfavorable trends caused a large decline in the export surplus with the Soviet Bloc and a shift from an export surplus to an import sur- plus with the West -- a situation that could not last, because of Czechoslovakia's large and growing foreign aid commitments and deficit on service transactions. The regime persisted in regarding economic problems that were developing in 1961 as temporary and hoped to be able to pursue the Third Five Year Plan. An increase of 14 percent in production of steel was planned for 1962 (compared with an aver- age annual growth of about 9 percent for 1961-65) --- enough to make up for the shortfall of 1961. A similarly high plan was established for heavy machine building. Some of the original goals for investments in 1962 had to be lowered, notably in the chemical and metallurgical industries, and the completion of some facilities expected to be in operation in that year was postponed.7) Simultaneously the foreign trade balance, especial- ly with the 'West, was to be greatly improved, and machinery ex- ports were to be increased by 27 percent.C) The economic situation grew steadily worse during 1962. production of steel increased faster than in 1961, but, once again, much more slowly than planned, for essentially the same reasons as in the previous year. Output of heavy machine build- ing increased at about half the planned rate, partly because of the lag in output of steel. Lags in the installation and in- efficient operation of new power-generating capacity and a drought that cut the capacity of hydroelectric power-plants caused pro- duction of electric power to fall far short of plan and led to a serious shortage of power. Continued shortages of freight cars, as well as uneven fulfillment of production plans, caused disrup- tion in the distribution of industrial materials, as reflected in production stoppages for lack of materials in some places and Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 unnecessarily large inventories in other places. Total indus- trial production rose only 6.2 percent compared with a planned 9.3 percent, as the growth of both employment and labor pro- ductivity declined. The construction industry also was unable to fulfill its tasks. Agricultural production declined sharply to the lowest level in 7 years, partly because of unfavorable weather but partly also because of the ill effects of collectivization and subsequent policies of the regime on farmers' incentives. In- stead of trying to stimulate interest in raising production and improving techniques, the regime in 1931-62 concentrated on gaining control over an increasing share of output by reducing payments in kind to collective farmers and placing further re- strictions on the remnants of the farm market. The foreign trade balance improved substantially as a re- sult of an increase of 7.2 percent in exports compared with only 2.3 percent in imports,9) and the shortage of hard currency was eased. The sharp increase in the export surplus, however, cut into cloriestic investment and consumption and also may have been partly responsible for the tight supply of industrial materials. Capital investment fell v percent below the level of 1931, not only because output of machinery and construction lagged but also because equipment originally designed for domestic use was ex- ported.lO)Similarly the stagnation of personal consumption in 1932 was due both to the decline in food production and to re- strictions on imports of foods and increased exports of namu- factured consumer goods. The dissatisfaction of the population grew considerably in 1932, not only because of the stagnation in consumption but also because of a severe imbalance on the consumer market. 11) The imbalance took mainly the form of a shortage of meat and other quality foods, which resulted in extended queuing before food stores. Having become accustomed to a steady, if slow, increase in consumption and to a reasonably smooth distribution of goods, the population grew increasingly resentful of the shortages, and there were even some riots in the first half of 1962. IV. Policies and Plans for 1963-70 By mid-1962 the cumulative deterioration of the economy had convinced the regime that the Third Five Year Plan could not be fulfilled. Accordingly the plan was abandoned, and the Czechoslovel; regime had to find a new approach to economic policy. The new approach was evolved during the second half of 1962, with criticism, apparent indecision, and some disagree- raent within the ?arty, and was incorporated into an interim plan for 13163 and a Seven Year Plan for 1964-70. 1. Publication of the "Perspectives" The first official disclosure that the regime was prepar- ing to abandon the Third Five Year Plan and the first intimations 7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 of a change in aims and methods were contained in a lengthy document of the Central Committee of the Communist Party pub- lished in mid-August 1962. 12) This document, entitled "Per- spectives for the yButure Development of Our Socialist Society" (hereafter referred to as the "Perspectives") was prepared for nationwide discussion in preparation for the Twelfth Party Con- gress, which eventually was held in December 1962. The "Perspectives" set forth the new approach in the fol- lowing statement: "The Central Committee has ... come to the conclusion that it will be desirable in the next few years to distribute our forces and means better, and to set targets so as to secure the porportionate development of the economy, and to create necessary reserves by exceeding these targets. In this way it will be possible to reduce the excessive strain in fulfilling the plan, to avoid defects in the supply of materials, and to insure smooth running of the economy and normal, even worm in enterprises." Clearly the "high-pressure" planning of the past was to be avoided because of the disruption and imbalances to which it had led. Economic plans would be more realistic and less influenced by political pressure and also would allow for contingencies. However, the extent of the necessary retrench- ment was not indicated, and the "Perspectives" at the same time strongly reemphasized the basic priorities of the Third Five Year Plan -- the rapid development of steel and heavy machine building -- priorities that had not been observed during 1961- 02. Consumption would have to be held down, as the "Perspectives" clearly indicated, and central controls over the economy would have to be tightened. The "Perspectives" also made explicit some far-reaching proposals for further institutional reforms in agriculture that had been discussed in speeches and the press for 2 or 3 years. These proposals not only involved amalgamation of collectives and payment of fixed wages to collective farmers but even entailed the elimination of the private plots of collective farmers -- potentially a highly disruptive measure. 2. Subsequent Discussion It is clear that Novotny and the "Perspectives" were under attac1: for several months and that in working out the new ap- proach to economic matters several lines of policy that had been tentatively set forth in the "Perspectives" were modified by the time the final Party Directives were adopted at the 't'welfth Party Congress early in December. Basically the evolution of economic policy during the period between the "Perspectives" and the Directives was in the direction of even greater caution in economic planning, of increased emphasis on agriculture, of a somewhat less negative approach to consumer desires, and of some toning down of the plans for potentially disruptive changes in agriculture. In no case was there a basic change in approach from that taken in the '"Perspectives," but the final policy may well reflect a compromise between more divergent views. 3. The Party Congress The basic reason for the increasing restraint in economic policy was the continued deterioration of the economic situation Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : QIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 during the second half of 1962, especially the decline in agri- cultural production that may not have been fully anticipated at the time the "P?erspectives" was written. It seers clear that as a result, some early assumptions for the plan for 1963 were revised sharply downward in November or December 1962. When the first definite goals of the plan for 1963 were released, 13) after the Party Congress in December, the percentage increase for industrial production had been re- duced to a mere 1 percent -- an unprecedentedly low figure in the entire Soviet Bloc. The original target had been set proba- bly at more than 5 percent. And, as was indicated earlier, in- creased caution and emphasis on agriculture and exports were re- flected in the discussions and directives of the Party Congress. The whole spirit of the Twelfth Party Congress lacked the optimism usually displayed at such gatherings and suggested that the Party leadership was seriously concerned about how to get its economic house in order. Instead of focusing on the past achievements of socialism and the prospects for a brilliant future, almost every speaker devoted most of his time to criti- cizing present shortcomings. The leadership placed some of the blame for the country's economic difficulties on "external in- fluences of both a political and economic character" (by im- plication, mainly the Berlin crisis, which had led to higher de- fense expenditures than had been planned). 14) Another scape- goat was the enterprise manager who had "misunderstood" the in- creased responsibility given to him in the decentralization of 1950-60 and acted contrary to the national interest. 15) The leadership itself had to accept some blame for having planned the economy without "adequate technical preparation" or allowance for contingencies. In fact, Novotny'sstatement that "subjec- tivism in planning is the greatest evil," 16) made at a Party meeting in March 1963, can be read only as an implicit admission of his own responsibility for the economic deterioration. 4. Characteristics of the New Policy The 11-point program approved by the Twelfth Party Congress formed the basic part of the published ?arty Directives. 17) This program, which followed the general approach of the "Per- spectives," had the following characteristics: a. 3conomic plans were to be carefully worked out and to be conservative enough to allow ample room for contingencies. Eigh-pressure planning, such as had been practiced by the Novotny regime since its inception, would be dropped. In support of the new plans, more attention than before was to be given to new technology, better quality and assortment of products, and closer intra-Bloc economic cooperation. Export commitments were to be met even at the cost of domestic investment. b. Agriculture was to receive increased attention by the Party. Czechoslovakia had to solve its own agricultural problem. and could not expect to fill an ever-growing agricultural deficit from Soviet Bloc sources. 9 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 C. The consumer could not expect a significant improvement in his living conditions until the economic situation, and es- pecially the agricultural situation, had considerably improved. d. The state and Party would have to exercise much tighter control than before over economic activity to insure that es- tablished priorities were observed and that economic develop- ment would follow the lines established in the plans. Enter- prises would lose thereby most of the increased authority that they had acquired during the 1353-63 reforms, at least until such time as an effective system of incentives could be worlhed out. 5. Specific Features of the New Plans The evidence of a shift to more conservative planning lay in a great slowing down of the growth of fixed investment during "the next 2 or 3 years" 13); in the considerably reduced rates of growth planned for key industrial branches like steel, elec- tric power, and machine building during 1904-73; and in the very small growth planned for 1933 in industrial production as a whole. The reduction in rates of growth planned for some leading industrial products and branches is illustrated in the following tabulation (in planned annual average percentage increases) 19): 1361-35 1933-70 Steel 9.4 6 Electric power 13 G to 7 Pllachine building 12 1 to 10 Judging from the above goals and past relationships, total in- dustrial production probably will be planned to grow by about 6 to 7 percent per year, whereas the abandoned plan counted on an annual rate of 9.3 percent. The planned rate of growth that is anticipated probably can be achieved, as it is well below the average rate of 9.2 percent a year estimated for 1956-G3 and about the same as the average rate estimated for 1331-62. The plan for 1913 called for an increase of only 1 percent in industrial production, an apparent decline in growth of labor productivity in industry, and a cut of 6 percent in capital in- vestments. Never before had any Soviet Bloc country actually planned so little an increase as 1 percent in industrial pro- duction. The over-all industrial goal for 1353 appears to be well below the goal that was envisaged by the regime when wor% on the plan began in mid-1962. Lard reality had caught up with the Czech super-planners, with the Czech people paying the price in food shortages and postponed consurmer goods. 10 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 APPENDIX SOD SCE 11EFEM-IicE S 1) Statisticlke zpravy, no 1, 1963, p. 220. 2) Rude pravo, Jul 60, p. 3. 3) Rdact pravo, 21 Nov +31, p. 5. 4) .t sty ohzor, no 7, 1961, supplement, p. 6. 5) i anovane ospo arstvi, no 1, 1911, p. 1-7. rhide pravo, Pe , p. 1-4. Ur, E CE. Economic Survey of Europe in 1961, Pt. 1, p. C) Planovane o-spodar5 v , no 3, 196 , p. 1-12, Rude pravo, 20-1 Jan 632 p. 1. bid., 2 Reb 63, p. 1-3. 7) Rude pravo, 1 Dec 61, p. 1-2. eh 62, p. 1. 3) P anovane hospodarstvi, no 3, 1932, p. 10. 9) aces ic.:e zpravy, no It 1963, p. 220. 13) iude pravo, ec 62, p. 2. Iola., 5 Dec 62, p. 4. 11) Planovane hospodarstvi, no 2, 1933, p. 14-17. 12) i~ a pravo, 1_ Aug 52. 13) Ru e pravo, 9 Jan 03, p. 3, 6. 14) Ibi Dec 02, p. 3. 15) lbld.o 7 Dec 62, p.3. Ibid.5 Dec CW, p. 7, ^, 11. 1C) oic., 24 Mar 62, p. 4. 17) -sRuce pravo, 10 Dec 62, p.l. 10) 19) =1 ca ., 9 Jul 30, p. 5, 6. Ibid., 5 Dec 62, p. 10. a~. ., 10 Dec 62, p. 1. 706ovane no 1, 1963, p. 1-13. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 25X1960b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Santiago de Chile 9 March 1964 ~~~ tyesl~a~e* s.R~CSae>r ORGANO OFICIAL DE LA CONFEDER ACTON NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES a Stgo., Chile ? Dic. 1963 '- N. 11-12 - H. Duran Director - Santo Domingo 1431 - Fono 87685 SIN RESERVAS TRABAJADORES MEXICANOS APOYAN LA ALIANZA PARA EL PROGRESO La Confederation de Trabajadores de Mexico (C.T.M.) ha dado su apoyo "sin reservas" a la Alianza Para e: Progreso. Pero todavia mas importante es que la C.T.M. ha claborado planes concretos de action para aprove- char la Alianza pars el Progreso en favor de sus trabajadores. ~Por que la C.T.M?, con todo su prestigio, fuerza e historic militante decidio que la mejor manera de alcanzar 1 -?justicia_social para sus trabajadores es por medio de la Alianza para el Progreso? ,Que descubrio la C.T.M. on Jos metodos y metas de la Alianza, que la indujo a ofrecerle su apoyo "sin reservas"? La C.T.M. declaro: "Los principios que dieron vida y actuation a nuestro moi- vimiento revolucionario toma- ron caracter institutional en la Constitution Politica de 1917. "Es para los mexicanos una satisfaction que dichos prin- cipios hayan tenido completa coincidencia con la Carta de Punta del Este. Asi podemos ver que las Republicas Ameri- su decision de asociarse en un esfuerzo comun para alE canzar un progreso economico mas acelerado y una mas am- plia justicia social para sus pueblos, respetando la digni- dad del hombre y la liberlad politica, y a esa asociacion la denominaron Alianza para el cial, 1a' Confederation pregun-- to: %Quc debe hater la Cont- federaci6n de Trabajadores de Mexico?", y se contesto: "Tomar la bandera de nues- tra Revolution, constituir co- mites pro Alianza para el Pro- greso en cada ciudad, en cada pueblo, en cada villa, a los cuales se invite a todas las personas que no sean traidoras a su patria y a su tiempo... " C a d a trabajador de la C.T.M. debe ser un abanders~? do y un soldado de esta revo- Iucidn social, en las grandes ciudades, en las pequenas, en el taller, en la gran febrica..." En consecuencia, la C.T.M. procedio a tomar su legitimo Qapel dentro de la Alianza pa- pa el Progreso. La Confedera- tion hara lo siguiente: Progreso". 1- Establecera subcomites L T__~- ' pro Alianza en cada una de LA C-T.M. DEBE sus cincuenta y una organiza- "TOMAR LA BANDERA" clones afiliadas en todo Mexi- En vista de, la eompatibili- co. Seran subcomites depen- dientes de la Comi4i6n Pro dad de la 'Alianza con la teO Alianza para el Progreso, que ria social de la Revolution esta patrocinada por la. Orga- bajadona y la lueha de Jos tra- nizaci6n de Jos Estados Amq' baadores por la justicia so- ricanos. Esos subcomites "deben con- vocar a reuniones de mesa re- donda, o de cualquier forma, con las autoridades, patrones, profesionales, militares, profe- sores, etc., etc., de la region, con el fin de lograr un invex$ tario de los problemas locales y encontrar la solution de esos mismos problemas, y comunicarlos al Secretario Ge- neral de la C.T.M., con el pro- posito de que este alto fun- cionario ordene la gestion, su tramitacion o estudio por la secretaria del Comite Nacional que le corresponda". 2.- Establecera un banco de trabajadores, para conceder creditos destinados a obras de autoayuda. Este banco obtenj: dra su capital --cinco millo- nes de pesos para comenzar- dentro de la Confederation misma. Las organizaciones afi- liadas pueden comprar accio- nes del banco y los trabajadoj? res pueden comprar acciones menores por media, de deduc- ciones semanarias de su sala- rio. 3- Fomentara el aumento de la ensenanza tecnica, espe- Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 - Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 ingreso hor habitante, Para acercar en c: mcnor tiempo posible el nivel de vida de Ios paises In tinoamericanos al de Ios paises indttstrializados 0 "Ejccntar programas de vivienda en la ciudad y en 01 campo, Para suministrar Casa decorosa a los habitantes do America", C;l "Lupulsar, dentro de las particularidades. de calla Pais, programas de reforma agraria integral, orientada a Ia efectiva transformation, donde asi se requiera, de ]as estructuras e injustos sistemas de tenencia y explotaci6n de la tierra. con miras a sustituir ci regimen de latifundio y minifundio par un sistema jusL to de propiedad, de tal mane- ra que, mediante el comple mcnto del credito oportuno y adecuado, la asistencia tecni- ca y ]a comercializacion v disi- trinocion ce los productos, la t,.crra c , ;ituya para el hom- lhre r,,b::ja, la base de I "L sc. cst ;talioad econ6mica, fun_ damento de su progresivo bie- nestar y _crantia de su librr- tad y dignidad". "Asegurar a los trabaja- dores una justa remune- ration y adecuadas condicio- nes de trabajo; establecer efil- cientes sistemas de relaciones obrero patronales y procedil, mientos de consulta y colaho_ ration entre las autoridades, las asociaciones patronales y las organizaciones de trabaja- dores, para el desarrollo ecoV noinico y social". Q "Acabar con el analfabe- tismo, extender en el pla_ zo mas corto los beneficios de la ensenanza elemental o pri- maria a toda persona latinol americana, y ampliar, en gran escala, las oportunidades de education secundaria, tecnica y superior". O "Desarrollar programas de salubridad e higiene con miras a prevenir las enferme- dades, luchar contra las epi- demias y defender en soma el potencial humano". s "Reformar las leyesi tri- butarias para. exigir mas a quienes mas tienen, castigar severamente la evasion de ini} puestos, redistribuir la renta nacional en favor de los see- tores mas necesitados y; al mismo tiempo, alentar la in- version y reinversion de capi- tales, y el ahorro". 3 "Dar rapida y duradera solution al grave proble- ma que representan para los paises de la America Latina las variaciones excesivas de los precios tic Jos productos quo do ordinario Sc exportan y de ios que r:On dcpende, on medi- da ti,n importante, la prospe- ridad de las Naciones Latino- americanas". C "Los Estados Unidos, por su parte, se compromei ten a ofrecer sit cooperaci6n financieral y tecnica; propor- cionarAn la mayor parte del fi_ nanciamiento, por lo menos de veinte mil millones de d6la- res, principalmente fondos pul-' blicos, que la America Latina requiere de todas ]as fuentes externas, durante el proximo decenio, ;lira completar sus propios esfuerzos". CONCLUSIONEES DE LA C.T.M. Al cabo de tres dias de cui- doso y detallado estudio, los delegados de la C.T.M. vota- ron, uninimemente, por apo- yar in Alianza Para el ProgrcF so "sin reservas". Uno do los dos tiltimos dictamenes apro- bados en la conferencia, dice: "Podemos entonces concluir quo nuesira Revolution ha for_ mado ell la Republica Mexi- cana todas las condiciones que las Hepubiicas Arrcricanas rc- conocen toms necesarias para desarrollar los objetivos pro- puestos en la Alianza para el Progreso... "For nuestra parte... clue- remos... dejar perfectamente clam c6run cntiende In Confe- deracion de Trabajadores do Mexico la Alianza Para el Prcr greso, y por que apoya sin re- servas la participacion limpia de nuestro gobierno en el es- fuerzo comun, para lograr el desarrollo cconomico y social de Mexico y de toda America. En el segundo dictamen fi- nal, la C.T.M. toma nota de que In Alianza para el Progrd. so es un esfuerzo cooperativo que atraviesa las fronteras na- cionalcs y afecta profunda- mente al trabajador libre on todo el continente. Por tanto la C.T.M. emiti6 un informe especial final, para subrayar su apoyo a la actitud que so- bre ]a Alianza para el Progrcl- so mantiene la Organization Regional Interamericana do Trabajadores (ORIT), a is cual esta afiliada la C.T.M. La C.T.M. seiial6: "Nuestra militancia en la ORIT nos ha permitido parti- cipar on sus diferentes con- gresos, en los cuales se han to- rnado acuerdos quo interprc{- tan el modo de pensar de las sindicalistas democratas d e America soars Jos mas deli- cados problemas ale 'nuestro Continento". Fundada on esta participa_ cion en la ORIT y on el cono- cimiento directo do la militan)- cia de la ORIT en favor de re- formas, fundamentales con arre glo a Ia Alianza Para el Pro- greso, In C.T.M. aclopt6 "Polyp to de Acuerdo" con la actitud de la ORIT. Entre ellos se cuentan: m "Nuestro completo apoyo en la lucha por lograr una adecuada Reforma Agraria, en los paises on don:IP todavia no existe, que transforms _las condiciones sociales y econo- micas Para favorecer la aplica_ cion de los objetivos de la Alianza para el Progreso. "Nuestro apoyo tambien en la lucha por obtener precios justos y estables en el mercado internacional Para las materias primas. "Una intensa preparation tecnica en nuestras filas, Para estar en aptitud de aten- der efizcamente la industrially zacion de nuestros productos y su diversification. ca "Una creciente actividad educativa on nuestros Ins- titutos de Education Obrera, para ampliar nuestros cuadros sindicales, incorporando en ellos a todos los hombres y mujeres dispuestos a servir a In colectividad. m "Un vigoroso impulso a las cooperativas obreras organizadar para la construc- cion de viviendas populares, a efecto de que puedan desem- penar con mayor eficacia una importante colaboracion tens diente a resolver la tremenda escasez de habitantes de tipo economico. m "Apoyo completo a las gestiones que la ORIT vie- ne realizando Para que en to- dos los organismos encargados de elaborar y desarrollar pla- nes de superaci6n social y econ6mica al traves de nuel-. tro continente, se de a los tra- bajadores organizados la debi- da participacion y atencion". Es esta, pues, la forma co- me uno de los movimientos obreros mas estimados y pode- rosos de America Latina juz- ga la Alianza para el Progre- so en lo national, en lo in- ternacional, y cual es su pro(- pio papel activo. En conclu- sion, la C.T.M. lanz6 este Ila- mamiento: "iA LUCHAR: PORQUE LA LIBERTAD Y EL BIENESTAR HAY Q U E CONQUISTAR- LOS1" Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 TABLE OF ECONOMIC MID POPULATION GROV IN LATIN AMERICA (The figures are in terms of 1961 prices. Included are 19 Latin American countries -- all except Cuba.) GROSS NAT'L PRODUCT BILLIONS OF DOLLARS PER CAPITA INCOME DOLLARS 1950 33.4 224 1951 34.8 227 1952 36.1 229 1953 37.4 231 1954 39.7 238 1955 42.1 246 1956 43.6 247 1957 45.9 253 1958 47.6 255 1959 49.4 257 1960 51.C 262 1931 54.3 267 1962 55.6 266 In 1950, the population of all of Latin America was estimated at 150,000,000, and was increasing at 2.5% per year. By 1962, it was 211,800,000, and was growing at 2.8% per year. If this rate of growth remains unchanged, the population will double within a generation and be about 500,000,000 by the end of the century. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2- Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 The New Leader March 2, 1964 evitali zing the Alliance Y NOW, . even among some of its staunchest advocates, By Herbert Cahn aggressive xenophobia. Instead of launching progressive programs, Washington had to spend a good deal of time apologetically ex- plaining that it was not trying to re-colonize the Hemisphere. Another important reason for the Alliance's failure is a basic contradiction in its conception. Ostensibly, the program is a de- liberate attempt to reach the masses over the heads of their govern- ments-the oligarchs, the land- holders, and the politicos. It was to be aid with a new twist, or "social" rather than capital invest- ment. Benefits were to accrue di- rectly to the downtrodden in a manner that would prevent their being stolen by the rich for ac- cumulation in numbered Swiss bank accounts. To qualify for aid under the Al- liance a country was supposed to agree to legislate steeper progres- sive income taxes; intensify land reform, which generally means ex- propriating the property of the large holders; pass anti-capital flight laws, and adopt other measures aimed at straightening out the selfish ruling classes. But in poor coun- tries reforms to soak the rich can often result in the redistribution of poverty, and not in the creation of new wealth. At the same time, there is general agreement that the Alliance for Progress has thus far been a failure. It must be said in all fairness, however, that the fail- ure was not predictable and the experiment was a reasonable and statesmanlike risk. When the Alliance was first be- gun, the United States expected to be dealing with rational partners eager for a joint approach to .solving economic and social prob- lems. But before long the reason- able and moderate Arturo Frondizi was deposed in Argentina, leaving the country at the mercy of rival military cliques that threatened civil war on the issue of the extent to which-not whether-the Peron- istas should be suppressed. And in Brazil another man who had been relied upon, Janio Quadros, suddenly resigned the Presidency and gave way to Joao Goulart, a man of consummate political- skills yet devoid of even an elementary sense of public administration. Al- most from the very start, therefore, instead of meeting a desire for cooperation the United States faced HERBERT CAHN, a new contributor to these pages, is a former `Rhodes scholar now living in Latin America. such reforms tend to discourage those who have created wealth in the past from continuing to do so. The thinking behind these pre- requisites for Alliance aid seems to have been twofold. First, the people would be shown that the Communists are lying when they say that the United States is the natural ally of the exploiting plu- tocracy. Second, social-minded, pro- gressive, forward-looking democrats and Socialists would be brought to power and eliminate the Commu- nists from the Latin American scene. The authors of the Alliance ap- parently reached the facile con- clusion that an undemocratic oli- garchy selfishly clinging to its priviliges was responsibly for the Hemisphere's problems. Had they given this more thought, they might have taken into account that the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela and Colombia had been elected by ir- reproachable democratic processes. Moreover, the politicians elected would compact with the Devil to insure re-election; they would de- pose the Bishop of Rome, let alone redistribute land, if they thought it electorally profitable. Why, then, haven't they? One reason is that their admin- Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RpP78-03061A000200070002-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :"CIA-RDP78-03061 00200070002-2 istrative facilities are not equipped ' Progress in particular. The follow- supervision of a long-term plan in- to handle modern social problems. ing, for example, would go a long variably involves the State Depart- There are always certain specific way toward revitalizing the Al- ment's interference in the internal areas-now in one place, now in liance: affairs of another country. Even another-where thanks to the tal- 1. Replace long-term planning were this not resented, it leaves the ents of some outstanding individual with a project-to-project approach. recipient government open to ac- administration is excellent. But the If a government prefers the long- cusations of tutelage. Finally, al- model of that now carried on by ward on opponents. or royalties to his home office. INV the terrorist groups in Venezuela. What is more, if U.S. aid is is worth adding that such legisla- All this is not to say that dicta- tied to long-term projects which tion would find much less opposi- torships, either of the Left or for one reason or another are tion in Congress than is usually Right, are the panacea for Latin abandoned, U.S. foreign policy is accorded foreign aid. American instability. Rather, the bound to be adversely affected. Industrial investment induced by point is that inflexible adherence, Individual projects, on the other tax incentives would also outflank to the principles of representative hand, do not suffer from the same most of the problems the Alliance' democracy is neither an essential weaknesses. Experience has shown wants to solve, and has attempted condition for keeping the Com- that most such projects survive a. to solve, by legislative fiat. Al- munists out of Latin America nor succession of administrations. Re- though the Alliance seeks to remedy sufficient for fostering economic gional self-interest as well as mo- the problems of primarily agricul- development. The danger of going mentum see them through to a con- tural economies, these problems too far too fast can, after all, exceed elusion even under the most diffi- will become increasingly less im- that of standing still. , cult circumstances. portant as industrialization proceeds In addition, it is much easier to to change the economic structure THINK that what is required, control expenditure, performance ' of the countries involved. A typical therefore, is a revision of U.S. and even venality when supervising example of this evolutionary process policy toward Latin America ffin individual projects without stepping in U.S. history is the agricultural gener pp and s~ved For Release 200/08? 7 n 'I i DP e-1 BV 3OglR88f 0071 'l '` of the South. No cure has permanent insurrection on the guised, allow more, flexibility to country by returning large profit and at best Bosch's government 4. his profits without straining the would have been in a state ' of balance of payments of the recipient him into an alliance with some of original tax credit as soon as he the less stable Leftist groups and t ~`9 begins to remit profits home, so possibly even with the Communists. that the first remittances will be The end result would have been Fr applied to amortization of the tax to undermine relations between credit. In this way, the investor Santo Domingo and Washington, would be encouraged to re-invest li~ 't. couraging their acceptance. is certainly no Communist, but his alienation of. the previous ruling r`r At the same time, the investor group would in time have forced could be required to reimburse his involved as well as of the danger little will come of this good adv- inherent in abrupt shifts of power. . until meaningful tax privileges am* A case in point was the election ? f ~` granted. Fast tax write-offs on in- of Juan Bosch to the Presidency vestments in underdeveloped coup- of the Dominican Republic. Bosch rTt~.. tries go a long way toward en- in power were aware of the risks omy as tax-oriented as ours, thot'gl' rather than particular, and social plans are lacking the U.S. should underdeveloped countries than do reforms raise popular expectations not demand them. Master schemes the recipients of aid, and should long before they raise the standard tend to make governments rigid, look upon its own efforts in this of living. Failure because of in- and they also provide a broad base field with some humility. competent administration can only for attacks from the opposition. 2. Tax Incentives. The United lead to revolutionary dictatorships, Often the same plans, deftly dis- States government has been very either Communist or Fascist.. In generous with exhortations to in- many instances, the governments vest in Latin' America. In an econ- over-all picture is a sad one indeed. term approach to economic de- though the U.S. produces the most Most of Latin America's social velopment, it should not be dis- automobiles In the world, it has problems are extensive and general, couraged. But where long-range no more experience in developing Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 ever been found for the South's did. But to the State Department's be handled on factual rather than moralistic grounds.) This is a typi- agricultural ills; they simply have dismay, the law actually penalized bvcomc less important as industry those who had brought capital into cal instance of U.S. involvement in has moved in. the country and scared new in- the internal affairs of other coun- 3. Stop interfering in internal vestors away. Only confidence can tries being foolish. politics. The case that comes most keep money usefully employed in For one thing, most Latin glaringly to mind is Peru. The these countries, and only police- American governments are better d t collect direct rather o c if Peruvian Army did not want Victor state methods can hold on to it this confidence is lacking. Before Haya de la Torre in power, and cancelled the country's elections. After the U.S. Ambassador made some public statements obviously designed to snatch the carpet from under the Generals' feet, they forced his withdrawal. Ambassadors, after all, are not supposed to govern the countries to which they are accredited. When they try, it usually leads to trouble or embarrassment. Recently, the American Embassy in Rio was ac- cused of using wheat counterpart funds to finance the election of anti-Communist deputies to the Brazilian Congress. In reply, the Embassy published a breakdown of the application of its wheat funds. One of the items listed was nearly Si million for "subscriptions to' equ-ppe than indirect taxes, so that higher rates on indirect taxes merely- serves to punish the honest. For another, progressive taxation in areas of capital shortage is a very doubtful policy, for it transfers in- come from investors to consumers, or from a more efficient sector of the economy to the least efficient: the government. Most Latin Ameri- can social security laws, incidental- ly, also fall under the heading of illusory legislation. The laws are passed; the deductions are made from the workers' payroll; and when it is time for him to receive the benefits, either his money has been eroded to nothing by infla- tion, or the benefit is simply not available. 4. Primary export product prices. One of the certain signs of underdevelopment is excessive dependence on the exportation of one or a few non-manufactured products. On this score, the Com- munists have pressed the argument that foreign aid from capitalists is nothing more than a loan to the recipient country of what was stolen from it by paying low prices for its exports. Their statisticians take as their base the high prices from the Korean War period, then go on, to show that if these high prices had been maintained Latin America would have double the foreign exchange income it has to- day and would not need aid. When correct figures are used the argu- ment is shown to be largely non- sense, but something could, and should, be done about its element of truth. The element of truth is that the more an exporter produces the less a have an opposite a all the signatories of the Alliance, progressive. Yet that should be he gets for his merchandise. And was urgMppr v sd or Kelewase 2000/08/27: ifDP78th-e issue is to Latin America is concerned, a strong protest from New York bankers halted the practice, the Kennedy Administration cooperated in this matter by going to' the absurd length of threatening physi- cal searches of airline passengers from Brazil to see if they carried correspondence containing flight` funds. Another area in which imposed legislation can backfire is land re- form. As noted earlier, such re- forms tend first of all to decrease production. Some Latin American governments may wish to under- take such a step on their own initiative, and in several instances it has worked out well. But if they are cajoled into doing so by the United States and the reform proves periodicals, etc." Since newspapers \ detrimental, the blame will re- in Brazil cost three cents each,_one could not escape the suspicion that the Embassy was lying or had gone into the used paper business. It is simply impolitic to coerce countries into passing legislation favored by our own Agency for In- ternational Development. Yet doing so is one of the basic procedures of the Alliance. If the United States government feels that it must with- hold financial cooperation from a foreign government, it is its privilege as well. as its duty to use its best . dound- to Washington. While few people seem to be aware of it, there is no land short- age in Latin America, nor is the lack of land the reason for rural poverty. True, land may be in- equitably distributed, but reform makes sense only when access to the land is barred by unproductive hereditary land ownership. Where this is not the case, more often than not land reform only succeeds in making starving peasants out of starving peons, and at the same judgement in each case. But it is time breaks up the social organiza- impractical to exhort other govern- tion of a society 'built on an agri- ments to pass new legislation to ac- cultural middle or upper class. commodate a U.S. viewpoint. Furthermore, much imposed leg- To begin with, much of this sort islation merely creates the illusion of legislation is double-edged, what of solving problems. The tax ques- the Brazilians call contra-produ- tion is a good illustration. The Al- cente. Laws that are supposed to liance for Progress favors more check capital outflow frequently progressive taxation. (No one zil like seems ever to have asked how 4T_ t Br Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070002-2 hardly any countries are sufficiently important as producers to control prices through reducing production. Meanwhile, they must continue to import goods at prices dictated by semi-monopolistic and oligopolistic manufacturers. The United States, therefore, should encourage and participate in more world marketing agreements .on commodities. Whenever prices have skyrocketed, Washington has tried to make such agreements. But the right time to make them is when prices are low and the other contracting parties are likely to agree to reasonable conditions. 5. Don't mix foreign policy with commercial interests. The com- mercial interests of U.S. firms do not necessarily coincide with the foreign policy interests of the U.S. government, and sometimes they obviously clash. American business- ;lien abroad, however, have a tend- ency to think that representatives of the U.S. government are on the scene only to protect them; that, in fact, their protection is the gov- ernment's primary function. Surely, there can be no objection to in- terference on the businessman's be- half when this does not conflict with more important political ob- jectives; but when it does, private commercial questions rightly be- come secondary. A good many American businessmen still refuse to recognize this. United States public utility firms all over Latin America are victims of a very difficult situation, having obligated themselves to furnish services at fixed prices computed in currencies which have lost their value. Consequently, they are un- able to give good service, let alone expand to serve growing economies. As their equipment becomes obso- lete, their services deteriorate and they become an embarrassment even to the most well-meaning local government. They made bad commercial deals. The utility firms then turn to ment for assistance, hoping to get the most out of properties that are rapidly becoming worthless. There are situations where they may be helped, and others where it would be best to tell them. to pull their own chestnuts out of the fire. Where the latter obtains, they must be threatened with serious conse- quences if they use their financial strength to force political inter- ference that may undermine the stability of the governments in the countries where they operate. 6. Public Law 480: counterpart funds. Ambassadors should be given use of a larger part of these funds and should be allowed to use them at their own discretion. An ambassador's hands should not be tied because at some place, at some time, some fool might. mis- appropriate funds or spend them in a manner inimical to U.S. interests. As it is, these counterpart funds are already lost to the U.S. econ- omy and lie about in depreciating currencies, steadily eroding away to nothing in central banks. The American taxpayer would be better served if ambassadors had them available for discretionary disburse- ments that are in our interest. that minimum restrictions be placed on these counterpart funds by the recipients of agricultural products. The availability of free funds can give ambassadors a greater ability to encourage policy decisions con- genial to the United States. 7. Lend less and give more. Much of the lending done under foreign aid today is illusory; it is illusory because the loans are eternally renewed. Many recipient countries would be better served by outright grants, and the donor would be no worse off. 8. Cut down propaganda activi- ties. American consulates and em- bassies are beginning to look ri- diculous in their propaganda. If it were only a question of money this would not matter, since the sums involved are not huge. The trouble is that those who are the targets of propaganda are more likely to become skeptical of the truth than convinced of it. The basic truths about the U.S. econ- omy, political systems and way of life are adequately covered by the wire services, magazines, and other unofficial communications media that do not provoke negative reactions. The best propaganda is supplied by the U.S. press when it explores the defects of our own society, for then the positive aspects of Ameri- can life seem all the more credible. In countries where a free and ade- quate press exists, official U.S. propaganda programs could be can- celed at no loss, and in many cases at a profit. THIS LIST of suggestions is hardly exhaustive. But it should help to make clear that if the Alliance is to be made effective, it must be- come more liberal in the classical sense. Though liberalism is old- fashioned, a continent that in many ways is still stranded in the 19th century can best assimilate the remedies appropriate to that period. In time, these very remedies will propel Latin America into the 20th Congress or to the Stateepat -1?ri~ip~lly$/27 n`~-FDP78-ii~st 1 A~~$070002-2 Approved oYY elease UU /u DP78 6