BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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Briefly Noted
Leadership Succession in the SOZG
L oscotwOs satrap ?or the SOZG (Soviet Occupied Zone of
ermany), I7alter ICicT, will be 71 this summer. A2a.rt from
being in the precarious position of all Communist dictators,
he has been reported to suffer from different physical ills that
might carry him off, Leis removal from the scene could trigger
a typical Communist dogfight over who will inherit the mantle
of power. Erich HIO11 C O has for some time been judged the most
likely successor for Ulbricht as First Secretary of the Social-
ist Unity Party (SED). A su nary of biographic data on Idoneclaer
is appended to this BPO as an unciabsified attachment to be 'Ue 3-.
in station files against the contingency of Ulbricht's removal
and/or a succession crisis in the SOZG.
Spanish CP Given Undue Credit
In a 13 May New York Tines article datelined Ijiadrid, the
:Franco Government was repot e{ claiming that Communist influence
is causing the current labor unrest in northwest Spain. The
Spanish newspapers and radio, closely controlled by the Franco
regime, were said to have first ignored the strike of miners and
metal workers in the t sturias region. Then, in a newspaper and
'adio campaign, the troubles were laid to Communist instigation.
It was further reported that on the local scene backers of the
i egime have formed a "labor front" apparently aimed at improv-
in ; relations between workers and management. The new organiza-
tion was said to have put up posters in Asturian towns warning
workers against "Communist maneuvers."
There is no evidence or belief that the Spanish C' is
actually the prime mover behind the stri lzes - the causes appear
to be purely economic. It is predictable, however, that the
Co ymunists will not fail to move in and grab all possible credit
for doing something real for the workers. In short, the Spanish
Government is repeating the mistakes of the Nazis and Vichy,
who unintentionally built up the stature and strength of the
i:F:ench CP by giving it the undeserved reputation of having in-
itiated most acts of .11v II resistance in France.
Press assets which deal with news of the Asturias strikes
and further developments in Spain should be asked to insert low-
...eyed comment that the official Spanish line risks giving al-
together undeserved benefits to the Spanish C?.
CPU Af ter the Thermidor.
The CPSU had 7.2 million members in January 19!5G, just be-
fore its 20th Congress. At the time of the 22nd Congress in
October 1061, Party membership had increased by 2.5 million to
7-. 1 on (announced. in Partiinaya Zl izn -- ?arty Life -- in
its January 1932 issue). once one 22nd ongpress, membership
has increased at an even faster pace, by almost 2.3 million in
3k'o4jet'F8? e9ii `9 / .,"' _&Oft B-S-8-61 b200080001-2
WEPEr (B"i-ief ly Noted bn,
 ( ~ ,Rfed . "Q-nP78-03061LA0QR30QQ8Q001-2
The Russian Ea-volution of 1S31.7 has often been compared
with, the French ).'evolution of 1709 which entered its Themidior
phase when Robespierre was overthrown on 27 July 1794 (9
Thermidor on the Revolutionary ca:Iendar).sp ewe's death
marl ed the and of the raiaYl of terror -- as did Stalin's in
Russia -- the beginning of the 5-man Directory government of
mediocre men (the best had been killed) and the growth of
public opinion influence.
The huge mass party of F hrushcahev no longer resembles the
Party of Lenin -- the hard core vanguard, an elite of profes-
sional revolutionaries. It is no longer led by a dedicated re-
volt uutionary elite but by a vast bureaucracy of party function-
aries. The party has increased by some 54% since Xhrushchev
came to power.
Bias in selection of new party members is clear. The
"typical" party member is Russian, male, urban and from the upper
middle class. Se:: and ethnic biases noted in the 35%a membership
in -crease from 195 to la3l appear to have been maintained. Less
than 3% of all adult women are meiibers (about one fifth of the
Party) against some 13% of the adult male population. Russians
accounted for some 64% of the Party but only 55%d of the popula-
tion in 1951 while Holdavians were underrepresented, (by 74%) ,
Baltic peoples (by S4%) , Central Asians (by 4:7%) etc. While the
Party is supposed to be composed of workers and peasants, it is
weighted to urban groups and within these to upper middle and
above economic groups.
The coning 170th anniversary of the French Thermizlor pro-
vides one among many opportunities to disci ss the nature of the
C:p3U and the Soviet society today -- a topic of particular in-
te-ost to Communist parties around the world as well as to
leaders in developing countries. On the one hand attention can
be rolled to the inevitable end of terrorist regimes (the re-
volution devours its children, -- Communist China will follow
the USSR in this process), to the failure of revolutionary forces
to maintain a society and their replacement by mediocre men,
spay?ee during the purges of the able opposition. On the other
hand, how vast a manpower is needed to maintain a dictatorship
and great power chauvinism can be demonstrated on the basis o .L
,5's constant expansion of his -party machine.
2
(Briefly noted.)
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That Trice Soviet Ail?
Chairman Ibhrushchev has discovered that winning African
friends away fro_.n Chinese Cosa unists and the free world is
expensive business and that his rubles do not always guarantee
success. In early May ,bh7rusnichev announced a $125 million loan
to Ben Bella (to who.i he also gave the Lenin peace prize) fol-
wing a re carpet state welcome for the Algerian President
in the Soviet Union. On May 24th Khrushchev himself wound up
a fifteen day visit to the United Arab republic, his first to
Africa, by granting a $277 million loan to F1as_ser. Both coun-
tries, the only African states receTv-Tng ny sutantial amount
of Soviet aid, are also to receive the dubious benefits of
agricultural advice and assistance. Algeria, having rid her--
selff for political reasons of the B'renc`a colon, who tilled
Algerian soil for generations, is now to have professional as-
sistance from a country known throughout the world for Its
spectacular agricultural failures. Perhaps agronomist Thru-
slichev expects that the Soviet "modal farm" he will send to
the UAR will become, there, the model he has never achieved
in the USSR.
The UAR was grateful for Soviet assistance to the Aswan
Day project but the Egyptian people oracle it clear that neither
respect nor affection could be purchased with Soviet money.
LLru hchovts popular reception was not exuberant and it became
even cooler when he presumed on hospitality by attacking the
UA 's friends, derogating their cherished beliefs and interfer-
ing in their internal affairs. 1e disparaged Arab natianalism
~.nd Arab unity and urged his audience to substitute Leu n's
unity of worker and peasant in a class struggle. lie spoke
disparagingly of the small but wealthy Arab Kuwait and of the
emir who has assisted many Arab countries including the UAI.
fe recognized Arab socialism but implied that such forms of
national socialism were simply early steps toward Commuaist-
style "socialism." Fie harangued against Western aid (the USA,
for instance, has provided $750 :million in aid to the UAR over
the past ten years) as imperialistic and dangerous, his awn as
open handed and friendly.
Khrushchev probably sought a double goal in Africa: to
convince Africans that they should look to USSR, notCommunist
hina,for Communist leadership and assistance; to deliver a blow
at Western non-Corraiunist influence on the continent. But he may
have overplayed his hand. The proud, roll- ous Arab peoples
apparently refused to respond to the. ,,:theist leader who seemed
to be saying, "Now that via have given you so much money and
assistance we will tell you how to achieve real socialism and
what :foreign policies to follow." The African countries below
the Sahara, noting the communiques which concluded both Ben
Bella's visit to Moscow and Khrushchev's to the Mr., may ques-
tion whether support to Soviet foreign policies over
the globe is not too high a price for OAU countries cos i.litted
by charter to strict non-alignment.
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BATS Off' 114ZE SST
June Afro-Asian Islhtuic Conference, Preparatory Meeting,
Bjak. 1964--full conference in late 19-04, early 65.
17 June German Day of Unity (17 Gar) commemorating E Ger worker
/youth riots l8-17 June 1953 quelled by Sov troops.
17 June HUngary announces trial, execution of Imare Nagy, 1953,
19 June Tibet: International Commission of Jurists charges
Chicoms with genocide, 1960.
23 June All-Christian Peace Conference; Prague, 28 June - 3 Jul,
29 June Ruthenia (formerly part of Czechoslovakia) ceded to
USSR, 1945) %
1 July Communist ?arty of China founded. 1921
2 July Afro-Asian Women's Conference, Djakarta, July 2-10.
5 July Conference for Denuclearization of Mediterranean Basin,
WPC--promoted, Algiers, July 5-9.
13 July Korea ceasefire negotiations begin 1951. (Armistice
signed by UN, N.K. and Comm. China 27duly 1955.
13 July Arrest of Lavrenti Beria for treason announced. 1953.
(Secretly tried and shot 13-23 Dec. 1953).
13 July President Urrutia, in TV address, charges Communism
endangers Cuban revolution. 1959.
13 July Pope Pius )y11 excommunicates all defending Communist
anti-Christian doctrines; bars from sacraments those
reading CP doctrine. 194'9.
19 July Laos becomes independent by treaty with France, 1949.
23 July Geneva A oxeenentsaranteein.! .acs' independence and
neutrality. 1962.
25 July Puerto Eico elevated to free commonwealth associated
with U.S. 1952.
27 July French Thermidor 179th anniversary. &obespierre over-
thrown, guillotined following day. 1794
31 July 30,444 refugees register during July at West Berlin re-
ceiving center (highest total since March 195 96
1~~1.
31 July Agreement reached for Federation of Malaysia. 1962
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CUID TO ,T C OUMMITIST DISSirj3SJOi3
co 13n
4?inc .~. Jevelor~:aents:
eti ? i~w
? The ChIn?se clisseininated widely, at the beginning of
the period, the hitherto private CCP-CISU letter exchange
mentioned in #29.
T110se texts are so revealing and so rich In
materials for varied propaganda exploitation that they are
treated in a separate C aid,ance, No. 7;09,
2. The Soviets, in an authoritative 3-part. series of
editorials in Pravda Uay 10-12, made a fu ere or' grapple
with the apparen.. contradictions in their "new loot:" approach
to relations within the movement and to spell out their case
against the CCP. The first emphasizes the need for "ideological
n , because under present condit,ions, in which the WC `H s-"'
made up of equal and independent parties and there can be no
hierarchical relations of leadership and subjection, ?the only
form of union can and must be a voluntary union of people who
t.hin_, aline. 11 Without ideological unity, C oml nunis_ . wou c ix
-4
ra.1s or;ae into an, amorphous conglomeration of rtie
i6
able of acting in a common line-.7-1 e P;, says ~~~. s ttt $tt iroon
he ins i a ve n,g ving up the leading role which was once
accorded to it -- over the objections of the Chinese: it is
now clear that they tried to keep the "office" of head of the
movement "in order to usurp it in due course." In damning the
Chinese, . ravda asserts a dly: "The Communist movement does
not howeVer eliove in prophets and oracles Who t inik an
ecie for a.l....
In the second, Pravda postulates "a creative attitude to-
ward theory" as the mos important principle o xr -L and accuses
Chinese theoreticians of attitudes toward "what was written
103, 53, or 30 years ago" like those of "churchmen to the Old
and New Testament." The Chinese attempt to use the analogy of
Lenin and the Second International against the CPSU "turns a-
against them," because it was Lenin w/ho creatively enriched
Marxism and who vanquished the dogmatists of the S.I. It close:
complaining about the Chinese "peculiar idea of socialism, " -
-
11 W
lwitho.;t democracy, justice and respec for -th6_1ights o the
The third discusses "the conceptions of 'Sinofied Marxism."
their "lac;, of coordination," "self-contradict on, ;Enos t curiot-.04
interweaving of the most obtuse dogmatism and the most flagrant
revisionism," "inconsistency of views," and most Important,
"the glaring gap" between their noisy revolutionary phrases and
their practical deeds.
Soviet state organ Izvestiya also started "the first of a
ser .esA o
ppr
f &4& ' e"l eT M ' C1AARDM=o D 0001-2
(Commentary Cont.)
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stc.te" on the 13th -- and to,loted with a two-part article on
May 22 and 23. Me firsts ,devoted ; largely to the erroneous
Chinese concepts and abuses of the Cictatorship of the prole-
tGriat: "distorting Lenin," they regard it "as an instrument
of coercion, saying nothing about the main, the Bost" seal
ff--that the proletarian dictatorship is democracy for
the working paople if
3. The "struggle between two diametrically opposite lines"
brought scandalous scenes 4nd, bitter attacks at three raore inter: -
national azeetin gs during this period, with the Sov t a-a gnec
Lia, or y to "railroad thpough" its documents see
accounts of Bucharest SocQnd, laternatjonal Conference on
?roble :s of grip bye notion," May 11-16; Trioscow "Fourth Inter-
national L i tiers Trade Union Conference,"-M=172-15; and tarsacr
"Second International Conference of Co .uaerce 17orhers, " -hay , .
4. The P onv'oli.aaz For i n Ministry on May 15 demanded :Zor
the fourth time _a. Chinese in Mongolia cease disseminating
propaganda materials.
5. Last Ocruaa boss Vlbxicht's visit to Hungary elicited
Mad ar 's su oort for a crorld party meeting, and Soviet media
a-kieo t as panes of Bel-ium, Costa' ica, and Uruguay to its
list of similar auPpor"e rs. tie .crass Labor Pa-r y conf .rmed
support of the CPU line but did pot mention a conference.
The Swedish Party came out against one at this time. The
Albanian oted for one, bu sT'~ et up wildly extreme conditions
VIhic1FTie C?SU coa d not cgnsfi.der, (Our unofficial count shows
that 23 pro-Soviet parties-exclusive of the CPSU -- have baei:
reported by Soviet or friendly media as unqualifiedly support,-
ing the calling of a world,meeting, of which 5 are ruling
parties -- with po]and, Rumania and Yugoslavia absent. Another
15 or more non-ruling parties are reported as having affirmed
their support of the CPSJ line since ?*pril 3 without :aention-
inv a world meeting. On the other side, the Chinese, Albanians
and Ilorth Viwt za s~ ca1~c, for, a world meeting, but the con-
c11tions sat by the f irst two are so extreme as to prat lu de the
possibility of ho ding one. This. means that about half of the
world's parties have not ;aeon, reported as expressing themselves
at all since the Soviet drive began on April 3, and only about
3 % have indicated readiness to go along with the kind of meet-
ing the CLPSU would call.)
u Cnificance:
"A spectra is haunting the CPSU -- the spectre of a ioz^1d
CoLl aunist Moveuent 'trans,formod into an amorphous conglomer tt 4c_1
o: parties incapable of acting in a cotiiaon line!"' We might
thus borrow from Marx and the 13 Uay Pravda editorial to depict
the dilemma in cihicb the C2,3U, theoreticans are squirming as
they try to preserve as much as possible of the old iovernonth
2
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(Coy .~,.r~~yec~r
wor',ing discipline -- ":; ohesion" and "u.iity an' agree lent in
action" are the ter;;is they use --.while developing a new posture
as Clharapions of "independence, I? "2Cruality, " and even "democracy"
a ainst the inhumane, Stalinist, CCP tyrants.
Soviet efforts to blac'sen tbp Zlhhinese and curry favor with
other parties have now led them into srch radically "liberal"
stateuents as the folloviinq: ......._,...-._.._
"The Co.un,ist movement does apt believe in prophets and
oracles who thini: and decide for ll." (13 May Pravda) ['t'hen
what's all this fuss about what h,'i~.rx Lngels or Len nin wrote so
lon ; ago?]
"There are no, and cannot be any, 'father' or 'son' parties."
(7 March CPOU letter to CC?, with similar formulation in 10 May
Pravda)
-- "Nobody can know the problems of struggle of the workers in
developed, capi tali st countries better than the Cns of those
cotintries." (10 May Pravda) This is straight from Togliatti's
C Pl line: the 22 April a anian statement extended it to in-
elude a country, and the Curd, will undoubtedly do so before
long.
w-- The Chinese are guilty of "a peculiar kind of socialism," --
"without dezicerayt justic' , and respect for the rights of
t' individual." (10 Ida y Pravda) Further, "thze proletarian
dictatorship is democracy o''`r`" ie people," though the Chinese
a party organs i n '~ the Jiroi~ of cApr^cac~n, " i4o~?eove~? they oven
use g ? "com nanding force" among the
people. (1G May lzvestiya)
the
ho~f~ T,~ia,rchi CpSJJ letter, the
:~auniar.2~;~ oz. pilla ~,-
hi
y T r^ 2 r. "declaration independence" seems somewhat
less audacious (though no less si5nificant) than at first. Note
that the "no 'father' and tson' parties" statement, which had
appeared to be one o:K. the strongest formulations in the umanian
statement, had appeared verbatim in the CPSU letter, a copy of
whichi had undoubtedly been given to them.
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W IT (Commentary Cont.)
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0
to tel s o~. 7
+' vas CZC.'~lc C'w: 5y and v i U v:I ica were Ble".itione(I in #210
~".~:tLxetc"..'.~: ~' r?.7. R .. .n so .'rate cover.
aney conti m iin'~': lrushcov ar;-^ives in A1e~atandrit7 to
av vi nmviet media contineTie to pL:bl i,c~L~e
X41 C)r ?~ tAe,.nW~~ line:_
ne: _ Counted for the first t' -^43 were
3~:L all Costa s.'4ican and r-u` ' i yan C ~`` i.~"s, t^. l calling for a
IiA
G Q1,c3 an a 3, ss LaBor arty, which d:ioes not.
visit to tjtln ar '? e1icitadi I adar o m':,p',ort fOr W..
~ . e ,.! h 18 b k w n ex .w x ~
o ^` a on c3^ex~ 3 t a i s ra r on i ~;~ r o L re ~o ~.oc by
a ,c our I nocrl ' es ~rak3 a ?redis g` w$a~ ~ aent,
Gove?meC
Si!' ned by E rermansson in x tIae MM a of aae ~c y t y a lly' p ab . :l -d ii
S P d~ .. I n6 .!# ay 13 , oppo .a;Lnt e calling of a world cc
1 1, 1, Rune present ci cu s antes." On the 13tH , aovzever,
d, ink r ousel ''ari ecl~ted version of Italian C-11 osr,
fi':~t a aGxx... x
warning a ain ~e1a-
T 6 :a$ s t:pz^ x il s-~ee :~. o~?iittIn his
zo: lunic.atins, 11 the Chinese but refl actin;; his reservations re
feasibility of F,` confer onlco.
I y -~ L. sc~"iew o ove:cnrien s tcr.;nents by the 5 Central
1
'
' k
pS4 n $OV of r, ? 16S protest .33e so wCOM.LL
___ -.
w
(Jy~ 4ail..a(. . W'- rrr.Y V rw..r r...r L r L _ __ V
2v~ and 11a7 4) 'Fto e~:clu1e the 'j-national Soviet Union from
Asia a coLln$r ies?'~ - ri..aGn oav oth; '`~a~aiasl, loth; Uzbe%s, llth;
statement says: "The
a~zzh_, i, c , brz; 15th. ~x.L d ~,e~ier ~~.
an
Ada zap l SS , critia a - terimito~cy 62 nearly 3 million square kilo-
meters, is -- 'Whether the Chinese leaders want it or not -- an
integral part of . ~,Soviet Union situated in the center of
the Soo
"? rev a ~ l iS es a -paint series Of major editorial
P.'a pt?
To es of ? ,-,qT 3,333 words each, on the general themc:
L1ar.; s; - ,aninisn s an inter nat iosaal I-. ovement of Comm v, S s
1*6,Of U Coy ntrics, An Mintroai ctio'a '$o the first states: "The
chtnese leadersaire c ecl~ ed open ideological and political
x
war" on the anc~ t-et.:16' r"aed on th6 course .o spil.$$l n ; t,
7iliie covering u their s lbveiosive activities with a "hulla oalooo
abQL. t elief ending 11-1, theJr ' . yt Thus, "the struggle for ~ ~~ G'O--
"~o is unity, whic -tacquiros a Primary impo ant ,1t Erb .1 Y3e C, j dealt twuth in this series
J .
u .. { { 1 it . '.. . ''I. %
'he firstis G(antitfed: tIdeo.og?iCal Unity is tae basis
r.
e-a-
of t~. Co7 e s~.~?n o.: t:ae ~o~ulL~nis$ gc,ve.?serat ~ tt It ZJegi:l;3 by
3Gisi IZ j it 11e PG'nOrl70t1S siSnificance o h $c^.z> Oil 5^al y- E3
a ttcoheeSion" which is "not si.rlply a
:tywnd t 4r.1V:AI in action" on the basis
;Ll(C 11t7
1::1$
vt
..
.~,t ~
~.LVti
o'
on O t.a.~
Q 1.2- mss. tt Ji ~~:{9I:11.s1.: rY1l , ~ 1 v s S u.cyit.L~i~.G',~ bindin-
Pa .-ties, v;as ab e ,to ui it Lori auni a of .xfferen$ count e
011.1y 7 y re'lyin _- on their ideo to i a:. unity. " N-Tow, when dle~: e
is no such org i ization and "corms of corirt .nications between
p .;~~ties have 'ywcOfe clix~erellt, and in view of all of "the
(Chroncloe;v "ont_.)
 1J"2000/04/14 : CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200080001-2
H Z;
for at =Ya ent. and al ^revolutionary forces, the 110
u
nstance, can know the problems of struL-
f_ the workors in eve o c
C
y O"UM 11.11SA.2 Would
: _ rnoveuen and wou a rans-
U Ja__Qx -people who thin'", alike
,
an tee n ~-
11 11,1111,
a
e
H I j
n? E1 A nnr.,s~.r,r
"it lti~~a r,tandable t%
t i
a
n the TJCM winh
,c . e Q u^ a and ind4ppendent parties, there
potx d -cannot be hierarchical relations of
aeac rpa4p and subjection. It follows precisely
'
o t; that
only Lorti of union can and oust
y
J
t^
a, iZ)s
ti
c ntrib
t
u
on to thy;
d0ra !?G ast.rr ,iaouso s~f
sa
' ism by basing itself
off f 0l
o
i
n
ts own dit
rec exporionco. NJo-
bodv _ fox. i
p
Lc?b a coun
"s a Qr than theCp
s of thoseti
counres....
ver r n9v! W+~Qr- in ? arx sn is not passed down per-
o z tori:.~, from the Summit of a theoretical Oly~:fpus
bud is, Q,b c c in practical activities, discussed
at ?4t Zaatiional Communist forurls, and becomes
the passe :,of the whole move1Qnt.... In thoc-
t'QtiOa.cjAputes between those who are Communists
the AA Z o, there must bo no room for
t ri f2 ,. ~e+ .fanatic intol
^
e?
af~ce to diffet
ren o fa o s gbt befit uec ioval honks but in
in
Thv"cre?atlve devolopuent of t leery" must be the "colloctjve
o"" of all Fd-I, parties if
, " not so much by.eMrt.s in study ~Ms by
~t,e.al.
,~
.
...ua an ncie endence
same time nsurIng a co nox
Q-CLQ .na on of act on an voluntary
^ar
Genera
k'Stic as alliance can only be fornod.. ,on the
Plat
upCa_ nose le^ciors, who have "tra~:.n od
aI k:O'Gctnrl It -,'
vca then turns on tine Ci i
aawaz ru;, even gate ti
of s lit prop` U
~~ to ?xus~ ^e dia.-
stif r their =OQr Mains activities.
sing as
supreme judges
ui
~.e op.;nly a a U'JQ
~Fa3. ! ? .d
poeial rights if. the field 0fL n thoory
he Ce unst
a
.
ovcrfent doest h
. no,owev :r, bollove
; 4L p ae.. a , ac. c r "I -IT 7
I t , ,d.QOlogicnl unit C ,,,
F -M-4
n'C
4 .+ +.aa awRi7 L~:14:.
"TbQ x'~.cL } ex-perionce of t
ry and It
. Al -2
(CLhronoJqZ;,T! q94
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(hronology Cont.)
to a, tradition according to which our party eras
Given a spe ial any a 1wadilas position cthich eras
confirz:cd in enwral docu-aonts of the C. movement.
The CC of our ?arty too% t o intitiativo to put an
end to this tradition, even a3a ns .t:e insis once
o a aiu;2 ear o o ner parties, among which one of
the most active -- saran ;e as this may sound today
-- was precisely the CCP..."
"The r cal rio aniL S of such a position of the
CC*.i3 loaders-has ocorae suite clear today. The
crux of the hatter scores to be Gat the Chineso
aZers sou ht officially even than to institute
an, 'office' at the 1iea,cl of' the C. novoment in
o 'd r to t:su t o duo course .?olinv novr
that zo Meoro aces eneralization of the
historic tasks of the prescn clay has faIlan coL::-
pletoly on do 'shoui_tors ok fiao 'Ise-tun; alone,
and our very' epoch is that of Mao Tse-tung's... ?
The s once ~. ticle is ontui led: "tihat Are the Chi:i3Se
Leaders s on the oraunist PrZover~ont Under the Guise of
-3.?" It is a st.arjly pointed exposition of previously sta od
CPSU criticis::is. " `ha Chinese 1. ;ac ors are revising M-L teach-
ing," roj octina one of its host' iiapor tant principles -- "a cro-
attvo attitudo tocrarcd theory."
ItTh,)y r prais3 all propostions of creative
Marxis rd by th3 odorn generation of
o
point ' ox viecr ?f ..what mess smitten
M- 1a from the
100, 50, "or 'CO 3 'years ago ..7..'Ct inose theoreticians
rem` .rd II-L as laving' boon 'created for all times
vii I the ntro luction of ' ii alterable rules, princi-
ples and slogans, to" cihicI 'the 'attitude of Co :i-
t1UZl.st$ Souldbe slullar to the a.ttitucle of
- c o zeory s or;ansca y es .:n to E2arx,
nEels and, tonin.,,.
4y;1a note* that "the C_C ioac`4ers try to conceal t oir
broa:c t7 i - , by reforonces 1c3 illo i istory of the noveraent,"
hea bocaus3 it cress Lenin who
"
~ turns ~. ainst
but tiao ar3ti lo " t.
crovol- ors Tc~iod 11- rxist a d riho trim p led over also o :.antic,
d c..b .ma so oa ors o e Second International.
It eucls Sri, criticisms o the ` CI.inese xa . of violence
and " ~:culiar' icon. of $ s?~ialism: uAthout dove16ec industry,
rritabou, e aocrapy, just-Ice , and respect for the rig-hits cf time
~.atiLZ pov..rt gt and privation o
ci- : I? Pet g the -' f the
in4lViCiVal? and or
laborinv raassos,'
Ttacoretica onceptions of theCfiineso Loadwrs."
lk o f," 3a article is entitled: "Tho Political Sense of the
Approved For Release 2000104/1 4; CIA-RDP78-03061 A00020008i'0001 -2
-
 (Cb*pp609991 gp)ease 2000/04/14 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080001-2
tI 7c tur,I1 to the conceptions of the so-
called 'Sinofie d Uaracism, I we are strut', by their
laa of coordination, their self-contradiction,
their nose curious interweaving of the most ob-
tuse do matjsm and the most flagrant revision-
e ncousistency of views, and- f na y and
MR important by the glaring gap between the
noisy revolutionary phrases and the practical
deeds of the CC!? leaders."
"If required by considerati
ons of national policy, the
Chineso leaders, w#"''"?,out batting an eyelid, cast aside both thoi;
revolutionary pbras" and their theoretical concepts," as demon-
strated by their "entering a border conflict" with non-aligned
India and then proclaiming their friendship with SEATO-sand CNfT4-
-aligned Pakistan;. The latest ox=ple is "their theory of the
so-called 'intermediate' Zone between socialist countries and
the U.S.,?..aimed at broadening cooperation with imperialist
countries such as Franco, Japan, West Germany and Britain."
"...Peicing.'s theoretical concepts are called
upon to provide a foundation and justification
for the great-power and nationalist path of the
Chinese leaders, to contribute to their bogetio-
nistic claims, to split the world liberation strug-
gle, and to draw under Chinese leadership certain
circles both within the Communist movement and
outside o `.~... "The CCP leaders themselvo$...havo achieved
a situation in which a determined ideological
struggle against their eo o~ ca _po lif ca plat-
ers has d-com road to un y. Marx s -
nnss laveno o orv~ayou "
Mti ll: The fourth volume of "Anti-China Materials from the
ov et Press, published by the World Culture Publishing
House
in Peking, went on sale throughout China: NCNA says that ite
includes 32 anti-China articles furor 20 publications.
L y 11-13: The "Second International Conference on Problems
o ped Women," hald in Bucharest under WFTU auspices, pro-
duc?cd further bitter public struggle, accorj to reporting
by iTCIJA and xanyu3 he 1 uman an
trovQrsi~;s ~, Press was silent on the con-
, It began at the opening session but the real
fir wor%s exploded after d'IFTU SecyGen Saillant delivered his
report, and the Chinese chief delegate Chi Yuan-te attacked it,
"analyzing the two diametrically opposite
political international women vori,ers movement." The Indonesian, Albanian,
Xoroan, Cuban, Japanese, Malian, Tfioorian and Chilean delegates
are cited by NCUA as supporting the Chinese line, but they were
opposed by "crude slavers and attacks" by the Italian, French, 1.4 Approved For Release 20004/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200060001-2
(Chronology Cont.)
 they snaroaefa.cedly sat down again....
tes stood _up and tl:raatened to wall-, out of
the co~aoG.o:._ dTx,en it pas cloar txza.t few could follow them,
.~...: ,-.>.. w+a rya aar.a aR-V Yi'" V J..eu.I.a i t? 4r w'.:
ism f.ai ,ed tQ "'pt the ChineOe delegate's speech, ',Fawn
_RI'leaae'208010411': CIA-RD'P78-03061 A000200080061-2"
to I
it 'L" , ~.e Lkd "~ pulating the drafting subcommittee meeting,"
it 'L" ~, tVIQ . ,Qou Qzzts_ wblch contain a series of erroneous
vax~
Vrh..cTz cl rou h the voting. The Chinese issued a statement
,a, od that "a hand fu.l. -af persons manipulated by
, e
1o'? rs of tt a SoX~,et c o1egation attempted to impose a capitu-
lat .on .st line" , .":oazt, sA, far .as to create an QCtrc rely foul
atziosph r e by ma'in_g a din and booing during the conference.
This was a grave act of splittis::m .to :undermine. unity,".
At the conoIMsiou. the Soviets. "ganrrin- up with their
Fhs 12: Tokyo is T inchi ]?aiJy News carries a dispatch from its,
Span (see Chrono May 1), describes two factors behind the
8ov of "sire-, ping reappraisal" o their Japan policy: (1) the
Japanese people harbor. tr dttfczx a11y strong affinity toward the
Chia vsepeopie and recent. signs indicate closer ties between
the two Qo tntri s., and (2) the Japanese C? and Japan-Soviet
Associationhave ,Qo;Ae to. be dominated by pro-Chinese forces.
"Under the circ i t 1QQQ5, the Soviet Union is expected to na',e
? s tiv upp ~oaohQS..to..tbe_. leading circles of Japan, namely the
loader of the ;ora ca}t, the tory party and the business world."
?i A
UPI rQports fro Moscow that, according
to "diplomatic
sources " re ugces_ are cr9asing fron China to Soviet territcry
at tIa? rate,. og ; r Qn to opc~' pe Chinese
persecution.
~
in Con-
t 4'~z~C cene of-further r public battling,, ThP .FourthIntornativaal Liners Trade Union Con-
ttling, witl^
S'S .t;z4_s
aceross system......."
and othc s .attar .tha arronoou: line of the revisionists but
t h e ov .et .. ar 3,pu tors "resorted. to the despicable and undomo-
c?cat .c practice Q railrQaCUjZ through two documents which were
-aoa rovo:u' .1?ouary and did - not combat imperialism." The Chinese
denQa;nc c"+ se its t_ics..,anc iYat pducecd an__ a~av:z l out. _ "1712$7 e
he law sea!ng, a number of people behaved uncouthly by pound-
fn ; ttioIr cups, booing and stamping their feet. What is worse,
those who man ,pulateci the - conference turned off the public
11-13 abgy .Again the Chinesex, Albanian, Xorean, Indonesian,
t;~ade protocol anci. "a protocol on the payment ahead of schedule
icy China o the ,lwua~ tracle T,axrears owed 'to the Soviet Union, "
Iaic according to ITc m "calls for the completion of the pay-
ea7~, n 100one, ear ahead of schedule."
A er, , i ieult negotiations carried on since January, a-1934
I Me
cA~ rdrhed I n/ 11 9DIe%8-
peaiag gross features a "supanar of the political re ort
Chrono log' ' ont . )
 A r ved F or R ease t200d/0 114 :CIA-RD 78-b3061 A0002000810001-
(C%a~ oho o y 'ont . 21
par t" actu::1ly it 'n s the rt4.:,ip co Tess of pro-Cninose
n ee~.~
c issiden s epos tr~ oc, in C1a+To io, January 18-1 .
Year 14-1i: The enoh C"'s 17V Congress br?uglat Toa f irfaation
the r os ovid conflict,
eor Lion coct's of tal:c: osit eci ion to inchet tho ?' amasinodv-iauccyGen replacing and t1
.? at ecZ
inrel, aurice `,h6rei v'ho vial raovdd 'upstairs to a newly~cre -
po'it of prosic" nt
P:,a 1 : The t.Ion ?l .an ~ y non pub ishes' a statement
i azc 7 noted t , aof ne s 3 3 July and 11 September 1963 the
2i "", June.
o o n ~.a rs had noranda to
isto. ox tI
ss~.r Wih-ht ion the
~ r~ a:efon
Ch 11,0s L ,ilbass cicra za l in hat {'it~sfoer the c'i-
the population oa oo'_:s u phlets, raagazineB, and u tins
a
"p ropagandizinn tho rasa::en va.etrs of the CC? leaders on the
'iajo:^ pio'a1ems of our ti ie~ ~ 1 1 itifi it to distriht:tion only
throe h the 1i? it Voroi,n inist and tae Lxectativo Co ittee of
I~o, ol.aia peace' azac 1~rlondsfii Ordaniz.tions 'fin this connec-
tion,, the Ifi~ 'ozcei" ~e iv ` e1 - . a ~;n Fr~~.ngstry vrecl ~L note to the C11311
zzbass in the on la Is ar l G ' i,iiich "again denounced these
acti vi
iesureen. as s"a cro oss viotatxon of the norris of nutua? re la-
s ~
Sri 1z a" a~ di ee niter: interference in tho' intern L"
aos t
.airs o rho. it raw aan de=ncleaaee:ce to the pro-
Issue I ? 5 01 $1 : ro- inese d ssid?nt kustrian ullotin
Itote W qIj a. kited ,b lag) a I a' been naneograp ao previously,
}A n 30 printed Pages, enclosing a 4~-pago leaflet appeal-
inG to a1.1. ?ius a aa,n$,,o un~.sts to rally n eport,
:to~.e it ndepenc once passages of the
~,uotes ec~,ve~ i~rora the
fw.aafliaza staton? ' . and 'carriei a list' of names of Austrian part--
c1 fuficti4nai: o , .s ao a avo,, o "ox ellecz rro a the warty or
ssod from ~o iu because of su~~poict f or~o a
r aet.as
cis i 0
anti Chinese po cioc.
May 15-16: The L?e!zin-q press g es baci:' to the April 22 an
nivar - 1 1. sa J o onints i" for tiro anti-revisionist editorials: on
tFa Af1G~ on tie l.3
the 15 at ^
lid ' ... Y._.._ 6th from
aCt~l $3~"a`, ri ullit
'
,
toc Sinnun
the Borth, Xoroan., ?
Mu 15 a:ad contizau nM: urn or Japa lose C? tteraher Toshio Ship a
p o,q p.. a a urr oa in the ranks by casting his vote in the
ttreaty, in oppositi.oii to
Diet er rat . o ~i aoza o. , tll s an
the :?art y is decision and the w os of the other 4 JC faoubers
~i the l clist'i i Iiuted
o
io and tFaefa c~zYled a press co ax ere ce nc
sire gated st' toj-a -It of his V icars. , a 14-11our C faeetin on
a ] n
to
h 3 eh z? UZUa tA1:. per Faexo&Il.eao1ro i thee artylioleading to
speculation that the pro-Soviet faction may split 0:u Iron the
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP?8- 03061A000g00Qsg001-2
(Chronology Con
 ZWJ .'..~:cr, it says:
ov *' "trip od' transition fron capitwiis;i to Con-
ion rota ca 3 .tali6M td i3bc f7 uP~1I' and trying to oxtoncl it to
ve tiT a accuses t ao ; i ese o "c1Q 4 ~rato1y passing
en Iuasis- "that iliarx had smol-,ari about the
~n
ce?io of tho' nroletar an uictatorsIii.b s a poriod of transi-
bjb411,141 C1A O&- 78-03061 Ad0('26666 i 4'
,'qq}} ^" Q? ,
eves carry es w-ya Fitt
n art~cie
? 3o 0 wJ
i .L
OU qo y~ for i to ~.o sh anx_ouncea as 'the: first in cL
uC Vs X$' q_ ` ^ is on taro et ca'i problens in _..w soc:.a s
o ?e ors ~ sto t .ng Le iriis ,
Ice and the pro e Sri ,na c7 .cta of^ship primarily
'
'
coercion,
anceven ?.; t~ ivq y as an Instrument oi
T
t
essential
a in no in about the a r. a Los
l e t ,'LI~L L r9 t ^izn ~?icta orsl is
71'7 I Pr
e c
s
organs w s force' instead or the role
role o tco raanelin
a
.~ e
party or a ro are oven SuC
AO rnassea
;co -ruous aces crlaenatosecrea~ryy o m.art~y siaeco ittee,.`re coves h
ii c, 'L IL
and bo~?insto a^eturii aecisions in cour&, cases.. "
vih o i',A ' tors lii, of the prole-
a~' to and internal deno-
t rns 'Into' cjl'c a ?;cshi o a group o
1, Seers. M s pract`ic6, alien to j- J* is con-
STao use
t
. o At 1 th cut t of .
It ILSt ppd 1,1;- i? I
, quite un: erstanclale
~ fi . e f e~ esi ro o ties Stalin :personality cult
by our 10ar~t?r^s sceui`ve~l-.:tze:n e eaclers
b" C
as soya z ,;a directa ap, .nst then, .. ,"
T vi r no rtZVEShYtiaantic .es in the announced "s.ories"
u3
VI 1en
aw11, T; y .. .. t
,.~ ]uo is _ ~oG a a 2 -par artic1e
T a A
oughh not identified as such. Aimed
. tp ^e itlY Ztendod as 4; _ _ r
J.t tethpts by the Chinese leaders
to rebut 'tl o ~v? and a jsavo
to ca pt aspersions allc? cr scre_C., the idea o tho state of all
'~
I 'PO Siva Activity
UIw :.call Ysava oe- '121.3 ?0-v,orcl attac , on 7 56 Divit i ver Activity
o32k the asi cI oyitp ior gists?in t he Light Of Suslovts t o-
ror
It leatd "that th arm rious i $~ 'i
~~d CL t rTk^i,haeca a , x sanit av, ~% lost Moir patience co?7lnL -, elf
ess aI 1 " r-s
on e C,'~ T:so oql-et "novi" p;,ssa-os Cone near tho and, alien
ttit st~.tes th2:t.
7,ar {yy'nQ.cou:,* ~tlrnt wf/~,n~emi ~c~.~eetin of the Cor/.~z-
19
Wi~~+yw ar. ies p~d1i6vilw Wbo _connvo1 ? and outlines
raonts on .tae S14Ject .. a
era scussion of all issues
.~~ 1 A men
0 4j Q ?
t
y that its delegation "v,ill truly
r~. to insure, 4 a i ^
Approved For 'ReIea a ,20 0 /141: ..CIA RDP7 -03061~~gqoOQ QO 8IQ001-2
Ci:ronolo;y cont. }
Q:1 all cnt~i.~~.so~~~
Oa pon, t~;to ?ua~ans ~.isS~ro~ in ~,u~.nntae'd s s csu~.~~ ci
v.rtie,~ n for all
^r se the iiV' 'of all i e bcrs: -to nak? 'thIs._ ^ Ilie
the people " it is iar^7eiy a rehash of previous Soviet pronounce-
 t~TM e` ca o S J res r' .um use ii or
'`i-1o nays
y , _ s t,; c2 av?nr_jj at tto February plelltl
eolne of its more
Yd- artie ass- m~yst * nT se 'olicly recognize
tkh..:_U le~.c3wship u
," c - cl~ admit,
sea is a ou e.~ ": it lists 4 r.:ic l t. s:z:~tyld pubs.:. ,~
'$} I ''Par' ti . es . , including those split oxf from others, a3'.aSG
be Np! a;E to attend viith equal rights. "On the other hand, the
mG oti canh 't be a ttencle by to rene-ade Tito clique...."
the C:~ u1 and :Eye other
(x The 'fdj rc'iarie~+ e~;ist71.S1~~ betv:een th.. require
~-tlc in advance and this rroulc'! dreg
dcc z:aehts Of each Other .rty.
( roii?ic ,j Cone ? )
ADorQvedFor Re'ease 120 0/e+411~: CIA RD'78-030Q1A( OQ2000 0001-2
countries , ,u . n m
50
~, v 111 i. c:i m7 u.K
id lid '~ "'tll k g I m y .,. m... ~.. a.1 ~..
.. ~ rnen A y red
I Z cafe that another international ,neetinc in that c UI nevi
, to a u no ova.e a e rounc:: t e ocoac~ International
'oila'.e;~ence dkltierico aoraers," attended by deloCates froze f7-
C Mj, Cv.T1
FC sC s a.1:aw . a Ou ,
b4 ? Il h that "the Chinese leadereship deliberately cr'eateci un-
" i~ ~orii itions, barring any opportunity for normal vlorEc
b raY Y.
-
^ it ecifically, they here "Sub
a~id Dignity. Sp
j ectvc"1 to tTa:ainnvi Shingt in the spirit of E ostilit;~ to the
as Inver ya cap an
t 4-N tJithc'ra.val of Soviet specialists,
E ! . X13 *ay iv^ s v+. V, ~. COV Irehti tiSl ;
n 4
h3 g e l*oe s o the secretariat.
and d er O ttibn Of J Chinese c ?
restthat the pov et e s 2 ative at the Sodretarciat had Opposed
~~eL~fed an alternative draft. ''The ;Quiet
the s tate~aent aiic.
e 461 flVetw efforts at sgcootmce arflussed the indignation of
r.r v v'
c ato
oit.cal
4&1 rsEli -p` ~ Ishes~ China.
ma
r
at emant, fl
te Pr e
Trn~ .~ ?
airis Brazils "unwarranted arr
twXi~ .yv1~ cre a~"bat ?~rotos. au ~ti^?el~s t' It also reports
.ravth u d=aon C s
i. 61.1" IJllidad, or aLl of the a
ca 1 on pis Cray from Cuzco to ]L ima of trade union Ia.lar
- ~_ __ .,.t, ?t, ,,,.~?~~~?-~ after he had
~
Peruvian CP/UU "dui Acomata a .
as actually orgalZ zee. by he 1~_nese
tai c~ gay tnc`? sp`~tt-eisv1
i a ~"a " rr t~ fifes, and adds a . net sat s a.ed Viith Eye
pop ! a i L -c hiai o they tried to sr-lash up the office of the
nrm To ovjorcthy also is the
x
1
~il
~,^ t ~,2 ~ wvc.n. s' ~^t c~: acs ~ ?
"'
n e o-C .ses tdis idenfsui ?er uIl (see throno r
Q 3r`Lress'{ o ~h p
~Ta Gar yin ; at article by "General 3ecre dry Of the
.rr ,." -,,,,
las The 11psflud000llfer Once"
APIA .RDP78-( 90b IPAO61DQ+ ,608~0001-2
 Approved For Release 20004Q ILA !--Q1 mP78-03061AOPO 89991-2
700. Soviet Lcono aic _?erform4ace Vs Propaganda
25X1C10b
All currently available information about Soviet economic
planning in 104 suggests that decisions are being rude cau-
tiously and hesitatingly. The most reliable grain forecast
(important for the whole economy) can not be made until just be-
fore the harvest and even this might prove inaccurate, especial-
ly if there is a lot of rain tiring the too-prolonged Soviet
harvest. Presumably, in addition to waiting until there is
some reliable grain forecast, an agonizing reappraisal of eco-
nomic and political needs is being fought over by conflicting
interests. A sudden change in Soviet economic policy -- i.e.
reallocation of material and manpower for military-civilian,
industrial-agricultural, and investment-consumption uses --
could be announced at any time. However, this would not change
the facts that, contrary to the economic situation projected by
Soviet officials over the last several years (1) the rate of
economic growth took a downturn in 190, (2) serious problems
had accumulated for several years, stemming from policies fol-
lowed from the beginning of Xhrushchev's leadership, and (3)
while an especially damaging crop failure was suffered in 1033
crops have been poor since 1950. Nor will new policies or pro-
grams change the fact that the world and, to some extent, the
people of the USSR now know that C]?SU officials distorted the
economic picture, cla nao- considerably better performance than
had been achieved and withheld much pertinent production data.
The 1933 Soviet digest omitted or provided enceedingly
little data on several sectors of the economy -- data which
has, however, been publicized in the free world. Three of the
slighted sectors, particularly critical for the Soviet ,snowy,
are as follows:
1. Investment. It is admitted that total investment rose
only 2.7 percent 1063, But since capital investment Is of
paramount importance in the future growth of an economy, it is'
significant that the usual detailed treatment of this sector is
avoided.
Approved For Release 200 R- DP78-03061A0000DOW0O02
 jgpxoyeedtF jr Release 2000/04/ja_ GIo-~~78-03061A000200080001-2
JUO
The CEA press release on 9 January 1J F. said:
Ater 1 6a, however, econo;-aiic g cowtih began
to slow appreciably. The rate of expansion of fixed
investment, upon w -ich growth depends, was not main-
tained. 'Uith annual increases in investment cut in
half, falling to between 4 anc1 v percent in 1062-03,
a sharp curtailment in economic growth was in-
evitable....
To a great extent Soviet economic difficulties
steri from a series of programs too ambitious for
available resources....
Much of the blame for recent reductions in the
rate of growth falls on the sharp increase in Soviet
defense spanding, which between 1953 and lDG3 in-
creased by about one-third. However, the problem
centers less on the total size of defense outlays
than on the diversion of scarce, critical resources
-- both manpower and materials. The military "bite"
was particularly severe on the best scientific and
engineering talent, on 'the most skilled construction
.quality ma-
specialists, and on the associated high-
terials and components, The costs of increased
military efforts showed up in s zor ~,fa -inn us-
a investment, especia y in gae c leas ca s in-
u ry, and In he gross underfulfili;.meat of the
Soviet plan for automation and modernization in in-
dustry.
2. A riculture. iTo grain production information is con-
14
tained in the CI, t' and the agricultural section is drastically
reduced, compared with previous issues. production on the New
lands is omitted -- the last good yield on this answer to the
Soviet's grain needs was in 1050. The current free world esti-
mate of the lS33 wheat crop shows that it was 17 million tons
be! 'ow that of 1362, itself not a good year. The USSI arranged
to import some 11 million tons of wheat and flour during 1a33-
1904 . The crisis in agriculture is known to have been buil.." ing
up for some years as a result of practices in which the soil
was mined and depleted, machinery was not made available, ferti-
lizer was not produced in sufficient quantity, and similar mal-
practices were coL witted which could have been avoided. The
debacle is all the more spectacular because Z. personally dic-
ta tecl agricultural policy in every detail, promised the people
in greasing supplies of food, and predicted an early equality
with the USA. The failure of the grain crops forced the
slaughter of livestock which in turn means that the vary dairy
any ,I eat products promised to the population will be set
even further.
2
Approved For Release 200010'w R1&P78-03061A0 O6 O -2
 (7p1'C)For Release 2000; ,DP78-03061 A000200080001-2
The four-page CIA press release of January 9, among other
things on this sector of the Soviet economy, said:
A necessary corollary of the headlong rush to
develop heavy industry was the neglect of agriculture.
Starved for Investment funds, agriculture was falter-
ing badly by the time Stalin died. IKhrushchev suc-
ceeded, at very small cost, in temporarily reversing
the downward trenc,. The New Lands put more grain
into Soviet stomachs, into livestoc':, and into for-
eign markets -- perhaps most importantly from the
standpoint of political stability, into the Luropean
Satellite countries to male up deficits in their own
laggard farm output, But the returns from the vast
new acreage plowed up in 1955-53 proved to be tempo-
rary. Once the original soil mositure and fertiw_.ty
were used up, output fell off. in 1963, a severe
drought in the traditional farming areas, as well as
in Kazakhstan and Siberia, resulted in a near disaster.
Output on a per capita basis in 1963 was about 13 per-
cent below that of 1953. Total agricultural output
de ;lined some 4 percent in 1962 and probably more
than 4 percent in 1933.
The plight of Soviet agriculture is further illustrated
by the composition of the Soviet diet. In total cv,:o--
ries, the average Russian citizen is not far behind
his American counterpart. But 73 percent of the
Soviet diet consists of grain and potatoes, compared
to 23 percent in the US. Only 25 percent of the
Soviet diet consists of quality foods -- livestock
products, vegetables, and fruits.
The impact of a short grain crop on this pattern of
diet is obvious. Bread for human consumption must
be curtailed. Livestock herds must be reduced. There
is plenty of recent evidence on the disappearance of
flour from stores, of distress slaughtering of live-
stock., and of the elimination of free bread from
factory cafeterias.
3. National Income. Data on this subject in the digest
is too ske c y to a ow proper analysis. Chile there is a chart
showing yearly changes in national income, it is given in per-
conta ;es from the base year 1940 On the question of economic
growl'-.1h, Soviet officials reacted most strongly to the CIA public
statement of a :"ecline in the rate of the OPTS to 2.5%. Soviet
rebuttals were confused and contradictory, but careful analysis
showed that they pretty much supported the 2.5% figure. The
January 9 press release said;
Although the slowdown in industrial output has
had its effect, the serious decline in economic growth
in 1962 and 1963 is largely due to the failures in
AppT6vu ' raReIease 2000/04/11t: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080001-2
(?g3 Cont.)
 (73 pp6gv.q For Release 20^^" -"?.j (JA*RP78-03061A000200080001-2
Although the Soviet ocononny, [-,-Ivan :lore favor-
able agricultural weather, may be able to rebound
from last ydar's growth of 2.5 percent, the prospects
for recovery to a sustained growth rate o ual to that
of the 1050's are not bright.
ACTION: To ':sop alive the image of grave and well-nigh
.:aso]uw e problens in the Connunist economic s s era, use any ap-
propriate report or nformaw on on Soviet oc economic affairs
as a peg. Target audiences are, particularly, individuals and
groups concerned with developing economies, and Communists an..
r :I' .cal leftists in all countries.
The withholding of information frosa the Soviet people (as
well as from free world governments, economists, etc.) .n the
1033 economic digest warrants special treatment in serious jour-
nals as well as speculative articles elsewhere. It is, for a:: -
ample, a change of policy from 1062 (to say nothing of the 1020';
when considerably more detailed data was presented. But 1062
was before the true state of the Soviet economy had been e_:)>se+
an: _1 need for grain Egad become so great that the Uw3.2. could
no longer deny facts. Soviet efforts to buy basic machinery an:i
plants as well as to obtain long terra credits from the free
world further belled the Xromlin's picture of the Soviet economy,
It is possible that the authorities in the Soviet Union are
still trying to arrive at the true facts -- or at least to agree
upon one set of facts. Account books have been juggled for so
long, figures confused by using different base years, criteria
and definitions, and indices (or percentages) used rather than
concrete figures, that it is no wonder there is a delay in pro-
ducing a new official digest of economic data. However, the
delay might not have cone if the free world had not successfully
contested Soviet figures. The failure of the C?SU to fulfill
its many promises to the people is bad enough; but deliberate
government deception (a Communist custom) can only cause citizen
to lose faith in the regime.
Generally speaking, the Soviet leaders will publish plans
and ;.prograras sooner or later which will loop, very good. Total
production figures will be impressive"'" ar e; goers will prob-
ably be low enough to permit overfulfiliment; certain imbalances
in production will be corrected; irrigation and other large uncu7_,
takings will be dramatically publici :ed. In our reporting and
co,- aentay y on these announcements, we deep things in perspective
by pointing out what is not in the plans, noting for example
the building program includes all of the unfinished
structures and the promises of forner years, e. . for
much needed housing;
increased investment in certain sectors is a necessity
Ap~POii2I;~t(~80~4sCF'D~30IOOi2
0 b (733 Cont.)
 'p*r Fbr Release 2000MIM 78-03061A000200080001-2
goals are ubstantially lower than previous plans,
but even so we shall no longer loot at pronises but
on performance since t -he history of shortfall is so
voluminous;
ACI~^ushchev's pr onise to catch u,,,3 with the US in meat
and dairy products can not be fulfilled -- the live-
stoc% slaughtered as a result Of two years of dis-
asterous grain crops has set the pronised and over-
optimistic date back even further;
while fertilizer nay be amply supplief` -- it may not
be troll distribute; -- it is probable that far ma-
chinery rill not be in sufficient supply to meat
the press"in needs of farmers.
7lhere vor possible, we cotuent upon t .e inevitable adninistra-
tlve, bureaucratic problems of the Coiraunist system where the
needs of the people compete with the desires of the military
a d the power of the Party, and where the whole economy is sub-
Ject to the major and minor foibles of functionaries.
The record of unfulfilled Soviet economic programs should
be treated in the cone o the ino-Soviet con jc T . Pravda's
two-part editorial. "?n Certain Aspects of Party-11 To in the
23-2 April), along other things, attacks the Chinese for
their economic failures, saying "the Chinese leadership has not
even considered it necessary to give an account of themselves?
on plan fulfilment. "They lack the courage to tell of the
sha_,.eful failure of the fantastic leap fo iard." Neither did
the Coviets tell of the untold thousands of deaths brought about
in their early efforts to collectivize the rural countryside,
or the hardships of tilling the New Lands, let alone the stead1
doclrnin agricultural yield brought about by mining the soil
and refusing to provide adequate tools and supplies to the
f a_rziers.
feferences -- See BPC's fl34, 135, l37S.
-- Current Intelligence Weekly Sum nary "USSR Cuts
Published conouic Information" 3 May 1364 Secret.
-- "Current Economic Weaknesses in the Soviet Bloc any
Coranunist Asia" -- ouo (Sent to posts by CA - 7322,
January 34, 1954)
... wia.,w auwu vo -;-t vi; --ouvie1G thcono=c ?'ropagandists
in Confusion" (w/unc 1. attachment)
Watch pry Cozy for continuing flow of articles.
5
Approved For Release 2nn DP78-0306'r~QQO?~00080001-2
U. 0
 Approved For Release !li
70. The C?SU-CC: 3zchan a of Letter :
A OropagandIa Bonanza.
All Pelking papers on 0 May carried the full
'OUfl
A
~CT
:
{CI
x3
, to zts of an e: chhange of 3 CPU and 4 CCP letters which the C?SU
probably did not want to see published. Despite their combined
length of about l9,000 words, they are relatively terse and
"meaty." They provide an unparalleled exposure of the poetical
warfare between the two protagonists.
Q,uctes from the INCHA texts are in the attached unclassified
sum iary review. The full texts in ITCINA's lsn;lish are in MIS
Far ,ast Daily Report Supplement No. 6 dated 11 flay. MovreVar,
t::e :multi-language versions published by the Chinese will be
:.most useful for field use: they are carried in full in the May
8 pehing Review (now in '. nglish, French, Spanish, Japanese and
Indone eons) and in separate pamphlets (no information
now available on languages other than English and Chinese)*
Evidence in late September and October indicated that the
w_SU was preparing to call for an international meeting of
parties to achieve "excommunication" of the CCP, but that sev-
eral important Soviet-sympathizing parties opposed the move --
le n by the Italian CP which stated its views in a 12,330-word
plenum statement in 1tUnita 23 October. Thus, the 7 I~Tovemfber
anniversary of the "October Revolution," which would have served
admirably as a public platform for launching a conference call,
passed uneventfully with Khrushchev calling once more for an
end to polemics.
(i) The h"hrushchev-sinned CPSU letter of 29 Novenber to
Liao .must be rea against this acIkgroun In contrast to the
militant Soviet statements of September -October -- includ-
ing the massive October Kommunist editorial calling upon every
Communist everywhere to "fulfill his international duty" by
helping to stop the Chinese -- this letter exudes a spirit of
fraternal reasonableness. it urges that the two parties put
aside their differences "until the heat of passion has coole6"
and concentrate on their common interests and tasks, proposing
such "concrete measures" as expansion of trade, "'broadenif"
of technical assns ance, including the send n ; of ov .e
t- s, settlement of boundary questions, and, as a sine clung non,
the cessation of polemics and factional activities. Th=egen-
eration o coraiunica on between a two is s ri king in the
plain-t? ve note that "Comrade Chou En-lai is reported in the
press to have declared in recent talks with foreign personali-
t es and journalists" that China Wants a er relations. ru-
shc hey s letter concludes by affirming that its proposals are
intended to create more favorable conditions for preparation
of. a world mee ing, -- which both 1aVe more than once advocated."
Approved For elease 200 RDP78-03061A000
 Approved For Release 2 04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080001-2
(769 Cont.)
(ii) On 22 , February, that is, almost 3 months later,, the
CCP wrote a brief letter saying that they had "learned from a
number of quarters" that the CPSU had, secretly and behind the
back of the CCP, sent a 12 February letter to other parties
which "distorts facts," "manufactures lies," and "instigates
struggle" against the CCP on the "pretext" that the CCP has not
answered the 29 November CPSU letter. After denouncing the
CPSU for regarding their letter as "God's will," demanding an
immediate and affirmative reply, the CCP says the 29 November
letter will be answered in due course and requests a copy of
the 12 Feb. letter. This and all subsequent letters were signed
only by the respective Central Committees.
While the Soviets had refrained from (overt) anti-Chinese
propaganda or political activity since 29 November, the Chinese
had continued their campaign with increasing belligerence. On
12 December they published the 6th in a series of People's Daily
/Red Flag "comments on the 14 July CPSU open letter," a hard,
bitter, 13,000-word blast on "Two Diametrically Opposed Poli-
cies." On 4 February they followed with the 7th, an 18,000-word
diatribe which is the most deadly "declaration of war to the
finish" on the CPSU and Khrushchev yet published. The CPSU
"agricultural" plenum which convened on 10 Feb. was expanded
on the 14th to include thousands of ideological workers in
secret sessions at which Suslov was reported to have delivered
a major speech on the problems with the Chinese.
(iii) The CPSU answered the 20 Feb. CCP note immediately
-- dated 22 Feb. -- justifying their 12 Feb. letter on the
basis of Chinese conduct and stating that "it was unnecessary
and even useless" to send the CCP a copy. Accusing the CPSU
of splitting activities is like a real culprit crying "stop
thief." "With what purpose" was the CCP letter sent: "ag-
gravation" and "exacerbation." It closes by reaffirming that
the CPSU "is always.ready to do everything in its power for
unity.
(iv) On Feb. 27, the CCP retorted, reiterating its charges
with supreme arrogance, taunting the Soviets -- whose "bluster
is like a pewter-pointed spear": "please produce all the magic
weapons in your treasure box"-- e.g. the "most resolute rebuff,'
"collective measures," etc. It proposes an agreement on re-
ciprocal publishing of all materials, "if you do not fear the
truth and the masses."
(v) On Feb. 29, the CCP followed up with a long r? ply, to
the original 29 November G SU proposal for "concrete measures."
It denounces scathingly the Soviet maneuver: we "will nix be
misled by honeyed words or bow under pressure or barter away
principles." Although seeming to comment reasonably perhaps
deceptively so) on boundaries, it sneers at aid and trade offers,
describing the harm done by Soviet efforts to use economic re-s
lations for political ends and declaring: Q"the hinese people
ca WFnnot tr t egl~l ~j7X8 Igo ; b1f lse
2
? q Cnnt _
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080001-2
(70'3 Cont.) T IN M M 10 11
i;;.aportant questions of principle" on w ich they are opposeci,
"issues of such magnitude" that they cannot be "evaded" aiact
"per:iit no equivocation." (noting a dozen of the more color-
ful epithets applied to there by the Soviets they asib: how the
CPS"U leaders can even tali of unity under the circumstances
and repeat their taunts. Eowever, the CCP concludes by affirm-
in willingness "to do its best" for unity and proposing "ade-
quate preparations" for a world meeting, with the resumption
of Sino-Soviet taLts in Peking 10-25 October, and a preparatory
co.t.aittae of 17 parties meeting at an unspecified later date.
(vi) Tho last CPSU letter in this exchange, elated 7 Eared,
consists largely ofre ~.fn hiations based on the C inese let'-ter
of 27 February. Asserting flatly that "there are no and can-
not be any, 'father, or ?son, parties," the C 2SU see.ls to be
15M:1.11,77 a rene ie plea or? cessation of poleiiics and discussions
"with tact and self-respect," -- but then they torpedo their
own effort by adding that "if you vrere really interested" in
unity, "you should have accepted our proposals long, ago!" Tac1ted.
On to the end, however, is an ac now a geraen of receipt of the
29 Feb. letter, which "rejecte a the proposals ere made. k_av
J "resolutely repudiates" all of its "libelous attacks" ^a1
promises to give an answer to it. ?ocrever, in the present let"
e:: it as necessary to corru1ent on "the question which worries
the whole Co;uaunist movement)" preparations for a world meet-
in. The CPSU questions Chinese motives in delaying the steps
so long and proposes a greatly accelerated schedule, leading
to a world meeting in auttuan 154.
Two days later the Chinese published the Guth article in
their joint series, another 13,000-word tirade callin ; on all
Cora:iunists to "repudiate and liquidate fhrushchev's revision-
ism," and on 3 April the CPSU launched its new polemical caim-
paign with the publication of the February plenum materials.
(vii) Ttao months after the date of the last CPSU letter,
the CCP replied with a belligerent blast dated 7 Ilay: it de-
nounces Soviet hypocricy of word and deed, calls Soviet
timetable "a step in your plot to accelerate an open split,"
repeats the taunts of "empty threats," and finally says that,
"judging by present circumstances," it will be necessary to de-
lay still further, with wino-Soviet talks coming perhaps in
Lay 1r6~5, and with 4 or 5 years or ion; er necessar o: prepare
for a crorld b, eeting. also clear y -orewrarns" the C ?GU that
any attempt to convene a faeetin of its sy:apathizers and call
it a world meeting world put the responsibility for a split
directly on theca. The CCP closes by stating its intent to pub-
lish the texts of these letters and repeats its taunting pro-
posal" for reciprocal publication of all materials.
ACTION: These C2SU-CCP letters, intended -- at least
by the o1Z ;;c-.-" :.- private communication between party leaders,
ezanose Co'ruiiu ist tactics and strategy raore dramatically and
Approved For Release 2000/ 78-03061A0002MU O14
 (7,gpja vte~For Release 0 0 RDP78-03061 A000200080001-2
convincingly than most other evidence. The bitter mutual
recriminations and the self-righteous hypocrisy of each in
charging the other with unscrupulous, self-serving political
propaganda manipulations) and evidence of betrayal by other
Communists, all expose basic vulnerabilities in the theory
and practice of Communism. The following points are suggested
particularly for Communist and left-wing intellectuals, and for
friendly neutralists, in media and through personal contacts.
1) Neither the CPSU/USSR nor the CCP/OPR is fit for world
leadership. Both aspire to domination (tic t;a 'u
"hegemony") first over the Communist world and then the whole
world. Both constitute a threat to all who risk involvement
in substantial relations with them on the party or state level.
The CCP (29 Feb letter says "To be frank, the Chinese people
cannot trust you ZCPS/" and gives a bill of particulars of
Soviet efforts to use economic relations "as an instrument for
exerting political pressure, to "infringe the independence and
sovereignty of fraternal countries." Betrayal and counter-
betrayal by Communist parties and individuals is spelled out
in the letter exchange (e. g. efforts of each to suborn the
Albanians to 1960; quick disclosure to CCP of the "secret" 12
Feb.CpSU letter). Soviet efforts to plunder the economy of a
satellite are now being described in detail by the Rumanians
Lso far classified information which will probably seep through
into the press] after they were broadly hinted at in their
22 April plenum statement. The broad line: if fraternal Commu-
nists -- in Party or State relations -- cannot trust each other,
then no one else can.
2) Trade and aid for control in developing (and also
developed) nations. The 29 Nov CPSU letter offering concrete
agreements in trade and other relationships, might appear
reasonable and constructive even to leaders in developed coun-
tries. But the Chinese, well schooled in Communist tactics,
readily unmasked this Soviet maneuver.
3) Wide range of unscrupulous Communist tactics. The
letters document more than the Communist strings attached to
trade and aid: many standard tricks in the Communist cold war
armory are detailed in the charges of lies, distortion and
quoting out of context, provocation by delay, and betrayal.
4) Communists fear a really informed, participating
populace. The 7 March CPSU letter explains its refucal of the
CCP proposal for reciprocal publishing of all materials bearing
on the dispute, saying: this would extend the party polemics
to "the peoples of our countries" and "would only arouse a feel-
ing of legitimate indignation among the Soviet people." And
this from a party which describes itself as representing the
whole people!" The Chinese, whose motives in publishing CPSU
Approved For Relea -RDP78-03()080001-2
 (per f or Release 200 DP78-03061 A000200080001-2
materials are hardly what they clai;a, accuse the CPI of
"fearing the truth and the masses, " and "treating them as
rabble." We should do the same toward both parties, but more
particularly we should help provide all the truth.
5) Black propaganda to Communist audiences. Both sides
have threatened fur er sc osures (C!?SU 22 : "One could
cite innumerable facts and if necessary publish documents that
expose the behind-the-scenes activity of the CCP..."; CCP 27
Feb: "I'ie could cite a wealth of facts (about tricks you have
played 3 ") . We should furnish some of these wide-ranging new
"facts." The Rumanian "declaration of independence" -- tilto
22 April plenum statement -- said "there is not and cannot be
a 'Parent' party and a teon t party." This statement is identi-
cal with one in the 7 March C?SU letter. We speculate whether
the Rumanians forced this on the Russians, and wonder further
about the rest of the Rumanian "declaration."
We also use quotes from the CPSU letters to taunt K for
"turning the other cheek," begging for sweet reasonableness
des-nite all the arrogant blasts of icy Chicom hatred.
Approved For Release 2 -RDP78-03061AOd080001-2
 Approved For Release j ,{DP78-0306~40n&?Og%%049 01-2
'I''() r'i3 , a. Stal finis:.:
25X1C10b
CKGR?1TI : Co:n iunist ^?overn~aients r
ave a loner record of
harshly-`ropr s in t eiw own peoples and of encour^gin ,
(sotietiraes assisting), other peoples to a ;te;npt violent over-
throw of their own legal governments Th
e cruelty exercised
. by the OPSU in the days of Stalin inflicted untold hardship and
suf:2erin on the Soviet people, and unfortunately for the
Chinese people, the dogmatically Stalinist CC? refuses to
benefit froze the experience of others. Communist governments
autocratically decide what the people want, regardless of the
suffering their decisions impose. CCP slavish adherence to
dogmatic theoretical solutions has produced crude policies
and programs for al-most all of their critical problems, for
example: forced colonization and prejudice against ethnic
minorities; unrealistic agricultural programs; premature,
forced industrialization; aggresive and predatory foreign rela-
tions; and a cult of personality.
Ethnic and Ilational Minorities: Stalin pursued policies
to assure R uss fjca ono a o he USSR. All of the so-
called autonomous republics and regions wore compelled, for cx-
ample, to concede the primacy of the Russians (their conceded
right to self-deter :sination was forcibly withdrawn), to have
their children taught Russian rather than their native language
and to have Russians assi ned to all the top ?arty and govern-
meat posts throughout the Soviet Union, In extreme cases,
ethnic minority groups were deported on masse or even liquidated
altogether. The !-Ian Chinese are no loss chauvinistic in their
attitude toward minority groups in China and no less reluctant
to apply terror iihen less repressive measures fail to solve
their problems. The Sian Chinese force their language on all
other nationalities, they wipe out races by such tactics as
colonizing the chosen people in minority regions and forbidding
Mongolians to marry Mongolians. CCP treatment of the Tibetans
leaves no doubt as to their willingness to commit cruel and
brutal genocide when their objectives cannot be achieved by
other mean,.
Agricultural policies: In a headlong attempt to solve
Russia s agr cu curate. pro lems, Stalin initiated forced col-
lectivization on tAeRussian peasants, expecting to bring them
completely under State control. This frantic and ill-advised
policy alienated the peasantry, increased Russia's agricult ^ual
problems, and caused hardship and starvation for untold millions
of Russian peasants. The CCp toot: a similar approach in the
formation of the cor aunes as part of the Great Leap Forcward.
The result was remarkably similar to those of Stalin's forced
collectivization: an alienated peasantry, still unsolved a r.i-
cultur`l deficits and starvation. in the countryside. See
Approved For Release 204/1 -RDP78-03 6C1A000200080001-2
?Cont.)
 (A MI?lor Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080001-2
IUhrushchev's L prii 15 pithy reanar^:s on a:, ?icultua^al failures
-- pages 4 of "Chronolo , ---Communist Dissensions f'#'27" in
EPC `144 of 4 May 1234.1
Forced Industrialization: Stalin dictated "priority
zlevelopraen o 3oa.vy n ustry" for the Soviet economy. This
policy meant two things for the Russian worT er: his daily
worl.: norms would be increased constantly to K-1eet the unbridled
demands of the Coiiunist planning chiefs; and, under conditions
where there was sohxetimes a, desperate need for consumer goods
tho people's desire to improve living standards was pushed ever
further into the future. Chicom economic planning experts are
following a similar prograr with special efforts devotoci to
dovelopiag a nuclear-explosion device. This was preceded by
erratic industrialization plans for which there was neither the
trained manpower nor the equipment -- facts which the CCP after
soaae 15 years in power is just recognizing, The Communist re-
gime sets ;oa.G for its own political purposes, sacrificing
the Chiner;;;(-) people for the attainment of "prestige" and power
cwjective';. ' as latest development is the application of a
tai li wary systau of discipline and control to factory wor :ers .
(CM I3PG #141, item 7C3, dated 1C May 1934. )
Foreign Policy: Stalin's foreign policy in the post-117or1
v`ra"N ^ '-aracterized by constant aggressive pressure
against all foreign countries, including other Communist coun-
tries. (It gins this demanding suspicious posture and attitude
that drove Situ ' r;oslavis out of the Coriinforri,) The Berlin bloc?:-
lade and t;; e jct. oan War were examples of attempts to take by
force ai , vlo:Lc;:tce what could not be ta?ben by peaceful i:ieans.
[ ~~a~?r.Y =, :, ~?:r .-,tv's uas of armed forced in Hungary is a piece of the
s~'l;i% k:~, u c? ?'n. The Cii coals mirror this Stalinist attribute in
thei ax )gan iy belligerent stand toward the rest of the world.
Thel=? ire ~~ + tip. of the nuclear test-ban treaty and their encour-
aga rx(=At r>:. subversion and insurrection in Southeast Asia are
but o's o' their basic foreign policy. Like s>i:alin, they
Sri; ?oi-n countries, including Coariraunis,:.-ruled coun-
tric r ? rvi- who. they demand unquestioning obediencr~,
4u7+ r, cf P,--; ~sonality: The Stalinist period was chE ?~ acter-
i
assignment of all wisdom and -'11 virtues
to '.~'~rebelr; 1eacle:,c. Pravda trui:ipeted Stalin's norfrection
in c::.ch calling h ri .the r,reatest wholar of ouir epoch,
. ? . Cgrcatoo't' nail t'+ary leader of all times.," Y
and A.J~ wa t~l
tTrx:w-. ;a a w4itAe 7.1.st of human endeavors. : subordinates
viera ??ecu:i.J-eel to pay him regular and frequent obei _a ice. One
Ni;4i~~ a S S. hruo'achev, for example said on January 31, 1 ?7:
"StV0:gin is hope, he is expectation, he is the bead. that guides
all progressive manLaind. S8a1in is our banner.' is our
will: Stalin is our victory!" A book called "2us:..an Land,"
published by the Xomsomol in 194 said: "Stalin! Always we
hear his clear name. ':end here in the Kremlin his presence touches
us at every step. We walk on stones which he may have trod only
recently. Lot us fall on our knees and. kiss those holy foot-
prints 11 "
App'rovedcFolyRi e j1 1 Or $/1 C -rRbP? 4 1A@Q02OO088@O ;.
' T 2 (7 0 Cont.)
 pprrnc veld For Rele v s ? CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080001-2
Lyrical expressions of his wisdou and cf the correctness of
his policies are cormaaoniolace. Radio >aahing recently called,
Mao's thoughts "the lighthouse which illuminates all our Wvork
and the compass needle or China's socialist revolution." The
July 1, 13:3 issue of China Youth said "as fish cannot leave
water and Infants cannot av e their mothers, so revolutionary
cadres cannot leave ChtArman 1.Mao's works." The inago of an
infallible loader of a dictatorial regine serves several pur-
poses, anong the most i,aportant of which are to cover up a
record OIL failure to malbe the people believe that their sacri-
fices have not been in vain, and to imbue them with confidence
that the Loader can answer any problems and assure success,
\rlaich is a li just around the corner. The infallibility imago
also serves to give outsiders the iupression that everyone is
united in strength behind "the wise one."
hicom Defense of Stalin: While the Chinese Co-;nraunists
are 3i L n , s Chief defenders they paid remarkably little at-
tention to his advice during his lifetime, particularly after
the aid-1220's when his insistence on an urban-based, proietari a s
-led revolution almost brought about the destruction of the CC'=.
Lfter that time the Chico-as virtually ignored Stalin's advice
although they did not openly challenge him or his right to give
them advice. In the 1540's Mao ignored Stalin's advice to enter
a coalition with ChiangK^ i-shek and to integrate the Coalaaaahfis?
army into the Chinese a2mod forces at the and of the war against
Japan in Lugus t 1545. Mao's decision to pass from guerrill?i,
war are to an all-or.t fuliscale offensive in slid-1543 was also
ta'hen against Stalin's advice. The extreme irony of the pre-
sent sitT ation in the Sino-Soviet dispute is that the Chinese
i
li
es
c
Cozr.lunists, Stalin's arch defenders, are following po
advocated by Trots'., , and at the same time are accusing 'tae
Soviet Union of Trots'::yism:
" uevolutiona r3' policies fail: Stalin's devotion to out-
;;sodec,, theoretical an cideolog .cal conceptions--and his easy
resort to force and violence to get compliance--were the cause
of his errors. conomic, social and cultural advances in the
Soviet Union cane when harsh measures and dictated solutions
were relaxed, not when tighter controls of farmers, laborers,
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(79 Cont.)
writers and artists were unposed. In spite of the tragic ex-
poria pces of the Soviet Union, the :aicoLi leaders are subjeet-
in their people to the samo needless and futile suffering--to
.p yr stomachs, to anguished separation of families, and to
;.to unemployment that acco_z nies stagnant economies. So-
called revolutiozary policies do not build a viable society,
they only sacrifice two or three generations of people in
failures that could easily be avoided. So long as China's
leaders thin% in the outmoded and discarded revolutionary
thoories of Stalin, they will fail to call forth the diligence
anc ingenuity of the Chinese people and the opportunity to
build a new, modern structure on the foundation of China's
natural resources will pass then by. But Communist revolution-
arius (i.e, the, first generations) knovd no other way. They carne
to power by the use of force and violence and those are the
:weans they use to Inflict their bankrupt policies on the people
they rule.
The facade of Innfallibilit : Cos luni,t regimes atte apt
to c~^Qato le 'Ma-7,e 62 an 1n 4 ib 1 e leader to promote unity
and strength as well as to cover up discontent, disunity and
weakness, Both in the USSR during Stalin's time and in Mao's
China there is much disunity between the regime and the people
and along the leaders themselves, Illusions disperse with time
and those who created or supported them have a difficult tirle
justifying tla role tlloy played in creating the myth.
Chicorl defense of Stalin: We question the ChicoT:ats sin-
cerity IF e r ar eat, a ease of Stalin, particularly when
they had so little regard for his advice when he was alive,
The Chicoms defend Stalin not so much because they think he
advocated the right policies, but because they approve of the
methods he used, the sale methods they now use. A story of how
Stalin v,ould have dealt with the CCP were he alive today would
raalme interesting reading--as a fable perhaps. Or, on a dif-
ferent note, other articles might fictionalize how Stalin would
have dealt with "the tliao clique" when they allowed the bloo wing
of 100 flowers or how he would have reacted to the Great Leap
Dorriard. Another idea for an ironical approach would be to say
that the Chieoras consider Stalin and Trotsky a good teal,
Trotslry for his good advice and Stalin for his terroristic
methods of control,
Nature of Coiwaunist Threat: We say that the breakup of
the tYlor cove. mun s a lovemen nto a radical-right group and a
radical-left group does not mean that one or the other is more
desirable or more dangerous to the free world. They are dif-
ferent kinds of threat and therefore they require different
kinds of responses on the part of the free world. Subversion.,
economic warfare, and .he gradual destruction of democratic
ideals are as dangerous and repugnant in the long run as the
immediately perceptible resort to force and armed invasions.
4l
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We remind that a basic tenet of the gree world's foreign
policy is that we are eager to establish peaceful relations
with all nations, Co imunist as well as non--Co:munist, if they
demonstrate their willingness to seeI, peaceful solutions to
the world's problem and to adhere to and abide by the solu-
tions taus reached, On the other hand, the free world will
stand firm and strong in the face of hostility, aggression and
belligerence from whatever quarter it nay co: e.
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l June 1964
25X1C10b
The Cotaanaunist Threat to Indian Labor
P AC kROM D: The Indian national labor groups are crea.-
~ eL8 s ~~~vQi ~D-7
tur~.s d2 WIle ~ ..r..r ~ 'ca~.~litic ,l ~'pa tics, ~ with the . ass general e_ nyqs
a cl ire xesses an reque2i`t' with the same leadership. There-
fore, the Communist labor center's current program of a; a er-
ship raids, jurisdictional disputes and labor agitation will,
if successful, have a political effect beyond economic disrup-
tion. The strength the politicised, labor ^oups can Yauster will
be equally critical in two crucial domestic events: the early
Iv35 election in the Coktaunist stronghold of Kerala and the
eventual necessity of choosing Prune Minister 1 e i., u1s sUcces3Or.
New developments in two continuing nternationa p o i3a ccu '
put the same strain on political loyalties: renewed Chinese
hostilities or clashes with Pakistan over iiasb i ir. rising
Soviet assistance to the Indian economy and defense adds an-
other element with possible political consequences. Communist
domestic gains on any of these occasions could dangerously
cripple India's democratic development, her neutral sta.tace in
foreign affairs or her defense against Communist China's ex-
pansion into South and Southeast Asia.
R F3RMTCWS : See the unclassified attachments to this issue and :
25X1X
Current Intelligence Special report,, "Con unist
Uni~on~s/ Gain in India's Labor !flovement?', April 17
(S-,,:JC% {J g )
Biwee,ly Guidances:
,0729 Indian Politics and the Succession Problem
(arid unclass. att.)
#751 China Attempts to Split the Indian Co iunist
Party (and unclass. att. )
#774 Trio Indian Communist Parties?
Prop Note 45, International Cos iunist Front
Organizations (and unclass. att.)
:1 Cont. )
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792, 1E The Chilean Elections -- A Contingency Guidance
..r
CZ5 oU1'r : [For more complete , chhgrround information,
see unclassified attachment, The Chilean 31ections, and its
Spanish version, Las elecciones c a enias, Either of these may
be passed to indigen?t s asse ts, but the caution that they
are to be used for the facts contained in them and n o t re-
It is a significant fact of contemporary history that no
Cc anzrm nist party has ever come to power in national elections
which were free and in which the voters had a reasonably clear
choice. 'However, electoral trends of the last year or LmOre in
Chile have so increased the strength of leftist political forces
that a victory of the Communist-led ? opular Action Front emerges
a a distinct possibility. For that reason, the elections
scheduled for 4 September 19G4 are perhaps the most important
ever to taL1-.e place in Latin f.merica.
produced verbatim.]
Presidential Election: A candidate must receive an abso-
lute major y oa the Votes cast to be elected outright. if
no one receives 50% of the votes in the 4 September election,
a joint session of Congress will meet on 24 October 1964 to
choose between the two leading candidates. This has happened
in the last three elections, and in each case congress has
voted overwhelmingly in favor of the candidate that came in
first.
slith few exceptions, all literate citizens are both eligib e
and obligated to vote. The number of citizens exercising their
franchise has steadily increased in recent years, and it is
estimated that some two and one half million will vote in sop-
te;mber. tloman's suffrage came to Chile with the elections of
1952, and their vote has become an increasingly important factor
in Chilean politics. They polled 30% of the votes for president
that year; the proportion rose to 35% in the 1950 elections,.
,=d will undoubtedly be higher in 1934. Women in Latin America
have tended to oppose Coamunist-bacLded candidates by small but
often decisive majorities, a pattern which Chilean women have
followed so far.
:?olitical parties in Chile fall in the right-center-left
spectrum usually associated with European parliaments. On the
r Sht, the Democratic Vront (FD -- Frente Derbocr,~tico) , which
controlled an absolute majority in congress, has recently dis-
solved into its separate components: the rightist Liberal and
Conservative Parties and the centrist L4adical Party (PR --
Partido Radical). Julio Duran Neumann, a senator and former
president of the Chamber of Deputies, is candidate for president
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On the extreme left, the popular faction Front (FRAP -
Frante de Accion Popular) is compose,.:: of the Communist Partyt
the Socialist Party and several minor leftist groups.
C r.ilean Communist Party, one of the best organized in Latin
America, plays a dominant role in this coalition, although the
candidate for FRfp, Salvador Allende Gossens, is a member of
the Socialist Party. For nearly 20 years Allende has been a
leader in this extreme leftist coalition. with the help of
the Communist Party, he came in close behind Alessandri for
second place in the presidential elections of 1959. In 1961,
he was re-elected senator from Valparaiso, also with the help
of the Co~waunists. Since 1954, he has been a frequent visitor
to the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Cuba, and is a
staunch supporter of Fidel Castro.
The Christian Democratic Party (P C -- Partido Democrata
Cristiano) occupies a position somewhat to the left of tenter
but between the R on the right and FRAP on the left. Like
most other Christian Democratic parties of Latin America, the
Chilean PDC is iceologically closer to the Socialists than to
the Christian Democratic parties of Europe. The candidate for
the PDC is Eduardo Frei Montalva, Senator from Santiago.
1953, Frei ran a poor third behind Alessandri and Allende.
Normally unallied with any other party, the PDC may this time
receive the support of the Liberal and Conservative Parties.
Campaign issues. Campaigning and voting in the Chilean
elect ons rvi be carried out against a background of a number
of vital economic problems which successive governments have
been unable to solve: inflation, the steady rise in the cost
of living, unemployment in the urban centers and underemploy-
ment on the farm, agrarian reform, nationalist resentments over
foreign owned copper industry, which supplies over 660% of
Chile's foreign exchange. Allende has promised that his first
act as president will be to nationalize the copper companies.
With this prospect, the companies themselves are reluctant to
spend money on plant improvement and expansion. The nationalism
that exercises the people over this problem is such a powerful
force that no public figure dares oppose the trend and' speak
out in favor of the foreign companies.
According to current indicators, no one candidate is
likely to win an absolute majority in the election. If Allende
wins a plurality, the Congress will be faced with deciding
whether to choose the second candidate, in accord with law but
somewhat in defiance of recent practice, or cast their votes
for Allende and totalitarianism. 25X1C10b
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There is little that stations outside Chile can do to
influence actual voting in the elections, against Salvador
Allende. When stations do receive specific instructions, it
will ;irobably be to prepare public opinion, particularly in
Latin 3are, against him in the event he should win the
.ss over by Congress after winning only a
elect-ko s or xc -,
plura.1-J, ty.
T;1, imes which stations outside Chile may be called upon to
ea,p w.t to condition public opinion against Allende and against
a Communist take-over:
a) Loss throughexpropriation. If elected, Allende
will expropr a e the fore gn-owned copper companies. An
immediate and massive flight of foreign and domestic in-
vestment capital will take place and plunge Chile into a
state of economic chaos worse than that of Bolivia and com-
parable only to that of Cuba.
b) Loss of individual freedom. If a Communist-
dominated cos on comes to power in Chile, the essential
freedoms will little by little be lost: there will be
strict government control of press, radio, television,
education, and organized labor. People will no longer
have freedom to move: they will be shot trying to escape
to Argentina, Bolivia, or Peru.
c) Hisuse of democratic procedures? Among intellectual
audiences, we at impt to Inspire a cop:.tinual dialogue on
the philosophical and ethical aspects of the very practical
problem with which the Chilean congress may be faced: Does
a people have a right to surrender that which we consider
unalienable, or untransferrible -- its freedom? Even more,
does a majority have a right to deprive a minority of its
freedom. If 55% of the Chilean people -- or of the Chilean
Congress -- decide they want a Communist government, they
will not only be acquiescing in their own enslavement, but
they will be dragging the other 45% down with them. It
would seem to be the right and the duty of the minority to
resist, especially in Latin America, where freedom occupies
an exaggeratedly high place in the scale of values:
"Liberty is the highest value," has come to be an axiom.
3 (792.)
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Erich HONECKER
Memter, Socialist Unity Party (SED) Polit~uro and Se .ret ?aria+.
Since 1958 Honecker has teen a memter of the BED Politturo and
Central Committee Secretary responsitle for security and mili-
tary affairs. For nearly ten years (1 46-55) he headed the
Free German Youth (FPJ), which he patterned after the Soviet
Komsomol ; he has teen a deputy in the Vo11rs-ammer since 1949
and is Secretary of the National. Defense Council, created in
3960. As a staunch Ultricht lieutenant, Honecker was nominated
to supervise drafting of the new Party statute and to expound
it at the Sixth BED Congress in January 1963.
Honecker was torn on 25 August 1912 in Neukirchen in the
Saar, the son of a miner who later tecame a Communist function-
ary. After completing elementary school., he learned the roofer's
trade. He joined the Young Pioneers in 1922, the German Com-
munist Youth Association (KJVD) in 1926, and the German Com-
munist Party (KPD) in 1929. Elected KJVD Secretary for the
Saar region in 1931. and a memter of the KJVD Central Committee
in 1.934, Honecker engaged in illegal Communist activities in
the Ruhr during the Nazi regime and server? as courier 1-etween
rerlin, Prague, Zurich and Paris. Arrested for the first time
in 1.934 and released for lack of evidence, he was charged again
in 1935 and was eventually sentenced ty the People's Court in
1.937 to ten years in prison. He was li.F erated ty the Soviet
Army from internment in Frandenturg at the end of WW II.
In 1945 Honecker tecame youth secretary in the Cen t-ral.
Committee of the KPD, helped organize the anti-Fascist youth
committees, and edited the periodical Neues Leten. When the
BED was estatlished in 1.946, he was elected to its Executive
Committee, and also t-ecame First Chairman of the Central. Council
of the FDJ, the organization he had helped found.
After long memtership on the BED Executive Commit.ttee, he
tecame a candidate memter of the Pol_i'r--turo in ..1,9 50. In 1955
he went to Moscow for a year's training at a party school, after
which ho assumed responsitility for security and military affairs
in the BED Central. Committee. At the Fifth Party Congress in
July 1955 he was taken in as a full. memter of the Politturo,
since which he has strengthened his position as potential
successor to Ultricht.
At the Sixth BED Congress in January 1963, Honecter served
as head of the Congress Secretariat and as Chairman of the
Statute Commission. In presenting the new Party statute, which
defines rights and duties of Party functionaries, he was given
the honor of making the only major speech tesides that of
Ultricht. Honecker also delivered the Politturo report to the
Second BED Plenum in April. 1963.
I (Cant.)
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fonecker has made many trips abroad in connection with
his youth and Party activities, including visits to the USSR
and Communist China. Fe has received numerous honors, includ-
ing the patriotic Service Order in Gold (19E_55). Eonecyzer's
firs; wife was Edith Baumann, who is a member of the SFD Con-
tral Committee and until 1933 was a member of the Secretariat
and a candidate member o: the PolitToiro. }Ionecker's nuzrierous
affairs with young girls connected with the FOJ led his f;trst
wife to divorce Ithi, later he married Margot Feist, one of
his mistresses who had born him a child. After marriage to
I-donecyer, T .argot Feist became Minister of Education in the
soviet Zone government and a member of the BED Central Coz-n-
iaittee. Eonecker wrote one book entitled d+riedensflug each
dean Osten (Peace Flight to the East) s after lie re Gurnee Erma
a trip the USSR in 1943.
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The CPSU - CCP Exchange of Letters
Publis ie by the .Chinese y r se s a-9 II 1964
All Peking papers on 9 May featured an 8 May NCNA release
of the texts of an exchange of 3 CPSU and 4 CCP letters, begin-
ning with a CPSU letter of 29 November 1963 and ending with a
new CCP letter elated 7 May 1964. This heretofore private ex--
change provides an exceptionally revealing "inside viers" of the
status of the S-S conflict and indicates its future. The
Chinese have published the texts in the multi-language Peking
Review and in separate pamphlets. They are quoted and para-
p ras d below in chronological sequence.
I. 3,000-word CPSU letter: 29 November 1963, The letter,
which contains no one critical word, sugges s$ they "let [dis-
puted views] wait until the heat of passion has cooled" and
concentrate on "the development of cooperation, noting that
"Corirade Chou En-lai is reported in the press to have declared
in recent talks with foreign personalities and journalists"
that China wants to develop contacts and trade with the USSR
and other socialist states. "In this letter, vie wish to give
our views on the contribution which our two parties could make,"
proposing "concrete steps for setting things right in Soviet-
Chinese cooperation," as follows:
(1) "In the course of the next few years, the USSR could in-
crease its export to China of goods in which you are interested,
and the is ors; or goods from China...."
(2) "If your side shows interest, it would be possible in our
view to come to an understanding on the broadening of technical
aid to the CPR...."Once again we affirm our readiness to send
Soviet specialists to the CPR should you consider it necessary
(3) "Both our countries would undoubtedly benefit from the
bro denin? of scientific-technical cooperation and also from
the develalmen or cultural es o many kinds .... How beneficial
was the influence o ov e - nese economic cooperation on he--
course of sollal construction in the R, and also on the
economic growth of the Soviet Union, is well known. It is all
the more to be regretted that economic coop at and trade
...has not only failed to grow in recent years, but on the con-
trary has constantly shrunk."
(4) "You will probably agree that the situation which has
arisen in recent years along different sections of the Soviet-
Chinese border cannot be regarded as normal. The SovGo- as
area y proposed that friendly consultation take place to de-
fine accurately the boundary in different sections," and "in
this connection, we are transmitting to you a relevant docu-
ment." "Statesmen s have -recently been mace in na concern-
-
Ina
the aggressive policy of the Tsarist government and the
unjust treaties imposed upon China. Naturally, we will not
/M11
1907 f ILA60002906$O601f 3-219
1 (cont.)
 f, , PO
convinced that you, too, do not intend to defend the Chinese
emperors who b force of arms seized not a few err tories ae-
eac ionary ac ons
longing- to others, 13ut while con ein ng use reactionary-
of the top-strata exploiters who held power in Russia and China
at that time, we cannot disregard the fact that historically
formed boundaries between the states now exist. anattempt to
Ignore this can become the source of ninunc erstandings and con-
iets....It would be simply Unreasonable to create territorial
problems artifically at the present timme.... "
(5) "We should also...bar any acts whatsoever that night under-
nine unity" and "repulse factionalists and splitters....
(6) "The CC/CPSU has more than once advocated the cessation of
public polemics .... 'Ie do not propose a general cessa ao~n of e
el" ,change o views on quay ons of principle conch ng world
developments, u desire only that it should take place in the
forms provided'-ior by the statement of the fraternal pare
(VP's) in IUOO -- through mutua consultation negotiations,
and exchanges of letters.'
The letter then states that "in making these proposals,
the CC/CPSU bases itself on the consideration that they will
help strengthen confidence and create more favorable conditions
for the preparation of a world meeting of t e Commun st and
workers parties. Recently, the CPBU and the CCF, like many
other FP's have more than once advocated the convening of such
a meeting. We now reaffirm this position of ours...."
"...Y"7e may differ in our understanding of this or that
ideological problem, or in our estimates of specific phenomena
of social development -- life will correct those who are mis-
taken ....But...the highesT _d u y o oraraun s s is to bullu
unity .... The peoples trust the Coramunistst and vie are called
upon to Justify their t- st."
The letter is signed by Ithrushchev as First Secretary of
the CC/CpSU. (All others on both sides in this series are
signed only by the "Central Committee.)
II. 500-word CCP letter: 20 February 1964. It begins
bluntly: ,e Have laarneC4 from a num or of quarters that the
CC/CPSU recently sent to fraternal parties (FP's) a letter which
is directed against he . s or the fac s, manu-
fa c ures lies alzc er nL the CCP, " and "instigated a so-called
'struggle against the great-power and Trotskyite views and the
factional and disruptive activities of the Chinese loaders.'
This letter has not, however, been sent to the CC?, from which
it has been kept a secret."
"...While crying for a halt to public polemics under the
pretense of desiring unity, the C?STJ leaders are engineering
a new campaign against the CCP and other Ili-L parties behind the
back of the CC? and are unscrupulously engaging in sec ariafa,
factional and divisive activities.... Your vicious two-faced
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2 Con .
 t aMWFFr LM.qQ/.14i 9l 7a A . &f ( ons 11
Mslon s ... .
"You have launched the present ca zpaign against the CCP on
the new pretext that the CCP has not yet replied to your letter
of 29 November 1903. But we would like to ask; Why were you
free for a long time to act wilfully and refuse to accept tne
acv cc of PPP's against bringing inter-party differences into
the open before the onemy and their proposal for a halt to pub-
lic polemics, whereas the CCP must regard the letter from the
CPSU leaders as God's will and give an immediate and afflruia ive
reply or also be c arged c-ith the major crime o insubordination?
Why are you privileged to publish thousands o lengthy articles
and other items attacking us, whereas we may not make any reply
to set the facts straight and distinguish truth from falsehood?
A journey has to be made step by step and problems have to be
solved one by one. Your letter will be answered in due course.
Your self-important and domineering attitude in maintaining
that you can attack whenever you please and that we must stop
as soon as you cry halt has fully exposed your inveterate habit
of great-power chauvinism and posing as the'fat er par y.
"The present grave act of the C?U leaders to create a
split has once again brought to light the intrigue you have
boon carrying on in behalf of a sham unity n- a real split.
The CCP has been consistent in its s anc o firmly efen ing
the purity of M-Y,....d'1e obey the truth and the truth only and
will never trade in principles."
III . 2 000-word CPSU letter: 22 February 1964. 117 e
rude tone an unworthy and insulting methods ? your letter
of 20 Fob.)...give us the moral right not to answer it at all
"It was no accident that we did not send you the
letter of 12 Februar ais year. In Vie` past few months
alone, e v w has repeatedly approached the leader-
ship of the CCI...with proposals that measures be taken
jointly for strengthening unity....The CC/CC? has not con-
sidered it necessary even to reply to our proposals.
"If you care to refer to the above-mentioned documents
and material [20 Nov, letter, CPSU Moscow proposals in
July 1933 talks, etc], it will be easy to convince your-
selves that they discuss the very sale problems about which
the CC/CPSU wrote briefly to the fraternal parties (FP's)
in its letter of 12 February of this year.
"While not ane;:ering our letters, you at the same
time unfolded a widespread campaign against the CPSU and
other PM-L parties and sharply intensified the schismatic
factional activity .... On 4 February this year, the news-
paper Jennin Jih .Dao (People's Daily) openly called for
a spli , .. .
"In these circumstances,...the CC/CPSU...considered
App+6v0rd9FMee
3 - (Cont.)
 Apps llAfi9j f et RjL1I, RIofIif 70%:9R291AQPj3O88f9 -2
decided to inky the 'PA'S of this.,..
"Our [12 Feb] letter condemned the intention of the
CCP? leadership to create a factional bloc with a special
program under its own hegemony.... ur pr ncipled position
on all the questions contain e in the 12 Feb, letter was
known to you long before we approached the FP's .... it was
unnocessary and indeed useless ss to send you our letter of
w February.
"After all this, one can only be surprised at your
allegations.... `.s the saying goes among our people, this
is using the well-known method in which the real culprit
cries 'stop thief.'
"If one is to look for real doubledealer....As early
as June 1960, Comrade Liu S? ao-chi and other CCP leaders,
in their-talks with an Albanian delegation, slandered the
CPSU...and tried to set the Albanian public leaders against
the CPSU. T H555 ac ons By the nese leadership evoked
the jus indignation of members of the Albanian delegation
who openly said so to the Chinese comrades and informed
the CC/CPSU.... One could cite innumerable facts-and-:02
necessary publish documents that expose the behind-the-
scones activity of the CCP leadership.,..
"As for the CPSU, we do not conceal our views and
activities....?he CC/CPSU has not allowed itself to be
provoked and has not taken the path of squabbling on the
principle of 'spearpoint against spearpoint'....
"As for your attempts to juggle with words like
'great-power chauvinism,' 'self-important,' 'domineering,'
'inveterate habit of posing as the father party,' 'God's
will,' etc., we have to tell you that the use of such ex-
pressions only testifies to the weakness of your position
"For 4 years the FP's of the world have been appeal-
int to the CC/CCP to approach the matter from the view-
point of common interests and to cease its attempts to im-
pose its erroneous 'general line' on the WCM..,.but with
growing ambition [the CCP? leadership] is posing as the sole
heir of the founders of L-L and the supreme judge as re-
gards the theory and practice of Communism....
"Your great-power habits also appear in your last
short letter when, addressing the CC/C?SU, you demand that
it send to you its letter of 12 Feb. You do noequest,
but demand .... This is not merely rude, but simply ridicu-
lous.
"Your letter and its deliberately rude tone compels
us to reflect once again: with what purpose was it sent?
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 Approved F,p R ~ 0~~/~ ` i~ ' ~..~ j QMj_9 y
and unity of the Communist movement, they Would have had
to leave their erroneous path, cease schismlatic activity,
and a :e their Stand in the same ranks as a the world ? s
x1.'9....11
Isl. 1, 330-word CC? letter: 27 L ebruary 1964, "The chara-c-
teristic fea uro o 'this letter yours of 222 7eb.) is the ro-
digality of the abuse ...with which you try to evade the ques-
ions of su a ante...:This is really a poor per ormance.'r
"u'ou accuse us of behaving like 'the real culprit,
crying stop thief:" In fact, it is you 'rho are playing
the trick of 'the real culprit, crying; stop thief' ....
First, you have actually sent a letter behind our backs
to BP's, a letter specifi-c-a7T-y-c7l-r-e-cT-ec7---aOhinst the CUP.
Second, you are actually planning behind our backs to take
'collective measures' from w c ~e ~. tr 11 be exc u e ,
an to go a stop further in splitting the ICd....
"You begin your letter with the assertion that you
have 'the right not to answer at all'....VJO have advised
you against Impatience because we have not yet completed
our reply to your numerous attacks. tihereupon you have
f9 own into a rage, as if we had commit d a monstrous crime.
. ease thin',: the Matter over calmly: can this be described
as treating FP's as equals?
"Far from examining your own errors and publicly
acknowledging and correcting them, ...you have even pro-
duced the Belishova case of June 1960 as an important
piece of evidence against us. But you have lifted a rock
only to crush your own toes. Our change of views with
the responsible comrades of a FP...tias aboveboard, en-
tirely normal, and beyond reproach. ?n t ~e o er hand,
s,
As early as January 1960-17-that
t e l b ova
..,.
months before Belishova case, you delegated Comrade
Mikoyan to meet the leading comrades of Albania in an of-
of engineer activities against the CCP...
"Yet, acting like '.knights for a day,' you state...
that you will'publish documents' and 'state our 'viOWWrs
openly.' Moreover, you declared on 21 September 1963 that
you would give us a 'most resolute rebuff.' Have you not
played enough of suvh r MOM ... ' e cou cited t of
facts, beginning from the -'20th CPSU Congross....In our
opinion, all your bluster simply reminds one of a paper
tiger. It is pewter-pointed spear. Please pro-
duce all the magic wagons n your treasure box or our
en ig Y enment....
"If you do not fear the truth and the masses, and if,
instead of treating th-Mm as rabble, you have faith in the
political consciousness and scernment of the maem'bers of
the UI?NU and the Soviet peo e, we propose that our two
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 Apprar erXiV For Rehe% 3999 j4 :bqI% 78 UAWOI OQ8000* 2
ps rear
equal basis, pt'o~ sb in its own pross the ocuments, arti-
cl?~s and other . rial both sides have uli heed or Will
publish in criticism of 6-ac other
In the last paragraph, the Chinese note that the CPSU
accuses them of blundering in "demanding" rather than "request-
ing" a copy of the 12 Feb. letter. They reply satirically,
,,. ,wa are now complying with your wish and request t that you
send us a copy....'"
V. 6000-word CCP letter: 29 February 1964, "in reply to
the CPSU letter o ,W oven er IT-begins by asserting
that "the differences between us...involve a number of major
problems of r nc p e" ~which "must be solved. if our di - erences
are to ' e e im -natec1..." The " views on the general line"
ez.pressed in their letter of 14 June 1963 and other,articl es
"are in full accord with K.-L and the, revolutionary principles
of the Moscow documents.". Direct comments one the questions
raised in the CPSU letter follow:
(1) The Sino-Soviet boundary. "A legacy froth the past, (it)
can he settled" 1=oug negotiation between the two governments
...,but "the Soviet side has made frequent breaches...,'" on the
border, "" and has " lagrantly carried ou arse-sea a subversion
in Chinese frontier areas," etc. "Among a tune gh3ors,
Is only the leaders of. the CPSU and the reactionary.. nationalists
of k1 a who have e i era e t croatw or er disputes w h
aina.... "
"The delegations of our two governments started bound-
ary negotiations in Peking on 25 February 1964. Although
the old treaties relating to the Sino-Russian boundary
are unequal treaties, the Chinese Government is neverthe-
less tai ng to respect them and take then as the basis
for a reasonable s fiaent of the ino- ova ou Clary
question.
(2) Lid. The Chinese again acknowledge their appreciation of
"'th.eriendly Soviet aid which began under Stalin's leadership,"
but they do not li% e the way Sovie propaganda s edaa beat the
"Far from Bing
drum about their '"disnnterest5 ass s ance. il _b
g~ ra isSoviet air was mainly n ra e pith China paying for
everything, with interest where credit was invo' vac T?e
prices of many o he goods we imported from the Soviet. Union
tiler 4i much i ,,aer than those on a world mark ....~, oreover,
...Many of the mineral products [ire sen ~4e"_aov U1 are raw
materials indispensable for the development of the Lmost ad-
vanced branc ,es 37 science and for the manufacture of rockets
aria nuclear weapons."
"As for the Soviet loans ...China used them mostly for the
purchase of war ana Brie. from the ov et union , the greater
up in ae vrar o res s U.S. aggression
part o which vas used
and and 'Korea....
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 rko&qt?e 20~4eG4a~P~~; A~O
trus c:d' y e yinese Goverrruent and people, t' and we "still
miss t henn to this day.... When the C 'SU leaders unilaterally
decided to recall all the Soviet experts in Chin a$ affirmed our re to have t ,em continue....But in spite of
our objections you turned your bac!Is on the principls...and
unscrupulously with ^ rev the ISUDD experts... , tore up 343 con-
tracts..., and scrap=e 257 projects..., all within the short
span of a month .... Your perfidious action disrupted Chinats
original national economic plan and nx is M enormous losses
upon China's socialist consTr-uction.... You took advantage 3f
China's serious natural disasters to adopt aese grave measures
"Your action fully demonstrates that you...use the
sending of ego erts as an instrument for exerting political
pressure on fraternal countries, butting into their in erns 3..
affairs and impedin and sabotaging their socialist con-
struction.
ports in certain fields, we tou a ,g, a d to send; t en!"
"Novi you have again suggested sending experts to
China. To be fran!, the Chinese people cannot trust you...c
't'le would like to say in passing that, basing ourselves
on the internationalist principle of mutual assistance anon;
countries in the socialist camp, we are very much. concerned
about the present economic situation in he ovie Union.
If you should eel he need for the tie p oT -Chi ox-
(4) Sino-Soviet trade. Nobody is in a better position than you
to know the real cause for the curtailment of Sine-Soviet trade
over the last Levi years. This curtailment was precisely the
result of your extending the di erences from the fiold of icbeo-
Vgy to that of state reaions .... '
Moreover,... you deliberately placed obstacles in the
way of economic and trad negotiations...ancl held up or
severer years you Eve used the trade between our coun-
tries as an instrument oar bring ng political pressure to
bear on China,...
lying ver row of the goods which vie nee a y . for
which vie do no really nee ...while ao c ing back, or sup-
refused. supplies of important goods which China nee~c s.
You have psis er on rov ng large amounts of goo Es
"12Tou constantly accuse us of 'going it alone' and
claim that you stand for extensive economic ties and di-
vision of labor among the socialist countries. But what
is your actual record in this respect? You infringe the
inclepondences and sovereignty of fraternal countries and
oppose their efforts to develop their economy....You bully
those fraternal countries whose economics are less advanced
and oppose their policy of industrialization ano try to
force them to remain agricultural countries forever and
serve as your sources of raw materials and as outlets for
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industrially ` more developed and insist that they stop
manufacturing eir traditional products and become ac-
cessory factories serving your industries...."
(5) Stopping public polemics. You "provokked" and "impooseed,
polemics on the entire r, , asserting that to do so Mas to "act
in Main Its manner." That was "a bad thing." But "now, with lie
ex ens vo unfolding of the public debate, the truth is becoming
clearer and clearer and P1[-L is making more and more progress.
What was a bad thing is becoming a good thing....It leads more
and more people away from the bad influence of the baton and
makes them think over problems independently,.,."
After citing a series of CCP offers to end polemics, which
the CLSU rejected, and quoting an early (1960) Soviet statement
calling for open discussions, the letter says
"But now you suddenly make a turn of 1010 degrees on this
question and say that we should o the differences wait.
What are ' ou up to? To put it plainly, you are merely re-
sor ng to this trick to deprive us of the right to reply
...after you have heaped so much abuse....,'
The CCP letter then gives a detailed account of the "anti-
Chinese campaign" carried on by the C.'?SU and a number of other
parties, by name, in reply to which "we have all along exercised
great restraint."
'How are you going to wind up the whole affair? Do you pro-
pose to come forward with a public statement admitting that
a our attacks on the CCP are lies and slanders and remov-
ng a1 the labels you have Stuck On it? Or nl you insist
that we accept your verdict, give up the revolutionary ban-
ner off! L and kowtow to your revisionist line?"
"It is. now perfectly clear that our differences with
you involve ...a whole series of important questions of
prince ,-'such Fs the following: Are the U.S. imperial-
ists the sworn enemies of the people of the world, or are
they sensible emissaries of peace? .... tire the Titoites
renegades or comrades?.... Vlas Stalin a great Marxist-
Leninist, or was he a murderer, a bandit and a gambler?
....These questions admit of no equivocation, but must be
throroug z y straightened out. Sow can issues of such faagni-
ticlue be evaded?...."
The letter concludes with an assertion that, despite every-
t%ing, the CC,P "is willing to do its best for the restoration
and strengthening of unity and proposes the following concrete
measures:" resumption of the Chinese-Soviet party talks in
m L ing, 10-2 October 25,6; followed by ur ther prepara ons"
by a meeting of representatives of 17 FP's, Including the rul-
ing parties lus Indonesia, Japan, Italy and France.
VI, 3 500-word C'SCI letter: 7 March 1964. The first
A~p~8veH R 'ga y
C (Cont.)
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Ma ch "has greatly astonished us." "you atteript to accuse our
party of some sort of behind--the-scenes activity against tape
CC9 and "wish to justify your own actions... by shifting respon-
sibility to others," but "we can say with a clear conscience
that tiro have no responsibility whatsoever for the situation that
has been crea ee:.
"The central point of the 27 February letter of the
CC/CCP is in fact a proposal for the intensification of
public polemics, in proposing the cone usion of an F.gree-
men on mu -ua1-pt:blication... , that you desire is, in es-
sence, that the polemics between the parties should embrace
the peoples of our coon ries....TO publish your articles,
t'i iic co-Ni ,in so many unjust assertions and slanders...
would only arouse a feeling of legimate indignation among
the Soviet people....Indeed, the polemics you are con.uc -
ng have long ago gone beyond the bounds of ideological
dispute....you pour torrents of dirt over our party and
our country, and are in essense employing the same tactics
as opponents of the Soviet state, who try to divide the
peop~e o ra the party and the P :rt from the leader .
....please consider ghat would happen--if we oo Vlore
take your path and reply to you with the same abuse that
you heap on us, and call upon the Chinese people to fight
against their leadersigp....
The letter refers to the CpSUts proposals in its 29 November
letter for normalizing the situation. "I7hile deliberately do-
laying an official answer to our appeal, you replied to it in
'ac oy inflaming the polemics" and by "intensifying schismatic
activities." The "campaign culminated in the 4 February article"
which declared that a split is a "phenomenon conforming to laws":
this disgraceful document, like other similar material,. was dis-
tributed in huge numbers and broadcast all over the world by
rac r.o >