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Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP7- $QOM00300020005-3 25X1X4 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 ApprovedeIease 1999/08/24 -03061A000300020005-3 Significant Dates DEC. 6 World Peace Council Presidential Committee Meeting, Berlin, 6-9 Dec 1964 8 Republic of China establishes seat of government at Taipei, Taiwan. Fifteenth anniversary. 1949 8 Pres? Eisenhower advances "Atoms for Peace" proposal in address to UN General Assembly. 1953 8 Yugoslav Communist Party 8th Congress 10 Soviet Bloc abstains as UN General Assembly adopts, 48-0, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948 12 Kew. a to become a republic 14 USSR expelled from League of Nations for unprovoked a gression; against. Poland and Finland. Twenty-fifth anniversary. 1939 15 Preparatory Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow [??] 17 Simon Bolivar dies, 1830 17 Afro Asian Islamic Conference, Bandung, Indonesia [postponed to Feb] 21 Joseph V. Stalin born, 1879 26 Mao Tse-tung born, 1893 JAN. 2 Fidel Castro assumes power, 1959 (Sixth anniversary) 6 Pres. Roosevelt enunciates Four Freedoms: Freedom of speech and expres- sion, of worship; from want and from fear, 1941 8 Charles de Gaulle inaugurated first President of the Fifth Republic , 1959 Sixth anniversary) 10 UN General Assemb3zy opens first session, London, 1946 11 UNGA establishes 12-nation disarmament commission to consider regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, 1952 12 US signs first trade agreement with European Economic Community (EEC), 1962 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 "Approved For Release I 999/08/2 DP78-03061 A000300020005-3 25X1C10b GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #1 Commentary 28 Oct-10 Nov 1964 Principal Developments: 1. The CPSU has continued to affirm, in authoritative editorials and in a major speech by Brezhnev on the 47th anniversary ofthe Soviet "October" Revolution, 7 November, that it will follow the same basic policies, with firm, though "unpolemical," support of all major positions opposed by the Chinese, including that of the necessity for a world Communist conference without further delay. Although specific plans for the December preparatory meeting were not mentioned, the 2 November Tass communique on Moscow talks with the Austrian CP delegation stressed agreement on the need to "continue preparations" for a world meeting "and a meeting of the drafting committee." 2. Prevailing opinion among Moscow observers is that the December' meeting will be postponed, particularly in view of the Chou En-tai talks (see below), but one more highly appraised clandestine report (Noforn) quotes a top-level Czech Party ideologist as asserting as late as 5 Novem- ber that the 15 December meeting will definitely be held in Moscow. Also, an authoritative 4 November clandestine report from Australia states that a 3-man delegation from the CPA to the Moscow preparatory meeting has al- ready booked passages 3. Most of the Soviet-oriented parties, including the 5 which had sent "fact-finding" delegations to Moscow, have apparently decided to ac- cept and support publicly the Soviet action in ousting Khrushchev and to quash further expression of concern regarding his treatment and fate, though sketchy reporting indicates that questions, doubts, misgivings and resentment on this issue are far from settled among most party leaders and rank-and-files The Italian delegation leader publicly admitted that the Soviet explanations were "not sufficient" to make them abandon their "re- servations," though the Party's subsequent resolution played down any lack of harmony. At least one of the visiting Party chiefs, Jesperson of Denmark, acknowledged that he had tried to see Krrushchev but was denied access on grounds of K's severe illness. 4. The Soviet 47th anniversary celebration brought unusually impres- sive high-level delegations to Moscow from most of the world's major CPs -- all ruling parties except the Albanians, who were not invited. The CPSU was admittedly using the occasion for secret political talks on problems of the WCM -- on an individual rather than group basis -- but little reli- able information has leaked out. Particular attention was focused on the strong CCP delegation headed by Premier Chou En-lai, considered the most "diplomatic" and "acceptable" to the CPSU of all top Chinese. Chou was ap- parently endeavoring to persuade the CPSU to agree to another round of bi- lateral talks, postponing further action on calling a world conference in Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 (Commentary cont.) Approved For Release 1999tQW44"0IA-RDP78-03061 A000300020005-3 the interim: as we close, with Chou still in Moscow, the press reports one "inside source" to the effect that the CPSU has agreed and another to'the effect that he is not aware of any agreement. (No mention of K by any of the many Party leaders in Moscow for the anniversary has been reported.) 5. Although it can be said that the Chinese have refrained from polemics since the fall of K, they were coming very close to polemicizing as the period progressed. All Peking papers on the 3rd carried a full page of comments by various other parties and leaders on the ouster, most of them critical of one or more aspects of the action. On the 6th, People's Daily published the full texts of the 17 October and 1 November Pravda editorials, setting forth at length the Soviet intent to adhere to the same policies. On the 7th PD followed with its own editorial which confidently recapitulated its own opposed views, gloated over the histori- cal vindication of its righteous struggle against K's revisionism demon- strated by his downfall (credit Icr ihich was given first to the Soviet people and only second to the Party), and made it clear that any reapproach-- ment with the CPSU would have to be on Chinese terms. Moreover, Chou in Moscow demonstratively visited Stalin's grave. 6. The Albanians, as so often in the past, charged out ahead of the Chinese, placing the blame on K and his group for a long list of betrayals; saying that K's downfall was the result of the struggle of the CCP, the Albanian Party, and their supporters; warning emphatically that K's ex- pulsion does not mark the end of K's revisionism; and pledging that all "Marxist-Leninists" will continue their struggle against "the perfidious line of the 20th and 22nd Congresses" until the "complete defeat" of the revisionists and liquidation of the deformations made in M-L." They de- clare that "many steps must be made in this direction," the most important of which is the proper rehabilitation of Stalin and his work. 7. Glorification of Stalin and demands for his rehabilitation were features of sharp polemics by pro-Chinese dissident elements in various countries: the Austrian Rote Fain went on to ask about the execution or "shameful ouster" by Khrushchev of a host of other prominent Soviet Party leaders, -- MolotovC'the most important living representative of Old Bolshevism"), Malenkov, Kaganovich, Zhukov, Beriya, -- etc. on grounds which have never been divulged. 8. The period brought further evidence of the growing trend toward autonomy and independence among the parties. Various acts of non-conformity have led to speculation that Czechoslovakia may be the next Communist state to follow Rumania on the "independence" trail. The French CP announces that talks with a Yugoslav Party delegation led to agreement on closer collabora- tion, and the Norwegian CP announces that its delegation to Sofia reached a "united viewpoint" with the Bulgarian Party on various questions, includ- ing that of the situation in world comiun:Un,. Most striking of all, per- haps, was the Swedish CP decision to reduce its money-losing daily papers to weeklies and use the savings to set up its own school for party workers, thus ending, its dependence on E. Germany and the USSR for such training. Approved For Release 1999/08124: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 (Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/2 P78-03061A000300020005-3 9. The disarray in the Communist cacao was sharply illuminated as the Italian fellow-traveling Paese Sera published on 30 October a Moscow report describing a 29-point Soviet document of the charges against K. (see Briefly Noted item, with translation of text) -- and the PCI's official daily L'Unita (printed in the same shop) on the next day denied the existence of the 29- point document but listed 14 points of accusation which had been reported from the USSR. On the following day, the Rome independent weekly Espresso published a summary of "Suslov's report" indicting K, supposedly received from E. Berlin -- and Vass on 3 November.denounced this report as a fabrica- tion. Significance: The new CPSU leadership still has not settled down to a definite course: Brezhnev's 7 November speech, trying "to be all things to all men", indicates the uncertainty and vacillations of the new men. In the meantime, however, they keep persuading friends and foes that they will pursue the old Khru- shchevian course even without old K. At the same time, they are making visible progress in whipping their foreign allies and followers back into line, i.e. causing them., from Gomulka down, to make public obeisance to the new regime and to accept the fact that K. has become an "cuzperson". However, close under this smooth surface we perceive continuing disquiet and misgiv- ings on all party levels; corrosive damage to the public image not only of the CPSU but of all Soviet-oriented CPs; and new impetus towards fragmenta- tion, "polycentrism" and autonomy for every national CP. It is still too early to forecast reliably the immediate future of the Sino-Soviet conflict:, Most observers believe that the CPSU has yielded to Chou's persuasion (or heavy pressure from the Italians, Poles, Rumanians, etc.) and agreed to postpone the 26-party preparatory meeting for a world conference for a few months while they undertake another round of bilateral talks with the Chinese, attempting once more (at least for the record) to avoid the impending split in the world movement; there is, however, conflict- ing evidence even on this. It remains still very unlikely that even if a temporary modus vivendi between Moscow and Peking should be reached (and we must not underestimate the strong impact this would have on the Communist movement), this will lead to a satisfying resolution of the basic conflicts between the two great Com- munist powers. Despite the difficulties and pressures under which the new Kremlin leaders are working, they have repeatedly reiterated their firm com- mitment to support all of the major pre-Khrushchev CPSU positions which the Cheese have opposed. On the other side, the Chinese have come very close to resuming polemics in their arrogant reiteration of their "diametrically opposed" (to use their own phr.?ase) positions, and they have practically served notice that any rapprochement will have to be on their terms. The Albanians may again have foreshadowed the Chinese line when they emphasized that it was Khrushchev and his group who were to blame for all the betrayals which they (and the Chinese) have denounced so vituperously in the past, that the removal of K alone can be considered only the first step toward an improvement, the most important single step being the full rehabilitation Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 (Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/ ~ClA-RDP78-03061AO00300020005-3 of Stalin and the "liquidation of the deformations made in M-L" by "the perfidious line of the 20th and 22nd Congresses." This call for the rehabilitation of Stalin also appears in the other pro- Chinese comment which we have seen during this period -- the Austrian Rote Fahne and the Belgian La Voix du Peuple -- and to the Chinese "non-polemical" 7 November statement., although the latter limited itself to crediting Stalin along with Lenin for leading the Soviet people to their great achievements. Treatment: 1. We continue along the lines suggested in Guide #1O, especially a. we keep Khrushchev before world public opinion and prevent his being turned into an "unperson"; b. we expose the Stalinist and Khrushchevist past of the "new men"; c. we contrast what Communist leaders and media said about K before and after 15 October. 2. We chide (gray in Social Democratic or other left-of-center outlets; or black) Soviet-.oriented leaders and parties (Gomuika, the French and Italian CPs, etc.) who at first protested the circumstances of K's ouster and now accept meekly the Kremlin's "line"; we press this line in interviews with Com- munist leaders and other official travelers returning from Moscow. We encour- age all personal acquaintances of K to seek to visit, or communicate with him. We encourage questions about K's disappeared books and pictures (See also Propaganda Note #75/C). 3. We confront the new CPSU leaders -- and Moscow-oriented Communists everywhere -- with the new drive for the "rehabilitation" of Stalin, quoting the Albanian, dissident Belgian and other materials mentioned above. We add black output attributed to Stalinists within the CPSU (Molotov?) and other pro Moscow CPs. We start rumors like construction work at Lenin's mausoleum to restore Stalin?s corpse to its former place of honor. We use cartoons showing Stalin's ghost appearing to Brezhnev & Co. reminding them that they owe their entire careers and their very lives to him, and so forth. 4. We speculate about the role of the KGB in K's downfall, relating it to the Schvirkmann incident, wondering about the future positions of Shelepin and other KGB bigwigs in the new regime and emphasizing that the Soviet Union remains under secret police control. 5. Contingency. If it should be confirmed that the preparatory 26-CP meeting will actually be p o s t p o n e d, while Moscow attempts to ap- pease Mao and stops polemics against the Chinese, we should redouble our efforts to counter such rapprochement -- for instance by black re-distribution of previously produced polemics, of the venomous output of the splinter groups etc. In letters and manifestoes attributed to pro-Soviet and anti Stalinist Communists (in the Bloc as well as in the free world), we should denounce any such postponement as a futile attempt to conceal the real issues, a shameful c a p i t u l a t i o n before Mao's dogmatism, jeopardizing the -_, al- legedly continuing - policy of "peaceful co-existence." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 (Commentary) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 7f 41 28 October-10 November 1964 NOTE: The extensive developments related to the CPSU's ouster of Khrushchev -- mostly focused on the 7 November anniversary of the Soviet Revolution during this period -- make it desirable to handle this issue in two parts like #40, i.e., the first presenting the few other items chronologically and the second a round-up review. October-November: Issue No. 12, October-November 1964, of the elaborately published, Paris-based,pro-Chicom journal Revolution (we have the French edition in hand) announces that during the month of October they are pre- paring in Paris the first numbers of a new series in English and French and in Bogota No. 1 of a Spanish edition for =tin America, representing a total of 50,000 copies. It also announces the following changes: a. D. will become a bimonthly (instead of a monthly), increasing pages of the French edition by 33%, of the English by 50~j, and will include a complete book (this issue prints Stalin's Principles of Leninism); b. The price of the French edition will be increased 15% in Europe and decreased 35% in the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. No increase in the price of the English edition. October 30: In a press conference on his return from Peking, Tomomi Narita, head of the Ja ese Socialist Party delegation which has Just held two weeks of talks with the CCP Chrono, October 14), says that, al- though the talks were deadlocked at times and they failed to reach agree- ment on certain concepts and issues, such as the Chinese nuclear test, they did find a number of "common points" on which they could agree and decided to exchange missions "every other year." November 2: Swedish CP Chairman Hermansson tells a press conference after meeting of the Executive Committee that they will change their money-losing central organ Ny Dag (and its Gothenburg filial Arbetar Tidningen) from a daily to a weekly gazette. The money saved by this change would be used to setup the party's own school for Party workers, thus ending its depend- ence on E. Germany and the Soviet Union for such training. November 3: Tokyo Kyodo agency reports that Yoshio Shiga, who leads a group of other recently expelled pro-Soviet Japanese CP members, would leave for Moscow on the 4th for a visit of a week to 10 days at the invi- tation of "the director of the Marx-Lenin Research Institute." "He re- portedly wants to see Soviet Government and Party leaders and seek their reply to a request made at the end of October by his group ... for clari- fication of reasons for the recent ouster of ... (10." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0306(!A4@992 Q5)3 % Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 November L : Norweaian CP daily Friheten publishes a joint communique on an October visit of an IKP delegation to Sofia for talks with BCP leaders, including First Secy Zhivkov, on matters of common interest -- including "questions concerning the construction of socialism,... the situation in the ICM and the workers movement ...." "The two parties had a united viewpoint on the questions which were taken up.'? November 5: French CP daily L'Humanit6 publishes under a 3-column heading a joint communique -on a two-week visit of a Yugoslav Party delegation for discussions with top FCP leaders which "underlined the necessity and re- ciprocal utility of developing closer collaboration between the FCP and the YLC, with a view to achieving better knowledge and a re-tightening of fraternal ties between the two parties." As our last period ended, delegates from 5 CP's were in Moscow for more explanations about Khrushchev's ouster. The first, from the French CP, had talks with the top figures of the CPSU, including Brezhnev, on the 26th and 27th: the Tass commiunique on the 29th, the day they departed, described "an atmosphere of fraternal friendship and frankness," and said that "the delegations exchanged views and information on questions of in- terest to both parties." They "confirmed the determination of both parties" to pursue common policies of peaceful coexistence, etc., "and to continue ire arations for another international conference of the Communist and workers parties." It made no mention of Ihrushchev or his ouster. Speaking after the delegation made its report to the FCP Central Committee on 6 November, SecyGen Rochet said: "We neither approve nor disapprove, since the resignation came as the result of a decision by the CC of the CPSU." The FCP statement published on the 8th, however, backed the ouster and emphasized opposition to "the leftist and nationalist line" of the Chinese CP leadership. On the 9th, the Paris weekly Express pub- lished a purportedly accurate account of the secret conversations of the delegation with the CPSU leaders according to which the French were not satisfied with the explanations. FCP delegate Leroy reportedly stated: "The 'resignation' of K. means for the FCP the immediate loss of 15 per- cent of its members and 20 percent of those who vote with it." Zxpress said that the French asked 12 times to see K but were refused. The Italian CP delegation met with the top CPSU leaders on 30 and 31 October and on 2 November. When they departed on 3 November, the Tass communique' spoke of "a spirit of friendship and sincerity," said the par- ticipants "confirmed the full resolution of both parties" on vague policy statements, and avoided mention of an international conference or the Khrushchev ouster. At home, however, delegation chief Berlinguer told newsmen on arrival that "these explanations, which certainly deserve great 2 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 attention, did not appear to be sufficient to make us abandon the reser- vations expressed by our Party." ':,uestioned as to whether he had asked to see K, Berlinguer replied: "No. It is a practice of elementary cor- rectness that when two delegations meet they are the delegations desig- nated by the two parties." The resolution approved by the ICP on the 6th accepts in effect the Soviet explanation, pays restrained tribute to the "positive contribution" made by K to "the process of development opened up by the 20th Congress," and "greets with satisfaction the signs of improve- ment" in Sino-Soviet relations while reasserting the ICP's "reservations" about calling a new international conference at this time. Meanwhile, the fellow-travelling Paesa Sera (Rome) described on the 30th a 29-point Soviet document of the charges against K which it said has been distributed to CPSU activists, while on the 31st, the ICP's daily L'Unita, printed in the same shop, denied the existence of a 29- point document, but listed 14 points of accusation which had been "reli- ably" reported. Then the Italian weekly L'Espresso on 1 November pub- lished a "summary of Suslov's report" at the plenum ousting K reportedly received from E. Berlin -- which drew an official Tass denunciation of it on 3 Nov. as "an anti-Soviet fabrication." And the pro-Chicom Nuova Units. on 5 November warned that the removal of It is only "one initial step in the fight against revisionism" and concluded that "the fundamental task facing M-Ls today is to denounce the projected world. Communist conference in Moscow." The Indian, Austrian, and Danish delegates met only with Suslov and Ponomarev, on 30 Oct., 31 Oct., and 1 Nov., respectively. Of particular interest was the Tass coimnunique on 2 Nov. regarding the Austrian talks: it added that both sides "stressed the need ... to continue preparations for a new meeting of the Communist and workers parties and a meeting of the draftinj committee." The few reports we have seen of comments by these delegates after returning home indicate that they have publicly ac- cepted and defended the CPSU action. Danish CP Chairman Jesperson even added the story that K is suffering from sclerosis. The ruling parties of Eastern Europe seemed to have fallen in step with the CPSU, except for the hostile Albanians, the independent Ruman- ians -- and the suddenly non-conforming Czechs. The Czechs' non-conform- ity is not great as yet -- on the 27th Rude Pravo published a round-up of demands for more info on the K ouster by the Austrian, Swiss and Uruguayan CPs and announced that a Czech Party delegation had gone to Paris to exchange views on the ICM with the FCP; Czech editorials con- tinue to omit the 21st Congress from those determining the Leninist line; and the Czech delegation to the 7 Nov. fete in Moscow was headed only by second-rater Hendrych rather than by Novotny (see later) -- but, together with recent radical domestic "liberalization" measures, it has led to speculation that Czechoslovakia may be the next Communist state to follow the Rumanians into "independence." 3 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 The "fact-finding" delegations had barely completed their talks in Moscow when delegations from most parties of the world arrived for the traditional anniversary celebration (47th this year) of the Soviet "October" Revolution on 7 November. The Chinese made world headlines by announcing on the 4th that Premier Chou En-lai would head a strong CCP delegation. Delegations of four ruling parties were headed by their chiefs -- Polish, Hungarian, E. German and Mongolian. Premier Maurer led the Rumanian contingent, and CC Secretary Hendrych of the Czech was the lowest-ranking of Soviet orbit delegates. Yugoslavia's leading ideolo- gist, Vlahovic, headed his party's delegation. The North Korean and North Vietnamese parties sent strong delegations, headed by a CC Vice Chairman and Premier, respectively. Economic boss Guevara represented Cuba. Albania was not invited. Tight secrecy has thus fax cloaked the talks which the CPSU must have conducted with these delegations. However, Chou, staying on after the others departed, was still there at the end of our period, and the press carried unconfirmed "inside" reports that the Chinese were pressing the Soviets to make another effort to avoid a split by holding a new round of bilateral talks before going ahead with plans for a world conference. Overt CPSU statements throughout this period have followed rather closely the 17 October Pravda editorial, i.e., commitment to the general line of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd Congresses, with its emphasis on peace- ful coexistence, support of the test-ban treaty, appeal for unity of the Communist world, and call for an international party conference -- with no mention of a specific time-table. The Soviet refusal to make funda- mental concessions to the Chinese was particularly evident in the key speech delivered by Brezhnev in the presence of Chou and the other leaders of the Communist world at the Revolution anniversary, -- and a Pravda editorial on 10 Nov. again emphasized that "the majority" of the world's parties believe that the time is "ripe" for convening a world conference. Peking papers on 3 November devoted a full page to statements by various CPs and their leaders on the K ouster. On the 6th, People's Dai carried full text of the key 17 October Pravda editorial and of the 1 November Pravda editorial which expanded on it. Then on the 7th, People's Daily carried an editorial devoted to the anniversary, under the title "Unite Under the Banner of the Great October Revolution," which arrogantly made it clear that an ra rochement would have to be on China's terms. It starts with a bow to great Soviet people taught and guided by Lenin and Stalin" who, "are successors to a glorious revolutionary tradition, can be trusted, and will not disap- point ...." It refers authoritatively to its "proposal concerning the general line of the ICM" (the 14 June 1963 CCP letter which drew the 14 July 1963 CPSU "open letter" and thus played a key role in the recent polemical war), and reiterates emphatically its stand on the principal disputed issues, such as the necessity for smashing the bourgeois state 4 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 apparatus with revolutionary violence, for persisting in the dictatorship of the proletariat and carrying the socialist revolution through to the end, etc. Unity 'must be built entirely on the basis of independence ... opposition to all forms of bourgeois nationalism, and of great-nation chauvinism in particular." In order to safeguard unity, "an uncompromis- ing struggle must be waged against all forms of opportunism which betray M-L, especially modern revisionism which is the main danger to the ICM today. PD then gloats over its new victory: "The course of development of the ICM in recent years has amply roved the great historic significance of persevering in the struggle against revisionism. "Khrushchev is the chief representative of modern revisionism. He has betrayed Leninism, betrayed proletarian internationalism, betrayed the path of the October Revolution, and betrayed the in- terests of the Soviet people. The Soviet people and the CPSU [note that "the people" come first] recently removed K from the leading posts he held in the party and state. This is a very good thing, and it has the support of M-Ls and revolutionary people of all the world..... "The Chinese People, taught and guided by the CCP and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, have always had the deepest respect for and confidence in the long-tested Soviet people.... Through no fault of ours, nor of the Soviet peoples, relations between the Chinese and Soviet par- ties and the two countries have met with difficulties and suffered impairment in the past period.... We are convinced that the diffi- culties... are, after all, only a historical episode and can be gradually resolved...." (N.B.: Chou also visited Stalin's grave in Moscow.) The Albanians., ans, as so often formerly, led the May in attacking the CPSU. On 1 November, Zeri I Po -lit featured an editorial "The Fall of Khrushchev Did Not Entail the Disappearance of Khrushchevian Revisionism." It begins: "The inglorious end of N. Khrushchev is the result of the in- transigent-and principled combat waged by all M-Ls who courageously struggled against modern revisionism [MR].... It is a great victory of M-L over MR. "All M-Ls and all revolutionaries regard K's ousting ... as the failure of the political and ideolo ical course of MR, as formulated by the 20th and 22nd Congresses.... 5 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 After a detailed denunciation of K's betrayals, ZIP asserts: "The political liquidation of N. Khruahrhev, although he was the head of modern rev1e onism, does not mse*n liquidation of his ideological, ececonomic, and organizational lticaleline, ?which cause so much harm the USSR, M-L the amp (etc.).... expulsion... has not entailed the death of Khrushchevian_revisionism: it has not liqui- dated his ideology and policy, expressed in the line of the 20th CPSU Congress...." ZIP went even further in its editorial on the Nov. anniversary. In this, the villain is N. Khrushchev and his group," who 'applied themselves to denigrating the Soviet Union, to weakening it, to liquidating the victo- ries of Great October, and to bringing back capitalism." K's ouster is "the result of the firm strug a of the G P the Albanian Workers Party, and other parties which adhere to the positions of M-L and all revolutionary Communists. This is the result of the unmasking of Khrushchevite revision- ists and the result of their profound crisis. This proves once again that he who raises his hand against M-L will be eliminated as a traitor." "But the liquidation of N. Khrushchev d9es not mark the definite end of revisionism.... The M-LB will continue their high-principled str to against Khrushchevite revisionists and a a inst the perfidious line of the 20th and 22nd Congresses until the complete defeat of the revisionists and until the liquidation of the deformations made in M-L. Many steps must be made in this direction. And one of them, incontestably the most important, is to put back in its place the per- son and work of J. V. Stalin and to reject the calumnies of K. revi- sionists against J. V. Stalin.... The pro-Chinese splinter groups in various countries have also carried on bitter polemics against their pro-Soviet rivals. The 1 November issue of Rote Fahne, organ of the Chinese wing of the Austrian Communists, blasted the local Party leadership for its protests against the manner of K's ouster and charged that "They do not speak from any democratic and humanistic con- science, but from shaking fear that the ousting of the chief revisionist, K, in the Soviet Union could also lead to the fall of his most compromised instruments in Austria." "They are those who did not find the smallest blemish when K on his way to power, did not hesitate to execute a whole series of people surrounding Stalin or to have them shot to death without any trial. Has anybod ever demanded an explanation of the shooting of Beriya, or the execution of Abakumov, Poskrebyshev, Bagirov, Rummin, and other functionaries? These executions were carried out on the basis of evi- dence which the public still does not know tod ." 6 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 "And where was this so-recently upset 'democratic feeling' of Fuernberg, Marek, and others when K, so devotedly defended by them, eliminated onr by_ono~Ma.!enl ovZ, 7.r; ., Mot otov, :aganovtch, She~nilov, Zhukov, Fervukhhin., and many other leadj.n&fuii ct? Has anyone ever heard that they objected to ... how, for example, the most impor- tant living representative of Old Bolshevism, who had organized and carried out the October Revolution, Comrade Molotov, was declared an 'enemy emy of the Party' and ousted sh ; efu11. y?" Rote Fahne attributed the recent"drift to the right" of the Austrian Communists to the influence of the Togi1atti.n morn'1um." The 6 November issue of La Voix du Peuple, weekly organ of the Belgian pro-Chinese "party," also redoubled its attacks against the "Khrushchevian traitors" leading the local official party and devoted a whole page to a glorification of. Stalin. Interestingly, La Voix has not once mentioned the names of Brezhnev, Kosygin, or any other leading CPSU figures. (Meanwhile, Drapeau Roue, organ of the official Belgian CP, has gone so far as to advise the Belgian fiscal authorities to investigate the sources of income of the Grippa-led pro-Chinese group, saying that Grippa would have wound up in prison for debt long ago if he had had to pay for his propaganda out of rev- enues in Belgium.) 7 (Chronology) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 25X1C10b L25X6F Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Approved For Release I 999/08/24 : I - DP78-O3O61Abb6s o0 `3 849. STATE OF TL SPACE RACE 25X1C10b SITUATION: On 12 October, the Soviets launched the Voskhod (Sunrise) space capsule with three men aboard, including a doctor (Boris Yegorov) and a scientist (Konstantin Feoktistov) as well as the pilot, Col. Vladimir Komarov. The space capsule was in the air for 24 hours and made 16 loops around the earth before landing. Much was made of the claim that the as- tronauts did not wear special space suits and that they moved freely about the capsule while in orbit: this suggested that the capsule was very spacious, even though three persons were in it. This was the first time that either the Soviets or the US had sent more than one person into space in one spaceship. Such a ship could be used as part of an orbiting space station, and might in future flights make rendezvous with other capsules. Whatever the scientific implications, the propaganda gain for the Soviets was considerable. Their last manned space exploit had occurred over a year before in June 1963 (twin flights of V. F. Bykovskiy and V.V. Tereshkova, the latter the first woman In space), and even Sir Bernard Lovell, usually prone to praise Soviet achievements, had published an article (New Scientist, 9 July 1964; Press Comment,, 3 August he stated that there seems little doubt that the Russians are~fasstxlosingh ground to the Americans." The world had become aware that the Soviets had suffered failures in space shots to Mars, Venus, and the Moon, since Octo- ber 1960, and that the US was building and successfully testing the Saturn rocket system, much larger than anything the Soviets possessed. Now, how- ever, the Soviets have leapfrogged the American space program, Due to slippage, the US is not now expected to orbit a two-man (Gemini) capsule until February 1965, and a three man (Apollo) vehicle will probably not take off from Cape Kennedy until 1967, As the Gemini shots take place, they will be compared unfavorably with Voskhod, so that the Soviets may gain more glory from these forthcoming US events than the US will, NASA plans that, during the second Gemini flight, the astronauts will rise in their seats and open a spaceship hatch; here again the Soviets will have forestalled and excelled the US, at least in regard to free movement. It was at least fortunate for the US that Voskhod itself was pushed off the front pages by the overthrow of Khrushchev, the first Chicom nu- clear detonation, and the British election. Many noticed that while Khru- shchev had wished the astronauts a safe return, it was he who needed good wishes, and who failed to appear at the Kremlin reception. Some observers pointed out that although an initial announcement indicated that there would be a "prolonged flight," and although the crew asked permission to stay aloft, the capsule was returned to earth after the shortest Soviet flight since Gagarinfs; this suggested that something may have gone wrong (Economist, 17 October 1964; Press Comment, 20 October'1964). Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 (849 Cont.) Approved For Release 199 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Unfortunately--and this time unnecessarily--much of the world press was taken in by Soviet language implying that a new, much stronger rocket was used, and some publications even concluded that the Soviets had something bigger than the US Saturn I, which used 1.5 million lbs. of thrust to orbit 36,700 lbs. on 18 September 1964. On 21 October, Soviet scientist M. V. Keldysh stated at a news conference that the Voskhod rocket had developed more thrust than "any other rocket in the world that had so far orbited pay- loads, instrument packages, or people." By qualifying "any other rocket in the world" in this way, Keldysh in effect admitted that the Soviet rocket was less powerful than Saturn: so far, Saturn has only orbited test loads of bal- last ("boilerplate"). As might have been expected, Pravda and Moscow News omitted the qualifying clause when quoting Keldysh. More surprisingly, the New York Times and the Baltimore Sun, while ultimately giving the full state- ment, did not realize the meaning of the qualification, and in their lead paragraphs they simply said that Keldysh claimed the mightiest rocket on earth. Aviation Week and Space Technology (26 October) repeated the most powerful' claim without any qualification, and European newspapers 'IikeVise hailed Soviet primacy in rocket power. The Washington Post (13 and 14 October 1964; Press Comment, 13 and 21 October 1964) quoted US officials as stating that the Soviets mated the upper stage from their planetary exploration program to "the old, tried and true first-stage Vostok booster." (FYI only: Classified analysis shows that the basic Voskhod booster was an SS-6, which has been used in all major Soviet space launches; for an upper stage, a Venik space rocket was employed, re- placing the less powerful Lunik upper stage which had orbited previous manned capsules. The SS-6/Venik combination had been tested in the launching of four recoverable photographic satellites. The Voskhod capsule weighed about 14,000 lbs., as opposed to 10,1+00 for the earlier Soviet manned shots. End FYI.) The Post also reported that these US officials maintain that the Soviets can- not take men to the moon without something near the size of the monstrous 7.5 million lb. thrust of the Saturn V rockets, which will send Americans to the moon, and which are now In production. The Soviets have given no overt sign of building a big new booster, which would be very costly in terms of valuable resources, and for which there is no military necessity. Very likely, Khrushchev disregarded the long-term need for a bigger booster and pushed for an immediate propaganda triumph now, just as he ordered the Virgin Lands and fallow fields plowed up in an attempt to gain a short-term agri- cultural surplus. The full publicity which attends the US space program doubtless made it easy to calculate just what would be needed to take the luster off the next three years of that program. The policy of the new Soviet leaders may differ from Khrushchev's. K. always hoped to overawe the world with space exploits, including their im- plication of an ICBM capability. Between Sputnik I (1957) and the Cuban missile crisis (1962) he seems to have thought that he could pull off a tremendous bluff, using space exploits and rocket-rattling to frighten the West into a surrender. This no longer appears possible today, and the new leaders may not see much point in pouring further resources in trained men and advanced equipment into the space program. But even if they do not build new rockets and space capsules, there are probably items of equipment, already finished, which they can use for a time for propaganda purposes. We may expect further Voskhod-type flights, probably lasting for longer perind.s proved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 JA"Kvroo (849 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/ DP78-03061A00030002Q2%9 -1 Ob 10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 SECRET (84+9 Cont . ) 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/2 A- DP78-03061 A003W0b'0,62J4 851 WH,f. UNIVERSITY REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 25X1C10b SITUATION: In Latin America, the concept "university reform" is at once an academic and administrative program, a political slogan, and a vehicle for Communist penetration of the universities and control of all important phases of higher education. For the students, it is also a "mystique," with such vague and emotion-packed overtones that its devotees do not respond to rational appeals on the subject. The concept of university reform was first articulated in April 1918 at the University of Cordoba by a congress of the newly founded Federacion Universitaria Argentina. This congress was composed of two delegates from each of the five then existing universities in Argentina and is generally regarded as the first National Student Congress. In essence, it was called in rebellion against the apathy and corruption into which the Ar- gentine university system had fallen during the successive dictatorships and liberal regimes of the republic. Ten "statutes" were adopted by the congress, the first two of which have had far-reaching and revolutionary effect: co-gobierno, or student participation in the management of the affairs of the university, and university autonomy. The first statute specified that a university should be governed, not by political appointees and a self-perpetuating staff, but by those most concerned with it: the professors, the students, and the graduates, in equal proportions. The sense of the term university auton- omy, especially as it has been interpreted later, was that the only role of the national government should be that of providing the necessary op- erating funds. For all other activities -- the appointment of a rector (president), the general orientation of the curriculum, the hiring, firing, and promotion of teachers, the management of funds, discipline on the cam- pus, etc. -- the university itself would be solely responsible. Other statutes called for optional attendance on classes, doing away with aca- demic tenure for professors, social (read financial) assistance to the students, and the orientation of the university toward the social problems that face the nation. Latin American universities are patterned after the University of Salamanca, which was an autonomous institution insofar as the relations be- tween Church, state, and clergy allowed in the Middle Ages. But the big difference between then and now is that the monks and lesser clerics (most students were then considered lay clerics) who ran things wer impervious to the penetration of subversive ideas emanating, for example, from the Muslim pagans in Southern Spain. The early colonial universities, those Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Smb@dm m (85J: Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/d8I) ~6IA-RDP78-03061A000300020005 3 of Peru ab1 Mexico, both founded a century before Harvard, were substan- tially democratic organisms, and the students, according to chroniclers of university reform, had the right to elect their own teachers. The. new university, envisaged by the reform, was to be anti-clerical and adopt a policy of laicismo, or secularism, not only for government-supported uni- versities, but for education in general, which would come ultimately to include Catholic universities and other Church-supported institutions in Latin America. Since the Cordoba congress of 1918, university reform has suffered the ups and downs of many other liberal, leftist, and somewhat anti- clerical movements: it has generally thrived under liberal regimes, only to be suppressed under dictatorships. At the present time it has spread to practically every secular institution of higher learning in Latin Amer- ica, either as accepted practice or as a goal to be reached. From the be- ginning, proponents of university reform have had a popular cause. No one will dispute that the old universities needed reforming, and there is ev- ery reason to assume that there was then just as much inefficiency and corruption in managing a university as in handling affairs of state. Un- fortunately, however, while university reform has undoubtedly eliminated many old abuses, it has created new ones, some of a purely academic or administrative nature, and others that constitute a potential danger in the context of the free world struggle against Communism. The fundamental fallacy of university reform, or rather of its two major postulates -- autonomy.khdco-government -- is the assumption that, just because a nation has adopted a democratic form of government, re- sponsive to the will of the majority, one of its components might func- tion under the same system. If one argues with a Latin American student that a warship at sea, a government bureau, or an industrial corporation are managed autocratically within the framework of a greater democracy, he will be likely to reply that the university is a sort of cosmos in itself, or a little world of its own that represents society-as a whole and that the elite corps which composes it is alone qualified to run it. Another fallacy is the assumption that young people are actuated by purer motives than older people. The Cordoba manifesto even asserts that youth ... "is disinterested, it is pure. It has not had time to contami- nate itself. It can never be mistaken in the election of its own educa- tors." Vis-a-vis the rest of the population, students have managed to put themselves on the side of the angels. From arrogating to themselves something of a monopoly of high ideals, it is not a very big jump for the students to assume that superior judgment goes hand-in-hand with their asserted incorruptibility. As a matter of fact, many Latin American stu- dentleaders -- and their followers -- appear to believe sincerely that they are possessed of both. It is the opinion of impartial observers that the basic postulates of university reform are wrong in both theory and practice. By voting themselves voluntary attendance onlolasses, the students have de-empha- sized the spontaneity of classroom'discussions and thereby avoided the 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 ii (851 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/2 4 CIA- kDP78-03061A000300020005-3 healthy discipline of day-to-day preparation. By outlawing entrance ex- aminations, they have contributed to overcrowding the universities with unprepared students. By eliminating such tedious exercises as term papers and insisting on easy, oral examinations, they have reduced the standards of scholarly achievement. Professor K. H. Silvert, after lecturing two years in the University of Buenos Aires and the University of Chile at Santiago, answered a claim by an American colleague to the effect that the Argentine university system was without peer in the rest of Latin America in these words: "I am not competent to say whether the Argentine univers- ity system was or was not the best in Latin America [from 1918 to the ac- cession of Peron], although certainly the Chileans would dispute the claim. In any event, this purely comparative statement does not tell us whether the university was good or bad. It is my opinion that the University of Buenos Aires never was truly a good institution of higher learning." The whole sense of Professor Silvert's report, published by the American Uni- versities Field Staff, is that the University of Buenos Aires, although the largest and probably the best in Latin America, has standards of schol- arship and accomplishment far below those of a mediocre U. S. university. "The situation," he said, "is tragic." Of all the changes brought about by university reform in Latin Amer- ica, perhaps the most harmful has been the so-called c6tedra libre, usu- ally translated as "free teaching,'.' but actually a euphemism for the abo- lition of life tenure for professors. Like other elements of the reform, it was intended to do away with an inveterate abuse: the continuance in teaching positions of incompetent teachers. Under the new system, pro- fessors are subject to periodic examinations and may be removed from their posts, promoted or reduced by decision of the Consejo Universitario (University Council), composed of teachers, students, and graduates in equal proportions. In actual practice, cf,tedra libre has become a device by which students, through their delegates on the council,-can maintain constant pressure on their teachers, even to the point of blackmail. A teacher who does not conduct his classes according to the whim of the stu- dents, or who does not conform to the prevailing orthodoxy, may not be promoted or may be discharged. On the campuses of many Latin American universities, the Communists occupy the controlling elective offices in the student organizations. In all of them, except certain private, Catholic institutions, they are a dynamic, influential element, prepared to assume control at any time. Since university reform was, from its inception, a leftist and anti-cler- ical movement, it was not only natural, but has been easy, for the Com- munists to seize control of it and use it to"their own ends. Therefore, student participation in university administration has not only prevented Latin American universities from keeping pace with their U. S. and European counterparts in purely academic matters, it has also opened the door for Communist penetration and control of the whole univers- ity system. Communist influence, exerted primarily at the university level, is little by little being exerted, through the new generations of teachers, in the primary and secondary levels of education as well. It is safe to 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 (851 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/~ A-RDP78-03061 A000300020005-3 say that the majority of Latin American students enter the university with their minds already well filled with the usual Communist cliches, and a fanatical minority are prepared to engage in active struggle as militant Communists. 25X1C10b AW 25X1C1Oc 4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 is r (851 Cont.) 5X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 CPYRGHT Reprint of Article in Paese sera 30 Oct 61., Rome [owned by Italian C.P.1 The So vi?ct CoTmwnist Party is beCinning to reply to the innun,ra'ule questions brought up by the more vigilant and attentive public opinion of the country. There is beginning a heavy job of orientation among the masses to parry certain dangers that could occur after the resignation of Khrush- chev: the danger of a weakening of the impetus of youth, of the initiation of a certain lack of political direction, and a certain ideological fatigue among the intellectuals and vast strata of workers. The Soviet Coiiuuuzist Party is beginning to reply, and it is doing it in a comprehensive manner, circulating its orientations in all places of work, in party buildings, and in the 300,000 so-called primary organizations (cells), so that its indi- cations can reach out everywhere to all the members of the immense army of 11 and a half million Soviet communists and, through them, to all the pop- ulation. The ideological section of the central party apparatus has been issuing certain explanatory documents during the past few days to all the peripheral party bodies. These documents are like instructions for the use of acti- vists, containing a series of indications which speakers at all factory and cell meetings use as an aid to face the difficult and embarrassing topic of the fall of Khrushchev. These documents are of different types and sorts according to the cate- gory of citizens to which they are addressed. Their circulation is strictly internal, and they are not for publication in newspapers. However, because of their widespread circulation -- there is talk of a circulation of 750,000 copies -- we were able today to learn with suffi- cient exactitude, on the basis of careful summaries, the contents of two of these instructions: one for local propagandists of Komsomol in student circles, and the other for party activists at the meetings that are in progress these days for the election of officers in rank-and-file bodies. Both contained a quantity of material to be used to answer questions that Soviet public opinion is asking about the silent cataclysm of October 13 and 14. The fundamental part of these texts records the criticism made against the ex-Premier, listed in 29-points. The charges are grouped in a pamphlet for Komeoma1 propagandists. Komsomol is the communist youth or- ganization of the Soviet Union. These pamphlets serve to provide a unified and comprehensive reply to the question of why Khrushchev was deposed. The (Italian) public already knows about a good many of these charges, since we repeatedly published some of them during the first days after the overthrow of the Premier. But there are about a dozen which are completely unpublished, and for the first time a confidential publication of the party groups all of them together in a comprehensive manner. They are grouped in pproved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A0003000 0005-3 ~{ {Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 CPYRGHT four large parts: Domestic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Communist Movement, and Personal Behavior of Khrushchev. Here is a list of the points in order, which was given to us by an excellent source, and added to them in some cases are the specific arguments suggested to the activists to better ex- plain every single point. Domestic Affairs. 1. Errors and profound contradictions in agricultural management. In 1957 Khrrushchev fought, against Molotov, for an extensive agriculture, for the initiation of cultivation of the virgin lands. But in February 1961+, also following the disastrous harm done by erosion in those areas that had just been put to the plow, he was forced to call for intensive farming and suspend efforts in the virgin lands. In March 1962 he carried on an all-out campaign against the system of rotation of forage crops and sustained the necessity to grow maize instead of grasses. But in May 1961 he was forced to admit that not always and not everywhere -- for example, in the Baltic countries -- is it advantageous to grow maize instead of grass. 2. Administrative and organizational confusion. In 1956 he fought against Molotov, originator of a wide-scale administrative centralization (plan), and came out in favor of de-centralization. But recently -- only a few months ago -- he returned to positions that are identical to those of Molotov. In November 1962 he launched a wide-scale general reorganiza- tion of the forty-seven regional economies of the Soviet Union, widening their scope and reducing their number to seventeen. In this way, there were created entangled relations between one area and another which led to conflicts of competence in the true sense of the word. Typical among these was a long controversy between the Bratsk region and the Irkutsk region, following the new reorganization, which led to delays in building roads and other public works. 3. Errors in planning. He presented to the plenum, and had it ap- proved unanimously, a complex project that placed the planning organization, Gosplan, under the jurisdiction of a super-planning body, the Supreme Coun- cil of the Economy. But confusion increased, as Khrushchev himself admitted in December 1963 (Plenum on Big Chemistry). 1+. Incorrect policy on light industry. For the past few years, Khrushchev had insisted on an excessive increase in allocations to produce consumer goods and to make the business structure smoother, putting into effect in September 1961+ certain changes that upset the work of technical experts and economists. 5. Underestimation of the role of heavy industry. The allocations in this sector are not, in proportion, satisfactory and adequate in terms of the directives for the development of the Soviet Union as a world power of the very first water. Grave defects occurred -- because of deficiencies attributed to Khrushchev directives -- in the production of sheet steel, to such an extent that it was necessary to import it from Italy and Germany. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 CPYRGHT Isufficient pace characterizes the replacement of old machinery. Certain errors were committed following the discovery of extremely rich deposits of ferrous material near Kursk, because of the misplacement of the new steel factories destined to process the ore, and because of the failure to oper- ate with technical methods adequate for the exceptional quality of the new deposits that were discovered. 6. Tax pressure. In 1960 there was an announcement of an imminent re- duction of taxes. But these reductions were postponed indefinitely because of intricate technico-financial reasons. 7. Mistaken building policy. At the end of the preceding state eco- nomic plan (1958) he was vividly in opposition to the designers and tech- nicians of the so-called reconstruction plan of Moscow. He declared him- self to be strongly against the large low-cost buildings of nine, fourteen and twenty stories suggested by the planners for reasons of economy, and adopts on a very large scale the small building policy -- housing unit of five or six stories at most. But later -- in the spring of 1963 -- he returned to the previously contested concept of the gigantic buildings, involving edifices of twenty- two stories in the central Moscow zones of Arbad and Sokol. 8. Mistaken city planning policy. He fought against the projects of the city planners who want to avoid in Moscow oil-slick expansion by creat- ing sputnik cities or directional residential centers in the extreme periph- ery. But he wound up by accepting their idea. He fought against the con- cept of the foot-bridge of the American type, demanding instead underground passages (which, it must be said, are technically more familiar to the So- viets, because of the brilliant experience of the subway of Moscow, Lenin- grad and Kicurt. 9. Inopportune and heavy-handed intervention into cultural matters. e famous speeches of Khrushchev of December 1962 and March 1963 in re- ard to socialist realism which has thus lost part of what little prestige t once had. 10. Untimely literary intervention in the question of Sivan Denis- ovic. In November 1962 the literary review Novy Mir, which for months ad been fighting for the publication of the novel, A Day in the Life of lexandr Solzhenitzvn (a. work based on " e theme of the terrible life in he Stalinist concentration camps), received unhoped for help: it was Pumshchev in person who asked for the publication of that work. This ntervention is today reproved because Solzheniczynts novel brought to light an ugly past. According to today's accusors, it should have been ignored and, above all, been made to be ignored. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: 3 CIA-RDP78-03061A00030066065-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 CPYRGHT Foreign Affairs: 11. Decline in prestige of the foreign ministry: Khrushchev, with his policy of personal contacts, many times crudely went over the head of the ministerial organs of government, without even informing them of what he was doing, and reduced the complex, efficient, and well organized diplo- matic network of the USSR to a simple information service, from which he acquired this or that notion that was useful to him at a given moment. 12. Doubtful result of the trip made in June of this year to the Scandinavian countries. A political result was awaited, whereas it pro- duced only an economical result of reduced proportions (ship orders, pur- chase of heads of cattle, etc.). 13. Danger of worsening relations with the Scandinavian countries. It was caused by some arguments, if only of a friendly nature, between the Soviet leader and the Swedish Premier Tage Erlander in regard to the asylum given by Sweden to the Ukranian emigrant Stechko and to Swedish aggression in the Ukrania, at the time of Charles XII. 14. Contradictory and only slightly firm attitude during the crisis of Cuba (October 1962). At first he publicly declared that there are no Soviet missiles in Cuba. Then he admitted their presence on the island. The result was that he had to retreat before the overbearing and illegal attitude of the United States, which loosed a sea blockade. 15. Dangerous thoughtlessness during the Suez crisis (October 1956). With his threatening, and fortunately very effective, ultimatum, Khrushchev involved the Soviet armed forces in the possibility of intervention, thus carrying the country to the brink of war without having consulted with sufficient clarity the high leadership bodies of the USSR. 16. Dark clouds over the relations with the member countries of the Comecon. Khrushchev rejected the five-year Soviet Plan, 1966-1970, which was the first one drawn up in collaboration with the countries of eastern Europe and which also took into account the interests of these countries. 17. Worsening in relations with Rumania. In talks with the Rumanian leaders in the past years, Khrushchev insisted on their abandoning some branches of industrial production (above all, metalmechanics), seeking to induce them to augment the production of vegetables and fruit, so as to have Rumania limit her role to simply that of vegetable-grower for the Comecor 18. "Druzhba" oil pipe line. He had the project for the Druzhba oil pipeline carried out and left aside Rumania, thus depriving this country as a market outlet for her petroleum. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: 6lA-RDP78-03061A000300dd66b1 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 CPYRGHT Communist Movement. 19. Internal disorganization of the Soviet Communist Party. Khrush- chev imposed in November 1962 a radical reform of the internal structure of the party, which completely suppressed the District Committees (Raykom), depriving automatically of authority a few thousand local leaders and re- placing their jobs with a two fold organization (Directorate of Production for Industry and Directorate of Production for Agriculture). Consequent to this there was an extremely wide scale organizational bogging down and decay. 20. Style of operation in the ideological dispute. The leader gave in more than once to the temptation to descend to the level of personal, episodic battle, far from the elevated terms of the political ideological dispute. 21. Errors in the conduct of the anti-Chinese polemics. The policy of the First Secretary led the Soviet Communist Party almost to the entrance of a dead-end street, committing the prestige of the Soviet Communist Party in the preparation of a conference that is opposed not only by the Chinese, but also various western communist parties. 22. Personal behavior. Nepotism. The already known incidents (Adzhubei, Director of Iszvestia,. Nina Petrovna, head of a cultural association,. Rada Khrushcheova Adzhubei, assistant editor of a magazine., Sergei Khrushchev, head of an important bureau) are supplemented by Khrush- chev's attempt to have Adzhubei made a member of the Central Committee and the Secretariat. 23. Edginess, intractableness, in personal relations. Recently, perhaps because of his advanced age, Khrushchev has had clashes with his closest collaborators. 24. Steps taken without consulting the plenum of the Central Commit- tee. An example is entrusting Adzhubei, who had been invited to West Ger- many by a group of six German newspapers, with a special diplomatic mission. Another example, retained inopportune, was the awarding to Egyptian Presi- dent Nasser of the title, "Hero of the Soviet Union." 25. Acceptance of forms of the personality cult with himself as object of the cult. The case history presents very frequent and rich ma- terial in this regard. 26. Question of form and attitudes that endanger the decorum and prestige of a leader of the Soviet Union. The shoe beaten on the desk at the United Nations, and certain crude, peasant-like expressions both at meetings with representatives of various communist parties and in public (one can recall the famous speech to the peasants of central Russia devoured by bedbugs "no less avid than the Ukrainian bedbugs"). Another example: the plate of goulash in his speech to the Hungarian workers, in April of this year, at Budapest. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 CPYRGHT 27. Uncontrolled outbursts which endangered and aggravated relations with brother parties. At the reception at Dom Priomov in honor of the Chinese delegation, in July 1963, Khrushchev allowed himself to be carried away by anger and insulted the head of the delegation, Teng Shao-ping and his co-workers, Pen-cen and Wu Hsiu-chaun. He said to them that they were the bearers of the "policy of madmen." 28. Declarations made in public with a thoughtlessness such as to give rise to long and violent anti-Soviet press campaigns. One of the most frequent examples of phrases on his lips was the one, addressed to the cap- italists, "We will bury you." 29. Rashness in decisions. An example is when he spoke to the Japa- nese members of parliament of the Soviet "super weapon," about which he was later forced to make contradictory and embarrassing corrections. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CAA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Excerpts from Algemeen Handelsblad Amsterdam 30 Oct 64 Nibelungen in Paris "Everything suggests that de Gaulle is disappointed with results of his striving for 'independence from America.' In fact he has had little success. His proposal for a NATO triumvirate was not accepted. The French- German treaty has become a scrap of paper and does not prevent Bonn from binding itself via the MGF still closer to Washington. French recognition of Communist China has annoyed the U.S. but produced no other results. De Gaulle's Latin American tour aroused popular enthusiasm., but the gov- ernments know well that France has much less to offer than the U.S. and West Germany does not intend to help the French take pot shots at the U.S. The only 'success' of de Gaulle's self-willed posture is that the new Russian leaders are playing up to him. He nevertheless threatens to car- ry arbitrary actions so far as to let the EEC and NATO break up. "De Gaulle's threats are unfortunately reminiscent of Nibelungen. If the hero loses, he wants to drag everyone else with him in his downfall. Is this a reason to let him succeed? By no means. "First, other European nations can manage better without France than France can without Europe. If angry Paris should walk out of EEC or NATO it would be an important development but would not prevent these organiz- ations from continuing their activities while keeping the door open for France after it regains its senses. "Second, the French are supposed to be a logical people and the Nibelungen sort of heroism will not fascinate them long. The General him- self has demonstrated that he can face setbacks with stoicism, but should he this time prove wrong, the voters will intervene. "Finally, it is clear that the majority of Europeans do not support de Gaulle's policy and prefer partnership with the U.S. as envisaged in Kennedy's grand design. Should the majority let itself be blackmailed by the minority, even if the leader of the minority threatens with political suicide? We believe the majority has the right and the duty to stick to its guns. It is the thankless task of the Netherlands to stress this con- stantly." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 25X1C10b Fact Sheets November 1964 COMPLETED [Note: This is only an outline list of events, as shown, for example, by the fact that as of the end of 1963 the US had launched 138 earth satellites, and the Soviets had launched 33 such satellites. Dates given are those of launching.] 4 Oct 1957 - Soviets launch Sputnik I. 31 Jan 1958 - US sends Explorer I into orbit. 2 Jan 1959 - Soviets send Lunik I into orbit around the sun. 1 Apr 1960 - US launches Tiros I weather satellite. 12 Aug 1960 - US launches Echo I passive communications satellite. L. Oct 1960 - US launches Courier I-B active communications satellite. 10 - 14 Oct 1960 Soviets fail in two attempts to send probes to Mars. 4 Feb 1961 - Soviets fail to eject Venus probe from orbit. 12 Feb 1961 - Soviets eject Venus probe from orbit, but radio fails. 12 Apr 1961 - Maj. Yuri Ga arin sent into orbit by Soviets, the first cosmonaut. tone circuit of earth) 5 May 1961 - Cdr. Alan B. Shepard, Jr. makes sub-orbital space flight. 21 July 1961 - Capt. Virgil I. Grissom makes sub-orbital space flight. 6 Aug 1961 - Maj. Gherman Titov makes 17 orbit space flight. 26 Jan 1962 - US Ranger III moon probe :Inters space at too high velocity, misses moon. 20 Feb 1962 - Col. John H. Glenn, Jr. orbits earth 3 times for US. 26 Apr 1962 - First international satellite, Ariel, uses US vehicle to carry 6 British experiments. 24 May 1962 - Lt. Cdr. Scott Carpenter makes 3 orbit space flight. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A0003000220005-3 ont. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 11 - 12 Aug 1962 Maj. A. G. Nikolayev and Lt. Col. P. R. Popovich sent 25 Aug 1962 - into orbit on successive days. Speculation that their spaceships were intended to meet in space. Soviet Venus probe fails to leave orbit. 27 Aug 1962 - Successful US Venus probe (Mariner II). (Passed Venus in Dec 1 Sep 1962 - Soviet Venus probe fails to leave orbit. 28 Sep 1962 - First Canadian earth satellite, Alouette; first satellite 3 Oct 1962 -- not US or Soviet-built. (Launched with US rocket.) Cdr. Walter M. Schirra orbits earth 6 time. 2 Apr 1963 - Soviet moon probe (Lunik IV), misses moon by 5300 miles. 15 May 1963 - Maj. Gordon Cooper orbits earth 22 times. 14+ -16 June 1963 Lt. Col. V. F. Bykovskiy orbits earth 81 times; after two 16 Oct 1963 - 25 Jan 196+ - 29 Jan 196+ - 25 Mar 19611. - 31 Mar 1964 - 2 Apr 196+ - 8 Apr 196+ - 29 Apr 1964 - 15 May 196+ - 6 July 1964 - days, Jr. Lt. Valentina V. Tereshkova also orbited, first woman in space. US launches first nuclear detection satellites, to detect test-ban treaty violations. Echo II orbited. Saturn rocket orbits 10 ton payload. Italy's San Marco Project successfully testfires 230 lb. capsule to 150 miles altitude off Kenya coast. US spokesmen say Soviets failed in Venus probe attempts in February and mid-March. Soviets launch rocket from earth satellite to undisclosed target. 1st US Gemini (two-man) capsule orbited empty in test. NASA says Soviets failed in launching apparently aimed at moon. Soviet space scientist says Soviet astronauts suffered afte.r- effects of weightlessness. (COSPAR meeting, Florence, Italy.; European Space Research Organization (ESRO) successfully launches first scientific payload, using British Skylark rocket. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 2 (Cont. ) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3 28 - 31 July 1964 Ranger 7 launched successfully, carrying six TV cameras. Transmits 4316 photos of moon, down to 1760 feet. 18 Sep 1964 - Saturn rocket lifts dummy Apollo (3-man) space capsule. 36,700 lb. capsule-2nd stage combination placed in orbit. 12 Oct 1964 - Soviets orbit 3-man Voskhod spaceship: Col. V. M. Komarov, K. Feoktistov, Dr. B. B. Yegorov. PLANNED Jan - Feb 1965 Launching of Saturn SA-9 to orbit Pegasus meteoroid detection satellite. Feb 1965 Launching of US Gemini (two-man) spacecraft; crew: Maj. Virgil Grissom and Lt. Cdr. John W. Young. (Backup crew: Cdr. Walter M. Schirra and Maj. Thomas P. Stafford.) Max 1965 Launching of Saturn SA-8. June-July 1965 Launching of Saturn SA-10. 1967 Current target for first Apollo (3-man) space flights. 1970 Current target for US flight to the moon. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020005-3