BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 1, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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I March 1965
Briefly Noted V
Reflection of Party versus State
Leadership in the USSR
Rivalry?
Wolfgang Leonhard,
well-known journal-
ist, Sovietologist? a graduate of
the COMINTERN school in MOSCOW and
a one-time instructor at the East
German party university, has pub-
lished (on 22 January 1965, in Die
Zeit, Hamburg) an article entitled,
"Wer regiert das rote Reich?" ("Who
Rules the Red Empire?"). Leonhard's
thesis is that there is a long-
standing controversy between the
CPSU and the State apparatus in the
Soviet Union, and that since the
fall of Khrushchev, the State has
regained some of the authority which
it lost to the Party during the post-
Malenkov period. Leonhard suggests
that in the current situation, a
shift in the relative strength of
the two "pillars" will probably have
effects on the relative status of
the two men who head them; in other
words, Kosygia may be gaining power
at the expense of Brezhnev. In the
long run, the present shift may rep-
resent an inevitable trend towards
a loss of party control, due to the
increasing complexity of the Soviet
society and economy, too complicated
to be effectively controlled through
ideologically-oriented Party offi-
cials who lack technical knowledge.
Our evaluation of Leonhard's ar-
ticle is that he somewhat stretches
his evidence; he does not really
prove that the Party-State rivalry
now exists. But his thesis is plau-
sible, and can be useful in propa-
ganda. Either by replaying Leon-
hard's article or by original treat-
ment along the same general line, we
can make the Party-State rivalry a
subject of discussion. This will
tend to make such a rivalry actually
develop, especially if Soviet and
other Communist audiences learn of
the discussion. Watch in particular
for Soviet articles and statements
which can be interpreted as evidence
of such a rivalry; black use of such
statements, aimed at Soviet elites,
should be considered.
In other play, develop Leonhard's
argument that the Party is no longer
able to run the Soviet economy effec-
tively. Khrushchev's efforts to im-
pose Party control should be portrayal
as a vain attempt to turn back the
clock, while the present leaders are
carrying out the logic of the bureau-
cratic machinery established by Sta-
lin. A conclusion could be that
revolutionaries neither build nor
run modern economies.
Leonhard's article is an attach-
ment to this Biweekly.
* * *
Justice Statutes of Limitation
is the
CPSU Justice is what those
who control the CPSU say
it is -- for the Soviet
people as well as their leaders.
Many currently powerful offi-
cials in the Soviet Union aided and
abetted Stalin in purging those col-
leagues his paranoic mind feared.
Their role was that of bearing false
witness, a crime officially punishable
by two to seven years imprisonment.
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But there is a statute of limita-
tions -- ten years at the most on
this crime.
Stalin died in 1953. so it would
appear that the current leaders who
gave false testimony for Stalin, are
safe -- unless the law should be
changed and the limitation period
extended.
Looking further into Soviet
statutes, it is clear that some de-
gree of arbitrariness is written into
the laws. Prosecution for crimes
subject to the death penalty, for ex-
ample, can be limited in time. But
use of this statute of limitations is
optional; and more and more crimes
are subject to the death penalty, e.g.,
economic. Conviction for economic
crimps is not difficult to obtain and
scapegoats for economic problems are
often needed. Since the CPSU controls
the courts, a large sector of the So-
viet population is in jeopardy of ar-
bitrary action against them by the
CPSU. History records that Communist
officials have known no compunction
against reaching far back into the
past, fictionalizing charges or im-
posing ex post facto interpretations
on actions. Statutes of limitations
are meant to prevent such action and
to protect the citizen -- but they
cannot be counted on, in the Soviet
Union.
* * *
STORED SOVIET WEAPONS
ENDANGER LIVES
If your country is receiving
armaments (gifts?) from the
Soviet Union,
the PEOPLE should know.
See Press Comment, 24 Feb 1965
for an article from a Caracas,
Venezuela paper, El Mind?.
The story comes from a Doctor who
treated soldiers for radioactive
illness. They were guards at the
caves where Castro stored the
Soviet warheads of large rockets
in 1962, and currently the small
atomic rockets.
The Doctor explains the causes of
the illness -- and its effect
upon the guards.
Where the question of the West
German Statute of Ltmitations on
war crimes (due to expire in May
after 20 years, unless extended)*is
raised, we ignore it and discuss_So-
viet practices, pegging them to cur-
rent events whenever possible. Or,
we raise questions about the involve-
ment of current Soviet leaders in
crimes of the past (either with Sta-
lin or Khrushchev) and discuss the
significance of the Soviet system of
justice in general.
*The cabinet has agreed to ask the Bundestag
2
Press Comment includes an
English translation of the
Spanish language article:
and the El Mundo
cartoon, in reproducible
proof form.
See pages 36-40 for
"Cubans Guarding Soviet
Rockets Suffer Radioactive
Contamination."
to extend.
* * *
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kBriefly Noted.)
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Significant Dates
NAR
14 Karl Marx dies. 1883 (Born 5 May 1818)
15 Ten-nation Disarmament Conference opens, Geneva. Fifth anniversary. 1960
21 World Youth Week starts. Celebrated by Communist WFDY. Twentieth anni-
zaKaaa of World Youth Council, predecessor to WFDY.
25 Treaties creating European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom signed by
France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. 1957
28 Sixteen leaders of Poland's Home Army and Govt-in-exile, invited to
Soviet Occupation Hdqrs under safe conduct: arrested for "diversionary
activities" and sentenced to up to 10 years in prison. Twentieth anni-
versary. 1945
APR
1 II Afro-Asian Journalists Conf., Algiers (sponsor: Chicom-Indonesia
dominated AAJA) once postponed.
10 International Auschwitz Committee, General Session (FIR) -- commemorating
20th Anniversary of Camp Liberation, Auschwitz, Poland, 10-11 April 1945.
11 International Day of Liberation from Fascism ("Day of Remembrance") cele-
brated annually by International Fed. of Resistance Movements (FIR -
Communist).
13 II International Conf. for Teaching Resistance History, (sponsored by FIR)
Prague, Czechoslovakia, 13-15 April.
17 Nikita Khrushchev born, 1894.
18 Easter, traditional Peace marches,e.g., Aldermaston (UK) and Western Euro-
pean countries.
18 Bandung Conf. (29 Afro-Asian countries call for elimination of colonialism,
for self-determination and independence, for UN membership all peoples)
18-27 April 1955. Tenth anniversary. [Note: Chou En-lai and Marshal Chen I
reportedly accepted invitations to celebrations in Indonesia.]
22 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin born. 1870 (Died 21 January 1924)
24 World Fed. of Democratic Youth (WFDY) Exec. Committee meeting and seminar,
Accra, Ghana -- to prepare for 9th World Youth Festival now scheduled mid-
summer, Algiers.
24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and for Peaceful Coexistence celebrated
by WY and IUS.
29,-30 Hitler commits suicide. Berlin. World War II. 1945 Twentieth anni-
versary.
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GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
44(
#47 Commentary 3-16 February 1965
s:Principal pevelopment
1. As last period ended, a top-level Soviet delegation headed by
Premier Kosygin was departing on a trip to Hanoi seen by most observers
as aimed to bring the North Vietnamese Party closer to the CPSU, and
perhaps even to induce them to attend the 1 March preparatory commission
meeting in Moscow. The itinerary was subsequently expanded to include
1-day stopovers in Peking en route to and from Hanoi and a 3-day visit
to North.Korea en route back to the USSR. Kosygin's visit was greatly
complicated by Vietcong attacks on U.S. troop quarters andALS. retaliatory
air strikes in North Vietnam beginning the day after his arrival. Kosygin
became increasingly militant in his public denunciations of the air strike
"provocations" in particular and U.S. imperialism in general, and signed
a relatively bland joint statement of mutual views in Hanoi, nothing in
Peking, and a more harshly anti-U.S. joint statement in Pyongyang. Al-
though, as usual, strict security was Observed regarding all talks and
we have no information of any secret agreements, most observers believe
that Kosygin went no further than to offer increased moral and material
support and to urge attendance at the I March Moscow meeting as a means
of consolidating unity. There is no evidence that he succeeded in the
latter effort.
2. The 15th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and
mutual assistance (14 February) brought expressions on both sides about
unbreakable fraternal ties. On the Soviet side, these expressions were
stronger than in recent years when Moscow had implied that the treaty had
lost its original meaning. China, however, was unyielding and Peking
People's Daily even went so far as to refer specifically to the CCP 25-
point] 14 June 126 "proposal for a _general line of the ICM" -- which
really touched off the open warfare between the two -- as the only basis
for unity.
3. We have seen two public Communist Party references to the 1 March
preparatory meeting, both reiterated endorsements by parties whose support
has not been in doubt: Mongolian First Secretary Tsedenbal in a 5 February
speech and the East German SED in a Politburo report to an 11-12 February
plenum, reported in Neues Deutschland 14 February.
4. The Rumanians continue their independent ways, publishing crit-
icism of Czech views on Comecon. Although they have apparently not form-
ally withdrawn from Problems of Peace andlSocialism, they have distributed
no copies of the Rumanian edition since last August.
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5. A 4 February Pravda article, signed by an unidentified and obscure
name, "A. :Veber," made an unprecedented acknowledgxent of the successes
of the social democratic parties in the West in "expressing demands of the
working masses, in leading them, and in achieving ... positive results in
everything concerning everyday vital interests of the working people."
Communists, it said, are led to "change some of their attitudes which no
longer correspond with the objective situation," and to draw some "basic
conclusions" on the democratic tenets of social democracy. It concluded
that Communists "cannot ignore the fact that a more or less substantial
coincidence of views on a number of basic questions makes contacts and
cooperation possible."
6. The Albanians, 16 February, renewed their call for the Soviet com-
rades to join all true Marxist-Leninists in throwing out the "Khrushchevite
traitors" (the present Soviet leaders who removed K. not because they op-
posed his course but to save revisionism). (The last and most strident
previous Albanian call for the Soviet rank and file to arise and throw out
the K. leadership came in the AWP "open letter to CPSU members" of 5 Octo-
ber 19641 on the very eve of K's ouster!)
Significance:
At the time of this writing, it is still doubtful whether Kosygin's
trip satisfied his and the CPSU Presidium's intentions: of course, we
cannot be sure what exactly the original purpose of his trip had been.
Ideological reconciliation between Moscow and Peking seems as far away as
ever -- but a military-tactical understanding to aid North Vietnam and to
exploit the U.S. predicament in Southeast Asia cannot be excluded.
There is still no conclusive evidence that the I March preparatory
commission meeting will be held (or that it will not). We consider it
possible that representatives of 18 or 19 of the 26 parties designated
may meet and address themselves to the problem of restoring a semblance
of unity, -- but it is unlikely that they can at this tile reach agreement
on organizing a world conference.*
The 4 February Pravda article may foreshadow another reversal of Com-
munist tactics concerning the Social Democrats, possibly a return to the
"united front from above" or "popular front" tactics endorsed by the 7th
Comintern Congress 1935 (to which the article alludes). Thus far, the
article has remained isolated: we have seen as yet neither follow-ups in
Soviet media, nor reactions in the foreign Communist or Social Democratic
press. It may be a trial balloon: it may have limited meaning for cur-
rent united front efforts in France and Italy and as an encouragement of
certain left-wingers in the British Labor Party. Or, it may have more far-
reaching significance, constituting perhaps even an implicit admission of
the failure of the Communist Parties in the advanced industrial countries
and a concession to similar heretical thoughts developed in the Italian CP
since Togliatti's political testnment, notably by Amendola. For the time
being, we watch further developments and reserve definitive judgment.
*Editor's note: delegates were gathering for the meeting in Moscow at
the end of February.
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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#47
3-16 February 1965
January (delayed) In the January issue of the Rumanian Party monthly
Journal, Lupta de Classa, an article sharply criticizes Czechoslovak
views that members of COMECON should adapt their economies to "higher
forms of economic cooperation," pegging the attack to a 1964 book by
Czech economic expert Prof. Jiri Novozamsky. Lupta strikes hard at
Novozamsky's proposals to establish joint industrial concerns (which
would lead to "serious economic and political complications in relations
between socialist countries") and for the opening of borders (identical
with 'the liquidation of state frontiers"). Observers also note that
no copies of the Rumanian edition of Problems of Peace and Socialism
have been distributed in Rumania since Aigust, 1964, when the delayed
and censored issues of May, June and July were circulated over a fort-
night. (The other editions still list Rumanian as one of the languages.)
January 29 (delayed): Part II of the long article by disillusioned
veteran Swedish Communist Strand, started on January 22 (Chrono #46),
appears in Ny Dag and Stockholm Tidningen: his theme is that no one
takes Swedish Communists seriously because they propose policies which
are now being abandoned as failures in Communist-ruled countries, and he
discusses these failures at length.
January 30 (delayed); Italian Cr' weekly journal Rinascita publishes full
translation of January Kommunist article on CPI discussions about creating
a single party of the working class (first reported by L'Unita on Jan.
23 see Chrono #46). A prefatory note by editor Pajetta gently takes
exception to Kommunist's "drastic formulation" in which "the (Italian)
Party leadership and its theoretical organs are said to have rejected
the theses of Comrade Amendola." Pajetta asserts that the debate is
continuing: "About the inquiry, its methods, and its results, we shall
have to write more than once in Rinascital and the comrades from Kommunist
will still have to give much information, we hope."
February 4: Pravda features 3,000-word article by A. Veber, "The Communists
and the Social Democrats." The first half is orthodox Communist comment
on the decline of the socialists since the split of the 2nd International
during World War One, their lack of success, and the "painful process
of reassessing values taking place" in some of them today. Then, using
"the problems of war and peace" as a bridge, he asserts that "there are
socialists today who are coming closer to the Communists in their attitude
to many problems of external and internal policy." He goes on:
"Historical development has removed or changed some problems
and attitudes which in the past were deliberately dividing Com-
munists and socialists and were thrusting the latter back to
the positions of the bourgeoisie. Undoubtedly, changes taking
place in the world under the influence of the forces of socialism
lead the Communists to change some of their attitudes which no
longer correspond with the objective situation....
(Chronoloov Cnnt )
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"The conferences of the fraternal parties of 1957 and 1960,
the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses dealt a resolute blow to sectarian
and dogmatist trends remaining from the past. The Communists take
into account the fact that social dlmocracy has deep traditional
roots in the workers' movement in the West, that it presents one
of its influential trends and cannot indiscriminately be regarded
as an agent of the bourgeoisie. The social democratic parties,
at least at certain moments, have succeeded in expressing demands
of the working masses, in leading them, and in achieving certain
positive results in everything concerning everyday vital interests
of the working people....
"Remaining fully on the positions of scientific socialism
and uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology in any
of its manifestations, the Communist parties have drawn some
basic conclusions which are important for understanding the
problem of unity of the workers' movement. These are conclusions
on the growing variety of forms of transition to socialism, on
the struggle for democracy as an integral part of the struggle
for socialism, on the role of profound democratic reforms and
transformations for the advance toward socialism in highly de-
veloped capitalist countries, and on the maintenance of a multi-
party system and the safeguarding of democratic legality.
"Concerning some important tasks of the workers' movement,
there already exist to a certain extent similar or coinciding views
between the Communists and socialists....No one closes his eyes
to the fact that, as before, there exist profound differences
between the Communists and social democrats in the understanding
of the socialist goal, its contents, the methods, and the rate
of achieving it. But one cannot ignore the fact that a more
or less substantial coincidence of views on a number of basic
questions makes contacts and cooperation possible."
February 5: At a large meeting of Ulan Bator city Party activists honor-
ing the Shelepin-led CPSU delegation (see also Chrono 01-6, Jan. 27),
Mongolian First Secy Tsedenbal asserts in his speech that "the MPRP
attaches great importance to the meeting of the drafting commission of
the fraternal parties set for I March this year." The Soviet delegation
concludes its visit on the 6th.
Februa 5-15: Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to North Vietnam (see
Chrono 60 Jan. 31 and Feb. 4) includes two one-day stopovers in
Peking, 4 days in Hanoi, and 3 days in Pyongyang, North Korea. It is
immensely complicated by the Vietcong attacks on U.S. installations
and the retaliatory air strikes in North Vietnam, 7-8 February.
Kosygin is met by Chou En-lai and lesser officials at Peking air-
port on 5 Feb., with an unpublicized reception which meets minimum
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protocol requirements (conspicuously differing from the "welcoming crowd"
which, according to RCM, met Cuban leader Guevara the day before with
bouquets, drums and cymbals, and applause). After a banquet that night,
"the two sides held a conversation." In Hanoi, Kosygin talks about
moral and material support and signs a long joint statement which ex-
presses common views on a wide range of subjects (but nothing offensive
to the Chinese), including: "The unity and solidarity of the socialist
camp and the ICM is an indispensable condition...."
Kosygin receives a similar low-key reception in Peking on his
return from Hanoi, 10 February, but he isl-eceived" the next morning by
Mao and Liu Shao-chi -- with no mention of any talks. His visit to
Pyongyang produces some unexpectedly strong speeches by Kosygin con-
demning the U.S. and supporting Korean unification as well as
N. Vietnam, plus a joint statement of 14 Feb. more harshly anti-U.S.
than that signed in Hanoi, though it is similarly "neutral" in supporting
unity and solidarity of the ICM.
Press observers comment that, despite the militant Soviet language,
the Kremlin apparently did not commit itself to any measures "beyond
its presumed earlier intent" -- and that "the policy statements evidently
did not serve to win Vietnamese and Korean attendance at the projected
meeting of CP a in Moscow."
February T.: The old-line, pro-Soviet Indian CP reacts to the highly
polemical Chinese reportage of the competing "congresses" of the CPI/L
and CPI/R (see Chrono #451 Jan. 16) with a sharp blast by Chairman Dange
in the Party weekly New Age. (Text not yet available here, but it
reportedly attacks the CCP bitterly.)
Albanian Party daily Zen i I Popullit carries 15,000-word attack
on "The Capitalist Nature of Yugoslav 'Workers' Self-Management' in
the Light of the 8th Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists."
Concluding its long-winded denunciation of the Yugoslav system, ZIP
notes Pravda's favorable treatment and adds:
"All attempts by the Khrushchevite Brezhnev-Mikoyan-Kosygin
troika and its followers to present as socialist the counter-
revolutionary work of the Titoists has not yielded and will not
yield any result. The little crows cannot become white. The
truth about Yugoslavia cannot be concealed...."
February 8: Moscow correspondent of Belgrade Borba comments that "Three
weeks before the scheduled meeting of the drafting commission of 26 CPs,
it is not yet clear whether or not it will take place, although there
are no signs either that it will be put off again." He adds that "To
all appearances the original idea that the commission should draft a
number of documents to be submitted to the consultation meeting of CPs
has now been dropped."
3 (Chronology Con.)
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February 14: The _altljaalasujimof the signing of the Sino-Soviet
treaty of friendship and mutual assistance brings a spate of affirmations
of unbreakable" fraternal ties in speeches at meetings, official
messages and media comment, -- but there is no evidence that progress
toward a reconciliation has been made or is likely. The Soviet ex-
pressions seem to go farthest toward meeting the other side and emphasizing
the ties that bind, -- but obviously not far enough to satisfy the
Chinese. Even the relatively brief telegram from the "troika," Brezhnev,
Mikoyan and Kosygin, in emphasizing Soviet determination to "strengthen
the unity of the socialist camp," stresses the recent conference of the
Warsaw Pact members, which, of course, did not include any of the Chinese
sympathizers and did include an observer from the Yugoslav regime
anathematized by the Chinese. The speech at the Moscow public meeting
is made by a relatively unknown CPSU/CC member, Boris Beshchev, Minister
of Railways. And signed articles (not editorials) in Izvestiya on the
13th and in Pravda on the 14th and 15th refer not only to the Warsaw
Pact meeting but also to the Kosygin delegation of North Vietnam and
the Shelepin delegation, both of which are obviously aimed at tightening
solidarity with the USSR as opposed to the CPR. Moreover, the 13th and
14th articles also include reference to Soviet "resoluta support" of
China "during the days of the Taiwan crisis Fwhen the Soviets are gener-
ally beliew:d to have exsa-ted their utloost influence tn restrain the
Chimes,: fron their aG3r,:u-Ave aims] and-in the alarming July of 1960," the
latter presumably referring to Chiang 's threat to invade the mainland,
restrained by the U.S.
The Chinese statements clearly make struggle against U.S. imperialism,
"the most ferocious enemy of the people the world over," the minimum
condition for "friendship and unity" between the two, but the People's
Daily editorial on the 14th goes much further:
"The basis of unity of the countries of our socialist
camp can only be M-L and proletarian internationalism, can
only be the revolutionary principles of the 1957 declaration
and the 1960 statement. The genera/ line of the ICM which
the CCP/CC.proposed in the form of a summary on 14 June 1963,
is completely in accord with M-L, with the revolutionary principles
of the statement and declaration...."
After thus reasserting that unity can come only on Chinese terms,
PD reaffirms that "our hearts are with the great Soviet people" who
will surely surmount all obstacles standing in their way" Lsuch as the
CPSU leadership/ and "together with us Chinese people, struggle to
uphold and strengthen the unity between China and the Soviet Union and
the unity of the socialist camp and fight against U.S. imperialism and
its lackeys until final victory is won."
February 16: Albanian Party daily Zen i I Popullit editorial, "What Lies
Behind the Divisive 1 March Meeting Being Prepared by the Khrushchevite
Revisionists?" reiterates its denunciation of Soviet efforts to organize
a splittist conference. It begins with a reference to the Albanian Party's
5 October 1964 open letter to CPSU members". which not only served notice
that it would not reply to the CPSU's original invitation to the pre-
paratory commission meeting and "will have nothing more to do with the
renegade group of N. Khrushchev," but also went on to call repeatedly on
the Soyiet rank and file to ari e_and_thmow out the
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-- less than two weeks before Khrushchev was ousted. (See also Chrono
#39) ZIP then goes on to say that: "Life has shown that the present
Soviet leaders removed K. from party and state leadership not because
aty were litzaing,t his anti-Marxist ideolo ical and ?.? litical course,
but rather to save reVisionism and follow in t e K. revisionist path
but without a discredited and unmasked K." Though not as blatantly as
in the 5 October letter, the Albanians renew the call for Soviet comrades
to overthrow the new leaders and join the true Marxist-Leninists:
"Thus the AWP considers that the Communist comrades
from the Soviet Union and all their companions who
struggle for the great cause of socialism and Communism
will strengthen the joint struigle against the Khrushchevite
traitors.... It is time for eyeghody to assume his duty
in the struggle against the renegades of M-L against
the Khrushchevites and their fgllowers. ... It is time
for them to save their honor, socialism, and Communism!"
(Late addition:)
February 14: East German Party daily Valles Deutsdhland notes that a
Politburo report to BED plenum 11-12 Feleruary endorsed the plan for the
I March preparatory meeting.
5 (Chronology Cont.)
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876. COMMUNIST MOB ATTACKS ON WESTERN .EMBASSIES AND LIBRARIES
Tar Brush and Kerosene Torch -- Substitutes
for Revolutionary Class Struggle?
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SITUATION: For years now, whenever an action of the U.S. Government
(or of any other Western power) displeased the Communists, they predic-
tably unleashed mob action against the embassies, consulates, information
offices and libraries of the "guilty" government -- primarily in the
Communist countries themselves, especially in Moscow, but also in neu-
tralist and allegedly "uncommitted" countries like Indonesia, Egypt and
elsewhere. The exact nature of the attack is always commensurate to the
"gravity' of the Western offense, but also to the limit to which Commu-
nist governments and parties have decided to go in any given case. Con-
sequently, these allegedly spontaneous "outbursts of popular indignation"
are carefully planned, ranging from mere demonstrations with
banners, placards, shouting and resolutions to physical assault, in-
volving stone throwing, defacing the facades, coats-of-arms and flags of
the embassy, breaking windows, but occasionally also destroying cars,
burning books and even invading diplomatic offices, attempting to seize
files (e.g., when burning the British Embassy in Djakarta) and committing
any other form of vandalism. In certain instances, on the spot TV and
other coverage reflects the premeditated nature of the so-called spontane-
ous demonstrations.
The police, even if given ample advance warning, seldom hin-
ders such pob violence: at the utmost, it sees to it that the demonstra-
tion does not exceed its pre-determined limits. It may not permit book
burning, if this is not part of the agenda. And it may induce the mob
to leave once the time, allowed for this "spontaneous manifestation,"
has elapsed.
The primary and obvious purpose of such government-authorized mob
action is psychological: the Communists (and certain of
their allies or sympathizers, such as Sukarno or Nasser) want to
humiliate the Western government in question, thereby demon-
strating that "all imperialists are paper tigers" (even though the
Soviets, unlike their Chinese competitors, shun the latter expression).
They can do this with impunity, since they know only too well that no
major Western power will stoop to retaliation in kind and that it will
even prevent genuine, truly spontaneous demonstrations of their own people
from coming too close to a foreign diplomatic installation. The Western
government afflicted may send a diplomatic protest -- which inter alia in-
dicates to the Communist perpetrators that their blow has been felt: or
it may demand financial compensation for the damage -- which, however
justified can be used by Communists t? tiv thelx cbam thimirpf
8-03061pau Oiuu
Aplinzaveck Rekeaseni99-2/08424tecckolk- -
4
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However, the noise and excitement of such mob attacks serves another,
more fundamental and more significant purpose: it hides from the
Communist rank-and-file and from public opinion at large the embarrassing
fact that their leaders can do little else, more specifically that they
are lacking the means which they ought to use against the "imperialists."
Neither Marx nor Lenin nor any other of the founding fathers of Commu-
nism were thinking of tar brushes and burning books when they preached
their gospel of the international class struggle which would "inevitably"
result in a world-wide dictatorship of the proletariat. According to
their doctrine, this proletarian class struggle would become stronger
and more powerful, the further the capitalist economy in a given country
would advance and the more class-conscious proletarians of the entire
world would cooperate in one single, rigidly disciplined, monolithic
international organization.
Consequently, if an imperialist government would threaten harm to
a socialist country, the proletariat of that imperialist country would
rise in righteous wrath to prevent -- or at least to impede -- such out-
rage. Appeals to that effect, addressed primarily to the workers of
England, France and Germany, are contained in numerous early documents
of the Coirununist International, in the first few years after World War
One -- to no avail. The Communists tried it again after World War Two,
mainly in France, when they endeavored to prevent, first, the Marshall
Plan for the reconstruction of Europe (1947) and then the NATO alliance
(19)-i-9) -- again in vain. In the U.S., Britain, West Germany and other
Western nations, the Communists have not even tried political mass
strikes or other forceful tactics in pursuit of their international ob-
jectives. In other words, the most fundamental tenet of Communist doc-
trine -- the inevitability of successful proletarian class struggle,
inexorably advancing in all capitalist countries -- has been completely
disproved by recent history.
The Communist leaders are aware of this basic failure, even though
they are careful not to admit it. The Chinese Communists have fairly
openly written off the Communist Parties in the major Western countries
(which mostly side with Moscow, anyhow) and are placing all their bets
on "national liberation" in developing areas. Moscow does not abandon
the Western CPs Which the Soviets can use as instruments for subver-
sion, espionage, sabotage and propaganda, even if they have little value
as power factors in the global Cold War. But both Moscow and Peking
have chosen as "short-range solutions" the easy, safe tactics of spec-
tacular mob attacks on Western installations and representatives --
which they are also promoting in developing countries, to make the im-
perialists "lose face."
Reference
Political Demonstrations (Confidential), especially its
chapter G, "Deceptive Demonstrations."
25X1 C1 Ob
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877. ARMAMENTS IMPEDE SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH 25X1 C1 Ob
SITUATION: Every year, in late January, the Central Statistical
Board of the USSR announces plan fulfillment results -- i.e., the results
of Soviet efforts to fulfill and surpass the plan targets -- for the pre-
ceding year. (There are also quarterly and semi-annual plan fulfillment
reports. BPG 818, "Soviet Industrial Growth Declines," 31 August 196)-i-,
discussed the results of the mid-1964 report.) As is usual in Soviet
statistical reporting, efforts are made to present the figures in as
favorable a light as possible, and to conceal major failures. This
January, although the report was frank in giving livestock figures which
are lower than last year's (this can be blamed on Khrushchev's poor har-
vest of 1963), grain production figures were omitted for the second year
in a row. Perhaps the harvest was not really as good as Soviet sources
claimed last fall; perhaps it was feared that the publication of both
gross production and percentage increase would enable people to deduce
the 1963 crop. Industry also showed a decline in growth, with results
particularly poor in the light and food industries.
In the long run, Soviet industrial growth rates would have declined
in any case, simply because rapid growth is harder to maintain in any
economy as it becomes more developed. But the decline in recent years
has been too dramatic to be explained by such long-term considerations.
A publication of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, Annual
Economic Indicators for the USSR, February 1964, gives the following
growth figures for Soviet civilian industrial production:
1959
1960
1961
1962
8.6%
6.3
6.7
7.2
The 1950-1955 average was 10.1 and the 1955-1961 average was 8.7, accord-
ing to another JEC publication, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power.
Recent estimates by some of the Committee's expert advisors gave a figure
of 6 per cent for 1963 and 1964. This 1964 figure (which was preliminary)
may eventually be revised downward, for in the past these Western estimates
have averaged around 2 per cent lower than official Soviet figures (which
involve double counting), and the Soviets now admit to an industrial
growth figure of only 7.1 per cent for 1964, the lowest admitted industrial
growth figure since World War II. In 1962-1964, Japanese industrial growth
came to 12 per cent.
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There has been, then,a rapid drop from the USSR's 10 per cent average
of the early 1950's, and indeed the decline becomes abrupt in 1958, 1959,
and 1960. The decline in the value of new plant completed is even more
striking: in 1958, new investment completed increased 16.2 per cent; in
1959, 13.2 per cent; in 1960, 8.0 per cent; and in 1961, 4.3 per cent
(Soviet figures, given in Annual Economic Indicators). The explanation
for the sudden drop appears to be that the Soviet economy became over-
committed, and in particular, that it became overcommitted to military
and space development. It was in the post-Sputnik years of 1958, 1959,
and 1960 that Khrushchev came to hope that he could bluff his way to
world victory, using space spectaculars and nuclear and ICBM demonstrations
to overawe the West. The bluff seems to have been put aside, at least
temporarily, after the Cuban crisis, but neither that event nor Khrushchev's
fall have brought about a serious cut in military-technical expenditures.
Such cuts as are advertised appear to affect only conventional forces.
(See also BPG #861, "Military Forces in the World Today," 18 January
1965.)
An unclassified attachment, "Problems of the Soviet Econogy," dis-
cusses the latest plan fulfillment results and the handicaps imposed on
the Soviet economy by the Soviet regime. See also BPG #839, "Soviet
Economists Advocate Capitalist Techniques," 26 October 1964, and BPG
#818, referred to above.
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879. COMMUNIST CHINESE EVICTED FROM BURUNDI 25X1C 1 Oc
SITUATION: The Burundi government's early February expulsion of
the entire staff of the Chinese Communist embassy temporarily halted
Peking's march through the countries forming the northern crescent
around their main goal: Congo (Leopoldville). The CPR's success in
buying their way into the Burundi government and key organizations
apparently led to their overestimating the extent of their control;
then they and their local lackeys blundered badly.
In December a massive Chicom arms shipment was transiting Burundi
when the King determined to put a stop to the use of his non-aligned
country as a base for support to the Congolese rebels. He seized the
arms and replaced pro-Peking Prime Minister Nyamoya. Still the extent
of Chicom subversion in Burundi might have gone unnoticed had not the
new Prime Minister been assassinated. (See unclassified attachment,
"Chinese Communist Subversion in Burundi.")
There is nothing new in the Chicom pattern of operation in Burundi.
Their clandestine operations might be likened to damage termites do below
the surface which is brought to light only by accident -- in this case,
murder. Key figures from youth and labor, from government and opposition
political parties are suborned (as the Chinese have also done, respec-
tively, in Congo (WI Sudan, Mali, and Senegal). Communications media
are established or penetrated (as in Kenya); refugees and dissidents are
armed (as in Cameroon and Niger). Political indoctrination and training
play a key role: some leaders and students were sent to Peking, as has
been standard procedure in other African countries, but Communist guer-
rilla warfare training facilities in Africa are being increased. Chinese
specialists are teaching guerrilla warfare at bases in Congo (B), Ghana
and reportedly are negotiating with Algeria.
References
A. Testimony of Tung Chi-ping, Committee on Judiciary, U.S. Senate
Biweekly Propaganda Guidances:
B. #754 "New China News Agency (NCNA): Key Tool of Peking's Global
Ambitions"*
C. #743 "Lessons of Zanzibar"*
D. #809 "Communist China's Indirect Aggression in Africa"*
E. #854 "Communist Lesson: Haw to Overthrow Governments"*
F. #857 "The Truth About the Congo"*
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880. ANNIVERSARY OF THE BRAZILIAN REVOLUTION
AGAINST GOULART AND HIS COMMUNIST ALLIES
25X1C10b
SITUATION: As the first anniversary of the April Revolution ap-
proaches, practically all events of this year have confirmed its unique,
Brazilian character. Although initiated by the military, it was con-
summated by a majority of the state governments and had been supported
by truly spontaneous, mass demonstrations in the major centers of popu-
lation. And although an arbitrary act set the revolution in motion,
the government of Brazil was restored to full legality after a lapse
of only two days.
Rather than a "revolution" the events of 1 April 1964, marked the
restoration of orderly processes and the end to a subtle and gradual
drift toward a Communist take-over. Since succeeding to the presidency
in late 1961, Jcfgo Goulart had contributed toward undermining his own
government by appointing Communist and ultra-nationalist leftists to
important posts.
The first of a series of events that precipitated the crisis was
Goulart's reckless sponsorship of a mass meeting on 13 March in Rio.
With the backing of the Communists, he called for basic changes in the
government structure, legalization of the CP/ and dramatically signed
two decrees, one confiscating six privately owned oil refineries, the
other giving the government broad discretionary powers to confiscate
land and hand it over to the peasants. The most important single act
was his refusal to discipline the enlisted personnel involved in the
mutiny of sailors and marines 25-27 March. When army troops arrested
the mutineers, Goulart ordered them released with assurances that they
would not be punished. On the evening of 30 March, Goulart addressed
a gathering of army sergeants, in a final effort to secure the sympathy
of the rank and file of the armed forces. This was the crowning in-
sult, but the revolt was already under way. The next day, Governor
Magalhies Pinto, of Minas Gerais state, called for the removal of Goulart.
He was followed. by General Amaury Kruel, Commander of the Second Army,
based in Sao Paulo, and other army commanders and state governors.
Goulart flew to Brasilia and sought support from Congress and the peo-
ple. Not finding either, he flew south to his home state of Rio Grande
do Sul. During afternoon of 2 April he crossed the border into Uruguay,
and the Revolution was thus consummated without shedding a drop of blood
or firing a single shot in anger.
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As elsewhere in Latin America, the Brazilian Army looks upon itself
as a stabilizing force, a guardian of the constitution. But Brazil is
unique among Latin American countries in that it has never been under
military dictatorship. Thus it was that, in the early morning hours of
2 April, the Congress met and declared that Goulart had vacated the office
of president. Article 79 of the Constitution was invoked and the presi-
dent of the Chamber of Deputies, Ranieri Mazzili? was declared president
and sworn in a few minutes later by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
The "violent" phase of the revolution had lasted only 55 hours.
On the 9th of April, the Supreme Revolutionary Council decreed its
now celebrated "Institutional Act," Which provided for a general purge of
corrupt officials and pro-Communist congressmen, depriving some of their
political rights over a period of years. On the 11th, in a joint session
of congress meeting under the authority of Article 79 of the constitution,
General Humberto Castelo Branco was elected interim president by a vote of
361 with 78 abstentions. In order to preserve the civilian character of
the office, the new president divested himself of his military rank and
title.
It was the role played by Congress that made the April revolution
unique in the annals of Latin American upheavals. Congress not only took
the initiative during the early confusion, but later cooperated actively
with the executive in passing much needed legislation. By the time it re-
cessed on 1 December 1964, 500 bills had been passed, of which only 150
had originated_ with the executive authority -- and many of these were
passed in altered and improved form. Congress has been neither Obstruc-
tionist nor a rubber stamp, but has found the rare and happy medium be-
tween the two extremes all too often encountered among the Latin American
democracies. Congress thus became an active partner in the revolution.
When the new government took over last April, it was confronted with
the staggering task of bringing some order to the chaotic state in which
Joao Goulart had left the Brazilian economy. The gross national product
in 1963 had not been able to keep pace with the increasing birth rate.
Inflation had climbed to an annual rate of 140% during the last three
months of the Goulart regime, about double the average increase over the
past decade. Budget expenditures appeared likely to reach 3.3 trillion
(3.3 millones des millones, or lmost $2 billion) cruzeiros, with an
anticipated deficit of 1.5 trillion. By the end of the year, the pro-
jected deficit had been cut in half and inflation had been brought back
to a manageable 80% for 1964.
These spectacular results were achieved only through courageous
resistance to public pressure and made possible by teamwork between the
executive and the legislative powers. Subsidies to inefficient govern-
ment-managed agencies were slashed, thousands of drones were removed
from government payrolls, and new tax laws passed to open up new sources
of revenue. Other legislation was enacted with a view toward encourag-
ing private investment, particularly of foreign capital. Thus, the
economic outlook for 1965 is good, with massive foreign assistance --
$450 million from the U.S. -- being an important factor.
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? Perhaps the most far-reaching legislation to come out of the new
government so far is the agrarian reform law, passed by voice vote of
both houses of congress on 26 November. Unlike most land reform pro-
posals in Latin America, this one seems to lack the demagogic, polit-
ical ingredient. It does not promise idly to expropriate from the
wealthy to give to the poor. As Castelo Branco sees it, land reform
means, first, increased production, and second, redistribution of land.
Where large estates are cultivated inefficiently or not at all, they can
be expropriated and the owners compensated with bonds whose value will
be tied to the cost of living. Conversely, where small holdings are
inefficiently used, they will be amalgamated to form larger units.
Other forward-looking legislation that has been passed include
the following: National Housing Plan (23 July 1964); a bill removing
tax exemptions for judges, lawyers, journalists, and authors (22 July);
a constitutional amendment on rural land taxation and expropriation
that paved the way for the Agrarian Reform Law (6 November); four bills
on union budgets, income tax legislation, consumption tax, and stamp
tax (27 November).
Under Article 79 of the Constitution, Castelo Branco's term was to
expire in January 1966, when the winner of the 1965 elections would
take over. On 22 July, Congress passed a constitutional amendment ex-
tending Castelo Branco's term to March 1967. This will give the present
governmental team an additional year to carry out its program. 25X1C10b
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881. BUDDHISM IN SOUTH VIETNAM:
25X1PEACEFUL FAITH OR POLITICAL MILITANCY?
u
SITUATION: A handful of "political" Buddhist monks in South Vietnam
are making it almost impossible to establish and sustain a viable govern-
ment in Saigon. The leader of this faction is Thich (meaning "Reverend")
Tri Quang, a controversial man who was twice arrested by the French on
suspicion of working with the Communists. However, the charge could not
be substantiated and he was released.
Tri Quang's negativeness and his reluctance to be specific about
what he wants, casts a serious doubt on his motives, on the one hand;
and on the other, make it virtually impossible for other South Vietnamese
elements to get his cooperation on any of the myriad life-and-death prob-
lems that they face. He will say, for example, in response to questions
about what kind of government he will support, only that he will back
"any government that agrees with out policy." But he is either unable or
unwilling to be any more specific about what his policy is. Regarding
Buddhist objectives, Tri Quang says only that "we Buddhists never want
anything. To say that we want this or that is wrong. We never sponsor
anybody." Tri Quang's reasons for opposing a particular individual with-
in the government are equally vague or general and rarely substantiated.
Whether Tri Quang is or is not working with the Communist Viet Gong may
beamoot question; but the vital fact is that his actions and his
entire position play directly into the hands of the Viet Cong and are be-
coming the main factor in bringing about the disintegration of law and
order that the Viet Cong so strongly desire.
Tri Quang claims that he speaks for some 80 to 90 percent of the
Vietnamese people. He arrives at this figure in the following manner:
everyone who does not explicitly state that he is a member of another
faith is considered a Buddhist and Tri Quang represents all Buddhists.
His claim is belied by Dr. Mai Tho Truyen, Chairman of the Vietnamese
Association of Buddhist Laymen. Dr. Mai, in his book "Buddhism in
Vietnam," estimates that only some 30 percent of the Vietnamese people
really qualify as true Buddhists. Further, Quang's faction is by no
means the spokesman for all Buddhists in Vietnam. In a secret-ballot
election just over a year ago Tri Quang was defeated in his bid to become
titular head of all Vietnamese Buddhist., In May last year Tri Quang
again challenged Thich Tam Chau, leader of the Guddhist executive ap-
paratus in Saigon, for control of the entire Buddhist hierarchy. Tri
Quang failed to achieve his objectiveamd Tam Chau got a vote of confi-
dence in his own leadership, while clearly rejecting Tri Quang's views
and tactics.
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Truly religious Buddhists who are loyal to the basic tenets of
Gautama Buddha want nothing to do with Tri Quang's constant intriku and
political manipulations. They quietly adhere to Buddha's "Four Noble
Truths." (1-Existence or Being is sorrow and suffering; 2--the source
of suffering is desire or craving; 3--the only remedy for suffering is to
expel desire; and 4--Desire can be expelled by following the Eightfold
Path which consists of right views, right endeavor, right mindedness,
right intentions, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood and right
concentration.) These concepts generally lead Buddhist monks to decry
"the wretchedness" of human conditions and to withdraw into a world based
on meditation, humility and adherence to the scriptures. Nowhere in
Buddha's teachings is there the slightest justification, for monks to
issue political decrees, organize demonstrations and riots, topple govern-
ments and generally seek to take State power in their own hands.
Unfortunately the very views of the unworldly, self-effacing Buddhists
make them easy prey for the minority faction that prefer intrigue and
political manipulation to the orthodox Buddhist pursuit of "impersonality"
through detachment, meditation, begging and other recognized spiritual
concepts. These passive attitudes also make Buddhist organizations in
general vulnerable to Communist infiltration and manipulation.
In Southeast Asia the Communists attempt to subvert Buddhism and
use it for their own ends just as they have done with Christian groups in
other parts of the world. They say that there is no conflict between
Communists and the principles of Christianity or Buddhism and they ex-
hibit puppet priests and monks as "proof" of their tolerance toward re-
ligious groups. However, once these groups are no longer useful to the
Communists, their religious beliefs are attacked as being fundamentally.
in conflict with Communism and then they themselves are denounced as the
arch enemies of Communism. Another classic error that religious groups
make is to believe they can "handle" the Communists and gradually bring
them back into the fold. The sheer numbers of people who have tried
this and failed is proof enough of the futility of such an approach.
Inside Communist China the regime is still maintaining the facade
of religious tolerance in deference to the strength of Buddhism through-
out Asia. Its true intentions, however, are clearly demonstrated in their
cruel suppression of Buddhism in Tibet. In North Korea the fate of
Buddhism was settled quickly and simply by assigning all monks to manual
labor on farms and in factories. A similar fate awaits the Buddhists in
any country where the Communists take control.
I
25X1 C1 Ob
? 0,
NI ?? ?? III III
401401Prr
(881 Cont.)
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GERMAN INDEPENDENT WEEKLY EXPLORES QUESTION
OF 'WHO RULES THE RED EMPIRE?'
,
gollowing is a translation of an article by Wolfgang
Leonhard entitled "Who rules the Red Empire?" in the
German-language independent weekly newspaper, Die Zeit
-QPYRGHT (Time)No. 4, Hamburg, 22 January 1965, page 47
A highly unusual discussion has lately been going on in
the USSR. The role and function of the communist party in Soviet
society is being debated.. Should the Party have authority over
all aspects and areas of living and should it get directly in-
volved in all details - as has been the practice up to now ?
Or should the Soviet Communist Party limit its activity to set-
ting forth the general policy directives and naming its members
to the most important positions and functions ? These problems
are being discussed not only by the high political authorities
but they have sometimes seeped through to the press even though'
still in rather veiled references.
This is not 'the first, time that contradictory interests
between the communist party and the state power authorities have-
become apparent. Immediately after Stalin's death in March of
1953 Malenkov who was the Soviet Prime Minister at that time,
tried to give a greater influence to the State organs 7 that it'
to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and to the Supreme So-.
viet - and thus to trim some of the all-encompassing power of
the communist party. At the beginning he even had some success.
Important political declarations - such as the introduction of
the "new course" in August of 1953 - were made by Malenkov to
the Supreme Soviet and not to the Plenary Session of the Central
Committee of the communist party. For a time the party leader-
ship was pushed somewhat to the background. Only after some dif-
ficulties did the party apparatus under the leadership of Mr.
-Ithrushchev regain the lost terrain and the "leading role" of the
party in all areas, of living was re-established ad consolida-
ted. This tendency was eyen more evident,inthe last years of
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CPYRGHT
the Khrushcliev era. All political ..1.nd CCfl)IlIi Li 1tii uChu
country, even the minutest details in agriculture, 'industry
and construction were almost without exception discussed by the
plenary session's of the Central Committee of the party, decided
upon and the decisions announced.
With the fall of Xhrushchev in middle of October 1964 a
new phase has begun in the changing relationship between Party
and State. The highest positions of the Party organs on one side
and of the State and Economic Administration on the other were.
given to two separate persons. As the First Secretary of the
Party, 58 year old Leonid Brezhnev represented and represents
the interests of the. eleven million members of the Soviet com.;.
munist party. H
But besides Brezhnev there is 60 year old Alexei Kosygin,
Chairman of the Soviet Council Of Ministers,which makes him to
all practical purposes the Prime.Minister. Apparently, the top
Soviet authorities, immediatel after Khrushchev's ouster, had
taken the decision, which.by.the way has not been publicly an-
nounced, to make the separation of the two highest positions .
final and permanent. This is apparent from a.reference the
Pravda (Truth) made on December16 to "certain additional gua-
rantees" that had been taken 'against an excessive concentration
of power in the hands of one person".
However, this decision.has obviously not done away with
:ithe,controversy between Party and, State Administration. On the
contrary: now the real tug of war began between the two powers. .
At the beginning it was the party which had the offensive. In
his speech at the anniversary of the October revolution party
:leader Brezhnev clearly expressed his views on the supremacy of
. the communist party.
But it seems that this declaration expressed only the
personal opinion of Mr. Brezhnev rather than the views of the
.entire leadership. In this connection it was 'noted thatat the
'plenary session of the Central Committee in mid-November it was
? Podgorny rather than Brezhnev, who delivered the decisive report;
'There was something else which was even more important. Up to
now the plenary sessions of.the:Central Committee had focused
'their attention on state and economic problems b?,It. the November
session limited its activity' almost exclusively to interior pars.
ty problems and personnel changes in the hierarchy. Another sur-
.prise was the w a y in which the communiqu?bout. the plenary
session was published. For the first time'since over twelve
years the communiqu?as not spread out over the entire front
ft
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page of the Pravda but was set in three columns only.
All this was no mere coincidence, as further happenings
plainly showed. Tv weeks after the plenary session of the Cen-,
tral Committee, the Government paper a (News) published
an article by the Prima Minister of to United Bielo-Russian
Republic, Tichon Kisels which created a. sensation. For the
first time the article openly discussed the delicate subject of
the Party-State relations..Kisel . was complaining that "in
recent years" the role of the State organs had been "curtailed".
.This tendency had had a ,"negative influence on the activities" of
the State organs". An end must be made to the "petty bossing of -
the economic organs and to the incompetent interference with
their aativities".The reader of lzvestia was left with no doubts'
whatever that "petty bossing" and "incompetent interference" re-
ferred to the Party.
The new trend was also apparent at the meeting of the
Supreme Soviet which was called in early December. At .this meet-
ing Brezhnev gave only a short address while Kosygin delivered
the program containing speech in which the new Soviet Prime Mi-
nister twice complained about the "petty bossing" of the State
and economic organs - which was clear enough to every one of
the 1400 delegates to the Supreme Soviet.
On December 6 the Pravda also ventured into this subject.
Although the mouthpiece of the party did not go as far as some
of the functionaries of the State administration and economic
administration would have liked it to, it now openly admitted
that "the role of the Soviets" - which Means the State organs -
"had in recent years been curtailed".
Of course,"as could be expected, this same article under-
scored the leading political role of the party, but at the sa-
me time it pointed out for the first time the limits of the
party's functions and power, and went so far as to advocate a '
revaluation of the state organs.
The reaction of the "pure" party functionaries was pre-
dictable. The local and regional circles of the party struc-
ture - and most certainly also some higher echelons of the par-
ty -.do not accept this new line without resistance. But the
other side is now also making itself heard. With the slogan.
"Down with petty bossing" the representatives of the state
and economic administration are trying to push"Carefully but
firmly a stronger independence of their organs while 'on .0-le
other side the representatives of the party want to reaffirm
the supremacy of the Party with their slogan,"The:Communists
-
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have ilole respowlibility for everyaliu?j".
The present discord about the changing relationship be-
tween State and Party has an immediate as well as a long term
aspect. The present aspect is in the fact that the Party is re-
presented byBrezhnev whereas the State administration has Kosy-
gin in the Kremlin. A shift of the weight of the two "pillars"
would certainly affect also the power position of .both men now
in top functions.
But the long range aspect is even more important: thd:1144
what kind of role should the CP play in the changing Soviet so-
ciety. Up to now the party and is organs were simultaneously
the ideological mentor; the centre of political power and an
economic-technical adminiStratio . But the more diversified the
industrial society becomes, the nore difficult is it for the
party to control and resolve all details .of practical economic
problems on top of the ,politiCal ideological ones. In'tlle past
the party has always successfully fought off any attemp0 to li-
mit its competence. But now the power relationship has altered.
Therefore, it is quite possible that this is the beginning of
a development which would upgradp the state and economic organs.
It is possible that this shift in power will already be lega-
lized in the new Soviet constitution which is now being drafted.
The current controversy between party and State could thus be-
come the starting point for a:pelletratin4 reform incthe politi-
cal system of the USSR. ? 1
. , 1
1
6879
C803 3801-D
?.:27
( .
? 1,
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25X1 C1 Ob
Fact Sheet
Problems of the Soviet Economy
I March 1965
On 29 January 1965, the USSR Central Statistical Board made its
annual announcement of plan fulfillment results for the preceding year.
The figure for 1964 national income growth -- "more than 7 per cent"
was 2 percentage points higher than Premier Kosygin had predicted in
December. On the other hand, industrial growth fell behind Kosygin's
expectations: instead of 7.8 per cent it was 7,1 per cent, the lowest
figure since World War II. Since national income is a measure of the
whole economy, i.e., of industry plus agriculture, and since industry
fell behind expectations, the increase in national income growth results
would appear, at least at first sight, to be due to the 1964 crop being
larger than expected.
Few would doubt that the 1964 harvest compares favorably with that
of 1963, a year of agricultural lisistr, The 29 January announcement
did not, however, reveal figures for the 1964 cereal, sugar beet, potato,
and cotton crops, saying only that delivery plans for these crops were
"fulfilled," and that the "total harvest of crops increased." Thus it
is impossible to say how these crops contributed to the national income
result, and the lack of data suggest that the Soviets are concealing
something. Theodore Shabad of the New York Times has reported that,
according to one theory, a higher proportion of the 1964 crop was de-
livered to the state than usual, so that record deliveries (claimed last
October in preliminary announcements) did not necessarily mean a record
crop. In regard to the difference between Kosygin's December figures and
the 29 January announcement, it has been suggested that when industrial
production fell behind expectations, Soviet statisticians saved the
day by calculating from a lover -- and perhaps more honest -- secret
figure for the 1963 harvest. This would make the 1964 agricultural
production increase higher, and thus raise the national income growth
figure despite the sag in industrial growth. In spite of admitted
shortages in livestock numbers (an aftereffect of the 1963 crop disaster),
the Soviets claim that total "agricultural production" increased 12 per
cent. It is very unusual for Soviet agriculture to show better results
than Soviet industry -- and in any case it is not really that agriculture
is doing so well now, but rather that it did so poorly a year ago. Per
capita food production is still below the 1958 level, and the Soviets
are still importing grain from Canada.
Parts of Soviet industry did better than others. Chemical production,
the object of ex-Premier Khrushchev's last campaign, increased by 15 per
cent (1963 -- 17 per cent); the new leaders have reduced the 1965 targets
In this industry. The production of electricity and "heat energy" in-
creased by 12 per cent in 1964, and the metallurgical and machine-building
industries, always favored up until 1963, scored 8 and 9 per cent in-
creases respectively. But light industry output only increased by 3
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per cent, and the food industry production increase is recorded at
2 per cent, partly a result of the 1963 crop failure. As usual, the
Soviet consumer received the least benefit from "the building of Com-
munism."
Most Western analysts would reduce the Soviet figures for national
income or industrial production growth by about two per cent. This is
partly because Soviet statisticians often count the same products more
than once, in varying stages of production: to take a hypothetical
example, a truck factory counts all the truck components, such as tires,
which are supplied to it and already counted by other factories, and the
tire and truck figures are added by the statisticians. Also, new pro-
ducts, whose production volume can expand the most rapidly, are given
high prices, exaggerating the Soviet industrial growth rate. Alec Nove?
an eminent Western student of the Soviet economy, says that "The official
Index Lof national incomil is at all times to be treated with a degree of
suspicion" and that "the official claim to a seventeen-fold increase in
the period 1913-55, for instance, is utterly incredible." tile Soviet
Ec27AL (N.Y., 1961), pp. 312-3.) Soviet figures are not often simply
fabricated, but they are influenced in various ways; it is useful to
compare one Soviet growth figure with another, but caution should be
taken in comparing Soviet figures with figures from non-Bloc countries.
Why should there be a slow-down in Soviet industrial growth? One
reason is that the Soviet economy is becoming more developed and mature,
and this almost always brings a slowing-down in growth rates. When pro-
duction is low in absolute terms, it requires little absolute increase
to make an impressive percentage increase; this situation changes as
absolute production rises. Other reasons for a slow-down in growth are
revealed in the 29 January statistics-. First, the increase in labor
productivity dropped from 5 per cent in 1963 to 4 per cent in 1964.
Second, the increase in new capital investment came to 8 per cent, but
there was only a 6 per cent increase in completed (new fixed) investment;
the failure to complete capital construction projects has been a con-
tinuing problem in recent years, with vast funds frozen in uncompleted
projects. Furthermore, in 1958, by contrast with 19641s 6 per cent,
new fixed investment was 16.2 per cent. A continuing increase in the
Investment growth rate would be needed to sustain an unchanging pro-
duction growth rate; the USSR, however, has been reducing its investment
growth rate.
Why should there be a decline in the rate of new investment, and even
more, in the rate of capital plant completion? Part of the explanation
lies in a'need to appease the Soviet consumer, and in particular, in a
need to spend money on agriculture. The quick, temporary gains in agri-
cultural production, brought about by plowing the marginal Virgin Lands,
cannot be repeated. But probably a more serious obstacle to investment,
and hence to the growth of industrial production, arises from the diversion
of resources to arms and space programs. With a national output about
half that of the United States, Soviet leaders spend on military and
space programs nearly as much as the US does. More serious, the very
size of the Soviet military and space effort means the tie-up of such
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that other economic objectives cannot be attained. To take one instance,
the Seven Year Plan program for the automation of industry is a shambles.
As already noted, the new leadership has cut back Khrushchevls chemicali-
zation program.
The disproportionate expenditure on arms and space spectaculars is
one of the economic penalties the Soviet Union pays for having its form
of economic dictatorship. Other handicaps to Soviet growth arise from
other features of the system:
1. Insufficient agricultural production -- a result of years
of sacrificing agricultural to industrial interests, even
amounting to the use of collectives as a means of seizing
crops without compensation. Earlier growth rates were only
possible through "primitive accumulation," the deliberate
neglect of agriculture and the consumer. Recent efforts
to restore agriculture have interfered with other programs.
2. Inability of_Elanning organs to cope with a develomi
economy -- Soviet planning has been an instrument for
forcing the development of favored projects, regardless of
considerations of cost. Even in the pre-World War II
period, the economy could only be made to work by supplement-
ing the plans with a sort of underground system of black
market, wire-pulling, and "fixing." Having achieved a
heavy industry base, and needing a more smoothly functioning
system, the Soviet and. East European governments have lately
been turning attention to various ways to substitute profit
and initiative for planning (Libermanism).
3. Meddling by,party officials -- under Khrushchev, the
economic processes were frequently disrupted while the
latest reorganization was carried out. This is evidently
one of the grievances which led his successors to engineer his
downfall. It is unlikely, however, that the new leaders will
avoid new reorganizations, even after they complete their
present work of reversing Khrushchev's policies: e.g., by
reducing the stress on chemical industry, increasing the
stress on metallurgy. The targets of the Soviet economy
are a political question, and if this question is not settled
unilaterally by a Stalin, it becomes the subject of debate
between various interest groups. The present leadership
situation is likely to evoke a severe struggle, as the pro-
ponents of various segments of the economy contend for a
bigger slice of Soviet resources.
4. Lack of incentive -- the plan system does not reward
imagination, enterprise, and honesty. It compels managers
to maintain a high inventory, produce old models, and con-
ceal production potential.
It cannot be said that free enterprise economies always work smoothly,
that they are immune to difficulties. But they do provide incentives
which work day in and day out, without special campaigns and pressures;
they do possess -- in the market -- a mechanism which reconciles interests
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and rewards enterprise without political conflict; they do have a means
of establishing prices and costs. The economies, so to speak, go with
the stream of human nature and human interests, and do not try to swim
against it; they have natural self-correcting qualities. The Soviets,
on the contrary, have tried to swim against the stream. Some recent
symptoms, such as the Liberman proposals indicate that at least some
people in the USSR begin to realize the futility of these costly
efforts.
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CPYRGHT
Wednesday, Feb: 10, 1965: THE 'WASHINGTON POST
oes de Ga lie
By J. A. Livingston
nRIDE underlies President
de Gaulle's recommenda-
tion that nations of the
world cease to rely on the
dollar and
the pound as
International,
currencies
and return
to gold, and
.g old alone,
,The Gener-
al's intent is
clear:
1. To re-
establish the Livingston
French franc
on a parity with the dollar
and the :pound in world
esteem. So long as West
Germany, or Sweden, or
Italy hold dollars,: and
pounds as reserves, and not
francs, the French currency
Is second-rate.
? But if gold becomes the
sole international currbncy,
then the dollar, pound and
franc are:on a parity. Things
equal to the same thing,
gold, are equal to each
other.
2. To notify President
Johnson, once again, that
France does not welcome
America's pervasion of Eu-
rope. Over, and over again,
? de Gaulle has resisted
American takeover of Eu-
ropean companies (such as
Simea by Chrysler and
elieve His Gold Views?
Machines Bull by General
Electric) and the establish-
uL of
Aaw...a utch.idi
aries in Europe. Companies
such as General Motors,
id, Ocneral Elcctric cto,
dwarf their European coun-
terparts.
In addition, de Gaulle has
resented American military
prowess -- in Europe and
elsewhere. He wants . the .
American commitment in ,
Europe to recede. " ;
BY CASHING in French
holdings of dollars
for gold, de Gaulle puts
pressure on President John-
son. He makes it more diffi-
cult for the United States to
, support the American estab-
lishments abroad and, at
the same time, to maintain
the dollar at $35 an ounce
for gold. His pronounce-
ment on gold added to the
pressure.
The de Gaulle recommen-
: dation has met with two sar-
castic responses in Eu-
ropean monetary, circles:
One is that the General ,did
, not mean what,' he said, the
other that he didn't say
what he meant.
The second is correct, if
:modified to: He didn't say
,all he meant.'
President de Gaulle is not
a stupid man. Nor are his
advisers stupid. Simple
arithmetic tells them that a
return to the gold standard
is impossible unless some-
thing is aone about tne gold
supply.
Tntal rt. cPrvp c a
Western nations amount to'
$43 billion, onl. 65 per cent
highesr than -In 113:12 Tn Malt"
26-year interval world trade"
has increased more than 600
per cent. .
Any, corporation which
grows in size has to main-
tain greater liquidity?cash
and other reserves. Thus, in
1948, when sales were $4.7
billion, General Motors had
$540 million in ?cash and
government securities. To-
day sales are $17 billion and
cash and equivalent are
about $1.5 billion. ?
iThE GAULLE knows that
.1.) world trade has bal-'
bowled. He kno ws that
the existing stock of gold is
inadequate. That's why na-
tions have used dollars and
pounds to supplement gold.
If man doesn't have enough
of one kind of money to'
carry on the world's work,
he'll devise another kind.
In propusing to return to
gold, de Gaulle is really
suggesting an increase In
the price of gold to $70 an
ounce or even more. This
could be done by unanii
'mous agreement among cen-
- tral banks and governments.
No 'change would take
place in the relationship of
world currencies. The dollar
would still bo orth arr
imately four West German
-marks, five French francs,
TINY
tin Italian Inv and bevel./
British shillings. The mar-
. ket value of U.S. gold hold-
ings wouid rise Lvw$13 to
$30 billion, the French gold
hoard would increase from
$3.8 billion to about $7.6,
and the gold of other coun-
tries would likewise double.
But some governments
would be cheated, Those
central bankers who relied
on the word of Presidents
Johnson and Kennedy
would discover overnight
that the dollar is only half
as good as gold. They'd be
able to buy only one-half
ounce of gold for $35 in-
stead of a full ounce as for-
merly.
Ministries have been over-
turned for less. Why, parlia-
ments would demand, did
you rely on President John-
son? Why didn't you keep
reserves in gold?
President de Gaulle
means well for France. But
in his quest for prestige for,
the franc he is trying to
;lead the world back to the
Nineteenth Century. Man
has not yet learned to get
along without gold as a
means of international pay-
ment, but he also has
learned that he can't get
along with it.
?
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TaES
February 1965
R clUrn to Gold?
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
The lure of gold has proved irre-
sistible to many men from King
Midas to Ian Fleming's Goldfinger.
President de Gaulle showed him-
self to be under its spell last week
when he proposed that the world's.
traders should return to the prac-
tice of paying their foreign debts,
in gold, "which does not change in'
nature, which can be made either
into bars, ingots or coins, which
has no nationality, which is con-.
sidered, in all places and at all4
times, the immutable and fiduciary
value par excellence."
The smooth regulation of inter-
national trade does, in fact, depend
on the existence of a means of
payment which all countries, can
respect. For a long time the gen-
erally accepted international cur-
rency was gold, and to facilitate
payments the major trading na-
tions maintained their own cur-
rencies at fixed values in gold,
known as the "gold standard."
During the great depression be-
tween the wars, however, most
countries had to go off the gold
standard and the second world war
further weakened currencies. ,
The eventual result was the
creation of a new system, the gold
exchange standard, under which
the dollar and the pound sterling
became accepted as alternatives to
gold in settling international pay-
cents. This was possible because
the U.S. undertook to convert dol-
lars into gold, at the rate of $35
an ounce, and. Britain undertook
to exchange pounds for dollars, at?
the rate of $2.80 to the pound. -
This system depends, however,
on foreign traders having complete,
confidence that the American and
British currencies will retain their
full value and this in turn depends
on the health of the economy in
the two nations. The financial cri-
sis last fall, caused by a lack of
faith in the ability of _Britain's new;
government to handle the huge
A"It?4t natisa'a balaase
payments, touched Off a wave of
speculation in the world's banks'
that demonstrated the precarious=.
ness of the whole system. The U.S.
is also surrermg trom a enronic
balance of payments deficit, accen-
tuated in recent weeks by France's
decision to conVert most of her,
'dollar holdings into gold.
Reform Of the international
4monetary system has been urged
ifor some time. Discussions on the,
'subject among the Club of Ten?
(the major non-Communist trading'
nations) ?got under way in 1963..
But there has been more general'
agreement on the weaknesses of
the present arrangements than on
the best way to rectify them.
The problem is that world trade'
has increased at a much faster'
pace than the liquidity of the mon-'
vtehich backs it up. World
trade, for instance, has increased
from $44 billion in 1938 to $298
billion last year; but the total
value of reserves in gold and for-
eign exchange (mainly dollars) has
only increased from $27 billion to
$65 billion over the same period,
Moreover the greater part of this
increase has been in the foreign
exchange holdings ? which have
gone up from $1.8 billion to $25
billion?rather than in gold hold-
ings ? which have gone up from
425.9 billion only to $39.9 billion.
President de Gaulle's analysis of'
the problem at his news conference
last week was generally accepted.
He also pointed out that when the
present system was adopted twen-
ty years ago "nearly all the world
gold resevers were then held by '
the U.S." whereas "the currencies
of the Western European states
are today restored, to the extent
that the total gold reserves of the.
Six today equal that of the,
Americans, and would surpass it
if, these state i decided to convert
their dollar holdings into gold,"
?rne rresident went on to criti-
cize the U.S. for taking advantage
of the dollar's status as a reserve
currency to put itself in debt
ahrnarl 0,gt 23. this he
meant that the U.S. could pay off
,its trade debts abroad with dol-
lars "which they alone can issue"
instead of With gold "which has
real value." He also complained
that since dollars were in demand
abroad, American investment In
foreign countries became profit-
able, the result of which was "a
sort of expropriation" of industry
in some countries by the U.S.
The President's proposal that
the world return to the gold stand-
ard was generally felt to be in-
adequate and even harmful. Gold
alone, it was agreed, would not be
sufficient to maintain the present
volume of world trade; one thirdt
of the total payments are now
made in dollars or pounds. A
statement from the U.S. Treasury
pointed out that such a standard.
"collapsed in 1931". and its restora-
tion would be quite contrary to ,
the main stream of thinking",
among governments now studying
reform of the system.
The main alternativ.e remedy to
have been suggested was the.
adoption of a new reserve cur-
rency. This was actually proposed
by France at the Club of Ten
meeting in 1963 but President de
Gaulle's remarks last week sug-
gested that he regarded such a
step only as a temporary measure
until there could be a complete
return to a gold standard. But
this proposal has from the start
been resisted by both the 'U.S. and
Britain who would prefer to
strengthen the dollar and the
pound rather than replace them.
The prevailing opinion seems to
be that it would be better to leave
the system as it is than to take
any retrograde step. ,
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1 March 196$
Chinese Communist Subversion in Burundi
25X1C10b
On January 15, 1965 Pierre Ngendandumwe, recently installed liberal
Prime Minister of the African kingdom of Burundi, was assassinated. On
February 2nd, Burundi suspended diplomatic relations with the Chinese
Communists and expelled the 20 man staff. The eighteen days between
these two events revealed a pattern of Chinese Communist activity --
some of it previously unknown even to top government elements in Burundi
-- which can be likened to early stages of Chicom or Soviet infiltration
in Zanzibar, Mali or other African countries. The Burundi government
has not released all details of improper Chinese behavior but enough is
known of Chinese contacts and techniques to put together a familiar pic-
ture of subversion in one more small country mistakenly believed to be
gullible and defenseless against communism.
Government Investigation. An intensive investigation begun imme-
diately after the assassination led to the arrest of several top figures
who were outspokenly opposed to Ngendandumwe's replacing pro-Peking Albin
Nyamoya. Those arrested included leaders of the trade union federation,
the youth group, former ministers and other prominent government figures,
many of them close to the confessed assassin and all of them strong sup-
porters of CPR positions. Gradually the Chicom role in Burundi has been
pieced together.
Chinese Campaign against Congo. Twig Chi-ping, a 24-year old cul-
tural attachd'in the Chinese Communist Burundi embassy who fled to the
U.S. embassy within 24 hours of his arrival, had worked for the CPR Com-
mission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. He stated that
the Burundi embassy was set up primarily as a base for fomenting political
disorder in the Congo (Leopoldville). "Actually, Communist China does not
care about Burundi. What they really care about is the Congo. Chairman
Mao has said that if we can grab the Congo, we can grab the Whole of
Africa." He also said the embassy staff was expected to establish the
friendliest of relations with the Burundi government so that the embassy
could be used as a "stepping stone for our operations in the Congo."
Chinese Communist support to Congolese rebels is well known, begin-
ning with Chinese arms and money invested in the Kwilu rebel movement
through Peking-trained Pierre Mulele. Burundi-based Chinese support to
the rebels in eastern Congo is supplemented by Chinese military training
camps in Congo (Brazzaville) -- which may now be increased in size due
to the loss of Burundi as an operating base.
One of the more flagrant abuses of Burundi's non-alignment occurred
in December 1964. After 12 months in Bujumbura the Chinese, quite con-
fident of their protected position, shipped in 100 tons of arms and am-
munition intended for transshipment to the Congolese rebels. The King
of Burundi learned of the plan, however, and seized the shipment.
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Subversion inside Burundi. Communist Chinese training, coercion
and bribery of Rey individuals are most significant for all countries.
Two grouns in Burundi -- labor ani. youth -- were prime targets as they
are in any country which opens its doors to Communist representation.
For example, Augustin Ntamagara, a member of the National Assembly
was among those arrested. He established a labor front, Federation
Travailleur Burundi as a Communist-line political base but it had no
legitimate labor membership. Ntamagara made frequent trips to both
Moscow and Peking butChinese money was apparently decisive. He boasted
openly that the Bujumbura Chinese embassy had paid for his cars and had
given him 5 million francs for demonstrations against newly installed
Prime Minister Ngendandumwe. The FTB planned to publish a news sheet
with Chinese funds and FTB apprentices were sent to Peking for "jour-
nalistic" training.
Also arrested were Francois Bangemu, President of the Burundi youth
organizabion, Jeunesse Nationale Rwagasore, and Secretary General Prime
NiyrigaLQ. Both had led p(7?ular demonstrations agal'ist the Burundi govern-
ment and had been strong supporters of the former premier, Albin Nyamoya
and some of the JNR leaders were members of his government. The youth
group program, like that of the labor group, had a pronounced Communist
flavor. According to the Wt African Pilot of Lagos, Nigeria (1 Feb-
ruary 1965), "JNR leaders have long been in the pay of the Chinese and
Soviet governments, as police investigations have revealed."
Former Prime Minister Nyamoya and Zenon Nicayenzi, his chief of
cabinet, were also among those arrested. Nyartoyais connivance with Com-
munist China culminated in his signing a secret barter agreement includ-
ing provisions which would have totally enslaved the Burundi economy.
This move, coupled with the massive arms shipment intended for the Congo
rebels, may have been the immediate basis for suspending relations with
the CPR.
Tribal Targets. Communist exploitation of tribal animosities is
widespread in Africa. The most radical Tutsi refugees from Hutu-
controlled Rwanda (once coupled with Burundi as Rwanda-Urundi) received
guerrilla training and money from the CPR. Chicom strategy may aim at
overthrowing the republican government of Rwanda in order to gain another
base for attack against the Congo. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Memmen Williams told a Senate committee that Ccomunist Chinese involve-
ment,
"...has included encouragement of extremist agitators who stir
up the refugees to pursue a militant policy toward Rwanda and to
terrorist raids across Rwanda's borders. Communist assistance
to refugee extremists reportedly has encouraged financial support
to the exiled ex-King of Rwanda and his close adherents, advice on
organizing terrorist raids, some arms aid and the training of guer-
rilla instructors in mainland China. It is believed that this as-
sistance in recent months probably has been coordinated by the
Chinese Communist embassy in Bujumbura."
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Many of those arrested in Burundi for pro-Chinese, anti-government
actions are Tutsi. Burundi is dedicated to "national reconciliation
among brothers" and abolition of "racial discrimination," according to
the so-called Gitega agreements of the ruling political party. Prime
Minister Bamina, who succeeded the assassinated Ngendandumwe, said that
the Gitega agreements
"... were sabotaged and compromised, as the facts unfortunately
testify. Those who sabotaged the Gitega conference were seeking
all kinds of opportunity to further their prestige.
In bringing about the defeat of the resolutions adopted at
the Gitega summit conference, the embassy of tne Chinese People's
Republic gravely compromised itself, and this interference on the
part of a foreign country in the internal politics of Burundi
obliged the Government of Burundi to suspend diplomatic relations
with the Chinese People's Republic. In fact their support and
their encouragement were always operated in one direction only and
risked compromising not only our feelings of unity and esprit de
corps between the Barundi themselves but also the relations be-
tween Burundi and neighboring countries."
Who is Next? The CPR now has embassies in Algeria, Congo (Brazza-
ville), Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Dahomey, Somalia, Sudan,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Central African Republic and United Arab
Republic. There are NCNA representatives in Tunis, Ethiopia and Senegal
which have no embassies. (The notorious Kao Liang who was expelled from
India for "unjournalistic activities" and then became funding channel
for CPR agents in Zanzibar, was NCNA representative for East Africa --
including Burundi -- until recently. He has now moved his operations
to Brazzaville, Congo.)
Moves against moderate or liberal elements may be expected in any
of these countries. Labor and youth groups will most certainly be in-
filtrated in all of them. All the familiar techniques will be used but
the measure of their success may not be evident in some cases until a
great deal of damage has been done to African sovereignty and independ-
ence.
3
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ey,8c2
RESTAURACION DEMOCRATICA EN BRAS IL
CPYRGHT
La democracia amenazada por la infiltracion comunista, facili-
tada y estimulada por el Gobierno y por los seguidores de aquella
doctrina, quienes ocupaban m?de 250 puestos importantes en la
administraciOn brasileria, fue restablecida por la rapida acciOn
de las Fuerzas Armadas, con el apoyo de los trabajadores, del
pueblo, del Congreso y de los Gobernadores de casi todos los
ea'stados de la Union. El papel de las Fuerzas Armadas, en el
episodio Joao Goulart, ha sido mal interpretado por quienes
desconocen la realidad brasileria aunque de buena fe y
por muchos a quienes interesa deformar, con fines politicos, el
sentido de la transformacion por la cual atraviesa el pais. Estos
dltimos insisten en ver en este acto de las Fuerzas Armadas un
sentido reaccionario, una connivencia entre grandes hacendados,
plutocratas y militares de alta graduaciOn, con el objeto de evitar
las ref ormas reclamadas y defender privilegios inconfesables. Sin
embargo, la realidad es diferente, pues no se ha mudado la
c.orma de gobierno, que es la misma; ha sido sustituido un
bre y los metodos que anarquizaban a Brasil, desde la indis-
ciplina que se predicaba entre miembros de las Fuerzas Arma-
das, la desorganizaciOn de la produccion, por las constantes
huelgas politicas promovidas por el Gobierno, hasta el empo-
brecimiento de los trabajadores, por la inflacion incontrolable y
por la demagogia desenfrenada. La intervenciOn militar ha
mantenido el Congreso, el Poder Judicial y la libertad personal
y politica de todos los que no han atentado contra la Dernocra-
cia, o no se han beneficiado con la corrupcion. La prensa mantie-
ne su libertad, y el derecho de vivir libre del yugo comunista ha
sido logrado sin un solo disparo.
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CPYRGHT
POR THEOPH11.0 DE ANDRADE
CPYRGHT
don, pues trendy. ma al hombre en easlavo
del Estado. Retrotrae la civilizacien al regi-
men de los despot' orientales. Y on times
vitalicios, que sato pueden ser elintinsdos por
Is revolucien, el golpe de Estado o el *tented?.
Ante Is imposibilided de definirse (co-
mo lo desean los comunistaa chinos) median-
te una purrs ? que boy seria atomics y an-
todestructora ?, la lucha entre la llbertad y
La eselavitud ha tornado otras forams, englo-
badas bajo la denominschin generics de "gue-
rra Iris". Guerra Biz es el denontinador co-
men. En los poises subdesarrollados, donde
aim c:xiste mucha rniseria y much& ignoran-
cia, adopts el nombre de "guerra revolucto-
nada", con una filosofia people y una tient
-
ca propis. Propende a Is destruccien ? des-
de adentro ? del Estado demoeritico,
tando aid, al sobrevenir el caos, el establect-
miento de los "Gauleiters" de Mooed y Pekin.
Ems es la euerra de la cua.1 estin Wend?
victimas Africa, Asia y America Latina. En los
paises pequeeios la suerte puede ser divers*.
En nuestro continents, se impulses en Cuba.
East victoria fue aprovechada pars establecer
alli una eabeza de pnente, y una escuela de
Is cual erresan profesores de sobversien y sa-
botaje, lucre enviados a otros paises de ori-
gen iberico. Esos "tecnicos" habriats de scaler,
con mayor y menor eficiencla, en Colombia,
Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, y muy especialmen-
te, en Venezuela y Brasil.
En esos liaises la conspiracien es realize-
da de dos maneras: de abajo hacia arriba, co-
me se ha intentado en Venezuela, y de arriba
hada sea* como se hizo en Brasil. En el
primer caso, saris la revolucion; en el segun-
do, el golpe de Estado. Aqui, %min las decla-
raciones del propio Sr. Luiz Carlos Prestos ?
que es el "Gauleiter" de Moue en Brasil, des-
de 1930 ? el comunismo ya tenia gobterno.
las "reforms de haze, contra IS Cs.aslit!1-
4slin rldiculleada come "erodes" Cease
tambien en la diesel/salon der la ledsta de
clases y en el ?rho de clues, mesa Aglaia fie
imagine en Brasil. De le "cern= de Metre"
importaron arms pars ser dhltribuidas entre
los Erupt* de campesimos tine integraban its
"Ligas Campesinas". La inflation fue &Ube-
rfulamente aseelerada, can It llnatidad de Min-
d's' a las mesas en is destsperation per el alest
dell costa de la vide, eituscio's quer el gobiernO,
arteramente, atdbd a las ?lases scandals-
des. Finalmente lo mise importante de todo
?machos' de les; denandos miUteres fUeron
confiados a *Betels* corromptdos y dociles is
Iaa insinuaciones del poder. Loa gargentoa, ma-
rineros y soldados eran Intifada' a rebelerse
contra sus superiorat jerisquiees. siesinarles,
destituirlos y realizar Ia revoluclon social.
Ya pared& que lba a ser full, con las con-
setuenclas transeedentales part Brasil y pa-
re *ad* America, Wins. Porque el die en one
se hublera concreted? la eubanizadert del
paiz. babrian seguido su hyena, inevitable-
mente, lodes los demis pathos, El eomulaismo
habria dominado el mend? iberoamericano,
como ya lo ha heeho con tail toda Asla y
parte de Africa.
Lo mis probable seria Is reaction "a pos-
teriori" de los brindle:Enos, la cue] defeat:Ade-
nazi& la guerra civil. Serie, por clerto. una
guava civil similar * la de Esparta, en 1996
Por el propio caricter ideolegice de este Pie-
rre, Isabela intervencisin de potencies ettran-
jeras. Aparecerian "veluntarios". Se organize
-
den "brigades internadonales". Ls guar& fria
se transformaria en guerra caliente. Y shiton-
ces, comenzaria en Brasil la tereera guerra
mundial, en Is cual, por la accion de Is "quin-
ts columns" castro-comunista, se verian en-
vueltos, de inmediato, taloa los denies paises
La revolution brasilefia del 1.0 de Abril ha
sido una victoria, no solo para Brasil, sino pa-
re todo et mundo democratic?. Por primers
?ez, despnes del exit? del Plan Marshall, el
onminsmo internacional ha sido derrotado
una 'lona de vital inmortancia para todo
{
Iii realida.d, la lucha emprendlda en Bra-
sil v que aim continua ? ya no interesa
to a un pats, sino a un continente, y en ultj.
ma inslancia, a toda la humanidad. El destino
del hombre depende, hoy -en dia, de saber si
1,4 ai;,4,.i decadas y tal vez los siglos
,,star.Ln regidos por goblernos de libertad
eschovitud. La vieja cuestion que envuel-
ve a la harrianidad, desde su organization en
soriedad, ionsiste en saber si la supremacia
sera para el individuo o pant el Estado. Per-
que la organnacion primitive del Estado hie
totalitaria. En el, sohtmente el gran despota
era 'fibre. ASI ocurrle en los imperios orienta-
les. La liberaeloin del individuo comenzo en la
firecia antigua, y se complete por medio del
cdstlanismo, en um labor que dementia vein-
sielos. AA, sin mayores sufrimientos. to-
dos habsian alcanzado I igualdad politica
econemica, medhotte la democracia. Si la his-
telt no marchara en avances 7 retrocesos, co-
mo todo en la naturaleza.
mom ie laitaua el pouer. I esse los a ger ?me-
nido meidiante las "reforrnaa de base", propue-
nadas en reuniones populares y con budges
oficiales ? incluyendo Is buelea general ?
urenararlav nor Inc ampanrpai minim Awl slr Iran
ae &menu& Latina.
Por consiguiente, subestimaron I* aspect-
dad de reaction del pueblo brunette que
habia derrotado a los rojos en las iltimas
Apr innsc al 4 .,i nu. fa reaction de los
Goulart. Debian cultnInar el 1.0 de Mayo si-
ruiente, con la transformation del regimen
LOS comunistas y SUB aliados estoban tan se-
turos del exit?, que haste se permitian el lujo
de divulgar la fecha pars, su revoluciOn. como
si se tratara de una fiesta.
La infiltration era general. Comenzaba
en la Presidencia de la RepUblica. donde los
Jefes de la Casa Civil y de la Casa Militar
er`an ennoeidos simpatIzantes etilinunistas al
igual qur el Secretario de Prensa y el equipn
tecnico del Palacio del Planalto. Varios minis-
tros de Estado militaban en la mime
? incluyendo los trek *Winos que se desem-
pefiaron en la certeza, de Educacion, que en-
tregaron a los rojos Is direceiOn dr las asocia-
clones estudiantiles. El Ministerlo del Exterior
apnvO abiertamente las tees cubanas, ruses
o neutrallstas:Los sindicatos Orem", centre-
lados desde arriba por el ministro de Trabajo,
fuel-on puestos en manos de los comunistas.
Sr crearon organizaclones superiores 'locales,
come Ia CGT (Comando General de Trabaja-
dome), la PllA (Pacto de Unidad y Accion)
y varies otras, para prornover la paraLizacien
Sobre re aspects, el comunismo tat co- general del trabajo. los mumps del Estado y
Z'ed;raiz amtosim es e entradtmantoto
gobernadores elegidos democriticamente, y
sobre lode, la de las Fuerzas Armadas, que
slempre ejercieron un papel politico hnspor-
tante en hada la via dr la nacion. Pueron
ellas tan eficientes y fulralnantes, toe rn :15
horas y sin haber dIsparado casi un soh: tire,
pudieron derribar el gobierno, cotter:tido va
en apendice de :Bosco y de Pekin. Dei e ei
punto de vista militia', ha aldo un unhurt);
de este milagro habrin de beneftelstese. nit
solamente los brasileflos. sino tonthier,
otros pueblos Libre' de la Tierra. iittm tpal
mente los de nuestro bentIsferio, nue _va nuA,
den considerarse exentos de revolutionrs pa
Asides en sus territories. Estos benefit:1w, fa
'sweets's. edemas., a lestados Unidos y a la. na -
clones demoeritleas de Europa, que ten ?
drin que envier a sus juventudes pare lather
en nuestras tierras, come tuvieron nue Nicer-
lo en Corea. y an shore, en Vietnian del Sur.
Porque is*. era la saerte que nos esperoba a
todo. Nosotros, los de Brasil, tenemos niti-
da conciencia de esa predlccien.
SI Goulart hublera logrado implants,. sus
"reformas". y dado su golpe de Estado con Is
ayuda de consejeroa ruses, cubanos y chinas.
61}WgZapNailcarT plaits bahrtan
- ? y lamed? al meta,
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cuando ya todo babria estado perdido. Corno
los bras:Helios supieron actuar a tlempo, y es-
tan tomando medidas reparadoras, respetan-
do escrupulosamente la estructura de Is Cons-
titucion democratica, nos critican, pretendien-
do darnos lecciones de libertad, como st la 11-
bertad no hubiera sido salvada en la undid-
ma bora, cuando estaba a punto de perecer en
este pais.
Con el apoyo de la opinion publics, fue
decretado un Acto institucional, de efectos ii-
mitados, que regiroi hasta el fin del presente
periodo gubernamental (31 de Enero de 1360,
cuando asuma el mando el tutor? prellidente
a ser elegido en Octubre de 1965. El objetivo
de este gobierno transitorio es "descomunizar"
Is miquina del Estado. Pero, ni siquiera ha
side decretou/o el "esiado de sitio", ni trabas
a la liberdad de prensa. Por lo demis, Ia su-
cesion se ha realizado constltucionalmente, y
el general Humberto de Alencar Castel? Bran-
co, que ha pedido su baja del Ejerclto pars
desemperiar el cargo, resulte electo por aphuo-
tante mayoria del Congreso.
Si bubo Intervencion de Las Fuerzas Ar-
madas es porque, en un pais como Brasil, tuna
revolucion no se desarrolla sin su concurs?
Y ese concurs? fue dado al pueblo y a be go-
bernadores, ya que, segtin a Constitucion,
deber de las Poems* Armadas velar por el
cumplimiento de la ley y por el Orden, que es-
taban siendo menospreciados por un gobler-
no perjure, que tralcionaba sus compromises
democriticos y conspiraba pars colocar el pais
detris de Is "cortina de hierro", tal como su-
cedio en Cuba.
La democracia es tma tradlcbin de an si-
glo y medio en Brasil, desde su independen.
eta; y, si las Foetus Armadas, que son an
factor politico en la formaclon y manuten-
)t?
don de la nacion han intervenido raras veces
en la evolucion politica, ha side pars ria.
blecer el orden democratic? y devolver en se-
guida el gobierno al poder civil. Es lo que tam-
Men ha sucedido shore. Las sucesiones por el
proceso electoral son norma en la historia bra-
sileria.
La revolucion victories& del 1.0 de Abril,
ha sIdo realizada, por to tante, pars, libertar
al pais de una terrible amenaza comunlsta,
que de haberse llevado a cabo habria tenido
consecuencias trascedentales para el hemis-
ferio y pars el mundo. Contrariamente a las
acusaciones de "fascianzo" y "gorilismo", di-
fundidas por la internacional roja, la rebellion
de los democratas brasilerios habra de mVe-
cer el agradecimiento de todos los pueblos 11-
bres de Is tierra. Solo por un pelo Brasil no
ha resultado el deteninte de un a tercera gue-
rra mondial.
.1 /
,-
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/ t'?',...."...........!
111111,
1
k !
/1
1
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1
I
8go
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NIERCURIO.?Santiago do Chile, Lunes 15 de Febrero de 1965
Brasil Retoma la Ruta del
Desarrollo
CPYRGHT
Entee 195( y 1951, la tasa
crecimiento economic? de Bra.
sil alcanza un promedio del
0,9 or ciente> annal rats
alta do America latina, una
de las mayores del mundo). En
el ultimo de los afios nombra-
dos; el crecireiento aleanze, al
7,7 Por ciento., La producciOn
aum m
industrial ento a on del
13,3 or ciento anual; la agrtco-
la, en un 5,7 or ciente anual.
El ritmo de inflaciOn se 'inantu-
vo entre un 15 y un 20 por
ciento en 1957158 y subid a un
promedio de 33' nor ciento ,
anuel entre 1959-61. Con un
ailment? formidable de pobla-
ciOn. a razon del 3,5 por ciento
anual, Brasil surgia como
nuevo gigante sudamericano,
aproximandose eon rapidez a
la etapa del despe.gue, segim las
tcorias de Rostow.
En 1962 la taga crecirnien.
to economic? bajo al 5,5 por
ciente. En 1963 descendio al
2,1 poi. eiento: La inflacion, en.
cambia, aum den
-
to
al 52 per de-
to en 1962 y el '71 por ciento
Pli 1963, La poblacion siguid
creciendo al.mismo ritmo ante-
rior, y, por primera vez, dcsli
1956, la renta nacional per ca.
pita disminuy6. Mil novecientos
sesenta y dos' fue el primer
alio de gobierno 'efectivo de
Joao Goulart; 1953 the el ano
en que su acciOn ecomimica y
social alcanz6 la maxima inten-
sided. Un impulso. asombroso
de crecirniento quedo estancado
en' dos antes por una politica
demagegica, supuestamente na-
eionalista, basada en la perse-
cuciOn del capital, especialmen-
te el ex?tranjero. A ella se
sumo, en los Ultinaos Meses de
1963, la eampana de ag,itacion
social 'orientada a perreitir,
mediante una reforma consti.
tucional, la reeleccion presiden-
rjal.
Este es la situaciOn que he-
redO el actual gobierno brasile.
no, al hacerse cargo del pais,
liace diez meses. .Aunque el
("amble oficial era de 1.200 cru-
zeiros por d6lar y el libre ban-
cario de 11260, el