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March 1, 1965
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78ata0300020007-1 25X1X4 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/4441WDP78-03061A000300020007-1 I March 1965 Briefly Noted V Reflection of Party versus State Leadership in the USSR Rivalry? Wolfgang Leonhard, well-known journal- ist, Sovietologist? a graduate of the COMINTERN school in MOSCOW and a one-time instructor at the East German party university, has pub- lished (on 22 January 1965, in Die Zeit, Hamburg) an article entitled, "Wer regiert das rote Reich?" ("Who Rules the Red Empire?"). Leonhard's thesis is that there is a long- standing controversy between the CPSU and the State apparatus in the Soviet Union, and that since the fall of Khrushchev, the State has regained some of the authority which it lost to the Party during the post- Malenkov period. Leonhard suggests that in the current situation, a shift in the relative strength of the two "pillars" will probably have effects on the relative status of the two men who head them; in other words, Kosygia may be gaining power at the expense of Brezhnev. In the long run, the present shift may rep- resent an inevitable trend towards a loss of party control, due to the increasing complexity of the Soviet society and economy, too complicated to be effectively controlled through ideologically-oriented Party offi- cials who lack technical knowledge. Our evaluation of Leonhard's ar- ticle is that he somewhat stretches his evidence; he does not really prove that the Party-State rivalry now exists. But his thesis is plau- sible, and can be useful in propa- ganda. Either by replaying Leon- hard's article or by original treat- ment along the same general line, we can make the Party-State rivalry a subject of discussion. This will tend to make such a rivalry actually develop, especially if Soviet and other Communist audiences learn of the discussion. Watch in particular for Soviet articles and statements which can be interpreted as evidence of such a rivalry; black use of such statements, aimed at Soviet elites, should be considered. In other play, develop Leonhard's argument that the Party is no longer able to run the Soviet economy effec- tively. Khrushchev's efforts to im- pose Party control should be portrayal as a vain attempt to turn back the clock, while the present leaders are carrying out the logic of the bureau- cratic machinery established by Sta- lin. A conclusion could be that revolutionaries neither build nor run modern economies. Leonhard's article is an attach- ment to this Biweekly. * * * Justice Statutes of Limitation is the CPSU Justice is what those who control the CPSU say it is -- for the Soviet people as well as their leaders. Many currently powerful offi- cials in the Soviet Union aided and abetted Stalin in purging those col- leagues his paranoic mind feared. Their role was that of bearing false witness, a crime officially punishable by two to seven years imprisonment. Approved For Release 1999/08,41.0461RDP78-03061AM3IX/Q2aelad1 Coat, ) Approved For Release 1999/08/241445=P78-03061A000300020007-1 But there is a statute of limita- tions -- ten years at the most on this crime. Stalin died in 1953. so it would appear that the current leaders who gave false testimony for Stalin, are safe -- unless the law should be changed and the limitation period extended. Looking further into Soviet statutes, it is clear that some de- gree of arbitrariness is written into the laws. Prosecution for crimes subject to the death penalty, for ex- ample, can be limited in time. But use of this statute of limitations is optional; and more and more crimes are subject to the death penalty, e.g., economic. Conviction for economic crimps is not difficult to obtain and scapegoats for economic problems are often needed. Since the CPSU controls the courts, a large sector of the So- viet population is in jeopardy of ar- bitrary action against them by the CPSU. History records that Communist officials have known no compunction against reaching far back into the past, fictionalizing charges or im- posing ex post facto interpretations on actions. Statutes of limitations are meant to prevent such action and to protect the citizen -- but they cannot be counted on, in the Soviet Union. * * * STORED SOVIET WEAPONS ENDANGER LIVES If your country is receiving armaments (gifts?) from the Soviet Union, the PEOPLE should know. See Press Comment, 24 Feb 1965 for an article from a Caracas, Venezuela paper, El Mind?. The story comes from a Doctor who treated soldiers for radioactive illness. They were guards at the caves where Castro stored the Soviet warheads of large rockets in 1962, and currently the small atomic rockets. The Doctor explains the causes of the illness -- and its effect upon the guards. Where the question of the West German Statute of Ltmitations on war crimes (due to expire in May after 20 years, unless extended)*is raised, we ignore it and discuss_So- viet practices, pegging them to cur- rent events whenever possible. Or, we raise questions about the involve- ment of current Soviet leaders in crimes of the past (either with Sta- lin or Khrushchev) and discuss the significance of the Soviet system of justice in general. *The cabinet has agreed to ask the Bundestag 2 Press Comment includes an English translation of the Spanish language article: and the El Mundo cartoon, in reproducible proof form. See pages 36-40 for "Cubans Guarding Soviet Rockets Suffer Radioactive Contamination." to extend. * * * Approved For Release 1999/08/444RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 kBriefly Noted.) Approved ? Release 1999/08/24 reirMI5P78-03061A000300020007-1 Significant Dates NAR 14 Karl Marx dies. 1883 (Born 5 May 1818) 15 Ten-nation Disarmament Conference opens, Geneva. Fifth anniversary. 1960 21 World Youth Week starts. Celebrated by Communist WFDY. Twentieth anni- zaKaaa of World Youth Council, predecessor to WFDY. 25 Treaties creating European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom signed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. 1957 28 Sixteen leaders of Poland's Home Army and Govt-in-exile, invited to Soviet Occupation Hdqrs under safe conduct: arrested for "diversionary activities" and sentenced to up to 10 years in prison. Twentieth anni- versary. 1945 APR 1 II Afro-Asian Journalists Conf., Algiers (sponsor: Chicom-Indonesia dominated AAJA) once postponed. 10 International Auschwitz Committee, General Session (FIR) -- commemorating 20th Anniversary of Camp Liberation, Auschwitz, Poland, 10-11 April 1945. 11 International Day of Liberation from Fascism ("Day of Remembrance") cele- brated annually by International Fed. of Resistance Movements (FIR - Communist). 13 II International Conf. for Teaching Resistance History, (sponsored by FIR) Prague, Czechoslovakia, 13-15 April. 17 Nikita Khrushchev born, 1894. 18 Easter, traditional Peace marches,e.g., Aldermaston (UK) and Western Euro- pean countries. 18 Bandung Conf. (29 Afro-Asian countries call for elimination of colonialism, for self-determination and independence, for UN membership all peoples) 18-27 April 1955. Tenth anniversary. [Note: Chou En-lai and Marshal Chen I reportedly accepted invitations to celebrations in Indonesia.] 22 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin born. 1870 (Died 21 January 1924) 24 World Fed. of Democratic Youth (WFDY) Exec. Committee meeting and seminar, Accra, Ghana -- to prepare for 9th World Youth Festival now scheduled mid- summer, Algiers. 24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and for Peaceful Coexistence celebrated by WY and IUS. 29,-30 Hitler commits suicide. Berlin. World War II. 1945 Twentieth anni- versary. Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 41410011^CP EgtriviEtThFor Release 1999/08/24 :tifirefin-03061A000300020007-1 GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS 44( #47 Commentary 3-16 February 1965 s:Principal pevelopment 1. As last period ended, a top-level Soviet delegation headed by Premier Kosygin was departing on a trip to Hanoi seen by most observers as aimed to bring the North Vietnamese Party closer to the CPSU, and perhaps even to induce them to attend the 1 March preparatory commission meeting in Moscow. The itinerary was subsequently expanded to include 1-day stopovers in Peking en route to and from Hanoi and a 3-day visit to North.Korea en route back to the USSR. Kosygin's visit was greatly complicated by Vietcong attacks on U.S. troop quarters andALS. retaliatory air strikes in North Vietnam beginning the day after his arrival. Kosygin became increasingly militant in his public denunciations of the air strike "provocations" in particular and U.S. imperialism in general, and signed a relatively bland joint statement of mutual views in Hanoi, nothing in Peking, and a more harshly anti-U.S. joint statement in Pyongyang. Al- though, as usual, strict security was Observed regarding all talks and we have no information of any secret agreements, most observers believe that Kosygin went no further than to offer increased moral and material support and to urge attendance at the I March Moscow meeting as a means of consolidating unity. There is no evidence that he succeeded in the latter effort. 2. The 15th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and mutual assistance (14 February) brought expressions on both sides about unbreakable fraternal ties. On the Soviet side, these expressions were stronger than in recent years when Moscow had implied that the treaty had lost its original meaning. China, however, was unyielding and Peking People's Daily even went so far as to refer specifically to the CCP 25- point] 14 June 126 "proposal for a _general line of the ICM" -- which really touched off the open warfare between the two -- as the only basis for unity. 3. We have seen two public Communist Party references to the 1 March preparatory meeting, both reiterated endorsements by parties whose support has not been in doubt: Mongolian First Secretary Tsedenbal in a 5 February speech and the East German SED in a Politburo report to an 11-12 February plenum, reported in Neues Deutschland 14 February. 4. The Rumanians continue their independent ways, publishing crit- icism of Czech views on Comecon. Although they have apparently not form- ally withdrawn from Problems of Peace andlSocialism, they have distributed no copies of the Rumanian edition since last August. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 m0mE101144m (Commentary Cont.). Approved For Release 199%69261401A-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 5. A 4 February Pravda article, signed by an unidentified and obscure name, "A. :Veber," made an unprecedented acknowledgxent of the successes of the social democratic parties in the West in "expressing demands of the working masses, in leading them, and in achieving ... positive results in everything concerning everyday vital interests of the working people." Communists, it said, are led to "change some of their attitudes which no longer correspond with the objective situation," and to draw some "basic conclusions" on the democratic tenets of social democracy. It concluded that Communists "cannot ignore the fact that a more or less substantial coincidence of views on a number of basic questions makes contacts and cooperation possible." 6. The Albanians, 16 February, renewed their call for the Soviet com- rades to join all true Marxist-Leninists in throwing out the "Khrushchevite traitors" (the present Soviet leaders who removed K. not because they op- posed his course but to save revisionism). (The last and most strident previous Albanian call for the Soviet rank and file to arise and throw out the K. leadership came in the AWP "open letter to CPSU members" of 5 Octo- ber 19641 on the very eve of K's ouster!) Significance: At the time of this writing, it is still doubtful whether Kosygin's trip satisfied his and the CPSU Presidium's intentions: of course, we cannot be sure what exactly the original purpose of his trip had been. Ideological reconciliation between Moscow and Peking seems as far away as ever -- but a military-tactical understanding to aid North Vietnam and to exploit the U.S. predicament in Southeast Asia cannot be excluded. There is still no conclusive evidence that the I March preparatory commission meeting will be held (or that it will not). We consider it possible that representatives of 18 or 19 of the 26 parties designated may meet and address themselves to the problem of restoring a semblance of unity, -- but it is unlikely that they can at this tile reach agreement on organizing a world conference.* The 4 February Pravda article may foreshadow another reversal of Com- munist tactics concerning the Social Democrats, possibly a return to the "united front from above" or "popular front" tactics endorsed by the 7th Comintern Congress 1935 (to which the article alludes). Thus far, the article has remained isolated: we have seen as yet neither follow-ups in Soviet media, nor reactions in the foreign Communist or Social Democratic press. It may be a trial balloon: it may have limited meaning for cur- rent united front efforts in France and Italy and as an encouragement of certain left-wingers in the British Labor Party. Or, it may have more far- reaching significance, constituting perhaps even an implicit admission of the failure of the Communist Parties in the advanced industrial countries and a concession to similar heretical thoughts developed in the Italian CP since Togliatti's political testnment, notably by Amendola. For the time being, we watch further developments and reserve definitive judgment. *Editor's note: delegates were gathering for the meeting in Moscow at the end of February. Approved For Release 1999108/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 f1,101141**m (Commentary Cont.) 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #47 3-16 February 1965 January (delayed) In the January issue of the Rumanian Party monthly Journal, Lupta de Classa, an article sharply criticizes Czechoslovak views that members of COMECON should adapt their economies to "higher forms of economic cooperation," pegging the attack to a 1964 book by Czech economic expert Prof. Jiri Novozamsky. Lupta strikes hard at Novozamsky's proposals to establish joint industrial concerns (which would lead to "serious economic and political complications in relations between socialist countries") and for the opening of borders (identical with 'the liquidation of state frontiers"). Observers also note that no copies of the Rumanian edition of Problems of Peace and Socialism have been distributed in Rumania since Aigust, 1964, when the delayed and censored issues of May, June and July were circulated over a fort- night. (The other editions still list Rumanian as one of the languages.) January 29 (delayed): Part II of the long article by disillusioned veteran Swedish Communist Strand, started on January 22 (Chrono #46), appears in Ny Dag and Stockholm Tidningen: his theme is that no one takes Swedish Communists seriously because they propose policies which are now being abandoned as failures in Communist-ruled countries, and he discusses these failures at length. January 30 (delayed); Italian Cr' weekly journal Rinascita publishes full translation of January Kommunist article on CPI discussions about creating a single party of the working class (first reported by L'Unita on Jan. 23 see Chrono #46). A prefatory note by editor Pajetta gently takes exception to Kommunist's "drastic formulation" in which "the (Italian) Party leadership and its theoretical organs are said to have rejected the theses of Comrade Amendola." Pajetta asserts that the debate is continuing: "About the inquiry, its methods, and its results, we shall have to write more than once in Rinascital and the comrades from Kommunist will still have to give much information, we hope." February 4: Pravda features 3,000-word article by A. Veber, "The Communists and the Social Democrats." The first half is orthodox Communist comment on the decline of the socialists since the split of the 2nd International during World War One, their lack of success, and the "painful process of reassessing values taking place" in some of them today. Then, using "the problems of war and peace" as a bridge, he asserts that "there are socialists today who are coming closer to the Communists in their attitude to many problems of external and internal policy." He goes on: "Historical development has removed or changed some problems and attitudes which in the past were deliberately dividing Com- munists and socialists and were thrusting the latter back to the positions of the bourgeoisie. Undoubtedly, changes taking place in the world under the influence of the forces of socialism lead the Communists to change some of their attitudes which no longer correspond with the objective situation.... (Chronoloov Cnnt ) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 "The conferences of the fraternal parties of 1957 and 1960, the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses dealt a resolute blow to sectarian and dogmatist trends remaining from the past. The Communists take into account the fact that social dlmocracy has deep traditional roots in the workers' movement in the West, that it presents one of its influential trends and cannot indiscriminately be regarded as an agent of the bourgeoisie. The social democratic parties, at least at certain moments, have succeeded in expressing demands of the working masses, in leading them, and in achieving certain positive results in everything concerning everyday vital interests of the working people.... "Remaining fully on the positions of scientific socialism and uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology in any of its manifestations, the Communist parties have drawn some basic conclusions which are important for understanding the problem of unity of the workers' movement. These are conclusions on the growing variety of forms of transition to socialism, on the struggle for democracy as an integral part of the struggle for socialism, on the role of profound democratic reforms and transformations for the advance toward socialism in highly de- veloped capitalist countries, and on the maintenance of a multi- party system and the safeguarding of democratic legality. "Concerning some important tasks of the workers' movement, there already exist to a certain extent similar or coinciding views between the Communists and socialists....No one closes his eyes to the fact that, as before, there exist profound differences between the Communists and social democrats in the understanding of the socialist goal, its contents, the methods, and the rate of achieving it. But one cannot ignore the fact that a more or less substantial coincidence of views on a number of basic questions makes contacts and cooperation possible." February 5: At a large meeting of Ulan Bator city Party activists honor- ing the Shelepin-led CPSU delegation (see also Chrono 01-6, Jan. 27), Mongolian First Secy Tsedenbal asserts in his speech that "the MPRP attaches great importance to the meeting of the drafting commission of the fraternal parties set for I March this year." The Soviet delegation concludes its visit on the 6th. Februa 5-15: Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to North Vietnam (see Chrono 60 Jan. 31 and Feb. 4) includes two one-day stopovers in Peking, 4 days in Hanoi, and 3 days in Pyongyang, North Korea. It is immensely complicated by the Vietcong attacks on U.S. installations and the retaliatory air strikes in North Vietnam, 7-8 February. Kosygin is met by Chou En-lai and lesser officials at Peking air- port on 5 Feb., with an unpublicized reception which meets minimum Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : gIA-RDP78-030t6pAgNapg143.7)-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 protocol requirements (conspicuously differing from the "welcoming crowd" which, according to RCM, met Cuban leader Guevara the day before with bouquets, drums and cymbals, and applause). After a banquet that night, "the two sides held a conversation." In Hanoi, Kosygin talks about moral and material support and signs a long joint statement which ex- presses common views on a wide range of subjects (but nothing offensive to the Chinese), including: "The unity and solidarity of the socialist camp and the ICM is an indispensable condition...." Kosygin receives a similar low-key reception in Peking on his return from Hanoi, 10 February, but he isl-eceived" the next morning by Mao and Liu Shao-chi -- with no mention of any talks. His visit to Pyongyang produces some unexpectedly strong speeches by Kosygin con- demning the U.S. and supporting Korean unification as well as N. Vietnam, plus a joint statement of 14 Feb. more harshly anti-U.S. than that signed in Hanoi, though it is similarly "neutral" in supporting unity and solidarity of the ICM. Press observers comment that, despite the militant Soviet language, the Kremlin apparently did not commit itself to any measures "beyond its presumed earlier intent" -- and that "the policy statements evidently did not serve to win Vietnamese and Korean attendance at the projected meeting of CP a in Moscow." February T.: The old-line, pro-Soviet Indian CP reacts to the highly polemical Chinese reportage of the competing "congresses" of the CPI/L and CPI/R (see Chrono #451 Jan. 16) with a sharp blast by Chairman Dange in the Party weekly New Age. (Text not yet available here, but it reportedly attacks the CCP bitterly.) Albanian Party daily Zen i I Popullit carries 15,000-word attack on "The Capitalist Nature of Yugoslav 'Workers' Self-Management' in the Light of the 8th Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists." Concluding its long-winded denunciation of the Yugoslav system, ZIP notes Pravda's favorable treatment and adds: "All attempts by the Khrushchevite Brezhnev-Mikoyan-Kosygin troika and its followers to present as socialist the counter- revolutionary work of the Titoists has not yielded and will not yield any result. The little crows cannot become white. The truth about Yugoslavia cannot be concealed...." February 8: Moscow correspondent of Belgrade Borba comments that "Three weeks before the scheduled meeting of the drafting commission of 26 CPs, it is not yet clear whether or not it will take place, although there are no signs either that it will be put off again." He adds that "To all appearances the original idea that the commission should draft a number of documents to be submitted to the consultation meeting of CPs has now been dropped." 3 (Chronology Con.) Approved For Release 1999108124: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 February 14: The _altljaalasujimof the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and mutual assistance brings a spate of affirmations of unbreakable" fraternal ties in speeches at meetings, official messages and media comment, -- but there is no evidence that progress toward a reconciliation has been made or is likely. The Soviet ex- pressions seem to go farthest toward meeting the other side and emphasizing the ties that bind, -- but obviously not far enough to satisfy the Chinese. Even the relatively brief telegram from the "troika," Brezhnev, Mikoyan and Kosygin, in emphasizing Soviet determination to "strengthen the unity of the socialist camp," stresses the recent conference of the Warsaw Pact members, which, of course, did not include any of the Chinese sympathizers and did include an observer from the Yugoslav regime anathematized by the Chinese. The speech at the Moscow public meeting is made by a relatively unknown CPSU/CC member, Boris Beshchev, Minister of Railways. And signed articles (not editorials) in Izvestiya on the 13th and in Pravda on the 14th and 15th refer not only to the Warsaw Pact meeting but also to the Kosygin delegation of North Vietnam and the Shelepin delegation, both of which are obviously aimed at tightening solidarity with the USSR as opposed to the CPR. Moreover, the 13th and 14th articles also include reference to Soviet "resoluta support" of China "during the days of the Taiwan crisis Fwhen the Soviets are gener- ally beliew:d to have exsa-ted their utloost influence tn restrain the Chimes,: fron their aG3r,:u-Ave aims] and-in the alarming July of 1960," the latter presumably referring to Chiang 's threat to invade the mainland, restrained by the U.S. The Chinese statements clearly make struggle against U.S. imperialism, "the most ferocious enemy of the people the world over," the minimum condition for "friendship and unity" between the two, but the People's Daily editorial on the 14th goes much further: "The basis of unity of the countries of our socialist camp can only be M-L and proletarian internationalism, can only be the revolutionary principles of the 1957 declaration and the 1960 statement. The genera/ line of the ICM which the CCP/CC.proposed in the form of a summary on 14 June 1963, is completely in accord with M-L, with the revolutionary principles of the statement and declaration...." After thus reasserting that unity can come only on Chinese terms, PD reaffirms that "our hearts are with the great Soviet people" who will surely surmount all obstacles standing in their way" Lsuch as the CPSU leadership/ and "together with us Chinese people, struggle to uphold and strengthen the unity between China and the Soviet Union and the unity of the socialist camp and fight against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys until final victory is won." February 16: Albanian Party daily Zen i I Popullit editorial, "What Lies Behind the Divisive 1 March Meeting Being Prepared by the Khrushchevite Revisionists?" reiterates its denunciation of Soviet efforts to organize a splittist conference. It begins with a reference to the Albanian Party's 5 October 1964 open letter to CPSU members". which not only served notice that it would not reply to the CPSU's original invitation to the pre- paratory commission meeting and "will have nothing more to do with the renegade group of N. Khrushchev," but also went on to call repeatedly on the Soyiet rank and file to ari e_and_thmow out the Approved For Release 1999/09/24s: C;IA-RUP79-03061A9MblinOireffship Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 -- less than two weeks before Khrushchev was ousted. (See also Chrono #39) ZIP then goes on to say that: "Life has shown that the present Soviet leaders removed K. from party and state leadership not because aty were litzaing,t his anti-Marxist ideolo ical and ?.? litical course, but rather to save reVisionism and follow in t e K. revisionist path but without a discredited and unmasked K." Though not as blatantly as in the 5 October letter, the Albanians renew the call for Soviet comrades to overthrow the new leaders and join the true Marxist-Leninists: "Thus the AWP considers that the Communist comrades from the Soviet Union and all their companions who struggle for the great cause of socialism and Communism will strengthen the joint struigle against the Khrushchevite traitors.... It is time for eyeghody to assume his duty in the struggle against the renegades of M-L against the Khrushchevites and their fgllowers. ... It is time for them to save their honor, socialism, and Communism!" (Late addition:) February 14: East German Party daily Valles Deutsdhland notes that a Politburo report to BED plenum 11-12 Feleruary endorsed the plan for the I March preparatory meeting. 5 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/27! mern5P78-03061A00030002000171165 876. COMMUNIST MOB ATTACKS ON WESTERN .EMBASSIES AND LIBRARIES Tar Brush and Kerosene Torch -- Substitutes for Revolutionary Class Struggle? 25X1 C 1 Ob SITUATION: For years now, whenever an action of the U.S. Government (or of any other Western power) displeased the Communists, they predic- tably unleashed mob action against the embassies, consulates, information offices and libraries of the "guilty" government -- primarily in the Communist countries themselves, especially in Moscow, but also in neu- tralist and allegedly "uncommitted" countries like Indonesia, Egypt and elsewhere. The exact nature of the attack is always commensurate to the "gravity' of the Western offense, but also to the limit to which Commu- nist governments and parties have decided to go in any given case. Con- sequently, these allegedly spontaneous "outbursts of popular indignation" are carefully planned, ranging from mere demonstrations with banners, placards, shouting and resolutions to physical assault, in- volving stone throwing, defacing the facades, coats-of-arms and flags of the embassy, breaking windows, but occasionally also destroying cars, burning books and even invading diplomatic offices, attempting to seize files (e.g., when burning the British Embassy in Djakarta) and committing any other form of vandalism. In certain instances, on the spot TV and other coverage reflects the premeditated nature of the so-called spontane- ous demonstrations. The police, even if given ample advance warning, seldom hin- ders such pob violence: at the utmost, it sees to it that the demonstra- tion does not exceed its pre-determined limits. It may not permit book burning, if this is not part of the agenda. And it may induce the mob to leave once the time, allowed for this "spontaneous manifestation," has elapsed. The primary and obvious purpose of such government-authorized mob action is psychological: the Communists (and certain of their allies or sympathizers, such as Sukarno or Nasser) want to humiliate the Western government in question, thereby demon- strating that "all imperialists are paper tigers" (even though the Soviets, unlike their Chinese competitors, shun the latter expression). They can do this with impunity, since they know only too well that no major Western power will stoop to retaliation in kind and that it will even prevent genuine, truly spontaneous demonstrations of their own people from coming too close to a foreign diplomatic installation. The Western government afflicted may send a diplomatic protest -- which inter alia in- dicates to the Communist perpetrators that their blow has been felt: or it may demand financial compensation for the damage -- which, however justified can be used by Communists t? tiv thelx cbam thimirpf 8-03061pau Oiuu Aplinzaveck Rekeaseni99-2/08424tecckolk- - 4 4140.140114ME? (876 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/04240/44-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 However, the noise and excitement of such mob attacks serves another, more fundamental and more significant purpose: it hides from the Communist rank-and-file and from public opinion at large the embarrassing fact that their leaders can do little else, more specifically that they are lacking the means which they ought to use against the "imperialists." Neither Marx nor Lenin nor any other of the founding fathers of Commu- nism were thinking of tar brushes and burning books when they preached their gospel of the international class struggle which would "inevitably" result in a world-wide dictatorship of the proletariat. According to their doctrine, this proletarian class struggle would become stronger and more powerful, the further the capitalist economy in a given country would advance and the more class-conscious proletarians of the entire world would cooperate in one single, rigidly disciplined, monolithic international organization. Consequently, if an imperialist government would threaten harm to a socialist country, the proletariat of that imperialist country would rise in righteous wrath to prevent -- or at least to impede -- such out- rage. Appeals to that effect, addressed primarily to the workers of England, France and Germany, are contained in numerous early documents of the Coirununist International, in the first few years after World War One -- to no avail. The Communists tried it again after World War Two, mainly in France, when they endeavored to prevent, first, the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe (1947) and then the NATO alliance (19)-i-9) -- again in vain. In the U.S., Britain, West Germany and other Western nations, the Communists have not even tried political mass strikes or other forceful tactics in pursuit of their international ob- jectives. In other words, the most fundamental tenet of Communist doc- trine -- the inevitability of successful proletarian class struggle, inexorably advancing in all capitalist countries -- has been completely disproved by recent history. The Communist leaders are aware of this basic failure, even though they are careful not to admit it. The Chinese Communists have fairly openly written off the Communist Parties in the major Western countries (which mostly side with Moscow, anyhow) and are placing all their bets on "national liberation" in developing areas. Moscow does not abandon the Western CPs Which the Soviets can use as instruments for subver- sion, espionage, sabotage and propaganda, even if they have little value as power factors in the global Cold War. But both Moscow and Peking have chosen as "short-range solutions" the easy, safe tactics of spec- tacular mob attacks on Western installations and representatives -- which they are also promoting in developing countries, to make the im- perialists "lose face." Reference Political Demonstrations (Confidential), especially its chapter G, "Deceptive Demonstrations." 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/08/24 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 kM?bigim (876 Cont.) 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 1965 877. ARMAMENTS IMPEDE SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH 25X1 C1 Ob SITUATION: Every year, in late January, the Central Statistical Board of the USSR announces plan fulfillment results -- i.e., the results of Soviet efforts to fulfill and surpass the plan targets -- for the pre- ceding year. (There are also quarterly and semi-annual plan fulfillment reports. BPG 818, "Soviet Industrial Growth Declines," 31 August 196)-i-, discussed the results of the mid-1964 report.) As is usual in Soviet statistical reporting, efforts are made to present the figures in as favorable a light as possible, and to conceal major failures. This January, although the report was frank in giving livestock figures which are lower than last year's (this can be blamed on Khrushchev's poor har- vest of 1963), grain production figures were omitted for the second year in a row. Perhaps the harvest was not really as good as Soviet sources claimed last fall; perhaps it was feared that the publication of both gross production and percentage increase would enable people to deduce the 1963 crop. Industry also showed a decline in growth, with results particularly poor in the light and food industries. In the long run, Soviet industrial growth rates would have declined in any case, simply because rapid growth is harder to maintain in any economy as it becomes more developed. But the decline in recent years has been too dramatic to be explained by such long-term considerations. A publication of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, Annual Economic Indicators for the USSR, February 1964, gives the following growth figures for Soviet civilian industrial production: 1959 1960 1961 1962 8.6% 6.3 6.7 7.2 The 1950-1955 average was 10.1 and the 1955-1961 average was 8.7, accord- ing to another JEC publication, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power. Recent estimates by some of the Committee's expert advisors gave a figure of 6 per cent for 1963 and 1964. This 1964 figure (which was preliminary) may eventually be revised downward, for in the past these Western estimates have averaged around 2 per cent lower than official Soviet figures (which involve double counting), and the Soviets now admit to an industrial growth figure of only 7.1 per cent for 1964, the lowest admitted industrial growth figure since World War II. In 1962-1964, Japanese industrial growth came to 12 per cent. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Sr.**ler (877 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/01!i0414408P78-03061A000300020007-1 There has been, then,a rapid drop from the USSR's 10 per cent average of the early 1950's, and indeed the decline becomes abrupt in 1958, 1959, and 1960. The decline in the value of new plant completed is even more striking: in 1958, new investment completed increased 16.2 per cent; in 1959, 13.2 per cent; in 1960, 8.0 per cent; and in 1961, 4.3 per cent (Soviet figures, given in Annual Economic Indicators). The explanation for the sudden drop appears to be that the Soviet economy became over- committed, and in particular, that it became overcommitted to military and space development. It was in the post-Sputnik years of 1958, 1959, and 1960 that Khrushchev came to hope that he could bluff his way to world victory, using space spectaculars and nuclear and ICBM demonstrations to overawe the West. The bluff seems to have been put aside, at least temporarily, after the Cuban crisis, but neither that event nor Khrushchev's fall have brought about a serious cut in military-technical expenditures. Such cuts as are advertised appear to affect only conventional forces. (See also BPG #861, "Military Forces in the World Today," 18 January 1965.) An unclassified attachment, "Problems of the Soviet Econogy," dis- cusses the latest plan fulfillment results and the handicaps imposed on the Soviet economy by the Soviet regime. See also BPG #839, "Soviet Economists Advocate Capitalist Techniques," 26 October 1964, and BPG #818, referred to above. 25X1 C1 Ob 34.11Prr (877.) 5X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/244.0WiR78-03061A00)03800120007-1 879. COMMUNIST CHINESE EVICTED FROM BURUNDI 25X1C 1 Oc SITUATION: The Burundi government's early February expulsion of the entire staff of the Chinese Communist embassy temporarily halted Peking's march through the countries forming the northern crescent around their main goal: Congo (Leopoldville). The CPR's success in buying their way into the Burundi government and key organizations apparently led to their overestimating the extent of their control; then they and their local lackeys blundered badly. In December a massive Chicom arms shipment was transiting Burundi when the King determined to put a stop to the use of his non-aligned country as a base for support to the Congolese rebels. He seized the arms and replaced pro-Peking Prime Minister Nyamoya. Still the extent of Chicom subversion in Burundi might have gone unnoticed had not the new Prime Minister been assassinated. (See unclassified attachment, "Chinese Communist Subversion in Burundi.") There is nothing new in the Chicom pattern of operation in Burundi. Their clandestine operations might be likened to damage termites do below the surface which is brought to light only by accident -- in this case, murder. Key figures from youth and labor, from government and opposition political parties are suborned (as the Chinese have also done, respec- tively, in Congo (WI Sudan, Mali, and Senegal). Communications media are established or penetrated (as in Kenya); refugees and dissidents are armed (as in Cameroon and Niger). Political indoctrination and training play a key role: some leaders and students were sent to Peking, as has been standard procedure in other African countries, but Communist guer- rilla warfare training facilities in Africa are being increased. Chinese specialists are teaching guerrilla warfare at bases in Congo (B), Ghana and reportedly are negotiating with Algeria. References A. Testimony of Tung Chi-ping, Committee on Judiciary, U.S. Senate Biweekly Propaganda Guidances: B. #754 "New China News Agency (NCNA): Key Tool of Peking's Global Ambitions"* C. #743 "Lessons of Zanzibar"* D. #809 "Communist China's Indirect Aggression in Africa"* E. #854 "Communist Lesson: Haw to Overthrow Governments"* F. #857 "The Truth About the Congo"* Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 rime41406eft (879 Cont.) 5X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/2444010MF'78-03061A0003000211300(7211965 880. ANNIVERSARY OF THE BRAZILIAN REVOLUTION AGAINST GOULART AND HIS COMMUNIST ALLIES 25X1C10b SITUATION: As the first anniversary of the April Revolution ap- proaches, practically all events of this year have confirmed its unique, Brazilian character. Although initiated by the military, it was con- summated by a majority of the state governments and had been supported by truly spontaneous, mass demonstrations in the major centers of popu- lation. And although an arbitrary act set the revolution in motion, the government of Brazil was restored to full legality after a lapse of only two days. Rather than a "revolution" the events of 1 April 1964, marked the restoration of orderly processes and the end to a subtle and gradual drift toward a Communist take-over. Since succeeding to the presidency in late 1961, Jcfgo Goulart had contributed toward undermining his own government by appointing Communist and ultra-nationalist leftists to important posts. The first of a series of events that precipitated the crisis was Goulart's reckless sponsorship of a mass meeting on 13 March in Rio. With the backing of the Communists, he called for basic changes in the government structure, legalization of the CP/ and dramatically signed two decrees, one confiscating six privately owned oil refineries, the other giving the government broad discretionary powers to confiscate land and hand it over to the peasants. The most important single act was his refusal to discipline the enlisted personnel involved in the mutiny of sailors and marines 25-27 March. When army troops arrested the mutineers, Goulart ordered them released with assurances that they would not be punished. On the evening of 30 March, Goulart addressed a gathering of army sergeants, in a final effort to secure the sympathy of the rank and file of the armed forces. This was the crowning in- sult, but the revolt was already under way. The next day, Governor Magalhies Pinto, of Minas Gerais state, called for the removal of Goulart. He was followed. by General Amaury Kruel, Commander of the Second Army, based in Sao Paulo, and other army commanders and state governors. Goulart flew to Brasilia and sought support from Congress and the peo- ple. Not finding either, he flew south to his home state of Rio Grande do Sul. During afternoon of 2 April he crossed the border into Uruguay, and the Revolution was thus consummated without shedding a drop of blood or firing a single shot in anger. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 aftisloPP4m, (88o cont.) Approved For Release 1990.1914,eTA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 As elsewhere in Latin America, the Brazilian Army looks upon itself as a stabilizing force, a guardian of the constitution. But Brazil is unique among Latin American countries in that it has never been under military dictatorship. Thus it was that, in the early morning hours of 2 April, the Congress met and declared that Goulart had vacated the office of president. Article 79 of the Constitution was invoked and the presi- dent of the Chamber of Deputies, Ranieri Mazzili? was declared president and sworn in a few minutes later by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The "violent" phase of the revolution had lasted only 55 hours. On the 9th of April, the Supreme Revolutionary Council decreed its now celebrated "Institutional Act," Which provided for a general purge of corrupt officials and pro-Communist congressmen, depriving some of their political rights over a period of years. On the 11th, in a joint session of congress meeting under the authority of Article 79 of the constitution, General Humberto Castelo Branco was elected interim president by a vote of 361 with 78 abstentions. In order to preserve the civilian character of the office, the new president divested himself of his military rank and title. It was the role played by Congress that made the April revolution unique in the annals of Latin American upheavals. Congress not only took the initiative during the early confusion, but later cooperated actively with the executive in passing much needed legislation. By the time it re- cessed on 1 December 1964, 500 bills had been passed, of which only 150 had originated_ with the executive authority -- and many of these were passed in altered and improved form. Congress has been neither Obstruc- tionist nor a rubber stamp, but has found the rare and happy medium be- tween the two extremes all too often encountered among the Latin American democracies. Congress thus became an active partner in the revolution. When the new government took over last April, it was confronted with the staggering task of bringing some order to the chaotic state in which Joao Goulart had left the Brazilian economy. The gross national product in 1963 had not been able to keep pace with the increasing birth rate. Inflation had climbed to an annual rate of 140% during the last three months of the Goulart regime, about double the average increase over the past decade. Budget expenditures appeared likely to reach 3.3 trillion (3.3 millones des millones, or lmost $2 billion) cruzeiros, with an anticipated deficit of 1.5 trillion. By the end of the year, the pro- jected deficit had been cut in half and inflation had been brought back to a manageable 80% for 1964. These spectacular results were achieved only through courageous resistance to public pressure and made possible by teamwork between the executive and the legislative powers. Subsidies to inefficient govern- ment-managed agencies were slashed, thousands of drones were removed from government payrolls, and new tax laws passed to open up new sources of revenue. Other legislation was enacted with a view toward encourag- ing private investment, particularly of foreign capital. Thus, the economic outlook for 1965 is good, with massive foreign assistance -- $450 million from the U.S. -- being an important factor. Approved For Release 1999/0?/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 1144141.4? (880 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/2~MEDP78-03061A000300020007-1 ? Perhaps the most far-reaching legislation to come out of the new government so far is the agrarian reform law, passed by voice vote of both houses of congress on 26 November. Unlike most land reform pro- posals in Latin America, this one seems to lack the demagogic, polit- ical ingredient. It does not promise idly to expropriate from the wealthy to give to the poor. As Castelo Branco sees it, land reform means, first, increased production, and second, redistribution of land. Where large estates are cultivated inefficiently or not at all, they can be expropriated and the owners compensated with bonds whose value will be tied to the cost of living. Conversely, where small holdings are inefficiently used, they will be amalgamated to form larger units. Other forward-looking legislation that has been passed include the following: National Housing Plan (23 July 1964); a bill removing tax exemptions for judges, lawyers, journalists, and authors (22 July); a constitutional amendment on rural land taxation and expropriation that paved the way for the Agrarian Reform Law (6 November); four bills on union budgets, income tax legislation, consumption tax, and stamp tax (27 November). Under Article 79 of the Constitution, Castelo Branco's term was to expire in January 1966, when the winner of the 1965 elections would take over. On 22 July, Congress passed a constitutional amendment ex- tending Castelo Branco's term to March 1967. This will give the present governmental team an additional year to carry out its program. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: dIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 101014NET? (880 Cont.) 5X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24.!tk*DP78-03061A000306012D7673-465 881. BUDDHISM IN SOUTH VIETNAM: 25X1PEACEFUL FAITH OR POLITICAL MILITANCY? u SITUATION: A handful of "political" Buddhist monks in South Vietnam are making it almost impossible to establish and sustain a viable govern- ment in Saigon. The leader of this faction is Thich (meaning "Reverend") Tri Quang, a controversial man who was twice arrested by the French on suspicion of working with the Communists. However, the charge could not be substantiated and he was released. Tri Quang's negativeness and his reluctance to be specific about what he wants, casts a serious doubt on his motives, on the one hand; and on the other, make it virtually impossible for other South Vietnamese elements to get his cooperation on any of the myriad life-and-death prob- lems that they face. He will say, for example, in response to questions about what kind of government he will support, only that he will back "any government that agrees with out policy." But he is either unable or unwilling to be any more specific about what his policy is. Regarding Buddhist objectives, Tri Quang says only that "we Buddhists never want anything. To say that we want this or that is wrong. We never sponsor anybody." Tri Quang's reasons for opposing a particular individual with- in the government are equally vague or general and rarely substantiated. Whether Tri Quang is or is not working with the Communist Viet Gong may beamoot question; but the vital fact is that his actions and his entire position play directly into the hands of the Viet Cong and are be- coming the main factor in bringing about the disintegration of law and order that the Viet Cong so strongly desire. Tri Quang claims that he speaks for some 80 to 90 percent of the Vietnamese people. He arrives at this figure in the following manner: everyone who does not explicitly state that he is a member of another faith is considered a Buddhist and Tri Quang represents all Buddhists. His claim is belied by Dr. Mai Tho Truyen, Chairman of the Vietnamese Association of Buddhist Laymen. Dr. Mai, in his book "Buddhism in Vietnam," estimates that only some 30 percent of the Vietnamese people really qualify as true Buddhists. Further, Quang's faction is by no means the spokesman for all Buddhists in Vietnam. In a secret-ballot election just over a year ago Tri Quang was defeated in his bid to become titular head of all Vietnamese Buddhist., In May last year Tri Quang again challenged Thich Tam Chau, leader of the Guddhist executive ap- paratus in Saigon, for control of the entire Buddhist hierarchy. Tri Quang failed to achieve his objectiveamd Tam Chau got a vote of confi- dence in his own leadership, while clearly rejecting Tri Quang's views and tactics. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 .11408 ITT (881 Cont.) Approved For Release 19991IriPPMPPPRDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Truly religious Buddhists who are loyal to the basic tenets of Gautama Buddha want nothing to do with Tri Quang's constant intriku and political manipulations. They quietly adhere to Buddha's "Four Noble Truths." (1-Existence or Being is sorrow and suffering; 2--the source of suffering is desire or craving; 3--the only remedy for suffering is to expel desire; and 4--Desire can be expelled by following the Eightfold Path which consists of right views, right endeavor, right mindedness, right intentions, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood and right concentration.) These concepts generally lead Buddhist monks to decry "the wretchedness" of human conditions and to withdraw into a world based on meditation, humility and adherence to the scriptures. Nowhere in Buddha's teachings is there the slightest justification, for monks to issue political decrees, organize demonstrations and riots, topple govern- ments and generally seek to take State power in their own hands. Unfortunately the very views of the unworldly, self-effacing Buddhists make them easy prey for the minority faction that prefer intrigue and political manipulation to the orthodox Buddhist pursuit of "impersonality" through detachment, meditation, begging and other recognized spiritual concepts. These passive attitudes also make Buddhist organizations in general vulnerable to Communist infiltration and manipulation. In Southeast Asia the Communists attempt to subvert Buddhism and use it for their own ends just as they have done with Christian groups in other parts of the world. They say that there is no conflict between Communists and the principles of Christianity or Buddhism and they ex- hibit puppet priests and monks as "proof" of their tolerance toward re- ligious groups. However, once these groups are no longer useful to the Communists, their religious beliefs are attacked as being fundamentally. in conflict with Communism and then they themselves are denounced as the arch enemies of Communism. Another classic error that religious groups make is to believe they can "handle" the Communists and gradually bring them back into the fold. The sheer numbers of people who have tried this and failed is proof enough of the futility of such an approach. Inside Communist China the regime is still maintaining the facade of religious tolerance in deference to the strength of Buddhism through- out Asia. Its true intentions, however, are clearly demonstrated in their cruel suppression of Buddhism in Tibet. In North Korea the fate of Buddhism was settled quickly and simply by assigning all monks to manual labor on farms and in factories. A similar fate awaits the Buddhists in any country where the Communists take control. I 25X1 C1 Ob ? 0, NI ?? ?? III III 401401Prr (881 Cont.) 5X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 GERMAN INDEPENDENT WEEKLY EXPLORES QUESTION OF 'WHO RULES THE RED EMPIRE?' , gollowing is a translation of an article by Wolfgang Leonhard entitled "Who rules the Red Empire?" in the German-language independent weekly newspaper, Die Zeit -QPYRGHT (Time)No. 4, Hamburg, 22 January 1965, page 47 A highly unusual discussion has lately been going on in the USSR. The role and function of the communist party in Soviet society is being debated.. Should the Party have authority over all aspects and areas of living and should it get directly in- volved in all details - as has been the practice up to now ? Or should the Soviet Communist Party limit its activity to set- ting forth the general policy directives and naming its members to the most important positions and functions ? These problems are being discussed not only by the high political authorities but they have sometimes seeped through to the press even though' still in rather veiled references. This is not 'the first, time that contradictory interests between the communist party and the state power authorities have- become apparent. Immediately after Stalin's death in March of 1953 Malenkov who was the Soviet Prime Minister at that time, tried to give a greater influence to the State organs 7 that it' to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and to the Supreme So-. viet - and thus to trim some of the all-encompassing power of the communist party. At the beginning he even had some success. Important political declarations - such as the introduction of the "new course" in August of 1953 - were made by Malenkov to the Supreme Soviet and not to the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the communist party. For a time the party leader- ship was pushed somewhat to the background. Only after some dif- ficulties did the party apparatus under the leadership of Mr. -Ithrushchev regain the lost terrain and the "leading role" of the party in all areas, of living was re-established ad consolida- ted. This tendency was eyen more evident,inthe last years of Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A0003000200071 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDF'78-03061A000300020007-1 CPYRGHT the Khrushcliev era. All political ..1.nd CCfl)IlIi Li 1tii uChu country, even the minutest details in agriculture, 'industry and construction were almost without exception discussed by the plenary session's of the Central Committee of the party, decided upon and the decisions announced. With the fall of Xhrushchev in middle of October 1964 a new phase has begun in the changing relationship between Party and State. The highest positions of the Party organs on one side and of the State and Economic Administration on the other were. given to two separate persons. As the First Secretary of the Party, 58 year old Leonid Brezhnev represented and represents the interests of the. eleven million members of the Soviet com.;. munist party. H But besides Brezhnev there is 60 year old Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Soviet Council Of Ministers,which makes him to all practical purposes the Prime.Minister. Apparently, the top Soviet authorities, immediatel after Khrushchev's ouster, had taken the decision, way has not been publicly an- nounced, to make the separation of the two highest positions . final and permanent. This is apparent from a.reference the Pravda (Truth) made on December16 to "certain additional gua- rantees" that had been taken 'against an excessive concentration of power in the hands of one person". However, this decision.has obviously not done away with :ithe,controversy between Party and, State Administration. On the contrary: now the real tug of war began between the two powers. . At the beginning it was the party which had the offensive. In his speech at the anniversary of the October revolution party :leader Brezhnev clearly expressed his views on the supremacy of . the communist party. But it seems that this declaration expressed only the personal opinion of Mr. Brezhnev rather than the views of the .entire leadership. In this connection it was 'noted thatat the 'plenary session of the Central Committee in mid-November it was ? Podgorny rather than Brezhnev, who delivered the decisive report; 'There was something else which was even more important. Up to now the plenary sessions of.the:Central Committee had focused 'their attention on state and economic problems b?,It. the November session limited its activity' almost exclusively to interior pars. ty problems and personnel changes in the hierarchy. Another sur- .prise was the w a y in which the communiqu?bout. the plenary session was published. For the first time'since over twelve years the communiqu?as not spread out over the entire front ft 'Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CCA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 ? crgt?piuswipd For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 page of the Pravda but was set in three columns only. All this was no mere coincidence, as further happenings plainly showed. Tv weeks after the plenary session of the Cen-, tral Committee, the Government paper a (News) published an article by the Prima Minister of to United Bielo-Russian Republic, Tichon Kisels which created a. sensation. For the first time the article openly discussed the delicate subject of the Party-State relations..Kisel . was complaining that "in recent years" the role of the State organs had been "curtailed". .This tendency had had a ,"negative influence on the activities" of the State organs". An end must be made to the "petty bossing of - the economic organs and to the incompetent interference with their aativities".The reader of lzvestia was left with no doubts' whatever that "petty bossing" and "incompetent interference" re- ferred to the Party. The new trend was also apparent at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet which was called in early December. At .this meet- ing Brezhnev gave only a short address while Kosygin delivered the program containing speech in which the new Soviet Prime Mi- nister twice complained about the "petty bossing" of the State and economic organs - which was clear enough to every one of the 1400 delegates to the Supreme Soviet. On December 6 the Pravda also ventured into this subject. Although the mouthpiece of the party did not go as far as some of the functionaries of the State administration and economic administration would have liked it to, it now openly admitted that "the role of the Soviets" - which Means the State organs - "had in recent years been curtailed". Of course,"as could be expected, this same article under- scored the leading political role of the party, but at the sa- me time it pointed out for the first time the limits of the party's functions and power, and went so far as to advocate a ' revaluation of the state organs. The reaction of the "pure" party functionaries was pre- dictable. The local and regional circles of the party struc- ture - and most certainly also some higher echelons of the par- ty not accept this new line without resistance. But the other side is now also making itself heard. With the slogan. "Down with petty bossing" the representatives of the state and economic administration are trying to push"Carefully but firmly a stronger independence of their organs while 'on .0-le other side the representatives of the party want to reaffirm the supremacy of the Party with their slogan,"The:Communists - Approved for Release 1999/08/24 --CIA-RDF'78-133061A000300020007-1 .cpwireiye For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 have ilole respowlibility for everyaliu?j". The present discord about the changing relationship be- tween State and Party has an immediate as well as a long term aspect. The present aspect is in the fact that the Party is re- presented byBrezhnev whereas the State administration has Kosy- gin in the Kremlin. A shift of the weight of the two "pillars" would certainly affect also the power position of .both men now in top functions. But the long range aspect is even more important: thd:1144 what kind of role should the CP play in the changing Soviet so- ciety. Up to now the party and is organs were simultaneously the ideological mentor; the centre of political power and an economic-technical adminiStratio . But the more diversified the industrial society becomes, the nore difficult is it for the party to control and resolve all details .of practical economic problems on top of the ,politiCal ideological ones. In'tlle past the party has always successfully fought off any attemp0 to li- mit its competence. But now the power relationship has altered. Therefore, it is quite possible that this is the beginning of a development which would upgradp the state and economic organs. It is possible that this shift in power will already be lega- lized in the new Soviet constitution which is now being drafted. The current controversy between party and State could thus be- come the starting point for a:pelletratin4 reform incthe politi- cal system of the USSR. ? 1 . , 1 1 6879 C803 3801-D ?.:27 ( . ? 1, Approved For Release 1999/08./24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00030002006i-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 25X1 C1 Ob Fact Sheet Problems of the Soviet Economy I March 1965 On 29 January 1965, the USSR Central Statistical Board made its annual announcement of plan fulfillment results for the preceding year. The figure for 1964 national income growth -- "more than 7 per cent" was 2 percentage points higher than Premier Kosygin had predicted in December. On the other hand, industrial growth fell behind Kosygin's expectations: instead of 7.8 per cent it was 7,1 per cent, the lowest figure since World War II. Since national income is a measure of the whole economy, i.e., of industry plus agriculture, and since industry fell behind expectations, the increase in national income growth results would appear, at least at first sight, to be due to the 1964 crop being larger than expected. Few would doubt that the 1964 harvest compares favorably with that of 1963, a year of agricultural lisistr, The 29 January announcement did not, however, reveal figures for the 1964 cereal, sugar beet, potato, and cotton crops, saying only that delivery plans for these crops were "fulfilled," and that the "total harvest of crops increased." Thus it is impossible to say how these crops contributed to the national income result, and the lack of data suggest that the Soviets are concealing something. Theodore Shabad of the New York Times has reported that, according to one theory, a higher proportion of the 1964 crop was de- livered to the state than usual, so that record deliveries (claimed last October in preliminary announcements) did not necessarily mean a record crop. In regard to the difference between Kosygin's December figures and the 29 January announcement, it has been suggested that when industrial production fell behind expectations, Soviet statisticians saved the day by calculating from a lover -- and perhaps more honest -- secret figure for the 1963 harvest. This would make the 1964 agricultural production increase higher, and thus raise the national income growth figure despite the sag in industrial growth. In spite of admitted shortages in livestock numbers (an aftereffect of the 1963 crop disaster), the Soviets claim that total "agricultural production" increased 12 per cent. It is very unusual for Soviet agriculture to show better results than Soviet industry -- and in any case it is not really that agriculture is doing so well now, but rather that it did so poorly a year ago. Per capita food production is still below the 1958 level, and the Soviets are still importing grain from Canada. Parts of Soviet industry did better than others. Chemical production, the object of ex-Premier Khrushchev's last campaign, increased by 15 per cent (1963 -- 17 per cent); the new leaders have reduced the 1965 targets In this industry. The production of electricity and "heat energy" in- creased by 12 per cent in 1964, and the metallurgical and machine-building industries, always favored up until 1963, scored 8 and 9 per cent in- creases respectively. But light industry output only increased by 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 per cent, and the food industry production increase is recorded at 2 per cent, partly a result of the 1963 crop failure. As usual, the Soviet consumer received the least benefit from "the building of Com- munism." Most Western analysts would reduce the Soviet figures for national income or industrial production growth by about two per cent. This is partly because Soviet statisticians often count the same products more than once, in varying stages of production: to take a hypothetical example, a truck factory counts all the truck components, such as tires, which are supplied to it and already counted by other factories, and the tire and truck figures are added by the statisticians. Also, new pro- ducts, whose production volume can expand the most rapidly, are given high prices, exaggerating the Soviet industrial growth rate. Alec Nove? an eminent Western student of the Soviet economy, says that "The official Index Lof national incomil is at all times to be treated with a degree of suspicion" and that "the official claim to a seventeen-fold increase in the period 1913-55, for instance, is utterly incredible." tile Soviet Ec27AL (N.Y., 1961), pp. 312-3.) Soviet figures are not often simply fabricated, but they are influenced in various ways; it is useful to compare one Soviet growth figure with another, but caution should be taken in comparing Soviet figures with figures from non-Bloc countries. Why should there be a slow-down in Soviet industrial growth? One reason is that the Soviet economy is becoming more developed and mature, and this almost always brings a slowing-down in growth rates. When pro- duction is low in absolute terms, it requires little absolute increase to make an impressive percentage increase; this situation changes as absolute production rises. Other reasons for a slow-down in growth are revealed in the 29 January statistics-. First, the increase in labor productivity dropped from 5 per cent in 1963 to 4 per cent in 1964. Second, the increase in new capital investment came to 8 per cent, but there was only a 6 per cent increase in completed (new fixed) investment; the failure to complete capital construction projects has been a con- tinuing problem in recent years, with vast funds frozen in uncompleted projects. Furthermore, in 1958, by contrast with 19641s 6 per cent, new fixed investment was 16.2 per cent. A continuing increase in the Investment growth rate would be needed to sustain an unchanging pro- duction growth rate; the USSR, however, has been reducing its investment growth rate. Why should there be a decline in the rate of new investment, and even more, in the rate of capital plant completion? Part of the explanation lies in a'need to appease the Soviet consumer, and in particular, in a need to spend money on agriculture. The quick, temporary gains in agri- cultural production, brought about by plowing the marginal Virgin Lands, cannot be repeated. But probably a more serious obstacle to investment, and hence to the growth of industrial production, arises from the diversion of resources to arms and space programs. With a national output about half that of the United States, Soviet leaders spend on military and space programs nearly as much as the US does. More serious, the very size of the Soviet military and space effort means the tie-up of such A pap rhoVehdlaroT hailagg finiStth41rt9fAifitDPM0t3061#000300020007Plant 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 that other economic objectives cannot be attained. To take one instance, the Seven Year Plan program for the automation of industry is a shambles. As already noted, the new leadership has cut back Khrushchevls chemicali- zation program. The disproportionate expenditure on arms and space spectaculars is one of the economic penalties the Soviet Union pays for having its form of economic dictatorship. Other handicaps to Soviet growth arise from other features of the system: 1. Insufficient agricultural production -- a result of years of sacrificing agricultural to industrial interests, even amounting to the use of collectives as a means of seizing crops without compensation. Earlier growth rates were only possible through "primitive accumulation," the deliberate neglect of agriculture and the consumer. Recent efforts to restore agriculture have interfered with other programs. 2. Inability of_Elanning organs to cope with a develomi economy -- Soviet planning has been an instrument for forcing the development of favored projects, regardless of considerations of cost. Even in the pre-World War II period, the economy could only be made to work by supplement- ing the plans with a sort of underground system of black market, wire-pulling, and "fixing." Having achieved a heavy industry base, and needing a more smoothly functioning system, the Soviet and. East European governments have lately been turning attention to various ways to substitute profit and initiative for planning (Libermanism). 3. Meddling by,party officials -- under Khrushchev, the economic processes were frequently disrupted while the latest reorganization was carried out. This is evidently one of the grievances which led his successors to engineer his downfall. It is unlikely, however, that the new leaders will avoid new reorganizations, even after they complete their present work of reversing Khrushchev's policies: e.g., by reducing the stress on chemical industry, increasing the stress on metallurgy. The targets of the Soviet economy are a political question, and if this question is not settled unilaterally by a Stalin, it becomes the subject of debate between various interest groups. The present leadership situation is likely to evoke a severe struggle, as the pro- ponents of various segments of the economy contend for a bigger slice of Soviet resources. 4. Lack of incentive -- the plan system does not reward imagination, enterprise, and honesty. It compels managers to maintain a high inventory, produce old models, and con- ceal production potential. It cannot be said that free enterprise economies always work smoothly, that they are immune to difficulties. But they do provide incentives which work day in and day out, without special campaigns and pressures; they do possess -- in the market -- a mechanism which reconciles interests Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 and rewards enterprise without political conflict; they do have a means of establishing prices and costs. The economies, so to speak, go with the stream of human nature and human interests, and do not try to swim against it; they have natural self-correcting qualities. The Soviets, on the contrary, have tried to swim against the stream. Some recent symptoms, such as the Liberman proposals indicate that at least some people in the USSR begin to realize the futility of these costly efforts. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061ADBO'5013120007-1 CPYRGHT Wednesday, Feb: 10, 1965: THE 'WASHINGTON POST oes de Ga lie By J. A. Livingston nRIDE underlies President de Gaulle's recommenda- tion that nations of the world cease to rely on the dollar and the pound as International, currencies and return to gold, and .g old alone, ,The Gener- al's intent is clear: 1. To re- establish the Livingston French franc on a parity with the dollar and the :pound in world esteem. So long as West Germany, or Sweden, or Italy hold dollars,: and pounds as reserves, and not francs, the French currency Is second-rate. ? But if gold becomes the sole international currbncy, then the dollar, pound and franc are:on a parity. Things equal to the same thing, gold, are equal to each other. 2. To notify President Johnson, once again, that France does not welcome America's pervasion of Eu- rope. Over, and over again, ? de Gaulle has resisted American takeover of Eu- ropean companies (such as Simea by Chrysler and elieve His Gold Views? Machines Bull by General Electric) and the establish- uL of Aaw...a utch.idi aries in Europe. Companies such as General Motors, id, Ocneral Elcctric cto, dwarf their European coun- terparts. In addition, de Gaulle has resented American military prowess -- in Europe and elsewhere. He wants . the . American commitment in , Europe to recede. " ; BY CASHING in French holdings of dollars for gold, de Gaulle puts pressure on President John- son. He makes it more diffi- cult for the United States to , support the American estab- lishments abroad and, at the same time, to maintain the dollar at $35 an ounce for gold. His pronounce- ment on gold added to the pressure. The de Gaulle recommen- : dation has met with two sar- castic responses in Eu- ropean monetary, circles: One is that the General ,did , not mean what,' he said, the other that he didn't say what he meant. The second is correct, if :modified to: He didn't say ,all he meant.' President de Gaulle is not a stupid man. Nor are his advisers stupid. Simple arithmetic tells them that a return to the gold standard is impossible unless some- thing is aone about tne gold supply. Tntal rt. cPrvp c a Western nations amount to' $43 billion, onl. 65 per cent highesr than -In 113:12 Tn Malt" 26-year interval world trade" has increased more than 600 per cent. . Any, corporation which grows in size has to main- tain greater liquidity?cash and other reserves. Thus, in 1948, when sales were $4.7 billion, General Motors had $540 million in ?cash and government securities. To- day sales are $17 billion and cash and equivalent are about $1.5 billion. ? iThE GAULLE knows that .1.) world trade has bal-' bowled. He kno ws that the existing stock of gold is inadequate. That's why na- tions have used dollars and pounds to supplement gold. If man doesn't have enough of one kind of money to' carry on the world's work, he'll devise another kind. In propusing to return to gold, de Gaulle is really suggesting an increase In the price of gold to $70 an ounce or even more. This could be done by unanii 'mous agreement among cen- - tral banks and governments. No 'change would take place in the relationship of world currencies. The dollar would still bo orth arr imately four West German -marks, five French francs, TINY tin Italian Inv and bevel./ British shillings. The mar- . ket value of U.S. gold hold- ings wouid rise Lvw$13 to $30 billion, the French gold hoard would increase from $3.8 billion to about $7.6, and the gold of other coun- tries would likewise double. But some governments would be cheated, Those central bankers who relied on the word of Presidents Johnson and Kennedy would discover overnight that the dollar is only half as good as gold. They'd be able to buy only one-half ounce of gold for $35 in- stead of a full ounce as for- merly. Ministries have been over- turned for less. Why, parlia- ments would demand, did you rely on President John- son? Why didn't you keep reserves in gold? President de Gaulle means well for France. But in his quest for prestige for, the franc he is trying to ;lead the world back to the Nineteenth Century. Man has not yet learned to get along without gold as a means of international pay- ment, but he also has learned that he can't get along with it. ? Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 TaES February 1965 R clUrn to Gold? CPYRGHT CPYRGHT The lure of gold has proved irre- sistible to many men from King Midas to Ian Fleming's Goldfinger. President de Gaulle showed him- self to be under its spell last week when he proposed that the world's. traders should return to the prac- tice of paying their foreign debts, in gold, "which does not change in' nature, which can be made either into bars, ingots or coins, which has no nationality, which is con-. sidered, in all places and at all4 times, the immutable and fiduciary value par excellence." The smooth regulation of inter- national trade does, in fact, depend on the existence of a means of payment which all countries, can respect. For a long time the gen- erally accepted international cur- rency was gold, and to facilitate payments the major trading na- tions maintained their own cur- rencies at fixed values in gold, known as the "gold standard." During the great depression be- tween the wars, however, most countries had to go off the gold standard and the second world war further weakened currencies. , The eventual result was the creation of a new system, the gold exchange standard, under which the dollar and the pound sterling became accepted as alternatives to gold in settling international pay- cents. This was possible because the U.S. undertook to convert dol- lars into gold, at the rate of $35 an ounce, and. Britain undertook to exchange pounds for dollars, at? the rate of $2.80 to the pound. - This system depends, however, on foreign traders having complete, confidence that the American and British currencies will retain their full value and this in turn depends on the health of the economy in the two nations. The financial cri- sis last fall, caused by a lack of faith in the ability of _Britain's new; government to handle the huge A"It?4t natisa'a balaase payments, touched Off a wave of speculation in the world's banks' that demonstrated the precarious=. ness of the whole system. The U.S. is also surrermg trom a enronic balance of payments deficit, accen- tuated in recent weeks by France's decision to conVert most of her, 'dollar holdings into gold. Reform Of the international 4monetary system has been urged ifor some time. Discussions on the, 'subject among the Club of Ten? (the major non-Communist trading' nations) ?got under way in 1963.. But there has been more general' agreement on the weaknesses of the present arrangements than on the best way to rectify them. The problem is that world trade' has increased at a much faster' pace than the liquidity of the mon-' vtehich backs it up. World trade, for instance, has increased from $44 billion in 1938 to $298 billion last year; but the total value of reserves in gold and for- eign exchange (mainly dollars) has only increased from $27 billion to $65 billion over the same period, Moreover the greater part of this increase has been in the foreign exchange holdings ? which have gone up from $1.8 billion to $25 billion?rather than in gold hold- ings ? which have gone up from 425.9 billion only to $39.9 billion. President de Gaulle's analysis of' the problem at his news conference last week was generally accepted. He also pointed out that when the present system was adopted twen- ty years ago "nearly all the world gold resevers were then held by ' the U.S." whereas "the currencies of the Western European states are today restored, to the extent that the total gold reserves of the. Six today equal that of the, Americans, and would surpass it if, these state i decided to convert their dollar holdings into gold," ?rne rresident went on to criti- cize the U.S. for taking advantage of the dollar's status as a reserve currency to put itself in debt ahrnarl 0,gt 23. this he meant that the U.S. could pay off ,its trade debts abroad with dol- lars "which they alone can issue" instead of With gold "which has real value." He also complained that since dollars were in demand abroad, American investment In foreign countries became profit- able, the result of which was "a sort of expropriation" of industry in some countries by the U.S. The President's proposal that the world return to the gold stand- ard was generally felt to be in- adequate and even harmful. Gold alone, it was agreed, would not be sufficient to maintain the present volume of world trade; one thirdt of the total payments are now made in dollars or pounds. A statement from the U.S. Treasury pointed out that such a standard. "collapsed in 1931". and its restora- tion would be quite contrary to , the main stream of thinking", among governments now studying reform of the system. The main alternativ.e remedy to have been suggested was the. adoption of a new reserve cur- rency. This was actually proposed by France at the Club of Ten meeting in 1963 but President de Gaulle's remarks last week sug- gested that he regarded such a step only as a temporary measure until there could be a complete return to a gold standard. But this proposal has from the start been resisted by both the 'U.S. and Britain who would prefer to strengthen the dollar and the pound rather than replace them. The prevailing opinion seems to be that it would be better to leave the system as it is than to take any retrograde step. , Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 1 March 196$ Chinese Communist Subversion in Burundi 25X1C10b On January 15, 1965 Pierre Ngendandumwe, recently installed liberal Prime Minister of the African kingdom of Burundi, was assassinated. On February 2nd, Burundi suspended diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists and expelled the 20 man staff. The eighteen days between these two events revealed a pattern of Chinese Communist activity -- some of it previously unknown even to top government elements in Burundi -- which can be likened to early stages of Chicom or Soviet infiltration in Zanzibar, Mali or other African countries. The Burundi government has not released all details of improper Chinese behavior but enough is known of Chinese contacts and techniques to put together a familiar pic- ture of subversion in one more small country mistakenly believed to be gullible and defenseless against communism. Government Investigation. An intensive investigation begun imme- diately after the assassination led to the arrest of several top figures who were outspokenly opposed to Ngendandumwe's replacing pro-Peking Albin Nyamoya. Those arrested included leaders of the trade union federation, the youth group, former ministers and other prominent government figures, many of them close to the confessed assassin and all of them strong sup- porters of CPR positions. Gradually the Chicom role in Burundi has been pieced together. Chinese Campaign against Congo. Twig Chi-ping, a 24-year old cul- tural attachd'in the Chinese Communist Burundi embassy who fled to the U.S. embassy within 24 hours of his arrival, had worked for the CPR Com- mission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. He stated that the Burundi embassy was set up primarily as a base for fomenting political disorder in the Congo (Leopoldville). "Actually, Communist China does not care about Burundi. What they really care about is the Congo. Chairman Mao has said that if we can grab the Congo, we can grab the Whole of Africa." He also said the embassy staff was expected to establish the friendliest of relations with the Burundi government so that the embassy could be used as a "stepping stone for our operations in the Congo." Chinese Communist support to Congolese rebels is well known, begin- ning with Chinese arms and money invested in the Kwilu rebel movement through Peking-trained Pierre Mulele. Burundi-based Chinese support to the rebels in eastern Congo is supplemented by Chinese military training camps in Congo (Brazzaville) -- which may now be increased in size due to the loss of Burundi as an operating base. One of the more flagrant abuses of Burundi's non-alignment occurred in December 1964. After 12 months in Bujumbura the Chinese, quite con- fident of their protected position, shipped in 100 tons of arms and am- munition intended for transshipment to the Congolese rebels. The King of Burundi learned of the plan, however, and seized the shipment. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A00030004660*-) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Subversion inside Burundi. Communist Chinese training, coercion and bribery of Rey individuals are most significant for all countries. Two grouns in Burundi -- labor ani. youth -- were prime targets as they are in any country which opens its doors to Communist representation. For example, Augustin Ntamagara, a member of the National Assembly was among those arrested. He established a labor front, Federation Travailleur Burundi as a Communist-line political base but it had no legitimate labor membership. Ntamagara made frequent trips to both Moscow and Peking butChinese money was apparently decisive. He boasted openly that the Bujumbura Chinese embassy had paid for his cars and had given him 5 million francs for demonstrations against newly installed Prime Minister Ngendandumwe. The FTB planned to publish a news sheet with Chinese funds and FTB apprentices were sent to Peking for "jour- nalistic" training. Also arrested were Francois Bangemu, President of the Burundi youth organizabion, Jeunesse Nationale Rwagasore, and Secretary General Prime NiyrigaLQ. Both had led p(7?ular demonstrations agal'ist the Burundi govern- ment and had been strong supporters of the former premier, Albin Nyamoya and some of the JNR leaders were members of his government. The youth group program, like that of the labor group, had a pronounced Communist flavor. According to the Wt African Pilot of Lagos, Nigeria (1 Feb- ruary 1965), "JNR leaders have long been in the pay of the Chinese and Soviet governments, as police investigations have revealed." Former Prime Minister Nyamoya and Zenon Nicayenzi, his chief of cabinet, were also among those arrested. Nyartoyais connivance with Com- munist China culminated in his signing a secret barter agreement includ- ing provisions which would have totally enslaved the Burundi economy. This move, coupled with the massive arms shipment intended for the Congo rebels, may have been the immediate basis for suspending relations with the CPR. Tribal Targets. Communist exploitation of tribal animosities is widespread in Africa. The most radical Tutsi refugees from Hutu- controlled Rwanda (once coupled with Burundi as Rwanda-Urundi) received guerrilla training and money from the CPR. Chicom strategy may aim at overthrowing the republican government of Rwanda in order to gain another base for attack against the Congo. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Memmen Williams told a Senate committee that Ccomunist Chinese involve- ment, "...has included encouragement of extremist agitators who stir up the refugees to pursue a militant policy toward Rwanda and to terrorist raids across Rwanda's borders. Communist assistance to refugee extremists reportedly has encouraged financial support to the exiled ex-King of Rwanda and his close adherents, advice on organizing terrorist raids, some arms aid and the training of guer- rilla instructors in mainland China. It is believed that this as- sistance in recent months probably has been coordinated by the Chinese Communist embassy in Bujumbura." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 2 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Many of those arrested in Burundi for pro-Chinese, anti-government actions are Tutsi. Burundi is dedicated to "national reconciliation among brothers" and abolition of "racial discrimination," according to the so-called Gitega agreements of the ruling political party. Prime Minister Bamina, who succeeded the assassinated Ngendandumwe, said that the Gitega agreements "... were sabotaged and compromised, as the facts unfortunately testify. Those who sabotaged the Gitega conference were seeking all kinds of opportunity to further their prestige. In bringing about the defeat of the resolutions adopted at the Gitega summit conference, the embassy of tne Chinese People's Republic gravely compromised itself, and this interference on the part of a foreign country in the internal politics of Burundi obliged the Government of Burundi to suspend diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic. In fact their support and their encouragement were always operated in one direction only and risked compromising not only our feelings of unity and esprit de corps between the Barundi themselves but also the relations be- tween Burundi and neighboring countries." Who is Next? The CPR now has embassies in Algeria, Congo (Brazza- ville), Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Dahomey, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Central African Republic and United Arab Republic. There are NCNA representatives in Tunis, Ethiopia and Senegal which have no embassies. (The notorious Kao Liang who was expelled from India for "unjournalistic activities" and then became funding channel for CPR agents in Zanzibar, was NCNA representative for East Africa -- including Burundi -- until recently. He has now moved his operations to Brazzaville, Congo.) Moves against moderate or liberal elements may be expected in any of these countries. Labor and youth groups will most certainly be in- filtrated in all of them. All the familiar techniques will be used but the measure of their success may not be evident in some cases until a great deal of damage has been done to African sovereignty and independ- ence. 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 ey,8c2 RESTAURACION DEMOCRATICA EN BRAS IL CPYRGHT La democracia amenazada por la infiltracion comunista, facili- tada y estimulada por el Gobierno y por los seguidores de aquella doctrina, quienes ocupaban m?de 250 puestos importantes en la administraciOn brasileria, fue restablecida por la rapida acciOn de las Fuerzas Armadas, con el apoyo de los trabajadores, del pueblo, del Congreso y de los Gobernadores de casi todos los ea'stados de la Union. El papel de las Fuerzas Armadas, en el episodio Joao Goulart, ha sido mal interpretado por quienes desconocen la realidad brasileria aunque de buena fe y por muchos a quienes interesa deformar, con fines politicos, el sentido de la transformacion por la cual atraviesa el pais. Estos dltimos insisten en ver en este acto de las Fuerzas Armadas un sentido reaccionario, una connivencia entre grandes hacendados, plutocratas y militares de alta graduaciOn, con el objeto de evitar las ref ormas reclamadas y defender privilegios inconfesables. Sin embargo, la realidad es diferente, pues no se ha mudado la c.orma de gobierno, que es la misma; ha sido sustituido un bre y los metodos que anarquizaban a Brasil, desde la indis- ciplina que se predicaba entre miembros de las Fuerzas Arma- das, la desorganizaciOn de la produccion, por las constantes huelgas politicas promovidas por el Gobierno, hasta el empo- brecimiento de los trabajadores, por la inflacion incontrolable y por la demagogia desenfrenada. La intervenciOn militar ha mantenido el Congreso, el Poder Judicial y la libertad personal y politica de todos los que no han atentado contra la Dernocra- cia, o no se han beneficiado con la corrupcion. La prensa mantie- ne su libertad, y el derecho de vivir libre del yugo comunista ha sido logrado sin un solo disparo. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 CPYRGHT POR THEOPH11.0 DE ANDRADE CPYRGHT don, pues trendy. ma al hombre en easlavo del Estado. Retrotrae la civilizacien al regi- men de los despot' orientales. Y on times vitalicios, que sato pueden ser elintinsdos por Is revolucien, el golpe de Estado o el *tented?. Ante Is imposibilided de definirse (co- mo lo desean los comunistaa chinos) median- te una purrs ? que boy seria atomics y an- todestructora ?, la lucha entre la llbertad y La eselavitud ha tornado otras forams, englo- badas bajo la denominschin generics de "gue- rra Iris". Guerra Biz es el denontinador co- men. En los poises subdesarrollados, donde aim c:xiste mucha rniseria y much& ignoran- cia, adopts el nombre de "guerra revolucto- nada", con una filosofia people y una tient - ca propis. Propende a Is destruccien ? des- de adentro ? del Estado demoeritico, tando aid, al sobrevenir el caos, el establect- miento de los "Gauleiters" de Mooed y Pekin. Ems es la euerra de la cua.1 estin Wend? victimas Africa, Asia y America Latina. En los paises pequeeios la suerte puede ser divers*. En nuestro continents, se impulses en Cuba. East victoria fue aprovechada pars establecer alli una eabeza de pnente, y una escuela de Is cual erresan profesores de sobversien y sa- botaje, lucre enviados a otros paises de ori- gen iberico. Esos "tecnicos" habriats de scaler, con mayor y menor eficiencla, en Colombia, Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, y muy especialmen- te, en Venezuela y Brasil. En esos liaises la conspiracien es realize- da de dos maneras: de abajo hacia arriba, co- me se ha intentado en Venezuela, y de arriba hada sea* como se hizo en Brasil. En el primer caso, saris la revolucion; en el segun- do, el golpe de Estado. Aqui, %min las decla- raciones del propio Sr. Luiz Carlos Prestos ? que es el "Gauleiter" de Moue en Brasil, des- de 1930 ? el comunismo ya tenia gobterno. las "reforms de haze, contra IS Cs.aslit!1- 4slin rldiculleada come "erodes" Cease tambien en la diesel/salon der la ledsta de clases y en el ?rho de clues, mesa Aglaia fie imagine en Brasil. De le "cern= de Metre" importaron arms pars ser dhltribuidas entre los Erupt* de campesimos tine integraban its "Ligas Campesinas". La inflation fue &Ube- rfulamente aseelerada, can It llnatidad de Min- d's' a las mesas en is destsperation per el alest dell costa de la vide, eituscio's quer el gobiernO, arteramente, atdbd a las ?lases scandals- des. Finalmente lo mise importante de todo ?machos' de les; denandos miUteres fUeron confiados a *Betels* corromptdos y dociles is Iaa insinuaciones del poder. Loa gargentoa, ma- rineros y soldados eran Intifada' a rebelerse contra sus superiorat jerisquiees. siesinarles, destituirlos y realizar Ia revoluclon social. Ya pared& que lba a ser full, con las con- setuenclas transeedentales part Brasil y pa- re *ad* America, Wins. Porque el die en one se hublera concreted? la eubanizadert del paiz. babrian seguido su hyena, inevitable- mente, lodes los demis pathos, El eomulaismo habria dominado el mend? iberoamericano, como ya lo ha heeho con tail toda Asla y parte de Africa. Lo mis probable seria Is reaction "a pos- teriori" de los brindle:Enos, la cue] defeat:Ade- nazi& la guerra civil. Serie, por clerto. una guava civil similar * la de Esparta, en 1996 Por el propio caricter ideolegice de este Pie- rre, Isabela intervencisin de potencies ettran- jeras. Aparecerian "veluntarios". Se organize - den "brigades internadonales". Ls guar& fria se transformaria en guerra caliente. Y shiton- ces, comenzaria en Brasil la tereera guerra mundial, en Is cual, por la accion de Is "quin- ts columns" castro-comunista, se verian en- vueltos, de inmediato, taloa los denies paises La revolution brasilefia del 1.0 de Abril ha sido una victoria, no solo para Brasil, sino pa- re todo et mundo democratic?. Por primers ?ez, despnes del exit? del Plan Marshall, el onminsmo internacional ha sido derrotado una 'lona de vital inmortancia para todo { Iii realida.d, la lucha emprendlda en Bra- sil v que aim continua ? ya no interesa to a un pats, sino a un continente, y en ultj. ma inslancia, a toda la humanidad. El destino del hombre depende, hoy -en dia, de saber si 1,4 ai;,4,.i decadas y tal vez los siglos ,,star.Ln regidos por goblernos de libertad eschovitud. La vieja cuestion que envuel- ve a la harrianidad, desde su organization en soriedad, ionsiste en saber si la supremacia sera para el individuo o pant el Estado. Per- que la organnacion primitive del Estado hie totalitaria. En el, sohtmente el gran despota era 'fibre. ASI ocurrle en los imperios orienta- les. La liberaeloin del individuo comenzo en la firecia antigua, y se complete por medio del cdstlanismo, en um labor que dementia vein- sielos. AA, sin mayores sufrimientos. to- dos habsian alcanzado I igualdad politica econemica, medhotte la democracia. Si la his- telt no marchara en avances 7 retrocesos, co- mo todo en la naturaleza. mom ie laitaua el pouer. I esse los a ger ?me- nido meidiante las "reforrnaa de base", propue- nadas en reuniones populares y con budges oficiales ? incluyendo Is buelea general ? urenararlav nor Inc ampanrpai minim Awl slr Iran ae &menu& Latina. Por consiguiente, subestimaron I* aspect- dad de reaction del pueblo brunette que habia derrotado a los rojos en las iltimas Apr innsc al 4 .,i nu. fa reaction de los Goulart. Debian cultnInar el 1.0 de Mayo si- ruiente, con la transformation del regimen LOS comunistas y SUB aliados estoban tan se- turos del exit?, que haste se permitian el lujo de divulgar la fecha pars, su revoluciOn. como si se tratara de una fiesta. La infiltration era general. Comenzaba en la Presidencia de la RepUblica. donde los Jefes de la Casa Civil y de la Casa Militar er`an ennoeidos simpatIzantes etilinunistas al igual qur el Secretario de Prensa y el equipn tecnico del Palacio del Planalto. Varios minis- tros de Estado militaban en la mime ? incluyendo los trek *Winos que se desem- pefiaron en la certeza, de Educacion, que en- tregaron a los rojos Is direceiOn dr las asocia- clones estudiantiles. El Ministerlo del Exterior apnvO abiertamente las tees cubanas, ruses o neutrallstas:Los sindicatos Orem", centre- lados desde arriba por el ministro de Trabajo, fuel-on puestos en manos de los comunistas. Sr crearon organizaclones superiores 'locales, come Ia CGT (Comando General de Trabaja- dome), la PllA (Pacto de Unidad y Accion) y varies otras, para prornover la paraLizacien Sobre re aspects, el comunismo tat co- general del trabajo. los mumps del Estado y Z'ed;raiz amtosim es e entradtmantoto gobernadores elegidos democriticamente, y sobre lode, la de las Fuerzas Armadas, que slempre ejercieron un papel politico hnspor- tante en hada la via dr la nacion. Pueron ellas tan eficientes y fulralnantes, toe rn :15 horas y sin haber dIsparado casi un soh: tire, pudieron derribar el gobierno, cotter:tido va en apendice de :Bosco y de Pekin. Dei e ei punto de vista militia', ha aldo un unhurt); de este milagro habrin de beneftelstese. nit solamente los brasileflos. sino tonthier, otros pueblos Libre' de la Tierra. iittm tpal mente los de nuestro bentIsferio, nue _va nuA, den considerarse exentos de revolutionrs pa Asides en sus territories. Estos benefit:1w, fa 'sweets's. edemas., a lestados Unidos y a la. na - clones demoeritleas de Europa, que ten ? drin que envier a sus juventudes pare lather en nuestras tierras, come tuvieron nue Nicer- lo en Corea. y an shore, en Vietnian del Sur. Porque is*. era la saerte que nos esperoba a todo. Nosotros, los de Brasil, tenemos niti- da conciencia de esa predlccien. SI Goulart hublera logrado implants,. sus "reformas". y dado su golpe de Estado con Is ayuda de consejeroa ruses, cubanos y chinas. 61}WgZapNailcarT plaits bahrtan - ? y lamed? al meta, CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 cuando ya todo babria estado perdido. Corno los bras:Helios supieron actuar a tlempo, y es- tan tomando medidas reparadoras, respetan- do escrupulosamente la estructura de Is Cons- titucion democratica, nos critican, pretendien- do darnos lecciones de libertad, como st la 11- bertad no hubiera sido salvada en la undid- ma bora, cuando estaba a punto de perecer en este pais. Con el apoyo de la opinion publics, fue decretado un Acto institucional, de efectos ii- mitados, que regiroi hasta el fin del presente periodo gubernamental (31 de Enero de 1360, cuando asuma el mando el tutor? prellidente a ser elegido en Octubre de 1965. El objetivo de este gobierno transitorio es "descomunizar" Is miquina del Estado. Pero, ni siquiera ha side decretou/o el "esiado de sitio", ni trabas a la liberdad de prensa. Por lo demis, Ia su- cesion se ha realizado constltucionalmente, y el general Humberto de Alencar Castel? Bran- co, que ha pedido su baja del Ejerclto pars desemperiar el cargo, resulte electo por aphuo- tante mayoria del Congreso. Si bubo Intervencion de Las Fuerzas Ar- madas es porque, en un pais como Brasil, tuna revolucion no se desarrolla sin su concurs? Y ese concurs? fue dado al pueblo y a be go- bernadores, ya que, segtin a Constitucion, deber de las Poems* Armadas velar por el cumplimiento de la ley y por el Orden, que es- taban siendo menospreciados por un gobler- no perjure, que tralcionaba sus compromises democriticos y conspiraba pars colocar el pais detris de Is "cortina de hierro", tal como su- cedio en Cuba. La democracia es tma tradlcbin de an si- glo y medio en Brasil, desde su independen. eta; y, si las Foetus Armadas, que son an factor politico en la formaclon y manuten- )t? don de la nacion han intervenido raras veces en la evolucion politica, ha side pars ria. blecer el orden democratic? y devolver en se- guida el gobierno al poder civil. Es lo que tam- Men ha sucedido shore. Las sucesiones por el proceso electoral son norma en la historia bra- sileria. La revolucion victories& del 1.0 de Abril, ha sIdo realizada, por to tante, pars, libertar al pais de una terrible amenaza comunlsta, que de haberse llevado a cabo habria tenido consecuencias trascedentales para el hemis- ferio y pars el mundo. Contrariamente a las acusaciones de "fascianzo" y "gorilismo", di- fundidas por la internacional roja, la rebellion de los democratas brasilerios habra de mVe- cer el agradecimiento de todos los pueblos 11- bres de Is tierra. Solo por un pelo Brasil no ha resultado el deteninte de un a tercera gue- rra mondial. .1 / ,- () N / t'?',...."...........! 111111, 1 k ! /1 1 ( (-- .N. 1 I 8go Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020007-1 NIERCURIO.?Santiago do Chile, Lunes 15 de Febrero de 1965 Brasil Retoma la Ruta del Desarrollo CPYRGHT Entee 195( y 1951, la tasa crecimiento economic? de Bra. sil alcanza un promedio del 0,9 or ciente> annal rats alta do America latina, una de las mayores del mundo). En el ultimo de los afios nombra- dos; el crecireiento aleanze, al 7,7 Por ciento., La producciOn aum m industrial ento a on del 13,3 or ciento anual; la agrtco- la, en un 5,7 or ciente anual. El ritmo de inflaciOn se 'inantu- vo entre un 15 y un 20 por ciento en 1957158 y subid a un promedio de 33' nor ciento , anuel entre 1959-61. Con un ailment? formidable de pobla- ciOn. a razon del 3,5 por ciento anual, Brasil surgia como nuevo gigante sudamericano, aproximandose eon rapidez a la etapa del despe.gue, segim las tcorias de Rostow. En 1962 la taga crecirnien. to economic? bajo al 5,5 por ciente. En 1963 descendio al 2,1 poi. eiento: La inflacion, en. cambia, aum den - to al 52 per de- to en 1962 y el '71 por ciento Pli 1963, La poblacion siguid creciendo al.mismo ritmo ante- rior, y, por primera vez, dcsli 1956, la renta nacional per ca. pita disminuy6. Mil novecientos sesenta y dos' fue el primer alio de gobierno 'efectivo de Joao Goulart; 1953 the el ano en que su acciOn ecomimica y social alcanz6 la maxima inten- sided. Un impulso. asombroso de crecirniento quedo estancado en' dos antes por una politica demagegica, supuestamente na- eionalista, basada en la perse- cuciOn del capital, especialmen- te el ex?tranjero. A ella se sumo, en los Ultinaos Meses de 1963, la eampana de ag,itacion social 'orientada a perreitir, mediante una reforma consti. tucional, la reeleccion presiden- rjal. Este es la situaciOn que he- redO el actual gobierno brasile. no, al hacerse cargo del pais, liace diez meses. .Aunque el ("amble oficial era de 1.200 cru- zeiros por d6lar y el libre ban- cario de 11260, el