BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 15, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE FATE OF COMMUNIST LEADERS
What is the life expectancy of Communist
Party leaders trained for positions of
power at home by foreign Communist powers?
Communist countries have harbored, trained and sent home many
a rebel dissident to head Communist regimes. Communists in
Exile reports not only on the early purges of these exiles
while in the Soviet Union (noted members of the CONINTERN for
example) but, of those who lived to rule Communist regimes in
Eastern Europe -- e.g., V1ko Chervenko in Bulgaria, Anna Pauker
in Rumania, Rakosi and Imre Nagy in Hungary, Rudolf Slansky in
Czechoslovakia.
All Communist countries today carry on
massive programs to indoctrinate foreign
youth and to train Communists and dissidents
in the hope of establishing them in power
in developing countries.
Youth and dissidents in developing countries might learn some-
thing from the history of the fate of CP leaders, presented in
this succinct, background booklet, Communists in Exile. Current
news of purges in Cuba, Communist China, of dismissals and dis-
appearances in the Soviet Union, would serve as additional mate-
rial on the fate of Communist leaders.
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IgriIfIcant Dates
II Afro-Asian Journalists Conf., Algiers (sponsor: Chicom-Indonesia
dominated AAJA) once postponed and still in question.
10 International Auschwitz Committee, General Session (FIR, Communist) --
commemorating 24th Annivers r of Camp Liberation, Auschwitz, Poland,
10-11 April 1945.
10 IV World Conference of Teachers (World Federation of Teachers' Unions --
FISE, Communist), Algiers 10-14 April; educational tours 16-17 April.
11 International Day of Liberation from Fascism ("Day of Remembrance")
celebrated annually by International Fed. of Resistance Movements (FIR,-
Communist).
13 II International Conf. for Teaching Resistance History, (sponsored by
FIR) Prague, Czechoslovakia, 13-15 April.
17 Nikita Khrushchev born, 1894.
18 Easter, traditional Peace marches, e.g., Aldermaston (UK) and Western
European countries.
18 Bandung Conf. (29 Afro-Asian countries call for elimination of colonialism,
for self-determination and independence, for UN membership all peoples)
18-27 April 1955. Tenth anniversary. [Note: Chou En-lai and Marshal Chen I
reportedly accepted invitations to celebrations in Indonesia.]
22 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin born. 1870: 95th anniversary. (Died 21 January 1924)
24 World Fed. of Democratic Youth (WFDY) Exec. Committee meeting and seminar,
Accra, Ghana -- to prepare for 9th World Youth Festival now scheduled mid-
summer, Algiers.
24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and for Peaceful Coexistence celebrated
by WFDY and IUS.
29- 30 Hitler commits suicide. Berlin. World War II. 1945 Twentieth anni-
versar,:.
APR
1
Month-long refugee exodus from Communist China to Hong Kong; estimated
70,000 cross border. 1962
1 May Day: International Workers' Day. Designated by Second International
(Socialist Congress) 1889; first celebrated Western Europe 1890; heavily
exploited since close of WW II in Communist countries.
1 Castro proclaims Cuba a socialist nation; no more elections. 1961
2 Berlin falls to Red Army. 1945 (20th anniversary WW II events)
5 USSR Press Day. Commemorating first publication in 1912 of Party con-
trolled paper.
5 Karl Marx born. 1.818. Dies 14 March 1883.
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GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#48 Commentary 17 Feb-2 Mar 1965
Principal Developments:
1. The 1 March meeting of the "26-party preparatory commission" is
under way in Moscow, -- but it appears to fall far short of the original
(and perhaps even the current) Soviet objectives. Though proceedings are
shrouded in secrecy, we note:
a. Aggravated warfare in Vietnam. has made it impossible for Moscow
to continue Khrushchev's aloofness;
b. The Chinese resumed a flow of belligerent polemics on the eve of
the meeting (see para. 2).
c. All media of the participants refer only to a "consultative meet:
ing," with no mention of preparing a world conference.
d. The 6 parties of the Chinese camp (Albania, China, Indonesia,
Japan, N. Korea, N. Vietnam) demonstrated solidarity in boycotting
the meeting, despite Kosygin's last-minute plea.and an ostentatious
Soviet show of solidarity with N. Vietnam and N. Korea. The indepenc:i-
ent Rumanians also stayed away.
e. The British delegation arrived several days after the others, with
a public statement that they decided to attend only because the meet-
ing would be consultative and not preparatory. The CPUSA delegates
are classed only as observers, but this is probably related to the
new U.S. action to prosecute U.S. Communists as agents of a foreign
power.
f. The group issued a statement on 3 March condemning U.S. imperial.
ism in Vietnam, -- but it did not go as far as recent Soviet state-
ments threatening action in support of N. Vietnam.
g. Moscow correspondents are agreed that the meeting is discussing
the problems of the movement, but there is little effort to predict
the outcome. One, the Yugoslav Barba?s, says that the meeting has
agreed that it "should prepare draft documents for international CP
consultations," but he describes three differing factions on the
question of holding a world conference new euphemism: `interna-
tional consultations").
2. After demonstratively publicizing an 18 January attack on :Tru
shchev and the present revisionists by Australian pro-Chinese Communist
Hill a week before the meeting date, the Chinese began on the 25th with
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a stream of their own anti-Soviet articles, ostensibly commenting on anti-
China materials in Soviet (also Czech and Polish) media but filled with
vituperative attacks on Khrushchevian revisionism still being followed by
his successors. Especially harsh is their prefatory note to their 3rd
volume of collected statements by Khrushchev - see February 25-26.
3. Some unconfirmed clandestine reports indicate that Peking is
calling on parties to convene for a rival meeting in Peking in the near
future. [There is no hard information on this and the reports can not be
accepted without confirmation.]
Significance:
The CPSU finally "succeeded" in at least getting delegates from 18
parties of the 25 invited to come to Moscow for the long-promoted 1 March
meeting -- in a world upset by the escalation of warfare in Vietnam and a
movement rent by dissensions, doubts and fears, and prodded by a resump-
tion of belligerently hostile Chinese polemics.
On the surface, it might appear that the CPSU leaders have abandoned
their original objective of a preparatory meeting to plan for a world con-
ference and have settled for the so-called "consultative meeting" as a
face-saving alternative to avoid the appearance of total failure. This
would certainly be a further setback of large proportions to Soviet pres-
tige and influence in the world movement, no matter how they might try to
divert attention by brandishing the whip of solidarity against the bogey
of U.S. imperialism.
However, it is quite possible that the entire Soviet posture at this
time -- its one-sided emphasis on unity and on fighting the "common enemy"
and its bland "consultative meeting" formulation -- is largely window-
dressing, behind which the CPSU is pushing its objective of a world con-
ference just as diligently as ever.
On the basis of present evidence, we can only assume that the chances
are slight that the meeting will produce any agreement on a new draft docu-
ment of a general line for the movement or on specific plans for a world
conference. At the same time, we remain fully aware that the continued --
or even more exacerbated -- Sino-Soviet conflict may intensify their com-
petition for "spectacular revolutionary deeds,," thereby further increasing
additional and enlarged subversion and aggression in all parts of the world.
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CHI ONOTIOGY -- COWUNIST DISSENSIONS
#48
17 Feb-2 Mar 1965
February 6 (delayed): Italian CP weekly journal Rinascita reports the
establishment of a "Committee of Initiative for a New Unity of the Left,"
based in Milan. Only 3 of the 19 members are from the PCI: 7 are from
Nenni's PSI; 3 from Vecchietti's PSIUP (left-wing split from PSI); 4 from
Saragat's Social Democrats; and 2 independents. Secretary is Vittorio
Orilla, PSI.
February 11 (delayed): Yugoslav Party weekly journal Komunist carries
interview with Mario Alicata, Director of PCI daily L'Unita, during
Belgrade visit, February 3-8. Asked about the Amendola rorop posal for
creation of a new party to unite the left, Alicata says: "We have agreed
that the discussion must be carried forward, but that it is necessary to
put it on a more solid basis." He says that "a group of comrades is
working on a document which will be discussed in the Party and in public,"
and reviews briefly and generally the problems to be considered.
February 17: French CP daily L'Humanite publishes a letter signed by
about 100 Partyllectuals, mostly professors at the University of
Paris, asking for a full debate on the role of intellectuals in the Com-
munist movement, -- together with a strong rebuke by t e Politburo.
February 18, 20 and. 27: Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popull.it publishes
3 editorials denouncing the 1Khrushchevite revisionists" for joining
with the U.S. imperialists in voting against a motion introduced by the
Albanian delegate to the U.N. General Assembly on the 16th. (It called
for resumption of normal voting procedures, which had been suspended to
avoid a showdown on Article 19. Only one delegation, Mauritania, voted
with Albania, with 97 opposed and 13 abstentions.) The Albanians' final
blow is the hardest. "The retreat and ca itulation of the Khrushchevite
revisionists in the face of the imperi ist diktat for journment...
is in itself a very serious act of treason.... The vote on the Albanian
motion unmasked the great bluff of the Mt. and the K. revisionists con-
cerning the alleged 'confrontation of the two great powers."'
ZIP goes on say that now "the Afro-Asian people can understand why
the U insists so on its participation in the next A-A conference....
(Soviet insistence) means that they intend to weaken and divide the
anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist front of the people of these con-
tinents and to halt and paralyze the revolutionary impetus of their
liberation struggle. As In other areas, there too they would like to
propagate the revisionist poison of retreat, compromise, and capitula-
tion to and collaboration with imperialism...."
On the 20th, the Peking press supports the Albanian action and men-
tions only the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia as opposing it, adding
that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reached a'behind-the-scenes agreement to
avoid voting.
(chronology cont.)
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February 19: Yugoslav Radio's Moscow correspondent Sundic reports that,
despite good connections, or, as in usually stated, reliable sources,
foreign correspondents is Moscow have ALiled until now to learn anything
definite about the fate" of the scheduled, drafting commission meeting.
"It is believed," he says, "that the initiators of the meeting themselves
are not so enthusiastic about its taking place." He adds that the ques-
tion of differences between the majority and the minority of the ICM is
not longer of much significance; now it is "the question of certain dif-
ferences in the ranks of the existing majority."
Februar 1y 9-20: Moscow publicizes communiques on CPSU meetings with
Portuguese and Finnish CP delegations. Both emphasize unanimity of
views on the need for strengthening the unity of the ICM. (The latter
was far more expansive, and covered many aspects of state relations as
well.)
February 20-22: NCNA on 20th publicizes full text of statement by E.F.
Hill, Chairman of the pro-Chinese dissident CP of Australia (M-L), pub-
lished in the 18 January issue of his organ Vanguard, denouncing the
CPSU-proposed 1 March meeting. Hill adds,:
"... Khrushchev did untold hares, but his advent had its posi-
tive side. It revealed clearly the rottenness latent in many Com-
munist parties....
"... The revisionists do not know what to do in the present
circumstances. They rush hither and thither, and they disagree
among themselves. They can never have unity, for revisionism ap-
proaches problems not from any principle, but from case to case."
Peking press 2ublishes on 22nd.
February 21: East German Party daily Neues Deutschland publishes com-
munique on discussions with Danish CP delegation 16-19th. "They estab-
lished a unanimity of views on basic questions of the Communist movement
and on efforts undertaken to consolidate unity and cohesion," but with
no specifics.
February 21+-25: Swedish press features reportage and commentary on a
press conference by Nils Holmberg, veteran Swedish Communist, leader
of the Chinese-attuned, hard-line SKP dissidents, attacking the Hermansson
leadership for leading the Party into a swamp of revisionism. He calls
for a new Party Congress.
February 25-26: NCNA distributes on 25th, and Peking papers print on
26th, three articles describing "anti-China materials" in Soviet, Polish,
and Czech media, respectively, and an announcement of Chinese publication
of the third volume of Khrushchev's statements, together with the full
text of an, explanatory publisher's note" which prefaces the volume --
and which returns to earlier Chinese vitujperation.
2 (Chronology Cont.)
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The note begins by recalling that 2 volumes, covering the period
1932-1953, had been published before K's downfall. They intend to pub-
lish "all of the public statements made by K between his assumption of
the post of First Secretary of the CPSTJ/CC and his fall..." which 'some
to as many as 10 million words, truly a flood of putrid verbosity." Thus,
the Chinese coUecttio ~l come to as many as 30 volumes," -- and this
will not include K's "shameful secret anti-Stalin report" at the 20th
CPSU Congress, because "it was never made pis by the Soviet Union."
The Chinese say that "modern revisionism bears the label of K," and thus
the collection will be "an encyclopedia of modern revisionism."
Following a very brief review of the most detested aspects of K's
revisionism, the article pays tribute to'Iao, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and
Stalin as positive teachers, but adds that "we also have teachers by
negative example in Chiang Kia-shek, the Japanese imperialists, the U.S.
imperialists, and those in our party who made the mistake of adopting
left or right opportunist lines. Those who belittle the role of teachers
by negative example are not thorough-going dialectical materialists...."
The old Chinese sarcasm bursts through:
"We never interfere in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries and other parties. However, we do want, just a bit, to take
up the cudgel on behalf of K. Those who spared no efforts in ex-
tolling K. and who had just pinned medals on his chest suddenly
about-faced when he fell and gave orders for the confiscation and
destruction of all his works, photographs, and portraits. That is
not quite the way to do things. Had they not been saying just a
few days earlier that K had developed M-L, that K was an outstanding
and talented leader and theoretician...? They why ... consign to
flames his works running to 10 million words? Can it possibly
prove that K revisionism has been thrown overboard?
"K's forced exit from the world political stage marked the
bankruptcy of K revisionishi. But the sinister spirit of K has not
departed. After all, there are larger or smaller groups of people
in the world, in the Soviet Union, even here in China, who believe
in K revisionism. Why? Because k revisionism does not owe its
origin and growth to any individual or any accidental factor. K's
revisionism is a product of the times...."
They close by urging readers not to avoid the works" "Just because
they are such rubbish":
"Khrus chev's statements provide us with a mirror in which
to distinguish Khrushchevism without Khrushchev in order to carry
the struggle against Khrushchev revisionism through to the end."
One of the other three articles reports that Moscow Television on
22 February and the C U magazine Politics Self-taught, No. 12, 1961+,
3 (Chronology Cont.)
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urge Soviet audiences to use the 14 February 1964 anti-China report by
Suslov (made at the CPSU plenum) for intensive study. Another reports
that the Polish Political and Economic Yearbook for 1964 contains attacks
on China. And the third details a charge, that "Czech papers have made
vile attacks" on the Albanian UN motion described above. "Chiming in
with the U.S. imperialists, they alleged that the Albanian delegate had
made the proposal at the 'instigation' of China."
Fe bruary 26: TASS reports that "the latest issue" of CPSU journal Kom-
munist carries an article extolling the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1950.
It stresses Soviet "efforts to strengthen, the unity of the socialist
camp, of the entire WCM," and "a number of new steps aimed at an improve-
ment of Soviet-Cbinese relations.'"It adds that the CPSU is "pressing
for an end to the public discussion inside the WCM."
February 26-27: NCNA expands on its list of Soviet media recommending
the use of the Suslov anti-China report, to include Kommunist of the
Armed Forces, Kommunist of Belorussia, Kommunist of Soviet Latvia, and
Party Life of the Kazakh SSR. It adds that "anti-China books and pam-
phlets in huge quantities are available in Soviet bookstores, -- and
were available in the Hall of Columns "even on 13 February when a public
meeting was held there celebrating the 15th anniversary" of the Sino-
Soviet treaty:" Peking press publishes on 27th, and again on March 2.
February 27-March 3: Soviet Premier Kosygin visits East Germany in con-
nection with the opening of the Leipzig Fair. He is accorded so little
public attention that speculation is rife: either he is insisting on a
new "cult of the nonpersonality," -- or the E. Germans are playing it
wary because they are convinced that he's only a short-term interim
premier.
February 28-March 1: NCNA distributes and Peking press publishes a
plashing 3,000-word denunciation of a "recently published" Soviet "anti-
China book, The International Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class,
with B.N. Ponomarev, CPSU CC Secretary, as its chief editor.
"The book gives great publicity to K. revisionism and attacks
the CCP, which upholds M-L, in an all-round, systematic, and foul
manner. It abuses by name Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the great leader
of the Chinese people, and pins on the Chinese leaders many political
labels such as neo-Trotskyism, petty? bourgeois nationalism, left-
opportunism, ultra-revolutionary, capitulationism, theoretical
messiahism, adventurism, hegemonyism, nationalism, subjectivism,
Chinese dogmatists, Chinese splitters, modern domatists, etc., etc.
"(It)... once again reveals the h-vpocris of those who profess
to reinforce the solidarity of the ICM, but in reality do something
else. While talking about reinforcing solidarity, they actually
deepen the split; while talking about putting an edn to the public
debate, they intensify anti-China agitation; ....
4 (Chronology Cont.)
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"ahe pact that the editors of the book go to such great pains
to boost K revisionism is additional proof that K's downfall merely
means a change of signboards and that what is on sale in the shop
remains the old wares of K revisionism."
(Editor's note: publication of this book was announced in the issue
of Party Life signed to the press on 17 September 1964, a month before
K's ouster.
March 1 and cont.nuing: The controversial "26-party meeting' is under
M on 1 March as scheduled, but it appears to fall far short of Soviet
objectives. The proceedings are shrouded'in secrecy, as usual in such
cases, but the following pertinent information has been published:
a. All public statements in media of the participants refer only
to a "consultative meeting," with no mention of preparations for a
world conference.
b. Only 19 parties, including the CPSU, are represented, with some
50 delegates present. Missing are the Albanians, Chinese, Indonesians,
Japanese, N. Koreans, N. Vietnamese, -- and Rumanians.
c. The British delegation arrives I March, several days after the
others, -- and the CPGB Executive Committee simultaneously releases
a statement saying that it decided to send representatives only be-
cause it would be a consultati eveaand not a preparatory meeting. The
CPUSA delegates are somew at mysteriously classed as observers rather
than participants: the American press comments that this might be
related to the new move by the U. S. Justice Department to prosecute
U.S. Communists as agents of a foreign power.
d. On 3 March the meeting issues a joint statement condemning U.S.
imperialism in Vietnam, demanding an end to aggression against N.
Vietnam and withdrawal of all U.S. personnel from the South. (The
statement does not go as far as recent Soviet statements, however,
and does not imply any action in support of N. Vietnam.)
e. Moscow correspondents agree that the meeting is discussing the
problems of unity in the movement, ideological differences, and the
role of a. world conference, but there is little effort to predict
the outcome. One of them, Yugoslav Boorrba's, says on 2 March that
the meeting has agreed that it "should prepare draft documents for
international CP consultations," and then goes on to describe three
different schools of thought on the question of "convening interna-
tional consultations" (new euphemism for world conference!):
"Some believe that everything should be done to convene inter-
national consultations as soon as ossible... (which) would afford
the opportunity for achieving a minimum joint platform of unity with
the CCP and those parties which support it.
5 (Chronology Cont.)
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"Representatives of other parties consider that international
consultations should not be insisted upon unless all parties want
them. Until then, Peking's attacks should not be answered and
pmics should not be accepted. Representatives of a third group
uphold the view that international consultations should not be in-
sisted upon as a form of achieving understanding and compromise,
but that concrete and frank d;?.scuson of controversial political
and ideological issues should advocated...."
6 (Chronology)
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882. FAILURES AND SHORTCOMINGS IN SOVIET EDUCATION
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SOON: Soviet educational practices have sometimes been held
up as a model, not least in the United States. America.n.education has
had its problems, while Soviet education has consistently taken more
interest in the creation of human resources which would strengthen the
Soviet state. But all is not well in Soviet education, as various re-
organizations and the abandonment of much-publicized reforms show.
(See unclassified attachment for detailed discussion of Soviet education,)
"r+` Problems faced by Soviet education include:
1. The tendency, contrary to Communist ideology, for higher
education to become the prerogative of a closed elite of the
children of party and'state officials.
2. The incompatibility of Party dogma with training encour-
aging creativity, imagination, and intellectual honesty, and
with objective scholarly and scientific research.
3. The disillusionment of much of Soviet youth with the of-
ficial ideals of the Party.
4+. The persistence of antiquated, learning-by-rote methods
in academic teaching, with students expected to parrot the
words of their instructors.
5. The reduction in the quantity (and therefore also in the
quality) of academic teaching.
6. The failure to develop fruitful vocational education.
Some of these problems, particularly No. 5, arise largely from the
national shortage in young manpower, and the lack of good teachers, con-
sequences of World War II and of Stalin's sacrifice of millions of poten-
tial parents and teachers in deportations and slave labor camps. Another
problem, which concerns all the rest of the world, is the one-sided po-
litical indoctrination of the population of the world's second strongest
m,litary power, with dangerous implications for future world stability.
There are some hopeful developments in Soviet education. The grip
of Trofim Lysenko on Soviet biology seems at last to be broken, and F.
Burlatsky has advocated (in Pravda 10 January 1965) developing political
science as an independent discipline, although still in a Marxist-Leninis
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framework. It is in the interest of the US that Soviet education become
more open to opposing viewpoints and more adequate for the world of today.
It is not in the interest of the US that the Soviet Union should be re-
garded as an educational model for other, especially developing, countries. 25X1 C1 Oc
5X1C1Oc
References
Edmund J. King, ed. Communist Education (London: Methuen, 1963)
Nicholas DeWitt, Education and Professional Employment-in the USSR
(Washington: National Science Foundation, 1 1
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SECRET (882)
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883 AF,FE,TAE,WH OAS REPORTS: STNO-SOVIET
25X1 C 1 INFLICT INCREASES COMMUNIST VIOLENCE
SITUATION: A recent publication of the Organization of American
States has focused attention on an aspect of the quarrel between the USSR
and Communist China that has been generally neglected. In a report on
"The Sino-Soviet Conflict and its Influence on Communist Activities in
the Americas" the Special Consultative Committee on Security examines,
country by country, the various aspects of Communist subversion in Latin
America and concludes: ..."that the dispute between China and the Soviet
Union has not diminished the subversive activities of international com-
munism in the Americas, but that, on the contrary, it constitutes, in
many countries, a greater incentive for the use of methods of violence."
It has been said that the Communist has no philosophy; he has only
a method and a goal. Certainly the factionalism that divides the Com-
munist parties of Latin America is less a result of differences in
ideology than in methods. The goal has remained the same: to bury the
free world. The,dispute has been largely concerned with how to go about
it: predominantly through peaceful subversion and infiltration, includ-
ing elections, as Moscow holds; or through terrorism, guerrilla warfare,
and other forms of violence, as Peking insists. We should not overlook
that this is not simply an ideological dispute. More basically, it is
a conflict between two countries both of which are seeking control over
the World Communist Movement and, through it, world domination. With
regard to the methods advocated by each side, the OAS report recognizes:
In effect, the Soviet line, by opposing the Chinese Communist
line in favor of the use of force, would appear to imply that Russia has
renounced the use of force, whereas the truth is that Russian Com-
munism continues its efforts toward world domination regardless of
methods.
The majority of the top leaders of the Communist parties in Latin
America continue to favor the Soviet position. Pro-Chinese elements have
come closest to seizing leadership in Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. In each
of these three countries there are two separate Communist factions, each
claiming to be the official party and expelling the other. In Venezuela,
the dominant faction, although nominally loyal to Moscow, has supported
for several years a policy of urban terrorism and guerrilla warfare.
However, as a result of the failure of the policy of violence to affect
the elections of December 1963, the Venezuelan CP is currently trying to
improve its image by calling for a suspension of terroristic acts in the
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lI E U li~Ei~ (883 Cont.)
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cities. Even so, it is actively supporting guerrilla warfare in the
rural areas. In Colombia, a split in the Communist youth movement put
.the Chinese faction in a dominant position and brought on a wave of
violence in rural areas and against U.S. companies.
In all five of the above countries, as well as in a few others
mentioned in the report, rivalry between the two factions of the Com-
munist movement apparently causes either an actual increase in violence
or a vast increased otential for violence and guerrilla warfare. In
Peru, for example, the potential has certainly increased, although overt
violence is currently inhibited by a particularly stable political situ-
ation.
Most Latin Americans, the OAS report points out, are still living
in the era of the caudillo -- the political boss, the man on horseback.
Certainly they are more prone to follow a flesh-and-blood leader than an
abstract ideal. Moscow has cleverly exploited this tendency by building
up the personality of Fidel Castro, who for millions of Latin Americans,
particularly the radical youth, is a sort of new Messiah. Castro-Commu-
nism, or fidelismo, as it is more commonly called, is usually identified
with advocates of violence, whether of the Moscow or the Peking persuasion.
The meeting of Latin American Communist parties which took place in
Havana in November 1964 [Reference C] apparently marked a change in tac-
tics: certain sections of the communique have been interpreted as call-
ing for a shift in emphasis in some countries from legal and peaceful,
to illegal and violent, methods to be used by the national parties in
the pursuit of Communist goals. This does not mean that the Soviet
directed parties had ever renounced the use of force or that they now
abjure legal means-. they use the tactic best suited to their objective
at a given time and place..
In addition to the new dangers that may have arisen as a result of
competition, the OAS report concedes -- courageously, since it was written
predominantly by Latin Americans -- that the United States, with a politi-
cally sophisticated population, can afford the luxury of dissent in the
form of a Communist party: it has "greater internal immunity" than its
neighbors to the south.-
"The special position of the United States, and its independence
in developing its own policy, can have an effect on the rest of the
American countries by contributing to the formation of a false con-
cept of the 'peaceful coexistence' advocated by Russia."
Also, that phase of the schism which projects the image of a China advo-
cating violent revolution and a Russia advocating more peaceful approaches
to the same goal may make the unwary Latin American think ..."that Russia
has renounced the use of force." 25X1 C 1 Ob
pprove
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 ? t1b 1FUn'70-03061A000300gg01 p 1965
884+, AF, FE, NE II AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
Will Malaysia be Allowed to Participate?
More on Algiers as Site for International Conferences
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Six Forums for Sino-Soviet Conflicts. Algiers is the
venue for six international conferences duringhy , most of which could
provide a setting for extending Sino-Soviet quarrels, or at least for in-
tense rivalry to dominate international organizations. The conflict has
already disrupted preparations for the conferences, has caused delays,
and has become a source of embarrassement to Algeria. Ben Bella is
trying hard to avoid becoming exclusively aligned with either Moscow or
Peking. Algerian inability to complete accommodations for a March
meeting of Afro-Asian heads of state effectively postponed this group's
decision as to whether the essentially European Soviet Union should be
invited to this II Afro-Asian Conference (II Bandung) --perhaps' the most
important of the six conferences.as the only govt.-to-govt. meeting.
Afro-Asian Conferences. Many African and Asian nations deplore that,
in recent years, international and Afro-Asian conferences have degenera-
ted into propaganda forums for Sino-Soviet differences; with such
prospects in view, they probably welcomed having the Conference delayed
until 29 June, although their foreign policies are not too dissimilar from
those of the host, Algeria. Others, like India, clearly prefer no con-
ference to one that would be dominated by the Chicom or Indonesian organ-
izers. The co-sponsoring Indonesians, who have supported the Chicom
stand on exclusion of the Soviet Union, have been consistently eager to
have the long planned Conference convened as soon as possible. They re-
gard it as a major platform for calling a Conference of New Emerging
Forces (CONEFO) and reiterating their policy of confrontation against
Malaysia, which they have labeled a puppet of "imperialism" and, thus, in-
eligible to attend.
Malaysia Attendance. Between now and 24 June when the decision-
making Foreign Ministers meeting is convened, both the Soviet Union and
Malaysia will work to convince Afro-Asians that they should be included
at the II Afro-Asian Conference, The Soviet Union can present its case
in many ways. It can enlist influential nonaligned nations, like India
--or Yugoslavia for that matter -- to work in its behalf; it can remind
other countries, which receive substantial Soviet aid, that their bene-
factor wants to be invited. Compared with the Soviet Union, Malaysia
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U (884+ Cont.)
 Approved For Release ? CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020008-0
has limited capabilities for waging its campaign for acceptance. How-
ever, a strong Malaysian bid is important because, if Malaysian acceptance
seemed imminent or were to be accomplished, the Indonesians might withdraw
or, as the main organizer, force a further postponement. No matter what
the Indonesian reaction, the presence of Malaysians at the II Afro-Asian
Conference would be a victory for moderate and pro-Western forces.
Malaysia's strongest argument is that it is an (Afro-) Asian nation.
It has economic problems, like over-specialization, that are common to
many of the Afro-Asian nations; being an ethnically mixed society (Malays,
Indians, Chinese), its social and political difficulties are similar to
those of other Afro-Asian societies. Indonesia's essentially propagan-
distic assertion that Malaysia is dominated by a neo-colonialist, im-
perialist power (Great Britain) has little meaning when subjected to
closer examination: of its own choosing, Malaysia may retain ties (e.g.
defense) with the United Kingdom; as a member of the Commonwealth, it
has this privilege as do all former British colonies; former French colo-
nies enjoy similar special relationships with France. A more positive
view finds that such arrangements basically are another form of foreign
aid. The contention that Malaysia is an artificial creation is irrele-
vant: as a political entity, it is no more artificial than many other
former colonial Afro-Asian nations, Indonesia included..
Indonesia's case against Malaysian attendance is weak, but, more
important, it is only a facade behind which Indonesian antagonism toward
Malaysia is ill concealed. Indonesian-Malaysian hostilities should not
be allowed to prevent Malaysia's attending. Differences, of comparable
magnitude, exist between other Afro-Asian nations fe.g. between Somalia,
Kenya and Ethiopia 7, but their names appear on the invitation list as
they should. One of the purposes of the II Afro-Asian Conference is to
explore those areas (economic, social and technical) where these countries
can cooperate despite political differences. Seen in this light, Malaysia
has the required credentials, and, turning to the positive, its potential
for contributing usefully to attacking common Afro-Asian problems, in the
economic field for instance, is far greater than ultra-nationalistic
Indonesia's.
Malaysia should be able to capture the sympathies of many Afro-Asian
nations. With behind-the-scenes assistance from Britain, particularly
among Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth, Malaysia has been and is
now actively seeking support. To this end, Deputy Prime . Minister Razak
departp for East Africa iii; the mi(ddi. 6f .Mare. Already numerous Afro-
Asian nations have indicated that they will vote for Malaysia, with India
as an especially strong proponent of Malaysia's cause.
Theoretically, any nation which is not committed to the Chicom
Indonesian "axis" should be willing to back Malaysia's bid. Indeed, many
who would find Soviet presence questionable, think that Malaysia shoald
be invited. Indonesia's recent withdrawal from the United Nations (ti)
because Malaysia became a member of the Security Council may work in
Malaysia's favor. Those Afro-Asian nations aspiring to a policy of non-
alignment, i.e. seeking to prevent becoming a battleground for influence
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${ T (88# Cont.)
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between East and West and between Moscow and Peking, wish to rely on the
continued existence of the United Nations. As a consequence, they have
expressed disapproval of Indonesia's actions and are likely to be less
open to Indonesian petitions against Malaysia. Algeria itself, as host
to the Afro-Asian Conference, has taken steps to lessen Indonesia's
chances for either keeping Malaysia away or launching CONEFO as a com-
petitor to the UN: Algeria officially notified Malaysia that the March
meeting would be postponed, and has also asked U Thant and Quaison-Sackey,
Afro-Asians holding the two highest offices in the UN, to come to
Algiers to the Conference.
Algerian Strategy. Algeria's posture toward the II Afro-Asian Con-
ference is symptomatic of a general strategy that it seems to be evolving
(to cope with the complications that have arisen from its play for a lead-
ing role in African affairs): Algeriai's policy toward the Afro-Asian Con-
ference has been to delay until moderate pro-Afro-Asian elements can be
brought in to insure that neither of the major Communist powers will have
a free hand, perhaps if only to maximize its own role in international
(front) meetings. Originally they may have encouraged the location of
Chicom and Soviet backed propaganda centers (i.e. African headquarters
for international Communist front organizations) and the rash of con-
ferences in Algiers with a view to deriving advantages from both the
Soviets and the Chicoms. From the Soviets, the Algerians receive sub-
stantial economic and military aid; the Chicoms give only token aid, but
their militant program for purging Africa of "colonialism" and "neo-
colonialism" reinforces Algeria's "manifest destiny." Algeria's current
handling of the Conference problem may not be entirely to Moscow's
liking but, on balance, is likely to be more in its..- favor than Peking's.
Of the five international Communist front meetings thus far scheduled
for Algiers in 1965, three could very easily be disrupted by the Sino-
Soviet dispute. Preparations for the Ninth World Youth Festival in July
have already been afflicted. As a possible consequence and also to en-
sure that the International Preparatory Committee (dominated by the Soviet-
controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth and International Union
of Students) accepts a modicum of an African orientation of the Festival,
the Algerian Preparatory Committee seeks to assert a role of "co-determina-
tion." At the recent Afro-Asian Economic Seminar in February, where
the Chicoms refrained from their usual harangue, the Algerians seemed to
be in control. Of other vulnerable conferences, the Afro-Asian Women's
meeting has been postponed from April to June, undoubtedly to Algeria's
satisfaction, and reportedly the Afro-Asian Youth Conference, which is
not yet firmly scheduled for Algiors, will go begging.
The Algerians have no apparent ready capability for imposing their
control over the other two front fonferences now planned for April, the
Fourth Conference of the Soviet-manipulated World Federation of Teachers'
Unions (EISE) and the Chicom-Indonesian-dominated Second Conference of
the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (AAJA). In the former, the Soviets
will probably hew to their usual tactic of not initiating debate of the
Sino-Soviet rift and, generally, trying to suppress the attempts of
others to do so. At the journalists' meeting, the Chicoms will be more
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AA*VTr (884+ Cont.)
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likely to attack the Soviet "revisionists:" The spotlight on the Sino-
Soviet squabble would leave an irritated Algeria in the shadows and the
majority of the Afro-Asian delegations deeply disappointed.
25X1C10b
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(884 Cont.)
 5X1 C1 Ob
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 ^1 JL in Min
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885. HANOI'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
25X1C10b
SITUATION: The NFLSV was created on the instructions of the Communist
Party of North Vietnam to be the political arm of the Viet Cong guerrillas
in South Vietnam. The NFLSV, headquartered in Hanoi, continues to expand
its foreign missions and now has permanent representation in Algiers, Berlin,
Cairo, Djakarta, Havana, Moscow, Peking and Prague. These missions are
staffed by skilled and active propagandists who hold press conferences, or-
ganize photo exhibits, write letters to editors:;., go on lecture tours, or-
ganize leaflet and pamphlet mailing operations, arrange "documentary" film
showings, and undertake countless other activities to show the "brutality
and terrorism of the U.S. and their puppets" in South Vietnam and to pub-
licize the valiant struggle of the "South Vietnamese patriots" under the
direction of the NFLSV. In all of this activity they are given extensive
support by Hanoi in the form of photographs, letters from eye-witnesses,
testimonials from survivors of"the innocent victims of U.S. bombing" and so
forth.
Recently the NFLSV representatives in foreign countries have attempted
to project themselves as the legitimate government of South Vietnam and the
only true spokesman for the South Vietnamese people. To support this image
they have publicized a complete program of political and economic objectives.
No foreign state has yet recognized the NFLSV as the government for South
Vietnam, but a number of Communist-originated news releases on the Front say
that "many governments" already consider the NFLSV to be the "real govern-
ment" and the international missions of the Front to be "the real diplomatic
envoys of South Vietnam." NFLSV propaganda regularly stresses that "over
one-half the population and two-thirds of the territory of South Vietnam are
under the control of the Front." Extensive publicity was given Australian
Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett's interview with Ngyuen Huu Tho, head
of the NFLSV, in which Burchett referred to Tho as the "de facto Premier of
most of South Vietnam" and to the NFLSV as "to all intents and purposes a
government." The establishment of a provisional government is undoubtedly
part of the Communist strategy for South Vietnam and they clearly would like
to have it established before any international conference on South Vietnam
takes place in order to demand a role for the NFLSV in the proceedings.
This is confirmed by the fact that special groups of administrative cadres
and governmental specialists are now regularly included among the personnel,
infilitrated from North Vietnam. (See unclassified attachment for additional
details.)
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&Wma"M r (885 Cont.)
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03089A000300020008-0
15 March 1965
Under Khrushchev, Soviet education underwent much the same impulses,
negative and positive, as Soviet agriculture. On the one hand there was
Khrushchev's penchant for ignoring the advice of competent advisors, and
for trying short-cuts. On the other side, there was evidence of his de-
sire to broak with the Stalinist pattern of bureaucratism and New Class
privilege. In education, Khrushchev was defeated even before his re-
placement as Chairman and First Secretary.
Proposed Reforms of 1958. In September 1958, in the heyday of his
power, Khrushchev proposed a number of reforms in Soviet education.
First, compulsory education was to be extended from seven years -- the
legal ideal, which was often not met in practice -- to eight years, after
which most children would go to work (age 15). Second, secondary educa-
tion (to run from the ninth to eleventh year inclusive) should be centered
on part-time evening and factory schools and correspondence courses, with
only a small number of full-time secondary schools for especially gifted
children. Third, no one should be admitted to a university or higher
school without two years post-secondary, full-time experience in produc-
tion work, and the first half of university education should be part-
time, with students also doing production work during that period. At
that time public criticism of Khrushchev's proposals was practically un-
heard-of, but nevertheless certain educators spoke up and without naming
the First Secretary, argued against the ideas of combining work and
study, of establishing schools for the gifted, of interrupting education
for work, and of evening schools. Perhaps the critics were emboldened
to speak by the fact that ideas similar to Khrushchev's had been tried
out in the period of the First Five Year Plan, and had been abandoned.
Such criticism, in the USSR, is also likely to reflect the existence of
undercover support in very high quarters, such as the CPSU Presidium.
New Class Threatened. While much of the criticism reflected sound
educational principles, it was supported by other considerations, too.
Khrushchev had challenged the Soviet New Class in an area in which any
privileged class will ardently defend its privileges -- its right to pass
on a privileged status to its children. In the post-revolutionary period,
when a working-class background was required to enter a university, some
parents forged personal documents to enable their children to continue
their education. Stalin dropped the ban on students of "undesirable
social origin" in December 1935, and fees were introduced for secondary
education in October 1940, in effect making such education the preroga-
tive of the New Class, The fees continued to be required until June,
1956; their removal, increased the number seeking secondary and higher
education. Now Khrushchev was proposing to go further, and to require
those whom he called "the white-handed ones" -- the children of the elite
-- to do full-time manual labor for two years and part-time work for
longer periods. Like other more or less self-made men, N. S. Khrushchev
was a great believer in the "school of hard knocks," and somewhat
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resentful of those who had never toiled with their hands. His proviso
for full-time schools for gifted children was poor consolation for the
New Class; after all, their children might not all be gifted.
Actual Reforms of 1958. As it turned out, the legislation on
educational reform, passed in November 1958, significantly modified
Khrushchev's original plans. All students were given the right to pro-
ceed to secondary education after graduating from eight-year schools;
regular secondary schools were retained, though now devoting one-third
time to "theoretical and practical production work"; schools for the
gifted were omitted (except for a few later experiments, and for schools
in the arts, which already existed); two years of production work gave
preference for university entrance, but was not absolutely required; the
requirement for practical work at the university level was slightly re-
laxed. In the case of students in the liberal arts, much less vocational
work was expected. Thus the main framework of secondary education was
preserved, though with some impairment, and the over-all educational
process was given a hybrid, trade school cum theoretical character.
Loopholes remained open for the children of the New Class.
Criticism. The system did not prove a success. By 14 September
1962, Academician A. L. Mints was complaining in Izvestia that voca-
tional training was having an adverse effect on academic standards. In
January 1964, four directors of Moscow secondary schools contributed an
article to Komsomolskaya Pravda in which they complained that the qual-
ity of education had deteriorated badly. Under the program inaugurated
in 1958, students in secondary schools were spending four days a week in
classrooms and two days in nearby factories, often simply killing time
and picking up bad habits, such as drinking. On 31 January 1964, Kom-
somolskaya Pravda reported that at the Riga Electrical Plant seventh
year pupils learned in one day how to perform operations on which
eleventh year secondary students had spent two years.
Neither were there any compensating advantages for the economy.
Since Soviet factories are often very large, employing almost everyone
in the area, schools often had only one factory to which they could send
their students. The reaction of the students to their exposure to a
factory was usually a resolve to avoid at all costs spending their lives
in that factory. One school sent 185 students to be trained in clothing
and electric clock manufacture; only 18 remained in these trades. Out
of 73 trainees at the Sverdlov plant, only one stayed on. Often the
training seems to have been make-work activity, using obsolete machinery.
Only one narrowly circumscribed specialty was learned, rather than gen-
eral skills useful in a variety of jobs. At the same time, qualified
employees have been needed to train the students, and they and material
resources have been diverted from production. More serious, the whole
educational process was prolonged, keeping youth from genuinely produc-
tive labor at a time when the manpower shortage, due to the drop in births
during World War II, was becoming extremely acute.
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New Reforms 1964. By the beginning of 1964, there were symptoms
(such as the publication of critical articles) indicating that the 1958
reforms were being reconsidered. On 20 June 1964, a decree appeared re-
ducing the time of study in advanced schools and universities by cutting
down on the amount of time spent in production work. On 13 August,
Izvestia published a similar decree for secondary education, reducing it
by a year, mainly by trimming down vocational work. Since pre-secondary
schooling remains at eight years, secondary schools are now expected to
cover their curriculum in two years, probably the world's shortest sec-
ondary school program. Actually the main reduction in secondary train-
ing did not occur in 1964, but in 1958 when the custom of spending one
third of the school week in factories was introduced. Another current
development is the "schools of the prolonged day," largely for small
children, which keep the pupils until 7 or 8 p.m., when their parents
come home. These also serve to replace another favorite plan of Khrush-
chev's, that for the boarding schools or so-called internats, which were
generally supposed to give priority to children from lower-income fami-
lies, and which were designed to build "New Soviet Men" by completely
controlling the child's environment; the internats have proven too costly
to operate on a large scale, though some still continue. To meet the
problem of the shortened secondary school program, some secondary stud-
ies are being transferred to the seventh and eighth years, and (since
December 1964) some are simply being dropped, including elements of alge-
bra, geometry, a survey of foreign literature, and the study of Deanran
Bedny, Khrushchev's favorite poet.
Holdovers and Continuing Problems. One important element of the
1958 system, an expanded system of night and correspondence schools,
still remains. It serves part to provide refresher work for those who
are completing their two years in the factory between secondary and ad-
vanced training. These schools, too, have come in for complaints: on
February 1965, Pravda noted that the standards for evening school grad-
uates were lower than those for graduates of day schools, and that many
pupils abandon these schools without completing the course. There is no
sign, however, that the regime will abandon these schools.
Various subjects on the curriculum have recently been criticized,
including agriculture (in connection with the ouster of Lysenko), lan-
guage (Pravda) 15 January 1965), mathematics (Pravda, 25 November 1964),
and composition (Izvestia, 17 May 1964). A general shortcoming of Soviet
education seems to be that there is too much learning by rote, and too
little opportunity for independent thought. While a few Soviet scien-
tists are unquestionably of top quality, the level of ordinary techni-
cians does not measure up with that of the West. In 1962-1963, Paul
Metzger, a Swiss engineer, spent five months directing the installation
of the automated controls of a chemical plant at Balakovo, 900 kilometers
east southeast of Moscow. Metzger reported: "The training of a Soviet
engineer compared at best with that of a Swiss trained mechanic; a Soviet
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trained mechanic knew less about how to do things than an untrained
Swiss worker." While Metzger's own observation was limited to Balakovo,
Soviet co-workers assured him that conditions were the same all over the
USSR. The exceptional students and graduates are likely to be the chil-
dren or proteges of elite scientists. A special school was established
in Moscow in 1963 to give instruction in advanced mathematics and physics
to 14 and 15-year-olds; a Soviet teacher reporting on the results stated
that the pupils were mostly from the families of mathematicians, but
were by no means all prodigies.
Privilege and Influence. In any society which has social inequal-
ities -- and the USSR is one of these societies -- the children of the
privileged have advantages. Mothers are at home to take care of the
children; they and the fathers are better able to tutor their offspring;
the parents do more to enrich the cultural experience of the children
and expose them to the attractions of science and the axts; the children
are more likely to have quiet places to study; they will be able to buy
their own books instead of having to wait to use library copies; and the
parents will be more aware of the advantages of education, and will prod
their children into studying harder. In the USSR more than in most
countries, the children in a few cities (such as Moscow and Leningrad)
have better opportunities than other children out in the provinces.
.Also, in the USSR blest or personal influence can go a long way, and
there are several crucial points at which this influence may come to
bear.
After completing the general primary eight year course, the student
(at about age 15) who continues his education may go into one of three
different kinds of schools: evening schools for individuals working
full-time on farm or in factory, diplomas from which do not entitle
their possessors to compete for entry into institutions for higher edu-
cation; technicums which give specialized and relatively advanced tech-
nical or managerial training, and the majority of whose graduates do not
go on to higher institutions; and general education secondary schools,
which continue to stress academic qualities, and whose graduates form
most of that 20 per cent which is excused from two years' labor exper-
ience. (There are also factory training programs for those not proceed-
ing with a secondary education.) About one third of those leaving eight-
year schooling enter one of the three kinds of secondary schools, and of
this third, half or more go into the first category, and 25 per cent or
less into each of the last two. The Soviet New Class naturally uses its
influence to get its children into the last two types of school, and
especially into the last one.
Another point of selection comes at entrance into higher institu-
tions. Prestige schools, like the Moscow State University, have four or
more candidates for every vacancy, while certain provincial teachers'
training schools have fewer applicants than vacancies. Soviet officials
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pull whatever wires they can to get their children into prestige insti-
tutions without performing the two years of manual labor. It is worth
noting that students who succeed in continuing their education without
interruption into post-graduate work can usually evade being drafted for
military service.
Character Recommendations. A Khrushchevian measure, still in effect,
makes university admission dependent on character recommendations from
Party officials, the Komsomol, trade unions, and heads of plants or col-
lective farms. Party officials also sit on examining boards. The most
hard-working and competent workers are supposed to be selected for higher
schools, -- also the most politically reliable. As Khrushchev stated in
November 1956, "We should admit to higher education only the best among
the best of those who are dedicated to the cause of Lenin." Further,
plants or collective farms may subsidize a certain number of their workers
in study at higher schools, and these need not compete with other appli-
cants for entry; upon graduation, they are required to return to their
former place of work. In many cases, the "higher schools" to which such
workers are sent are specialized trade schools, not representative of the
top level of Soviet education. It is obvious, however, that the general
requirement for character recommendations from party hacks and factory
bureaucrats tends to stifle creativity and intellectual honesty. The
worst feature is the premium placed on Party orthodoxy, reinforcing the
efforts of the Soviet educational system to place ideological blinders
on the youth. Academic freedom, so highly prized by professors and stu-
dents elsewhere, is completely missing. Free dialogue and debate, essen-
tial for intellectual maturity, are absent.
Educational Crippling. That part of the official propaganda which
seeks to glorify labor and the party leadership probably has little effect.
Soviet society blatantly contradicts this aspect of the indoctrination
program. But other parts, dealing with the theory of economics, modern
history, politics, literature, and philosophy, are highly successful.
The picture of the world outside the Bloc is grossly distorted, and in
this case, there is little available information to contradict the offi-
cial picture. In studying the origins of World War II, for example, the
Soviet student is taught that the British, French, and Americans tried to
use Hitler in an effort to induce him to attack and defeat the Soviet
Union: e.g., "The British Government wanted no part of any collective
measures [against Ansc.h.luss], for, like the U.S. and French governments,
it was bent on encouraging Hitler's aggressions" (G. Deborin, The
Second World Wax, pp 26-27). The study of foreign literature was'see
above) one of the first things to be dropped when the curriculum was
curtailed. The state publishing houses produce a flood of literature on
such themes as "Communism is the Future of Mankind," while non-Communist
publications are almost completely unavailable. One result of this sort
of education is a kind of xenophobia which is sometimes a problem for the
regime itself; it is no accident that African students at Lumumba Uni-
versity have found themselves treated as savages of an inferior race.
Another result is an incapacity for sophisticated thought in politics,
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5 (Cont.)
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economics, and philosophy: there is not enough competition in ideas, and
there is too much reliance on shibboleths and generalizations, a promi-
nent feature of Marxist education. A soviet general writing a serious
article about anti-missile missiles states that it would be bad for
"aggressors" to have such weapons, but that it is proper for "peace-loving
countries" to have them; obviously he means that the capitalist nations
belong in the former category, and the Communist countries in the latter.
What is alarming is that after years of conditioning, he may really think
that non-Communist countries are always aggressors -- and therefore fair
targets for preventive attack as soon as the USSR is strong enough. In
order to shackle the non-Communist press, the Soviets have proposed a
ban on "war propaganda," but there is actually no place where there is
more spreading of hatred and glorification of "good" wars, (e.g., "wars
of national liberation") than in the USSR.
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15 March 1965
Hanoi's National Liberation Front Expands Operations
In September 1960, at a North Vietnamese Communist Party Congress,
Party First Secretary Le Duan called for the creation of a "broad united
front" in the South which would have as its ultimate goal the establish-
ment of a "national democratic coalition government." In response to
Le Duan's instructions, the Viet Cong on 20 December 1960 publicly pro-
claimed formation of the "National Pont for the Liberation of South
Vietnam." Shortly thereafter, Hanoi's news and propaganda outlets be-
gan to applaud and commend every statement and action undertaken by the
Front. In February 1961, the NFLSV issued its "Manifesto," a document
that bears remarkable similarity to the phraseology and the substance
of Le Duan's speech.
The Front's most important tasks, according to the Manifesto, were
to overthrow the Government in Saigon and form a "broad national demo-
cratic coalition administration" to "negotiate" with North Vietnam on
"reunification" of the whole country. This objective of reunification
of Vietnam under Communist control has not been changed; on the contrary,
it has been made increasingly clear and insistent. This fact should pro-
vide ample discouragement to anyone who believes that a "neutralist"
solution can be negotiated that would leave South Vietnam free from in-
terference from the North.
The domestic tasks outlined in the Manifesto included all of the
pet slogans that Communists list in such documents: land reform, full
employment, low rent, democracy, and social justice. It also pledged
a general amnesty for all political prisoners and the elimination of
foreign cultural influences
The operation of the NFLSV has been patterned after earlier models
used by Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants. To fight against the Japanese
during World War II, Ho operated behind the facade of the Viet Minh
(League for the Independence of Vietnam), which he cast aside when it
was no longer useful. Then in 1946, he formed the Lien Viet (Vietnamese
United Front), this time to mask the Communist direction of the war
against the French.
The Communist background of the ostensible leaders of the NFLSV is
a well-documented matter of public record. Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho is
a pro-Communist lawyer who has been involved in Communist political ac-
tivities in Vietnam since 1947. The first Secretary General, Nguyen Van
Hieu, has been a Communist propagandist since 1945 with both the Viet
Minh and the Viet Cong. Current Secretary General and Vice Chairman of
the Front Huynh Tan Phat has been involved in subversive activities since
the 1930's and is a crypto Communist. Other leaders of the Front have
similar records.
(Cont.)
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The NFSLV is of course said to be the spokesman for an exceedingly
wide range of South Vietnamese organizations, including for example,
Students and Pupils for Liberation, Peasants Union for Liberation, As-
sociation of Patriotic and Democratic Journalists, Writers and Artists
for Liberation, Labor Unions for Liberation, Vietnamese Nationalists of
Chinese Origin for Liberation, Association for the Restoration of Bud-
dhism and Hoa Hao, and so on almost ad infinitum. But many of these
are not really groups at all; they do not have memberships such as bona
fide organizations do, nor do they represent those people engaged in the
activity which their name implies, even where there is such an activity.
These "organizations" are in reality small staffs with very little public
participation; while their function is to create propaganda, one of their
most important reasons for existing is simply to be a "member" of the
NFLSV. The tactic is used to give the impression that the Front repre-
sents every social, ethnic, religious, professional, political, and eco-
nomic group in South Vietnam. The complete lack of support for the NFLSV
in South Vietnam has been made perfectly obvious on many occasions, but
perhaps never more clearly than on the overthrow of the Diem government.
The Military Revolutionary Committee, in the first hours after the coup,
issued a declaration restoring democratic freedoms and calling on all
the South Vietnamese people for support. The truly democratic groups
that has been banned by Diem and the real patriots who had been exiled
returned to South Vietnam to assist in reorganizing the government and
establishing viable institutions to serve the people. None of the con-
stituent members of the NFLSV made any attempt to participate in these
affairs.
The most significant "member" of the NFLSV is the People's Revolu-
tionary Party (PRP), which was formed in early 1962 and openly admits
its Marxist-Leninist lineage from the original Indochinese Communist
Party and from the Communist Lao Dong Party of North Vietnam. Hanoi
and the Front itself try to give the impression that the PRP is only a
routine member and that it has no more influence than allegedly non-
Communist elements in the organization. Captured Viet Cong documents
belie this masquerade by stating clearly that the PRP only poses an in-
dependent party and that it is in fact the Lao Dong Party apparatus in
South Vietnam; these documents are equally explicit about the PRP's
vanguard role" in the affairs of the NFLSV. This being the case,
Hanoi's attempt to create the appearance of a popular front is further
exposed.
Internationally, the NFLSV has permanent missions in Algiers, Berlin,
Cairo, Djakarta, Havana, Moscow, Peking and Prague. These offices are
staffed primarily by propagandists who give lectures, write articles, ar-
range showings of "documentary" films, and numerous other typical propa-
ganda activities all designed to show that all blame for the situation
in South Vietnam lies with the "U.S. and their puppets," and to prove
that the NFLSV is the "true representative of the South Vietnamese peo-
ple."
2 (Cont.)
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The Communists are currently stepping up the activities of the
Front, particularly those activities designed to give it the appearance
of being the legitimate government of South Vietnam. Much publicity
is given to. statements ttat the NFL-,SV is "considered by many people to
be the reGJ_ go'>ernment of South Vietnarn'F or that the NFLSV representa-
tives in forei6pi count-G?ies are "received as the real diplomatic envoys
of South lietnez.." All of this is part of the Communist plan to insist
on a prominent role for the NFLSV in any discussions or negotiations that
may take place on the Vietnamese situation. The Front can be expected to
do I.-s utmost to carry out the Its tructions originally given it by the
Commo-nis-; Lao Doug Party of North Vietnam to form a "coalition" govern-
ment: and reunite itself with North Vietnam. They do not say so, but there
can be no doubt that the reunification will take place only on Communist
terms and would mean Communist rule in South as well as North Vietnam.
For additional background material see:
Communism in North Vietnam, P.J. Honey, MIT Press
Cambridge, Mass., 1963.
The Last Confucian, Denis Warner, Collier-MacMillan,
1963 London, 1963.
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