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November 11, 2016
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August 4, 1998
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March 29, 1965
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5X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/0 RDP78-03061 A000300020009-9 29 March 1965 Briefly Noted 00010, Soviet Seaman Russian Stabs Ghanaian Sprung Thru Policeman Influence Press Comment of 22 March carries a story from the Lagos, Nigeria Daily Tele- ra h of 9 March, describing the re- lease of a Russian seaman, Rumgari- zem, who had been arrested while breaking into a Ghanaian home, who attacked a policeman with a knife, who was released on bail and failed to appear when ordered, and who was sentenced to two years imprisonment by a Ghanaian court. Now he has been allowed to return to the USSR. The Daily Telegraph publishes a let- ter on the case by a Ghanaian exile leader, Kwow Richardson, charging that the release has been due to Soviet influence with the Ghanaian government. This story deserves wide replay in Africa, with special emphasis on Richardson's charges that the Russians maintained that "Black men shouldn't try a Russian," and on the strange leniency of the Ghanaian government. Elsewhere, there may be appropriate local cases to be compared with this case, providing a pretext for play; for example, in India the Tarasov case, and in Australia the Petrov case. In all possible play,,call attention to the fact that under a decree of 15 February 1962, Soviet law provides for a death penalty for those who endanger the lives of po- licemen or party vigilantes (called militia and druzhiniki respectively), even if the police officer is not actually killed. In the Ghanaian case, it is not yet clear whether or not the officer who was stabbed will live. Religion Afro-Asian Islamic or ConferenceSAAIC . Politics? Islamic delegates from 32 countries, but not including Malaysia, assembled in Bandung (6-14 March), condemned "ag- gressive actions" by Britain against Indonesia but rejected Chieom/Indo- nesian/Pakistani proposals urging strong condemnations of other issues specifically involving Western pow- ers or the U.N. The Conference did, as expected, "condemn imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism in all its forms and manifestations." Failure fully to achieve the spon- sors' main objectives was due to India's determined opposition and the lack of support from or disin- terest on the part of certain Mid- dle East, African (Sudan, Senegal, Nigeria) and the Soviet delegations. Indeed, Indonesia's steamroller tac- tics tended particularly to alienate conservative members of Middle East- ern delegations who objected to cer- tain anti-West resolutions and fo- cussed on those directly concerned with Islam. The Soviets, admitted as full members over the objection of the Chicoms, avoided playing an active role rendering token support to Indonesia only. The Chicoms' rel- ative restraint was probably due to an early assessment that the Confer- ence would not be susceptible to all- out political manipulation. However, the Indonesians suc- ceeded in forming an "Afro-Asian Is- lamic Organization" with the seat of the organization in Indonesia, chaired by an Indonesian (Idham Chalid) -- vice presidents are from the UAR, Pakistan and Nigeria -- and an Indo- nesian as secretary-general, at least Approved For Release 1999/08/24: 'n P78-03061 A000300020009-9 (Briefly Noted) Approved For Release 1999/08 P78-03061 A000300020009-9 until the organization's congress will ieet in three years. We comment on the Chicom/Indo- nesian.//Bakistani political setback and laud all efforts, especially those of Arab delegations under the leadership of the UAR, in resisting a political perversion of a religious conclave; and on the geographic and religious oddity of Indonesia as the center of Islam, a fact highlighted by the absence of Saudi Arabia at the Conference, We caution that Islam can be exploited for political ends: there was a resolution to establish Islamic Afro-Asian economic links with friendly "progressive nations"; and the permanent organization with its vaguely defined sub-divisions (for workers, peasants, women, for Leaching and culture) parallel in- ternational organizations already in existence and may become supporting olements for Sukarno's CONEFO (Con- -erence of Emerging Forces) concept, Competing with efforts of the U.N., Orom which Indonesia recently has withdraiwn, and of other free world organizations o The Soviets' full participation in the AAIC should be interpreted as setting the precedent for their rightful presence at the important Second Afro-Asian Confer- ence in Algiers in June. Moscow-style African ReZional Consistency Gr~ aTa Moscow's displeasure over regional groups which do not play the Communist game .- either wittingly or unwittingly Tras clearly demonstrated by Soviet reaction to the February summit meeting of Afro-Malagasy states in Nouakchott. The Afro-Malagasy Common Organization, formed there, followed OAU charter pro- visions in urging African leaders to end "interference in internal affairs of other states" and condemned Afri- can subversion, "especially Ghana." Moscow, whose stock in trade is subversion and interference in others' affairs, immediately declared that the OCAM runs counter to OAU princi- ples, Moscow, whose arms shipments to UAR and Algeria feed the Congo rebellion, becomes almost laughable when claiming that the 0AU Congo so- lution calls for an end to "foreign interference" implicitly of the OCAM variety' "Assistance to be given to Tshombe in his struggle against the insurgents is totally opposite to the OAU's stand," said Moscow in a broadcast to Africa, ignoring the OCAM's forthright statement of ad- herence to OAU. There may be some good regional groups in the Soviet view. it will be interesting to see what Moscow has to say of the l4+ March Bamako meeting of the radical states lead- ers' ('Q umah of Ghana, Keita of Mali, Toure of Guinea and Ben Bella of Algeria) after the OAU Nairobi meeting had failed to recommend rebel support in Congo. There was a gen- eral air of clandestinity about the Bamako meeting, They issued no for- mal communique on the "anti-imperial- ist" subjects they admittedly dis- cussed but spoke of "greater support" for the OAU. Moscow will undoubtedly see this group -- which includes two ardent supporters of the Congolese rebel cause -- as a correct grouping which upholds OAU principles, Approved For Release 1999/08/$4: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 (Briefly Noted ) 5X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approvegforl~eIease 1999/08/24: 'rt 18-03061 A000300020009-9 Significant Dates APR 17 Nikita Khrushchev born, 18911. 18 Easter, traditional Peace marches, e.g., Aldermaston (UK) and Western European countries. 18 Bandung Conf. (29 Afro-Asian countries call for elimination of colonialism, for self-determination and independence, for UN membership all peoples) 18-27 April 1955. Tenth anniversary. [Note: Chou En-lai and Marshal Chen I reportedly accepted invitations to celebrations in Indonesia.] 22 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin born. 1870: 95th anniversary. (Died 21 January 19211) 211 World Fed, of Democratic Youth (WFDY) Exec. Committee meeting and seminar, Accra, Ghana (in conjunction with Ghana Young Pioneers Seminar 20??23 Apra) - to prepare for 9th World Youth Festival now scheduled midsummer, Algiers. 29-30 Hitler commits suicide. Berlin. World War 11. 191+5a Twentieth annia VerSarya MAY Month-long refugee exodus from Communist China to Hong Kong; estimated 70,000 cross border. 1962 1 May Day: International Workers' Day. Designated by Second International (Socialist Congress) 1889; first celebrated Western Europe 1890; heavily exploited since close of WW II in Communist countries. 1 Castro proclaims Cuba a socialist nation; no more elections. 1961 2 Berlin falls to Red Army. 1945 (20th anniversary WW II events.) 5 USSR Press Day. Commemorating first publication in 1912 of Party con- trolled paper. 5 Karl Marx 1818. (Died 111 March 1883.) 5 Federal Republic of Germany achieves full independence as Western Powers lift remaining controls. Tenth annivers armor, 1955 6 Interal Union of Socialist Youth meeting, 6-9 May, Colombo, Ceylon. 6 French defeated by North Vietnam Communists, Dien Bien Phu, 1951+. 8 VE-Day. Armistice ends World War II in Europe - 1915. (20th anniversax; a) 9 IV Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) Conference, Accra, Ghana. (Tentative date.) 11 (Soviet Bloc) Warsaw Pact for military cooperation and mutual aid con- eluded.(1i l4 May). Tenth annivers a 1955 15 COMINTERN (third, international) dissolved, declaring autonomy of Communist Parties outside USSR. 19113 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061 A000300020009-9 ,25X1C10b GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #49 Commentary 3-16 March 1965 Principal Developments: 1. The 19-party "consultative meeting" in Moscow stretched on from 1 to 5 March, producing an ambi ous inconclusive communique devoted mostly to pontification on the theme: what unites us is~tstronger than what divides." Although approving a new "international meeting at a suitable date," it sets up preparatory steps so unlikely to be carried through that it in effect de- fers any such meeting indefinitely: e.g., a "preliminary consultative con- ference" of all 81 parties which participated in the 1960 Moscow conference, just to discuss the question of a new world meeting; and "it is necessary to hold consultations with all these parties" just to decide the question of con- vening the preliminary conference'. It expresses itself as "favoring" the dis- continuance of open polemics while endorsing comradely exchange of opinion. 2, A Pravda article three times as long as the communique stretches it to cover the pre-meeting CPSU line, -- considerably increasing the ambiguity of the situation. CPSU-aligned parties publish more or less enthusiastic endorsements, emphasizing the aspects nearest to their own views. In an un- precedented move, the Italian CP publishes the text of its presentation to the Moscow meeting, which strongly objects to considering that meeting as "preparatory" in any sense- As of our closing date, only the Rumanians among the prominent European parties had failed to mention the meeting: -- among the Asian parties we have seen only a Mongolian affirmation of "com- plete solidarity" and a rather tentative Indonesian comment along the line that TIt'ssright as far as it goes, but 3. During the Moscow meeting, the Chinese continue their attacks on "Khrushchevian revisionism" On the 4th, People's Daily devotes a full page to excerpts from 12 recent Soviet articles preaching Kp revisionism"; the editor's note introduces a new slogan characterizing "the main content" of Soviet polemics as "the line of 'the three peacefuls and the two wholes,"' (See Chrono for discussions Next day, Peking announces publication of a. new book, with 11 "vital" Chinese articles: the 14 June 1963 CCP letter is the CPSU, the series of 9 Comments on the CPSU open letter"(end the text of that CPSU letter), and the November 1964 "Why Khrushchev Fell." On the 5th they begin a new anti-Soviet propaganda campaign using the forceful Soviet suppression of the March violent, Chinese-led student attack on the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The theme is Sov brtat?t etcd.., in defense of the U.S. imperi ists and in suppression of Asian (sometimes African and o o the a essiOl. ousl sing Latin American are mentioned.) students righte ~__ _----- of UoS0 imperialism in Asia. It is expanded to include-T'-premeditated po- litical persecution of the seriously wounded students in hospitals" (the Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 (Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Chinese apparently deliberately enlarged on the original incident by organ- izing provocations in Soviet hospitals, according to Soviet charges). Soviet media ignore the affair until the 12th, when they publicize the Soviet Government note rejecting the Chinese official protest: it says that the loud Chinese propaganda campaign consists of distortions of fact and a "maze of concoctions," brands the affair a planned provocation, organ- ized and directed by the Chinese Embassy in Moscow, which it accuses of mak- ing "intolerable attacks" against the Soviet Government, categorically re- jects the protest, demands Embassy measures to "rule out completely" any new actions, and warns of full punishment for violations of Soviet law, "no matter which foreign citizens commit them." The Chinese campaign picks up intensity and scope after this. People's Daily of the 15th harshly denounces the Soviet Government's preverted action of fawning on U.S. imperialism," and ends with a ringing call for the peoples of China and the Soviet Union (and the "revolutiona es of the world") to unite in struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys (clearly including the Soviet Government). A new Chinese Govt. note on the 16th rejects the Soviet note (which "distorted facts and reversed right and wrong") and re- peats the derisive Chinese taunts. (As the period closes, observers note that there has been no issue of the fortnightly Chinese theoretical journal Red Flag since No. 1 of 19651 6 January: this unprecedented delay implies that one or more combined issues will be used to publish major polemical tract.) #. An Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial (3 March), going beyond Chicom statements, implies that the American air raids in North Vietnam are not only "closely linked with the encouragement given by Kosygin" but also were planned with the knowledge of the USSR. 5. A major Castro speech is interpreted by Havana correspondents as ac- knowledging that the Moscow meeting has widened rather than narrowed the Sino- Soviet conflict and that Cuban participation had been reluctant. He emphasizes Cuba's independence and "was understood to be "warning both the Soviet and Chinese Embassies .against carrying on propaganda warfare in Cuba." Significance: The CPSU and USSR have apparently suffered further serious set-backs. In the Moscow "consultative meeting", the new Kremlin leaders have retreated again, succumbing to pressures from many sides, including the strong "no pre- parations now" bloc led by the Italians. The session stipulated such elabo- rate preparatory steps for an "international meeting" at "a suitable date.," that is most likely can not be held in the foreseeable future, -- and would not serve Soviet purposes if it were held! Even the one "positive 'plarm in the communique -- "favoring" a truce in polemics -- was immediately cancelled by the savage Chinese propaganda campaign built on Soviet "brutal repression" against anti-imperialist students righteously demonstrating against U.S. ag- gression in Asia. This Chinese action seems to have achieved real success in Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Si r 1 COtCrtY,-n+Sartr rn. a N Approved For Release 1999/08/ ? IA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 spoiling any improvement in Soviet Vietnamese relations which may have been achieved by Kosygin's demonstrative trip, as Yugoslav Radio's Moscow cor- respondent comments on the 15th, adding that, "whether on its own initia- tive or under Chinese pressure, the DRV has also contributed to a great extent to the deception of theAsion public. Considerable space in the Chronology is devoted to a detailed account of this Chinese campaign. it escalates the Sino-Soviet conflict; it is also a first-rate case study of skillfully conceived and executed political/propa- ganda action which a totalitarian Communist state can do so well - and this time directed against the pioneer Communist state. Note the follow-uo- vocations in the hospitals, the heroes' welcome, and the ostentatious hospi- talization with "consultation of specialists in Peking to enlarge on the original violent melee; the use of ove.rnment notes and youth front notes, counter-demonstrations, selective quotes from "Western observers," etc.; and on the Soviet side, the use of letters from fie-witnesses who, long after the fact, "can no longer keep silent` , supplementing the official note. There: will undoubtedly be more to come on both sides. Before the end of the Moscow meeting, it appeared that the Chinese were preparing to resume their theme of "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" on a massive scales Their serial publication of Soviet material seemed to be in preparation for a major new polemical tract (as had been the pattern last year) -- and the failure of Red Flag to appear added to this impression. In view. of their threat last summer -- the day the "preparatory commission" meets in Moscow will bQ:: the day of the great split in the movement -- we might not have been too surprised if the Chinese had gone very far in their reaction to the 1 March meeting, -- and they may still. However it now seems likely that they may have decided that the extremely "conciliatory" and "rea-, sonable" line taken by the "consultative meeting" and its total surrender on preparations for a world conference have made it an unprofitable target for attack at this moment. Hence, the shift to the new campaign, which they seem to be exploiting so profitably. Regarding the future, we can only be sure that Sino-Soviet relations have never been so bitter and that the con- flict will-go on with increasing enmity, on whatever grounds and levels the 2 j)4C40,gonists find suitable. 2cv4 C4 nb 999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 T (Commentary Cant,) 5X1C1Oc Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #+9 3-16 March 1965 February 20 (delayed): SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL Information, London, publishes English translation of a "Reply to Pravda by Austrian Social- ist Friedrich Scheu which appeared in the Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitun February 6. (This was the 4 Feb. Pravda article, "The Communists and the Social Democrats," described in Chi rono #+7.) Scheu's views are summarized as follows: "That the Socialists are on the advance in many countries is correct. But to infer from this that they should carry out unity of action with the Communists is false. On the contrary, Socialists know from the experiicuce of half a century that coaxone Communist par- ties is "Lenin's dictum that 'Commuists must support Social Democrats as the rope suUorts the hanged man' is well known.... "As far as 'similarity of outlook' between Communists and Socialists in concerned, it is the differences which are more strj.kin . Social Democratic parties are still forbidden in Connn:uiist countries...." March c h 1 (delayed): Rote Fahne, monthly organ of the pro-Chinese faction of Austrian Communists, carries article accusing the Austrian CP of being a mere appendage of the Austrian Socialists: it also includes a special supplement containing a 3200-word excerpt from the Albanian Zeri I PopuLt:it editorial of 16 February 1963, "What Behind the Divisive 1 March Meeting Being Prepared by the Khrushchevite Revisionists?" (Chrono #+7) and a 1000-word excerpt from the ZIP editorial of 13 November 1961+ on Togliatti's Testament (Chrono #11.2. March 1-5 and continuing: The 19-party "consultative meetjn3," which be- gan in Moscow on the 1st, and which issued a joint statement on U.S. aggression against Vietnam on the 3rd (see Chrono #18), ends on the 5th with an announcement that the communique would be made public on the loth. On the 8th, Tirana announces that the Albanian Party CC "refused to re- ceive and without reading it, returned the communique of the divisive and fa ctionalist meeting held by the revisionists in Moscow on 1 March." The 1500-word communique is publicized by Soviet and Soviet-aligned media on 10th and following days. The first two-thirds emphasizes agree- ment on the need for unity, cohesion, solidarity: "What unites the Com- munist parties greatly outweighs that which at present divides them. Although it approves of "a new international meeting, to be held a a suitable date and of "ate ctive and all-sided preparations" for same, it outlines preparatory steps so difficult to carry out that it defers an international meeting indefinitely; e.g.: Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A0003000200019-11 ``Chronology Con .- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 "The participants believe it is desirable to hold a Mimi consultative conference of the 81 Parties that gathered at the 1 0 meeting to discuss the question of a new international meeting. it is necessary to hold consultations with all these parties to decide the question of convening this pre3 minarr~ conference. It adds that the participants "favor discontinuin open lemics," "which are in character unfriendly and egcading, but consider it useful to continue, in comradely form and without attacks, an exchange of opin- ion...." It concludes: "The representatives of the parties trust that all fraternal ,parties will respond favorably to this consultative meeting. Soviet and Soviet-aligned commentary on the communique in next few days emphasizes the "what unites us is stronger than what divides" line, but Yugoslav Radio Moscow correspondent Sundic says on the 10th that "this is a rather bold assertion, particularly in view of the policy and tactics of the CCP. He adds that "at present hardly anyone believes in the possibility of holding new consultations." A 5:000-word Pravda torial on the 12th tries to stretch the communique as fax as possible toward covering the pre-meeting CPSU line and demonstrates the ambiguity of the present Soviet position. It stresses the necessity for a new world conference, expected to redefine the "general 1:ne"' in accordance with modern Soviet ("Khrushchevian,the Chinese would say) views; viz. "Many events have taken place since the preceding international Communist conference in 1960; new tendencies have developed in the international situation; new rich experience has been accumulated in the workers and liberation movements. It is now necessary to make a creative assessment of this experience." At the same time, it acknowledges the necessity for all parties to participate and agrees that "the democratic principles of independence and a uali " of all fraternal parties must be adhered to." Each "can only take ecisions which place obligations on it by its own free will. On the other hand, however, "it was pointed out in the 1960 statement that the interests of the Communist movement demand the loyal adherence of every CP to the assessments' and conclusions worked out joint by the fraternal parties at their conferences. In an unprecendented step, the Italian Party publishes in their weekly theoretical journal Rinascita for 1k March the abridged text of the speech in which their d elegation chief Berlinguer presented their position to the Moscow meeting. It, and the PCI post-meeting statement, strongly stress their opposition to letting the March meeting be "pre- paratory" in any sense : "We disagree with references made by some comrades about the possibility that consideration now be given to dates and deadlines for forthcoming conferences. We add in a completely explicit manner that we are completely ainst possible proposals that tend to give an organizational continuity in any form to this assembly. We cannot in anyway give the impression of setting ourselves up as an organ- izing committee of the (world) conference, -- or even of a possible preparatory meeting of the 81 parties...." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIS RDP78-03061AWW6~ OC~'gtS) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Only the Rumanians among the prominent European parties failed to comment or repo onrt the Moscow meeting. Among the Asian parties, we have seen only a M ar 21 an affirmation of "co ple- to solid by Montsame on the 11th and a rather tentative, skeptical Indoneaian comment in Harian Rakjat on the 13th, along the line that "it's all right as far as it goes, but --." The participants agreed "to stop the unfriendly polemics which humiliate fraternal parties," HR says: "Does this mean that the meeting approved an open polemic as long as it is friendly and not humiliating?" If the latter is so, the PKI approves, because as lon as opportunism exists in the workers movement in any country in any Part of the world, will always be a polemic...." March 5 & 4: Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit features on 3rd a 5,000 word accusation of the Soviet lease sr hipfor collaborating with the U.S. against Vietnam, under the title: Khrushchevite Brezhnev-Mikoyan- Kosygin Troika on the Way to Negating and. Sabotaging the Peoples' Freedom Struggles." It includes the bald charge: "It is our opinion that the U.S. imperialists' further base provocations against the DRV are close Y linked with and come as a result of the encouragement given them by Kos in in his general and purely formal speech. But was the Soviet Government knowledgeable from the start regarding the new bombs raids which the U.S. Air Force was going to make against DR'owns? If so, and we have every right to think that they were knowled eg able, as time will show, we accuse the Soviet revisionists of committi a downri ht crime against the DRV and the South Vietnamese people by failing to denounce in time the U.S. imperialists' barbaric and bandit-like plan." This is followed on the 4th with "The USSR Must Take an Active Role in the Vietnam Issue," which concludes: "The Soviet Government must not be content simply to utter words.... It must throw into the balance the whole weight of its mi t and its international authority as a great and powerful social- ist state. But in the current situation is the Soviet Union able to act in such a way? Unfortunately,... it is no longer in a position to act as becomes a great socialist state, to defend the vital inter- ests of the people and socialism, because the Khrushchevite revision- ists and agents of imperialist bourgeois ideology have it by the throat ." It adds that "the events we are witnessing... could not have occurred in Stalin's time" and "it is precisely for this reason that the imperialist bourgeoisie and its allies, the modern revisionists, so much detested J. V. Stalin and rejoiced at his death." March 4 & 5: Under the headline "Look What Sort of Propaganda Is in the Soviet Press These Days," Peking People's Dail on 4th devotes a full page to extracts from 12 recent Soviet press articles,, "all devoted to the preach ng of Khrus c ev revisionism. A brief editor's note introduces 3 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 a new phrase to the lpo emics, characterizing the "main content of K. revisionism" as "the line of 'the three -acefuls and the two wholes: "'Peaceful coexistence,' 'x~eac?"- ef3 co eon,' and ' ep acefvl transition' constitute the eapitulationist line of refusing to make a revolution oneself and not permitting others to make a revolution, refusing to oppose imperialism oneself and not permitting others to oppose imperialism, and ganging up with imperialism to put down the revolutionary movements. 'Theme state o f the whole eo le and 'the ar?y of the whole people mean liquidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, bringing about a capitalist restoration, and changing the nature of the party of the proletariat so that the revolutionary party becomes totally degenerate." Among the 12 excerpted is the 4 February Pr, avda article mentioned in the first entry in this Chronology. On the 5th, all Peking papers prominently announce the People's Publishing House iiew-'book of great political and theoretical significance Polemics on the Gee neral Line of the SCM." It is a collection of 1.1 vital articles' which have been published as separate pampehl is by the CCP -- the i7-June 1963 CCP letter to the CPSU, the 9 in the series of "Comments on the Open Letter of the CPSU," and the November 1964 "Why Khrushchev Fell" -- plus the CPSU letter to the CCP of 30 March 1963 and the CPSU open letter of 14 July 1963. Bel rade Radio comments that "the Chinese vress has recently devoted more space to relations with the fPSU leadership than to American op licy in SX.Asia." March 4 and continuin%: A demonstration by several thousand students at theme U.S. Embassy Moscow in protest against "the latest bonf'aing raid on the MV by U.S. imperialism and its extension of the war in Vietnam erupts into a violent melee when a hard core (apparently largely Chinese) attempts to storm through resisting police lines. The Chinese build it into a major propaganda campaign on the theme of Soviet defense of the U.S. erial ists to the extent of brutal persecution of the Asian African and Latin American students righteously protesting U.S. aggression in Vietnam. A March NCNA Moscow dispatchdescribes the melee in colorful detail, beginning: "More than 2,000 angry Asian, African, and Latin American students held an impressive demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow this afternoon to protest against the latest bombing raid.... The Soviet authorities moved in more than 700 troops and police... Many students were injured., quite a few of them seriously.... A Soviet officer wearing the isignia of major general was in command...." NCNA admits that the violence began when students broke their way through the triple-row barriers set up by the police and attacked the build:i ig. 4 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 "More than 200 Soviet troops joined the police.... They soon began kicking and hitting the youths with their fists and truncheons, and lifted some of them up bodily and slammed them on the ground.... Indignation and anger seized the students.... The demonstrators marched to the MV Embassy... and held a rally of solidarity with the Vietnamese people...." It concludes by noting that TASS reported only the rally at the DRV Embassy and avoided any mention of the demonstration and violence at the American. On the 5th, NCNA reports that the Chinese Ambassador visited the injured anct names nine, with a gory inyentorY of their injuries. It adds that 6 of the wounded wereustifiabl ey__x1~ed-led on the grounds that they didn't recjuire hospitalization. NCNA also reports visits to the wounded Chinese by Vietnamese diplomats and students. News coverage in all Peking papers includes photos. On the 6th, the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow delivers a CPR note to Gromylo protesting Soviet violence against Chinese students, polem- ically charging Soviet fear of offending the U.S. and demander that the Sov. Govt "acknowledge its error and apologize to the st" tudents... and severely lash those who committed the violence." Also on the 6th, NCNA Pekinz reports that "students from Vietnam, foreign friends in Peking, And. and Chinese students" demonstrated against the USSR Embassy there. NONA Moscow says that African and Latin P erican as well as Asian students have called to sympathize with the wounded students and adds that 7 of the 9 have now been expelled from the hospital, "obvious?-Y for rolitical reasons." The All-China Students Federation sends 3 messages: (1) on the 7th to the Soviet Govt, slightly longer and harsher than the CPR Government note; (2) on the 8th to the Union of Chinese Students in the Soviet Union; and (3), also on the 8th, a message of sympathy with the students of Vietnam and other countries injured or arrested by Soviet troops and police. Soviet media, which had maintained a pained silence about the affair, f strike back on the 12th, publicizix a USSR Fore Ministry note to the Chinese Embassy: In the past several days a loud propaganda campaign has been growing in China, in the course of which facts related to the dem- onstration... on 4 March... are being distorted. Matters went so far that on 6 March a 'demonstration' was organized in front of dented the building of the USSR, bassy in Peking: this is unprecedented in relations between socialist countries. The CPR Embassy presented .,, a note consisting of a maze of concoctions." It affirms Soviet support of Vietnam and condemnation of U.S. aggres- Sion, but emphasizes the distinction between "Aractical steps to curb aggression on one hand and 'provocations against a foreign embassy and Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-74DP78-03061A 5' fi0W?~9F) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Soviet officials entrusted with the maintenance of public order" on the other, and adds that the Chinese have never permitted any such damaging demonstrations in Peking. The Soviet note then brands the 4 March affair as "nothing less than a re-planned attempt to provoke violent 'actions," aimed at the Soviet organs as well as at a foreign embassy, claims that the militiamen were unarmed, and that more than 30 Soviet personnel were badly injured. Re- garding the accusation that wounded Chinese had been expelled from the hospital, the note charges that this was'another provocation organized by the Chinese Embassy, which sent the students there to demand "to be hos- pitalized or given certificates that they had allegedly received serious injuries," although Soviet medical examination showed the groundlessness of such action. The note concludes by categorically rejecting the Chinese protest, accusing the Embassy of "intolerable attacks against the Soviet Union, demanding measures to rule out any new actions,wning that violation of law will be cut short and punished, "no matter which foreign citizens com- mit them." Pravda supplements the note with letters from (1) employees of two institutions ns across from the AmEmbassy who "witnessed the outrageous actions committed by hooligans," and (2) the hospital staff, telling how this group of Chinese actually came to the hospital late that nightlong after the fracas, to demand hospitalization and refused to leave "without orders from their Embassy," etc. The Chinese continue their campaign with new vigor. On the 12th, NCNA Moscow reports that one of the two students who had not been earlier evicted was "brutally beaten" (to convulsions) in the hospital on the 10th, and "then taken to the mental ward with his hands and feet bound," etc. NCNA Peking on the 12th summarizes Western press reportage of the 4 March affair, highlighting comments such as French L'Aurore's: "Never be- fore were the Russian police so brutal and never before was Gromyko so quick to apologize.... The respect shown toward the Americans and the brutal suppression of the Asians showed that they -- the Russians -- pre- fer peaceful coexistence to unity of the Communist world. Their choice has been made." On the 14th, Peking reports a heroes' welcome at Peking airport for the, 1+ most seriously wormed students brought home for medical treatment -- and driven in ambulances "straight to the famous Hsieh Hospi- tal." "More than 260" students from 12 named Afro-Asian countries joined more than 2,000 Chinese students and officials in this thunderous welcome. People's Daily looses a blast on the 15th, following the same line as the Foreign Ministry note but going further. It uses language such as "the Soviet Government's reverted action of fawning on U.S. imperialism," and concludes with a ringing cal o revolution (against the SovGovt. by impli- cation): 6 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 "Unite, peoples of the socialist camp, peoples of China and the Soviet Union, and the revolutionaries of the world, in the struggle a ainst U.S. imperialism and its lackeys:" The 16th brings a second Chinese Foreign Ministry note "categorically rejecting" the 12 March Soviet note and again Soviet admission of error and apology. Branding the Soviet version "an utter distortion of the facts, a reversal of right and wrong," it rebuts the various points of the Soviet note. The Peking press on 16th and 17th continues to feature the story, pub- lishing lengthy "medical histories" for each of the 4 victims, signed by top Chinese medical specialists who consulted in the "diagnosis," reports of visits by prominent Chinese and foreign figures in China, messages from foreign Communist groups, more photographs -- and X-rays showing bone fractures, etc. March 6-13: The Afro-Asian Islamic Conference in Bandung brought an un- successful Chinese attempt to prevent admission of Soviet delegates. March 6 and continuing: on 6th, NCNA announces that Chairman Williams of the C of New Zealand and Chairman Hill of the pro-Chinese dissident CP of Austre- lia M-L have arrived in Peking for "friendly visits," the former Frith wife and the latter with two CP comrades. CPNZ SecyGen Wilcox arrives in Peking on 13th, and on the 14th Mao has a "cordial talk" with all of them and entertains for lunch. March 10,11,&12: People's Daily devotes 4 of its 6 pages on the 10th to the text of a 26 February 6-part article from the Japanese CP daily Ake, which, says NCNA, "made a penetrating analysis of and repudiated the modern revisionist's capitua.ationist line." Under the title "T. T'imofeyev and U.S. Imperialism," the Akahata article "answer: the abusive attack leveled by the Soviet journal Kommunist on a previous Akahata arti- cle. " On the 11th, PD features an article "On the Struggle for a Principled Marxist Stand," from the December 1964 issue of the Australian Communist, organ of the CPA (M-L). On the 12, PD features an article, "U.S. Imperialist Aggression Against Vietnam and the Disillusionment of Modern Revisionists," from 25 February Akahata, an article from the 10 March issue of Vanguard, paper of the CPA (MM-Land an article from the CP of New Zealand organ People's Voice of 7 March, under the self-descriptive title: "Kerala Election Re- sults in India are Powerful Blow to Revisionism, Says SecyGen of CPNZ V. G. Wilcox." March 14: NYTimes reports from Havana on a broadcast speech by Castro at Havana University previous evening in which he "made no bones about his irritation with the Soviet Union," declaimed that "we are not and will not be satellites of anybody," and announced that he would "proscribe any ideological controversy among Cuban Communists. "The address was taken 7 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 here as an aclmowledgement that the recent conference of CPs in Moscow had widened rather than narrowed the rift between Soviet and Chinese Com- munists and that Cuban nax?ticipation had been reluctant. Castro "was understood to be warning; the Soviet and Chinese Embassies against carry- ing the propaganda war into Cuba when he said: "It is useful to know that propaganda here is made by our party." Khrushchev appears in Moscow to vote at his old polling place, spur- ring speculation but no agreement regarding possible significance. (His appearance was not reported in Soviet media.) March 15: Yugoslav Radio Moscow correspondent Sundic says that with its play on the 4 March demonstration, "Peking has engaged in spoiling rela- tions between the Soviet Union and N. Vietnam. Whether on its on initia- tive or under Chinese pressure, the DRV has also contributed to a great extent to the deception of the Asian public and creation of a false picture of the incidents..,. According to foreign observers, whose opinions are to a great extent identical with Soviet views, the Chinese Govt really wants to force open Soviet involvement in S.E. Asia." March 16: Observers have noted that no issue of the Chinese fortnightly theoretical journal Red Flag has appeared since No.1 of 1965, on January 6. In the past, they have published two issues in one to accomodate a parti- cularly long'article under one cover, but this seems to be an unprecedented hold-up. 8 (Chronology) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA- -03061A00030002a$1('?I9h 1965 886. EROSION OF PARTY CONTROL IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 25X1C10b SITUATION: In half a century of trial under all kinds of conditions in the USSR, and for a shorter time in East Europe, the methods used by Communist regimes have failed to establish healthy economies or to satisfy basic human needs of the populace. The governed have been led or driven on by a steady diet of alibis, promises and ideological jargon, while the regimes exhausted inherited reserves of labor, productive capacity, and morale. Excuses, subterfuges, and slogans can no longer be used by the Communist regimes as a substitute for a measure of enlightened government. Eastern European and Soviet economists are now pouring out a flood of tortured ideological rationalizations as to y their regimes have bungled economically; there is no attempt to explain away the universal fact that after nearly 50 years of opportunity, communist measures have not produced a healthy national economy anywhere. Nor is there any men- tion of how the Communists are ruining the economies of countries they have taken over, e.g., Cuba, Czechoslovakia. Having come up against a dead end, the Communist regimes are now obliged to cast about for remedies for the undesirable aspects of their system: retention of high-cost, unprofitable industries; long delays in the completion of investment projects; sluggishness in the introduction of new techniques; the absence of any producer response to consumer de- mand -- all compounded and perpetuated by excessive party control of planning and day-to-day management. Typically, most of the regimes are not seeking primarily to abandon their "command economy" approach, but are looking for quick expedients which would entail no irretrievable loss of control, as wide decentralization might do. The obvious eco- nomic weU-being of developed countries in the Free World is hauntingly before them, and they are looking for trays to emulate these material successes within a Communist political framework. In the process, they are more and more impelled, willingly or not, to orient their economies Westward and to bring in Free World economic practices, e.g., market competition and self-regulation, material incentives, and corporate man- agement techniques. They arc also attracted to the trade and foreign exchange of the West. What Communist rulers understand before (and at times to the exclu- sion of) all else is the nature of dictatorial power. They have good reason to fear that any loosening of the levers of poiA--r would set in motion popular forces which they could not control and which would sweep Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 (886 Cont.) Approved For Release . CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 them out of power. What Communist regimes do not necessarily comprehend is that Western (self-regulating) economic processes function because they are not sacrificed to political power -- that totalitarian dictator- ships cannot successfully import Western economic methods without some political changes. Whether the European Communist regimes grasp the full implications of what they are doing or whether they see no other choice, their common reaction to their common economic impasse is some form of relaxation and partial decentralization of economic administration along Western lines. From nearly every European Communist country (including the USSR) voices are being heard calling for elimination of bureaucratic interference with governmental and economic processes, for delegation of authority, for decentralization of power and planning, etc. ' And political initiatives tend to ensue. See unclassified attachment for a roundup on the influence which economic imperatives are having on Communist political institutions in Europe especially in Yugoslavia. It outlines how economic initiatives have been the opening wedge for desirable political evolutions or reforms that would have been unattainable otherwise. 25X1 C10b 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 MMWA trt' O (886 cont.) 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/2 78-03061A0003000nMg# 1965 887. THE INHUMANITY OF COMMUNISM 25X1C10b SITUATION: Inhumanity flows inevitably from the principles of Communism: its cause and power take 1?rimacy over and deny all individ- ual rights. Historian-philosopher Arnold Toynbee pointed out that this political philosophy, which places society before man in pursuit of the welfare of all, turns Western values upside down. Communist leaders learn by harsh experience that the denial of human rights which they advocate, ap- plies equally to themselves. Fanatic idealists -- and Marx is joined by many besides Lenin among the Communist leaders who qualified for this description -- might have learned from history that their very idealism would drive them to increasingly cruel practices as they endeavored to consolidate their power over an uncharted society. As contrasted with amoral tyrants in search of power for its own sake, Robespierre is the epitome of the idealist in a totalitarian move- ment who is driven by adversity and resistance to save his cause. Noted for his horror of bloodshed and his incorruptibility as well as for his fanatical determination to carry out Rousseau's philosophy in regenerat- ing France and mankind, Robespierre heightened the Reign of Terror in 1793 in a last desperate effort to achieve his idealistic ends -- to extremes where his colleagues finally found it necessary to guillotine him to save themselves. Marx was concerned with humanistic values and was determined to end the alienation of man. Lenin, intent on forming a hard revolutionary core to end tyranny in Russia and to establish Communism, demanded the use of any means to accomplish Communist ends and provided sanctions for this policy by redefining morality as a Communist concept. Over a century earlier, Robespierre had resorted to sophistry in defining the philosophy of his Committee of Public Safety thusly: "The mainspring of popular government in a revolution is at once virtue and terror; virtue without which terror is baleful, terror without which virtue is powerless." Virtue, in Robespierre's eyes, was the absorption of the individual into the "general will" in accordance with Rousseau's theory (in its suppression of personality and human rights scarcely different from the Marxist-Leninist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat). A more pragmatic member of Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 -- (887 Cont.) Approved For Release I 9 ff2i CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 the Jacobins, Saint-Just, put it bluntly: "What constitutes the Republic is the complete destruction of everything that is opposed to it." Recognition of cruelty. The brutality of a Communist revolution (e.g., Russia and China) is self evident; and the destruction of political collaborators in a popular front takeover (e.g., Jan Masaryk's "suicide" in Czechoslovakia) is frequent. Nevertheless, the inhumanity inherent in Communism (as reflected in the concept of Soviet Man) and further extended in practice, is not as readily perceived. Callousness is present in every stage of Communism -- whether seeking or maintaining power -- as seen, for example, in practice against: the people of Kerala, when the short-lived Communist Government of 1957 abro- gated laws and tyrannized the population in an unrestrained use of police power; the German people, fenced in by Ulbricht's Wall and Soviet occupa- tion troops; the peoples of Venezuela and other Latin American republics, terrorized by Communist insurgents, saboteurs and kidnappers; the hapless peoples of Southeast Asia, brutalized by Communist infiltrators and guer- rillas from the North; high Communist officials, convicted of treason or merely disgraced in secret meetings such as that which stripped Khrushchev of his power; and, not least, against the peoples of Communist countries, subjected to dehumanizing practices from the total invasion of their lives by the Party to arbitrary commitment in insane asylums for political rea- sons. The failure to recognize that cruelty is inherent in Communism (and that the system will not work without threat or use of force) is not due to ignorance alone. The ideology, for example, appeals to some as pro- mising the good life in an ethical society; malcontents are attracted to anti-status quo movements, including Communism, on a, theoretical level; opportunists in high and low places think they can use Communism as they would any other vehicle; and still. others believe that Communism is just one more "normal" party or movement, not understanding the concept of the Soviet Man, or failing that, not recognizing Communist techniques used to force adherence to such a concept. Doctrine of dehumanization. The omnipotence claimed for materialism as the basis of society and the theory that Communism is the ultimate (structural-functional) form of society contain the seeds for dehuman- izing civilization. Preaching complete secularization of life, Communism denies all religious-spiritual values; proclaiming the scientific evolu- tion of society into a single ultimate form, it demands that consideration of other forms be abandoned and then attempts to stamp out the curiosity which drives man to ask the question "why," -- which is perhaps the major difference between man and the lower animals; and, defending the morality of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the use of any means to its ends, it places society before man and demands a forfeiting of personal initiative in almost every facet of life. 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 W&&"*qWO" (887 C ont . ) Approved For Release 1 999/0 -RDP78-03061 A000300020009-9 Men resist these restrictions in one way or another; and leaders determined on maintaining such controls must resort to force. When eco- nomic theories -- from the nature of motivation to the cause of exploita- tion, and environmental theories -- from the roots of crime to the in- evitability of socialist realism as the only form of expression in the arts, prove faulty in practice, scapegoats must be found; men must be driven to more strenuous efforts; and new controls must be devised to insure subservience to the "scientific" doctrine. An entrenched bureau- cracy, basing its raison d'etre on erroneous theories, must seek any means to indoctrinate, persuade or force the governed to believe its myths and shibboleths - thus adding a further dimension, belief, to the controls to be exerted over human behavior. Historical record. For those who find theoretical analysis unconvinc- ing or unimpressive, the history of Communism exposes varying but continu- ous currents of inhumane practice. Cruelty within a Communist society becomes less brutal in physical terms after a Party comes into power and consolidates its control. But the domination of men by the Party elite -- i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat -- merely takes new forms, which are probably more devastating to civilized man in their mental, spiritual and psychological impact. Particular types of cruelty are predominant at, but not necessarily restricted to, different stages of Communist develop- ment, for example as follows: weakening the status quo -- techniques to destroy confidence in the existing government and wreck its ability to function, by harassment, sabotage and civil disobedience; mounting a revolution -- classic examples are the Russian and Chinese revolutions, in which terror, massacres and destruction are rampant; .consolidating power -- classic examples are again the Soviet Union and Communist China, but Eastern European countries repeated most of their practices and Cuba is following much of the same pattern, such as purges and mass slaughter; maintaining over -- in which animal brutality gives way to "civilized" inhumanity in developed Communist countries as the Party elite seeks to put its mechanized theory of human behavior into effect, resorting to forceful control over the lives and careers of all, and a new kind of purging in all groups from political to intellectual. 25X1 C10b 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 ~wrir~ (887 C ont . ) 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release I 999/06TP** K'i !?P78-03061A0003GrO0 0-91965 888 AF,FE,NE,WH. Militarism: Basic Chinese Communist Outlook 25X1C10b SITUATION: The daily life of all people in Communist China has been increasingly regimented and militarized since the Communist Party came to power in 1949, The People's Army is the model for all industrial and agricultural organization. Schools, trade unions, government departments, artists and scientific organizations, all are part of a vast, rigidly struc- tured apparatus whose purpose is to achieve objectives set down by a small clique of top Party leaders. Each day a far-reaching propaganda apparatus tells the Chinese people that all the ills of their lives, as those of their forbears, are inflicted by foreign imperialists and their lackeys. There- fore, only by war and revolution can imperialist influence be eliminated. It is frequently implied that the Chinese have been cast by destiny to eliminate imperialist influence, primarily in developing areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The ambitions of Mao and his comrades to dominate the world are clearly spelled out in their speeches and in their basic doctrine. That they mean what they say is clearly shown by their arrogant defiance of international law and custom as well as in their blatant aggression against their neighbors and their subversion in distant lands. To refuse to re- cognize this basic and fundamental aspect of Chicom militarism or to try to appease it is to court certain disaster. Their aggression and hostility can be rendered harmless only by firmly and resolutely facing them,isolat- ing the Chicom leaders, and uniting -- with the great majority of the 25X1C10 b Chinese people -- in defending mankind's peace in freedom. 888 Cont. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24:S 78-03061AO0030002606V-9h 1965 889 AF,FE,NE,WE. TRENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD. 25X1C10b SITUATION: The limited unity with which the Arab world has arrayed itself against what it sees as an Israeli threat has provided fertile ground for the seeds of communist influence. The Soviet Union skillfully presents itself as sympathetic to nearly all the Arab aspirations and prejudices formulated by President Nasir of UAR. It clearly suits Soviet plans for Nasir to rid the area of Western influence (without losing the large financial assistance of the US, the UK and France) and of Western bases along the Mediterranean where the Soviets have never successfully established themselves. They have, without compunction, strongly implied a commitment to the Arab stand against Israel but would not cut their official ties with Israel (thus abandoning the ICP) despite their anti- semitic behaviour in USSR. It is probably no accident that Nasir's in- difference toward the Soviet puppet, Ulbricht, changed quickly after the Cairo visit of USSR's Shelepin to assure Nasir that the new Soviet regime would carry out Khrushchev's aid offer. Ulbricht's state visit was a direct slap at a major Soviet target -- Bonn -- and it triggered the pre- sent Arab crisis over Germany and Israel. The Communist world recognizes Nasir as the key leader in the Arab world and probably sees Ben Bella as potentially able to play Castro's Latin American role in Africa. So the Soviet Union has pulled all stops in a campaign which depends heavily on wooing these two leaders and their countries. In an effort to influence Arab development of an economic structure patterned after its own (and if possible to pre-empt Chinese influence) the USSR made Nasir's LIAR the largest single recipient of Com- munist foreign aid funds during 1964. The Soviets also increased mili- tary aid to many countries in the area and promised an impressive amount of weapons for dispatch to the Congo rebels. (For facts on aid to Arabs, see unelassif3,ed attachment). They may believe that after they have secured central Africa thru these means they can then exploit the Egyp- tian's traditional yearning to control the head waters of the Nile. Algerian and Egyptian adventures, including arms and troops to the Congo, may be a foretaste of interference elsewhere in Africa. The UAR, with the only battle-trained troops in Africa, and Algeria, with seasoned liberation fighters, could be a formidable threat in support of opposition forces against weaker countries -- doubly so if armed and backed by the Communist countries. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 (889 Cont.) Approved For Release I 9 .CIA-RDP78-03061 A000300020009-9 Nasir undoubtedly believes he can safely exploit comr;iunist interest in the Arab world, despite the recognized risk. Ben Bella's relations with the Communist world may be tinged with some naivete because of his emotional commitment to revolution. For these and other reasons, Com- munist influence in the Arab world is growing as is the probability of Arab expansion under ambitious Arab leaders backed by Communist guidance 25X1C10c 25Mt IMport . 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 (889 Cont.) 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-030& (QQflJ 0020009-9 March 1965 Economic Imperatives Force Communist Political Reform RUMANIA. As a member of CEMA, Rumania became an important target in the Soviet design to consolidate Moscow's political power in the bloc through economic integration. Rumania balked and got away with it. This defiance in the economic sector established a precedent which immediately encouraged Bucharest to take other initiatives, leading directly to her present stature as the most politically independent of the Soviet satel- lites. For example, Rumania has -- for its own purposes -- steadfastly op- posed Moscow's call for a world CP congress which could lead to expelling the Chicoms. The same effort to reject Soviet domination and exploit Moscow's difficulties with Peking was apparent in Bucharest's suppression of the journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, (which supplanted the Cominform as Moscow's means of coordinating international communist doc- trine and activities) and its open challenge to Soviet authority at con- ferences of international front organizations. There are even recent signs that Bucharest's attitude is touching on the sensitive matter of its commitment to the Warsaw Pact. Perhaps most significant of all has been the gradual disinterment of territorial controversy with Moscow con- cerning Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. All of these Rumanian examples give encouragement to centrifugal forces in Eastern Europe and diminish Moscow's power position. While the foregoing events have not changed the basic fact of Com- munist dictatorship in Rumania, they have nevertheless had direct influ- ence on internal conditions. The amnesty of virtually all political prisoners was announced last June. The regime has taken significant steps to permit greater freedom of thought: jamming of Western radio broadcasts has been stopped; access to Western news sources was otherwise broadened; "socialist realism" was all but abandoned, in practice if not by decree, as the guiding principle for art and literature; Rumanian intel- lectuals of the past were rehabilitated politically, and Rumanian life and education were conspicuously de-Russified. By "standing up to the Russians" the Rumanian leaders have won a measure of respect and support from the masses and intellectuals alike. Having cast off the protection of the USSR, which was formerly the real substance of the regime's power, the Rumanian leaders are now increasingly dependent upon the popular support they won by their acts. With such support they appear to feel that they can permit more internal reforms and still maintain control. But reforms will further increase popular aspirations for a freer and more affluent life. And the price the regime will have to pay to keep popular support will be the satisfaction of popular aspirations. An economic wedge is now becoming available to the Rumanian people to resist the regime's political domination of them. (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Czechoslovakia is, of course, the classic example of Communist economic mis-management in East Europe. In their public soul-searching some Czechoslovak Communists have admitted that in "the most highly industrializi nation in Eastern Europe," the command economy and directed management have "caused more damage than anywhere else in the Soviet Bloc" -- that the politico-economic concepts of Marxism- Leninism are least workable and most destructive in the most advanced societies -- that these concepts have been to blame for the wreckage of the Czechoslovak economy. President Novotny, the chief Stalinist holdover, is steeped in the tradition that rigid, monolithic politico-economic management is the sine qua non of Marxism-Leninism. Applying the impersonal words of Prof. Ota Sik, one of the more enlightened Czech economists, Novotny is one of the "many comrades who look with distrust at all unusual non-Stalinist theories" and are "accustomed to a single, absolute form of Stalinist society, in- cluding its economy and management." (Kulturni Tvorba, 19 Nov 64). Other Czechoslovak economists such as Radoslav Selucky, Eugen Loebl, Benedict Korda, and Josef Goldmann have rationalized ad nauseam on the causes or blame for the economic bungling. In two fundamentally revisionist articles in the Czechoslovak economic journal, Planovane Hospodarstvi, Goldmann challenged the cardinal Marxian notion that economic cycles and long-term economic stagnation are not possible in socialist economies. This thesis, which represented a fundamental departure from the Stalinist economic model, evoked a polemical response from some Czech colleagues, but found a more sympathetic response in Poland, where his two articles were pub- lished in leading economic and political journals. Loebl asked in Kulturni Zivot, "Do we realize that mental work is an economic category of the first order? Do we believe in the force of the human intellect? Do we value the individual as a person or merely as a carrier-out of indicators and directives?" BY 1963 the disastrous economic situation brought a storm of demands for reform from more liberal elements both outside and within the party. Most regime economists were at last persuaded that the only possible solu- tion was to scrap ideological doctrine in favor of economic common sense. Novotny resisted but finally had to give way. What emerged in late 1961+ was a plan for the most dramatic and radical economic reform yet suggested in the Communist bloc. The presidium approved the plan in September 1961+ and the central committee in January 1965. The essence of the new system is in the abandonment of strictly centralized planning at all levels of industry. Gross production levels are to be scrapped as economic indica- tors. Revenue and profits will take their place. Sweeping changes are foreseen in all areas of planning, financing and pricing. A central plan- ning body is to set only long-term aims on a national scale. Even here, economics, not dogma, will determine decisions. The planning center is to have but little to say in short-term goals, production targets, and de- tailed development. Directors and technicians are to decide individual factory production programs. According to the new plan, they will say 2 (Cant.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 what and how much they will produce, and the director will fix wages, which will rise in accordance with the growth of national income created by the enterprise. Each factory is to compete with others in the same branch. And the director will be expected to show a profit - or (as in the case of Yugoslavia) he and his factory will go to the wall. Non-Communist economists believe that the new system - if forcefully implemented from above, could make the country the soundest economic unit in the Soviet bloc. The key words, "if forcefully implemented from above," also imply profound improvements in other than the economic sphere. If there is to be opposition it will probably come from the Central Committee itself, where a large number of members and candidate members are also economic functionaries notorious both for their incompetence and for their close identification with middle level cadres of Stalinist leanings. Cer- tainly there is recognition by all involved that full implementation of the proposed economic changes would strongly curtail the o~ litical power of the party bureaucracy and greatly enhance the pol4tical influence of the ablest managers of industry, many of whom are not CP members. The power to determine the actual operations of the nation's economy on both a daily and long-range basis would pass out of the hands of party bureau- crats, at least in part. The Czechoslovak reformist trend, rising from economic roots, has carried over into its foreign relations and brought a limited measure of Czech self-assertion vis-a-vis Moscow. During the 19th CEMA Council Meeting in Prague (28 Jan 65 to 2 Feb 65),wthe Czechoslovak Vital Inter- est," another term for the new economic reform program. If bona-fide economic self-interest does gain at least an equal footing with doctri- naire politics, it will be interesting to observe whether and how this affects the longstanding role of Czechoslovakia as the main satellite carrier of Soviet bloc "aid-trade" penetration of the developing and un- aligned areas of the world. YUGOSLAVIA. Stalin's excommunication of Yugoslavia in 1948 set off a form of de-Stalinization in that country and gave early impetus to an elimination of some holdovers from the Stalin era. However, under Presi- dent Josip Broz-Tito and Vice President Rankovic, the Federal Executive Council (FEC) served for the next 15 years as the undisputed voice of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in rule of the country. The Federal Assembly (parliament) was little more than a propaganda sounding board for decisions of the FEC. With the governed having no real repre- sentation or initiative in the affairs of government, internal conditions went from bad to worse. Only when the country had been brought to the verge of economic collapse was the LCY leadership forced to admit that rigid politico-economic management could not be made to work, not even when (as in the case of Yugoslavia) supported artificially by infusions of foreign aid from the capitalist West. *(insert:) the Czechs clearly took heart from the Rumanian example. A Rude Pravo ar i clc of 5 Feb 65, reporting on the Council Meeting made clear that no C1MA schemes for division of socialist labor would be allowed to interfere with Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 As later in Czechoslovakia, it finally occurred to the regime that a certain amount of economic common sense had to be substituted for ideo- logical doctrine. Economic decentralization measures were undertaken with considerable domestic and foreign fanfare. The regime gave evi- dence of an apparently genuine intent to make the economy more self- regulating and freer of state and party intervention. Finally in 1963, an entirely new Yugoslav constitution was adopted, which designated the Parliament as the ultimate repository of power in the government. After initial hesitancy among the parliamentary deputies as to how real their new powers were, and despite attempts by entrenched party bureaucrats to preserve the old order in effect, the parliament has begun in a small measure to assert itself as a bona fide legislative body should. For ex- ample, the FEC put to the parliament a proposed 1965 economic plan that would clearly have retarded, rather than advanced, the Yugoslavs' much- heralded trend toward a self-managed and consumer-oriented economy. Par- liament twice rejected this plan out of hand, and put it through 11 re- visions before they accepted it. Similarly, the parliament has referred back to the FEC several tax bills which were deemed "contrary" to the new economic policies. In short, the parliament has begun in fact to exercise its constitutional authority over the FEC, and is moving more into the management of day-to-day affairs that formerly were run by the party. Having begun to assert its supervisory role in domestic affairs, the Yugoslav parliament may even be preparing to assume its proper au- thority over foreign affairs. The changes have not, of course, altered the fact of the Yugoslav one-party system nor have they seriously affected party control within the country. Candidates for public office must still be approved by the party. But the economic relaxations and the voters' new options to choose from more than one candidate for public offices seem certain to give rise to a degree of political give and take. The fact that the party has had to loosen its control is in itself a tacit admission that the old system had proved definitely unworkable, thus opening the door for further ex- perimentation with democratic alternatives. A group of leading Slovene communist intellectuals attempted some daring social criticism in their review Perspektive, which was suppressed in May of 1964. Now a group of Croatian philosophers has voiced new heresies in the March-April 1965 issue of Praxis, which may run afoul of the right of the hierarchy to de- cide what is constructive criticism and what is not. Among Praxis' here- sies is the contention that by making a fetish of materialism, Yugoslav communism has resurrected many of the evils of capitalism - that since socialism has not been successful in the economic field it should shift its emphasis from production to human relations and the development of the individual personality. Stalin's break with Tito removed Moscow abruptly as Belgrade's source of guidance and doctrine, and Marxist theory provided no help at all. Not until their methods brought them inescapably face to face with economic ruin, nearly 15 years later, did the Yugoslav leaders begin in part to comprehend that totalitarianism was a bankrupt system, whether or not a Stalin was at the head of it. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A00030 009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Some European Communists have made much of the Yugoslav example as a model of "independence" - a pioneer in "socialist innovation." Yet Yugoslavia's only "independence" was the castoff status imposed on her by Stalin, and her only "innovations" consisted of copying certain Free World economic techniques after Communist techniques had brought her to the brink of economic disaster. Economic and political reforms are un- questionably emerging in the country, but only because the communist leaders can no longer stifle reform. HUNGARY. Compared to Rumania and Czechoslovakia, Hungary is taking a careful and pragmatic approach to economic reforms. In the reorganiza- tion of industrial administration, increasing stress is being placed on the importance of competence as a basis for filling and holding responsi- ble positions. There also appears to be some recognition that industrial managers must be provided with sufficient executive power and prerogatives to break through the bureaucratic bottlenecks that reforms are sure to encounter. However, there is no evidence of an immediate intention to depart basically from a bureaucratic, command economy. In 1961+, Hungary became the first Communist country to charge interest on the use of fixed and working capital. And different incentives, such as a form of share- cropping, have been introduced into collective farm administration. Some of the loudest ideological criticism in the Communist bloc has been heard from Hungarian Gyorgy Lukacs, who stands as an authoritative Marxist theoretician in the eyes of Communist elites. Prague's Josef Goldmann only went so far as to question certain Marxian economic maxims. But in an interview with the Italian CP organ, Rinascita, Lukacs derided not only the "Marxist theory" not being used to justify the administra- tive structures and practices in communist states, but asserted that "a well-founded theoretical definition of the socialist economy does not even exist." In the course of his lengthy interview with Rinascita, Lukacs explained: "The evil comes when there is. an attempt to pass off certain means of political acceleration -- which may be temporarily nec- essary -- as a sort of theoretical law. This leads to theoretical cor- ruption under which an entire generation has matured. The intellectual corruption of Stalinism has produced a generation tempted by empiricism, and thus made complete self-criticism difficult. There are only a very few theorists among present leaders of the workers' movement. We are at the outset of a long period of transition." Lukacs also assumed a re- visionist posture on a number of other controversial issues under debate in the Marxist world. He categorically rejected the role of Communist parties as critics of works of art. He stated that the party should not have "aesthetic positions." He thought that Central Committees which have expressed themselves regarding music or films have merely succeeded in making themselves look ridiculous. He strongly advocated cultural lib- eralism in the Marxist world and suggested that a familiarity with Western culture will "obviate the artificial distinction between Western culture and Eastern culture." All of which is to say that in the cultural sphere as well as the economic one, the people of Eastern Europe are turning to- ward the Free World - not because it is culturally superior - but simply to escape the sterile slogans of Marxism-Leninism. Approved For Release 1999/08/24 5CIA-RDP78-03061A0003000gAQ. 9P Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 SOVIET OCCUPIED ZONE OF GERMANY (SOZG). In 1961 the Ulbricht regime was forced to abandon the unrealistic Seven-Year Plan (1959-65)- On 16 Jan 63, Nikita Khrushchev advised Ulbricht and his followers in a speech at the East Berlin congress to forget about West Berlin and get on with development of the SOZG. In July 1963 the Council of Ministers adopted the new economic system of planning and management" which was to bring "scientific" (that is, rational) planning to the economy of the SOZG. The line of command for the economy was clarified. Theretofore, effective control was shared by the Economic Council and the district Party directorates, and confusion was the result. Under the new system, the central economic agencies and the individual enterprises relinquished authority to about 80 economic monopolies (VVB's). The Party, relieved of day-to-day management problems, is free to direct policy which it still firmly controls. The new system, using market research and eco- nomic incentives, has yet to prove its effectiveness. The practical ap- proach to problems, however, has resulted in a more equitable distribu- tion of consumer goods and has thus improved the lot of most of the 17 million inhabitants. As long as Ulbricht remains in power and the apparatus of control remains intact, as it still is, the effectiveness of the program will depend entirely on the continued support and self-restraint of the leadership. Judging by past performance, the leadership is likely to resort to too-difficult production goals, even though the principal objective of improving product quality is still far from being achieved. The following things have stood in the way of quality. First, the re- gime thus far has not provided for a market situation or a substitute therefore. Thus the "new system" has lacked the essential economic discipline of effective consumer demand. The designer is so isolated from the consumer that he lacks a sense of responsibility to the cus- tomer. He has no counter-part of the flow of criticisms and ideas for new and improved products, such as the "capitalist" designer gets from his customers and salesmen. A second crippling defect has been the cumbersome bureaucracy of the economic system, making it enormously dif- ficult to change anything. For any change to reach the manufacturing plant at the bottom of a vast administrative pyramid can, and frequently does, take years. Even a modification takes time. The latest model of the Wartburg auto involved no radical changes -- it has the same old three-cylinder, two-cycle engine and the body is a hybrid copy of the front of the Italian Fiat 1500 and the middle section and back of a West German DKW F102. The original design was submitted in 1960 and approved finally in 1963. In 1962+, five prototypes were built, and the first models are scheduled to appear on the market in the spring of 1966, but production will not be in full swing (180 cars a day) until 1968. De- sign in the SOZG is design that is stagnant, sterile and dying on its feet. Just as in other bloc countries, Communist economic practices have vitiated the SOZG and forced its regime to eye non-Communist examples in search of remedies. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: C6lA-RDP78-03061A000300Q39nq -9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 POLAND. When popular demonstrations, coupled with internal party strife, impelled the Polish Communist leaders to set Poland on its "own road" toward "building socialism" in October of 1956, the Poles became overnight the least constrained people in the Soviet Bloc. However, the bright prospects of the "Polish October" have faded steadily, as the Gomulka regime has increasingly reverted to harsh measures. The regime has continued to rely on the state bureaucracy to make all im- portant economic decisions. Once the most economically unorthodox coun- try in the bloc and still the only Communist country where agriculture is still mainly in private hands, Poland has played only a small part in the recent rash of economic readjustments. Immediately following the October 1956 uprising, state management of the economy was eased, and popular pressures developed for a change toward market socialism. As Gomulka consolidated his political position, however, he repressed the liberals, halted the economic reforms, and went so far as to reverse some of them. Even the increasing economic difficulties of the past two years seem only to make the regime deter- mined to patch up the existing command economic system. As one of the more "independent" countries of the bloc, Poland, like Yugoslavia, has received substantial aid from the U.S., and Polish trade with the non-Communist world has risen to approximately 66 per cent of the country's total commerce. Tentative negotiations have been under way between the Polish Government and West Germany's Krupp executives to undertake a radically different joint production venture, which would operate within Poland, combining communist and Western capital and management. However, most of the current economic reforms in Poland are weak counterparts of those in the SOZG. The chances are that the Polish ?. economy can get by for several more years without drastic reforms, and the present leadership seems unlikely to give up any more controls than it considers absolutely necessary. The USSR. Wolfgang Leonhard, well-known journalist, Sovietologist, a graduate of the COMINTERN school in Moscow and a one-time instructor at the East German party university, has published (on 22 Jan 65, in Die Zeit, Hamburg) an article entitled "Who Rules the Red Empire?" Leonhard's thesis is that there is a longstanding controversy between the CPSU and the State apparatus in the Soviet Union, and that since Khrushchev was sacked, the State has regained some of the authority it lost to the Party during the post-Malenkov period. Rightly or wrongly he surmises that the power shift may represent a trend towards a loss of party control, due to the increasing complexity of the Soviet societ and economy, too complicated to be effectively controlled through ideologically-oriented Party officials who lack 4echnical knowledge. (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 While Leonhard's article falls short of proving that serious Party- State rivalry does exist in the USSR, there are admissions from Moscow itself that the CPSU, along with other bloc parties, cannot handle economic planning or management. In March 1965, the Moscow foreign affairs monthly, International Affairs, announced in an article by two Soviet economists that the Communist camp has had to put off its plans to overtake capitalism because of a slowdown in bloc economic growth and difficulties and contradictions in CEMA's integration plans. The article frankly admitted that while the growth rates of the capitalist world had accelerated in recent years, the general growth rate throughout the countries of CEMA (East Europe's "mutual assistance" pact - otherwise known as COMECON) had slowed down to an alleged annual figure of 8.6 per cent for 1961-1963. Because of the fall-off, CEMA planners were said to have been forced to postpone targets for their program of "peaceful eco- nomic competition" with capitalism. Offering excuses for the USSR and bloc regimes separately and collectively, the setbacks were blamed on everything from planning errors to raw material shortages and poor co- operation between the pact's eight active members. "Life, as the experience of the past years shows us, has proved more complex than doctrinaire constructions and dogmatic illusions," the --article declared. "The course of the development of the world social- ist community is not a path strewn with roses. It is a complicated and contradictory process involving different tendencies, complex problems, and often sharp contradictions." In the USSR, as elsewhere in the bloc, there are signs that total- itarian party rule is being breached by economic imperatives. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0306 act Sheet 29 March 1965 Inhumanity of Communism Inhumanity has emerged as a constant attribute of the Communist system. The historical record covers sufficiently varied circumstances and a long enough period of time to document the nature of Communist prac- tice, both as regards its impact on rulers and ruled and in the many stages of its development. That record, inter alia, covers close to half a century in the USSR, from 15 to 20 years in Eastern European countries, 16 years in the People's Republic of China and 6 years in Cuba. While the methods used by Communists to take over governments by force may not seem dissimilar from other revolutions, and the vicious purges in estab- lishing control over a people not unique to Communism (e.g., resembling in part the course of the French Revolution), these phases take on a different aspect when brought into perspective by subsequent Communist rule. Inhumane treatment shifts from physical brutality in the earlier stages to mental-psychological-spiritual abuse in restra3ting and regi- menting individual behavior in later stages; this shift, while preserving life and limb, is all the more destructive in damaging the very nature of civilized man, if not successfully resisted in time. A brief outline of techniques used by Communists in establishing power and ruling a society is presented below. Weakening the status quo -- techniques to destroy confidence in the existing government and wreck its ability to function. While European CP's engage in efforts to damage and discredit a government, the Parties in Latin America and other developing areas resort to cruder, more violent action, such as sabotage, destroying plants, supplies, means of transportation; civil strife, political demonstrations, wanton destruction of private and public property, street fighting, tribal skirmishing; terror, threats to life and limb, kidnapping, and intimidation of officials, class enemies, innocent civilians and peers alike. Mountin& a revolution -- classic examples are the Russian and Chinese revolutions. However, whether or not Communist forces have a reasonable chance to succeed, they may shift from attempting to weaken the existing regime, through sporadic insurgency for example, to all-out attack -- as they have done in abortive efforts in Indonesia, as the Huks were on the verge of doing in the Philippines, as they may do in Venezuela and other L.A. countries, and as they are trying in Vietnam and Laos as well as in African countries like the Congo. The savage brutality of this stage is carried out through full-fledged war; massive sabotage, insurgency and guerrilla warfare; massacre, fire, looting and rape. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A00030e09-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Consolidating power -- although the Eastern European countries re- peated the practices of this stage, the classic examples are the Soviet Union and China, with Cuba resorting to similar brutal practices, namely, summary execution, for those engaging in or suspected of counter revolution, as Khrushchev reported in his secret speech at the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956, "but of a total of 139 full and alternate Central Committee members elected at the 17th Party Congress, 98, or 70% were arrested and shot.... Out of 1,956 delegates to the [17th] Congress with deciding or advisory votes, 1,108 were arrested and accused of counter-revolutionary crimes." or, as Khrushchev sanctioned on 30 January 1937, "CQmrade workers, men and women, engineers, employees, men of science and art, and all working people of our country! We are gathered here, on Red Square, to raise our proletarian voice.... against the enemies of the people, the traitors of the Mother- land, the betrayers of the workers' cause, the spies, the di- versionists, agents of fascism, the vile, despicable Trotskyites.... and as Khrushchev urged on 5 June 1937, "... no matter how deep they sit in their burrows, we will unmask and annihilate them, and reduce to dust every last one of them, and disperse them to the wind so that not even a trace will remain of these damned betrayers of and traitors to the socialist Motherland." Z~Mes., for those contending for power among the leaders, the tone of which is caught in Khrushchev's speech to the Ukrainian Central Committee on 26 May 1938 (during the Stalin era) as follows, "The peoples of the Soviet Union rejoice that they have uprooted this foul, abominable, treacherous gang, the loathsome Trotskyite- Bukharinite bandits, that they have eradicated and exterminated them under the leadership of our great Stalin, under the leader- ship of our Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov [NKVD chief]." Defeated contenders for power are also relentlessly pursued in exile, for example: Trotsky, assassinated in Mexico in 19+0 (with one son murdered in Paris in 1938 and 3 other children in Russia); Ukrainian nationalists Bandera and Petlura (who was tracked down in Paris in 1925 after having led his government to its brief 1918-1919 inde- pendence); and two more Ukrainians in exile, murdered for the Soviet government under Khrushchev by Stashinskiy in West Germany. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: c1A-RDP78-03061A000300d2Wb4-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 death, starvation., and group destruction for those considered re- actionary or unable to withstand the rigors of exposure and over- work in drastic economic upheavals (e.g., USSR collectives, CPR Communes, colonization). For example, over 5 million peasants died of famine, artificially induced to break their resistance, in the compulsory collectivization in the Ukraine in the early 1930's (and hundreds of thousands of educated Ukrainians were deported or li.quicl ated at the same time). Genocide overtook many of the minor- ity pooples of the USSR, either by death or forced migration; and the Tibetans at the hands of the Chieoms. Families and communities were broken up to destroy old institutions (private property and personal loyalties) as well as to provide manpower for crash eco- nomic programs or population for new communities. The "revolution devours its children," as conspiratorial leaders, engulfed in an atmosphere of suspicion and fear, find their way to power (and hopeful survival) by purging those in power; and as the revolution destroys the society in an attempt to build a new one from the embers. Maintaining power -- animal brutality gives way to "civilized" inhumanity in developed Communist countries. Although affecting phys- ical aspects of life in countless ways, it takes its toll on the mind and the spirit of man. The Party pursues a mechanistic theory of human thought and behavior in an effort to create a Soviet Man subjugated to Party doctrine and devoting his time to regimented activities in the service of the Party State. Perhaps more than the major crimes against the individual, the piling up of little irritations does more to deaden or break the spirit -- e.g., the lack of living space (so many square feet per person, forcing unrelated persons into common quarters), queuing up for supplies, constant haranguing and regimentation. One exile said that the Soviet Union was not so much a prison as a kindergarten. The "new man" is not a man at all but only a child; the regime attempts to keep the nation in "petty tutelage." However, there are severe penalties unposed to keep the populace and leadership alike in hand, as follows: banishment (officials), through summary and often secret proceed- ings, political leaders charged with inadequate if not treasonous performance are dismissed and disappear from sight. Such a fate befalls farm managers and agricultural commissars, industrial direc- tors and others who are scapegoats for failures in a system which cannot admit fallacy. In the Stalin era, high political figures were purged physically; in subsequent periods, they were more often dismissed and made "unpersons." For example, when Khrushchev won the struggle for power (after Beria had been executed by the "col- lective" leadership) against Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and . Bulganin, he charged them only with having deserted the cause of the Party. Refusing the demand of delegates to the 22nd CPSU Con- gress to "expel these dissenters and factionalists from the Party's ranks," he left them in that limbo reserved for his enemies, where J Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A0003016O9-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 they neither died nor received an opportunity to defend themselves. After Khrushchev, in turn, was suddenly shorn of his position in secret session, his purging was described in the following terms: "The Commmunist system requires a personal sacrifice... The system is regarded as infallible. Therefore, if it does not achieve all its objects at home and abroad, the fault must lie with the leader personally and with his 'harebrained' schemes." "Khrushchev was dismissed -- not in the old brutal wa , but humiliated nonetheless.... (He) merely made it safe for the people to be indifferent to his dismissal..." destruction of careers for objectivity (scientists), for those who, following the dictates of their discipline, come to conclusions or advocate policies threatening to Party ideology. The most cele- brated cases are connected with Iysenkoism, after the man who in- sisted that acquired characteristics could be inherited genetically -- and was believed by Stalin and Khrushchev. Vavlian, who headed a school of Mendelian genetics in the 1920s and 1930s, (and those who followed similar courses) was exiled and imprisoned. Editors who published works on genetic research were fired. Farmers who refused to toe the line on Lysenkoism, were berated, demoted, fired and held responsible for farm failures. sanctions against intellectuals (writers, artists), those whose writing does not support socialist realism or who criticize any significant aspect of the Communist system, or whose art may be interpreted as decadent or immoral. They may have their reputations destroyed, be expelled from professional societies, lose their jobs, have their manuscripts turned down, be jailed or placed in mental institutions. The intelligentsia of the Soviet Union have waged a running battle in an effort to escape the tyranny of the CPSU, in contrast to Chinese Communist writers who were largely defeated in Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign. The frustration of the CPSU leader- ship, in failing to persuade the literati to devote their energies to indoctrinating the public, and the tactics turned against them is illustrated by Khrushchev's statement before a writers' group on 8 March 1963, as follows: "... One cannot suppose that psychological disorder will be eliminated and that the rules of communism will be safe from being violated by mentally deranged people. I can't say for certain but there will obviously be some means to curb the out- bursts of lunatics. Today, too, there is the strait jacket which is put on lunatics to deprive them of the possibility of raving and doing harm to themselves and others." Approved For Release 1999/08/24 :'CIA-RDP78-03061A00030d Od9-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Mikhail Naritsa, Valeriy Tarsis, Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin and Valentin Ovechkin were committed to asylums. Josef Brodsky was com- mitted in 1964, but released after world opinion had been brought to bear by writers' organizations. Other forms of repression have been rampant -- e0g., loss of freedom to travel, public self-criticism, threatened exile. Selected Books Koestler, Arthur Darkness at Noon Solzhenitsyn, Alexsandr One Day in tho Life of Ivan Denisovich Power and Pur es Leonard, Wolfgang Child of the Revolution Daniels, Robert The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia Conquest, Robert Power and Policy in the USSR: The Study of Soviet Dynamics Pistrak, Lazar The Grand Tactician: Khrushchev's Rise to Power Gibney, Frank The Khrushchev Pattern Nations and Minorities Kostiuk, Hryhory Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: Study of the Decade of Mass Terror (1929-1939) Deker, Nifolai and Genocide in the USSR Lebed., Andrei, eds. Seton-Watson, Hugh East European Revolution Conquest, Robert The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities Dmytryshyn, Basil Moscow and the Ukraine 1918-1953: A study in Bolshevik National Policy 5 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Repression of Intellectuals Chow Ching-wen Ten Years of Storm: The True Story of the Communist Regime in China MacFarquhar, Roderick The 100 Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectual Lifton, Robert Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China Aczel, Tamas and Revolt of the Mind: Case History of Meray, Tibor Intellectual Resistance Behind the Iron Curtain Encounter pamphlet #9 Khrushchev on Culture: A Full Text with Notes on Ehrenburg, Evtushenko, Sholokhov, ... etc. Labin, Suzanne The Anthill: The Human Condition in Communist China Tongas, Gerard I Lived in the Communist Hell of North Viet-Nam and I Chose Freedom Approved For Release 1999/08/24: gIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 25X1C10b March 1965 Trends in the Arab World Arab Unity The Arab summit conference of January 1964 turned a trick which had eluded UAR's President Nasir for several years: thirteen Arab governments all subscribed to common -- albeit limited efforts. The key to this tenuous unity was the problem of Israel. The intensity of feeling to- ward Israel varies from Syria, most militant of the eastern Arabs, to the Maghreb Arabs who found the matter somewhat lacking in immediacy. The Israeli plan to start pumping the Jordan river waters in 1964-65 brought Arab agreement under Nasir's urging, to two long range plans: to divert Jordan River headwaters in Arab territory and to form an United Arab Command (UAC) to protect the diversion effort. Nasir's military chiefs soon dominated the UAC which they patterned after Egypt's own military command. In the UAC Nasir has a ready military instrument, and in Arab unity against Israel he has a psychological weapon for influencing other aspects of Arab foreign and domestic policies. He has pressed for removal of foreign bases in the Arab world -- in Libya, for instance;, and Aden. He has pressured UAC members to procure identi- cal military equipment by purchasing all armament from the Soviet Union. Arab League Relationships Among the thirteen members of the Arab league are four monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya and Morocco); four "liberated" countries (Nasir's definition of UAR, Iraq, Yemen and Algeria); three republics (Lebanon, Tunisia, Sudan); one Sheikhdom (Kuwait); and a Ba'athist mili- tary dictatorship (Syria). Traditional animosities or suspicions between them have usually outweighed their mutual concern and could flare up again at any time. The United Arab Republic which Egypt formed with Syria was Nasir's first and most disastrous effort at Arab unity. Established in February 1958, it collapsed in September of 1961 when the Syrians rebelled against Egyptian domination. A second UAR, this time including Iraq as well, was agreed upon in April 1963, but abandoned when the Ba'athi (resurgence) governments of Syria and Iraq insisted on collective leadership rather than control by Nasir. Pro-Nasir elements now form the chief opposition to Ba'athi rule in Syria and share up the unpopular Iraqi regime which succeeded the Ba'athists there in November 1963. Nasir's army has been fighting for two years against forces of the deposed but unyielding Islamic monarch (Iman Badr) in Yemen. The UAR is believed currently to have 40 to 50 thousand troops in Yemen. Saudi (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Arabia, fearful of a radical Egyptian toohold on the Arabian peninsula, has consistantly and actively supported the royalist government. A new UAR offensive is momentarily expected with rumored attacks on supply bases inside Saudi Arabia. These military moves against other Arab countries are concurrent with Nasir's call for Arab unity. Lebanon and Jordan, of the eastern Arab countries, have found little in cormnon with the revolutionary expansionism of the African Arabs. Lebanon, a parliamentary democracy with a large Christian population (nearly 50%) is little attracted by a Nasir-dominated Islamic brotherhood. King Husayn's Jordan is a relatively stable state despite its position astride the Jordan River and the presence of thousands of Palestinian re- fugees. Tiny Kuwait holds a unique trump in the Arab world. With wealth earned as the world's second largest exporter of crude oil she has created a welfare state and a foreign aid program in less than four years of in- dependence. The four North African Arab states of the Maghreb contain great con- trasts and mutual animosities. Ben Bella's radical revolutionary Algeria shares a poorly defined border and considerable political hostility with the constitutional monarchy of King Hassan's Morocco. Their mutual anti- pathy is undisguised although there have been no military incidents since 1963. Algeria and the Republic of Tunisia have worked out a modus vivendi without open hostility. Neither has close contacts with the constitutional monarchy in neighboring Libya where: King Idris' rule over his oil-rich but backward country is challenged by a Nasir-supported opposition. The Republic of Sudan is now engrossed in a power struggle between nationalist parties and the Sudan Communist Party. Nasir has given some support to the Sudanese communists. Rude Pravo, of Prague, announced with obvious satisfaction on February 23rd that a history of the Sudan Communist party and the revolution, now circulating in Sudan, was printed in Cairo "with approval of Egyptian authorities concerned." Trends Toward Communism The new look of the Arab world's growing unity is accompanied by a rising Communist world influence and an increasingly Communist-type pat- torn of socialist development. Although Communist exploitation of the Arab's fear and hatred of Israel is probably the most potent factor for Communist influence, there are others, some based on illusion, such as-- 1 -- Once convinced by deep emotional reaction and by carefully nur- tured propaganda, that the Western powers (the USA in particular) are on the "side" of Israel against the Arabs, the latter have little difficulty seeing the USSR (and the European Communists) as their principal ally. 2 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 The Soviets use their support to Arabs to gain Arab assistance in the important struggle against Communist China and to further other in- terests in the Mediterranean such as a nuclear free zone, elimination of Western bases and agrecr:n~nts to provide ship "servicing" facilities -- not "bases" for ships of communist governments. Khrushchev's visit to Egypt in 1964 was a prestigious effort of the new Soviet offensive in the Arab world. The visit was preceded by Nasir's releasing many Egyptian Communist's from jail and followed by the Soviet Union's granting $280 million credit to the UAR. Political, diplomatic and economic ties between Moscow and the Arab capital were all strengthened by these quick interrelated moves. In April 1964, during an official visit to Moscow, Ben Bella of Algeria was feted in a style unprecedented for a. non-Communist leader. He was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize and made a Hero of the Soviet Union. Inthis heady atmosphere he supported Soviet foreign policy positions on Vietnam, Cuba, Korea, peaceful coexistence and disarmament. 2 -- As domestic Communists are elsewhere returning to respectability, trade-aid ties are tightened end top level diplomatic or cultural contacts are increased, subtler Soviet blandishments are also at work. The Communist countries have long recognized the importance of supporting key figures among developing countries, especially where CPs are not adequate instrurlents. The Communists exploit the ambitions of Nasir and Ben Bella, both dynamic figures anxious to enlarge their in- fluence beyond the borders of their own countries. In other Arab countries labor, youth, exile and opposition leaders typically receive funds for local subversion. 3 -- Afro-Asian front groups in many fields including youth, women and journalism are prominent in the African Arab states. The Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Committee, long a Communist front, has a permanent secretariat in Cairo. Algeria is playing host to six communist front groups conferences, including the World Federation of Democratic Youth, in 1965. Arab leadership and Arab prestige are enhanced as both the Chinese and Soviets seek to control these groups with Arab assistance. 4 -- Equally significant is the "non-capitalist path" of development a line which the 81 Communist parties promulgated at their 1960 Moscow conference. This euphemism describes how, by following certain prescribed politico-economic lines, the underdeveloped countries could evolve into "socialist" countries without passing through an intermediate capitalist stage. The Soviets now push this concept hard, relying on the Arabs to mistakenly equate capitalism with imperialism and therefore -- equally mistakenly -- to emulate "scientific" socialism as the correct model for Arab socialism. "In the two biggest Arab countries, the UAR and the Algerian Republic, the revolution has gone beyond the bounds of political emancipation from imperialism and entered a new stage of its develop- ment, that of attaining complete economic independence and of effecting Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 3 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 radical socialist changes which have put both t} e se Arab countr it s on the road of non-Capitalist development leading to social.ism." (In-- formation Bulletin),30 December 1964, World Marxist Review from Al Takkaddum of October 1964. Arab Foreign Relations in Africa the Arab countries of the Maghreb are among the most power- ful m;;mbors of the Organization of African Unity. With the exception of President Mtrumah of Ghana, no other African leaders have attempted the expansion of their own influence that both Nasir and Ben Bella practice. Using "liberation" as their battle cry, Arabs send arms (procured for the most part from the USSR), troops, transport and supplies in quantity to the rebels of eastern Congo. Under Arab influence, the Congo's East African neighbors have been persuaded that this is a genuine popular up- rising deserving the assistance of all independent African governments. The tragic result is that Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Sudan have variously provided safe havens, facilitated arms and troop movements and expressed official sympathy with what is essentia]-ly a tribal rebellion, lacking popular support outside the tribal areas and making its way in the Congo by terror. Radical Arab influence has helped to prevent an OAU investi- gation inside the Congo, which might have given the Africans a more real- istic picture of the entire struggle. Fear that African moderate members of the OAU may be acquiring decisive influence in the OAU (following the February Foreign Ministers Council in Nairobi) precipitated a meeting between Ben Bella and the extremist African leaders of Ghana, Mali and Guinea who are believed to have discussed means of stepping up support to the rebels. The Sudan CP, which Nasir is trying to use for his own purposes, recently abandoned its demand for either secession or federation of the large Negro minority areas of southern Sudan (bordering the Congo) pre- sumably because they fear that such a change would disrupt the line of Communist and radical support to the Congolese rebels. African exiles (and such widely divergent groups as the Viet Cong and the Quebec separatists) find housing and encouragement in Algiers. Some among the rival African groups which have Soviet support also re- ceive support from Ben Bella's government. In the non-Communist world some Arab ties with the West are strength- ened by the western oil-producing companies whose revenues provide a major portion of the national income of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya. Lack- ing these resources Algeria, UAR and Jordan receive budgetary and develop- mental assistance from the UK, US, France, West Germany and others. But, as 1965 developments with Bcnnhave shown, Western relations with Israel are easily interpreted as hostility to the Arab world -- the more positive factors of Arab-West relations then count for little. [For an insight into Arab and particularly Egyptian mentality on this subject, see Foreign Af- fairs January 1965 article by ex-Ambassador John Badeau "USA and UAR: A Crisis in Confidence."] Approved For Release 1999/08/24 It CIA-RDP78-03061 A000306069-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9 West Germany's decision to recognize Israel following Ulbricht's state visit to Cairo, set off a chain reaction which resulted., by mid- March, in thirteen Arab countries calling hone their representatives from Bonn. Their varying interests, including for instance North African links with the European Common Market, suggest that Nasir may be unable to achieve unanimous Arab break with West Germany or recognition of East Germany. President Bourguiba of Tunisia has openly criticized Nasir on his extreme position and general Arab emotionalism over Israel. The German issue is a major test of Arab unity, of Nasir's leadership and of the future course of relations with both the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020009-9