BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 7, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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7 June 1965
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Briefly Noted 000,
Truth Khrushchev's Role in the
About Battle of Stalo inZrad Now
WW II? Minimized.
In the official six-
volume history of World War II, pub-
lished under the then Premier Nikita
Khrushchev, he was credited with a
prominent role in the defense of Sta-
lingrad now Volgograd) and in plan-
ning the great counter-offensive that
caught the Germans there. This vol-
ume, "The Great Victory of the Volga"
was edited by Marhsal Konstantin
K. Rokossovsky, who should have
known the facts since he partici-
pated in the Stalingrad operation
as commander of the Don front,
The Soviet Union published a
new history of the Battle of Stalin-
grad -m on 25 May 1965, This vol-
ume is described by its authors as
"more objective" than previous
works. In it, Khrushchev is men-
tioned only twice, simply as a mem-
ber of the military council in the
area in 19+2; no strategic deci-
sions are attributed to him. Cred-
it for the battle is given mainly
to marshals and other military
leaders directly in command of the
Red Army, such as Marshal Georgi K.
Zhukov. Zhukov was discredited by
Mre K. in 1957; he was brought back
for public ceremonies, the 20th an-
niversary of WW II, just recently.
May 19757.
(See NYTimes and Press Comment 26
The simple principles of Soviet
history writing are repeated in this
one further example. Facts are dis-
torted, falsified or otherwise ma-
nipulated to credit friends and dis-
credit enemies. Soviet claims to
their own success and attacks on the
performance of former allies during
the course of World War II should be
challenged with such examples as
this new "history." [See also Mos-
cow Interprets World. War Two, iden-
tified in the BN section of the last
BPG issue #166]
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Col. Abel What the Chekists Did
Honored in the Great War
At the 20th anniversary
of VE-Day, with every
Soviet dignitary recounting the vic-
tories of the Red Army in the Great
Fatherland War, the Soviet press
had little to say about the contri-
bution of the other Allies. Pravda
did', however, have room for a lengthy
article by the Chairman of the Com-
mittee for State Security (KGB), V.
Yee Semichastny, telling how the
Soviet Chekists "won the fierce bat-
tle on the invisible front of strug-
gle against the intelligence services
of the Hitlerite coalition." Semi-
chastny admitted that there had been
"serious distortions and errors in
the wos~k of the organs of state se-
curity" in "the period of the per-
sonality cult," but claimed that this
did not change "the socialist nature
of Soviet intelligence and counter-
intelligence and ... did not separate
it from the party and the people."
He added: "It was precisely the
close links of the overwhelming ma-
jority of the Chekists with the peo-
ple that created those conditions
which in the final analysis prede-
termined their victory over the in-
telligence of fascist Germany."
Semichastny also listed the "heroes"
of Soviet intelligence, and paid his
respects to "the intelligence agent
known under the name of Rudolf Abele"
A few days before, on 4 May, a Mos-
cow television program had given the
first Soviet publicity to Abel, in-
dicating that he had been decorated
after his repatriation in 1962.
(See attachment for text of Semi-
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Useful Background Material
COMMUNIST-NAZI Relations in WORLD WAR II
Two unclassified, well sourced, unattributed multilithed
papers provide the historical facts of Communist-Nazi re-
lations during World War II.
The first and longer (175 pages) is more comprehensive
in its treatment, covering not only the war period but
CPSU activities and relations in Germany from 1918
through the war, and describing Soviet activities in
individual countries, i.e., France, Italy, Greece and
Czechoslovakia during the war. COMMUNIST-NAZI RELATIONS:
The Myth of Communist Anti-Fascist Resistance in World
War Two, contains a detailed index and a selected bibli-
ography.
The second paper (44 pages), written for and entitled
the 20th Anniversary of Hitler's A ression Against the
Soviet Union, June 22, 191-1 is in effect a detailed
account of Soviet-Nazi relations during the period 1939-
1941. In addition to documentary material on the Nazi-
Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939 and the subsequent secret
protocols, the paper provides details about the USSR's
political and economic assistance to the Nazis and de
scribes the double game played by the Soviets even dur-
ing the 1939-1941 period.
[You may request either or both
of these historical papers from
headquarters.]
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Significant Dates
JUNE
24 Afro-Asian Foreign Ministers Meeting, prelim to II Afro-Asian Confer-
ence, heads of state, opening 2 June, Algiers.
25 North _Korean Army crosses 38th Parallel. 27 June, UN Security Council
USSR boycotting resolves aid to Republic of Korea; 7 July establishes
UN Command, 53 nations endorse assistance, 17 contribute units to UN
Force. 1950. Fifteenth anniversary.
26 UN charter adopted at conference of 46 nations, in San Francisco
25 April 1945. Twentieth anniversary,
28 Rumania bows to USSR's ultimatum, cedes Bessarabia, Bucovina and Hertza
District. 1940. Twenty-fifth anniversary.
29 Czechoslovakia cedes Ruthenia to USSR. 1945. Twentieth anniversary.
JULY
1 Communist Part of China founded. 1921.
6 East Germany (Grotewohl) and Poland (Cyrankiewicz) recognize Oder-
Neisse line as permanent frontier. 1950. Fifteenth anniversary.
7 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) World Congress,
Amsterdam, 7-16 July.
10 World Congress for Peace, National Independence and General Disarmament,
Helsinki, 10-17 July, sponsored by the Communist World Peace Council
(WPC) which is working toward the formation of a "united front" of world
peace organizations.
10 Lavrenti Beria arrest for treason announced. Secretly tried and shot,
18-23 December. 1953.
12 Soviet Russia signs treaty with Lithuania recognizing its independence
and sovereignty. 1920. (occupies Lithuania 1940). Fortes-f-fifth anni-
versexZ
13 Cuban President Urrutia charges Communism endangers Cuban revolution.
Four days later Castro charges Urrutia with treason. 1959.
16 Potsdam Conference (16 July-2 August) (Churchill, Attlee, Truman and
Stalin-1_975. Twentieth anniversary.
18 Big Four "Summit" Conference, Geneva, 18-23 July. France, Great Britain,
US and USSR. 1955. Tenth anniversary.
25 First World Festival of Youth and Students opens, Prague; sponsored by
Communist WFDY and IUS, 1947.
27 Ninth World Youth Festival, Algiers, 27 July-6 August.
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#54 Commentary 12-25 May 1965
Principal Developments:
1. Communist statements continue to focus on "U.S. imperialist
aggression" in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. Soviet pronouncements
are becoming somewhat more militantly and threateningly anti-U.S., --
while Soviet media continue to remain aloof from the infighting within
the ICM and repeat their stress on the need for Communist solidarity.
2. The Chinese, however, carry on their running attacks against the
Khrushchev revisionists currently leadinthe CPSU USSR, with: (a) a de-
tailed account of their allegedly victorious battle against Soviet forces
at the 4th AAPSO conference in Ghana (where their main thrust seems to
have been directed against Soviet efforts to get themselves included in
the forthcoming Algiers Afro Asian II Conference); (b) a shrill 11 May
People's Daily editorial aimed principally against the U.S. but reiterat-
ing the Chinese charge of "U.S.-Soviet cooperation for world hegemony";
(c) a hostile commentary on the Shastri visit to Moscow, which revived the
Chinese charges of USSR allying itself with India against China; and (d)
replay of a major anti-Soviet attack from JCP daily Akahata. Peking pub-
lishes the 6th volume of Khrushchev's Statements, but does not report any
accompanying editor's note." The Chinese also publish another -report of
"brutal suppression " of demonstrating students, -- this time by You .Rslav
police against Latin American, Asian, and African students" in Belgrade!
(A minor incident reportedly did occur, but it has not been mentioned by
any other media, as far as we know.)
3. The Albanians again lead the Chinese camp in vituperation, with
an abusive attack on Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky, and, through him,
on Soviet use and misuse of the Warsaw Pact as a captive instrument serv-
ing Soviet policy: it culminates in another appeal to the Soviet people
to throw out the "usurpers." Also, the Albanians alone report that the
2nd Chinese atom bomb test on 14 May brought "great rejoicing" among their
people, -- while other Communist media generally report: the event briefly
with no comment.
4. The Indonesian CP, holding a CC plenum and staging an elaborate,
Sukarno-graced celebration of its 5th anniversary in a posture of "inde-
pendence and equality," restates policy lines with a strong ChiCom flavor.
The arrival of fairly high-level Party delegations from Europe -- USSR,
Albania, and Rumania -- as well as from China, Japan, North Korea and
North Vietnam, brought Indonesian exultation: such participation testi-
fies to the status of the PKI in the 1CM. Party messages on the occasion
were rather restrained, paying tribute to, the PKI's struggle against modern
revisionism (the main danger) and duo natism.
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5. The Pajetta-led Italian CP delegation discussed in preceding issues
returns to Rome on completion of its visit to Hanoi, -- without making the
relatively little extra effort to participate in the above Indonesian cele-
bration. Visit characterized by expressions of agreement on need for soli-
darity and of Italian Communist support for the Vietnamese communists:
after his return, Pajetta says that Italian volunteers will be ready to go
to Vietnam if and when requested. While Pajetta is returning, another PCI
delegation headed by L'Unita Director Mario Alicata flies to Havana via
Prague, where they hold ' o dial talks" with Czech Party leaders.
6. U.S. Embassy in Bucharest reports marked Rumanian interest in
Austrian independence and neutrality in international politics, particularly
evident in connection with a current Austrian industrial exhibit there. An
article in the 13 May issue of foreign affairs weekly Lumea refers positively
to "The Austrian Example" of non-identification with military blocs: Embassy
sees this as hint of Rumania's discomfort in the Warsaw Pact.
7. A further clandestine report comfirms previous indications (#53)
that delegations of 16 Western European CPs will meet in Brussels 1-3 June.
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CHRONOLO -- COWNTIST DISSENSIONS
12-25 May 1965
May 7-2 The Indonesian CP celebrates the 45th anniversary of its
fourid,ing and holds a CC pleni)m in Pray. On the 7 th, Party daily HE,.rian
'7 t)
Rak'at publishes lengthy th;ces on the 45th anniversary: the brief
9 on the IOM stresses PKI devotion to the "revolutionary principles"
of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow documents and "independence and equality in
relations among CPs."
"Let us continue to hold aloft the six banners in the stKI!aale
against revisionism: (1) the banner of M-L against revisionism;
22 the banner of revolution against capitulationism; (3) the banner
of concrete peace against abstract peace; (I,.) the banner of prole-
tarian internationalism against great nation egoism; (5) the banner
of unity against division; and (6) the banner of revolutionary
optimism against pessimism."
The PKI plenum, 11-13 May, hears a 4-hour general report by Chair-
man Aidit: the limited reporting so far available surprisingly empha-
sizes his sharp attack on Trotskyism. The plenum's resolution on "Modern
Revisionism" says that "the session assessed the developments in the ICM
and considers that the f al o S. Kh sh chew signified the triumph of
M-L and the bar'L u cy of r :.ern rt3vis;r~~:..sm. However, facts show that
modern revisior:L , k1:c, {out K. ti.:LI exibt and this is proved by the
holding of the sc:nisnatic meeting in March 1965. By its cunningness and
hypocrisy, modern revisionism without Iarushchev todey is even more
d . eroum....
Medium-high-level P delegations to the 45th anniversary are
reported from the USSR Albania, and Rumania in Europe, and China, North
Korea, North Vietnam, and Japan in Asia. Greetaigs from Mao as well as
the North Korean and North V .etnamese Parties cc>:igratul to the PK1 for
its struggle aaianst modern .-,.-iris .or_ism -- the main cL r.!.ger arld-do -
matism. The CPSU message em paaizes the need for. iuterna:iona1 soli-
darity of all ranks of the international revolutionary movement. Haxian
RRaak 's editorial on the 22nd exults that "the participation in the an-
niversary celebrations by fraternal parties testified to the status of
the PKI in the ICMM and to the vitality of proletarian internationalism --
the spirit of M-L." Sulsarno's address at the anniversary rally on the
23rd emphasizes his full support of the PKI and the "kom" part of "Nasakom."
10-16: The 4th Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference in Winneba
(Accra).. Ghana, is marked by bitter Sino-Soviet infighting as well as
violent anti-U.S. propaganda attars. T on the 17th publicizes a de-
tailed description of Soviet attempts to ipulate the proceedings and
successful Chinese counter-measures.
"The Chinese delegate sternly pointed out at the conference
that all these anti-China activities came from one source, the Soviet
delegation .... The schemers failed to disrupt the normal process
(Chronology Cont.)
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of the conference They have instead aroused the indignation
of many delegates. More serious still was the fact that some people
actually tried to make use of the conference to create a climate or
a so-called public opinion to help the Soviet Union to force its
into the 2nd Asian-African conference( Algiers . The Indian delega-
tion openly demanded the admission of the Soviet Union to that con-
ference."
"Some people insisted on writing into the declaration of the
conference phrases suggesting Soviet participation in the second
Asian-African conference .... Their suggestion, however, was re-
jected by the conference, and their attempt was foiled. The confer-
ence was also challenged with the question should the Afro-Asian
Peo 1es Solidarity movement continue'to work along i s own political
and organizational lines, or should it submit itself to the foreign
policy of a non-Afro-Asian country or tn international organiza-
tion under its control?
NCNA reports that the 5th AAPSO conference will be held in Peking in
1967. The general declaration also announces that Latin America would be
represented at future meetings and that a'separate conference would be
held an Hav next January 6, with a preparatory meeting in Cairo Sep-
tember 1. itorializi.ng on the conference on the 19th, People's Dai
says that "in the end, the cons iratorial'activities of tt "e s itters and
ca itulationists met with ignominious f ure and the revolutionary line
of unity against imperialism won the day. Soviet media report only the
conference's strong stand against imperialism.
I 11: The Pajetta-led Italian CP delegation departs from Hanoi after
its 11-day "friendship visit. See Nos. 51, 52, and 53 for earlier re-
ports.) VNA's round-up on the 11th stresses Italian Communist support
of North Vietnam and their agreement on tie need to "strive persistently
for the unity of mind among the international Communist and workers move-
ment on the basis of M-L and proletarian internationalism."
May 13: An Italian CP delegation led by Mario Alicata, Director of
L'Unita, flies 7o" Havana from Prague, where they "had a cordial talk"
with Czech Party leaders, according to a Prague CTK report on the ]Jth.
Rumanian foreign affairs weekly La article, "The Austrian Example,"
refers positively to Austria's example of non-identification with military
blocs.
14: A shrill People's Daily editorial headed "The Johnson Doctrine
Is eo-Hitlerism" contains a shams attack . on "Khrushehev revisionism":
"The birth of the 'Johnson Doctrine' is closely tied up with
the capitulationist line followed by:the modern revisionists ....
Neither K himself nor his successors dare to offend U.S. imperialism.
K. revisionism is the new oc rine of abasement of the 60's."
2 (Chronology Cont.)
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The Chinese 2nd nuclear bomb test on this date draws much the same
reaction as the first in September 1964: only the Albanians report
"great rejoicing!"
Ma 15: An Observer article in Pravda, headed "Words and Deeds of the
Leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Finland," emphasizes the "vital
necessity for the working masses of Finland." of the "cause of unity" and
criticizes the "old direr of anti-Communism, distrust, and hostility
toward the Soviet Union" o`'`the Social Democrats.
"The alarming fact remains that the SDPF leadership still de-
clares openly and unambiguously their active support for the deci-
sions of the Socialist International on international questions,
permeated with the spirit of anti-Con unism and solidarity with the
policy of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc."
On the previous day, TASS had announced the award of a new Soviet
contract to Finland for the construction of 21 tankers at a total cost
of 0 million rub es.
May 17: NCNA publicizes and People's Dai y reprints text of a 7 May
article fr m Japanese CP daily Ake eta entitled "A Refutation of CPSU
Leaders' Groundless Charges -- second Comment on the Maxch Moscow Meet-
ing." PD adds its own banner headin g: "CPSU Leaders Reveal Their True
Features of Sham Unity and Real Split; the More They Try to Cover Up,
the More They Reveal Themselves."
NCNA Peking reports that, "according to news reports from Belgrade,"
the Y oslav police brut suppressed a demonstration against U.S. ag-
gression in the Dominican Republic by "Latin American, Asian, and African
students" there. "One demonstrator said that on 12Ma about 50 students
... carrying placards ... marched toward the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade....
Yugoslav policemen who blocked the streets brutally beat up the students....
A Colombian student, beaten to unconsciousness by the police, had to be
sent to the hospital....
May 20: NCNA announces publication of the 6th volume of "Khrushchev's
Statements it contains "80 of K's speeches, reports, letters, and cables
published from January to June 1957." There is no mention of a "editor's
note."
May 21: A long NCNA comment on the 8-day visit of Indian Prime Minister
Shastri to Mosco12-vi says that "speeches by both parties during
Shastri's visit and the joint communique show that the new Soviet leaders
who inherited the mantle of Khrushchev continue to follow the line of
vigorously fostering the Indian ruling group and allying with India to
oppose China." Although "here was tacit understanding that no critical
reference to China and Pakistan be made in the communique" the Soviet
leaders "took the lead in applauding" Shastri whenever he "maliciously
attacked China" in his speech, which "the Soviet press published in full"
and TASS publicized.
3 (Chronology Cont.)
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22: Albanian Zeri I P o LIlit article, "Reply to Marshal Malinovsky,"
is s ashing attack on Soviet use and misuse of the Warsaw Pact, pegged
to Malinovsky's 14 May Moscow speech on the Pact's 10th anniversary, in
which he mentioned the "exce:;,rf:ion" of "Albania, which has isolated itself
from other members of the alliance," adding that, "regardless of this
fact, the door will always be open to it,"
"Marshal Malinovsky is a revisionist demagogue who has more
than once proved that he does not blush with shame even when slan-
dering or vulgarly injuring others., (However) ... Historic facts
are not tin soldiers which can be arranged or moved at will....
Everyone knows that it is not we who wanted to remain outside
the Warsaw Pact, but rather that the Khrushchevite revisionists,
particularly N. Khrushchev, Malinovsky, and their comrades now
leading the Soviet Union, in an absolute, arbitrary, and illegal
manner prevented Albania from exercising its rights as an effective
member of the WP and evicted it dea cto....
ZIP goes on:
"... There no longer exists a Warsaw Pact similar to the one
set up by its founders but rather a,tool of the revisionist-chauvinist
i r4 ? ^ i rrr
policy of the Soviet leaders....
The Wars w Pac is dominated b and has had imposed on it the
will of a single power, since the Pact is, in fact, directed by the
Soviet Defense minister Marshal Grechko, commander of the united
armed forces of the WP countries, is at the same time First Deputy
to Malinovsky. General Batov, chief of the General Staff of the
Pact armies, is simultaneously First Deputy Chief of the Soviet Army
General Staff. Other personnel of_the machinery of the Pact armies
-..wry ri _..
are, from first to last, members of the Soviet Defense Ministry.
Officially, the deputy commanders are the defense ministers of the
participating countries, but only in form. They are never asked
anything and know nothing of the plans or activities of the leader-
ship of the WP.... Representatives -of the armies of the partici-
pating countries ... have become simile couriers.... Hence it is
you, Marshal Malinovsky, who closed the doors and left Albania
outside the WP....
In a perfidious and crude manner, you (Soviet leaders) arbi-
traxilr tore p the bilateral agreements and trampled the obliga-
tions... '-"'--"
You pilfered from us eight submarines, as well as
Albanian warships which were in Sevastopol for repairs. You dis-
mantled the Vlore base and did your best to weaken the defense camp
and Albania... Yo made efforts to, incite our military against
our Partr and state. After all of these acts of grave treason,
splitting, and anti-Marxism, you still have the audacity to accuse
Albania of having isolated itself from the Warsaw Pact!
4 (Chronolo Cont.))
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It is not only against Albania and its leaders that you have
acted in a sly and perfidious manner. You have behaved cowardly
n toward '
,your own men, the eminent staff of the Soviet Arny....
Examples exist in the hundred and thousands. Here we will recall
Just one which clearly typifies the plots and putsches hatched by
Khrushchev, Malinovsky, and their colleagues whom we now find at
the head of the Soviet party and state. To rid yourselves of Marshal
Zhuukkov, ... you plotted against him.,.. In his place, the revision-
ist group designated Marshal Mali collaborator of long stand-
ing and faithful tool of Khrushchev. Zhuukkov, that remarkable Soviet
military leader and one of the most eminent Soviet
during the great ~'~ officers
patriotic war, whose name was respected and honored
through the world, was accused in a cowardly manner by the 1C.
group.... Zhukov's eviction was the -signal for sacking thousands
of army officers and appointing to leading army organizations ele-
ments loyal to the K. revisionist 15ne,
...We are certain that the Soviet people will not tolerate for
long charlatans , liays~Iwho have usurped the comma~xl hosts of the
Soviet Army and state`..
5 (fC~hhrr
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7 June 1965
"The Soviet Chekists in the Great Fatherland War"
Moscow PRAVDA 7 May 1965 -- A
(Article by Chairman of the State Security Committee of the USSR Council
of Ministers V. Semic'ia.stny)
(Text) Twenty years ago the heroic Soviet people and their noble armed
forces under the leadership of the Communist Party achieved a world-
historic victory over fascist Germany. Our people courageously defended
the achievements of socialism and protected the freedom and independence
of their homeland. The fighting men of the army, air force, and navy and
the Soviet partisans displayed unrivaled courage, firmness, military
mastery, and boldness in battle. Thanks to the selfless labor of the
workers class and kolkhoz peasantry, the Soviet intelligentsia, our youth,
and the Soviet women, our front and our rear areas obtained everything
needed to crush the enemy.
The armed struggle on the fronts of the Great Fatherland War was the main
form of the struggle between the Soviet Union and fascist Germany but not
the only one. Together with the open armed struggle, a fierce secret war
was waged, the scale and degree of tension of which were unprecedented
in history. The war as an unprecedented test for Soviet intelligence
and counterintelligence. The Soviet Chekists contributed many efforts
and much inventiveness to routing fascism and, with the support of all
the people, they won the fierce battle on the invisible front of strug-
gle against the intelligence services of the Hitlerite coalition.
Fascist Germany's military and political leadership set very wide and
far-reaching tasks for its intelligence and counterintelligence organs.
Even before the beginning of the war they were assigned to collecting
exhaustive intelligence data about the military potential of the Soviet
Union, and also to preparing, from the intelligence point of view, the
carrying out of the first operations aimed at routing the Red Army.
After the beginning of military operations the fascist German agents
were to continuously supply the military command with information about
Soviet troops and the work of Soviet industry and transport. In addition
to this, Hitler's organs of secret war aimed at demoralizing our rear
through mass diversion activities and through organizing mutinous actions,
sabotage, terror, and defeatist agitation, and thus undermine the combat
capability of the Soviet front troops.
According to available information, to achieve these aims the Hitlerites
concentrated more than 130 intelligence and counterintelligence organs
on the Soviet-German front and set up about 60 special schools for train-
ing agents. Hitler's generals hoped that this would enable them to base
their perfidious attack on an accurate knowledge of the Soviet Union's
military-industrial and political potential. But in the war against the
Soviet Union the fascist espionage strategy was utterly defeated. The
hopes placed by the Hitlerites in a "fifth column" in the "weakness"
(Cont.)
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of the rear, in the "cracks" in our social and state system collapsed
like a house of cards. All designs of the Gei :an fascist agents failed
before the strong moral-political unity of the Soviet people, their
ardent love of their homeland, their high revolutionary vigilance, and
the courage and firm pas of the Soviet Chekists.
We know that the period of the personality cult was connected with
serious distortions and errors in the work of the organs of state se-
curity. Yet we also know that these errors did not change the social-
ist nature of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence and that they
did not separate it from the party and the people. It was precisely the
close links of the overwhelming majority of the Chekists with the peo-
ple that created those conditions which in the final analysis predeter-
mined their victory over the intelligence of fascist Germany.
The reorganization of the work of the state security organs in time with
military requirements took place under the direct leadership of the party.
In a directive dated 29 June 19+1 the Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars
obliged the Chekists to give comprehensive assistance to the army in
crushing Hitler's Germany, to intensify the protection of the rear areas
against the enemy's subversive activities, and to decisively destroy
spies, diversionists, and parachutists. A special directive formulated
the tasks of the state security organs relating to organizing the strug-
gle in the enemy's rear areas. From the beginning of the war the in-
fluence exerted on the military counterintelligence organs by the mili-
tary front and army councils increased.
The state security organs set up a tight, reliable screen against the
enemy's penetration into the vitally important centers of our country,
into key points of the national economy, first and foremost into those
branches in industry which were directly working for the requirements
of the war. The rear of our armed forces was under the reliable guard
of the Chekists.
In the zone of military operations itself, the task of protecting the
Red Army against the agents of the adversary was entrusted to the organs
of military counterintelligence. In spite of great difficulties, the
special section coped successfully with that task. A harmonious system
of struggle against spies and diversionists was created in the zone of
the fronts. The operative plans and intentions of our command were care-
fully protected against the enemy. The enemy did not succeed in obtain-
ing one single plan of defensive operations of our forces in the years
of the Great Fatherland War. The Soviet Chekists, operating in close
contact with the army staffs, systematically provided the enemy with
wrong information on the plans of the Soviet command on the movement of
troops, and on the situation in the rear areas. This contributed toward
shifting considerable enemy forces to areas which were favorable for the
Soviet command and also toward sudden advance operations being carried
out by the Soviet troops.
2 (Cont. )
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The border and internal troops covered themselves with unwaning glory in
the struggle for the homeland. The border guards were the first to absorb
the sudden blow of the enemy and they fought for every inch of Soviet ter-
ritory with unparalleled st?adfastness and gallantry. Here is a brilliant
example of partiotism and. fa.-,thfulness to duty: Not a single border guard
detail withdrew from the border without orders. The enemy could spread
the border cordons with fire, he could encircle and destroy small border
guard garrisons, but he did not succeed in forcing them to surrender.
Units of the border and internal troops, which guarded the rear of the
operative army, waged a selfless struggle against the enemy's subversive
activities. Along the entire length of those borders which were not in-
cluded in the zone of combat operations the Chekists mounted combat guard
duty, cutting off all attempts of the enemy agents to penetrate into Soviet
territory.
Special communications troops were successfully operating on the fronts
of the Fatherland War. Under the complicated conditions in combat situa-
tions the members of the state security communication organs insured
reliable covered communications for the leaders of the party and the
government, and the staff of the Supreme Command with the fronts and
armies, and they successfully cut off the attempts of the enemy diver-
sionisto to interrupt communications.
The feats of Soviet intelligence men operating in the rear of the fascist
Germany army will remain forever in the glorious history of our victory.
Thousands of patriots in areas temporarily occupied by the enemy, as well
as on the latter's territory itself, were conducting intelligence and
diversionist work during the years of the war. They were supplying our
army with important information concerning the location and movements of
the forces of the enemy, concerning the latter's operational plans. Thus,
in 191+2 Chekists obtained a number of important documents characterizing
the situation among Hitler's forces and staffs. In the spring of 191+3,
information was collected concerning the transfer of enemy infantry and
tank divisions from Europe and Africa in the direction of Kursk, and con-
cerning the preparations for a large offensive of the fascist troops in
that area. Operating in the rear of the enemy the Chekists infiltrated
its intelligence and counterintelligence organs and exposed enemy agents
trained to be dropped in our rear areas. The operative groups of the
Belorussian Chekists alone detected in the rear of the enemy 22 intelli-
gence division schools of the "Abwehr" and also a large number of local
and other agents.
The Chekists actively assisted the party organizations in developing the
partisan movement and in carrying out diversions in the rear of the enemy.
The names of glorified Chekists D.N. Medvedev, S.A. Vaupshasov,and others
who were commanding partisan units are now far beyond the borders of the
homeland.
The Soviet Chekists took part in the "war on rails" and carried out bold
attacks against the headquarters of the enemy and objectives in the rear
areas. They derailed hundreds of railroad echelons and destroyed quite
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a few German fascist occupiers. As a result of diversionary blows
against important eneiay ob ec wives, the C'.e ?ist diversion groups seri-
ously hampered the activities of the enemy rear organizations and fre-
quently wrecked the movement of troops and combat equipment.
The Great Fatherland War te`:;ed the ability of Soviet state security
organs to wage a struggle agc.inst the subversive activities of an ex-
perienced and perfidious enemy--activities which were unprecedented in
their scope and cruelty. Here the courage and steadfastness of the
Soviet Chekists were put to the test. The war showed that the over-
whelming majority of the Chekists passed these tests with honor. They
were ardent patriots of their motherland; they were honest and brave
men who were devoted to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Just as all
other Soviet people, they displayed mass heroism and self-sacrifice.
Our people will cherish the memory of hero Chekists V.A. Molodtsov,
V.A. Lyagin, N.I. Kuznetsov, G.M. Kravtsov, F.F. Ozmitel, and B.L.
Galushkin, and of hero border guards A.V. Lopatin, I.K. Golubets, S.S.
Pustelnikov, and others, who gave their lives for the freedom of the
Soviet motherland. The Soviet people pay deep respect to the heroic
exploits of Chekists and border guards K.P. Orlovskiy, P.I. Derzhavin,
N.F. Kaymanov, Ye.I. Mikovskiy, M.I. Naumov, A.M. Rabtsevich, and many
others.
On the eve of the great holiday of victory we cannot but also express
our special appreciation and profound gratitude to the courageous Soviet
intelligence agents who, just like Hero of the Soviet Union Richard Sorge
or like the intelligence agent known under the name of Rudolf Abel, im-
plemented the difficult but honorable task of struggling against the
enemy.
Their efforts were truly selfless, efforts which demanded great spiritual
exertions, courage, and determination, and boundless love and devotion
to the homeland.
The time has not yet come to give the names of all those fearless men,
but history will require them with all the good things thay they have
justly deserved. For it is precisely to their selflessness and to their
exerting service under complicated conditions--far from their homeland,
their families and friends--that we owe the fact that the perfidious
plans of Hitler's Germany were exposed, plans directed not only against
the Soviet Union but also against other peoples who were part of the
anti-Hitlerite coalition.
The 20th anniversary of the victory over fascism is celebrated by our
people under conditions in which the forces of peace and socialism are
constantly becoming stronger. Against these forces imperialism is at-
tempting to oppose an unrestrained armaments race, indulgence of the
ideas of revanchism, and the fanning of hotbeds of war in various areas
of the globe.
4 (Cont.)
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The contemporar:' peri ,~" :'.s c'1 r c.e,? i ed by an aetwvization of the
subversive activities of ina erialism, which is headed by the aggressive
circles in the United. States, for the purpose of paralyzing the defen-
sive capability of t'?:j