BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 21, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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21 June 1965
Briefly Noted
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JULY
Significant Dates
1 Communist Party of China founded. 1921.
6 East Germany (Grotewohl) and Poland (Cyrankiewicz) recognize Oder-
'Neisse line as permanent frontier. 1950. plamn.92saniyama.
7 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) World Congress,
Amsterdam, 7-16 July.
10 World Congress for Peace, National Independence and General Disarmament,
Helsinki, 10-15 July, sponsored by the Communist World Peace Council
(WPC) which is working toward the formation of a "united front" of world
peace organizations.
10 Lavrenti Lena arrest for treason announced. Secretly tried and shot,
18-23 December, 1953.
12 Soviet Russia signs treaty with Lithuania recognizing its independence
and sovereignty. 1920. (Occupies Lithuania 1940), Eaty.:ELELLaall-
versary.
13 Cuban President Urrutia charges Communism endangers Cuban revolution.
Four days later Castro charges Urrutia with treason. 1959.
16 Potsdam Conference (16 July-2 August) (Churchill, Attlee, Triunnn and
Stalin) 1945. Twentieth anniymaa.
18 Big Four "Summit" Conference, Geneva, 18-23 July.
US and USSR. 1955. Tenth anniversaia.
25 11th annual World Conference, All Japan Co
gen Bombs (Gensuikyo); Tokyo, Nagasaki, Hir
supported by JCP.
France, Great Britain,
uncil Against Atoi_lid.dr2,-
oshima. 25 July-9 August,
27 Korean Armistice signed. 1953.
28 Ninth World Youth Festival, Algiers, 28 July-7 August. Sponsored by
Communist WFDY and IUS.
30 Pathet Lao guerrillas, armed by Communist North Vietnam, attack army
posts in northern Laos. 1959.
31 30,444 flee to West Berlin in July -- East Germans seal the border two
weeks later (13 August). 1961,
AUG.
5 Friedrich Engels dies. 1895. (70th anniversary). [Born 28 Sept 1820].
6 20th anniversaa atomic explosion Hiroshima; A-bomb dropped on Nagasaki
9 August. 1945,
11 World Convention, Japan National Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen
Bombs (Gensuikin), Tokyo, for about 4 days. Supplementary events,
Hiroshima, Nagasaki 5-9 August. Supported by JSP and SOBYO.
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
411(
#55 Commentary 26 May-8 June 1965
Principal Developments:
1, The Chinese Communists continue to press their political/propaganda
offensive against the Soviet and Yugoslav "revisionists," the Indian "re-
actionaries," and the U.S. "imperialists." Most aggressive are: (a) a
speech incorporating the most extreme Chinese charges against the Soviet
leadership delivered by Peng Chen, chief of the Chicon delegation to the
Indonesian Party's 45th anniversary, at the PKI's Aliarcham Academy; (b)
a People's Daily Observer article expanding NCNA's earlier denunciation
of the Shastri visit to Moscow; (c) further expansion of the Chinese cam-
paign against "brutal suppression of Asian, African and Latin American
students" by the Yugoslav authorities; and (d) an interview given to a
French journal by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yl maintaining that Chinese
anti-Soviet polemics are making a positive contribution to the Vietnam situ-
ation. Peking also lists 9 world languages in which it is distributing its
March book, Polemics on the General Line of the ICM (which includes 11 major
attacks on the CPSU previously published as separate pamphlets, as described
In #49). And as the period ends, Premier Chou En-lai is in Tanzania on
another visit apparently aimed partiortlarly at building support for the
Chinese line at the 29 June Afro-Asian Conference II ("Bandung") in Algiers
(though he hurried back to China on the next day, after expected invitations
for subsequent African visits apparently did not materialize).
2. In introducing Peng Chen at Aliarcham, Indonesian CP Chairman Aidit
admits that the PKI follows "the pronouncements and attitudes of the CCP
toward modern revisionism," -- even though "sometimes we are not quick
enough in understanding" them!
3. The Albanians publish four more major attacks on the Soviet leader-
ship, one of which spreads its fire to include the Italian revisionists.
4. Meanwhile, the CPSU/USSR continues to take a public stance of re-
straint in the face of these inflammatory provocations. Even while pro-
testing Peng Chen's truly outrageous conduct in abusing Indonesian hospi-
tality to attack another PKI guest from a PKI rostrum, the Soviets are
defensive and refrain from any counter-charges. Behind-the-scenes Soviet
political activity is indicated, however, in visits of high-level Party
delegations to Bulgaria and France and a Marshal Grechko-led military
mission to Rumania, plus talks in Moscow with a Kadar-led Hungarian dele-
gation and a North Korean military mission, which is granted a new military
aid pact. There are further indications of (somewhat belated) Soviet in-
tent to press for participation in the Algiers Afro-Asian Conference II.
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5. French and Italian CP chiefs met secretly in Geneva (24-25 May)
while the CPSU delegation was in France (19-31 May), -- and just a week
before delegations of all West European CPs were to meet in Brussels.
(We have had no report on the Brussels meeting as yet.)
6. The Rumanian leadership surprisingly decides in plenum to change
the name to Rumanian Communist (instead of Workers) Party, to correspond
with the current stage of development of Rumanian socialism.
2
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CHRONOLOCa -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#55 26 May-8 June 1965
May 25 (delayed): Albanian Party monthly theoretical journal
Partise No. o features a 23?000-word editorial: "The Modern Revision-
ists, Greatest Liquidators in the History of the ICM." (Also published
in daily Zen. I Ponu3lit in. 2 parts, 25 & 26.) It is a ponderous attack
on the Italian Communist. debate published in Einascita in recent months,
centering around the controversialliendsamt2a.ak on the need for
creating an entirely new "strAILLarty of the left" in the 28 November
issue. The editorial ties this development to the "ill-famed 20th CPSU
Congress" and refers back to the 7 April 1964 ZIP article. entitled "The
Modern Revisionists on the Road of Social Democratic Degeneration and a
Merger with Social Democracy." (Chrono #27). It then turns to the
4 February 1965 Pravda article, "The Communists and the Social Democrats,"
(Chrono #47) and. asks: "Can one not see learly were Ame.1.2a212....mt his
laulztion?" It answers itself: "Rialuarties are unanimous in declar-
ing that to sabotage the proletarian revolution in thecapitalist coun-
tries and to restore capitalism in the socialist countries, the revolu-
tionary Party of the working class must be 1iaa-2.date1 at all costs."
"But the liquidating positions of Amendola, of the revisionist
leadership of the Italian CP, and of the Khrushchevite revisionists,
have become the positions of all international modern revisionism.
Thus the discussion within the ICP about the 'single party', the
new, perfidious and liquidating step by Amendola, is by no means a
unique and isolated phenomenon. It represents, in fact, one of the
aspects, and perhaps the most typical and the clearest one, of a
whole newcam2a1.01 which has been started by all modern revision-
ists for rapprochement., collaboration and fusion with social demo-
31.ax This emerges from the decisions, resolutions, and discussions
with the various revisionist parties of Western Europe. This is
clearly demonstrated by the round-table discussions on the problems
of 'unity of the workers and the democratic movement in the capital-
ist countries' organized by the international revisionist journal
Problems of Peace and Socialism, discussions which were published in
issues Nos. 1 and 2 of this year."
May 25-Jy.122_2 (continuing from #54, May 7..24): Party delegations to the
Ipdonesian CP's 24.121.2,m_ite_r_ celebration busily engage in local po-
litical activity. Most active and controversial is the Chinese delega-
tion, headed by Politburo member and CC Secretary Peng Chen, whose 25 May
22a.e.sh at the PKI 's Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences turned into an
anti-Soviet harangue incorporating the most extreme Chinese charges
against the CPSU leadership, including passages such as the following:
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"Khrushchev revisionism is gisiniagEatIng the socialist camp,
alituRE the ICM, sabotaging the national liberation movement and
the people's revolutionary movement in all countries, lulling the
vigilance of the people of the world, and Rapying_the role of a
..qzsial detachment of the U.S. iuerialists and all reactionaries
By all this, the K. revisionists have set themselves against the
masses of the people who comprise more than 90% of the world's
population ....
K. revisionism is tl-e_2.12,21211.21.1122_2alltalist forces in the
Soviet_Union. With K's coming to power, a bourgeois privileged
stratum gradually came into being (It) has completely divorced
itself from the Soviet people .... K and his like are the political
representatives of this bourgeois privileged stratum ....
K's successors are more prafty than K .... They think
that acting stealthily may be better for them Precisely be-
cause the K. reviuionists are putting on more subtle camouflage and
are more deceptive, it is all the more incumbent on the M-16 to
e2cPcse the essence falie
their However numerous the
metamorphoses of the K. revisionists, they will eventually reveal
their true features as monsters."
Introducing Peng, PKI Chairman Aidit says that "the PKI and the CCP
are like nails and fingers" and explains that:
"It is true that sometimes we are not quick enough in under-
standinz pronouncements by the CCP_Against modern revi-
sionism; we must first read these pronouncements over and over
again and study them thoroughly. This is generally because we do
not have a complete grasp of the overall situation. However, lati-
matel we are able to understand these pronouncements thoroughly.
Based on this experience, we consider the ronouncements and atti-
tudes of the CCP toward modern revisionism as a 'signal' light which
serves as our beacon and guide."
Just before its departure from Djakarta on the 4th, the CPSU dele-
ag_Liar. issues a terse statement briefly thanking "the Indonesian Commu-
nists and all friends of the Soviet Union" for their welcome and then
T.S(2,L2E1_,, Pen's "provocative andanderousattacla" at Aliarchaml
"The CPSU delegation files its protest in view of the fact
that an authoritative representative of the CCP, While misusing the
hospitality of the PKI, has used the forum it was given for improper
and offensive attacks a ainst the CPSU, whose delegation isa alalit
of the Indonesian Commnnists ...."
The statement concludes:
2 (Chronology Cont.)
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"Nevertheless, there need be no doubt that any efforts to
undermine the friendship between Soviet and Indonesian Communists,
to undermine the anti-imperialist unity between the Soviet Union
and Indonesia, are bound to end in failure."
Nhy 26: A Radio Pekin-, broadcast (in English to South Asia) lists nine
'foreign languages in which the People's Publishing House has issued its
book Polemics on the General Line of the ICM: English, French, Spanish,
German, Itissian, Japanese, Indonesian, Vietnamese and Arabic. This vol-
ume is a collection of 11 "vit1 articles"r2...sy.L.;iss_a published as sepa-
rate pamphlets -- the 1.4=1.57-0rP7itter to the CPSU, the nine edi-
torials in the series of "Comments on the Open Letter of the CPSU," and
the November 1964 "Why Khrushchev Fell" -- plus the CPSU letter to the
CCP of 30 March 1963 and the CPSU open letter of 14 July 1963 (see Chrono
i49 for first Chinese notice of publication of this volume on 5 March).
A CPSU delegation headed by leading theoretician Suslov
pays "a visit" to Sofia to "acquaint themselves with the activities of
the BCP and exchange experiences." In a 13,000-word speech at a 2 June
meeting (published in Sofia Rabotnichesko Delo on 4th and Pravda on
5th), Suslov attributes difficulties in the ICM to differences in eco-
nomic development, historical traditions, and political conditions. He
warns against "every attempt at artificially erecting a wall between
'one's own' CP" and the rest of the movement, and says that no "detach-
ment" will be able to solve any task "if it isolates itself, if it re-
tires into its national shell, if it passes on to a platform of national
egoism."
Ily_21...anz...1: Soviet media press for S2y..i.e.L2Lallaiit_ttioz.2 in the Afro-
Asian Conference-TITTZEITg") in Algiers, in an article in No. 22 of
the multi-language weekly New Times and a Radio Moscow English-language
commentary to South Asia, both on the 26th. NyTimes correspondent Peter
Grose reports from Moscow on the 4th that -- according to "diplomatic
sources" there -- "the Soviet leadershikluja91121.1aAWilklagt!gal-
mnnist China's bid for rimac amo the African and Asian nations" at
the conference.
May 27.: Pravda 5,000-word Sevastyanov article on 45th anniversary of
Lenin's book Left.,Win Communism An Infantile Disorder says that "the
entire contents of the book "were intended to strengthen unity" and shows
that Lenin would be on the CPSU's side in the dispute with the Chinese.
However, it does not mention the Chinese by name and is generally re-
strained and conciliator in tone.
An Observer article in Pe.2EaLLEgIE expands baluz on the 21 May
NONA comment on Indian Prime-kinister Shastri's visit to Moscow (Chrono
IW), concluding:
"The more K's successors fraternize with the Indian reaction-
aries, the more clearly will their revisionist face be exposed.
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Since K's line of .1alligarall India_ta_amallapal has gone
bankrupt, will the present Soviet leaders come to any better end
than K.?"
The French CP announces that its chief Rochet and Italian CP chief
Longo had conferred secret in Geneva777TR31-On a wide range of
subjects, -- not identified.
May 28: NCI IA reports an interview given by Chinese Vice Premier (and
Foreign Minister) Chen Yl to correspondent K.S. Karol for the French
journal Nouvel ObserNsteur on the Vietnam problem. One question is:
"Do you not think that the saemics (between People's China and the USSR)
tend to divert world pub1ic opinion from the important problem and, there-
fore,klty_asneative-rOYe:
"This is not mx_ylpw .... The the the people of the
whole world to distinguish between truth and falsehood, between real
and sham struggle against imperialism, and between real and sham
support for this struggle; they contribute to the struggle of the
people of the world against U.S. aggression ....'
Mx.29: The Albanian Zeri_Laltypit blasts "the hypocritical, anti-
revolutionary, and capitulationist attitude of the Soviet leadership"
again, this tirrp in connection with Indian Premier Shastri's visit to
Moscow.
mac?) Pravda publishes joint communique on the "friendly visit" of a
4a4=121_Eauarian Party delegation to Moscow, 23-29 May: it stresses
complete identity of the viewpoints of both sides on the situation in the
ICM" and reports that they "decided to wage a consistent struggle for the
cohesion of countries of the socialist comity ara for the strengthening
of unity ...."
May 31: TABS announces that a ,CSS(.j...1G.9.2,,Lblal headed by Boris Ponomarev
returned home after a 19-31 May visit with the French CP. A communique
says that the visit "reaffirmed the profound identity of the views of
both parties on all main problems of our time."
TASS also announces thesjsza.,, with a North Korean military dele-
mum in Moscow, of an reement to strengthen further the defensive cap-
abilities of the rPRK: no details are given.
June 2-8: Chinese Premier Chou En-lai stops in Pakistan 2-3 June enroute
to Africa on another visit, seen by observers as aiming particularly to
rally support for Chinese leadership at the forthcoming Algiers Afro-
Asian Conference II. A 4-day visit in Tanzania 4-8 June produces a .51212L
contunique, worded much like Chou's speeches in its references to "foreign
intervention in the Dominican Republic," tg "Vietnamese people fighting
heroically against foreign intervention," and the Congolese people's
"fight for national independence and freedom," without, however, naming
the U.S. -- or the U.S.S.R. Chou's repeated remarks on revolution bring
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a sharp denunciation from neighboring Kenya, and he unexpectedly flies
back to China from Tanzania on June 8 instead of continuing the antici-
pated round trip, -- leading to press speculation that the Chinese have
worn out their welcome among the true neutrals of Africa.
June 3: Bucharest releases a communique on a 31 May-2 June CC plenum:
it includes the statement that "The plenum unanimously decided to submit
to the (lth) Congress the proposal that the paEtz_ka_and the Rumanian
Communist (instead of Workers) Party, which corresponds with the current
stage of development of our society, the stage of fnlfilling socialist
construction, and the final aim of the Party, namely construction of a
Communist society."
June 5: The Alicata-led Italian CP deleqation to CUba (Chrono 054, May 13)
142,parts for Moscow. VYTimps reports from Havana that they held long talks
with Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders on "the conflict between Moscow
and Peking and Communist involvement in Latin America."
The Chilean Ministry of the Interior grants permission to move to
aatam the Latin American Conference on Solidarity with Cuba which had
been scheduled for Montevideo June 18 but which the Uraguayan authorities
banned in a last-minute reversal of policy.
The Albanian auLlmallIL denounces the Khrushchevite revisionist
for "committing treason toward the Dominican people" by pursuing "their
policy of collaboration with and unprincipled concession and capitulation
to American imperialism."
June 6: NONA reports three messages sent by the All-China Students Fed-
eration in connection with the 'brutsal_jpzuszian by Yugoslav authori-
ties of students from Asia Africa and Latin America who took part in
a demonstration on 12 May against the U.S. imperialist invasion of the
Dominican Republic" (see Chrono it54, May 17, for first liCNA report on
subject):
a. A. massage of to the Yuiraglayeral Executive Council
which stated: "Your present act of violence again exposes to the
world's people the _.vi11s....4.1sz of theYos3.avleaders. They are act-
ing as a special detachment of U.S, imperialism to stamp out the
national liberation movement ...." It "demArds" that the Yugoslav
PaLtlaatts"inim_e.s_lies_a_betermLnate the mnment of the students
from Chile, Colombia, and Palestini" ang.d"lie" to the Asian,
African, and Latin American students who participated," with "assur-
ances that there will be no repetition."
b. A letter to the Peking office of the EArab] Palestine Liberation
Organization expressing "deep sympathy with the Palestine student
persecuted by the Yugoslav authorities," paying "'high respect to his
militancy."
5 (Chronology Cont.)
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c. A vil....I121..z.specuted students in Bel rade, sent "in care
2.f..:_lh..4s_Em..._a_basof SA.c....E2kuljac of Chile inyzellavia." "The Chi-
nese people as a whole, including the students, firmly support your
just action ...."
June 7: In a departure from their recent policy of non-involvement in
Sino-Soviet polemics, the PolisluEela_pyblishes the 4 June protest of
92.2_g2L22...szd.t.2.r2air_taairw_....:.s.:__.ttheP_a;6e Chen echz at Aliarcham.
The three English-language Calcutta newspapers report that a new
Indian CP was formed by Communist centrists critical of both the Soviet-
aligned CPI/R and the Chinese-sympathizing CPI/L at a meeting in Calcutta,
5-6 June. The Statesman comments that the new party is more inclined
toward the CPSU on najor international issues but strongly opposed to
CPI/R Chairman Dange.
June 8: An Albanian ZaLLI_Emallt editorial on Vietnam denounces the
vile attitude of the K. revisionists": The anti-imperialist garb in
which the K. foursome of Brensi_inev, 1_,....s.agzial_astan and Suslov are mo-
mentarily masquerading will not dupe anyone. It cannot hide the anti-
revolutionary and anti-Vietnamese plot which they have hatched with the
American imperialists." It concludes with another dire prediction:
H... The Soviet people ... will find the strength and opportun-
ity to put in their places the revisionist traitors who play with
their fate and that of socialism. In the end, true M-L will triumph
over lies and revisionist treason, and that day is not far off 1"
6 (Chronology)
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916 AF,FEINE,WH.
LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
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SITUATION: An official Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman has
denied the recent spate of rumors that Mao Tse-tung is seriously ill.
But the fact remains that Mao was 71 years old last December, and that
he certainly is infirm and under the constant watch of medical attend-
ants. His current prolonged absence from public view has encouraged
speculation that his poor health now keeps him from performing even
routine ceremonial duties. However, Mao's health at this or any other
particular moment merely symbolizes the crucial fact that China will
very soon face a succession problem, not only in transferring power
from Mao to his individual successor, but also the far more complex task
of passing authority from one generation to another. Totalitarian so-
cieties have always shown themselves to be ill-equipped to deal with
these problems. Some quarters contend that the history of the Chinese
Communist party suggests that the CPC will be able to achieve these im-
mensely complex tasks without much difficulty. When Lenin died and
again when Stalin died, it was also contended that the remaining Com-
munist leaders were firmly united in their determination to carry on the
policies of the dead leader, and yet in both cases, the former subordi-
nates of the late departed were soon deeply divided and engaged in life
and death struggles for power.
The Chinese have attempted to ease the situation by grooming Liu
Shao-chi as Mao's appointed successor. In 1959 Mao turned over to Liu
the Chairmanship of the Government while retaining the more important
post of the Party Chairman. Liu however is 67, nearly as old and frail
as Mao and even if he should achieve a successful takeover from Mao, his
would necessarily be a caretaker administration. Liu certainly does not
have the status to appoint his own successor as Mao had done, so the
question of his successor can be expected to be even more problematical
to the remaining leaders.
Only two other men besides Liu appear as possible candidates to
succeed Mao. They are Premier Chou En-lai and Party General Secretary
Teng Hsiao-ping. Both of these men are about the same age as Liu and
neither of them is likely to challensphim so long as Mao is alive.
Whether they would willingly accede to his leadership during a critical
period after Mao's death remains to be seen. Peking's Mayor Peng Chen
and Foreign Minister Chen Yi are dark horses who would assume increased
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prominence on the demise of any one of the Party leaders mentioned
above. (See unclassified attachment for biographic sketches of high-
ranking Chinese Communist leaders.)
The average age of the 18 Politburo members is over 66 and Most
of them are in,their late 60's or early 70's. No attempt has been
made to bring younger, second-echelon leaders into the higher bureauc-
racy gradually and train them for ultimate leadership. On the contrary,
a strenuous effort seems to have been made to keep them out. The top
40 men in the Party are all in the older age-group, and even in the
layer below these men, the majority is in the 55-60 bracket. There is
twofold significance in these facts: First, the younger men may react
strongly when the legendary Mao departs the scene. Their long frustra-
tion at being kept away from the seat of power may acme to the surface
and cause them to rebel against the "Yenan Caves" mentality of their
elders. Second, the advanced age of all of the immediate contenders
for the top post may mean that the top post will change hands several
times in the next few years, and the competition might enhance con-
siderably the influence of this younger group as the competing factions
vie for support against their antagonists. The most important question
therefore is not who will succeed Mao, but haw many times in the next
few years will the leadership change hands, and how long will it take
before power is transferred to the hands of the next generation.
The old men who rule China have become increasingly alarmed by
what they consider the flagging revolutionary zeal of the younger peo-
ple; and they have undertaken an intensive indoctrination campaign to
remedy the situation. The course of events in the Soviet Union since
the death of Stalin has made them painfully aware of what might happen
to their own revolution once they are gone; it has made them fear that
their successors will grow soft and betray the sacred trust of carrying
the revolution to the rest of the world. Their alarm is probably the
best evidence that there is at least some possibility for a change in
the attitude of China's future leaders. If the hard, doctrinaire in-
flexibility of the current leaders appears to the younger generation
to pay off in the desired results, that generation can fully be expected
to continue the pattern, and. even to increase Communist China's arrogant
militarism and interference in the affairs of other countries. If, how-
ever, today's leaders meet firmness and resolution in all their attempts
to foist their views on their neighbors and on developing nations around
the world, it may be possible to convince the next generation that its
best prospects lie in devoting their full attention to their own internal
affairs and solving the vast problems that have 'plagued the Chinese peo-
ple for so many centuries.
2
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...r6raidadmiim (916 Cont.)
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..114.114?I'm (916.)
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Red Spies in the UN
by Pierre J. Huss al)Z.T_ George Carpozi, Jr.
1965. Coward-McCann, Inc., 200 Madison Avenue,
New York 16, N.Y. Indexed. Illustrated.
287 pages. $5.50
As the title suggests, this book concerns the use of official and
diplomatic status by Communist intelligence officers. The authors, two
well-known journalists, obtained a number of incriminating photos on
Communist espionage cases from the United States Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI), and included them with the FBI's permission. Some
of the photos show the Communist UN officials in the act of making
clandestine rendezvous with espionage agents.
The book relates more than a dozen cases of Communist espionage
and conspiracies to commit espionage in the United States, all conducted
under the shelter of the UN missions of the Soviet Union, and of some of
its satellites. The first known case of espionage involving a Soviet
employee of the United Nations occurred in 1949, when Valentin Gubitchev,
an engineer attached to the Secretariat, was arrested with an American
woman, Miss Judith Coplon. Gubitchev had conspired with Miss Coplon to
steal highly classified official documents from the United States Depart-
ment of Justice. A court found Gubitchev guilty, and he was sentenced
to 15 years in prison, but the U.S. Department of State intervened, and
asked that the court suspend the sentence provided that Gubitchev agree
to leave the country, a condition waich the latter accepted. Mis Coplon
received the same sentence, but it was later reversed on a technicality,
and she was freed.
As subsequent events have shown, Gubitchev was but the first of a
long succession of Soviet and other Communist officials working at the
UN (either as officials of national delegations or as employees of the
UN itself) who have been caught spying, and been sent home as a result.
Again and again, the book shows, the protection afforded by the UN to
the foreign nationals employed there has been abused by the Communist
Bloc.
One of the most spectacular cases related involved a 1962 attempt
by Cubans to sabotage oil installations in New Jersey, and to create
terror in a large New York department store by causing an explosion.
According to the authors, there is strong evidence that the Soviets
masterminded the whole plot, although this was never alleged in court.
The book concludes with a Soviet espionage operation which was ex-
posed in 1963. It involved two Soviet agents, living together as man
and wife, who had "borrowed!' the identities of two American citizens,
unbeknownst to the latter. In fact the man whose name was used by the
Soviet agent in Washington, D.C. was actually a Catholic priest in
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Amsterdam, New York. The case was solved largely because the FBI had
information that Petr Egorovich Maslennikov, First Secretary of the
Soviet Mission to the United Nations in 1962-63, was actually a Soviet
Military Intelligence officer, and kept him under surveillance almost
from the moment of his arrival in the United States in January, 1962.
Through their surveillance of Maslennikov, the FBI agents noticed the
strange couple in Washington, D.C., who were using the names of two
American citizens, and checked extensively on their backgrounds. In
this way they learned that the couple were really Soviet citizens, who
had somehow managed to enter the United States illegally, and that they
were involved in espionage against the United States. Maslennikov evi-
dently became aware that he was being watched, for he abruptly ceased
both his espionage activity and his official work at the UN, and de-
parted for the Soviet Union. However, another Soviet national, Ivan
Dmitrievich Egorov, who was involved, but who did not hold diplomatic
status, was arrested, as were the couple who were using other people's
names, and were discovered to be couriers for a Soviet spy ring operat-
ing in New York and WashirCcrun.
The book is as exciting as most fictional epy thrillers and has the
advantage of being true. Unfortunately, it is marred by occasional
slight errors such as giving a date incorrect17. nrertheless, the
book is well worth reading, and should be rec;:i by those intcrestDd in
preserving the United Nations, and keeping it -,ree of Cold War activi-
ties detrimental to its main mission of preserving the peace.
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I
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United Nations Disarmament Commission
Resolution Passed 15 June 1965 .
The DisarmanPnt Commission,
Having considered the report dated 17 September 1964 of the Eighteen-
Nation Disarmament Committee submitted to the United Nations Disarmament
Commission and to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly,
Reaffirming the ultimate and continuing responsibility of the United
Nations for disarmament,
Noting with regret that during 1964 despite the efforts made by the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee no specific agreements were reached
either on general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the
lessening of international tension, or halting and reversing the arras race,
Deploring that, notwithstanding General Assembly resolutions 1762
(XVII) and 1910 (XVIII), nuclear weapon tests have taken place and also
that no agreement has been reached on the QTE discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons for p11 tine UNQTE, which is one of the
stated objectives of the partial test-ban treaty,
Considering that the memorandum of 14 September 1964 submitted to
the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the dele-
gations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the
United Arab Republic, represents a fair and sound basis for the conduct of
negotiations towards removing the remaining differences for the conclusion
of a comprehensive test-ban treaty,
Convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious
consequences,
Deeply conscious of the urgency of making early progress towards the
goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international
control and of reaching agreement on measures which would facilitate the
attainment of that goal,
Bearing in mind the proposals made at its present session for measures
to reduce international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, and
also at the meeting of the Organization of African Unity and the Second
Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,
Recalling the principle that a substantial part of the resources that
will be released through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and
social development of the developing countries, thus contributing to the
evolution of a safer and better world,
(Cont . )
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I. Reaffirms the call of the General Assembly upon all States to
become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space and under water, and to elide by its spirit and
provisions;
2. Recommends that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should:
. (a) reconvene as early as possible to resume as a matter of
urgency its efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete dis-
armament under effective international control, and to consider all
proposals for measures to relax international tension and halt and
reverse the arms race, including those submitted to the Disarmament
Commission at its present session;
(b) consider as a matter of priority the question of extending
the scope of the partial test-ban treaty to cover underground tests;
(c) also accord special priority to the consideration of the
question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons giving close attention to the various suggestions
that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of cer-
tain related measures;
(d) keep in mind the principle of converting to programmes of
economic and social development of the developing countries a sub-
stantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction
of military expenditures;
Requests the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to report to the
Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly during its twentieth
session on the progress made in respect of the above recommendations.
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Biographical Data 21 June 1965
MAO Tse-tung
Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and Politburo; Deputy for Peking to
the National People's Congress; Honorary Chairman of the CPPCC.
Since 1935 Mao Tse-tung has been the accepted leader of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). In 1930, Mao put don, in a bloody purge at Fu
Tien, revolutionaries who opposed his orders and from then his claim to
the party leadership was only a question of time.
Mao was born in Hainan in 1893, the son of a middle peasant family,
and was graduated from Changsa Normal College in 1918. In the summer of
1920 he became a Marxist and was a delegate to the convention that founded
the Chinese Communist Party in July 1921. His early years in the Party
were spent in organizing the peasants and conducting propaganda among them.
His experiences in these early days led him to develop the thesis for which
he is now best known, namely, that the peasants were the vital element in
any successful revolt in an agrarian country like China. This thesis was
opposed by the party leadership of the time. They were following Soviet
advice at the time and attempting to conduct a revolution based on the urban
proletariat. The official Party leadership in Shanghai gradually lost in-
fluence and authority to Mao and his lieutenants and finally joined him in
Kiangi in 1932. During these years the Communist Army successfully fought
off four attempts by Chiang Kai-shek's forces to crush it, but a fifth at-
tack forced the Communists to undertake the "Long March" in October 1934--
6,000 miles through Kweichow and the mountainous border provinces to Shensi,
where a new headquarters was established in 1935 at Yenan.
The Party extended its control during the Sino-Japanese war (1937-45)
by guerilla tactics and the mobilization of the patriotic peasantry against
the Japanese. At the end of the war in 1945 the Communists were thus in a
stronger position than in 1935. On the establishment of the Central People's
Government in 1949, Mao became Chairman of the Government Council, of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, (CPPCC), and of the
People's Revolutionary Military Council. In January, 1953, Mao was Chair-
man of the Constitution Drafting Committee and on the consequent reorganiza-
tion of the government structure in 1954, he was elected Chairman of the
Republic and ex officio became Chairman of the National Defence Council.
Mao was seriously ill during 1953 and 1954, and little was heard of
him until July, 1955, when he came back to call for the rapid full-scale
socialization of agriculture. After this he remained well in the public
eye, and all subsequent major policies have been ascribed personally to
Mao.
In December, 1958, it was announced that Mao was about to retire from
the Chairmanship of the Republic "in order to devote himself more to ideo-
logical study." His retirement came in April, 1959. Mao remains Party
Chairman, appears in public regularly and continues to be treated as the
leader and father of the Chinese people.
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Mao married three times, first in 1919 in Shanghai, his wife being
executed in 1928. His second wife was with him on the "Long March,"
during which some of her children are said to have been abandoned. One
was killed in the Korean War, one is evidently a Russian translator at
a Ministry in Peking, another an army officer in Szechwan. His third
marriage, to an actress, has produced two daughters. No member of his
family takes part in public life.
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Biographical Data 21 June 1965
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Biographical Data
'OS ?T-0 ? g? I. 'III III III.
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21 June 1965
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Biographical Data 21 June 1965
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Biographical Data 21 June 1965
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Biographical Data 21 June 1965
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Biographical Data
21 June 1965
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