Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 14, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 16, 1965
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2.pdf1.83 MB
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : Cl 1A000300040004-2 SIgnifficant Dates AUG. 30 II World Population Conference, Belgrade, 30 Aug-10 Sept. SEPT. 1 Germany invades Poland: World War II begins. 1939. 8 10th Congress, Union of Resistance Veterans for a United Europe, Brussels, 8-12 September (pro-west). 10 III annual Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit, Accra: postponed; no date set. 10 Continental Congress for Self-Determination of Peoples and of Solidarity with Cuba and the Dominican Republic, Santiago, Chile 10-12 Sept. Gov- ernment ban on foreign communist representatives. 13 III Arab Summit, Casablanca. 13 International Memorial Day for Victims of Fascism, annually celebrated by communist Inter'l Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR). 14 UN GA calls for USSR "to desist from repressive measures" in Hungary and adopts report of Special Committee. 1957. 17 USSR invades Poland. '1939- 19 Week of International Struggle Against Fascism and War (Communist). 20 USSR grants sovereignty to East Germany. Tenth anniversary. 1955. 21 People's Republic of China proclaimed. 1949. 28 Friedrich Engels born (14-5 years ago) 1820. Dies 5 Aug 1895. 28 First International founded, London. 1864. Disintegrates by 1872. 28 USSR and Germany conclude "Friendship and Boundary" Treaty. 1939. 28 USSR and Estonia sign, 101-year pact which "shall not in any way infringe sovereign rights of parties..." 1939. Infringed, June 1940. 1 First Soviet Five Year Plan begins. 1928. 1 Federation of Nigeria becomes independent. Fifth anniversary. 1960. 3 20th anniversa , adoption of statute of World Federation of Trade Unions WFTU at founding congress, Paris, 3 Oct 1945. (Communist) 8 6th WFTU Congress, Warsaw, 8-22 Oct. 14 Russia signs treaty with Finland, recognizing Finnish independence and sovereignty. 1920. Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 ? I 78-03061A000300040004-2 25X1 GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #59 Principal Developments: Commentary 21 July-3 August 1965 1. The Chinese heavily and repeatedly attack the Soviets on familar themes (largely related to Vietnam) such as "the Khrushchev revisionist line of capitulation, betrayal, and split," and "Soviet-U.S. collaboration for domination of the world," -- in a 2-page Peking editorial, an authori- tative People's Daily "Observer" commentary on the Helsinki WPC, remarkably militant speeches by Chinese delegation chief to the "11th World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs" in Tokyo, and an unprecedentedly criti- cal speech by the Chinese Trade Union delegation chief to the Japanese Sohyo convention in Tokyo. They publish the 7th volume of Khrushchev's Statements without editorial comment. They also publicize another article from Vanguard, organ of the pro-Chinese dissidents in Australia, parroting not only the Chinese line on Soviet-U.S. collaboration to dominate the world but also their charge that K revisionism in the USSR has its social basis in the new privileged stratum. The Albanians continue their running fusillade, including a new charge that "the K troika is prepared to sacri- fice the GDR." 2. On the other side, the Soviets continue their one-sided moratorium on polemics. They publish two restrained articles of note: a 27 July Pravda article exhorting the Social Democrats of the Socialist International to "discard anti-Communist prejudice" and join the Communists in joint ac- tions opposing U.S. aggression; and a 30 July Red Star editorial affirming the CPSU's resolute struggle against -- inter alia -- "manifestations of nationalism in the countries of socialism, in the workers and Communist movement.' 3. Belgrade's Borba on the 30th turns Peking's "privileged stratum" charge back against the Chinese, describing the million "socialist capi- talists" in China, "some who draw many thousands of yuan per month while the national average of wages in China ranges between 50 and 60 ... live in rich apartments, drive expensive automobiles .. (etc.)." 4. The annual "world conferences against A & H Bombs" in Japan are again split along lines of the Sino-Soviet conflict, with the World Peace Council, the Soviet Peace Committee, and other Soviet-aligned groups boy- cotting the "11th World Conference" meeting from 27 July to 2 August under sponsorship of the Chinese-line, JCP-controlled Gensuikyo. After the belli- cose Chinese speech mentioned above, the. conference adopted resolutions Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 66*9* (Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 20 RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 fully supporting major Chinese -- and Indonesian -- policy positions, including "crush Malaysia!" The rival Soviet-line, JSP-controlled Gensuikin conference will meet 11 August, with WPC and Soviet repre- sentation expected,... 5. The pro-Chinese dissidents supporting the semi-monthly Rote Fahne (Red Flag) announce establishment of a preparatory committee - for founding a new Marxist-Leninist CP in Austria: they appeal for support to "workers" and socialists as well as Communists. 6. The pro-Chinese dissident Swiss CP launches an appeal "to all revolutionaries, Marxist or not," to forma new "Revolutionary Inter- national." Protesting against the",superiority complexes" of both Moscow and Peking, the :P C.S' indicates that the new international would create a third force between "the to hostile brothers" and pre- dicts that it will be set up early in August "somewhere in Europe." 7. Italian Communists are engaged?in a new discussion of "the crisis in Marxism" on the pages of PCI illustrated weekly Vie Nuove (New Ways). Significance: The furious Chinese onslaughts against the Soviets in mass meetings of international front organizations as well as in their own media con- tinue to widen the gulf between the protagonists -- and, it seems likely, to drive more and more sympathizers on both sides toward "third-force," neutral, or "plague on both your houses" positions. We will watch care- fully for possible reactions to the reported initiative of the Chinese- sympathizing dissident Swiss CP toward the formation of a new "Revolution- ary International," which seems to be a manifestation of such a drift toward middle ground between the egocentric "hostile brothers." If there were ever any doubt about the purpose of the Soviet initia- tive in urging a rapprochement between the Communists and the Social Democrats in Western Europe, as signaled by the 1+ February 1965 Veber article in Pravda, it has now been starkly revealed by the 27 July Pravda article by the same author calling on these Social Democrats to join the Communists in opposing U.S. "aggression." 25X1 2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 (Commentary Cont.) 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 #59 21 July-3 August 1965 May-June--July (delayed, and continuing): A fresh discussion of "the crisis in Marxism' by Italian Communists, precipitated by a statement in the 3 May issue, No. 22, of the PCT illustrated weekly Vie Nuove (New Ways), con- tinues on through No. 29 of 22 July. Participants are the initiator, pro- minent PCI writer Pier Paolo Pasolini who conducts a regular column in the weekly under the heading Dialogue with Pasolini," and his correspond- ents. Pasolini's most revealing statement to date is in No. 24+, 17 June, as he replies to a rebuttal by Lamberto Guidotti. After cautiously acknow- ledging the possibility that he is "projecting a personal internal crisis and converting it into a non-existent crisis of Marxism" and affirming that in any case he is still a good Marxist and writes "full of sincere good intentions," Pasolini goes on: "Having said this, I must persist in saying that a real crisis of Marxism -- it would be better to say 'of the Marxist parties' -- does indeed exist. I shall confine myself to listing a number of actual facts: (a) The violent and sometimes profoundly alarming polemic be- tween China and the USSR, which has split the traditional "intercommunist nation" in two. (b) The resultant break between the CPs of poor or underde- veloped nations and the CPs of industrialized nations. (c) The still partly mysterious deposition of Khrushchev.... (d) The evil triumph of Stalinism in all Marxist parties.... (e) The alarming political situation in many socialist countries, where Communist governments faced by very serious, urgent prob- lems have failed to 'continue' the revolution and have taken strong, highly centralized positions.... The position of writers and of intellectuals in general is very difficult and .in some cases precarious. Furthermore, some middle-class at- titudes that never quite died out have revived (for example, minority nationalism such as Slovakian, Transylvanian, etc., which seem sadly ridiculous phenomena). (f) The dramatic situation in the PCF [French CP], a party that has clung to a politically archaic mentality, steeped in a kind of rationalism borrowed from rigid and moralistic liberalism. One symptom of its crisis is the demise of the intelligent pub- lication of the French Communist youth (the pro-Italian) Clarte, a demise decreed by Communist officialdom. Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300QC4l0004;?iogy Cont . ) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 (h) The marginal position into which the PCI has been forced in Italy in recent years, for the center of the stage has been oc- cupied by a struggle between a potential labor group (the center-left) and budding conservatism (the Milanese liberalism of neo-capitalism). Symptoms of the PCI's involuntarily marginal position are its efforts to regain a place at the center of the political struggle: its dialogue with Catholicism (designed to overcome the temporary Catholic-Socialist alliance) and the project for a 'single party.' As you see, I have simply listed harsh facts.... If you think that this is a matter of the usual continuous crisis, like unending evolution or the unceasing need to adaptto ever-changing historical reality, etc., you are being dishonest with yourself. For in doing this, you are ignoring the real situation.... I must say, furthermore, that your own letter confirms my be- lief that the rank and file of the Party are only vaguely aware of the real crisis through which the CPs are passing right now.... The Communist elite and the intellectuals talk of nothing else.... Yet the rank and file ... go on fooling themselves with their old opti- mism about proto-Marxism, etc., etc...." June 15 (delayed): Rote Fahne (Red Flag), semi-monthly organ of pro- Chinese dissident Austrian Communists, announces that "a meeting of 42 activists of this magazine" in Vienna 12 June 1965, condemning the "re- visionist degeneration" demonstrated by the 19th Congress of the Austrian CP, "constituted itself as the preliminary 'Central Preparatory Committee' for the founding of a new CP in Austria," -- "a revolutionary, con- sistently M-L, really Communist Party." It lists 11 members of a "busi- ness management office," with Franz Strobl designated as initiator. "The success of the work of the preparatory committee will es- sentially depend on the extent to which it manages to involve left- wing socialists and revolutionary-minded unaffiliated individuals, particularly young people, in addition to revolutionary and class- conscious individuals. The conference further decided to change the subtitle of Rote Fahne to "Tribune of the Austrian Marxist-Leninists" (from "Tribune of the M-Ls in the Austrian CP"). July 10 (delayed): Finnish CP daily Kansan Uutiset carries a forthright discussion of peaceful transition" by George Paile. "... I believe that the socialistic system will gain many new sup- porters if we clearly acknowledge the boundaries of political con- flict set by the present constitution and legislation. The fear Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300S40ZB$112gy Cont. ) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 that the Communists would not play by the rules of our modern demo- cracy is one of the reasons for our political alienation. If we acknowledge peaceful transition to be morally binding, then we also have to acknowledge that no single party in Finland can bring about socialism. The only possibility is cooperation with other socialists, and this in its turn would mean ... that we accept the existence of several other parties. Also, the question of a particular party's'leading position' has to be seen in an en- tirely new light. Can one speak of cooperation if one simultane- ously emphasizes one's own 'leading position". ... Peaceful and democratic transition means also the rightful existence of a po- litical opposition.... The peaceful return from socialism to the old system must also be possible if the required majority so desires. If these rights are acknowledged, then the talk about the dictator- ship of the proletariat is useless...." July 21 30: Paris independent daily Le Monde carries items concerning a new initiative launched by the Chinese-sympathizing dissident Swiss CP. First is an AFP dispatch datelined Geneva, 20 July, reporting the launch- ing by the PCS of an appeal "to all revolutionaries, Marxist or not," for the creation of a new Revolutionary International" uniting "all parties or groups desiring to struggle against imperialism." "At the same time, the PCS arises violently ainst the superi- ority complexes of Moscow as well as Peking.' This appeal, which especially noted the support of 'Belgian, German, English, Spanish, French, Italian, and American comrades,' affirms that the idea of a new pro-Chinese International is hence- forth set aside. 'In effect,' declares the PCS Central Secretariat, 'it is not fair that Moscow or Peking manifests such superiority complexes and preempts, under various guises more or less biassed or egocentric, the role of ruler of the Communist w,prld. The two hostile brothers are too involved in maintaining and deepening their divergences to have the right to dominate anybody and to give advice and orders that they themselves do not follow....'" In an article on the 30th, LM acknowledges a letter from the PCS, rebutting criticism in a 27 July latter to the editor: "As of 15r?July 1965, 311 cards have been delivered to members, and our records indicate a larger number of cards delivered to sym athizers. After all, we have never pretended to be thousands. It is true that as long as our party defended only the theses of the Chinese comrades, re- cruitment was difficult. Now that we have opted for a Communist path adapted to Swiss realities and possibilities, it is much less difficult for us to find new adherents." 3 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 LM adds that in the remainder of the letter this new way is de- fined as a "clear and independent line" showing that the signatories "desire to e neither slaves nor robots." And finally, the PCS announces that a new "revolutionary international" will be set up at a conference "somewhere in Europe during the early part of Au ust. r 22: Peking announces publication of Volume 7 of Statements by Khru shchev, containing 98 of his speeches, reports, etc. from July to December 1957. Jury 24: The Rumanian CP ends its Congress (see #58, July 18 and con- tinuing) without an outbreak of polemical warfare among its mutually hostile guests. July 27; Peking daily Ta Kung Pao devotes two pages to a comprehensive article on The Struggle Between the Two Lines over the Question of Deal- ing with U.S. Imperialism," by Fan Hsiu-chu. After castigating the "Johnson doctrine" as "neo-Hitlerism," the article turns on "the Khru- shchev revisionists ... (who) have degenerated into the lowest flunkies of U.S. imperialism." "Both K and his successors who claim to be M-Ls are filled with awe before U.S. imperialism. They have vociferously attacked Com- rade Mao Tse-tung's thesis that imperialism is a paper tiger and distorted Lenin's famous saying that iriperialism is a colossus with feet of clay.... The K revisionists are blind to the strength of the world's revolutionary people and regard U.S. imperialism as almighty.... The counter-revolutionary black thread of Soviet-U.S. cooperation for world domination runs through their whole set of revisionist policies, be they peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition, or peaceful competition. .... Their words and deeds are hardly different from those of the U.S. imperialists.... They profess support for the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but when it comes to deeds, they undermine them.... ... By repeatedly capitulating to U.S. imperialism, what the K revisionists have received is humiliation and again humiliation. 'While the drooping flowers pine for love, the heartless brook babbles on.' And so the joint domination will end in nothing else than the K revisionists being dominated by U.S. imperialism...." Pravda features an article by A. Veber (author of the noteworthy 4 February Pravda article urging collaboration of Communists with Social Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : 8IA-RDP78-03061A00030D848Q82 Cont. ) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Democrats in the West, #47) and A. Chernyayev exhorting the Socialist International to "discard anti-Communist prejudice, and, at all levels where social democrats have influence, demand that the U.S. Government stop interfering in the internal affairs of Vietnam and also of other peoples fighting for national independence and social progress, and that it stop supporting rotten puppet regimes which are selling the interests of their countries." "The question ... is not one of discussing ideological differ- ences, not of a political rapprochement, but of the elementary duty of all democratic to join their efforts toward preserving peace, in the face of the worsening international situation caused by U.S. ag- gression. Joint actions of socialists and Communists in this field could be a good example to all other democratic forces of the world." July 27 and continuing: The annual "world conferences against atomic and hydrogen bombs" in Japan are again split along lines of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The ''11th World Conference" sponsored by the Chinese-line,JeP'=.iC-P_ controlled Gensuikyo meets in Tokyo 27 July-2 August, while the Soviet- line, JSP-controlled Gensuikin conference is scheduled for 11 August. Despite a 10 June Gensuikyo letter -- released on 26 July -- to the Soviet- controlled World Peace Council and the Soviet Peace Committee urging them "not to attend any splittists' meeting but to attend the 11th World Con- ference," there is no representation from the WPC, the SPC, or any other Soviet-aligned group. (NCNA claims, however, attendance by the largest number of foreign delegates in its history: 169 from 4+7 countries.) KYodo reports from Moscow on 27 July that the Soviet Union will not at- tend either of the meetings in Japan this year, according to "a Soviet CP source." Tokyo Asahi on the 29th reports that the World Peace Council will not send delegates to either meeting but will send messages to both -- and that Gensuikyo responded with a statement that it will not accept such a message from the WPC! The 28 July speech of Chinese chief delegate Liu Ning-i was remark- ably bellicose for a "peace assemblage": "Chairman Mao Tse-tung has said that 'the atomic bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't.'... Scared out their wits by U.S. imperialist blackmail, the lead- ing clique in another nuclear power ... did not hesitate to betray the interests of the people of the whole world in order to concoct the notorious Moscow tripartite treaty in partnership with U.S. and British imperialism. This capitulationist line of yielding to the nuclear blackmail of U.S. imperialism is the diametric opposite of the correct line which this movement has persisted in all along.... 5 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Lately these greatest splitters have suddenly changed their tune and have been calling out for 'unity.'... Are we supposed to unite with them to promote the general line of 'peaceful coexistence' for purposes of Soviet-U.S. cooperation for the domination of the world?...." The three resolutions adopted support all major Chinese--and Indonesian --positions, including Conefo, "the world cj~nference for the liquidation of foreign military bases to be held at th this year in Djakarta," and "the peoples of Malaya--including Singapore and North Kalimantan -- in their just struggles to crush Malaysia and for national liberation!" (Japan Times on 4 August carries a Gens uikin announcement that a Soviet delegation will participate in their conference.) July 28: Two Albanian dailes carry anti-Soviet articles: -- Zeri I Popullit: "The Helsinki Congress -- A Stern rebuff to the Capitulationist Line of the K. Revisionists," by Thanas Nano, head of the Albanian Peace Committee delegation to the Helsinki World Peace Congress. -- Zeri I Rinise: "Another Divisive Move by the Soviet Revisionists in the International Youth Movement," unsigned, pegged to the "thoroughly erroneous resolution imposed on" the IPC at Tampere to postpone the World Youth Festival scheduled to open that day in Algiers to an unspecified date and location in 1966 (see #58). July 29: NCNA publicizes an article from the July issue of Vanguard, organ of the pro-Chinese dissident CP of Australia (M-L), entitled he K Modern Revisionists Are Going Further Down the Road of Revisionism." "Some Australians did not believe Australian M-Ls when they said K had deserted the cause of socialism and that K revisionism had its social basis in a privileged stratum in the Soviet Union composed of high-paid technicians,etc. Since those days, just a few years ago, many facts have emerged to demonstrate the truth of this.... These people do not want in any way to disturb their peaceful life nor their positions of wealth, power and privilege. They seek to collaborate with U.S. imperialism because they fear that failure to collaborate ... will lead to war and thus upset their positions of wealth and privelege. This reason- ing is extended into direct U.S.-Soviet collaboration to dominate the world.... July 30: A Moscow Red Star (Soviet Army daily] editorial "In the Spirit of Proletarian Internationalism" includes the following passage: Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00030QCA 8fl6I;gy Cont. ) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 "The CPSU and other M-L are waging a resolute struggle against the militant nationalism of monopolistic capital, great-power chauvinism, and racism, as well as against manifestations of national- ism in the countries of socialism, in the workers and Communist move- ment...." Belgrade Borba prints a Peking dispatch by Tanyug correspondent Bogunovic headed 'One Million Socialist Capitalists:" "...The Chinese road toward socialism differs from many others, al- lotting to the national bourgeoisie even today a rather important political and economic function in the socialist building of Chinese society.... There are,among the 1 million of these 'socialist capitalists,' some who draw many thousands of Yuan per month, while the national average of wages in China ranges between 50 and 60 yuan per month. They live in rich apartments, drive expensive automobiles, and frequently receive Western journalists.... The reason for this Chinese policy is that the CCP wanted to keep as many as possible of the bourgeois intelligentsia in their leading posts in industry and trade.... The sum of about 1 billion dollars alone, which the Chinese working class has almost entirely paid to its bourgeoisie, shows the true aspect of this phenomenon...." French CP daily L'Humanite carries without comment an AFP report of the remarks disparaging Soviet aid to Vietnam made by Chairman of the Chinese A-A Solidarity Committee, Liao Che_ng_ chi, identifying him only as "a high Chinese personality" (see #58, July 15 for details) and adding that the story was "confirmed by an East European source." APP's report added that the Soviets, "displeased by the obstacles Peking put in the way of transit for its material to Vietnam," were told by the Chinese: "You delivered your rockets to Cuba by sea, didn't you? All right, do the same for Vietnam; L'Humanite followed this report with a Tokyo dispatch on the "World Conference against Atomic Weapons," noting that it had refused to accept messages from the WPC and the SPC and adding that it had con- demned all nuclear tests "except those of China." July 31: Peking People's Daily carries an authoritative Observer com- ment on the "fierce and complicated struggle" against "the line of capitu- lation,betrayal, and split" advocated by the K revisionists at the Helsinki World Peace Congress. Again, the Chinese vividly describe the wide range of unscrupulous tactics used by the Communist professionals at these front meetings: ":.. For fear of revealing more of their ugliness, they (the K re- visionists) concealed their bag of U.S. tricks and asked others to peddle these tricks, while they themselves brandished the baton -- Approved For Release 2005/06/13: (TIA-RDP78-03061AOOd$`0UV4906W~2 Cont. ) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 behind the scenes. They did their utmost to dominate the Congress, suppress democracy, forbid consultations, restrict speeches, and tamper with the documents of the Congress. They even went so far as to try to interrupt the speeches not to their liking by pounding the table, stamping their feet, yelling, booing, and singing...." TASS, announcing the departure of the Indonesian CP delegation headed by Chairman Aidit which had stayed in the USSR from 6 to 31 July, says only that they "had an exchange of opinion on the major problems of the world situation, the ICM, as well as relations between the CPSU and the PKI." August 1: Speaking to the 28th convention of the Japanese General Council of Trade Unions (So o) in Tokyo, Tang Chang of the A11--China Federation of Trade Unions denounces "certain people (who)are working strenuously for a conspiracy to bring about peace talks in serving the purposes of Lyndon Johnson's fraud of unconditional discussions. "While giving sham support to the Vietnamese people, they are engaged in a real betrayal. We must relentlessly expose and condemn their dirty work...." Tang added: "I am shocked by and deplore the draft program of action (of Sohyo) ... which attacked China by name for its nuclear test...." AsahiEvening News comments: "His speech marked the first time a representative of a foreign country has criticized Sohyo's action policy during the labor federation's national convention." August 2: In an article on the 20th anniversary of the Potsdam conference, Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit charges that "the Khrushchevite troika is prepared to sacrifice the GDR, and to cause more serious harm to the cause of socialism and peace." Au ust 3? French CP daily L'Humanite features a "Proclamation" dated 28 July and signed by Hocine Zahouane, former member FLN Politburo, calling on the Algerian people to resist the instigators of the 19 June coup. Approved For Release 2005/06/13: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004r2nology) 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/1 [ P78-03061A000300044QO ust 1965 936 WH. PROMOTING THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 25X1 SITUATION: The Comite Interamericano de la Alianza para el Progreso (CIAP -- Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress) was created by the Inter-American Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) at its meeting in Rio 29 October-16 November 1963. The CLAP was originally suggested by former presidents Juscelino Kubitschek, of Brazil, and Alberto Lleras Camargo, of Colombia, and in response to growing criticism of the lack of progress in the Alliance. It is composed of a chairman, Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, of Colombia, and representatives from seven member countries. The U.S. repre- sentative is Walt Whitman Rostow, chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council. Among the many functions of CLAP are: to examine Alliance problems; evaluate annually the amount of financing required by Latin American de- velopment, and survey the progress of the national and regional plans. The fourth anniversary (17 August) of the signing of the Charter of Punta del Este comes as CIAP has just begun an intensive country-by-country survey of progress made during the year. The first country to come under review was Argentina. Next on the Committee's agenda during the month of August are Haiti, Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile. Progress and problems of all other countries in the Alliance will be examined before the end of the year. It will be recalled that the initial optimism generated by President Kennedy's dramatic announcement of 13 March 1961 was followed by a period of disillusionment. Alliance early accomplishments fell far short of the high hopes generally held for it in Latin America. For one thing, most people expected far too much far too soon; for another, per capita income, as a meaningful indicator pf progress, actually began to show a slight de- cline in the area as a whole and an alarming drop in certain countries. Now, after four years, although none of the major goals has yet been attained, progress in the last year has been encouraging. Most important, perhaps, the per capita income rose from $300 for 1963 to $306 for 1964. This represents a per capita growth rate of 2% -- less than the minimum goal of 2.5% set by the Charter but more than the 15 year average of 1.7%. All 19 countries under review have made efforts to adopt tax reforms and improve the administration of tax collection. More than half have sub- mitted national development plans -- still one of the bottlenecks in govern- ment-to-government financing. Most of the countries have passed agrarian Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 0040"E- (936 cont.) Approved For Release 2 -RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 reform laws, although nowhere has the prescription been appropriate to the problem, and agricultural production continues low in the area as a whole. But despite these few optimistic signs, the Alliance is still plagued by the same fundamental ills that have inhibited its progress from the beginning. It was originally contemplated in the Charter that the bulk of the capital needed for development would come from the private sector; that is, private firms would invest new capital in Latin America in the form of new industry. Unfortunately, this most important aspect of the Alliance has been the most conspicuous failure, and it is the least talked about because the root causes are the political and social conditions for which the Latin American people and their leaders are largely responsible. For example, government instability, threats of nationalization, harassment of private enterprise, discriminatory laws, corruption at all levels of govern- ment, have combined to keep foreign capital out and cause domestic capital to seek better investment conditions elsewhere. In one of his last speeches, President Kennedy said in Miami on 18 November 1963: "If encouraged, private investment, responsive to the needs, the laws, and the interests of the nation, can cooperate with public activi- ty to provide the vital margin of success; as it did in the development of all the nations of the. West, including my own." And he added, undoubtedly thinking of the Latin American capitalists who in- vest their money abroad: "There can be no progress if people have no faith in tomorrow." 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/19, -03061A000300Cj_,t0% -t? t 1965 937 AF, FE, NE. 25X1 SECOND AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE BANDUNG II SITUATION: On the heels of the June coup in Algeria, the second Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung II) was postponed until 5 November; the Foreign Ministers' session until 28 October. The permanent preparatory committee's decision defeated Algerian and Chicom-Indonesian efforts to proceed according to schedule and accorded with the more or less univer- sal interest in postponement, indefinite or otherwise. The disappearance of Ben Bella and quick Chicom-Indonesian recognition of the Boumedienne regime have caused adverse reactions, particularly among the Arabs and Africans. As a result, not only Asian moderates, but also and more sur- prisingly, radicals, notably Ghana and the UAR, may for different reasons find excuses or take steps that could further delay the Conference. The Radicals. For example, Ghana announced on 23 July that the Organization for African Unity (OAU) Summit in Accra would not take place in September but instead would begin on 21 October. This proximity of the OAII gathering to the scheduled date of the Afro-Asian Conference coupled with the concurrent session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) could pose, perhaps, insurmountable logistical and policy problems for the Africans. The Algerians seem to regard the?Ghanaian move as an attempt to have the Conference moved out of Algiers. In an apparent effort to marshal continued support for the convening of the Conference in Algiers, the Algerian foreign office on 24 July gave a briefing on the current status of preparations to the Afro-Asian chiefs of mission in Algiers. In their drive to get the Conference underway as soon as possible the Chicoms have focused their efforts on the Arabs and Africans. Their pre-emptive measure in June was successful. in postponing the meeting until the fall: this initiative through the preparatory committee prevented indefinite postponement by the foreign ministers' session which would have meant the end for the committee and, perhaps, for the Conference itself. The Chicom drive to ensure that there will be a Conference this fall began before they left Algiers in June. They will continue to take steps to redress Arab or African disaffec- tion and counter closer moderate cooperation. Since the "Africa-is-ripe- for-revolution" line and speedy recognition of Boumedienne have been some- what counter-productive, they will probably be generally more cautious and less blatant in their dealings with Arabs and Africans; even assigning a good portion of the action roles to their Indonesian and Pakistani friends. Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Sni?o i : -i- (937 Cont.) Approved For Release 20 RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio went to Africa in late July, but even here discussion of the Conference appears to have been buried in broader discussions. The Chicoms could be confronted by a conflict be- tween their objectives and Indonesia's: The Chicoms are opposed to a radical rump session, but the Indonesians would probably accept it since they label the Conference a step on the road to a Conference of Newly Emerging Forces (CONEFO), currently Sukarno's pet idea. Still another postponement would jeopardize the current plan for CONEK dAiring the summer of 1966. The Moderates. Arab and radical African steps to delay the Confer- ence would obviously be welcomed by the moderates. Some moderates feel that the truly unprecedented cooperation' within their ranks was instru- mental in achieving postponement, and they look to increased cooperation between the Far Eastern group and the Indian-led South Asia bloc. Other estimates point to Indian-Ceylonese supported actions at the abortive June gathering as the only effective ones, although they were defensive in character. Significantly, the Ethiopian draft, with some changes to suit the radicals,. was the basis for the preparatory committee's communique on postponement. Currently, Japan, India and Ethiopia are planning discus- sions before the Conference but dissensions seem to exist between CENTO moderates Iran and Turkey and between. these two and Pakistan. Moderate Arab and African participation on the permanent preparatory committee is generally regarded by the active moderates (on and outside the committee) as ineffectual. To remedy this situation, it has been suggested that the committee be revamped to bring about greater active moderate representa- tion that could break the radical monopoly over preparations. Some Issues. Moderates will also continue to be concerned. with the issues of Malaysian, GVN, ROK and Soviet participation. The Algerian threat to the Philippines that the dispatch of troops to Vietnam could constitute grounds for exclusion suggests a premise-that the Chicom- dominated group could use for keeping the ROK (which has troops An South Vietnam) and 'GVN out and ad?hitting only the sVu Interestingly, some moderates maintain that within the context of the Conference they take confidence in a firm U.S. position in Vietnam, and even radical Arab and African leader states are actively concerned that a negotiated peace be obtained in Vietnam, whereas the Chicoms want the Second Afro-Asian Conference to support their national liberation policy and. its specific application to the Vietnam situation. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 (931 Cont ) 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 938. Approved For Release 2005/06/13310 '11 1965 SOVIET ESPIONAGE CONTINUES 25X1 SITUATION: On 16 June 1965, a Norwegian court sentenced Captain Kristen GjOen (pronounced 'GYOAN) to twelve years imprisonment for espi- onage in what Norwegians consider their most serious spy case since World War II; it is their eighthcas.e since that conflict. Gj$en was a security officer in the Norwegian Air Force, stationed at Bod$ airfield in 1956- 1957, and at Rygge airfield after the fall of 1960. He had also attended a Norwegian Defense Staff security course and, in 1957, a British Royal Air Force security course in England. In his position, Gj$en had access to highly secret information about Norwegian air bases, Norwegian air force personnel, NATO papers, mobilization and defense plans. Gj$en went to the Soviet embassy in Oslo at an undisclosed date in 1964, see the Soviet military attach', and offered to sell mili- tary information to the Soviets. The Norwegian captain had gotten into .debt due to his domestic expenses and his excessive'drinking, and his alcoholism and financial worries had affected his work. He had been fined for drunkenness, and had learned in December 1963 that he would be removed from his security duties, but the removal was not immediately carried out, and he continued to have access to highly secret information: Thus, with his career under a cloud, with an urgent need for money, and with access to secret information, Gj$en decided to betray his country. During GjOen's first visit to the Soviet Embassy, the military attach, Colonel A.A. Zhuk, a GRU officer, questioned Gj$en to establish his bona fides, received documents from-him, and gave him 2000 kroner (approx. U.S. $280), getting a receipt for the money. On 19 October, GjOen visited the Soviet Embassy again, this time meeting with a member of Zhuk's staff, Lt. Col. Sergei Yevdokimov, another GRU officer. (Zhuk was reportedly out of Oslo at the time on other duties.) Gj~en was asked if he could obtain in- formation on the NATO exercise Fallex, and he said he could, given time and money. In response to a question, Gj~en also told Yevdokimov that he could travel, though not on short notice. Yevdokimov wanted him to go to either Vienna or Bern for t r a n i n g, and it was arranged that if Gj$en could go to Vienna he would send the Oslo embassy a postcard signed "Willy" (W for Wien); if he could go to Bern, the card would be signed "Billy." On arrival at one of these cities, he would go to the Soviet embassy, ask for Approved For Release 2005/06/13 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 (938 C ont . ) Approved For Release 2005/06/ L3~_ CIA-RDP78-03061 A000300040004-2 the military attach4, deliver whatever documents he could bring with him, and stay-for three or four days. G,j$en was not to call at the Oslo embassy again, or sebk other contact with embassy personnel in Oslo; he was shown photographs of a location outside Oslo and was told that 1heft was a "mail box," nearby ( a hole in the side of a hill, covered lay a stone) in which he could place documents. At the end of the meeting, Gj$en received another 2000 kroner. Then Gj$en had the idea of going to the American embassy as well, telling them what he had done and offering to be a double agent. In this way he would make more money and he hoped that working for the Americans would "legitimize" his activities. But the American air at- tache'to whom Gj$en talked refused to consider such an arrangement, and told Gj$en that he would immediately inform the Norwegian authorities. Very reluctantly, G,j~en then turned himself in to the Norwegian Security Police. Despite their domestic publicity regarding the past accomplishments of Soviet espionage (see BPG #904, "Whitewashing the KGB," 24 May 1965), the Soviets customarily deny current accusations of espionage in other countries, no matter how well-founded. They have been particularly vehe- ment in their denials in the G,joen case. On 18 December 1964, immediately after the Oslo press had first revealed the arrest of Captain GjOen and had linked Gj$en with the Soviets (the official Norwegian press release had only said that G,j4en had spied for an "unnamed foreign power"), Soviet Embassy Charge"A.S. Kaplin made an oral complaint to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Kaplin was reminded that the official statement had not named the USSR, and that the Norwegian government cannot muzzle the Norwegian press. On 23 June 1965, after the trial, the'Norwegians made an official protest to Soviet Ambassador Lunkov over Soviet activities revealed in the Gj$en case. The Soviets brusquely rejected this protest on 21 July, main- taining that Norwegian complaints over Soviet activities were groundless and that Zhuk's activities violated neither international law nor diplo- matic status; the Soviet note also expressed the hope that the Norwegian government would try to end the "press campaign" on the case, which was "damaging Norwegian-Soviet relations." To Norwegians, it seemed that the Soviet note of 21 July was an insult to their system of justice, and a demand that '.their press be muzzled. (See Press Comment, 5 August 1965) The Soviets may have been encouraged in their brazen attitude by the tactfulness of the Norwegian government. Norse authorities did not officially name the USSR in their December 1964 announcement of Gj$en's arrest, and later on, authorized accounts of the trial disclosed only Col. Zhuk's involvement, and not that of Lt. Col. Yevdokimov. The pub- lished record of the case (see Press Comment, Special Issue, July 1965) released on 21 June 1965 made it appear that Gj$en's second conversation at the Soviet Embassy (19 October 1964) was, like the first, with Col. Zhuk. Yevdokimov's role emerged in public only after press leakages on 9 July.1965. (See Press Comment, 26 and 27 July 1965) Zhuk had returned 2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/178-03061A000300040004-2 to the Soviet Union in early December 1964, ostensibly because his tour of duty was over, while Yevdokimov remains in Oslo. (FYI only, the Norwegian government may have wished to avoid a persona non grata action, which would probably result in Soviet retaliation against a Norwegian diplomat in Moscow. End FYI.) The Norwegian government tries its best to avoid unnecessary friction with its big Eastern neighbor; as is the way with totalitarians, the Kremlin only takes advantage of this policy to try to throttle criticism. 25X1 3 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 (938 Cont.) 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 CPYRGH Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 T COMMUNISM TODAY: A Refresher Course U NDERGROUND and in open combat, by subversion, terrorism, blackmail, riot and rhetoric, faithful Com- munists the world over have for decades waged a holy war against the rest of humanity. The tempo and techniques vary from era to era, from continent to continent. And the nature of Communism changes, Whereas Moscow now shuns the perilous confrontations that so often brought the cold war to boiling point, Peking grows ever more militant. For both capitals of world Communism, the focal points of conflict have shifted from Europe to Africa, Latin America and- most notably-Southeast Asia, where the Johnson Admin- istration last week solemnly committed the U.S. to what could be a prolonged and painful war. Thus the Marxist dream of world domination is palpably no McCarthyist mirage. From Indonesia, where govern- ment-sanctioned mobs howled for the ouster of a newly arrived U.S. ambassador, to Cuba, where Fidel Castro pro- claimed that "the imperialists" will not prevent Red regimes from taking over throughout the hemisphere, it was also becoming clear last week that the U.S. would have to stand increasingly alone against the free world's enemies. Nonetheless, to a world grown weary of cold-war ful- mination, the thunder out of Hanoi or Havana often has a curiously chimerical ring; the Iron Curtain itself seems less an instrument of terror and repression than a gigantic cob- web of cliche. Particularly to the generation that has reached voting (or at least debating) age since the early coups and crises of the postwar era, the sounds of struggle appear al- most as irrelevant and unreal as fragments of a horror tale recollected from childhood. Many of their elders see Com- munism in the confused, self-doubting terms that have char- acterized the. recent wave of academic protest over Viet Nam and Santo Domingo. "Is it up to us to say who is a Communist and who is not?" asks Anatol Rapoport, 54, of the University of Michigan, a leading organizer of teach- ins. Shrugging off the Red infiltrators in Santo Domingo, a Stanford professor of Latin American history allows: "You can find 58 Communists in New York, or San Francisco, or anywhere." Political Scientist Stanley Millet, 48, formerly of Briarcliff College, goes so far as to argue that "terror on our side accounts for all that has happened in Viet Nam." Since the U.S.-Soviet detente that developed after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, more venerable and more qual- ified commentators also have begun to sound as if Com- munism had quietly buried itself. Not long ago, the Man- chester Guardian pronounced: "The Russians and the Ameri- cans no longer have any reason to quarrel." And there is a widespread school of chop logic that maintains simul- taneously: 1) Russia can no longer be seriously regarded as a threat to the West, and 2) by its firm stand in Southeast Asia, the U.S. is inviting Russian retaliation: Both premises are debatable at best; together, they are not an argument but a plea for passivity. The danger of such wishful think- ing, as the State Department's Walt Rostow has warned, is that "but of a false sense that the cold war is coming to an end, out of boredom or domestic preoccupations, or a de- sire to get on with purely national objectives, we will open up new opportunities for the Communists to advance." The Polycentric Era Communism ? has itself made wrenching readjustments. One of the more striking has been the post-Stalin push for respectability. True; the spectacle of Khrushchev banging a shoe at the U.N. did little to convince the world that Kremlinologist Christian Duvael diagnoses as "the fatigue of ideology" in the Soviet bloc. As Marxism proved less and less relevant to the economic and social problems of con- temporary society, Soviet ideologues came to realize that they could no longer be solved in class-war terms. As the old terror abates but never entirely vanishes, as the old dogmas die but.never get burled, Intellectuals In Russia and Eastern Europe increasingly feel as "alienated" from their own societies as some of their Western counterparts. When British Poet Stephen Spender recently told a gathering of Polish writers that what he wanted to see most of all was a Communist, a voice from the back of the hall called out: "You have come too late for that." Soviet-bloc Commu- nism has *become a weird conglomeration of Marxist rem- nants, state socialism with tentative injections of free enter- prise, and above all, nationalism. In today's polycentric Eastern Europe, once tightly controlled satellites have devel- oped what De Gaulle might call a Communisme des patries. All this has only exacerbated Sino-Soviet antagonisms. Red China's'rulers, fiercely determined to preserve ideologi- cal': purity against Muscovite "revisionism," are bound to re- main cruel and, spartan. Contemptuous of Soviet policies, obdurate in its distrust of anything resembling capitalist methods, insistent on violence, China is irreversibly commit- ted to the notion of central direction for the whole Commu- nist movement-as long as'Peking can do the directing. The Fronts Obviously, it would be foolish for the West to pretend that Communism in 1965 is the same monolithic menace it once was; but it is equally nonsensical to regard Communism as a legitimate or benign form of government, or to suggest, as the London Times did recently, that Marxism may have "ceased to be an organized international movement." Communism may no longer have a single line or direction, but it remains highly organized, aggressively international, and more intensely competitive than ever as a result of Sino- Soviet rivalry. Though the Cominform (successor to the Comintern) was dissolved in 1956, control over the world- wide Communist movement is still vested in special depart- ments of the Soviet and Chinese Central Committees. Of the world's 105 Communist Parties, Moscow can count on 72, as against 21 for Peking. Twelve other Communist Parties-mostly in Western Europe-are vaguely independ- ent. In 1964, foreign aid by Communist countries. amounted to $1.7 billion, of which Soviet funds accounted for half, Eastern European funds for a quarter. Of 17,530 Commu- nist technicians working in foreign countries-a skarp rise from the preceding year-only 15% were Chinese. One of the most effective instruments of Communist sub- version remains the front organization. In McCarthy's hey- day Communist terminology was tossed about too carelessly, and in many quarters today words and realities such as "infiltration" no longer seem entirely credible. Yet the lead- ing fronts still reflect the reality and breadth of the Com- munist subversive effort. They range from pacifist groups such as the World Peace Council (headquartered in Prague) and the International Institute of Peace (Vienna) to various youth and professional outfits such as the International Union of Students and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (Prague and Brussels). Most of these organizations-many launched by non-Communists with the best intentions and then taken over-are dominated by Soviet-line Communism, although the Chinese are fighting hard to capture them and are setting up rival fronts of their ever, Soviet di~}31e1t R?D`~~ ~lA_R ~6f r the two Red giants, and in which Soviet agents pushe oreign Minister Jan to some extent in rep y6'lo' it ommunist subversion pro- Masaryk from a window of Prague's Czernin Palace. coeds apace, highly successful in some quarters, disastrously A far more significant development is what Munich failing in others, but always at work. By all odds, the threat is most serious in Asia, where Coin- munism-predominantly Chinese Communism--exploits the vast turmoil of social disorder and political-economic dis- content. Peking has chosen as its chief weapon "the war of national liberation," an export version of the Chinese Com- munist revolution, which is based on the theory that through interminable guerrilla war a weaker force can wear out and finally overcome a stronger one. The Chinese work through nominally independent "nationalist" organizations such as the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front. It makes no difference to Peking if such fronts contain many non- Communists; as in North Viet Nam when the French were forced out, Communists can always take over. As Yugo- slavia's Tito has expressed it: "The Chinese will fight to the last North Vietnamese." Peking also uses the "united front" stratagem elsewhere. Most effective example is in Indonesia, where the 2,000,000- member Partai Kontuuis Indonesia, the third largest Com- munist Party in the world (after China and Russia), domi- nates the streets and, through the streets, President Sukarno. Pro-Peking Communists also work hand in hand with Singa- pore's Barisan Socialist Party, have long since captured Japan's 10 million-member Gensuikyo, its Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (which nonetheless lost con- siderable support with the advent of Red China as a nuclear power). Though India's 160,000-member Communist Party is split down the middle, the pro-Chinese wing holds the psychological whip hand, having won 40 seats in this year's Kerala state election to only three for the Muscovite wing. The victory was doubly impressive, since there has been virulent anti-Chinese feeling in India since the 1962 invasion. The Chinese are currently laying the foundations of in- surgency in northeast Thailand. Among primitive hill tribes such as the Lahu, Peking has sent native cadres trained in China to spread the word of a new messiah. One savior is already at work among the Lahu, claiming to possess a "magic hammer, magic rope and magic knife" with which he can kill all enemies, even if they number "as many as the sesame seeds in three baskets." Peking's most formidable source of subversion is the 15 million "overseas" Chinese, who dominate much of the trade and commerce of non- Communist Asia. In Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, the Philip- pines and Burma, their hsiao-tzu (literally, "little groups"), of three to 22 members, perform subversive chores wher- ever possible. Everywhere, Red China cynically exploits racism to the detriment not only of the Western powers, but also of the Russians, who are. increasingly on the defensive in Asia. But racial feeling also works against China, for many Asians have a centuries-old fear of the Chinese and it is at ]east as strong as their anti-white prejudice. The greatest threat Peking holds over its Asian neighbors is its army-2,500,001) infantrymen, a 12-million-man militia-which could inun- date the continent if all its subversive stratagems should fail. That is why Viet Nam is the ultimate test of Peking's poli- cies: if the U.S. backed away from the threat of Chinese intervention, it would lend powerful support to the untested notion that China is invincible. o are rea t y avai a c o p < Latin America Yet the myy country where an operational in time be locked in a bitter internecine contest to re estab- subversive final iiQ Frl tllF@l giAeh~lQlOfifO&dsltteGlA-RD49718QO1 E644t F0 0(4(oO*~elligerent purity. In ap- As a result, Communist activists in Latin America have peal and purpose, Communism today is unquestionably a adopted new tactics. They are best exemplified by the failing creed. Yet it is precisely in decline and decay that a . ;.inntnait.c like 'mnirec_ can nroye most dan?erous. Latin America: Hiding Behind Ideologies With the exception of Cuba, no Communist Party in Central or South America holds power, but all are well prepared to manipulate perpetual popular discontent. Cas- tro's Cuba is the prototype, the precedent, and to a large extent the preceptor of incipient Communist revolutions in the hemisphere. Since 1960, Castro has trained guerrillas from most Latin countries, including Colombia, Haiti, Vene- zuela and the Dominican Republic. Propaganda and arms tential revolutionaries throughout d1 t bl t ~i~}S~r~ iYt r a scling into a Itgitimate Ap~ye~]-egg 2005/06/13 :CIA-tY+S-C FlritfsY~tQ,H~~`+~'v3th hopes of duping its idealistic leader, Juan Bosch. Much the same technique was employed a year ago in Panama and in Goulart's Brazil (1961-64), and in both countries it proved unsuccessful. Nonetheless, in Panama and the Dominican Republic, the Reds achieved a secondary objective, that of forcing the U.S. to intervene in a conflict that to the gullible could be made to resemble a valid internal revolution. Africa: Money & Arms "Revolution-the witch doctor in tiger skins," wrote a Polish poet in praise of the Congo rebellion. In fact, Red witchcraft is doing poorly in Africa. The only African coun- try under outright Communist domination is the former colony of Congo-Brazzaville. Through hamhanded diplo- macy. and sloppy technology, the Russians alienated two of their likeliest converts, Guinea's Sekou Toure and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah. China, usually more subtle in its subver- sive techniques, has also managed to stomp on African toes. Peking's men in Burundi were thrown out early this year after a Chinese subversion campaign that was climaxed by the assassination of Moderate Premier Pierre Ngendan- dumwe. During a recent visit to Tanzania, Chou En-lai ineptly pronounced Africa today was "exceedingly favor- able" for revolution-which to incensed African leaders suggested that Peking was plotting their own downfall. Russia and China both had to write off major investments in Algeria's Ahmed ben Bella, who managed to woo Mos- cow and Peking simultaneously before his precipitate ouster last June. Still; as the Russians proved when they sent arms to the Congo rebels, both Moscow and Peking continually attempt to influence students, intellectuals, officials. Europe: A Problem of Prosperity Except for the U.S., where Communism can claim only 10,000 party members, the Red cause has probably fared worst in Western Europe. Nonetheless, with a quarter of a million members, the French Communist Party pulls fully 20% of the vote, ranks as the second biggest political force in the nation (only De Gaulle stands taller). Italy's 1,5 mil- lion Communists have gradually increased their share of the vote until it stands at 25%. Many such Communist votes amount to a ritualistic protest by citizens who simply oppose the existing order. Yet through sheer numbers, the national parties today exercise a potent veto power on Mos- cow's line. The U.S. in the past decade has become far more sophis- ticated about Communism, moving from frightened hostility to eagerly sought contacts ranging from the test ban treaty to trade. Washington has abandoned dreams of "rolling back" the Reds-and has learned in the process that Com- munists can fear coexistence more than the West. For its party Soviet Communism in the 1960s has mel- lowed considerably as its leaders have discovered that goulash is more palatable than gunpowder. Under Khru- shchev and his successors, Premier Aleksei Kosygin and Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev, the old, unbending creed of unconditional war against capitalism has yielded to the cautious dialogue of coexistence. It has had to, for the workers of the industrialized world today are not likely to be inveigled into violent assault on social systems that have given them so large a measure of prosperity. As for hungry, underdeveloped Red China, the uncom- promising letter and spirit of crusading Leninism dovetail neatly with economic necessity and Peking's dreams of re- asserting its ancient hegemony over Asia. The threat to peace lies between the extremes, between Russia's evolu- tionary progress and China's hard adherence to a fundamen- talist philosophy. In the struggle for power and legitimacy throughout the Communist world, Moscow and Peking could Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 25X1 16 August 1965 Abusers of Hospitality (Note: The following is a list of Soviets who have been declared resoona non grata or expelled for espionage, subversion or other undesirable activity. This list only includes recent cases; moreover, this list represents only some of the Soviets who have been obliged to return to their own country, since it only includes cases which have appeared in press reports. In other cases, governments have refrained from making public announcements, usually for diplomatic reasons. Accompanying each name is the nominal position, the date of departure and the place from which the individual Soviet was obliged to leave.) 1. SAMOYLOV, Mikhail Kuzmich, First Secretary, Soviet Legation, Monte- video, Uruguay, January 1961. Engaged in subversive activities. 2, YENAKIYEV,, Oleg Yakolevich, Izvest a correspondent, Bonn, Germany, August 1961. SHUT IY, Vladislav Stanislavovich, Tass correspondent, West Berlin, September 1961. li. METKIN, Mikhail Vasilyevich, Tass representative, Karachi, Pakistan, November 1961. Subversive activities among students, As of the summer of 1965, METKIN was in the Sudan. 5. SHIBAYEV, Sergey Vasilyevich, Trade Attache, Soviet Embassy, The Hague, October 1961. 6. POPOV, Anatoliy Dmitriyevich, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, The Hague, October 1961. 7. PONOMARENKO, Panteleymon, Ambassador, Soviet Embassy, The Hague, October 1961. SHIBAYEV, POPOV, and PONOMABENKO were expelled after they had scuffled with Dutch police while trying to spirit the wife of A. GOLUB, a defecting Soviet scientist, out of the country, 8, LOGINOV, Anatoly Fedorovich, Lt. Col., Assistant Military Attache, Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, December 1961. Attempted to obtain secret information from a Canadian government employee, 9. SOLOD, David, Ambassador, Soviet Embassy, Conakry, Guinea,, December 1961. Involved in p1gts against the Guinean government. 10, PRIPOLTSEV, Valerian, Employee, Soviet Trade Mission, Cologne, Ger- many. Arrested for espionage in August 1961, convicted in February 1962,.and released and expelled,, July 1962. U. ANDREYEV, Vladislav Sergeyevich, a Commercial. CCounsellor, $oviet Embassy, Wellington, New Zealand., July .1962,, Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 (Cont.} Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 12. SHTYKOV, Nikolai Ivanovich, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Wellington, New Zealand, July 1962. SHTYKOV and ANDREYEV were attempting to recruit agents. 13. MISHUKOV, Yuriy, Translator, United Nations Office of Conference Services, New York, USA, September 1962. 14. ZAITSEV, Yuriy V., Political Affairs Officer, United Nations, New York, USA, September 1962. MISHUKOV and ZAITSEV attempted to re- cruit an American citizen for espionage. 15. VYRODOV, Ivan Y., Member of USSR UN Delegation, New York, USA, October 1962. 16. PROKHOROV, Yevgeniy M., Member of USSR UN Delegation, New York, USA, October 1962. VYRODOV and PROKHOROV sought to obtain US defense documents from an American citizen. 17. BARANOVSKY, Georgiy, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm, Sweden, June 1963. 18. NIKOLSKIY, Vitally, Military Attache, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm, Sweden, June 1963. BPtRANOVSKY and NIKOISKIY were involved in the case of Co. Stig. WENNERSTROM. 19. KISELEV, Lev Sergeyevich, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Reykja- vik, Iceland, February 1963. 20. DMITRIYEV, Lev, Employee, Soviet Embassy, Reykjavik, February 1963. Ragnar GUNHARSSON, an Icelander, told police of KISELEV's and DMITRIYEV's efforts to recruit him for espionage. 21. PAVLOV, Gleb A., Attache, Soviet UN Mission, New York, USA, October, 1963. 22. ROMASHIN, Yuriy A., Third Secretary, Soviet UN Mission, New York, USA, October 1963- 23* IVANOV, Igor A., Chauffeur, Soviet UN Mission, New York, USA, October 1963. PAVLOV, ROMASHIN, and IVANOV met with a New Jersey engineer who gave them US defense secrets. 24. TARASOV, Vasiliy, Izvestiya correspondent, Ottawa, Canada, April 1964. Attempted to buy classified information from a Canadian government employee. 25. SKRIPOV, Ivan Fedorovich, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Canberra, Australia, February 1963. Recruited an Australian government employee. 26. SOLOMATIN, Vladimir losifovich, Soviet Trade Representative, London, UK, March 1964. Attempted to get information on strategic equip- ment, also personal information on British businessmen for future blackmail. Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004- 2 Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040004-2 27. ABRASIIC N, Mikhail Y., Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Karachi, Pakistan, June 1964, 28. UDAIAV, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, Assistant Air Attache) Soviet Embassy, Washington, USA, December 1964. 29. TKACHENKO, Vadim, Assistant Naval Attache, Soviet Embassy, London, UK, December 1964. 30. ZADVINSKIY, Vasiliy Vasilyevich, Military Attache, Soviet Embassy, Washington, USA, December 1964. 31. GRECHANIN, Vladimir Petrovich, Assistant Military Attache, Soviet Embassy, Washington, USA, December 1964. 32. KOLESNIKOV, Mikhail Ivanovich, Soviet Delegate, Conference of Fed- eration of-Colombian Trade Unions (CSTC), Bogota, Colombia, Decem- ber 1964. 33. OPEKUNOV, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, Soviet Delegate, Conference of Federation of Colombian Trade Unions (CSTC), Bogota, Colombia, December 1964. KOIESNIKOV and OPEKUIIOV were charged with espionage and overstaying their visas. 34. KARPOVICH, Boris Vladimirovich, Novo ti correspondent and Embassy Counsellor, Washington, USA, December 1964. 35. PAVLOV, Serge) Sergeyevich, Aeroflot representative, Paris, France, February 1965. 36. KHOKHLOV, Nikolai, Izvest a correspondent, Leopoldville, Congo, March 1965. 37. SHAKHAROV, Khairula M., Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Colombo, Ceylon, May 1965. SHAKIIAROV had already been obliged to leave Thailand in 1958. 38. KALASHNIKOV, Aleksandr F., Chauffeur, Soviet Embassy, Teheran, Iran, March 1965- 39. BYCHKOV, Anatoliy Yef imovich, Commercial Attache, Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, Canada, May 1965. 40. POLUSHKIN, Vladimir Nikolaevich, Employee, Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, May 1965. 41. NYUNIN, Viktor Ivanovich, Assistant Military Attache, Teheran, Iran, March 1965- 42. KIRSANOV, Stepan Mikhailovich, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Washington, USA, June 1965. 43. BOYAR Vit iy Konstantinovich Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Ap on{Re 25/06/13 : CIA-R1DP78-03061 A000300040004-2 o ? 3