Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 14, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 30, 1965
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1.pdf10.87 MB
Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Ap ed For Release 2005/641016441111141aF'78-03061A000300040005-1 Significant Dates SEPT. 14 Vatican Council convenes. 14 UN GA calls for USSR and adopts report of 17 USSR invades Poland. 19 20 20 "to desist from repressive measures" in Hungary Special Committee. 1957 1939. Week of International. Struggle Against Fascism and War (Communist). USSR grants sovereignty to East Germany. Tenth aanIKIERaa. International Organization. of Journalists (I0J) Executive meeting, Santiago, Chile (Communist). 21 People's Republic of China proclaimed. 1949. 27 Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation (AFRASEC) Council meeting, Peking, 27-29 September. 28 Friedrich Engels born (1)i'5 years ago) 1820. Dies 5 Aug 1895. 28 First international. founded, London. 1864. Disintegrates by 1872. 28 USSR and Estonia sign 10-year pact which "shall not in any way infringe sovereign rights of parties..." 1939. Infringed, June 1940. 1955. Committee OCT. 1 Federation of Nigeria becomes independent. Fifth annRaa. 1960. 3 20th annivy, adoption of statute of World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) at founding congress, Paris, 3 Oct 1945. (Communist) 8 6th WFTU Congress, Warsaw, 8-22 Oct. 14 Russia signs treaty with Finland, recognizing Finnish independence and sovereignty. 1920. 17 22nd Congress of CPSU. Khrushchev and Chou En-lai clash on Stalinism and Albania. 17-31 Oct 1961. 19 Political upheaval in Poland defies Kremlin and places Gomulka at head of party and government, 1956. 20 Chicom troops begin advance into India, escalating border war. Withdrawal announced 21 November, 1962. 21 III Annual Organization of African Unity Oallo Summit, Accra, origi- nally scheduled for early Sept., considering Oct. date. 21 UN condemns Chicom suppression of Tibet. 1959. Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 StIMORNMEED Approved For Release 2005/06/1331.M1:778-03061A000300040005-1 25X1 #6o Principal Develaal2LL: GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS 41( Commentary 4-17 August 1965 1, The Chicoms limit themselves to two attacks on the Yugoslays as servants of U.S. imperialism and to publicizing a "routine" New Zealand CP denunciation of Modern revisionists, while the Soviets blandly reaf- firm their devotion to the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses and to the new Party Program as true Leninism. The Albanians "routinely" denounce Soviet- U.S. "secret diplomacy" in connection with the "Harriman mission" to Moscow. 2. The French CP publicly attacks -- for the first time, as far as we are aware -- the pro-Chinese French dissident Communist "Federation of Marxist-Leninist Circles" and its Chinese masters. 3. Splits are formalized in two more CPs in smaller countries -- Israel and Colombia -- with a small Peking-oriented faction in each ar- rogating the Party's name and holding what it claims to be the Party Con- gress. Possibly the strongest divisive issue in the ICP seems to be the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the old-line, Soviet-aligned faction charac- terized (by Israel Radio) as "pro-Israel" and the Peking-oriented splinter as "pro-Arab. 4. The Indonesian CF's total alignment with the Chicoms is confirmed by the statement of "complete unanimity of position and views" during the Aidit-led delegation's brief visit to Peking, as contrasted with the "ex- change of opinions" during their stay of almost a month in Moscow (see #59, July 31, for Moscow statement), 5. The JSP-controlled, Gensuikin-sponsored "World Conference Against A & H Bombs" (see #59, July 27 and continuing, for rival JCP-controlled Gensuikyo conference), with a Soviet delegation in attendance and two Russian "observers" representing the WPC, is relatively small and quiet, with no polemical attacks reported, 6. An "international symposium" on "Trends in European Capitalism" sponsored in Rome by the PCI's Gramsci Institute brings wide attendance by Communists and left Socialists from most countries of Western and Eastern Europe, including the USSR, However, the carefully generalized reporting thus far available indicates that the discussion touched so many issues troublesome to Marxists and brought about so much debate that the sponsors are not sure how to handle the results. 7. The period ends with a conspicuous -- and apparently successful -- Soviet effort to use the North Korean celebration of the 20th anniversary Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 (Commentary Cont.) 25X1 Approved For Release 2oo5IesepgmferRDP78-03061A000300040005-1 of "liberation from Japanese imperialism" for improved relations: the Shelepin-led Soviet Party-State delegation is by far the most senior in attendance, and it is further supplemented by a Soviet war veterans group headed by a General. The North Korean Kim-Choe telegram respond- ing to the Soviet Brezhnev-Mikoyan-Kosygin congratulations pays tribute to their "militant friendship and cooperation" and promises to "do every- thing in our power to strengthen further and develop this friendship and the unity of the socialist camp and the solidarity of the ICM." 2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 401406414=1, (Commentary) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #60 4-17 August 1965 June 25-27 delayed): An "international symposium on 'Trends in European Capitalism' sponsored by the PCI's Gransci Institute in Rome is attended by several dozen "economists, sociologists, and political leaders of all persuasions from all countries of capitalist and socialist Europe" -- according to L'Unita of 29 June: the wide-ranging list of names in L'Unita on the 26th includes in "foreign delegations" Swedish CP Chair- man Helmannson, Soviet economists Ambartsumov and Timofeyev, Britain's Maurice Dobb (one of the principal speakers), USA's Robert and Sylvia Thompson, France's Charles Bettelheim (also a principal speaker), as well as most of the top Italian Communists and extreme-left (PSIUP) Socialists. Although reporting on the proceedings is general and vague (as for as we have seen, at least), a comment in Rinascita of 3 July indicates that the discussion touched on developments which are truly disturbing to Marxists, provoking involved debates and arguments: "...The Gramaci symposium marked the end of a certain way of reasoning and of the use of certain patterns of judgment which have for far too long interfered with a truly effective Marxist economic debate.... Marxist thought, both in the West and in the East, is definitely liberating itself from many of its idols.... Some day; when it is possible to study all of the proceedings of this conference with greater care -- the conference publications actually involve thousands of pages -- we will get a better picture of the fertility of its work and we will also be able to debate and research in a more specific and profound fashion...." July 2 (delayed): La Voix du Peuple, organ of the pro-Chinese Belgian Communist dissidents, tells how "on Thursday; 6 May 1965, Reverend Herve'Chaigne, editor of the magazine Fre,es du Monde published in Bordeaux by a group of Franciscans and lay people, was scheduled to deliver a lecture on the "Chinese Theses" on the invitation of the Belgium-China Association. The Office of the Papal Nuncio to Belgium, at the last moment and as a result of various pressures..., expressed the 'ioh that this lecture be cancelled." La Voix publishes Father Chaigne's statement on his abstention and lengthy excerpts from the intended lecture, including the following passages: "...Chinese Communism -- how is it possible not to understand this -- is precisely what the proletarian nations have always been, and still are, waiting for. ...It is possible that the 'Chinese Theses' can be taken to be the universal truth of Communism. sinre by ?bilging the USSR to Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A0R9.09613235-1cont. ) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 keep track of the particular kind of Marxism in use in the under- developed countries, these theses compel the Soviets both to return to and to maintain themselves in M-L orthodoxy. ...If I dare make the comparison, I might say that the 'Chi- nese Theses' plead the cause of revolutionary 'Catholicity." July 21-27 (delayed): French CP weekly France Nouvelle publishes the French CP's first attack on the pro-Chinese French dissident Communist "Federation of Marxist-Leninist Circles' and its Chinese masters. FN's attack is pegged to the 29 June Swiss police expulsion of a Federation "delegation" -- which included the directors of the faction's monthly L'Humaniter Nouvelle -- for illegal political activity with members of the Chinese Embassy in Bern. Asking "Who finances this enterprise?", the FM article by Lucien Mathy declares that the Bern incident "illu- minates the nature and activity of these tiny groups who flaunt the claim of defending the purity of M-L but whose true aim and practical activity is to throw confusion into the democratic workers movement." The pro-Chinese dissidents are "ambitious dupes, careerists, some of whom have been rejected by the Party as unworthy to be members, who have become 'agents' ... of the EL2nchineseci." August 2 (delayed): NCNA publicizes an article entitled "Contradictions and Revisionism" from the June issue of the New Zealand Communist Review, a routine denunciation of the modern revisionists for "undermining the national liberation movement and holding back the people's revolutionary struggle." AWalsr.1:2220472.1: NCNA denounces "Borba, organ of the Yugoslav Tito clique, which has openly spoken for U.S. aggression against Vietnam and praised U.S. President Johnson's 28 July statement." August 3-6: The Aidit-led Indonesian CP delegation which had spent most of July in Moscow (see f/-59, July 31 for departure) has talks with loalhinese CP officials headed by Liu Shao-chi on 3-4 August, is ban- queted by Mao Tse-tung on the 5th and departs for home "by special plane" on the 6th. In contrast to the TASS report of only an "exchange of opinion" in Moscow, NCNA on the 4th reports that "the two sides had a complete unanimity of position and views on all these questions." NCNA on the 7th describes a tumultuous send-off at Peking airport, with Chou En-lai heading crowds of cheering, banner-waving, bouquet-presenting Chinese. August 4-8: Israeli Radio reports describe a split in the Israeli CP, with a "Wilner-Tai group," described as Peking-oriented and toeing a stronger pro-Arab line, breaking away from the old-line "pro-Israel faction" headed by Parliament members Mikunis and Sneh. Each of the rival factions arrogates the ICP name and holds its own "15th ICP Congress" concurrently. The Mikunis-Sneh group convenes August 4-7, with greetings from the CPSU and CP's of other countries. Dr. Sneh Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 2 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 openly blames China for slitting the socialist comp. The Vilner-Tubi group meets from the 5th to the th. Israeli Radio says that for the first time the Chinese CP did not send its greetings to an ICP Congress. Moscow domestic service on the 9th reports only that "the 15th Congress of the ICP ... has completed its work," electing a new Central Committee and Mikunis as General Secretary. On the 11th, however, TASS International acknowledges the split and separate coftgresses: making no mention of the "pro-Israel" and "pro-Arab" issues, it says that: "Both congresses expressed support for the documents of the Communist and workers parties meetings in 1957 and 1960 and the consultative meeting of CP representatives of March 1965. Both, however, accused the other of 'departure from the principles of internationalism,' factional activities,' 'backsliding to positions of nationalism,' etc." August : Albanian Party daily Zen i I Popullit vehemently denounces Ambassador Harriman's "mysterious visit to Moscow and his confidential talks with the K revisionist leaders" under the expressive heading: "A Second Camp David; Treacherous, Revisionist Secret Diplomacy Must Be Unmasked." August 9: Peking People' Daily Observer article denounces the Tito- Shastri "peace plan" for Vietnam as "the result of the tripartite con- fidential parleys between one master and two servants ... which peddles Johnson's 'peace talks' swindle." gust 10: Pravda and Izvestiya editorials, pegged to the publication of volumes 54 and 55, completing the Fifth Edition of a complete col- lection of Lenin's works, both take the occasion to reassert that the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses and the CPSU Program are the embodiment of "the Leninist general line" and "may serve as an example of such a creative approach to theory." August 11: NCNA reports from Bogota on a resolution adopted by "the Communist Party of Colombia at its 10th Congress" which declares that "The anti-revisionist struggle is a matter of life and death for the Communist parties.... It must be carried through to victory." After a long statement of Chinese-line views on a wide range of policy problems, including denunciation of "the treacherous leadership of the CPSU," the resolution concludes by branding "the group headed by Gilberto Vieira (Chairman of the old-line PCC)" as "renegades who peddle bourgeois ideas" and asserting that "Me are the PCC which contains no group of revision- ist renegades." (The existence of a small group of pro-Chinese dissi- dents who called themselves the "PCC-ML" [Colombian Communist Party - Marxist-Leninist] has been known, but this is the first report to reach us indicating its intent to arrogate the name and stature of the old PCC.) Al4oust 11-13: The "World Conference Against Atomic & Hydrogen Bombs" sponsored by the JSP-controlled Gensuikin is held on schedule (see 5;1'59, Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 3 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 July 27 and continuing, for rival JCP-controlled Omstikyo conference). Japan Times of the 12th reports only "33 foreigners were present as delegates and observers from 11 countries and 2 international organ- izations." The Soviet Peace Committee was represented, and, according to JT, two Russians attended as observers for the WPC. There is no report (thus far, at least) of any polemics against other Communist parties or organizations. August 15: North Korea's celebration of the 20th anniversary of Korea's "liberation from Japanese colonial rule" brings CP and/or State delega- tions from most Asian and some African conntries. The only non-A/A -- and conspicuously the most senior -- of the delegations reported is the Soviet, led by the powerful Shelepin: in addition, there is a prominent delegation of Soviet war veterans led by General Chistyakov. (The Chinese delegation is headed by Wu Hsin-yu, Deputy Secretary General of the NPC Standing Committee.) Shelepin's (and Pravda's) lauding of the Soviet Army's "crushing blow to the Japanese imperialists" is not re- flected by the North Koreans (the U.S. role is naturally not mentioned), but the telegram signed by NK Party Chairman Premier Kim Il-song and President Choe Yong-kon in response to the Brezhnev-Mikoyan-Kosygin message of congratulations contains a warm tribute to Soviet achieve- ments in "Communist construction" and the following passages which seem to read like a general endorsement of the Soviet line and position in the Communist world: "The relations of militant friendship and cooperation between peoples of Korea and the Soviet Union have been formed and consoli- dated in the common struggle against imperialism and for national independence and the victory of the cause of socialism and Communism.... Our people value the friendship with the fraternal Soviet people and will, in the future, too, do everything in our power to strengthen further and develop this friendship and the unity of the socialist camp and the solidarity of the ICM on the principles of M-L and proletarian internationalism." Pravda commentator Burlatsky, under the heading "Liberation Move- ment and Scientific Socialism," notes "the urgent need ... for clearer visualizing of all shades of contemporary socialism and for more clearly drawing the line between proletarian and non-proletarian trends." "Of course, this is not done to 'excommunicate' someone from socialism." B. specifically points to two "wrong approaches": those who say that non-Communist trends have nothing in common with socialism and do not "take into consideration the tremendous striving for socialism by the nutldtbug. non-proletarian masses of the working people, progressive intellectuals, and other sections of society"; and others who speak of "European," "Asian," "Afi.ican," etc., types of socialism. "Marxist-Leninists have always clearly visualized that social- ism in various conditions will assume different, largely dissimilar forms and specific features. Experience has shown that this is Approved For Release 2005/06/13 ?CIA -RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 4 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 really so. However, socialism shone fuadamentally a single system. There is no, nor can there ever be, a Russian or German, Chinese or African socialism." August 17: Djakarta's celebration of the 20th anniversary of "the proclamation of Indonesian independence" brings delegations and messrtg-,8 from a wider range of states than the North Korean anniversary described above, including such prestigious visitors as President Stoica of Rumania, which was not even represented in Korea (according to reports). Here the Chinese delegation, headed by veteran Party leader, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yl, overshadows and outpovers (even if it does not technically outrank) the Soviet delegation headed by Vice Premier Mazurov? a relative newcomer to the hierarchy. Reports thus far indicate no polemics or infighting at the event and no evidence of any partiality in treatment by the Indonesians. 5 (Chronology) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 App For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 SPOTLIGHT lincRernattkonn[l [Ja1DOP 'MUM Registered at the G.P.O. Melbourne for transmission by post as a periodical SPECIAL ISSUE JUNE 1965 ARMS and MEN from the NORTH The quickening pace of Hanoi's aggression 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1SIXPENCE INEINNIIIIIMINKVIRIMPUreefft Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 MORE V AT rums. Altivi"upptieeby e(1771.111,UniSt countries were seized by South Vietnamese jorces at Da Bia March 26, 1965. CPYRGH Approved For Release PYR H Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 ARMS and MEN from the NORTH Two significant changes have taken place in the nature of North Viet-Nam's interven- tion in South Viet-Nam: ?weapons manufactured in the communist bloc are becoming standard equipment in the regular units of the communist Viet Cong guer- rillas in the south; ?increasingly, these units are composed of men born in North Viet-Nam and sent clandestine- ly into the south. These developments have not changed the fundamental character of North Viet-Nam's ac- tions in the south. Hanoi has consistently infil- trated men and war materials into South Viet- Nam, by sea and overland through Laos, in viola- tion of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. Now, however, this intervention is much more blatant and difficult to disguise; an analysis of TRAINED OFFICERS, SPECIALISTS sent south by Hanoi are backbone of Viet Cong movement. Nguyen Thanh Hoa (above), formerly captain in North Vietnamese armed forces, became commander of VC 4th Main Force Battalion. Nguyen Van Do (be- low), senior captain in north, guided infil- tration group H. 26 into south, rallied to South Viet-Nam Republic in October 1963. Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CI DP78-03061A000300040005- For Release tfo SIGNAL PLATOON COMMANDER Le Van Thank, lieutenant in North Viet-Nam's 324th Division, was sent south in 1961, ral- lied to the Republic of Viet-Nam May 1962. al1111113. HEAVY WEAPONS INSTRUCTOR, Lieu- tenant Le Van Quyen, left North Viet-Nam for the south in April 1962, rallied to sup- port of Viet-Nam Republic six months later. GI-LY-14C-k1 ClAaRDRMIN611740310130(1040905-during the past 18 months shows clearly that North Viet-Nam is supplying the Viet Cong with most of their striking power. Weapons manufactured in the communist bloc, for the most part types which are now standard in bloc armies, have been captured by government forces in increasing quantities since 1963. During the early 1960's, when the Viet Cong were accelerating their effort to make orderly life impossible in South Viet-Nam, they relied primarily on weapons hidden in the south in 1954, and arms seized from government troops. The Viet Cong had few heavy weapons, however, and providing ammunition for their heterogeneous stock of arms posed a major problem of logistics. It is now evident that North Viet-Nam made a decision to re-equip all, or at least a major por- tion, of the regular Viet Cong units. The begin- nings of this trend were revealed in a report sub- mitted on January 29, 1964, by the government of Viet-Nam to the International Control Com- mission (ICC), responsible for overseeing imple- mentation of the Geneva Accords. The government's report said that war mate- rial made in Communist China and other bloc countries had been captured from the Viet Cong in widely separated parts of South Viet-Nam. It listed 14 heavy weapons, over 150 rifles and other small arms, more than 600 rounds of ammuni- tion for heavy weapons, and nearly 300,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition made in communist countries. This indicated that a significant flow of com- munist-bloc weapons into the south had begun. As the months passed, the flow increased sharply. For the first time, the Viet Cong began to em- ploy large-caliber machine guns. recoilless can- non, and other heavy weapons. Many of these arms, when captured from the Viet Cong, proved to have been manufactured in the communist bloc. Submachine guns, rifles, and other modern small-arms standard in communist armies and re- quiring ammunition made only in the communist bloc began to be captured in growing quantities. The most striking find was made in li eoruary 1965, after Vietnamese Air Force planes sank a North Vietnamese ship which had brought about 100 tons of arms and ammunition to a secluded cove in South Viet-Nam. In caves near the shore of Vung Ro Bay, the Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 3PYRGHT Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 - RADIO TECHNICIAN Dao Kien Lap, North Vietnamese Communist Party member since 1955, was picked to run clandestine radio station, but rallied in October 1963. VC WEAPONS TECHNICIAN Nguyen Thao was sent south in early 1963, rallied to the Republic two months after arrival at a se- cret Viet Cong arsenal. ENGINEER SQUAD LEADER Van Cong Khanh in VC Region 7 had infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in March 1962; he was captured in the fall of that year. VC BATTALION COMMANDER Tran Quoc Dan kept the rank of major when he was transferred from North Viet-Nam to the Viet Cong in 1962. He rallied in 1963. Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 TONS OF AMMUNITION, THOUSANDS OF WEAPONS supplied by Hanoi via North Vietnamese ships were seized from several VC caches in Vung Ro area. Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78 Viet Cong had numedly hidden approximately one million rounds of small arms ammunition; 4,000 rounds of ammunition for mortars, recoil- less cannon, and other heavy weapons; over 3,000 rifles, submachine guns and carbines; and large quantities of grenades, explosives, and medicines from factories in the communist bloc. The arms cache at Vung Rb Bay was inspected by Indian, Canadian, and Polish representatives of the ICC and by newsmen from all over the world. Maps, documents, and other evidence showed that the ship had come from North Viet- Nam. Markings, labels, and the types of weap- ons themselves proved incontestably that they were made in communist countries. Stencils on the boxes and ammunition showed that much of it had been produced as late as 1964. 0 , ther substantial finds continue to be made. Scores of modern bloc weapons were re- covered by government forces after they repulsed a large-scale Viet Cong attack on a post in Binh Dinh province in early March. A motorized junk carrying large quantities of explosives and ammunition and several hundred rifles and machine guns from North Viet-Nam was sunk in South Vietnamese coastal waters March 14. Over 100 cases of explosives and car- tridges, and 74 rifles made in Communist China, were recovered when the junk was refloated. Crew members told authorities that the rest of the cargo had been thrown overboard when the junk was spotted. Two tons of ammunition, nearly 700 individual v,sor,reapons, and a number of mortars, large-caliber machine guns, and explosives?mostly of bloc origin?were uncovered by government troops after an action in the vicinity of Vung Ro Bay March 16. It is difficult to determine precisely the quan- tity of communist-made weapons in the hands of the Viet Cong, but testimony from captives and other evidence suggests that a large percent- age of the personnel of regular Viet Cong units, and in many cases, a majority, are equipped with these weapons. One consequence may be a new logistics prob- lem for the Viet Cong, because they will be whol- ly dependent upon supplies from North Viet-Nam to provide ammunition for these weapons. Some skeptics have suggested that the Viet Approved For Release 2005/06/1 03000 000 COMMUNIST SUPPLIES for Viet Cong include Chinese weapons (above), German rifles taken by Soviet Union in 1945. CPYRGH Approved For Release 2005/06/13: Cong may have bought these weapons on the inter- national market. Aside from the unlikelihood that the Viet Cong might turn to such a source, and the difficulties of finance, acquisition, and delivery, the large quantities involved, and above all the very recent manufacture of much of the material, argue tellingly against such a speculation. Virtually no weapons of these types were in South Viet-Nam when the Geneva Accords were signed in 1954. Indeed, in 1954 some types were not yet items of general issue in communist armies. Detailed evidence from a wide variety of sources shows beyond doubt that these new types of war material were sent into the south from North Viet-Nam. These weapons constitute con-, vincing proof of aggression against the south by the communist regime in Hanoi. IT he mounting infiltration of native North Vietnamese has added new dimensions to I the struggle in South Viet-Nam. This change in the form of infiltration began in late 1963, at about the same time that Hanoi began to supply the Viet Cong with large quan- tities of arms made in the Soviet bloc. Both developments are of far-ranging signif- icance. As a consequence, Hanoi's intervention in the south has become more obvious and undis- guised. In addition, the Viet Cong may encounter added difficulties in carrying on guerrilla war. A review of the record of infiltration from North Viet-Nam into the south shows the mean- ing of this change. Since the outset of the Viet Cong's effort to disrupt the fabric of South Vietnamese society, they have found it difficult to recruit the men they need. The primary difficulty has not been numbers alone. Following the textbooks of com- munist guerrilla strategy, the Viet Cong leaders have been most concerned over the cadre problem. In their eyes, the most pressing requirement has been to obtain enough experienced, qualified and, above all, politically reliable commanders and specialists. Part of their manpower needs could be met within South Viet-Nam itself. A large number of communist guerrillas who had fought against the French remained in South Viet-Nam after the Geneva Accords of 1954 were signed. The Viet Cong have added local recruits, through persuasion or, more often, through force Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 C-PY lease 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 THE WAR IN VIET-NAM, in President Johnson's words, "is very dirty and brutal." Weapons and explosives supplied from the north (such as the 200-gram boxes of TNT at left) are being used increasingly in terrorist attacks on civilians. VC sabotage on train left this small girl between life and death, killed her parents and two other children. P78-03061A000300040005-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061 PYRGH Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03 and intimidation. Increasingly, the part-time vil- lage and regional guerrilla forces are composed of young boys, often in their middle teens. Since the Republic of Viet-Nam became inde- pendent in 1954, however, the Viet Cong have never succeeded in finding enough qualified cadres in the south. Consequently, North Viet-Nam has sent to the south thousands of carefully selected, trained, and indoctrinated personnel to provide the Viet Cong with leadership, direction, and specialist skills. The scale of this infiltration is shown by the report issued by the U.S. Department of State, "Aggression from the North." The nature of clandestine infiltration makes it difficult to secure immediate and complete infor- mation. Many months may elapse between the ar- rival of an infiltration group in the south and the capture of one of its members or the dis- covery of documentary evidence. Vietnamese and American experts have, how- ever, sifted evidence from hundreds of captives and large numbers of documents, making it pos- sible to establish the volume of infiltration and the methods employed by the Hanoi regime to send men into the south. This exhaustive analysis shows that from 1959 through 1964 at least 19,500, and possibly as many as 37,000, infiltra- tors were sent into South Viet-Nam from the north. The minimum figure of 19,500 represents the men in infiltration groups whose size and arrival in the south was verified by two or more sources: independent testimony by different defectors or captives, or a combination of evidence from for- mer Viet Cong and from captured communist documents. This is a very conservative figure. The arrival of the additional 17,500 was indicated by credible sources, whether former Viet Cong or document- ary evidence. Only one source has so far been available for each group of infiltrators listed in this category, and consequently the additional figure is considered probable rather than con- firmed. With few exceptions, those infiltrated from 1959 through 1963 were born in South Viet-Nam. They had fought in communist units against the French and had been sent north after the Geneva Accords of 1954 were CHINESE MARKINGS on 75mm recoilless rifle shells seized at Dinh Tuong in 1963. Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 j., A TERRORIST BLAST on a Saigon street killed 14 civilians, injured 42 more (below). And more grenades, mines, explosives (above) come to the Viet Cong from the north. signed. Many wgippmiffdEFlotoRbkied`ier2065i/43S/13 : C namese army. Others demobilized temporarily tnd went to work on farms and factories in the orth. Six years ago, when the regime in Hanoi be- gan to accelerate its campaign to export communism to the south, it began to draw on this stock of trained men to stiffen the Viet Cong. Dossiers were combed to select men of proven orthodoxy, obedience, and technical skill. They were sent through a carefully organized network of military training camps, re-indoctrination courses, supply points, and way-stations along the infiltration routes. For the most part, infiltrators were dispatched in small groups on foot through Laos?in viola- tion of the 1962 Geneva Accords, which prohibit owe-the presence of foreign military personnel in Laos and the use of Lao territory for interference in the affairs of other countries. When they reached their destination in the south, these men were as- signed as cadres and technicians in guerrilla units and main-force battalions. There were many advantages to employing men born in the south. The communist regime in Ha- noi found it easier to disclaim responsibility for its intervention in the south. Furthermore, the differences in dialect and customs between the various regions of Viet-Nam are considerable. The infiltrators were usually sent back to their home areas, where they were familiar with the terrain, spoke with the local inflection, and often had family connections. vimov It was easy for them to melt into the popula- tion, a crucial advantage in guerrilla operations. Beginning in the latter part of 1963, the flow of infiltrators born in the south decreased sharply. The tempo of infiltration has not reduced, but during 1964 an estimated three- quarters of infiltrators were born in the north. Moreover, in addition to men assigned as cadres and technicians, an increasing number of the northerners are being employed as ordinary front-line soldiers. Government troops have cap- tured a nurnber of northerners serving with the Viet Cong. Other Viet Cong captives testify that men of northern origin have joined their units on a growing scale during recent months. For example, Viet Cong captured in Binh Dinh NORTH VIETNAMESE passport, official Lao Dong (Communist) Party record (be- low) show Hanoi's control of VC personnel. Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00030004000 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 CHILDREN PLAYING are not a military target. But they were the main victims when a VC explosion killed and injured 56 people on a busy street. Brutal hit-and-run tactics mark the Viet Cong's campaign of terror and sabotage?made possible by ammunition and supplies and arms that keep coming in from the north. Published by Free Trade Union Publications Service P.O. Box 275B, a rewind F r Paipaca 9nm/ow1-A ? ria_PnP7Ft_ninm annninnnannng4 ivieibou e, Victoria. CPYRG province during the past few weeks say that many of the regular Viet Cong battalions in central Viet-Nam now are composed in large part of northerners. The causes of this change are difficult to estab- lish precisely. The most probable explanation is that the pool of qualified men of southern origin may be running short. The men who went north in 1954 are now a decade older, and the Viet Cong have suffered heavy casualties. Whatever its causes, the growing infiltra- tion of northern-born personnel is like- ly to have a considerable effect upon Viet Cong operations. In the long run, it may be a source of weak- ness. The northerners are unfamiliar with local geography, are considered outlanders by the vil- lagers, and tend to reciprocate this attitude. Viet Cong terrorism in central Viet-Nam has been unusually indiscriminate during the past several months. It is possible that this is due to the heavy concentrations of northern-born command- ers and soldiers in the Viet Cong battalions in that region. If this trend continues, the mobility and ef- fectiveness of the Viet Cong may be reduced ac- cordingly. The resentment of the people against Viet Cong terrorism and exactions may become more intense. Furthermore, as the proportion of northerners in Viet Cong units grows, the difficulties of re- cruiting local auxiliaries are likely to increase. The tactical consequences of this infusion of aillik northern-born personnel into the Viet Cong may not, however, be evident for some time. In any case, the infiltration of native northern- ers establishes with more telling clarity the direct intervention of North Viet-Nam in the south, and the intent of the communist leaders in Hanoi to extend communism into South Viet-Nam through force. As the Department of State's report pointed out: "The record is conclusive. It establishes beyond question that North Viet-Nam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the south." roved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 HUNTING DOWN elusive Vitt Cong, determined South Vietnamese lymth*EgLers - trek through: jungle's swalrips waters Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00 Approved For Release 20051061111fl11 1965 939. 25X1 CONTINUED TROUBLES OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY SITUATION: In its 9 July issue, the British weekly New Statesman published an article from its Moscow correspondent, Gloria Stewart, entitled "Soviet Economy Under Fire." In contrast to the New Statesman's usually sympathetic stance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, this article de- scribes criticisms reportedly made by a leading Soviet economist, accord- ing to which the Soviet economy is in chaos, and American (i.e., CIA) data on that economy are correct. The economist, Abel Aganbegyan, re- portedly said that the Soviet Central Statistical Agency's figures were "very strange," that the structure of Soviet industry is backward, that Soviet citizens hoard their rubles rather than buy bad-quality goods, that unemployment is rife and that planning is in a state of confusion. These views, originally contained in a report to the CPSU Central Com- mittee, are supposed to have been revealed in a lecture in Moscow. Miss Stewart added that Aganbegyan's strictures are taken very seriously by Kosygin and top party economists, and that the next CFSU plenum will very likely discuss how to reorganize the Soviet economy. (See attached copy of Stewart article.) A. G. Aganbegyan, who is only 33 years old, is the youngest doctor of econOmics in the Soviet Union, and has been considered one of the rising stars in Soviet economic analysis. He has been an advisor to the State Committee on Labor and Wages of the USSR Council of Ministers, and is head of the laboratory for mathematical-economic methods of the Siberian Department of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, located at Novosi- birsk. Aganbegyan is interested in linear programming and the applica- tion of mathematics to the analysis of agricultural statistics and labor productivity; he has belonged to what might be called the "Kantorovich school" of Soviet economists, who place reliance on advanced mathematics and computers, rather than to the "Liberman school," who seek to simplify industrial management, giving plant managers more scope and more incen- tive. His reported criticisms of the Central Statistical Agency appear to relate to a controversy he has had in the past with the head of that agency, Vladimir Nikonovich Starovsky. Aganbegyan has published mainly on labor economics and on the comparison of the Soviet-US economies, hitherto taking the orthodox Soviet line in such comparisons. He has traveled to the West, and has been described as short, stocky, and not likeable. On 28 July, Tass published (to foreign countries, not domestically) a reply from Aganbegyan to the Stewart article, in which the Siberian Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 4NPM.PPrillmm. (939 Cont.) Approved For Release 20014114M9911A-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 economist stated: "The only facts in the article relating to me which correspond to reality are my age and my place of residence." The re- mainder of the Tass release is a recital of official Soviet figures on the growth of Soviet national income, per capita real income, and social welfare expenditures, together with a flat statement that no unemployment exists in the USSR, an Assertion that "there can be no doubt" about the veracity of Soviet statistics, a denial that Aganbegyan or his colleagues had made estimates of Soviet grain crops ("me are not specialists in this field"), and an affirmation that Soviet planning is not being abolished but strengthened. Quite likely, Aganbegyan made this statement under pressure, if he made it at all. Aside from Miss Stewart's report, he is known to have debated Soviet statistics and to have done research on agri- cultural output. The existence of unemployment in the USSR .was recently attested in an article by Ye. Manevich in lIoprosy Ekonomiki (Problem of Economics), No. 6, 1965 (see attachment), and an article in Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (Economic Gazette) (30 June 1965) affirmed that unemployment was especially severe in small and medium-sized cities. (See also BPG #895, 26 April 1965.) (FYI, US officials have some suspicions about the may the Aganbegyan story was surfaced. Miss Stewart gave a copy of the notes on Aganbegyan's lecture on which her. article is based to officials of the US Embassy in Moscow. These notes are disjointed and in part illegible, and contain statements it would be difficult to attribute to a competent Soviet econ- omist. Many figures are given which are exaggerated; for the most part, Gloria Stewart modified these in her article or, more often, omitted them entirely. The tendency of the notes is to make Aganbegyan appear a fanatical critic of the Soviet system. One possibility is that the notes were written by linguistically and economically incompetent middle-men, perhaps some time after the lecture was delivered. Another possibility is that the notes and the surfacing through Gloria Stewart are designed to denigrate Aganbegyan personally, the economic reformers generally, and even to weaken the position Of Premier Kosygin. Gloria Stewart's relations with the Soviet authorities are somewhat ambiguous and she may be under Soviet control herself; her approach to the US Embassy has been followed by other approaches by Soviet newsmen and scientists, suggest- ing an orchestrated attempt to arouse Western comment. A. N. Shelepin, in particular, would be in a good position to organize such an operation. The Stewart article, even though less pungent than the notes, is well calculated to provoke the fury of conventional Soviet economists, of Soviet planners, and of the Soviet defense establishment. (Naturally, the Soviet public at large will learn nothing of the Aganbegyan story from the Soviet press.) Shelepin or others could exploit uncritical Western acceptance of the Aganbegyan story within CPSU circles, using it to show that the reformers and Kosygin are betraying the USSR and providing grist for the capitalist propaganda mill. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Aganbegyan delivered a critical lecture. If the lecture were wholly fabricated, this would Approved For Release 2005/06/3 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 amilkbPIPP.0 (939 Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13$19141011118-03061A000300040005-1 come to light in CPSU circles. Also, most of Aganbegyan's strictures, while somewhat overstated, reflect genuine weaknesses in the Soviet economy, and relate to subjects on which Aganbegyan and others have written in the past. We believe that the Aganbegyan story can be ex- ploited in such a way that dogmatists will reap no advantage. End FYI.) Even aside from the Stewart article, there is abundant evidence of continuing Soviet economic difficulties. In particular, there are the announcements (11 August) that the USSR has purchased 5.1 million metric tons of flour and wheat from Canada and 1.1 million tons of wheat from Argentina. Earlier this year, the USSR had purchased one million tons of wheat from Argentina, 300,000 tons of wheat from France, and. 735,000 tons from Canada, so that the 11 August purchases bring the total up to 8,235,000 tons; this figure may not be complete, since small purchases are not widely reported. Thus this year's purchases are not far behind those made in the disaster year of 1963, which came to over 10 million tons. The purchases from France and Canada are to be paid for in cash, which means that the Soviet Union will again be obliged, as in 1963, to sell gold to meet the payments; the Soviets would like to trade Soviet goods instead, but the market for inferior Soviet products in the Free World is limited--as Aganbegyan reportedly pointed out. These Soviet gold sales will tend to increase stability in world money markets, pre- venting fluctuations in the price of gold and thereby discouraging spec- ulative attacks on the dollar and the pound sterling. As in 1963, the shortcomings in this year's wheat crop as compared with other years are largely due to weather conditions. This does not provide an excuse for Communist agricultural management, however, since the purchases reflect an inability to build up reserves in good years; even during the good years -- as interpreted by Soviet statistics -- Soviet agriculture has been unable to keep pace with the growth of population. The Seven Year Plan has resulted in a decline, rather than a rise, in Soviet wheat pro- duction. And the Communist Bloc as a whole will import more grain from the Free World this year (over 15 million tons) than ever before (previ- ous high -- 12 million tons; 1961-4 average -- 10 million tons). Aganbegyan's description of the plight of the Soviet consumer is quite correct. In an article in Pravda on 31. July, the'Deputy Chief of the Central Statistical Agency, I. Nalyshev, has admitted that "the total slim of wages grew faster than the velum of retail, trade" in the first half of 1965, and that the production of "certain" consumer items, not counting sewing machines and watches, fails to satisfy demand. Four per cent fewer bicycles and motorcycles were sold, than in 1964, and the in- crease in refrigerator production is only half that predicted by Kosygin last December. Published figures on Soviet and US consumption of elec- tricity present some interesting contrasts for more than 10 years, the per capita consumption of electricity in Soviet homes has remained slightly under 8 per cent of the US consumption, and while home consump- tion in the US amounts to an increasing proportion of the total (domestic plus industrial) consumption of electricity (1950 -- 20 per cent; 1965 -- 27 pm,cent), the proportion of Soviet electricity used in the hoMe is Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CI-A-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 1011411,41. (939 Cont.) 25X1 Approved For Release 2040l1rdolarmfilA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 decreasing (1950 -- 10 per cent; 1965 -- 6 per cent). In this field, as in others, the USSR remains a generation behind the US. It appears increasingly clear that economic problems have much to do with struggles in the Soviet leadership, though the details of these struggles remain obscure. Khrushchev publicly boasted of his ability to increase Soviet production, and was found wanting by his own standards. Kosygin is evidently the technical expert who has been expected to better Khrushchev's record by using more rational procedures. Given time, it is quite likely that Kosygin would bring about some improvement. But in the face of present difficulties and in the dog-eat-dog atmosphere of the Kremlin, new changes in the leadership may easily occur before Kosygin has a chance to accomplish anything. Approved For Release 2005/06/48 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 14401144. (939 Cont.) 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/19+010445F'78-03061A00030064000511ft 1965 940 AF,FE,NE. 25X1 THE MYTH OF THE AFRO-ASIAN BLOC SITUATION: It is always easier to combine against someone or some- thing than it is to find common cause for constructive action. The Com- munists, both Chinese and Soviet, exploit basic individual and national resentments in order to form an "Afro-Asian Bloc," aimed against Western "imperialists." Both the Chinese and Soviets hope to use this "Bloc" as an instrument to advance their own expansionist ends and to obscure their own goal of world domination. Implicitly appealing to strong racist feel- ings, the Communists blame the former colonial powers and the "American neo-colonialists" for poverty, oppression, and injustice. Had the Bandung II Conference taken place at Algiers as scheduled, the Communists would have used it to symbolize the Afro-Asian unity they allege to exist. And Peking and Djakarta will doubtless continue their efforts to organize a Bandung II. Yet actually, most of the leaders of Africa and Asia know that there is little to bind them together, and many of these leaders never wanted a second Afro-Asian Conference at all, and heaved an almost audible sigh of relief when conference plans fell through. Anti-colonialism will undoubtedly be ,a strong political force in Africa, Asia, and other areas too for a lbng time to come. Yet anti- colonialism is a backward-looking, "bloody shirt" issue, like "revanche" in France between 1871 and 1914, or anti-Yankee feeling in the post- Civil War South. Given a reasonable amount of peace and prosperity, "bloody shirt" feelings tend over a period of time to lose their impact. Admittedly, the prospects for peace and prosperity are mediocre in many parts of the developing world, and the Communists will do their worst to keep anti-colonial resentments burning. But there are many other issues on which developing countries might become aroused, some of them with much greater advantage for themselves. Aside from a feeling of resentment against the real and mythical imperialists, the developing countries of Africa and Asia are united chiefly by their common poverty. The Communists blame this condition Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 (9)40 Cont.) Approved For Release 20001111DP78-03061A000300040005-1 on the "colonialists," and at the same time they aggravate it by sabotaging peaceful economic development. They foster bad-feeling between local governments and Western governments and firms, frighten off investment, encourage inexperienced officials to attempt extrava- gant and uneconomic programs on the Soviet model, sell surplus arms to developing-country armies, and in some cases, disrupt the whole economy by guerrilla action. The worse things get, the better from the Communist standpoint, and anti-colonialism contributes to making things worse. Therefore, it would be an advantage to Africans and Asians if their attention could be diverted from the will o' the wisp of an Afro- Asian unity based on anti-colonial resentments, and directed to other, more constructive goals. One such goal might be regional organization, enlarging economic areas and enabling developing countries to pool their resources. Unlike the projected unity of two continents, regional fed- eration would be a real political possibility and would have real eco- nomic significance. Other goals might be mainly domestic within the various countries, trying to cope with such problems as illiteracy, disease, malnutrition, and population pressures. Whether or not Asians and Africans can turn to more modest unions or more concrete goals, there are plenty of factors to keep them from attaining over-all unity. Of the countries of the "Afro-Asian Bloc" some 14 are monarchies, not a few, such as Ghana, Burma, Indonesia and Algeria are "socialist" states headed by dictators. Twelve countries of those two continents are members of the British Commonwealth of Nations; over a dozen are heirs of French colonization and culture; several others trace their social and political structures to Italy, Belgium or Portugal. Three countries of Asia are violently divided against themselves and caught in active conflict between the forces of Communism and democracy: North and South Korea; North and South Vietnam, Communist China and Nationalist China. Many of the postwar independent governments in both continents, while protesting their al- legiance to democratic principles, have veered far from democratic practice as expressed constitutionally in elected legislatures, the two-party system, a cabinet and independent judiciary. Although most of Asia and Africa are becoming increasingly aware of the racial discrimination both displayed and fanned by the Soviet and Chinese communists, discrimination among themselves still holds sway between the "black Africans" and the Arabs, the Africans and the Asians -- the Chinese historically have described the Africans as "black devils." Religious differences and discrimination also play a divisive part within the "Bloc." The tenets of Islam, of Buddhism with its many sects, the animism of tribal Africa, the rites of the Hindus all serve to trans- late issues in different Li4f,hts. 2 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 4?6611.6L (940 Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/0e1J.4101~78-03061A000300040005-1 It has long been acknowledged that a common tongue is a virtual requisite for nationhood - yet just one country of the "Bloc," India, is more diverse than all of Europe. Within her borders is a population larger than all of Latin America and Africa combined, speaking 14 major languages and about 1,000 dialects. It is improbable that any one knows how many languages and dialects are spoken in Africa. Economic environment, population pressure on the land, and the customary relationships sanctioned by a long history of social and re- ligious traditions exert a subtle influence to differentiate even the broad common problems of developing countries: poverty, ignorance and disease. Today a little more than two-thirds of the World's people live in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Within 35 years, these areas will hold four-fifths of the world population. But Africa is not afflicted to the same degree by the appalling population problem which weighs on many Asian countries. Her main economic problem, as well as that of much of Asia, is too often the reliance upon a single crop in a single area which puts the local economy at the mercy of flucta- tions in world raw-material prices. Rich sub-soil resources may not even have been found and known natural wealth is very inadequately utilized. By and large Africans have obtained their independence with less violence than Asian countries and largely in agreement with the former colonial powers. The postwar fever for independence catapulted some 30 states into freedom within a decade. Struggling as they are to create viable political institutions and elbowing each other for leadership, it is not so much the principle of democracy and freedom for which the Africans struggle, but the end of the rule of white over black. All too often color, not creed, is providing the stimulus. There is but one common denominator upon which all independent north and central African states can agree: the condemnation of the South African, Rho- desian and Portuguese regimes. The "atomic bomb club," which in 1945 consisted of the United States alone, has five full members (Russia, Britain, France and Communist China) and at least 8 "associate members" whose advanced nuclear technology puts the bomb within their easy reach: India, Japan and Egypt are among these, while a boastful Indonesia brags of her ability to produce the bomb soon. In Asia the racial issue does not play that strong a role. For years the Soviets have fanned the flames of racial conflicts in order to use the black/white contrast in its political undermining activities. Now the Chicom apartheid policy is considered by Moscow to be a threat to Soviet expansionist policies, and they are in the process of being caught in a net they have helped to spin. But racial feeling also works against China, for many Asians have a centuries-old fear of the Chinese and it is at least as 3 Approved For Release 2005/06/13: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 (940 Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/01,161.4kialaW78-03061A000300040005-1 strong as their anti-white prejudice. Thus even race, the factor which above all others might seem to divide "Afro-Asians" from the West, also 25X1 keeps Asians and Africans divided. Approved For Release 2005/0613 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 61PENIMININJ. (olln (7,,+ ) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Approved For Release 2005/041416011611111r8-03061A00030094(1004t 1965 941 WH. 25X1 GUATEMALA: COMPETITION IN SUBVERSION SITUATION: The small nation of Guatemala has long been a major arena in the struggle with Communism, though it is far from the monopolistic- capitalistic nation with an oppressed industrial proletariat which Karl Marx envisaged as the true source of Communist revolution. Guatemala's population is estimated by the UN to be 4,095,000, of which two thirds live outside the cities, reflecting the importance of agricultural and forestry products such as coffee, bananas, cotton, sugar and rare woods. About 53% of the people are pure Indians, most of the remainder being of mixed Spanish and Indian blood. The literacy rate is about 30%. Communism in Guatemala first came to international attention during the administration of Jacob? Arbenz Guzman, from 1951 to 1954, when the Communists succeeded in achieving effective control of the government. Arbenz' ouster by the forces of Carlos Castillo Armas in June 1954 set the Communists back severely and the Guatemalan Party (officially known as the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) -- Guatemalan Labor Party) remained a relatively ineffective clandestine organization for several years. However it regained some strength after the assassination of Castillo in 1957 and during the period of resurgent leftism that took place under the regime of President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes (1958-63). In the course of these years the Party adopted a position which has plagued it ever since: emphasis on organizational work among the masses takes priority over violent action because conditions for revolution have not yet matured. And the Party was clearly right according to Marxist doctrine. In the meantime, however, a group of young army officers attempted to spark a revolt against President Ydigoras and, failing, headed for the hills where they began a guerrilla war under the name of the Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre (MR-13 Nov) -- 13 November Revolutionary Movement, named after the date of the abortive uprising, November 13, 1960. Lt. Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, a man of half Chinese, half Guatemalan parentage, became the leader of this guerrilla band. It was based in the northeastern department of Izabal, mountainous jungle region well suited to guerrilla operations. The group has achieved some limited success since that time -- petty harrassment of communications lines, busses and railroads; attacks on military outposts and plantations to acquire arms and money; assassinations of army personnel, police informants, and wealthy landowners; and sporadic attacks against commercial and official installations. Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 (941 Cont.) 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/C8116.441*.RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 While You Sosa's achievements, objectively measured, were not a sub- stantial danger to the regime, the very fact that they constituted violent revolutionary action appealed enormously to a faction of the PGT. And so, in 1962, to appease this faction, and to attempt to bring this "extracur- ricular" movement within its control, the PGT established contact with the guerrillas and began supplying them with food and medicine and initi- ated a propaganda campaign to boost the popularity and extoll the signif- icance of this movement. Otherwise the Party's main activity remained in the political realm -- infiltrating political, labor and student organiza- tions -- and violence was espoused only as one of the many means toward revolution. Throughout 1963 and 1964 PGT leaders remained divided over the issue of recourse to violence as the major form of struggle. The problem was compounded by the fact that many members of the Party joined various guer- rilla groups in the hills, including Yon Sosa's, and they increasingly championed the insurrectional line and called for the Party to follow their example. Those who remained in the cities and carried on the tra- ditional organizational work among the masses found themselves severely harassed by government security forces. There the Party was demoralized, members became suspicious of one another, and the rank and file often re- fused to carry out party tasks for fear of the police. Their morale was not aided by the exiled Party leaders such as Victor Manuel Gutierrez, Jose Manuel Fortuni, Edelberto Torres Rivas, and Jaime Diaz Rozzotto who, comfortably ensconced in Mexico or other safehavens, exhorted the faith- ful to continue the work among the masses and warned against the doctrinal error of premature revolution and wholesale resort to violence. By late 1963 the Party managed to establish a united guerrilla front, called the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) -- Rebel Armed Forces. FAR in- cluded three main guerrilla groups: Yon Sosa's 13 November Movement, a Communist "12 April" youth group, and a Communist-dominated "20 October" group. However it remained a "united front" more in theory than in prac- tice. The revolutionaries resented the PGT's attempts to control them while it remained reluctant to commit itself wholeheartedly to armed revo- lution. PGT efforts to dominate the guerrillas were also undercut by the latter's ability to secure funds, equipment, and training from other coun- tries, notably including Cuba. In July 1964 Revolucion Socialista, a publication of the 13 November Movement, first appeared. This first issue did not attack the Soviet Union and tended to avoid the Sino-Soviet issue; but it did support an uncompromising, nationalistic revolutionary creed. Shortly thereafter the PGT replied in an open letter in which it pointed out that revolutions take time and that impatience can only bring harm to the cause. The PGT decried the divisionist tendencies of the 13 November Movement and appealed for unity (as it has done ever since, to little avail). The PGT's position was supported by the Havana Conference of Communist Parties in Nove.mily Approved For Release 2005/06A3 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 smadollIRK1111111. (941 Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/0619treianfflorrel- 3061A000300040005-1 Toward the end of 1964 and early in 1965 there were rumors that a modus vivendi had been worked out under which the PGT would accept MR-13 November leadership of terrorist activities and guerrilla operations while the Party would stick to the peaceful coexistence line and continue its "work among the masses." Whatever truth there may have been to the rumors, the modus vivendi cane to a dead end in January 1965 with the publication of issue number 8 of Revolucion Socialista wherein Yon Sosa asserted the 13 November Movement -"has had to fight a political battle against conciliatory, vacillating and reformist tendencies which seek to confine the workers and peasants of the country to the false perspective of the so-called ?democratic-national revolution.' Those tendencies are embodied especially in the leadership of the PGT." (!) Not content with that, You Sosa goes on: "the PGT leadership has supported the pacifist, revisionist, conciliatory line of Khrushchev and the privileged caste of the USSR." From there he proceeds to a vociferous espousal of the Chi- nese Communist line of world revolution and struggle against petty bour- geois pacifism. In this issue number 8, Yon Sosa does not limit himself to denuncia- tions and exhortations. In good activist style he calls for a Conference of Guerrillas from Guatemala, Colombia and Venezuela, to be held in 1965 on "free territory" controlled by one of these guerrilla groups. "This Conference would have as its object the interchanging of experience, forms of struggle and tactics for organizing the struggle jointly, mutual support, and the extension of guerrilla and revolutionary warfare to new countries in Central and South America." The Chicoms thus seek to extend their influence via Guatemala into South America. Having published these views, Yon Sosa withdrew from FAR, eliminating the only formal organizational tie to the PGT. Temporarily non-plussed, the PGT soon reverted to a charge it had only begun to develop the preced- ing year: "Trotskyism! Yon Sosa is surrounded and captured by Trotsky- ites!" Soon thereafter a lieutenant of Yon Sosa, Luis Turcios Lima, leader of a guerrilla group called "Edgar Ibarra," also discerned Trotsky- ites in the woodwork; whereupon he left Yon Sosa, taking his group with him, and joined the PGT Communists. With this accession of a full-fledged guerrilla band, the PGT resurrected the FAR which now constitutes a Moscow- line front of guerrillas, students, laborers, and other "mass organiza- tions." It is noteworthy that the PGT line considerably hardened after Yon Sosa adopted the ChiCom position. Apart from denouncing Trotskyites among its rivals, it began to talk of violence in much more positive terms, rec- ognizing that a guerrilla movement is a necessary and desirable facet of the revolutionary struggle, contributing to the development of the essen- tial clandestine organizations and the formation of experienced and dedi- cated cadres. It is apparent that this change in line, fortified by the support of Turcios and his band, represents a real hardening of the PGT position and that henceforth the Guatemalan people will have to contend with two distinct subversive movements. Further proof may be adduced from Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : Clk-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 .4.1044Per (941 Cont.) 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/14ifitergiltirlaDP78-03061A000300040005-1 evidence upturned by a police raid on a PGT hideout in Guatemala City on 22 July 1965: a substantial cache of armaments, printing presses and other paraphenalia of subversion. On account of the raid, as reported by "El Imparcial" of Guatemala City, 23 July 1965, is included as an un- classified attachment to this document.) 4 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 mIX1414114?Tm? (941 Cont.) 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 CPYRGH Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 30 August 1965 Problems of the Rational Utilization of Manpower in the USSR (The following is a complete version of an article by Ye.Manevich.] One of the fundamental characteristics of socialism is the univer- sality of labor and the absence of classes and social groups which do not participate in socially useful activity. Inseparably connected with this is the right of citizens to work, which is ensured economically by the entire system of socialist production relations. Work in the USSR is not only the right but also the honorable duty of all able-bodied members of socialist society. The rapid development of the productive forces in our country calls for an ever larger number of skilled workers. V.I. Lenin attributed primary importance to the general education and special training of workers and to their ability to work. "Learn- ing to work," wrote V.I. Lenin, "is a task which the Soviet state must put before the people in its entirety."1 We have done a great deal to follow Lenin's instructions. Our modern day working class as a mass consists of educated people. This conclusion can be corroborated by the USSR population census. In 1959, the incidence (per 1,000 persons) of intermediate and higher education among lathe operators was 667; among milling-machine operators, 683; among machinists, setup men, and adjusters and regulators of equipment, 628; among electrical installers and visual inspectors of power networks, 633; among woodwork pattern- makers, 690; and among railroad workers, Ia. At present, about one third of all industrial workers have fin- ished either complete or incomplete secondary schools. The general educational level of the working class is rising every year, and an Increasing number of youths begin work in enterprises with either com- plete or incomplete secondary education. Along with technical progress, the number of skilled workers, es- pecially those engaged in servicing machines and mechanisms, is increas- ing. From 1939 through 1959, the number of workers at power installations almost tripled, the number of electric and gas welders more than quad- rupled, the number of electrical installers and visual inspectors of power networks almost tripled, etc. Concomitantly, the number of workers doing heavy work (miners at the face in the mining industry, ditch diggers in construction, lumberjacks, etc.) is being considerably reduced. Some trades requiring heavy physical labor are disappearing altogether. Thus, in the coal industry, there are already no cutters, manual drillers, cart- pushers, and the number of cutting-machine operators is being drastically (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 CPYRGH 4".ved r.. Iklecte 2005/00/13 . CIA-RDP70-03001A000300040005-1 cut. In construction, there are already no material carriers and no diggers. As a replacement for the vanishing trades, new trades have been created by the rapidly developing technology -- electric locomotive mechanics and operating personnel, crane and bulldozer operators, cement workers, installers, and many others. Although a large number of highly skilled workers are employed at socialist enterprises, training of skilled personnel does not always meet the increased requirements of modern technical progress. Skilled workers, as we know, are trained at enterprises within the framework of the technical and trade training system, and also, to a degree, in the general education school. The majority of skilled workers still get their training directly at enterprises. In 1963, even in a leading branch of the national economy like machine-building where work- ers with higher skills (72% of those employed are in complex trades) are needed, 503,100 of the 603,700 new workers (i.e., 83.3%) were trained at the enterprise. However, training skilled workers directly in production by means of individual or group apprenticeship often fails to impart ade- quate theoretical knowledge, and is carried out under arbitrary programs. The workers do not always learn to read blueprints, study the properties of materials, get to know new equipment, etc. Nonetheless, large sums are consumed in teaching workers new trades and in raising their skills. According to the Central Statistical Administration USSR, more than 50 million workers were either trained or improved their skills by means of individual or group apprenticeship or by taking courses during 1959 - 1963. Thus, shortcomings in the training of workers in this most wide- spread system of training result in a substantial loss to the state. The system of technical and trade training in urban and rural day, evening, and seasonal schools is of utmost importance to the planned and organized training of skilled workers for all branches of the national economy. The training of highly skilled workers for all branches of the national economy can be organized in these schools. In 1963, a total of 1,291,000 persons were being trained in them. However, here there are also serious shortcomings in the organization of the educational process. In many educational establishments the industrial training base is in an unsatisfactory condition (training is often on obsolete equipment, no ac- count being taken either of the direction of technical progress or its already attained level, and the schools are short of classroom and lab- oratory equipment, visual training aides, tools, and textbooks). The teaching staff (especially foremen) of the trade training system do not possess, in many cases, high enough skills and general educational back- grounds. As far as training of skilled workers in the general education school is concerned, it must be said that unfortunately the recently accomplished reorganization of that school has not produced significant practical results. In some areas of the country, vocational training in 2 (Cont.) Approved i-or Keiease 21RM/06/1.3 : CIA-R1J1-1/13-0.30151A000J000401M-1 CPYRGH Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 those schools has thereby become little more than a waste of time and effort. Vocational training is offered for more than 500 occupations including such simple ones as that of packer, brick dryer, rubber pro- duct dauber, etc. When the vocational training program was set up in those schools, not enough consideration was given to the need for man- power in a particular branch of industry or in a particular area of the country. For example, 18.6 percent of all industrial workers in the USSR work in the timber, paper, and wood-processing industries, but only 8 percent of the students are getting vocational training in these occupations. A reverse situation prevails in regard to light industry: while 17.8 percent of the country's industrial workers work in light industry occupations, 24.7 percent of the students are being trained for these occupations. It is especially important to point out that the graduates of those schools in most cases do not work in the occupations for which they were trained. Surveys made in Moscow, Kiev, Sverdlovsk, and several other cities showed that of all seccndary school graduates about one half entered higher educational ineLitutions, some 33 percent entered tekhni - kums (technical schools), and only a few of the 10th- to 11th-grade grad- uates went to work in industry. And these, as a rule, did not choose the occupations for which they had received training in school. A 1962 survey made in Fruzenskiy Rayon of Moscow, for example, revealed that of 312 persons trained in school to become machinists and machine-tool opera- tors only 58 were engaged in these occupations. Of 68 graduates of School No. 627, Moskvoretskiy Rayon of Moscow, who had been trained to become radio technicians, only 8 were found to be engaged in this occupation. The facts given indicate that the whole system of vocational train- ing (including that offered in the general education schools) should be critically reviewed, related more closely to the real needs of the na- tional economy and particular areas of the country, and made to meet the new requirements posed by modern technical progress. The USSR has all the possibilities for predetermining the manpower required by the national economy and training the workers in the necessary occupations. The planned nature of its...socialist economic development stipulates full employment of all workers in a constantly expanding na- tional economy. The average annual number of workers and employees in the national economy is steadily increasing. There were 12.9 million in 1913, 22.6 million in 1932, 31.2 million in 1940, 38.9 million in 1950, 56.5 mil- lion in 1959, 73.2 million in 1964, and there will be an estimated (planned)76 million in 1965. Even though the number of workers and employees has more than quin- tupled in the years of Soviet power, there are labor shortages in the USSR. The labor supply has been particularly tight in the eastern regions 3 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 CPyRGH Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 of the country. One should remember that West Siberia, East Siberia, and the Far East, all rich in natural resources, comprise over 50 per- cent of the territory of the USSR but have only 10.4 percent of the country's population. It was for this reason that the 22nd Party Con- gress decreed that living and cultural conditions be improved in these regions so as to encourage migration of workers to these regions. How- ever, data for 1956-1962 indicate a continued outflow of population from these regions. Thus, in 1956-1960, over 700,000 persons (including family members) moved into Siberia. Nevertheless, the overall growth in Siberia's population was slightly lower than its natural growth, that is, the number of people who left Siberia in those years exceeded the number who moved in.2 Where did this manpower go? Analysis of the data shows that it went mainly to the southern and western areas of the country even though there was no labor shortage in these areas. For a corresponding influx of 100 persons from there to the cities of Siberia in 1956-1959, 135 persons moved to cities of the south, 107 to the Northern Caucasus, 130 to the Transcaucasus, and 142 to Central Asia. Also, 1.3-1.7 times as many moved to the central regions of the country, the Ukraine, and Belo- russia, 3 times as many to the Baltic areas, Moldavia, and the Northern Caucasus, and 2.5-2.7 times as many to Central Asia from the Kuzbas as moved from the given regions to the Kuzbas. The population flow to the Northern Caucasus and Central Chernozem area has been particularly heavy in recent years. In 1959-1962, for example, one fifth of the RSFSR's population growth was accounted for by the Northern Caucasus, although this region contains only one tenth of the republic's total population. This largely explains why at present about one fifth of the able-bodied population of the Northern Caucasus is employed on private plots (zanyata lichnym khozyaystvom) and does not participate in social production. The interregional (and to some extent, intraregional) migration of the population is explained mainly by the fact that climatic hardships, higher prices, and poor cultural facilities in certain regions are not comoensated for by good wages and housing, adequate schools, or enough tekhnikums and vuzes. Prices in Murmanskaya and Arkhangel'skaya oblasts, Karellskaya ASSR, the Far East, and Far North compare as follows with prices set for the central regions of the country: beef, 13 percent higher; bread, 19 percent higher; sugar, 27 percent higher; and milk, 46 percent higher. There is a 70 to 80 percent difference in the cost of living between the southern regions and the Far North. The cost of food for normal nutrition is 37 percent higher and that of ordinary per- sonal effects is 38 percent higher (45 percent if services are included) in the Far North than in the central regions. The housing supply is less adequate and the quality is poorer in Siberia and the Far North than in the central regions of the country. Thus, the wage level, housing and living conditions, zonal prices (and often the prices on the kolkhoz market), and medical and cultural 4 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 CPYRGH services in remote regions of the country are not conducive to the workers and their families settling in these regions.3 The state spends vast funds for organized recruitment of manpower, in moving it to the places of wprk, and in training. Subsequently, these workers leave and are replaced.' According to our rough computations, the loss to the USSR national economy caused by labor turnover, amounts to two billion rubles annually. Most of this occurs in the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East. Estimates and studies show that, just as there is a shortage of labor in the eastern regions of the country, there is a considerable num- ber of adult able-bodied persons in certain regions who are not drawn in- to social production. This has to do not only with women engaged full or part-time in housekeeping, but also with the significant number of youths and adult males employed in housekeeping and on private plots.5 In certain large cities, primarily in the central industrial regions of the country a certain overabundance of labor has been noted. This is due to the continuous growth of production mechanization and automation and the natural increase in the number of working youth born during 1946 - 1948. There were unutilized labor resources in Leningrad, Odessa, Moscow, and other large cities as far back as the beginning of the Seven-Year Plan. Since then the growth rate of the able-bodied population has also increased in many other smaller cities, particularly in the Transcaucasus, Belorussia, the Central Chernozem and South-Western regions, the central asiatic republics, and also in Moldavia and Lithuania. In these and other regions, individual groups of workers find it definitely difficult to obtain work in their specialty. Because of the insufficient indus- trial development in many medium-size and small cities, workers are forced to occupy themselves on private plots and in housework. Whereas the proportion of the able-bodied population not participating in the social economy amounts to six to seven percent in Leningrad and Moscow, and an average of 20 percent for the USSR, it reaches 26 percent in Siberia, and is still higher in some cities of this region. The follow- ing table shows the distribution of labor resources in Novosibirskaya Oblast in 1962 (in percent): Social economy (including students of working age) Housekeeping and personal plots Novosibirsk 90.0 10.0 Iskitin 80.4 19.6 Berdsk 72.8 27.2 Karasuk 70.0 30.0 Kupino 62.7 37.3 Toguchin 61.2 38.8 5 (Cont.) Arrrnuari Fell^ PolonQc. 9nm/owl-A ? ria_PnP7Ft_ninm annninnnannng4 CPYRGH Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Aside from this, part of the labor resources (particularly women) is not used in social production because of the one-sided, restricted development of industry in a number of economic regions. Thus, the production of consumer goods is more poorly organized in Western and Eastern Siberia, the Far East, and in Kazakhstan than in the central regions of the country. Correspondingly, the employment of women in Primorskiy Kray, Amurskaya, Kamchatskaya, and Irkutskaya oblasts, and in Krasnoyarskiy Kray and certain other regions, is far lower than in Leningrad, Moscow, and Kalininskaya and Vladimirskaya ()blasts. A natural (zakonanernoye) release of manpower is taking place in various branches of the national economy in connection with technical progress. It is clear that a growth in labor productivity leads to a saving of labor. With the development of the material-technical base of communism, -- complete electrification of the country, the introduc- tion of comprehensive mechanization and automation, as well as the ex- tensive chemicalization of production -- the release of personnel from certain enterprises and their placement into other, new enterprises, in sparsely populated regions of the country, where there are opportunities for the development of the productive forces, is occurring and will occur. This process is inevitable just as technical progress is inevi- table. Even now, the number of persons employed in peat and coal indus- tries, in railroad transport, and in certain other branches of the na- tional economy has been noticeably reduced. This takes place today, to some extent, in every enterprise. However, for a number of reasons, over many years the actual number of personnel at enterprises has been decreas- ing at a slow rate. This is partly explained by enterprise expansion, the conversion to a shorter work-day, and the desire of management to have a definite number of workers "in reserve." Such practice is stimu- lated to a certain extent by the existing system of material incentives procedure for management personnel, as well as enterprise personnel, be- cause the salary rates for engineers and technicians, the bonus rates under socialist competition, and other types of incentives are made di- rectly dependent on the number of workers and employees. On the other hand, since the enterprises themselves must place these released workers into jobs (and they cannot do so at all times) the enterprise administra- tion is actually forced to keep unnecessary workers and employees on the staff. We have analyzed data on changes in the number of workers at sixty industrial enterprises of the Moscow city sovnarkhoz for the past six to thirteen years, including fifteen machine-building enterprises, twenty- one chemical, sixteen food, and eight footwear and leather enterprises. The analysis indicated that in all the =achine-building enterprises, without exception, in spite of the introduction of mechanization, auto- matic lines, etc., the total number of personnel, especially workers, has increased from year to year (and not always in proportion to expan- sion of production). It is true that in individual enterprises of the chemical, food, footwear and leather industries, there was some, very 6 (c ont . ) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 CPYRGH slight, reduction in the number of personnel, but in the majority of the enterprises in these branches of industry the number of workers grew. As a result, there are often many people working at enterprises who are not felt to be necessary at all. These people have an inadequate work- load; they are often used at jobs unrelated to production. An excess of workers at industrial enterprises does not contribute to labor disci- pline or to the efficient utilization of working time. According to figures of the Central Statistical Administration USSR, the loss of work- ing time in sovnarkhoz industries in 1961 amounted to 231 million man- days. Especially great losses of working time are noted at enterprises of the coal, chemical, and wood-working industries because of all-day Idleness, badly organized work places, and other reasons. A reduction, if only by half, in intra-shift losses, would permit an increase of at least five percent in industrial labor productivity.6 Until the efficient utilization of manpower is organized, one can- not truly put the system of material incentives to workers right, strengthen -khozraschet:' and achieve a significant increase in labor productivity and reduction of production costs. The problem of the efficient utilization of manpower becomes all the more acute in connection with the development of overall mechaniza- tion and automation in industry. Displaced workers can and must be used in other branches of the national economy, and also for the further de- velopment of the unexploited regions of the country. The fulfillment of the grandiose plans outlined by the party and government for the building of a communist society demand an enormous number of workers and employees of all specialties. In the next two decades, given a total increase in the able-bodied population of more than thirty per- cent, the number of those employed in industry will grow approximately fifty to sixty percent, and the number of personnel employed in the sphere of non-material production will increase two to three times. Consequently, the question is how to allow for the unavoidable in- tensive processes of the redistribution of labor resources by sectors of the economy, by regions, and to utilize manpower more rationally, while combining, correctly and flexibly, the personal and social interests of the participants in the building of communism. In connection with this, the necessity arises of organizing the comprehensive, well-planned ac- counting of manpower movements in all cities and regions of the country.7 Obviously, a specialized organization should even now be created, which would concern itself with problems of the job placement of workers and employees, and which (along with other measures) would permit enter- prises to get rid of surplus workers and employees. And finally, this will create conditions under which the placement of workers, taking in- to account their specialties, trades, age, inclinations, family status, etc., will be taken care of in the best way.8 7 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 CPYRGH From the point of view of the interests both of the workers and of socialist production, it would be expedient to provide some definite form of material maintenance for workers and employees displaced by techno- logical progress, during the time spent in placing them in jobs. If one calculates how much the government is obliged to spend on the maintenance of superfluous workers and employees at enterprises (to say nothing of the fact that the presence of superfluous workers is an obstacle to in- creased labor productivity), it becomes clear that this provision.of ma- terial security is fully justified. Freeing enterprises of superfluous workers will indeed have enormous significance for the further development of socialist production and will permit fuller use of the advantages of the socialist economy. It will play a large role in the creation of conditions which will ensure the fullest realization of the element of personal material interest in the strengthening of economic accountability and in the growth of socialist production. Manpower accounting and its organized distribution will permit the more efficient utilization of the principal productive forces of society -- the workers in socialist production. It will permit alterations in the structure of the employment of the population, including in the non- productive sphere where very few people are now employed. For example, each garment-sewing shop in the USSR is obliged to cater to ten times as many people as in the USA. At the present time, there are 16 employees in trade establishments per 1,000 people in the USSR as compared to 76 in the USA; in laundries, the corresponding figures are 0.11 and 1.7. However, in our economic literature it is often noted that increased employment in material production and lowered employment in the field of services is a special "advantage" of the socialist economy. In the USSR, the service sphere is expanding, not only because of increased employment in public health, education, and culture, but also in other fields (trade, the municipal economy, etc.). Along with this, thanks to the growth of labor productivity, a decrease in the number of those employed in material production is occurring and will continue to occur. We now need, and will need even more in the future, tailors, shoemakers, hairdressers, workers in public eating places and trade, and kindergarten teachers. Hence an acute need has arisen to train many thousands of people for the service fields. This is necessary both for a sharp improvement of services to the population, and for efficient utilization of available labor resources, especially in the non-industrialized regions of the country. The efficient utilization of labor resources in the USSR urgently demands the solution of a group of national economic problems. These in- clude, in particular, improvement of the system of training and retrain- ing skilled personnel; the development of new branches of the national economy, including those in the non-production sphere; a well thought-out system of measures for the economic development of small cities; organi- zation of effective economic incentives for the migration of workers to 8 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 CPYRGH those regions of the country which require manpower (a higher level of wages and longevity payments, expansion of the construction of well- arranged living auarters, improvement of the municipal, personal, and cultural services for the population of these regions, and so forth); creation of specialized organizations, the duties of which would in- clude accounting for the movement and placement of workers; the working- out of a system of material maintenance for workers and employees dis- placed from enterprises in connection with technological advances. The combined efforts of scientific and economic establishments and organiza- tions are required for the solution of all these problems. (Moscow, Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 6, Jun 65, pp 23-30) Footnotes 1. V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol. 36, p. 189. 2. In recent years the turnover of personnel has intensified not only in all branches of industry, but also, for a number of reasons, in agriculture. Moreover, it is the more efficient male portion of the population that is leaving the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Whereas in the years 1953-1958, the number of kolkhozniks on the kolkhozes of the RSFSR declined by 400,000 persons, or 3.4 percent, during the years 1959-1961 it was reduced by 3.1 million persons, or 27 percent. In agriculture as a whole in 1959-1961, the intensity of the departure of manpower to the non-agricultural sectors was approximately 2.5 times higher than in the previous three-year period. As a result of the outflow of the rural pop- ulation during the years 1955-1963, the overall population in Pskovskaya, Kalininskaya, Kostromskaya, Smolenskaya, and Kirovskaya ?blasts declined. 3. The articles of certain economists, who have attempted to "sub- stantiate" the need for a reduction in the wage differentials in dif- ferent regions of the country have hardly played a useful role in this connection. Thus, B. Sukharevskiy wrote that now "an equalization of the conditions of labor and its easing in all sectors, and a gradual equalization of living conditions by economic regions, is occurring. As a result of all these changes differences in labor are being reduced. Under these conditions the consistent realization of the principle of payment according to labor inevitably contemplates not the increase, but the gradual reduction of gaps in wages." And further: "The dif- ference in wages by economic regions is also being reduced. Many co- efficients and increments which were set when certain regions were not yet developed, have become obsolete and now should, naturally, be re- placed." (Kommunist, No 3, 1960, pp 31, 37) 4. Estimates show that workers lose about 30 days on the average in moving from one region to another. Organized recruitment costs amount to approximately 500 rubles for every person arriving in Siberia. If these funds has been utilized for an increase in wages, the construction of living quarters, the improvement of the municipal and personal services 9 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 iXpprnwarl Fnr Paloaca 9nnginwil ? ria_PnP7g_nnnAl annnwinnAnnng_i to the population, etc., then the population of Siberia would have been considerably greater than it is now, and the national economy would have received a substantial savings from the reduction in the turnover of personnel, the reduction in the costs for their training, etc. 5. In 1959 the number of members of familieS of kolkhozniks, as well as of workers and employees, employed on personal plots, amounted to 5.9 million persons. In addition, dependents and individual persons employed in families in the teaching of children and in housekeeping, were reckoned at 12.8 million people, which constituted 17.7 percent of the labor resources of the country (see Sotsialisticheskiy TrUd, No 2, 1961, p 13). 6. Intra -shift losses comprise nearly two-thirds of all loss of working time, but under existing practice such idleness lasting up to thirty minutes is disregarded. Some economists see the principal reason for increased intra -plant losses of working time in the fact that workers and foremen at enterprises are not drawn into administrative and other responsibilities. I. Kasitskiy writes that intra-shift losses of working time comprise ten to twenty percent of the total working time. "This is a monstrous waste of national wealth, which ismostly due to the lack of organization, and the indifference and unconcern of individual foremen, shop chiefs, and plant managers. However, we do not know of anybody who would take personal responsibility for such wastefulness of the principal productive force of society." (Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, 23 Nov 63) The reasons for lost time, however, lie first of all in inadequate personal material interest on the part of the workers, the presence of superfluous workers, and poor organization of labor and production. 7. The necessity for such accounting is attested to by the fact that several million persons annually transfer from one enterprise to another by their own wish; one-third of these change their occupation. 8. At the present time, even in large industrial cities of the USSR there is no specialized organization which keeps a record of manpower re- quirements, which has the necessary data on the availability of personnel in need of job placement, and which also studies the distribution and re- distribution of manpower. Such a situation, under the conditions of our planned economy, where almost all aspects of the economic and cultural life of the country are planned, is abnormal. 10 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 CP`n-',GH NEW STATESMAN 9 JULY 1965 Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 Soviet Economy Under Fire .GLORIA STEWART The Soviet economy is in chaos; this is the message of an outspoken report made by one of Russia's 'up-and-coming economists, Agan. begyan. Aged 33, he is a member of the Academy of Sciences and is one of Novosi- birsk's leading economists. His conclusions were presented lo the Central Committee last December and have become available as a result of a lecture he gave at a Soviet publishing house. He confirmed much of what has long been said about Soviet economy. He said that statistics were kept so carefully hidden that economists themselves could not get at theirt. The central statistical agency here, he said, did not supply real information about the state of affairs. It was often easier to get information from American journals. He slammed into Stavrovsky, an economist who conducted a series of polemics with the western press last year, denying the Amen- ,can assessment of the Soviet economy, say- ing that Stavrovsky was trying to prove the 'impossible. He went on to say that many of the central statistical agency's figures were very strange. He took as an example the - agency's grain figures. They maintained that the Soviet Union had harvested about 8,000m. poods of grain (1963). Aganbegyan says that if this were so the Soviet Union would be selling wheat abroad not buying it, for his unit .in Novosibirsk has calculated exactly how much is necessary to supply the population, even taking into consideration the amounts of grain used for feeding livestock illegally. They even counted the amounts required for technical needs. The total was very much less than the agency figure. He concluded that the agency had fiddled it by counting the 'grain before it had dried out. As a result of the agency's machinations, he said, it 'came as a great shock to everyone- when they learnt what a wreck the seven-year' plan was. In fact, he said, the rate of growth of the economy was decreasing, not increasing. Real income had also decreased because of rises in food prices. Aganbegyan then attacked the structure of Soviet industry. He said it was the most backward of all developed countries. He : quotes the example of the Soviet machine;- 'tool industry. He says that the Soviet Union . has the same number of machines as the United States, but, half of them are per- manently out of commission being repaired ?-- there are more workers employed on the maintenance of machines than on actually using them for production. He adds that the Soviet Union makes worse use of its labour ? :force than any developed capitalist country. .The timber industry is the next to come under . fire. He says it manages to produce a much. smaller quantity of processed wood than any 0t14 /6 . stage, he says, where she can no longer afford to stockpile unsaleable consumer goods. In his opinion stockpiling has now almost reached the level it did in the West during .the depression, but he says it is worse here because money is around. People will not spend it. They prefer to keep it under the floorboards to buying bad-quality goods. There is never any difficulty in selling good- ;quality imported goods even if they are much more expensive. . He then moved on to another subject Rus- sians prefer not to mention ? employment. H. said that there has been a great rise in un'employment, especially in small towns and in the countryside. He considers the defence industry to be one of the main reasons for the decline now being encountered in Soviet in- dustry. He says that a quarter of the total working population is employed in defence in some way or another. He points out that 'the Soviet Union spends about the same amount on this as does the US, with only half America's economic potential. Another Qason for the decline of the Soviet economy is the policy of selling goods cheaper abroad than they can be produced at home, creating '& permanent imbalance of trade. This is especially so as nearly all the Soviet export trade is in raw materials. Not even com- munist countries will buy Russia's shoddy .manufactures. The next reason for the decline . of the Soviet economy, he says, is manage- ment, direction and incentives, which, he says, have remained the same since the Thirties. The Soviet system of planning next gets the full blast. He says that plans are origin- ally worked out at regional level in republics. Then they are sent to the Gosplan Central Planning Agency who practically ignore them and send back their own 'plans which have very little in common with the actual con- ditions in the republics themselves. Aganbegyan ended by saying that there were several solutions being put forward for : reorganising the economy ? ? abolishing Lregional economic councils, setting up trusts, -larger economic units and firms which all work together planning and producing ? but ' the basis of all the recommendations was .,that management was to be given its head. All these proposals at present were being :considered by the government. Univetsity :. economists have also been discussing them. Kosygin obviously thinks highly of Agan- 1 bcgyan's report. He is said to have offered !'him the top job in Gosplan as a result. Agan. begyan turned the offer down; saying that there were too many people in Gosplan who lived in the past. He said that he would not have .enough power to do what he thought should be done. His report has been dis- cussed at great length by top party econo- 'mists, headed by Kosygin. In Moscow' at present it is thought ailikely that, when : CIA-RDP78reOWIA046108110a C.11rnmittee next ,meets, they will discuss how they are going to reorganise the Soviet economy.. ?? , Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 CPYRGH ?Voprosy Ekonoraiki No. 61 1965 E. MaHostig BCEOBLIVOCTYD TPYAA 4 11POBJ1EMbl PA11,140HAJIbl-101-0 HCF10,111,3013AIVASE PABOLIEN CH,Tibl 3 CCCP* 0,II,H011143 KopemiblX OCO6eIlliOCTC.11 COHH3J1B3Ma 51B.T151eTCA aceo6uurocri., Tpy,rta, OTCYTCTBHe. KaaCCOB, caoea, 06W,CCTBCHHI)1X rpynn, xoropbie He npH- Hitmaini 6bi yilacrtiR B 0611eCTBCHHO noneaHoii ?aenTenbuocTH. C arvav, He- pa3pEano canaano npaa,o rpa.)K.Ltan Ha Tpy,a, KOHQMHtIeCKH o6ecnctmaae- moe aceil CHCTCMOil COU,klaJIHCTH'ICCKHX HP0143BOACTBCHIMIX OTHOLLICHHil. Tpya B CCCP He TOJIbH0 npaao, HO H noLierHaff 06533aHHOCTb BCCX pa- 60TOCCI000?6111a1X WICI-1013`couHaoncrilliecKoro oauecraa. EbICTP0e pE.'3BHTHC CIPOH3B0.2.4Tenbl1blX CHZ Hawe cTlialibi Tpe5yer ace 6ozbuiero Nomitiecraa KBaJiliC.IillakipO'BaHHbIX pa6ornHiKon. B. H. ,TleHHil nplulaBaJi riepaocreneHHoe 314atieHne o6igeo6pa3osare,rib- 11011 cneumazhHoll noaroroaxe p36oTHHKoa, 14X YiVI.CHHIO pa6orarb. Pa60TaTb,? nuca,n B. H. ACM-1H,? 3Ty 32,11,a,IY COBCTCKaA Ha 110CTaBliTb nepe,a napoaom BO acem ee o6lieme? Ha,ao OTMCTHTla, LIDO AAR ocyatecra.nemisi DTOCO .TICHHHCKOr0 yKa3alizg y Hac coae.uano otienb NINO- ro. Haw conpemenumil pa6oti.H1,1 Kviacc a caoe acce COCTOHT 143 o6pa3o- aamiux j110,11,C9. 05 .O.TOIVI MONCHO CyllifTb rro Aar-Ilium nepenHcH nace.rie- CCCP. B 1959 r. na 1 Tue. ToKapefl Hmeza cpe,afiee H abicwee o6pa- 3033H14e 667, Ope3epormanKoa ? 683, mexamma, Hina,[itancoa, HaCTpOciatH- KOB, peryompoaumKoa 06Opy,a0Ba141-114 ? 628, aneKTpomonrepoa, Haacmorp- III,HKOB CeTerl ?633, mon,e,r1buth1(03 Aepea000pa6orKH ? 690, pa6otnix i-KCJIe3- 110,ELOpOZCHOr0 Tpancnopra ? 408. B Hacrosnuee apemst Off0.1t0 npombnu.geHnux pa6otnix oKoHTIHJIH nozHyio HJIH HenozHylo cpe,amozo LuKodiy, rIpwLIeM o5u.keo5pa3oBaTenbHbiCt yporseHb pa6ogero Kzacca 11013bILLI3CTC51 Hs rorka B roz, 1450 ace 6ozbalee '1HC,TIO MOJI041,C>EH npkixoawr Ha ripearipwiTHH, HMC51 nozHoe 14.1114 Heno,r[Hoe cpezmee 06pa30BaHHC. Ho mepe TexinNecKoro nporpecca yee.alitmaaercrf Kommecrao KaaaH- CpHnHpoaakuiblx paoolnlx, OCO6CHHO 33H14TIAX o6c,nymcnBaH1-Iem maumH MC- X2H113MOB. C 1939 no 1959 r. KORIP-ICCTBO pa6oHmx Ha CH.110BbIX ycraHosKax YBeJIHT-IkITIOCb HOIITH B 3 pa3a, DJiewrpo4 H ra3oenapw,HIcoH-6o.nee gem B 4 pa3a, 3/.1eKrpomo1irepoa ki Ha,I,CMOTp1.11,HKOB ceTeil?no4TH a 3 pa3a H T. r.L. 04HoppemeaHo npoucxo,aHT 3ki3lll1TelfbH0C coKpaigeHHe Hnua 33H5ITBTX T11- xce.num Tpy,a,om. (3a5ocanHKH a ropHo,u,o6LIDamme.H ripombunneHnocTx, 3CM- ? zeKonbi a CTPOHTCJIL,CTBC, pa?oogHe., aauFrude Jiec03aroToBKax, 14 1-IeltoTopbie npo(Pecum T14)KCJI0r0 4m3HliecKoro rpyRa Boace 14cge- 3aior. B yrozbiwci npombiamenilocTz ye aer 3apy6waKoa, 6ypHabaulKos apyithylo, OTKaT4HHOB, pe3xo cHH)KaeTcg KOJIHtICCTBO MallIHHHCTOB 2py60- MAX mamHH, B Juirecalom npoH3aoacTBe JIHKBH,aupylorcsi npo4peccHa,c1op- MOBLII.131{0B spyHHylo, BbIC)HBa.riblitHHOB, o6py5n,mco3, imapy6iwixos, mo,ttenb- B nopro,Ko B.' H. e a i a, floolioe co6pa14ie T. 36, cTp. 189. Approved For Release 2110b/U6/13 : CIA-KliFito-U3OblAUOUJOUU401M-1 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2005/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040005-1 IJAHKOB npyithylo, B crpoxre.abcTse y>xe Her xaTazeil-xpioimaxo3, K030110- COB, rpa6aperi. Ha cmeuy acqe3atouxam npocpeocaRm nppiuma 1103b1C npo(peccaa, BbIaBall1IbIe 1< >K113.1111 6b1cTpo pa33aBarowecics1 TeXiikIKO1A,? Mali11111aCTb1 II mexamixx 3JICKTp013030B, yr0J11)111)1X xomoailHoB, paooLiae no OGCJIy}KII,B3H1110'H pemoury cpopmonottaux H JIIITC1111blX maaam, 3xcxa- 133T-OpLI1TI1{13, xpanonw,alth, 6y.nb,n,o3epacTu, 6erown,axii, MOETWKIIIIKH H mHorae ,apyrae. ? Hecmorpm Ha TO, HTO Ha coua.nacTatiecxxx npeAppairrasix Tpya,wrcit 60J1bW0e KOAHLICCTBO BbICOKOKBaJIM4)HIthp0BaHHIAX paaogax, TIO.arOTOBKa xBa.nacpatuipoBaHHux xaz,poB ewe He scer,ro oTneimeT so3pocu1Hm TpeGona- HHANI cospemeHHoro Texnwiecxoro nporpe.cca. KaK H3BeCTHO, no,aroTonxa 1CBaJ1HHLwpoBaHHbIX pa6oLiax ocyw,ecTn- J15ICTC5l Ha npe,anpairraRx, .13 cacTeme npocpectaona,nbuo-Texinixiecxoro 30B3H112, a aroice B H3BeCTII0i1 mepe B o6weo6pa3onaTe,ra)Hoci,r4arowasi tiacm x3a.npr4mk1ponaHaux pa6ogax ,ao cax flop no- Aylmer no,aroTonxy HenocpeAcTneHHo Ha npe.anpas1r:451x. )I,a>Ke B Taxoil ae- iywci Hapo,aHoro X0351fICTBa, mawanocTpoeuae, r,a,e Tpe6yxyr- _ cif pa6oulle Haago.nee nucoxoil '