BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 11, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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BrIefly Noted /
What Purpose Peking Cuts British
Diplomatic Representation
Relations?
In late September,
the British foreign
office confirmed the fact that
ComChina had asked their govern-
ment to cut their two-man consular
representation in Shanghai in half,
to stop granting visas to Hong
Kong, and to refrain from flying
their flag on the Consulate's car.
These demands are highly irregular
and interfere in the normal conduct
of an official foreign establish-
ment.
Petty harassment and incessant
restrictions hamper the legitimate
activities of foreign representa-
tives in ComChina; they also raise
serious doubts as to the present
CPR government's willingness or
ability to enter into normal dip-
lomatic relations with any nation.
High level diplomats from the
free world in Peking -- e.g., from
Great Britain and France -- are
largely ignored. Those from Com-
munist countries hardly fare any
better, especially when they con-
test Chicom policy. Even friendly
African officials -- including
those from countries being wooed
with aid and trade by the CPR --
have discovered that they are pre-
vented from carrying out the dip-
lomatic functions normal in state
relations.
Many governments are advocat-
ing the extension of diplomatic rela-
tions with the CPR. They support
their proposals by saying that the
CPR must be drawn into normal con-
sultative and negotiating relations.
They should be asked to examine
their own experience and that of
others who have entered into such
relations. It should be pointed
out that the CPR will not change
its approach simply by being brought
into normal international relations
-- this has been tried for 15 years
now. Rather, the CPR must be in-
duced to change its policy by firm
resistance on the part of all civi-
lized nations.
Targets Soviet Propaganda,
and Mid-1964 to Mid-1965
Tactics
USIA has published an
analysis of propaganda
appearing in major Soviet media,
especially Pravda (official organ
of the CPSU) during the past year.
The paper, which finds that Moscow's
principal concern has been its dis-
pute with Communist China, examines
the lines taken by the USSR on the
major subjects treated, as follows:
U.S. -- responsible for increasing
world tensions; disarray in world
communism -- attack on Mao, the
Togliatti memorandum, K's ouster;
and on the international scene,
concentrating on Viet-Nam, Cyprus,
the Congo and Latin America -- an
attempt to appear active while in
fact avoiding greater -- or more
specific -- commitments on any of
these issues. For example, in the
latter, Moscow engaged in compli-
cated actions to supply Nicosia
with arms and at the same time made
friendly overtures to Ankara --
after the threat of immediate hos-
tilities had subsided.
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Significant Dates /
OCT.
23 Orderly student demonstration in Hungary becomes national anti-Soviet
uprising when Soviet tanks fire. (See 1 Nov). 1956.
26 Chinese Communist "volunteers" intervene against UN forces sweeping
through North Korea. 1950.
29 KOMSOMOL (Communist Union of Youth) established. 1918.
NOV.
1 Hungarian Revolt 1-4 (see 23 Oct above). 1956.
4 Greek Civil War ends with Communist acknowledgment of defeat. 1949.
5 Afro-Asian Bandung II still scheduled for Algeria but increasingly
doubtful.
6 U.S. grants billion dollar Lend-Lease credit to USSR. 1941.
7 Bolsheviks seize power in October Revolution (Julian calendar date
is 25 Oct). 1917.
10 World Youth Day (Communist). To celebrate 20th anniversary of found-
ing of the WFDY (1945).
11 International Student Week, concluding with an International Student
day on the 17th (celebrated by communist IUS).
12 Trotsky expelled from the CPSU. 1926.
15 Bolsheviks proclaim "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia,"
affirming principle of self-determination of peoples of the former
Russian Empire. 1917, (Later abrogated)
19 Milovan Djilas arrested. 1956.
20 U.S. lifts naval quarantine of Cuba. 1962.
22 Charles de Gaulle born 1890 (75th birthday).
26 Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF -- Communist) founded
1945. 20th anniversary.
29 Yugoslavia proclaimed People's Republic. 1945. 20th anniversary.
30 USSR vetoes Security Council resolution requesting withdrawal Chinese
Communist "volunteers" from Korea. 1950.
NOV. Proposed meetings of Communist controlled groups -- no firm dates
-- AAPSO (Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization)
Executive Committee Meeting, Conakry, Guinea.
-- AAPSO sponsored Afro-Asian Women's Conference, Algiers.
[Previously postponed.]
-- Joint Spark, World Marxist Review Seminar, Accra, Ghana.
[Previously postponed.]
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#63 Commentary 15-28 September 1965
Principal Developments:
1. The Chinese assault the Soviet leadership with increasing intensity
over Soviet support of India and "collaboration" with the U.S. They even
include in an official Chinese Foreign Ministry protest note to India (over
a demonstration at the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi) a charge that the
Indians' "undivulgeable motive" (in staging the provocation) was "to seek
reward from the imperialists and modern revisionists." The Chinese also
publicize expressions of support from sympathizers in Albania, Australia,
Belgium, Indonesia and New Zealand. (NZ alone of this group did not in-
volve the Soviets with the Indians.)
2. The strongest (and only) Soviet statement, a Pravda report on the
Sino-Indian border tension which seems to accept the Indian version of the
situation and notes "foreign news" reports of Chinese troop movements on the
frontier, warns cautiously: "Reports of this kind cannot but make uneasy"
all who are interested in the restoration of peace in south and southeast
Asia, including the liquidation of U.S. aggression in Vietnam. Meanwhile,
Kommunist sets forth a low-key exposition of the Soviet line on the peaceful
achievement of socialism in developing countries via "a new political force --
a revolutionary democracy": the Kommunist article stands in sharp contrast
to the Chinese line as freshly expounded by Lin Piao (#62), although there
is no polemicizing with, or even mention of, the Chinese.
3. A North Korean Nodong Sinmun article on the 17th on the India-Pak
-fighting seems to disassociate itself from the Chinese charge of Soviet com-
plicity as it asserts that "the chief manipulators ... are none other than
the U.S. and British imperialists." On the 25th North Vietnamese organ Nhan
Dan, in a commentary on the Chinese-Indian border issue, comes out with
"resolute support" of the "just stand of China," repeating the Chinese charges
against India and warning that "the more it (India) persists in its stubborn-
ness, the stronger the opposition it incurs from the Asian-African peoples
and progressive opinion in the world."
4. The strongest Communist criticism of the Chinese comes from the
Yugoslavs. A Borba commentary of the 26th includes the forceful statement:
"Chinese policy would endeavor to attain a number of its goals over the bodies
of the people of India and Pakistan!"
5. Bilateral meetings on the Soviet side continue. The visit of the
top-level Rumanian delegation to Bulgaria which began last period produces a
communique with a strong Rumanian flavor, with repeated emphasis on independ-
ence, equal rights and non-interference. The communique from an 11-day visit
of an Ulbricht-led East German delegation to the USSR unsurprisingly affirms
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"full identity of views" and calls for an international meeting of all
parties in the future. A 5-day visit of a Tito-led Yugoslav delegation to
Bulgaria emphasizes the resumption of friendly relations and "an identity
or proximity of views." And a Kadar-led Hungarian delegation stops off in
Moscow en route on a "friendly visit" to Mongolia, with no report of any
results.
6. The CPU/CC is meeting in plenum as we go to press, with no indica-
tion thus far of any discussions or decisions on problems of the ICM per se.
7. bitter behind-the-scenes political 25X1X6
infighting over Soviet participation in the 2nd Afro-Asian ("Bandung") Con-
ference; Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi suffered sharp setbacks on this
issue during his visits to Guinea and Mali early in September. In a press
conference on the 29th, Chen Yi publicly states that the conference should
be postponed unless there can be assurance that it will specifically condemn
U.S. imperialism. Meanwhile, Pravda raises a question mark with an editorial
on the 27th condemning the arrest of Algerian opposition leaders earlier this
month.
Significance:
Chinese attacks on Soviet leaders -- now unequivocally identified --
as well as on the Indian "reactionaries" and U.S. "imperialists," have
reached a shrill, emotional vituperation bordering on hysteria (note espe-
cially the reports of Chen Yi's press conference on the 29th). The single,
cautious Soviet attempt to counter the Chinese onslaught against India, the
Pravda article of the 22nd, was an apparent effort to appeal directly to the
North Vietnamese and their sympathizers to rally to a position that the
Chinese bellicosity toward India at this juncture hinders the North Viet-
namese cause. However, it was coldly rebuffed by the Nhan Dan commentary
3 days later asserting full Vietnamese support for all aspects of the Chinese
position. Meanwhile, the Yugoslavs mince no words in denouncing the Chinese,
accusing them of trying to achieve their own ends over the bodies of the
Indians and Pakistanis!
Nothing has yet come out of the continuing top-level bilateral meetings
on the Soviet side or the CPSU plenum to give substance to our earlier specu-
lation (#62) on possible significant new developments there.
Sino-Soviet, India-Pakistan, and a wide range of other animosities and
problems are interacting to roil planning and prospects for the 2nd Afro-Asian
("Bandung") Conference, with no reliable prognostication now possible.
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950. THE U.S. SCENE:
DOMESTIC REALITIES VS FOREIGN SLANDERS
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SITUATION: The lot of the average-American is almost universally
envied abroad, American technology, commercial techniques and living
styles are widely imitated, foreign students flock to American colleges
and American aid of all kinds is avidly sought after. Paradoxially,
though, the very political and social system which begets these much-
admired results is misunderstood and slandered -- not only by Communists,
but by the mass media of allegedly "non-aligned" countries and in the
territory of many of our allies as well.
In recent months, such slander and distortion has concentrated on
allegations such as the following:
a. The U.S. Government is "a ressive" and "beZZicose"
;Vietnam, San Domingo, Congo) abroad, while neglecting
"far more urgent" domestic ills, such as racial dis-
crimination, mass unemployment, poverty, slums and crime;
b. Whereas President Kennedy/ pursued a peaceful, progressive
policy, President Johnson concentrates on warmongering,
reactionary, "imperialist" policies;
c. The American "people" -- notably negroes, students, in-
tellectuals and liberals in general -- are increasingly
opposing these policies.
In order to make these claims more plausible [See, for instance,
Lin Piao's article, attachment to guidance #947, "China Advocates World-
Wide Wars," 27 September 1965], Communists and other antagonists apply,
inter alia, the following techniques:
a. They publicize every U.S. military move, draft calls, de-
fense production etc. in great detail (and often exag-
gerated), while minimizing -- and often completely omitting
-- any positive U.S. news, whether from the international
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(foreign aid, contributions to U.N. and other interna-
tional bodies) or from the domestic scene.
b. They scream hypocritically about purported U.S."aggress
sion" or "atrocities," but carefully omit stating what
caused such U.S. actions.-- whether Communist aggression
in South Vietnam, atrocities committed by Communist-sup-
ported rebels in the Congo, Communist terrorism in
Venezuela and other Latin American countries.
c. They claim that any dissenting voice in the U.S., every
picket line, "teach-in" or speech critical of government
policies, reflects "the masses of the people," while con-
cealing from their audiences the U.S. public opinion polls
which consistently confirm popular support for the govern-
ment's foreign as well as domestic policies and the stand
taken by numerous mass organizations (such as, for ins
stance, AFL-CIO with its millions of worker members), pub-
lic leaders and publications.
d. They employ numerous sleights-of-hand to present their
distortions or exaggerations as "factual reporting." For
instance, Soviet newspapers claim that "one third of the
U.S. population is inadequately fed" -- without telling
their readers that this estimate is based on the very
high nutritional standards set in the U.S. (not only a
high amount of calories, but also a properly balanced
diet): if the same exacting standards were applied to
the Soviet Union, perhaps two thirds or more of their
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"DE-KHRUSHCHEVIZATION" ADVANCES --
AND "DE-STALINIZATION" RECEDES
SITUATION: The several CPSU histories. The CPSU has just published
the first post-Khrushchev version of its own history, a new (second) edi-
tion of KPSS Spravochnik (CPSU Handbook), released to the press 10 June
1965. It represents a major step in the "de-Khrushchevization" process,
purging the Party's history of the distortions of the "Khrushchev person-
ality cult" -- and reversing the Party's de-Stalinization course.
Before the first edition of this Handbook appeared in 1963, the
only valid CPSU history was the 763-page, one-volume History of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (called a "textbook" in Soviet refer-
ences), second, revised edition, published in 1962. The first edition
of this "textbook" in 1959 had finally replaced Stalin's famous "Short
Course" -- distributed in 60 million copies over 15 years.
The Party had also announced its intention to publish a massive,
definitive 6-volume Party history, to be completed by the 50th anniver-
sary of the "October Revolution" in 1967: Pravda in a 22-column article
spread over its issues of 22 and 24 June 1962 proclaimed in great detail
the tasks of the editors of the new work, and Izvestiya on 19 July 1962
stated that the first volume would be released in 1963. (See BPG No. 99,
Item 569, 10 September 1962.) The first volume actually did appear a
few weeks before Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 -- and was subsequently
recalled, presumably because of several favorable references to K. in the
54-page Preface! (See BPG No. 158, Item 866, 1 February 1965.)
Current history: first version. The 1963 first edition of the
Handbook was overlooked by Kremlinologists (including ourselves). It is
a modest little volume in pocketbook format (340 pages): its style is
terse and factual, and, particularly in treating the post-WWII period,
it is largely an account of the Party's various congresses and plenums,
plus some of the major international Communist events, the 1957 and 1960
Moscow meetings, Warsaw Pact, and CEMA affairs. Only 20% of the volume
was devoted to the post-WWII period (even less than the 22% of the "text-
book"). Although there was no flowery adulation, this was clearly
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Khrushchev's Party histor : policies and developments were described from
K's subjective point of view; the criticisms of Stalin, the "ant,i-Party
group," and Zhukov are all there as K had detailed them; and K's is almost
the only name mentioned positively in the post-WWII period (it appears 26
times in the last 45 pages, mostly in connection with his formal "reports"
to the Party meetings). We have not noted K's name in the pre-WWII period
(there is no index), but the WWII section begins with a quoted tribute by
him to the war heroes, and 3 pages later he appears again when Stalin is
accused, inter alia, of having ignored an April 1941 letter from Ukrainian
First Secretary K warning of inadequate military preparations to meet the
German threat.
The second version compared. The new second edition of the Handbook
follows the same format as the first. Although it covers 2 more years and
is described as "corrected and amplified,"the post-WWII part is 18 pages
shorter than in the first edition. There, history since 1945 was divided
into 3 chapter-eras: 1945 to the death of Stalin in 1953; 1953 through
1958, -- and from the "Extraordinary" 21st Party Congress at the beginning
of 1959 through December 1962. In the 2nd edition, Stalin's death no longer
marks the end of an era: the events of 1945-1958 are covered continuously
in a single section, while the last section continues through May 1965.
The revisions from the 1st to the 2nd editions are significant not
only in their treatment of personalities and the historical record of
bygone events, but even more for their implications regarding the Party's
future policies. Appended as an unclassified attachment is a 15-page de-
tailed analysis of the changes prepared by a competent outside researcher
for his own organization. We emphasize particularly the following:
Personalities. Khrushchev is not made an "unperson," nor is he
directly criticized in the new volume. However, his name is mentioned
only 5 times (by our count; still no index): as speaker, together with
Malenkov, Moskatov, and Saburov at the 19th Party Congress in 1952.(the
lst.ed,. did.,not name any speakers!); when elected First Secretary in 1953;
as the lone speaker at the 21st Congress in 1959 (the same as in the 1st
-- but it will be noted that the 2nd ed. does not name any speaker for the
20th Congress, where K. made his most sensational performance ; as speaker,
together with Kozlov and Gorkin, at the 22nd Congress (same as the 1st);
and when he was relieved of his posts in 1964. The 2nd ed. abandons the
fiction that K voluntarily resigned and implies that he was guilty of his
own cult of personality. There is also criticism of policies which he
had promoted, especially in agriculture.
Criticism of Stalin is considerably toned down. Factual reference
is still made to the Party's resolutions "about the cult of the personal-
ity and its results," and measures to overcome the harmful effects thereof.
However, the details of Stalin's transgressions and the names of prominent
Communist victims are now omitted.
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Likewise, whereas the 1st ed. named all eight persons purged by K in
1957-8 as associated with the "anti-Party group," the 2nd names only
"Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov., and others" as a group opposing the line
of the Party and adds that these three were expelled by the June 1957
plenum's resolution "On the Anti-Party Group." The charges against Zhukov
and his expulsion from "leading Party organs" at the October 1957 plenum
are not mentioned in the 2nd.
Pioneering Soviet astronauts, Gagarin, Titov, Nikolayev and Popovich,
were named in a tribute to Soviet science under the Party's care in the
1st ed., but the entire passage is missing from the 2nd.
Implications for future: The Party seems to be quietly abandoning
Khrushchev's unrealistically grandiose claims and goals for building Com-
munism in the USSR in 20 years, formally set forth in "his" 3rd CPSU Pro-
gram, adopted by the 22nd Congress. Thus far, however, the changes are
largely of omission: the Program itself has not been criticized, and the
principal points of its platform, including such controversial concepts
as the transformation from a "dictatorship of the proletariat" to an "all-
peoples' state," are still listed factually.
Consistent deletion of the 1st edition's references to "mass partici-
pation" in the elaboration of Party policies in the K era indicates that
the practice of turning CC sessions into mass meetings of several thousand
activists will be rejected.
While the 1st edition still accurately reported that the 1960 81-party
meeting in Moscow had "confirmed a resolution about revisionism as the main
danger to the Communist movement," the 2nd blandly says that "the meeting
again pointed to the unavoidability of decisive struggle against revision-
ism as well as against dogmatism and sectarianism," -- thus further con-
firming the CPSU's intent to dissociate itself from that embarrassing con-
cession in the 1960 document.
Noteworthy sidelights: The 1st edition implicitly admitted Soviet
support for the Communist underground in the UAR, Turkey, and other coun-
tries where the USSR is attempting to woo Government favor. It states,
under the heading "The CPSU and the World Communist Movement" (p. 336),
that "many CPs of capitalist countries carry on their work in a deep under-
ground (in Spain, Portugal, the UAR, Turkey, Iran, the FRG, Peru, and
others) ...." The 2nd edition cuts this sentence off after "underground!"
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SITUATION: There is a substantial investment of Latin American-
controlled capital outside of Latin America; the amount is estimated to
be about $L billion. This capital is badly needed within Latin America
to foster economic development. The need is now greater than ever in
view of the steady decline in the influx of private foreign investment
capital.
The basic reasons for the flight of capital are unstable political
and economic conditions, the threat of expropriation, and a generally un-
favorable climate for private enterprise reflected in a lack of business
confidence in government.
Foreign aid programs and private foreign investment tend to encour-
age local investment to contribute to building a solid base for economic
development and expansion, and therefore tend to counter capital flight.
And, conversely, substantial local investment tends to attract foreign
investment.
Therefore, creating favorable conditions for local investment, which
is a matter within the power of the separate nations of Latin America, has
the two-fold effect of encouraging local investment ,of(domestic capital
and of attracting increased foreign investment capital.
A report on the flight of Latin American capital is enclosed as an
unclassified attachment; a Spanish translation is included for the ap-
25X1010 b
propriate stations.
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953. KASHMIR
BACKGROUNDER ON THE INDIAN-PAKISTAN CRISIS
25X1C10b
"AZZ attempts by us to normalize our relations with
India were frustrated by a persistent refusal to honor
a solemn international pledge given by it to hold a
plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.... We
fought for the right of self-determination of our peo-
ple, and the whole world has come to acknowledge the
just and moral basis of our struggle."
..........President Ayub Khan of Pakistan,
Radio address, September 22,1965.
"A plebiscite in Kashmir is neither practical nor
necessary." Its accession to India is "legally, con-
stitutionally, politically and ethically complete and
just."
..........President Radhakrishnan of India,
Radio address, September 25,1965
The circumstances which led up to the current impasse between India
and Pakistan, centering on the status of Kashmir, are so complex and am-
biguous that it is impossible to single out one party as the aggressor
or any one event as the cause of the dilemma.
Not only is it impossible to place the blame unequivocally, which
might then suggest a simple solution, but the pervading historic and po-
litical influences have created from the present crisis a bitter, emotion-
laden conflict of interests involving vital issues of international sig-
nificance and the maintenance of world peace.
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The escalation of the Kashmir problem has presented the United
Nations with one of the most severe tests of its authority and via-
bility; caused an apparent re-alignment of national relationships which
a short time ago would have been considered unlikely; provoked Communist
China and the Soviet Union into postures previously held untenable; ag-
gravated political tensions in which long-festering national grievances
and pride erupted into acts of violence; fomented flagrantly bellicose
and intemperate governmental accusations, claims and counterclaims, and
prompted dramatic tactical maneuvers which so far have served but to
reinforce the stalemate.
Although the dissension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has
been a legal and diplomatic issue only since 1947 when the two countries
became separate and independent, the emotional, religious, social, geo-
graphic and economic factors involved have their roots far back in the
past. These historic problems and communal rivalries are to a great
extent responsible for the seemingly irrational intransigence of both
nations. (See unclassified attachment for historic background of Kashmir.)
Far from solving the Hindu-Moslem problem, the partition of India
exacerbated it. In late 1947, mass migrations of some ten million peo-
ple (Hindus leaving Pakistan and Moslems leaving India) were accompanied
by massacres in which one million or more died in a nightmarish communal
blood bath.
Communist China's attack on India in October 1962 strengthened India's
resolve to hold Kashmir for strategic as well as emotional reasons. That
debacle delivered a telling blow to Indian national pride and drove home
the fact that India must seriously attend to its Himalayan defenses.
While the Kashmir dispute is but one of India's foreign policy prob-
lems, Pakistan's frustration over its inability to wrest Kashmir from
India is the basic emotion molding its entire foreign policy. To the
Pakistani, Kashmir is a blight on Pakistan's national honor. Proposals
aimed at saving face for Pakistan - but leaving India in control of the
Vale - have no appeal in Rawalpindi or to President Ayub whose political
future is inextricably tied to Kashmir.
In 1959, Ayub first tried to exploit the Sino-Indian border diffi-
culties by proposing a joint Indian-Pakistani defense of the sub-continent
-- which had real merit in itself -- predicated on a Kashmir settlement.
Prime Minister Nehru of India was unresponsive.
It was then hoped by Pakistan that Chinese pressure on the Indian
border would force India to secure its flank with Pakistan by offering
concessions in Kashmir. However, in the view of Pakistan, the Western
allies of Pakistan, by sending military assistance to India following the
1962 Chinese invasion, eliminated the necessity of Indian concessions over
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Kashmir. The sending of US arms in particular, even though intended only
for self defense against China, is interpreted by Pakistan as disloyal
and treacherous support of an enemy by an ally. It is a fact, however,
that the US and UK did succeed in getting India and Pakistan into talks
on Kashmir in 1963; but Communist China's gestures toward Pakistan and
Pakistan's responsiveness destroyed what little chance of success there
may have been for a settlement.
Recent constitutional steps to complete the integration of Kashmir
by India convinced Pakistan that time is on the side of India. The Rann
of Kutch confrontation which developed in January-April 1965, further
seriously strained Indo-Pakistan relations. Following the Rann of Kutch
agreement, and the declaration by India in July 1965 that Kashmir is "not
a matter for discussion," seemed to convince Pakistan that more drastic
action was necessary. Pakistan therefore embarked upon its guerrilla cam-
paign designed to force the Kashmir question into the open. On 5 August
1965, armed men from Pakistan crossed the cease-fire line into Kashmir.
The counter action by India and the subsequent escalation.by both sides
resulted into an undeclared war; a conditional and fragile cease-fire
effective September 22 under the auspices of the United Nations, and the
subsequent involvement of the Great Powers and many smaller nations in :.
diplomatic efforts and political machinations designed to resolve the
Kashmir problem.
The escalation of the conflict has been fanned primarily by Commu-
nist China but it is being exploited by the Soviet Union as well. Both
look for a solution in which their respective and currently divergent
interests and long-range political aspirations will be furthered.
An already complicated situation has been worsened further by the
addition of other serious issues, some of which are deliberately inserted
into the overall picture by the Chinese Communists, for example: threats
of retaliatory action against India for alleged violations of Chicom ter-
ritory; relating "US aggression in North Vietnam" to "Indian aggression
against Pakistan"; setting forth conditions for a seat in the UN while
praising Indonesia for leaving that body and probably encouraging Pakistan
in its threat to do the same unless her demand for a plebiscite is honored.
Other issues tangential to the direct conflict further confuse the problem,
such as: alleged use of US arms by both parties; the tactically expedient
"cooperation" by the Soviet Union with the US in efforts to reach a peace-
ful settlement and to counter Chicom aid or intervention to support Pakistan.
25X1C10b
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25X1C10b
11 October 1965
Some Major U.S. Social Legislation Enacted Into Law
during and. Since the Kennedy Administration
Equal Rights. PL (Public Law) 88.-38, signed into law 10 June 1963,
guaranteed equal pay to women doing the same work as men.
Public Health. PL 88-129, signed 24 Sept 1963, appropriated some $175
million annually to provide matching federal grants for construction
of teaching facilities for training of medical and dental personnel.
Social Therapy. PL 87-274 was extended in the autumn of 1963, continuing
the annual $10 million to develop comprehensive community support of
progress for prevention and control of youth delinquency in areas of
need.
Environmental Improvement. PL 88-157, signed 24 Oct 1963, provided con-
tinuing federal incentives for control of visual (billboard) adver-
tising adjacent to public motor highways.
Public Health. PL 88-165, signed 31 Oct 1963, and PL 88-156, signed
24 Oct 1963, appropriated over $611 million for federal aid to
mental health facilities and related programs.
Care of Elderly. PL 88-158, signed 24 Oct 1963, appropriated $225 million
for the program of urban housing for the elderly.
Death of Pres. Kennedy. 22 November 1963. Beginning of Johnson admin-
istration.
Education. PL 88-204, signed 17 Dec 1963, appropriated some $1.2 billion
in federal aid for college classroom construction.
Public Health. PL 88-206, signed 17 Dec 1963, appropriated $95 million
for activities to combat air pollution.
Social Therapy. PL 88-214, signed 19 Dec 1963, provided federal assist-
ance and some $861 million in funds to educate and train out-of-
school, out-of--work youths.
Public Works. PL 88-253, signed 30 Dec 1963, appropriated over $816
million to expand 11 river basin authorizations and to start or
broaden work on five dam and reservoir projects.
(Cont.)
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Grants of U.S. Foodstuffs. PL 88-250, signed 30 Dec 1963, provided $1.9
billion for the "Food for Peace," foreign assistance program.
Foreign Aid. PL 88-258, signed 6 Jan 1964, appropriated $3 billion for
foreign aid.
Civil Rights. The 24th Amendment was ratified by the required three-
fourths (38) of the states and became a part of the U.S. Constitution
23 Jan 1964, outlawing use of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting
in federal elections.
Social Therapy. PL 88-268, signed 10 Feb 1964, provided over $289 million
in supplemental funds for programs for the mentally retarded, impacted
school areas, student loans, and Mexican seasonal farm labor.
Education. PL 88-269, signed 11 Feb 1964, provided $55 million for federal
assistance to public library construction.
Tax Reduction. PL 88-272, signed 26 Feb 1964, enacted an overall $11.5
billion tax reform and reduction.
Public Works. PL 88-280, signed 11 Mar 1964, authorized $75 million
annually for federal aid to development of airports.
Peace Corps. PL 88-285, signed 17 Mar 1964, appropriated $115 million
for Peace Corps operations in Fiscal 1965.
Public Health. PL 88-305, signed 12 May 1964, provided for control over
use of pesticides potentially harmful to humans and wildlife.
Civil Rights Act. PL 88-352, signed 2 July 1964, the most far-reaching
civil rights legislation since the U.B. Reconstruction era, outlawed
all racial or religious discrimination in schools or other public
facilities.
Public Works. PL 88-365, signed 9 July 1964, authorized matching federal
grants up to $475 million annually for improving urban transit systems.
Public Works. PL 88--423, signed 13 Aug 1964, provided $1.179 billion for
federal highway construction in each of fiscal years 1966 and 1967.
Justice. PL 88-455, signed 20 Aug 1964, authorized federal judicial
circuits to establish procedures for providing indigents accused of
federal crimes with adequate legal counsel at public expense.
Social Therapy. PL 88-452, signed 20 Aug 1964, appropriated $947 million
for the President's "war" on the multiple causes of poverty.
Public Health. PL 88-497, signed 27 Aug 1964, provided $69 million in
federal funds for public health training.
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Public Works. PL 88-552, signed 31 Aug 1964, provided for federal-
private joint construction of four major ultra-high-voltage elec-
tric power :facilities to provide low-cost current in Western U.S.
regions,
Social Help. PL 88-853, signed 31 Aug 1964, authorized funds for reset-
tlement and rehabilitation of Seneca Indians who would be dislocated
when part of their reservation was inundated by a new dam necessi-
tated by a flood control project.
Public Works. PL 88-560, signed 2 Sept 1964, appropriated over $1.1
billion to fund urban renewal and public housing programs.
Conservation. PL 88-577 (the "Wilderness Act"), signed 3 Sept 1964,
provided for preservation of substantial land areas of the nation
in wild, unspoiled condition.
Conservation. PL 88--578, signed 3 Sept 1964, set up a major new program
in the field of parks and recreation, providing about $200 million
annually for lend and water conservation measures.
Public Health. PL 88-581, signed 4 Sept 1964, authorized $283 million
for four and five-year programs of nursing school construction and
expanded nurse training.
Socia~erapy. PL 88-582, signed 7 Sept 1964, provided some $25 million
to improve economic and social conditions for migratory and season-
ally employed farm workers.
Foreign Aid. PL 88-263, signed 7 Oct 1964, provided for $3.25 billion
in foreign aid, closer to what the President recommended than any
previous annual appropriation in the U.S. Foreign Aid Program's
19 years of existence.
Public Health, PL 88-654, signed 13 Oct 1964, provided for federal loans
to students of optometry.
Social Therapy. PL 89-4, signed 3 Mar 1965, provided for federal economic
development programs needed in the Appalachian region.
Education. PL 89-10, signed 11 Apr 1965, appropriated $100 million to
strengthen and improve educational quality and educational opportu-
nities in U.S. elementary and secondary schools.
Social Therapy. PL 89-15, signed 26 Apr 1965, provided $46 million in
federal funds for retraining of professional employees displaced by
changing employment patterns.
Social Therapy. PL 89-36, signed 8 June 1965, provided federal funds to
establish a National Technical Institute for the Deaf, in order to
train the deaf for successful employment.
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Public Works. PL 89-42, signed 17 June 1965, appropriated $908 million
for flood control, navigation aids and conservation measures in 11
major river basins.
Tax Reduction. PL 89-44, signed 21 June 1965, removed federal excise
taxes which had been imposed in wartime on the sale of most merchan-
dise and services in the U.S.
Small Business. PL 89-59, signed 30 June 1965, appropriated: some $1.7
billion for federal assistance to "Small Business," and amended the
original law to provide for assistance to disaster victims.
Conservation. PL 89-72, signed 9 July 1965, provided federal funds to
insure that river basin hydroelectric and flood control programs
would also provide, insofar as possible, for the interests of fish
and wildlife, and water resources.
Care of Elderly. PL 89-73, signed 14 July 1965, appropriated some $5
million to $8 million annually for programs to help elderly persons
with respect to employment, housing, etc.
Public Health. PL 89-74, signed 15 July 1965, enacted special controls
for new classes of depressant and stimulant drugs and counterfeit
drugs.
Conservation. PL 89-80, signed 22 July 1965, appropriated $13 million
for natural resources development through establishment of a water
resources council and river basin commissions.
Public Health. P1 89-97, (''Medicare"), signed 30 July 1965, provided a
comprehensive hospital insurance program for the aged(under the
Social Security Act) with a supplementary health benefits program,
an expanded program of medical assistance, and increased benefits
under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance systems.
Public Health. PL 89-105, signed 4 Aug 1965, appropriated some $30 million
annually to provide professional and technical personnel for compre-
hensive community mental health centers.
Civil Rights. PL 89-110 ("Voting Rights Act of 1965"), signed 6 Aug 1965,
set up further enforcement safeguards of the voting rights accorded
to U.S. citizens of all races and colors under the fifteenth amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution.
Public Works. PL 89-117 ("Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965"),
signed 10 Aug 1965, provided for federal assistance to enable private
housing to be available for lower income families who are elderly,
handicapped, displaced, victims of natural disaster, or occupants of
substandard housing.
4 (Cont.)
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Public Works. PL 89-118, signed 11 Aug 1965, appropriated up to $185
million annually to expand and accelerate the saline water conver-
sion program.
Public Works. FL 89-139, signed 28 Aug 1965, appropriated a supplemental
$3 billion for highway safety and interstate highway development for
the fiscal year ending 30 June 1967.
Public Works. PL 89-174, signed 9 Sept 1965, created a new Executive
agency known as the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Cultural Expansion. FL 89-209, signed 29 Sept 1965, appropriated $60
million to create a National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities
for federally supported national companies of the performing arts --
e.g., ballet, opera, theater --, for a film institute, for grants to
artists in residence, for schools and colleges, etc.
5
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11 October 1965
The Flight of Capital
from Latin A aerica
The World Bank, in its annual report published on September 25,
1965, warns that the growth of developing nations is threatened on two
fronts. The flow of capital to poor countries, both private investment
and government aid, has leveled off and shows no sign of increasing
soon. At the same time, the prices of raw materials, on which the
poorer nations depend for foreign earnings, are eroding. This results
in a decrease in purchases by the poorer nations of machines and other
finished goods which are necessary to hasten their further development.
In its report the Bank urges the richer nations to enlarge their aid or
to face an even slower rise in the standards of the poor.
Faced with this situation, it behooves the Latin American nations
to draw the maximum possible benefit from whatever investment capital
is available to them. It is therefore particularly distressing to note
that Latin Americans often prefer to invest their own capital abroad.
That is, while foreign investors, private and governmental, are being
urged to supply more investment capital to Latin America, many Latin
American money-holders are sending their own money abroad for invest-
ment -- principally in the richer nations of North America and Europe.
This transfer of money abroad is commonly called the "flight of capi-
tal," a term which has been given various definitions, but is used
herein to refer to capital which is owned or otherwise controlled by
Latin American individuals or companies and which is invested outside
their country.
Private assets may be transferred abroad overtly or covertly.
Overt transfers, in the form of bank deposits and purchases of shares
in foreign concerns, can be traced in some instances (particularly in
the united States where the statistics of such foreign holdings are
regularly published), and this permits some calculation of the sums
involved. However, an important share is transferred abroad covertly
and this amount is obviously not calculable. Such capital may be
transferred ostensibly as commercial transfers to agents abroad, or
by the techniques of over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of
exports. Additionally, American dollars or other foreign currency may
be purchased domestically and. held within the country as a hedge against
inflation.
Reliable statistics on the total value of Latin American assets
abroad, which include the normal export of capital as well as flight
capital, are woefully lacking. Estimates vary from $3 to 15 billion.
(Cont.)
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One report in The Economist, London, in 1962 stated that "wealthy Latin
Americans are believed to have some $10 billion safely lodged in Swiss
banks and elsewhere." Since the total foreign holdings in Swiss banks
in 1962 were estimated at about $7.5 billion, this is obviously exag-
gerated. According to more conservative estimates based on the limited
data available, the value of Latin American long and short-term assets in the
US at the end of 1963 approximated $2.8 billion. With this guidepost, it
may be presumed that the total value of Latin American assets abroad
is perhaps on the order of ' billion ... a substantial sum. (This
figure is supported by a study prepared for the U.S. Department of Com-
merce by its Committee for the Alliance for Progress, dated January 4,
1963 and also by research done by the Danish economist Poul H$st-Madsen
of the International Monetary Fund, published in the IMF's bulletin
Finance and Development, March 1965.)
The reasons for the flight of capital are not difficult to find.
Normally it takes place: (a) under conditions of economic instability,
such as excessive inflation and currency devaluation, reflecting the
desire of business and private citizens alike to preserve their property
intact through the purchase of foreign assets; (b) under conditions of
political and social instability, frequently aggravated by acts of ter-
rorism or sabotage; c under the threat of expropriation; (d) as a re-
sult of a general loss of business confidence in the government (as in
Mexico in 1961 or Columbia in 1963); or e) when the profit to be made
abroad substantially exceeds that which is locally realizable. In many
Latin American countries only income arising from sources within the
country is taxable, therefore these nations themselves put a premium
on investing abroad.
The existence of conditions of political and economic instability
does not, of course, a u t o m a t i c a 1 1 y induce massive capi-
tal flight. Despite continuing acts of violence in Venezuela, capital
flight is not now believed to be a serious problem there. Or again, in
the case of Brazil, where turbulent inflationary conditions have existed
since 1959, general confidence in the resiliency and potentialities of
the nation have helped to deter any sizable flight.
The relationship of capital flight to foreign aid programs is a
complicated problem. On the surface the former appears directly to nul-
lify the latter. However it is questionable that the two can be put in
rigid opposition. It can be argued that much of the foreign aid repre-
sents developmental outlays for projects which are pre-requisites for
accelerated economic activity, but which do not attract (for reasons of
low profitability, or because of the immense sums involved) capital from
private sources. Additionally, some of the flight money probably would
not have been available for any developmental purposes even had it re-
mained in Latin America.
2 (Cont.)
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However, the important point is that in the long term both foreign
aid programs and private capital investments by foreigners tend directly
to counter those conditions which lead to the flight of capital. The
effort of foreign aid programs to strengthen Latin economies tends to
lend both political and economic stability, which in turn helps to elimi-
nate the causes for capital flight. Private foreign investments attract
and combine with local capital to build new or expand existing factories.
And the confidence evidenced by foreign investment in a country creates
the local confidence necessary to persuade persons to invest locally.
It might also be pointed out that the strength of foreign investors is
also frequently a counter to demands for expropriation, which again re-
duces one of the principal motivations for capital flight.
The converse is also true: when domestic capital is invested lo-
cally, the confidence of the Latin investors in their own country's
future will attract foreign investors and support.
The conclusions which may be drawn from these considerations are
that: (Othe flight of capital from Latin America is substantial; (b)
the causes for it relate directly to local stability and respect for
private enterprise; (c) foreign aid programs and private foreign invest-
ments, to the degree to which they promote stability and confidence in
private enterprise, stem capital flight; (d) it is essential for each
individual nation to establish stable conditions which will encourage
local capital to be invested locally and, concurrently, will encourage
the influx of foreign investment capital.
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11 October 1965
THE FIRST DEKHRUSHCHEVIZED VERSION
OF CPSU HISTORY
With publication of the "second, corrected and amplified edition"
of the official reference work "CPSU" ("KPSS - Spravochnik," Izdatelstvo
Politicheskoi Literaturi, Moscow 1965, passed for printing 10.6. 5 the
first complete dekhrushchevized version of Soviet party history has been
issued by the new Kremlin leadership. It is a significant event because
it provides, implicitly, the most comprehensive criticism of the Khru-
shchev era yet to have been published.
Molotov & Co. Partially Rehabilitated
One of the most significant aspects of the revised textbook is the
partial rehabilitation of the one-time "anti-party group" of Molotov,
Malenkov et al., which was defeated by Khrushchev in June, 1957. This
section (pp. 302-303, 1st ed.) has been completely rewritten and dras-
tically curtailed to a nine-line paragraph as follows:
"While the CPSU developed work to implement the decisions of the
20th Congress, the group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, et al.,
came out against the party line. The question about this group was
discussed at the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957.
The plenum adopted the decree 'On the anti-party group,' dismissed
Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov from membership of the Central Com-
mittee and its Presidium. Severe measures of party coercion were
adopted also against other members of this group." (p. 305, 2nd
ed.)
The most important change here is that the one-time "anti-party
group" has been cleared of the charge of being "anti-party." It is
twice referred to simply as a "group," while the original epithet oc-
curs only once, with reference to the title of the decree then adopted
by the Central Committee, and is carefully set off in quotation marks.
In the first edition the group had been repeatedly described as "anti-
party" (without quotation marks). Moreover, all its members had been
identified by name, including Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, Shepilov,
and Vorshilov. The new version has dropped all the more blatant charges
previously made against the members of this group, in particular that
they had opposed the struggle against the personality cult and abuses
of power, as well as the efforts to find those guilty for the repres-
sions against honest communists. The charge that Molotov, Malenkov and
Kaganovich were accessories in these (Stalinist) abuses is likewise
omitted, as is the reference that this decision of the Central Committee
was "unanimously approved by the party and the entire Soviet people."
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In the chapter on the 1937-1938 pruges Molotov, Kaganovich, and
Malenkov have been cleared of responsibility for the repressions and
are no longer accused of having formed "the closest entourage of Stalin"
(see 1st ed. p. 244; 2nd ed. p. 255).
In the new version of the 21st Congress any reference to the fact
that the
"Congress delegates unanimously approved the decisions of the June
plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957, which unmasked and
ideologically defeated the anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov,
Kaganovich et al." (pp. 308-309, 1st ed.)
has likewise been dropped. (1)
Disunity under Khrushchev?
Should these omissions be taken to mean that there was no "unani-
mity." about this question in either the Central Committee or the party
Congress? It is, in fact, noteworthy-that the new edition repeatedly
conveys the impression that there was lack of unanimity on various poli
dies.- Thus, for instance, whereas the first edition claimed that the
20th Congress "fully approved the theses of N.S. Khrushchev's report
'On the Personality Cult and its Consequences'" (p. 290; emphasis sup-
plied), the second edition merely notes that the 20th Congress "adopted
(1) An adverse reference to mistakes made by Molotov in directing
the party organ Pravda in the pre-World War I period has likewise been
dropped from the 2nd edition (p. 81; first ed. P. 78). Moreover, on
p. 90 of the new edition Molotov is mentioned as a member of the "lead-
ing troika" of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee in 1916 (omit-
ted on p. 86 of the first edition). In the new edition Malenkov, as well
as Saburov (another member of the "anti-party group"), are now listed
among key-note speakers at the 19th CPSU Congress (p. 292, 2nd ed.), a
fact the first edition had tried to erase from the record. Nevertheless,
the version about Molotov's and Kaganovich's co-responsibility (with
Stalin) for "excesses" in the collectivization drive of the early thirties
is upheld by both editions (1st ed. p. 217; 2nd ed. p. 229). According
to unconfirmed reports Malenkov returned to Moscow some time after Khru-
shchev's fall. However, on July 19, 1965, Malenkov was criticized by
Pravda for dismissing the possibility of the USSR becoming involved in
World War II. Victor Zorza viewed this as indication that Malenkov's
present position had become a political issue in the Soviet Union (The
Guardian, July 20).
2 (Cont.)
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the decree 'On the personality Cult and its Consequences'" (p. 295).
In the new edition the earlier claim that the 21st CPSU Congress "fully
approved the activity of the party's Central Committee and the great
measures it carried through after the 20th Congress in the field of do-
mestic and foreign policy ... (and) demonstrated the monolithic unity...
of the party...." has been scaled down by omission of the words under-
scored by us (see 1st ed. p. 308, 2nd ed. p. 311).
This should not be taken to mean that the very concept of "mono-
lithic unity" is now regarded as outmoded, as some Italian CP leaders
have suggested: it is merely with respect to the Khrushchev era that
this notion now appears to be taboo. For in a subsequent passage in the
new edition we read:
"The monolithic unity of the party, its unflinching fidelity to
Lenin's precepts was demonstrated by the October plenum of the CPSU
Central Committee in 1964." (p. 322, emphasis in text)
The regularity with which the "monolithic unity" supposed to have
existed under any Soviet leadership is subsequently debunked by its suc-
cessors would seem to cast some doubt on the claim that "monolithic unity"
was at last established after Khrushchev's overthrow.
Marshal Zhukov Exempted from Criticism
The harsh criticism of Marshal Zhukov in the first edition has now
been retracted, as may be seen from the description of the October plenum
of the Central Committee in 1957. In the 1963 edition it said:
"The October plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957 condemned
the,,gross violations of Leninist principles of leadership by the
Armed Forces, dismissed Zhukov from the leading organs of the party,
and adopted measures for strengthening party-political work in the
Soviet Army and Navy." (p. 303; emphasis in text)
The rewritten passage on the same event is now entirely non-polemical.
"The October plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957 discussed
the question of improving party-political work in the Soviet Army and
Navy. In the plenum decree it was pointed out that 'in the practice
of party-political work there are still serious shortcomings, and
sometimes it is directly underestimated..' The plenum adopted meas-
ures to strengthen party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy."
(2nd edition, p. 305; emphasis in text)
While Stalin is still held responsible for disregarding signals
about the imminence of war in 1941 and for failing to make corresponding
military preparations, it is no longer claimed, as in the first edition,
that
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"Responsibility for this is also born by the then People's Com-
missar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and the Chief of the General
Staff G.K. Zhukov." (p. 258, first ed.; dropped from second ed.
on p. 268)
The claim made in this context that Khrushchev unsuccessfully tried
to call Stalin's attention to the lack of defense preparations has like-
wise been erased in the new edition (see p. 258, lst ed.; p. 268, 2nd
ed.).
Hesitating Reappraisal of Stalin
Still on the subject of World War II, the new edition of the history
textbook has omitted the following passage:
"The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Fatherland War was
achieved by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist
Party headed by the Central Committee. This disproves the legend
created in the period of the personality cult that Stalin was al-
most the only maker of all the most important victories on the front
and at home. The history of the Great Fatherland War shows that
Stalin committed gross mistakes and miscaluclations in the period
preceding the war, and during the war itself, correction of which
often cost great efforts and victims." (p. 271, lst ed.; omitted
from 2nd. on p. 281).
The cancellation of this passage seems to make room for a somewhat
more positive evaluation of Stalin's role during the war, which may be
partly prompted by the fact that it, should be difficult to convince even
a moderately intelligent reader that the victory was due to "leadership
of the ... Central Committee" when he is told at the same time that the
Central Committee was convened only once during the entire war period,
viz. in January 19+4 (ibid., p. 271).
In an amendment to the earlier text, the new edition explains why
Stalin was allowed to remain Secretary-General of the party in spite of
Lenin's adverse appraisal of his personality in the letter he wrote to
the 13th party Congress. Allegedly, this was because of "I.V. Stalin's
energetic struggle against Trotskyism which represented the basic danger
to the party at that time" (1st ed. p. 196; 2nd ed. p. 207). Incidentally,
Lenin's letter, which was previously said to be "known under the designa-
tion.of testament" (1st ed. pp. 195-6) has now been deprived of this de-
signation. This was presumably done in order not to provide any historical
precedent to justify the designation of Togliatti's Yalta memorandum as his
"testament."
4 (Cont.)
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Kirov Murder in New Perspective?
Whereas the first edition had pointed out that
"Stalin used the murder of S.M. Kirov for reprisals against many
people he disliked." (lst ed. p. 231; 2nd ed. p. 244)
this passage has now been eliminated, although the significance of this
move is not quite clear. Does it presage a reappraisal of the causes
and consequences of the Kirov murder? Or is it merely part of an effort
to make Stalin appear less bloodthirsty?
Memory of Purge Victims Obliterated
The latter explanation might appear more plausible because a few
pages later the new edition omits the only passage which listed the most
prominent victims of Stalin's terror, directly linking their death to the
late Soviet dictator:
"Prominent leaders fell victims to the arbitrariness of Stalin
and his closest entourage, such as N.V. Krylenko, P.P. Postyshev,
S.V. Ko~ior, Ya. E. Rudzutak, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, V. Ya. Chubar,
A.S. Yenukidze, R.I. Eykhe, A.S. Kiselev, M.S. Kedrov, V.I. Nevsky,
the military leaders V.K. Blyukher, A.I. Yegorov, A.I. Kork, I.E.
Yakir, M.N. Tukhachevsky, I.P. Uborevich, R.P. Eydeman and many,
many other true Leninists." (1st ed. p. 244; 2nd ed. p. 255)
In the same context, the new edition fails to make the following
statement, which had been restated so often under Khrushchev as to be
virtually canonized:
"However, Stalin's personality cult, although it hindered the de-
development of Soviet society, could not halt its further advance
toward communism. The party carried on a selfless struggle for the
interests of the people, for building socialism in the USSR." (lst
ed. p. 244; 2nd ed. p. 255)
The omission of this thesis may well be a precautionary measure,
for if Stalin's personality cult could not halt the advance of Soviet
society toward communism, then obviously Khrushchev's personality cult
could not do so either. But the new leaders may soon be in need of a
scapegoat to explain why they are unable to stick to the original time-
table for the advent of communism in the USSR set by the new Party Pro-
gram adopted in 1961. What would be more tempting than to blame Khru-
shchev for having to advance the advent of communism once again? But
more about this later.
5 (Cont.)
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In discussing the 17th party Congress held in early 1934, the new
edition makes one omission which at first glance seems to reflect un-
favorably on Stalin:
"The party came to the 17th congress united and monolothic. There
were no oppositional groups in the party. The former leaders of
the oppositional groups Zinovyev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, and
Tomsky made penitential speeches, recognizing the party's suc-
cesses." (1st ed. p. 230; 2nd ed. p. 244)
Actually, neither edition discusses in any way the subsequent
Stalinist show trials of these leaders, so that any unbiased reader is
bound to ask himself why they had to be tried and executed once they
had given up their opposition and made "penitential speeches." Rather
than to discuss the Stalinist show trials, those responsible for the
new edition appear to have preferred to keep mum about the capitulation
of the old Bolshevik opposition to Stalin. At the same time it should
be noted that since publication of the first edition the notion itself
that there was "monolithic unity" at the 17th party congress was de-
bunked by the old Bolshevik Lev Shaumyan who pointed out in an author-
itative article published by Pravda (7.2.64) that there were "old
Leninist cadres" at the Congress who, remembering "Lenin's Testament,"
were thinking of how to replace Stalin as Secretary General of the party.
Shaumyan, presumably, did not have in mind Zinovyev, Kamenev, et al.,
but such "stout Leninists" as Khrushchev, Shvernik, Mikoyan, etc.
Trotsky - A Lesser Villain?
While virtually no change can be detected in the attitude of the
present editors of the CPSU history textbook toward Zinovyev, Kamenev,
or Bukharin, a slightly less irreconcilable attitude appears to have
been adopted by them toward Trotsky. To keep this statement in perspec-
tive, it must be remembered that Trotsky was the chief villain of the
1963 edition and still fills this role in the present edition. Never-
theless, it must be regarded as noteworthy that the new edition omits
the following statement about Trotsky's attitude when admitted-into the
party at the 6th party congress in the summer of 1917:
"... however Trotsky dropped his struggle against the Bolsheviks
only temporarily, in order to try afterwards to foist his anti-
Marxist, anti-Leninist policy upon the party." (1st ed., p. 124)
Instead, referring to the leaders admitted into the party at the
6th congress, the new edition says, non-polemically, that
"They declared their full acceptance of the policy and tactics of
Bolshevism. Among those admitted were M.M. Volodarsky, A.V.
Lunacharsky, D.Z. Manuilsky, L.D. Trotsky, M.S. Uritsky." (2nd ed.,
p. 132, emphasis supplied)
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What exactly prompted this omission is not clear, but even if it
should have been only the reference to Trotsky's "anti-Marxist" policy,
this would be welcome in the interest of a more objective Soviet party
historiography.
While the earlier edition had referred to Lenin's sharp struggle
"with Trotsky and the 'left communists'" at the Central Committee ses-
sion of February 18, 1918 (about signing the peace treaty with Germany),
the new edition reverses the order of importance, making it read "with
the 'left communists' and Trotsky" (1st ed. p. 145; 2nd ed. p. 155).
Tukhachevsky Downgraded
Tukhachevsky is the only one of 15 "civil war heroes and military
leaders ( olkovodts )" to be dropped from the record in the second edi-
tion (p. 1 7). In the first edition these military leaders were said
to have come "from the ranks of the Communist Party, from the people"
(p. 157). Since Tukhachevsky was of noble descent, this claim was false
in the first place. But to drop him, on that account, from the record
as a civil war hero and military leader and include him instead into a
list of "military specialists," as done in the second edition (p. 168)
seems to be no less of an injustice to one of the most popular Soviet
military leaders. "Military specialist" is the designation given to
those who previously served as officers in the Tsarist army.
Zhdanovism Undefended
In 1946-1948 the Central Committee adopted a number of decisions
"directed against deviations from Marxism-Leninism in science, litera-
ture, and art." This reference to the notorious Zhdanovite decrees of
the early postwar period in the first edition (p. 283) had been dropped
in favor of the noncommittal statement that these decisions "defined the
tasks in the field of ideological work." Whereas the first edition had
noted some negative aspects of these decrees, as well as their positive
effects, the latter are no longer mentioned in the new edition, which
thus adopts an entirely negative approach to this episode in Soviet cul-
tural history. The sentence omitted read:
"The Central Committee decrees on questions of literature and art
played an important role in the development of Soviet culture."
(1st ed., p. 283)
The same approach has been adopted with regard to the 1947-1951 dis-
cussions on philosophy, biology, physiology, linguistics, and political
economy. These discussions (of which only the first one, on philosophy,
was held under Zhdanov's direction) were earlier said to have "helped to
overcome a number of ideological distortions and strengthened the princi-
ple of party-mindedness in science" (1st ed., p. 284). Since this positive
7 (Cont.)
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statement has been dropped from the second edition (p. 291), while the
negative appraisal of their consequences remains unchanged, the attitude
toward these scholastic discussions of the early post-war period appears
to have undergone a wholesome change. Partly this might be explained by
the fact that the second edition was not edited under the supervision of
B.N. Ponomarev, one of the closest collaborators of M.A. Suslov, who must
have known that Suslov was more intimately associated with Zhdanov's ideo-
logical campaigns than anyone else in the present Soviet leadership.
Khrushchev's Blunders in Agriculture
A detailed criticism of Khrushchev's agricultural policies emerges
from the omissions and changes that have been operated in the chapters
on the agricultural plenums of the Central Committee held since 1953.
The chapter on the September plenum of 1953, when Khrushchev took over
direction of Soviet agriculture, has been adapted to fit the new edition
by making a few significant omissions. Khrushchev's name has been sup-
pressed, of course, as has been the claim that the analysis of the state
of Soviet agriculture given at the plenum was "profoundly Marxist." The
previous gross mistakes in agriculture are mentioned, but they are not
attributed to the "period of Stalin's personality cult," in line with
similar efforts elsewhere in the new edition to deny Khrushchev any credit
for the destalinization. The achievements of this plenum have been con-
siderably scaled down by omitting (1) the claim that its results "guar-
anteed the steep upswing of agriculture"; (2) the assertion that the "prin-
ciple of material incentives was restored"; (3) the statement that "monthly
and quarterly advance payments to kolkhoz farmers were introduced"; and
(4) the final conclusion that "the September plenum of the CPSU Central
Committee was the turning point in the development of Soviet agriculture"
(1st ed., pp. 294-295).
Overall approval of Khrushchev's Virgin Lands' program by the new
leaders is reflected in the new edition's treatment of the February-March
plenum of 1954. Nevertheless, there are some substantial changes: (1)
omission of the statement that it was intended to "increase within the
next few years state procurements and deliveries of grain by 35-40 per
cent as compared with 1953": (2) The claim that 36 million hectares of
new land were "opened up" (osvoyeno) within three years has been reduced
to the statement that they were "plowed up" (podnyato), which appears to
acknowledge the fact that a substantial portion of these new lands sub-
sequently reverted to their former state or became wasteland as a result
of soil erosion; (3) omission of the conclusive statement that "The Soviet
people under the leadership of the Communist Party had accomplished a great
feat." (1st ed. pp. 295-296; 2nd ed. p. 299).
The most significant omission (and implicit admission), however, re-
lates to the "profitability" claim made in Khrushchev's time and, inciden-
tally, often doubted by western experts:
8 (Cont.)
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"The opened up virgin and waste-lands not only covered expenditure,
but brought a net profit amounting to 18 billion rubles. In 1958
the gross production of grain amounted to 8.6 billion poods - 71
per cent over 1953." (1st ed. p. 298, 2nd ed. p. 301)
Omission of the latter sentence would seem to leave the door open
for a future downward revision of Khrushchev's grain statistics.
In the chapter of the January plenum 1955, the reference to the
stepped up corn-growing program has been dropped. Likewise there is
no mention any more of the then adopted principle of assessing live-
stock farming results on the "basis of 100 hectares of farmland."
Whereas the decision adopted at the time provided, inter alia, for the
"creation of reserves" by the state, as noted in the first edition (p.
296), there is no'mention of this particular aspect in the second edi-
tion (p. 300). This would seem to confirm reports from Peking and calcu-
lations by western specialists to the effect that the Soviet strategic
grain reserve set up under Stalin was depleted during the Khrushchev
period. While reproducing faithfully most of the earlier text on the
new planning order of agricultural production adopted at this plenum,
the. present edition adds: "But in reality this order was frequently
violated" (p. 300).
The chapter on the February plenum 1958 has been drastically cur-
tailed in such a way as to leave little doubt that the liquidation of
the MTS and sale of their equipment to the farms which was decreed on
that occasion is now considered to have been premature or, at any rate,
over-hasty in its execution. The only sentence describing this reform
carried over into the new edition says that it was considered "expedient
gradually to reorganize the MTS which have fulfilled their basic functions"
(p. 300). Not underwritten by the post-Khrushchevian editors, however,
was the statement that "the machine and tractor stations had completed
their historical role in creating and consolidating the kolkhoz order,"
as well as most of the other enthusiastic claims made in the earlier edi-
tion (p. 297).
By contrast, the short account on the June plenum 1958 which re-
vamped the previous pricing and payments structure in agriculture to the
advantage of the kolkhoz farmer has been left unchanged in both editions-
(except for the dropping of Khrushchev's name).
The chapter on the December plenum 1958 which had previously de-
scribed the successes achieved in agriculture under Khrushchev's leader-
ship has been considerably curtailed and rewritten to include references
to shortcomings. There is no mention any more of the (unfulfilled) agri-
cultural targets of the Seven-Year Plan (1st ed. pp. 298-299; 2nd ed. pp.
301-302).
9 (Cont.)
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The chapters dealing with the subsequent Central Committee plenums
on agriculture held during Khrushchev's leadership have been dropped in
toto in the second edition. Summarily referring to these plenums, the
new edition says that "In spite of some necessary measures, justified in
practice, which were carried out by the party after the 21st CPSU Con-
gress ... agriculture does not satisfy the country's requirements" (2nd
ed. p. 318). Dressing a long list of shortcomings in agriculture during
this period, the new edition notes inter alia, the violation of economic
laws, of material incentives, the "subjectivism of the leadership," the
"great harm" of frequent reorganizations, the failure to raise farming
tehftique, "cliche recommendations" etc., etc.
Khrushchev's 1957 Economic Reforms Discredited
Summarizing the party's economic achievements during 1953-1958, the
new edition significantly fails to mention the fact that the CPSU "im-
proved the organizational forms of production and management of the na-
tional economy" (1st ed. P. 290, 2nd ed. p. 296), while the reference to
the party's line of priority development of heavy industry during this
period has not been found objectionable. The extent to which this omis-
sion implies dissociation from Khrushchev's 1957 sovnarkhoz reform is evi-
dent from the new text on the February plenum of the Central Committee in
1957 which provides the barest factual information on the reform in three
short sentences. The original (1963) text had noted, inter alia, that
the "system of leadership of the economy through specialized central min-
istries had outlived itself," that the then existing 200,000 enterprises
could not be directed from one center, that the reform reflected the
principle of democratic centralism, "combining centralized state leader-
ship with increased rights of republican and local ... organs," that the
reform gave "an enormous political and economic effect," etc. (1st ed.
pp. 291-292; 2nd ed. p. 297).
Khrushchev's Unrealistic Party Program for Building Communism in the USSR
While officially no criticism has yet been voiced about the new Party
Program adopted on Khrushchev's behest at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961,
there is much implicit criticism in the way the editors have found it neces-
sary to reformulate the corresponding chapter in the new edition of the
CPSU history textbook. The 22nd CPSU Congress, to begin with, is no longer
described as the "congress of builders of communism" (1st ed. p. 310; 2nd
ed. p. 313).
Whereas in its earlier interpretation the new Party Program had de-
monstrated the inevitability of the "destruction" ( ig bel) of capitalism,
this has now been changed to read "the inevitability of the transition from
capitalism to socialism" (1st ed. p. 311; 2nd ed. p. 314).
10 (Cont.)
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Most portentous for the future, however, are the following omissions
which clearly show that the goals set by the Program cannot be fulfilled
within the time limits originally set in 1961 (passages underscored have
been dropped);
"The Program contains a definition of the communist society and a
concrete, scientifically based plan for its building in the USSR
calculated for 20 years, which foresees the solution of three inter-
dependent tasks: the creation of the material-technical basis of
communism, the development of communist social relations, the edu-
cation of the man of the communist society. As a result of the
execution of the 20-year plan the communist society will basically
be built in the USSR.
"The Program plans to increase the volume of industrial production
approximately 2.5 times within 10 years and surpass the level of US
industrial production, to increase the volume of industrial production
by not less than six times within 20 years and leave the present volume
of US industrial production far behind; to increase the volume of agri-
cultural production approximately by 2.5 times within 10 years, and by
3.5 times within 20 years; to increase labor productivity in industry
more than twice within the first decade, and by not less than 2.5
times in agriculture." (1st ed. p. 312; 2nd ed. p. 314).
Omission of these passages shows that some of the key goals set by
the Party Program are now regarded as unrealistic and will have to be re-
vised. Especially noteworthy is the implicit admission that the communist
society cannot be built even "basically" within twenty years, as provided
by the Party Program. This means, in fact, that the grand finale of the
Program which says that "THE PARTY SOLEMNLY PROCLAIMS: THE PRESENT GENERA-
TION OF SOVIET PEOPLE SHALL LIVE IN COMMUNISM!" is to be considered null
and void (emphasis in Program text).
The first hints that the Party Program for building communism in the
USSR cannot be fulfilled were dropped in this year's edition of the May
Day Slogans which suggested to us at the time that "the entire pace of
communist construction set by the 22nd CPSU Congress is to be slowed down."
In retrospect it would seem that this was a key controversial issue which
caused the unprecedented delay in publication of the slogans. The issue
was subsequently brought most forcefully to public attention by Stepanov's
Pravda article of May 17, who championed the "priority of politics over
economics" or, more concretely, the building of communism vs. economic re-
forms. These, in fact, are at the very best compatible with a socialist
society, but not with a communist one. Hence the necessity-!to postpone
execution of the Party Program in this respect. Publication of this volume
which was passed for printing on June 10, suggests that by that time the
die had been cast in favor of Kosygin's economic reform faction.
(Cont.)
11!
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This implicit criticism of some aspects of the 1961 Party Program
suggests the need for certain amendments to it which may be adopted by
the forthcoming 23rd CPSU Congress.
More circumstantial evidence on the slowing down of the advance to-
ward communism is provided by the elimination of two chapters in the
second edition, viz. on "The All-People's Movement for Communist Labor"
(1st ed. pp. 328-330) and the "Successes of Communist Construction" (1st
ed. pp. 330-331).
The title of the text-book's last section has been changed from "The
Party is the Inspirer and Organizer of Large-Scale Construction of the
Communist Society". (in the first edition) to "The Party is the Inspirer
and Organizer of Communist Construction" (in the second edition).
All-People's Discussion of Party Policies Undesirable?
The consistency with which references,-rto "mass participation" in
the elaboration of party policies under Khrushchev have been eliminated
is quite noteworthy. Thus, with reference to the measures worked out
by the Central Committee in the 1957 economic reform, the second edition
fails to mention that they were "approved by the whole people" (1st ed.,
p. 292; 2nd ed. p. 297). With reference to the February plenum of 1958
(liquidation of the MTS) the new edition omits the sentence: "The pro-
posals of the February plenum of the CPSU Central Committee were discussed
by the entire people" (1st ed. p. 297; 2nd ed. p. 300). In a passage dis-
cussing party policies in the 1953-1958 period the following statement is
conspicuous by its absence: "The CPSU Central Committee took the initia-
tive for holding all-people's discussions of basic questions of socialist
construction" (1st ed. p. 302; 2nd ed. p. 305). The new editors of the
textbook also appear to lack understanding for the fact that "In the work
of the (December 1958) plenum (on agriculture) participated foremost
workers, innovators of agricultural production, scientists, :eaders of kdlktnzes,
sokhonc*5, R'TS." (1st ed. p. 298; dropped from 2nd ed. on p. 301). The
paragraph on the "all-party and all-people's discussion" of the theses of
Khrushchev's report to the 21st CPSU Congress has likewise been cut out.
By contrast, a similar paragraph giving details about the "all-party and
all-people's discussion" of the draft Program and draft Party Rules before
the 22nd Congress has been taken over without change in the new edition
(1st ed. P. 311; 2nd ed., p. 313). This differentiated approach would
seem to suggest that "all-people's" or "all-party" discussions will hence-
forth be considered justified only in quite exceptional circumstances, in
connection with the adoption of very important new documents (the new
Soviet Constitution, etc.). The Khrushchevian practice of turning Central
Committee sessions into mass meetings also appears to be rejected now.
12 (Cont.)
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Fiction of "Voluntary Resignation" of Khrushchev Dropped
Apparently for the first time the fiction about Khrushchev's request
to be relieved from his functions because of ill health has now been of-
fically dropped. The new edition of the manual says:
"The (October 1964) plenum adopted the decision to relieve N.S. Khru-
shchev from his duties as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee, member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, and
Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers." (2nd ed. p. 322)
According to the official communique released after last year's
October plenum,
"The CPSU Central Committee plenum granted comrade N.S. Khrushchev's
request to be relieved from his duties as First Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee, member of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium,
and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in connection with his
advanced age and deterioration of his health." Pravda, 1 .l0. ;
emphasis supplied)
Lest the absence of the title "comrade" give rise to any unwarranted
speculation about Khrushchev's party membership, it should be noted that
the use of "comrade" is not customary in Soviet history textbooks.
The new edition, incidentally, again fails to mention that Khrushchev
was relieved also from his position as Chairman of the RSFSR Bureau of the
Central Committee and, while mentioning the RSFSR Bureau, has merely dropped
a sentence referring to Khrushchev's nomination as Chairman of this Bureau
(1st ed. p. 300; 2nd ed. p. 303).
South Vietnam Annexed to Socialist Camp?
Perhaps the most striking revelation of the new edition is that, the
socialist camp has made new territorial acquisitions to the tune of 100,000
square kilometers since 1961. Both editions refer to the socialist camp
as being made up of 14 countries (i.e., including Yugoslavia and Cuba),
but its total territory increased from 35.1 million square kilometers in
1961 to 35.2 million square kilometers in 1964. Its percentage of the
world's total territory correspondingly rose from 25.9 per cent to 26 per
cent. The socialist's camp total population increased from 1,072 million
to 1,134 million during this same period. As a percentage of the world's
total population, however, the socialist countries fell back from 35.5 per
cent in 1961 to 35 per cent in 1964 (1st ed. p. 332; 2nd ed. p. 326). This
means that the population of the free world is growing faster than that of
the communist camp in spite of China's tremendous population surplus every
year. The increase in the socialist camp's territory might be explained
by the territorial conquests of the Vietcong in South Vietnam, which has
a total territory of 171,700 square kilometers (LSE Year-Book 1964, p. 234).
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Bloc Economic Cooperation Loosened
Revisions made in the chapter on the "Struggle for Consolidation
of the Community of Socialist Countries" show that economic cooperation
requirements between socialist countries have not only been loosened in
practice, but also in theory. The following statement, set off in italics
in the first edition, is conspicuous by its absence in the second edition:
"All forms of cooperation - political economic and cultural - between
the socialist countries are being strengthened and extended." (lst ed.
p. 33~; 2nd ed. p. 327).
Instead of "all-round economic cooperation" between the socialist
countries- ?the textbook now demands simply "economic cooperation" (1st ed.
p. 334; 2nd ed. p. 327).
Even more significant is the alternation of the definition of the
"highest form of economic cooperation." In the first edition it said:
"The highest form of economic cooperation that developed during the
past few years is direct production cooperation, which concretely
manifests itself in the coordination of national economic 121ans, in
the specialization and cooperation of production." (p. 334, emphasis
supplied)
These requirements have been considerably lowered in the definition
given in the present edition:
"The highest form of economic cooperation is direct production co-
operation, the agreement upon and mutual coordination of the most
important indices of national economic plans." (p. 327; emphasis
supplied)
A bad ideological blunder was committed in this connection by the
editors of the present volume in that they unwittingly took over the old
formula about the "more or less simultaneous transition to communism" of
all socialist countries from the earlier edition. This reads:
"In the process of economic and scientific-technological cooperation
of the countries of socialism, the coordination of their national
economic plans, the specialization and co-operation of production,
conditions are being created for pulling up the economically less
developed countries to the level of the foremost, the perspective
being opened up of their more or less simultaneous transition to
communism within the limits of-one historical epoch.". lst ed. p.
336; 2nd ed. p. 328; emphasis in text)
It appears to have escaped the attention of the editors that the "con-
ditions" set by this formula for the simultaneous transition to communism
have become obsolete to the extent that they had to be dropped, respectively
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amended, in the new definition of the "highest form of economic co-
operation" between socialist countries, as noted above.
The above summary of'editioral changes made in the "corrected"
edition of KPSS _ Spravochnik could not be made exhaustive, although
an effort has been made to list all the issues involved which appeared
to be of more general interest. Many omissions and changes had thus to
be left unmentioned, including all the omissions directly or indirectly
related to Khrushchev's activities as "preceptor of literature" (pp.
301, 326-328, lst ed.), the omission of the demand that "primary" at-
tention be paid to the development of industry (in favor of agriculture?;
p. 314, lst ed.), the newly included reference to unspecified "guarantees
against relapses into the personality cult" allegedly included in the
new Party Program and Party Rules (p. .313, 2nd ed.), the omission of the
1957 claim that the housing shortage in the USSR would be "finished" with-
in 10-12 years, i.e., by 1967-1969 (p. 300, lst ed.; p. 302, 2nd ed.),
the omission of the paragraph on the 1958 school reform (ibid.), omission
of the criticism of the "grassland system" which was earlier supposed to
have hampered grain production before the war (p. 251, lst ed.; p. 261,
2nd ed.), omission of the thesis about revisionism being the "chief danger"
in discussing the Moscow Conference of 81 parties (p. 337, 1st ed.; p. 329,
2nd ed.), an expanded list of prominent Soviet military leaders during
World War II, to which have been added the names of K.A. Vershinin, S.G.
Gorshkov, M.V.?Zakharov, N.I. Krylov, N.G. Kuznetsov et al. (p. 281, 2nd
ed.; p. 272, lst ed.), a newly inserted paragraph on shortages in economic
planning arid defense production before the war (p. 259, 2nd ed.; p. 249,
Ist ed.), a new periodization of Soviet postwar history covering 1945-1958
which blots out 1953 (Stalin's death) as a decisive milestone in Soviet
history (pp. 275 and 287, lst ed.; p. 284, 2nd ed.) as well as many others.
In spite of such far-reaching changes in the new leaders' view of
Soviet party history, it would seem prudent to assume that it will gradually
become even more articulate and evolve new and original concepts rather than
limit itself basically to a sort of censorship of Khrushchevian historio-
graphy.
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Fact Sheets
11 October 1965
India ikistan and Kashmir
Although the dissension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir
has been a legal and diplomatic issue only since 1947, when the two coun-
tries became separate and independent, the emotional, religious, social,
geographic and economic factors involved have their roots far back in the
past. These historic problems and communal rivalries are to a great ex-
tent responsible for the seemingly irrational intransigence of both nations.
Lying across the western invansion route from Tibet and Sinkiang
into the Indian subcontinent, the picturebook Vale of Kashmir is the heart
of a rugged land. All of Kashmir is in dispute, but it is the Vale itself
which holds strong emotional and traditional attraction for both Hindu
India and Moslem Pakistan. Its suzerainty is the goal of both countries
and to both a symbol of national stature without which either would lose
face.
Underlining the Kashmir problem through the years is the friction
between Hindus and Moslems in the entire subcontinent. It began about
1000 A.D. when the expanding Moslem empires of the Near East and Central
Asia pressed heavily on the western border of Hindu India. The doctrine
of Islam was spread to the west and to the east byMoslem warriors who
ruthlessly 'converted' their captives through death and destruction. By
1200 A.D. a Moslem dynasty had been.es,,ablished at Delhi, and Moslem con-
quest extended to the states of Bihar and Bengal. Shortly after 1300
A.D., the Moslems penetrated into the Deccan plateau and for the next
two hundred years northern India was ruled by a succession of alien Moslem
dynasties whose influence was limited by constant conflict with Hindu
rulers.
Kashmir proper has been Moslem since the 14th century, and was
annexed to the Mogh.ul Empire by Emperor Akbar in 1587. After about 1760
the Moghul Empire fell apart, and its remnants gradually came under control
of the British, who ruled most of India from about 1800 to 1947.
Hindu control of Kashmir was not re-established until 1846 when
the British turned the state over to the Hindu Maharaja of Jammu as part
of their efforts to improve the security of British India along its north-
western perimeter. Hindu rule was autocratic and otherwise inacceptable
to the Moslems in Kashmir. Moslem resentment led to open agitation, in
many cases associated with the efforts of Indian Moslems, in the years pre-
ceeding World War II. When it became generally recognized that India would
eventually achieve its independence, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and other Moslem
leaders began to agitate for the creation of a new Moslem nation to be
formed from the regions of India where Moslems predominated. It was only
(Cont.)
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after an unbreakable deadlock over constitutional arrangments led to
serious communal rioting in 1946 and 1947 that Jawaharlal Nehru and his
colleagues reluctantly accepted partition of India along communal lines
- and Jinnah became the "Father of Pakistan."
Far from solving the Hindu-Moslem problem, the partition of India
exacerbated it. In late 1947, mass migrations of up to 10,000,000 people
- Hindus leaving Pakistan-and Moslems leaving India - were accompanied by
massacres in which 1,000,000 or more died in nightmarish communal violence.
The peoples of India and Pakistan have never forgiven each other for this
mass slaughter; the violence of their sentiments has distorted every ef-
fort at mediation and negotiation over Kashmir during the last 18 years.
With the partition of India at the time of independence in August
1947, the status of Kashmir, like that of some 600 other princely states,
remained to be settled. The rulers of these states had concluded treaties
with the British Crown recognizing Britain as the paramount power. Under
paramountcy, the rulers were theoretically sovereign allies of the British
Crown, but followed vice-regal foreign policy, retaining all the trappings
if not the reality of independence. When independence was announced, it
was decreed that paramountcy would lapse on the day the British handed
over power and that each princely state would become totally independent
again. Only if the ruler agreed to "accede," would his state become part
of the new country. At the time of independence all but three of the
princely states had acceded either to India or Pakistan. The three which
were left out were Hyderabad, Junagadh ... and Kashmir.
The Hindu maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir continued to stall, how-
ever, in hopes of securing a greater degree of autonomy. By October 1947 a re-
volt broke out in the Poonch region among the Moslems who were joined by
several thousand Pushtoon tribesman from Pakistan's Northwest Frontier
Province. Slaughtering indiscriminately, the Pushtoons swept perilously
close to Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. The frantic maharaja belatedly
appealed to New Delhi for troops to cope with the tribesmen and to sup-
press the local Moslem rebellion, with the understanding that he would
then accede to India. Lord Mountbatten, at that time Viceroy of India,
agreed with the Indian decision to send military aid to Kashmir, and sug-
gested that if the maharaja did accede, the accession must, under the
circumstances, becpnditional on a plebiscite as soon as law and. order
were restored. None of the Indian ministers involved, including Nehru,
dissented from that fateful decision.
India lays its claim to Kashmir on a technically strong legal
foundation, namely, the Hindu maharaja's acceding to India.
Pakistan, on the other hand, points out that the basic concept of
partition was that Pakistan was to comprise the contiguous Moslem-majority
areas of British India. They insist that Kashmir is such an area and that
2 (Cont.)
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the Kashmiri people without question would then have preferred to join
Pakistan and that they still do. The people of Kashmir, according to
Pakistan, were prevented from doing so only by Hindu troops at the time
of accession and by the subsequent refusal by India to conduct a plebi-
scite.
In 1948 and 1949, the UN Commission for India and Pakistan secured
the agreement of both parties to a cease-fire, demilitarization, and a
plebiscite in Kashmir. The demilitarization agreement was never fulfilled
by either side, and in 1956 India announced that it therefore no longer
held itself bound to conduct a plebiscite. With minor interruptions, how-
ever, both sides held to the cease-fire, until the present outbreak early
in August 1965.
Since,the ce4ge-fire of 1949, Pakistan controls several mountain
districts comprising about one third of the total area of Jammu and
Kashmir. The districts to the north had tenuous ties with the old princely
state and are administered as special political agencies. The districts
lying along the western edge of the Vale make up what is known as Azad
("Free") Kashmir, supposedly a separate provisional government pending
the settlement of the dispute, but actually under Pakistani control.
India's portion of Kashmir includes the famous Vale and the city
of Srinagar, by far the most desirable part of Kashmir and the traditional
center of power. Over the years the Indian government has integrated
Kashmir more fully into the Indian union until there are no significant
constitutional distinctions.
India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis. Tinker, Hugh. Praeger, New
India, A World in Transition. Lamb, Beatrice. Praeger, New York. 1963.
References
India, A Modern Hiss tom. Spear, Percival, University of Michigan Press,
1
York. 196o.
Danger in Kashmir. Korbel, Josef. Princeton University Press. 1954.
"India vs. Pakistan: Who Won? Who Lost?" U.S. News & World Report.
October 4, 1965.
"Senseless War on the Subcontinent." Newsweek, September 20, 1965
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India-Pakistan Dispute
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
11 October 19 5
1 September 1965 Resolution.
The Security Council, noting the report of the Secretary General
dated 3 September 1965. Having heard the statements of the represent-
atives of India and Pakistan, concerning the deteriorating situation
along the cease fire line in Kashmir.
1. Calls upon the Government of India and Pakistan to take
forthwith all steps for an immediate cease fire;
2. Calls upon the two governments to respect the cease fire
line and have all armed personnel of each party withdrawn to its
side of the line;
3. Calls upon the two governments to cooperate fully with
the United Nations Military Observer Group, India-Pakistan in its
task of supervising the observance of the cease fire and,
4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Council
within three days on the implementation of this resolution.
6 September 1965 Resolution.
The Security Council, noting the report by the Secretary General
on developments in the situation in Kashmir since the adoption of the
Security Council cease-fire resolution on 4 September 1965 (S/Res/209)
(1965) being document 5:6661 dated 6 September 1965.
Noting with deep concern the extension of the fighting which adds
immeasureably to the seriousness of the situation
(1) Calls upon the parties to cease hostilities in the entire
area of conflict immediately, and promptly withdraw all armed per-
sonnel back to the positions held by them after 5 August 1965.
(2) Requests the Secretary General to exert every possible
effort to give effect to this resolution and the resolution of
4 September 1965, to take all measures possible to strengthen the
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan and
to keep the Council promptly informed on the implementation of the
resolution and on the situation in the area.
(3) Decides to keep this issue under urgent and continuous
review so that the Council may determine what further steps may
be necessary to secure peace and security in the area.
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20 September 1965 Resolution.
The Security Council, having considered the reports of the SYG on
his consultations with the Government of India and Pakistan, commending
the SYG for his unrelenting efforts in furtherance of the objectives of
the SYG's resolutions of L and 6 September, having heard the statements
of the representatives of India and Pakistan, noting the differing replies
by the parties to an appeal for a cease fire as set out in the report of
the SYG (s/6683), but noting further with concern that no cease fire has
yet come into being, convinced that an early cessation of hostilities
is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the out-
standing differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other
related matters,
1. Demands that a cease fire should take effect on Wednesday,
22 September 1965, at 0700 hours GMT and calls upon both Governments
to issue orders for a cease fire at that moment and a subsequent
withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by
them before 5 August 1965;
2. Requests the SYG to provide the necessary assistance to
ensure supervision of the cease fire and withdrawal of all armed
personnel;
3. Calls on all states to refrain from any action which might
aggravate the situation in the area;
4+. Decides to consider as soon as operative paragraph 1 of
the Council's Res 210 of 6 September has been implemented. What
steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the politi-
cal problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime
calls on the two governments to utilize all peaceful means, includ-
ing those listed in Article 33 of the charter, to this end;
5. Requests the SYG to exert every possible effort to give
effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to
report to the SC thereon.
2 (Cont.)
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Shastri's message to the Secretary General
"As already commwiicated to you in my letter of 15th Sept.
1965, I am willing to order simple cease fire and cessation of
hostilities on being informed of Pakistan's agreement to do
likewise. To carry into effect such cease fire from 7 a.m. GMT
on Wednesday, 22nd Sept, as provided in SC RES, it would be
necessary for me to arrange for issue of necessary orders to
field commanders by 12 noon GMT on 21st Sept. I would, therefore,
request you kindly to inform me of Pakistan's agreement to cease
fire before this hour."
Ayub's answer as read by Bhutto on September 22, 1965
"Pakistan considers Security Council Resolution 211 of
20 September as unsatisfactory. However, in the interest of
international peace and in order to enable the Security Council
to evolve a self-executing procedure which will lead to an
honorable settlement of the root causes of the present conflict,
namely the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, I have issued the following
order to the Pakistan armed forces: You will stop fighting as of
3 a.m. on 23 September -- 2200 GMT 22 September, and from that
time you will not fire on enemy forces unless fired on."
3
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