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November 11, 2016
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May 17, 1999
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December 6, 1965
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Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/1?*tM- DP78-03061A000300050006-9 Women and WIDF Peace Formula "Democracy" in Action... Reporting of the late October session of the Council of the 25X1 C10b Women's International 25X1 C10b Democratic Federation (WIDF) 25X1C10b 25X1C10b 25X1C10b highlights the increasingly vitriolic polemics of the Sino-Soviet dispute reflected in recent international communist front meetings. WIDF congresses and conferences demonstrate equally, if not more than other front meetings, the violence and intensity of emotion- charged, divergent views among commu- nist delegations. This conduct is particularly ironic for WIDF which is perhaps the most overtly guileless of all communist international fronts with its appeals to "women of the whole world" for peace, and its claim of stewardship for the welfare of mothers and children. Although the more moderate pro- Soviet forces prevailed in the final resolutions of the Council meeting, the militancy of the Chicom delega- tion and its followers (DPRK, DRV, NFLSV, Japan and Albania) seriously challenged the WIDF leadership of the Soviet women, even more than at the WIDF Fifth World Congress in Moscow in June 1963. Many observers of the political scene tend to cross off gatherings of the WIDF as "Just another women's meeting"; but the speeches of the Soviet and Chicom 'hard core' leaders -- clearly reveal the respective lines and policies of the world move- ment and the dissensions which cur- rently infest it. BrIefly Noted 0000' In becoming embroiled in Sino- Soviet polemics, WIDF leaders offer assets excellent ammunition to ex- pose its true nature -- especially to women's audiences. WIDF sarcasm and destructive denunciation has heretofore been reserved for the "capitalist" world. Their extreme outbursts in support of Chicom mili- tancy or Soviet tactical "peaceful coexistence" may be used to expose their pretense of speaking for the peace, security and live-and-let live hopes of the women of the world. Liberalization, Czechoslovaks Still Communist style Harass Intellectuals X1C a letter from a Dr. Ivan Svitak, 25X1 C10b printed by Fg um, an independent, liberal monthly in Vienna. The let- ter is self-explanatory. Until 14.months ago Dr. Svitak, a man in his early 40's, was a mem- ber of the Philosophical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sci- ences. Since then he has been ex- pelled from the Institute and from the Party, his lectures banned, his personal papers confiscated, and suitable employment has been closed to him. Where he is now and whether or not he has been arrested is un- known. Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061AO00300050006-9 fipw (Briefly Noted Cont.) Approved For Release 1999,I IA-RDP78-03061 A000300050006-9 His total transgressions con- sisted of having critical opinions on the regime's attitude toward philosophy and culture, and writing one letter to a liberal publication, which, although it was not published, came to the attention of the regime. Continuing incidents of this kind make it clear that despite West- ern wishfulness as to Czechoslovak "liberalization" and "relaxation," the Prague regime still retains ap- palling features of repression and "thought-control." Independence: British Guiana under Communists Not very long ago, Only when Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP) formed the Government, he demanded immedi- ate independence from Great Britain for British Guiana. But the PPP does not control the government now, and Cheddi Jagan is opposing prepar- ations to make the country fully in- dependent in 1966. Jagan's activities over the past several years present a clear pattern of Communists tactics with regard to independence for colonial territories: they agitate loudest for independence, and for severing relations with the mother country, imperialism and colo- nialism -- when they control a coun- try; they are in the vanguard of those who would postpone independence when the government is not firmly in the hands of communist-oriented par- ties. Jagan's PPP has thrived on the ethnic split in the population in the past. East Indians supported him in opposition to the largely African supported People's National Congress and Jagan created ethnic-racial strife in labor relations to insure this sup- port. He is using the same techniques now that his Party is in the minority, even to the point of intimidating his own East Indian followers. But East Indians did not support him in his call to strike against the sugar estates in November 1965. His at- tempts to excite racial antagonisms while playing down his Communist sympathies have been so extreme as to sow discord among his Communist col- leagues. Nonetheless, his hope is to ride to power on the racial issue in a takeover for communism. Premier Forbes Burnham's accom- plishment in negotiating for inde- pendence should be contrasted with Jagan's abdication of responsibility in refusing to participate in the conference. Similarly, Burnham's success in bringing order to the Guiana economy and administration should be placed against the back- ground of mismanagement left by Marxist Jagan. The communist's double policy: for independence should be noted wherever possible and especially among African audiences. In addi- tion, where appropriate, Marxist Jagan's anti-Africanism, and his inciting to racial violence (even though other Communists in British Guiana are viewing his extremism with alarm) should be used to portray Communists as outright opportunists and not as protectors of all working- men, as they pretend. Approved For Release 1999/09/17 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 (Briefly Noted) Release 1999/09/17 P78-03061 A000300050006-9 IgnIficant Dates 1 20 International Week of Solidarity with the Vietnamese People, to begin 20 December -- 5th Anniversary, Founding of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam; sponsor, World Peace Council (international Communist front organization). 21 Joseph V. Stalin born. 1879. (Dies 5 March 1953.) 26 Mao Tse-tung born. 1893. 27 Netherlands transfers sovereignty to interim Republic of United Provinces of Indonesia. 1949. 29 15th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 December - 4 January. I Conference (heads of state), African and Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM), mid-January, Tananarive, Malagasy Republic. 2 Fidel Castro assumes power, 1959. 2 7th Anniversary, the Castro regime (note: the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples Solidarity [Tri-Continent] Conference sponsored by the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization [Communist] begins on 3 January; the timing is not accidental.) 3 Afro-Asian Latin American Conference (Tri-Continent Conference), Havana, 3-10 January, sponsored by the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organiza- tion (Communist controlled). 6 President Roosevelt states Four Freedoms: of speech and expression, of worship; from want and from fear. 1941. 17 (Yugoslavia) Plenum of CP Central Committee expels Vice Premier Milovan Djilas. [See Calendar of Significant Political Events for similar sub- sequent actions against Djilas. If you do not have a Calendar, you may request one.] 21 (Tibet) Chinese People's Republic orders government representatives to Peking to negotiate "peaceful solution Tibet's status." (See Calendar for subsequent events). 15th anniversary. 30 3rd anniversary, Founding of Organization of African States (OAU) by 20 nations; Lagos, Nigeria, 1962. I UN General Assembly charges Chinese Communist aggression in Korea. 1951. Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 f "Approved For Release 1999/09/ilKoe"- DP78-03061A000300050006-9 25X1 C #67 Commentary 10-23 Nov 1965 Principal Developments: 1. The Chinese again "declare war" to the finish against the CPSU leader- ship -- naming Brezhnev and Kosygin. An 11 November joint People's Daily/ Red Flag editorial savagely condemns and rejects the post-Khrushchev Soviet appeal -- "what unites us is stronger than what divides" -- for unity in common action against the imperialist aggressors. It declares that "nothing unites us" and there is only an irreconcilable "class antagonism" between M-Leninism and K revisionism. It repeats many old Chinese charges and adds % some new grist, mostly in connection with Vietnam: e.g., revealing an ex- change of communications earlier this year in which the Soviets proposed a Soviet-Vietnamese-Chinese summit, the Chinese say the CPSU leaders "have no other purpose in mind than to deceive the world, to tie the fraternal countries to the chariot of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world domination, to use the Vietnam question as an important counter in bargaining with the U.S., and to isolate and attack the CCP and all other fraternal parties up- holding M-L." Peking calls on "all M-L parties to draw a clear line of demarcation, both politically and organizationally, between themselves and 25X1X6 the revisionists, and again blatantly appeals to the Soviet people to ex- ercise their "ever stronger dissatisfaction and opposition." Without specifically identifying them, the article clearly confirms the secret ex- change of letters described by 25X1X6 - Crankshaw in the London Observer on 14 November, stating that they were just received "fron an East European source" (see attached Chrono). ~~.- 2. Peking paved the way for the above blast by publishing in People's Daily almost 3 pages of texts of "anti-Chinese comments" by Soviet and Soviet- aligned parties with a harshly denunciatory "editor's note" -- the same ma- terial which had been scheduled for publication on the 2nd (see #66), with the addition of a few more texts, including the Polyansky October Revolution speech. The Chinese continue to fan the flames with a sardonic People's Daily Commentator article on the 18th pegged to two TASS deletions in re- porting the Polyansky speech and a tauntingly derisive PD editor's note prefacing the full text of the 16 November Pravda commentary on the joint article (see below). And they go back to publicize a long, anti-CPSU, 7 November editorial from Japanese CP organ Akahata. 3. Soviet media react almost a week after the Chinese joint editorial: Pravda and Izvestiya feature identical commentaries attributed to Pravda's Peking correspondent -- essentially defensive but sharply critical abandon- ing the "moratorium" on anti-Chicom polemics, maintained since Khrushchev's Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 0*$" (Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 1999IJ CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 ouster]; they reveal the nature and extent of Chinese warfare more than any other Soviet source in recent times, perhaps since the CPSU open letter of l4 July 1963. 4. Czech and East German press rally to Soviet support, Neues Deutschland specifically endorsing a Soviet-Vietnamese-Chinese meeting as urgently necessary." Moscow correspondent for Belgrade Borba says that the Chinese attack is believed in Moscow to have been timed for the 23rd CPSU Congress (29 March 1966) and that "political quarters" in Moscow think that "it is incomparably more important to make good preparations for the Congress than to engage in futile polemics with China." 5. Reporting indicates that a WPC Presidium meeting in Sofia was not at- tended by the Chinese and pro-Chinese Japanese members. Significance: The new Chinese joint article is a bellicose reaffirmation -- if any were needed -- of Peking's total rejection of the "soft" approach to prob- lems of the WCM attempted by the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership, of their appeal to build a working unity in action of Communists against im- perialists of the basis of their greater common ties -- "what unites us is stronger than what divides." The Chinese demand for all M-Ls to "draw a clear line of demarcation, both politically and organizationally," is clearly intended to push the splitting process further, and could even foreshadow a concrete initiative to form a competing international alignment. The apparent boycott of a WPC Presidium meeting by the Chinese and pro-Chinese Japanese members could be a harbinger. We note the Yugoslav report from Moscow, speculating that the new Chicom attack is "timed for the 23rd 'CPSU Congress": could it be that the Chinese really entertain hopes that their appeal to the "90% of the Soviet population" who are "in a position of antagonism" to the new CPSU leader- ship could contribute to an anti-revisionist, pro-Chinese reversal at that Congress next March? The CPSU leaders, in giving their people a more sober and realistic view of the lines of Chinese attack than allowed since Khrushchev's ouster, could be paving the way for a strong counter-offensive. However, we believe it is doubtful that the Soviet leaders, encouraged by their clear gains vis-a-vis the Chinese during the past year and still preoc- cupied with domestic woes, will make any radical departures from the 25X1X6 policies and conduct under which these gains were realized. 25X1X6 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 - (Commentary Cont.) 5X1 C1 Ob L Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 #67 10-?23 November 1965 November 10-11: Peking People's Daily (10th) devotes almost 3 pages to anti-Chinese statements made by leaders of the CPs and press of the Soviet Union and some other countries since the divisive meeting in Moscow last March." An introductory editorial note denounces the new leadership of the CPSU, "pursuing Khrushchevism without K': `... While talking about unity,... (they) are engaged in splitting activity; while talking about the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, they are engaged in anti-Chinese activity; while talk- ing about a halt to public polemics, they are engaged in spreading rumors and slanders to malign the CCP and other M-L parties.... (They) have sent their people abroad on secret anti-Chinese mis- sions in all parts of the world.... ... This material further exposes the new leadership of the CPSU in their true colors as revisionists and splitters." 72 "anti-Chinese statements" are printed, including 13 Soviet, 22 Czech, 11 Hungarian, 8 Bulgarian, 3 East German, 2 Polish, 7 Italian and 6 French. Next day, a People's Daily and Red Flag joint 11,000-word editorial "Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on United Action," harshly rebuffs the Soviet "what unites us is stronger than what divides" appeal of the past year. It is divided into 7 (unnumbered) sections as follows: -- The Unity of the International Proletariat Must Be Based on Principle Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao are cited on the need for genuine, revolu- tionary unity, which "demands resolute and unequivocal struggle against all brands of opportunists and splitters." It lists the various measures taken by the CCP to defend M-L, the unity of the ICM based on M-L" (the major Chinese polemical statements from 1956 to 1965 are named, -- plus warnings in "numerous talks and exchanges of letters ... that it [the K clique] must rein in on the edge of the precipice"). But the new leaders of the CPSU, although "vociferously advocating 'united action'" and "in- cessantly spouting such fine words as 'unity,"' are "protagonists of sham unity and real hostility toward China." This opening section concludes: "Let us expose their fraudulence by citing their misdeeds both inter- nationally and at home in the course of the past year." -- The Khrushchev Revisionists Have Undermined the Common Basis of Unit The editors reject the CPSU "argument" that all CPs have "a common ideold" and "a common program." After a brief outline of the old Chinese Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-0306~! v696y9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 charges of CPSU betrayal of the common ideology and program by emphasis on peaceful coexistence and "shamelessly emasculating Lenin's theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat," the article asserts: 'Between the M-Ls and the K revisionjsts there is a difference of fundamental line, a major difference between what is right and what is wrong. In the circumstances, how can there be a 'common ideology' and a 'common program' between the M-Ls and the K re- visionists? How can there be a cor 'non, basis for unity?... In all fundamental issues of the present epoch the relation is one of s 0 ositio there are things that divide us and nothing that unites use, things that are antagonistic and nothing that is common.... ( They are) striving for Soviet-U.S. collaboratior,!:Ttoo dominate the worlds and opposing the people's revolutions in various countries.... "The antagonism between M-L and K revisionism is a class antagonism between the proletariat and the hour jeoisie: it is the antagonism between the socialist and the capita List roads and be- tween the line of opposing imperialism and that of surrendering to it. It is an irreconcilabZe antagonism...." -- Tinited Action is Impossible with Those Who Transpose Enemies and Friends. "The new leaders of the CPSU argue that even if there are dif- ferences of theory and line, these can be put aside and that 'united action' should be taken and 'unity against the enemy' achieved in practical struggle against imperialism.... The reactionary nature of K revisionism is expressed in concentrated form in the line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for domination of the world. The K. clique completely transposed enemies and friends...." The editors then discuss four "facts" demonstrating their charge: 1. Even though at times they find it necessary to talk about a tendency toward a 'freeze' in Soviet-U.S. relations, 4' the Soviet leaders "behind the scenes are step ipng up their secret diplomacy and their deals with the U.S." 2. The new CPSU leaders have not only accepted the legacy of the partial nuclear test-ban treaty, but they are "actively plotting new deals with the U.S." to prevent proliferation and thus maintain the "monopoles of the two nuclear overlords" against China and all other independent coun- tries. 3. "... Together with the U.S. imperialists, they are using the United Nations to attack, weaken, and divide the forces opposing imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism...." 2 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 4, They have carried on their role in the K.ennedy-'Nehru--TC.hrushchev alliance against China. ~~ ~~- --. The New Leaders of the CPSU are Pakin United Action with the U.S. on the question of Vietna .gyn. The editors again "consider" a series of (unnumbered) `'facts, eluding: 1. New CPSU leaders "have been busy rennin errands for the U.S. a res- sors.... When Kosy in ...passed through Pekin on his visit to Vietnam in February 1965..., he stressed the need to help the U.S. 'find a way out of Vietnam." 2. "On 16 February this year, the day after Kosygin's return to Moscow, the Soviet Government officially put before Vietnam and China a proposal to convene a new internaticnal conference on Indochina without prior con- ditions.... On 23 February, disregarding the stand which the Vietnamese Government had taken against this proposal and without waiting for a reply from China,... (they) discussed the question ... with the President of France through the Soviet Ambassador to France." 3. "After these plots of 'unconditional negotiations' and of 'stopping the bombing and holding negotiations' were foiled,... (they) began to col- laborate with the Indian reactionaries and the Tito clique -- both lackeys of U.S. imperialism -- as brokers on the question of Vietnam...." 4. "China is helping the Vietnamese people to the best of its ability," but "whether in quantity or quality, their [i.e., the Soviet Union's] aid to Vietnam is far from commensurate with the strength of the Soviet Union. They have ulterior motives in giving a certain amount of aid -- they are trying to hoodwink the people at home and abroad, to keep the situation in Vietnam under control, to gain a say on the Vietnam cuestion, and to strike a bargain with U.S. imperialism on it." 5. The U.S. imperialists "appreciate the trick''`: far from objecting to Soviet "aid" to Vietnam, they welcome it. "In fact, the new leaders of the CPSU have disclosed the details of their so-called "aid" to Vietnam to the Americans through various channels." 6. "Furthermore, the new CPSU leaders have been using their 'aid' to Vietnam as a pretext for wantonly vilifying'China, and have been assiduously spreading the lie that 'China obstructed the transit of Soviet military equipment for Vietnam.'" The editors reach the conclusion that the new leaders of the CPSU have no other purpose in mind than to deceive the world, to tie the fra- ternal countries to the chariot of Soviet-U,S. collaboration for world domination, to use the question of Vietnam as an important counter in their bargaining with the U.S., and to isolate and attack the CCP and all other fraternal parties which uphold M-L. 3 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 i4_pP M F 'i le ecj~?.P 09f17a' ppP obi 'i q? pPI 50006-9 Old Chinese charges are repeated, sometimes more luridly, such as: "... (They) have conducted a feverish campaign against the CCP throughout their , party and among the entire Soviet people.,.. "While continuing the practice of subjectZ otker CPs and socialist countries to pressure, sabotage, and subversion, the new lea ers of the CPSU are also employing the more insidious strategema of trying to woo them, buy them over, deceive them, and sow dissen- sion among them.... ''... They repeat K's despicable stock tricks at the meetings of these international organizations, rely on behind-the-scenes manipulation as well as open trout e-making and even resort to such ludicrous tactics as banging tables and stamping their feet. "In the name of 'united action,' the revisionist leadership of the CPSU is vainly trying to recover its position as the 'father party,'... Actually, however, its former power and prestige are gone beyond recall.... "Facts have shown that if the Communists of a particular coun- ty; accept the hodgepodge of revisionism, great-power chauvinism, and splittism of the CPSU leaders, the country's revolutionary cause is impaired and undermined, its CP becomes corrupted, goes down- hill, and degenerates.... In many countries, the M-Ls have broken with the revisionist cliques and either rebuilt M-L parties and organizations or founded new ones.... Beyond all doubt, it is perfectly right to (do so)....`' --"United Action," So-called, Is a Slogan to Deceive the Soviet People Rebutting the CPSU claim that the socialist countries have "a socio- economic system of the same type" and share the "common goal of building socialism and communism," the article brings up old Chinese charges that 14rr "the new CPSU leaders are bringing about the further degeneration of the Soviet Union toward capitalism in the name of realizing 'Communism.' It goes on to assert that "they are in a position of antagonism to the Soviet people, who constitute more than 90% of the Soviet population, and they are encountering ever stronger dissatisfaction and opposition on the part of the Soviet people. It adds: "In our view, when a revisionist clique emerges and a capitalist comeback occurs in a socialist country, all the M-Ls in the world are duty-bound to expose and struggle against these things.... Comrade Mao Tse-tung has often said ... that if China's leadership is usurped by revisionists in the future, the M-La of all countries should like- wise resolutely expose and fight them; and help the working class and the masses of China to combat such revisionism...." (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 -- Persevere in the Strizle . Against Khrushchev Revisionism "... The people's revolutionary struggles in all countries will certainly triumph, while imperialism, reaction, and modern revision- ism will step by step descend to their doom.... But imperialism and reaction will not fall down unless you strike them down, and modern revisionism, too, will not collapse unless you fight it.... "At present, the task facing all the M-L parties is to draw a clear line of d.em cation, both politically and organizationally, between themselves and the revisionists, who are serving U.S. im- perialism, and to liquidate K revisionism.... "In the final analysis, in all parts of the world, including the Soviet Union, the masses of the people who constitute the over- whelming majority of the population, and the overwhelming majority of Communists and cadres want revolution and are upholding or will uphold M-L.... The M-Ls and all the other revolutionary people of the world must continue their victorious pursuit and carry the struggle against K revisionism through to the end!" November 11; Reporting from Peking on the appearance of the above arti- cle, Yugoslav Tanyug's correspondent says "What strikes the eye in this terrific text is the effort to discredit Soviet foreign and domestic policy in every country in the world." Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit carries its own denunciation of Soviet-American collusion in Vietnam, entitled: "Imperialist- Revisionist Maneuvers and Plots Cannot Crush the Vietnamese People." November 14: Commenting on the new Chinese attack, Edward Crankshaw of the London Observer adds that he has just received, "from an East European Communist source," copies of two secret letters exchanged be- tween Moscow and Peking which cast "the most revealing light on the head- 'to on collision between the two great Communist powers." Crankshaw does not describe the Soviet letter but quotes the Chinese reply as saying: "The CCP/CC and the Chinese Government disagreed with your pro- posal of April 3 for a summit meeting of Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union. This is quite a normal thing in relations between fraternal parties, yet your letter of April 17 arbitrarily abuses is, and even goes so far as to slander us as 'encouraging the ag- gressors.'... "Frankly speaking, we do not trust you. We and other fraternal countries have learned bitter lessons in the past from K's evil practice of control under the cover of aid. The same old tricks you are now playing on the Vietnam question are even less likely to work." 5 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 In addition to leveling the same charges as contained in the above joint editorial, the Chinese in this letter detail and denounce alleged Soviet plans for military infiltration of the Vietnam area under the cover of military aid: "It should also be pointed out that you wanted to send via China a regular army formation of 1,000 men to be stationed in Vietnam, without first obtaining her consent. "Under the pretext of defending the territorial air of Vietnam, you wanted to occupy and use one or two airfields in southwestern China and to station a Soviet armed force of 500 men there. "You also wanted to open an air corridor in China and obtain for Soviet airplanes the privilege of free traffic in her air space. "In view of these moves of yours and your collusion with U.S. imperialism, we have every reason to think that you have ulterior motives in offering such assistance." November 15: Belgrade Borba's Moscow correspondent reports that the new Chinese attacks are "being described as another attempt at harsh inter- ference by Peking in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union" and "are believed in Moscow to have been timed for the 23rd CPSU Congress." Borba says that although "political quarters in Moscow are considering a pos- sible reaction" to the new attack, "two reasons are put forward against reacting: first of all, public polemics cannot settle anything in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and secondly, it is now incomparably more important to make good preparations for the 23rd CPStJ Congress than to engage in futile polemics with China." November 16: Identical articles in Pravda and Izvestiya, credited to Pravda's Peking correspondent and dated November 13, report and denounce the Chinese joint editorial: "With regard to the bitterness of the attacks and the crude tone, the article stands out even against the background of other materials of this sort regularly published by the Chinese press. The article bears evidence to the fact that the CCP leadership is openly rejecting unity of action with the CPSU and the other M-L parties.... "The struggle of the Soviet Union for the preservation of peace and against the threat of a new world war is libelously represented in the article as revisionism. The article alleges that the Soviet Union has entered into a plot with American imperialism in the name of joint rule of the world. As a 'proof' of this, the signing by the Soviet Union of the treaty banning nuclear tests in three environ- ments is cited. It is known, however, that over 100 countries throughout the world have acceded to this treaty. 6 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 "Another 'proof' of a plot ... is stated ... to be the proposal made by the SU on the need for a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which would prevent the handing over of nuclear weapons to the West German revanchists. All the aid and support which the SU has been giving in strict accordance with the request of an ..,agreements with the DRV to the struggle of the Vietnamese is presented in the article as 'a plot with American im- perialis "The CPSU course toward building a Communist society ... is declared to be a course for the 'bourgeois renaissance' of the Soviet people." Pravda goes on to say that the latest Soviet agricultural measures, particularly the decisions of the March plenum, are presented as "ac- celerating the development of capitalism in the countryside" and the de- cisions of the September plenum as "the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union." It quotes the Chinese article as declaring that between the CCP and the CPSU "there is what disunites and there is nothing that unites them... Moreover, the Chinese proclaim the need for "drawing political and organ- izational boundaries" between the CCP and its supporters on one hand and the rest of the"Communist and workers parties on the other! "The entire article from beginning to end is saturated with impermissible, utterly groundless, slanderous, and provocative fabrications and is pervaded with the spirit of hostility toward the Soviet people and the CPSU.... Such a pronouncement without question greatly damages the common cause of struggle against im- perialism and for peace...." November 17: The Czech press republishes the above Pravda comment, Rude Pravo adding that by its efforts to renew unity with the Chinese the CPSU has "proved that it is sincerely carrying out the resolution" of the March consultative meeting: "nevertheless, the Chinese continue their attacks and calumniations." November 18: People's Daily carries a bitterly sardonic "Commentator" article exploiting two TASS deletions in reporting Polyansky's October Revolution speech (one simply "deleted" the eye-catching phrase 'Soviet- American cooperation'" and the other a longer passage emphasizing peace- ful economic competition) as "remarkable and significant": "The fact is that the successors to K have learned to be a bit wiser than K himself.... They talk little but do a lot; they speak in evasive terms, uttering falsehoods and withholding the truth as best they can.. However, Polyansky blundered in his report and let the cat out of the bag.... That is why ... the new CPSU leader ... hurriedly got TASS to make the corrections.... 7 (Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 "K's successors, it seems, are having a really tough time.... They persist in pursuing K revisionism, yet they want to mask their true features.... They want to realize 'Soviet-American cooperation' at a faster pace, yet they want to avoid= being exposed and condemned by the M-Ls and revolutionary people. Their doublefaced tactics inevitably land them in a mess of contradictions, from which they can never extricate themselves." A Pravda report by Rome correspondent Yermakov on the 36th Italian Socialist Party Congress deplores the "sharply negative position on such major questions as unity of the labor movement and relations with the CP." It concludes that "the Congress resolutions are bound to damage seriously the cause of the unity of the working class and people and the cooperation of all democratic forces in Italy." November 18-19: Albanian Party daily Zen I Popullit attacks Soviet policies in two successive editorials, the first denouncing the economic reforms announced.,by Kosygin at the September plenum and the second reiterating-the'charge of "Soviet-American collaboration to achieve hegemony of the two big powers" in a blast against continued exclusion of China from the U.N. November 19: NCNA publicizes a long 7 November Japanese CP Akahata editorial on the October Revolution anniversary which repeatedly refers to the betrayal of the path of Lenin and the Revolution by K and the new leadership of the CPSU. November 20: People's Daily publishes the full text of the 16 Nov. Pravda comment on the Chinese 11 Nov. joint editorial, prefaced with a scathingly derisive editor's note which concludes: "As Pravda would have it, our article is simply bad all the way through. Such being the case, dear comrades, why are you afraid to publish it and let the great Soviet people judge for themselves what is right and wrong? Why are you afraid to come right out and carry on the public polemics with us by presenting facts and reason- ing things out? "It seems that, like K, the new leadership of the CPSU are afraid of: (1) U.S. imperialism; (2) M-L; and (3) the Soviet people and the revolutionary people of the whole world. This, fundamentally, is the reason why they are afraid to publish our article." An editorial on "solidarity with Vietnam" in the East German Party daily Neues Deutschland denounces the slanderous Chinese attacks on the USSR -- tantamount to putting differences of views above the struggle against imperialism" -- and declares that "our party considers talks by the Communist and workers parties -- especially of the CPSU, the Vietnam Workers Party, and the CCP -- on joint measures against the U.S. aggressors, on the coordination of aid for Vietnam, as urgently necessary." TASS publicizes a summary of the editorial. Approved For Release 1999/09/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A66br3?686v 06gn4' ) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 November20-21: Radio Moscow on the 20th announces that Brezhnev, Suslov, and Ponomarev met that daj_'in a friendly and warm atmosphere" with a visiting Greek CP (KKE) delegation of Koliyannis and Partsalidhis. TASS on the 21st reports that it is "officially announced" that Suslov, Ponomarev, and Korionov QPa few days ago" held talks "in a friendly atmosphere" with an Israeli CP delegation headed by Mikunis and Sneh. November 20-22: The World Peace Council Presidium meets in Sofia to discuss the situation in Vietnam and questions of European security": reports indicate that it is not attended by the Chinese or the rP o- Chinese Japanese members of the Presidium. November 22: A Pravda commentary on the ban imposed on the Sudanese CP says that it was precipitated by "an anti-religious statement by an agent-provocateur at the Omdurman Teachers College." Washington Post Moscow correspondent Rosenfeld writes that on the same day Soviet agency Novosti quietly distributed a review of the situation in Sudan which said that the Sudanese CP on the 20th identified this statement as made by a member of the "revolutionary leadership of the CP," "agents of the CCP" who were expelled from the Party in mid-196+. Rosenfeld writes that diplomats see this as indicating Moscow preparations to "ready the onus of disaster -- if Sudan's Communists come to that -- for Peking." 9 (Chronology.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release I 999/0 1 IA-RDP78-03061AA6'1d3Obb- 9 966. COMPARING SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN THE US AND THE USSR 25X1C10b SITUATION: The evidence is that both the US and USSR decided around the middle of 1955 to attempt the launching of artificial earth satellites. Owing at least partially to their postwar development work on large rocket boosters for intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviets were able to orbit the first earth satellite - Sputnik I - on 4 Oct 57. That Moscow made good use of the propaganda potential in this feat is well known. However, even the Kremlin leaders appeared to be somewhat surprised at how effective an instrument Sputnik I proved to be in influ- encing world opinion, and the extent to which the loud cries of surprise and consternation from the Free World helped their cause along. A 1960 evaluation by George Allen concluded that whereas before Sputnik I, few people of the non-Communist world believed that the Soviets were capable of challenging the US in the broad fields of science, technology and pro- duction, the early Soviet space feats were widely accepted as evidence of world leadership in all these fields. The economic value (with its political consequences) of such a change in world opinion should not.b.e underestimated and, indeed, all the evidence is that it was not underestimated by the Soviets. Joseph Guilfoyle, writing from Montevideo in the 20 Nov 58 issue of the Wall Street Journal, quoted a "disturbed" foreign diplomat as saying, "The South American people, who previously were always suspicious of the Reds, now seem willing to accept their goods and offers of aid without question." Guilfoyle noted significant increases in trade between Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and Peru and the Soviet Bloc in early 1958, along with a slump in trade with traditional customers. "Increased respect for Russia's technical and scientific achievements," he said, "has given them a degree of respectabil- ity they've seldom enjoyed here." These initial propaganda windfalls have been followed up by Soviet propagandists to the end that quite a few audiences have been persuaded that Moscow's much-ballyhooed bombs and space spectaculars prove "social- ist superiority" in all branches of science and technology. This guidance is designed to provide a broad and updated appreciation of the fact that, since the Sputnik I era, the Soviets have been falling ever further behind the US and its Western partners, scientifically and technologically. This is truest, moreover, in the very field where Soviet prestige got its greatest boost, namely, space exploration. Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 P@*"T (966 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09{ CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Several guidances issued since Sputnik I have dealt in detail with certain specific aspects of Soviet propaganda claims for their science and technology. Salient points of those guidances are reviewed in an unclassified attachment, which gives item titles and dates, but omits numbers and other classified nomenclature. A collective review of these points gives an impression of the pace at which the Free World has drawn ahead in the past decade. The attachment concludes with an updated sum- mation of comparative attainments. 25X1C10b (966 Cont.) 5X1 C1 Ob L Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09 - DP78-O3O61A0Obt 5bOdg 9 967 AF,e. AATUF: AFRICAN LABOR ORGANIZATION DOMINATED BY THE WFTU 25X1C1Oc SITUATION: In typical communist fashion, African workers are being subjected through the abuses of the AATUF to an attempt to achieve commu- nist colonialism. Communists have recognized that open affiliation with the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) is a liability for African labor organizations at this time. Therefore, they are attempting to cap- italize on the nationalistic and Pan-African sentiments in the newly emerged African states by advocating national and regional unions, inde- pendent from any world body. AATUF poses as such an independent, eschew- ing international affiliation; but WFTU, in advocating non-affiliation with international organizations, cites only free world groups -- i.e, the ICFTU*and the IFCTU-- when giving examples. While WFTU works largely behind the scenes in its efforts to increase AATUF membership and strength, evidence exists to demonstrate its direct ties to the African organization. For example, ideological lines and tac- tics are identical; and WFTU officials attend AATUF meetings and maintain close relations with its officials. AATUF, posing as an independent nationalist organization, is pursuing two tactics in an effort to dominate or eliminate its major rival, the ATUC (African Trade Union Congress). It proposes "unity of action" pro- grams -- the step toward a popular front in which the intent is to destroy the identity of and absorb the rival (or rivals). Simultaneously, AATUF officials have petitioned the heads-of-state OAU to become its official labor arm. [See two unclassified attachments for Communist tactics and WFTU-AATUF relationship.] Biweekly Propaganda Guidances #166, Item 907, May 1965, "World Federation of Trade Unions" #168, Item 914, June 1965, "ICFTU" #178, Item 961, Nov 1965, "New Cracks in the World Communist Labor Front" *International Confederation of Free Trade Unions **International Federation of Christian Trade Unions Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 (967 Cont.) 5X1 C1 Ob L Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 8-03061A(0O3 500 -J The Quality and Quantity of Her Self Defense 25X1C10b SITUATION: The military role of the U.S. in Vietnam is receiving such extensive world-wide coverage that the impression is rapidly grow- ing that this is a U.S. war. With over 200 correspondents from the U.S. alone accredited to Vietnam, readers and viewers around the globe are constantly reminded that the U.S. is fighting on the Asian continent. This concentration on U.S. military activities in Vietnam has also suc- ceeded in furnishing Communist propaganda mills with more grist for their theme of U.S. "imperialist aggression." The very considerable role being played by the South Vietnamese is receiving minimal coverage: this is harmful to the image of a viable South Vietnamese Government and her people gallantly fighting aggression and subversion. Actually the conflict in Vietnam is a Vietnamese war: the South Vietnamese armed forces are doing most of the fighting and have sustained most of the casualties; the civilian population has suffered hunger, devastation, kidnappings, torture and assassination at the hands of the Viet Cong. Despite great odds, the Vietnamese people are still battling courageously and the military assistance they are now receiving from friendly nations they requested only after they had defended them- selves for almost a decade. 17 Sept 1965 speech of U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, John T. McNaughton. II Nov 65 Daily News item on US Airlift Evacuation of Wounded SVN Soldiers. II July 1965 New York Times article by Dr. Howard Rusk on Tech- nical Assistance in Vietnam. Excerpts from October-November 1965 Press Coverage of non-military role of U.S. in Vietnam. Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 (968 Cont.) 25X1C1Oc L Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17P78-03061AO063500 969 AF,NE,WE,WH. VENEZUELAN COMMUNISTS LOSING 25X1C10b SITUATION: The Venezuelan government, since the election of Romulo Betancourt in 1958, and continuing under current President Raul Leoni, has been both democratic and progressive in fostering social and economic de- velopment programs. It has gained and kept the loyalty of the campesinos, organized labor, and the military. Recently it has mounted a resolute counter-insurgency program to combat Communist-authored violence and ter- rorism in the countryside and in the cities. The counter-insurgency program is now beginning to pay off in rather spectacular fashion. In September alone 100 guerrillas (out of a force of approximately 1800) were captured and in October several top leaders were apprehended. At the end of October an underground Communist arms and munitions factory was discovered, which was undoubtedly a serious blow to the rebel movement. There is solid evidence that the leadership of the Venezuelan Commu- nist Party (PCV) now favors a shift in emphasis, playing up participation in a popular front, concomitantly playing down guerrilla violence. This shift is producing dissension within the guerrilla movement, although it is too early to forecast its ultimate significance. Enclosed as an unclassified attachment to this Guidance is a report on the Communist movement in Venezuela and on the Government's anti-Commu- nist campaign; a Spanish translation is included for the appropriate sta- tions. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 (969 Cont.) 5X1 C1 Ob L Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/1 I.P78-03061A0003MSQOO669 970 AF,NE,WH. DEMOCRATIC ACTION IN TURKEY: 1965 General Elections 25X1C10b SITUATION: Many prophets were confounded by the landslide victory of the centrist Justice Party (JP) in the general elections in Turkey on 10 October 1965. Although it was predicted that the JP, successor to the banned Democratic Party of former Premier Adnan Menderes, would win a plurality over its chief rival, the Republican People's Party (RPP), most public opinion anticipated another coalition government. However, the political heirs of Menderes won a decisive victory in a free election in Turkey just five years after the overthrow of the Menderes government by a military coup and four years after his execution, winning about 54% of the vote and some 240 out of 450 seats in the National Assembly. This political development is viewed as at least a partial repu- diation of the Turkish left and the 1960 revolution; neither of two new and more extreme parties made much of an impact on the voters. The Turkish Labor Party (TLP), first genuine left-wing party allowed to contest an election in 35 years, and the somewhat shadowy Republi- can Peasants' Nation Party (RPNP) demonstrated only marginal appeal. In spite of campaign claims and Monday-morning quarterbacks, the strength of the JP vote cannot be credited entirely to party platforms .or' an election fought on the basis of principles and not personalities. The overwhelming JP victory is seen as due primarily to four fac- tors basically independent of party principles: the effective use by the JP of the "party machinery" inherited from the old Democratic Party; the extensive campaigning of the JP, led by Suleyman Demirel, which carried its white (iron gray) horse symbol into the most remote villages, and attracted the peasants, workers and the growing middle class; the ap- parent accommodation between the JP and the military; and the emotional loyalty of the Turkish masses, particularly the peasants, to the "mar- tyred" Menderes. Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 (970 Cont.) Approved For Release I 999/ P78-03061 A000300050006-9 ` ` But the campaign issues, if not the election result, represent the real beginning of the left-right debate that is part and parcel of po- litics in most western democracies. This is the first political cam- paign in Turkey in which key foreign policy issues have become contro- versial , largely because of the emergence of a vocal political left. Turkish politics may be beginning to divide along ideological lines but the process is curiously confused, the structure and membership of the main parties contrast oddly with what the parties preach. Justice Party. The JP draws its strength mainly from business, peasants and industrial workers; it is a middle-of-the-road party which accommodates a range of beliefs and which holds that Turkey's economic future lies in giving full freedom to private enterprise whether Turkish or foreign. It's victory brought comfort to businessmen, industrialists, investors and foreign oil companies. The JP believes that Turkish nationalism is served by a pro-Western stand. It declared that it is in Turkey's national interest to rein- force its security by close relations with Western friends and allies, and by regional defense organizations such as NATO and CENTO. The JP favors a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem through negotiations with Greece. It also advocates friendly ties with the countries of the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Afro-Asian countries - but its pre- election pronouncements ignored the Soviet Union. On domestic issues, the JP is moderate, emphasizing that only a strong and stable government can solve Turkey's problems. It advocates a mixed economic system, but wisely avoided the hotly contested issue of foreign investment in the petroleum industry, although promising to encourage "productive invest- ment." Republican People's Party. The RPP, on the other hand, has always been mildly progressive, and basically rooted in the bureaucracy, the military, bourgeoisie and the landowners. Although it contains some energetic reformers and made some progress in social reform while in office since 1961, it failed to sell itself as a serious reforming party. Primarily because of internal dissension, it lacked the organization and leadership necessary to carry on a campaign. In a belated effort, aimed primarily at attracting votes from the left, it became stridently inde- pendent and ultranationalistic, with anti-US overtones. Its leader, former Premier and elder statesman Inonu, spoke out in favor of improved relations with countries outside the Western alliance "in defense of our high interests in the international field." The RPP took a belligerent stand on the Cyprus issue, largely in order to embarrass the then incum- bent coalition and especially the JP. Finally, this summer Inonu an- nounced the party's position as "left of center." This cost it support 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 (970 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/1I 8-03061 A000300050006-9 from two groups; those who feared it was moving too far to the left; and those left-wingers who doubted its sincerity and decided to take a chance on the Turkish Labor Party. The RPP won only about 134 seats. How far Turkey's traditional fear of Russia lost votes for the RPP can only be guessed. But the JP freely hurled the charge of "communist" at both the Labor Party and the RPP, which aroused strong feelings among the peasants. Turkish Labor Party. The TLP draws its strength not from indus- trial workers - most trade unions regard it with considerable suspicion - but predominantly from intellectuals and white-collar workers. It attacked all political parties, especially the JP, and its election theme was that the "TLP will give land to the villages." It proposed nationalization of the oil industry, banking, insurance, and foreign trade, called for planned economic development, and employed the "Ameri- can exploitation" theme lavishly against all comers. It strongly de- nounced Turkey's membership in both NATO and CENTO as incompatible with national sovereignty. The TLP had no real hope of making any immediate strong impression on the political life of Turkey, (it won about 15 seats) but it is working for the future when conditions may be more favorable for the development of the political left, Republic Peasant Nation Party. RPNP is the product of the merger of the late 1950s of two small conservative parties, both organized by groups of dissidents from the old Democratic Party. When radical Col. Alparslan Turkes and his followers took over the party in July 1965, after being rejected by the JP, the RPNP became what has been called a "potentially semifascistic organization which is essentially the per- sonal vehicle of a single dominating leader." The election dealt a major blow to Turkes whose party received only 11 seats. The military play a watchdog role in Turkey. The Army is unique in the Moslem world for its earnest attachment to democracy, and its paternalistic supervision of the "democratic processes" as guardian of the Constitution. The coup of 1960 ended nearly 40 years of reasonably stable govern- ment which followed the founding of the first republic by Ataturk in 1923. During this time, power had transferred peacefully from Inonu and other Ataturk associates to Menderes' Democratic Party in the elections of 1950. The attempt to foster democracy, complete with a two-party system, gave way to traditionally Turkish authoritarian pressures during the last years of the Menderes regime. After a year of direct rule, the military authorities returned the government to civilians under arrangements designed to preclude the re- surgence of followers of the executed Menderes. His old Democratic Party was banned, most of its top figures imprisoned, and an electoral law im- posed that set up a system of proportional representation, which resulted in a series of weak coalition governments that did little to inspire public 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 ESEEWE~ (970 Cont.) Approved For Release I 999 78-03061 A000300050006-9 confidence. Until last February, the Army remained in the background while trusting only aged Inonu to be premier. Despite his party's having polled less than 37% of the vote in the 1963 election (as against 46% for'the JP), Inonu stayed on as head of a coalition gov- ernment, but resigned in February when parliament rejected his budget. A caretaker four-party coalition headed by Urguplu, an independent, then held office until the October election freed the voters to pick whatever democratic government they pleased. The Army, having become accustomed to and gained confidence in the JP, apparently concluded that a single-party government can be a good thing for Turkey if it does not abuse its power. But it will un- doubtedly exert whatever pressure is needed to keep the new government in line. On the whole, the military seem generally satisfied with the election results and now see the JP as the main defense against the left. The cabinet announced by Demirel, on 27 Oct, appears to be gen- erally competent, is acceptable to the military, and includes most of the moderate leaders of the dominant Justice party. Some of the ministers - including the defense minister - were Jailed briefly after the 1960 coup, but nearly all are from the JP's moderate wing, which has advocated accommodation with the army and has disavowed any vengeance for the coup. The program of the new government was presented to the National Assembly by Premier Demirel on 3 November 1965. It presents no drastic new proposals and follows the reasonable and constructive policies pro- mised during the campaign. In external relations it emphasizes Turkey's pro-Western links without abandoning the cautious normalization of relations with the Eastern Bloc and Soviet Russia. In its internal economic policies the government promises help and encouragement to private enterprise, within the framework of its constitution-based 25X1C10c planning organization. (See unclassified attachment) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 (970 Cont.) 5X1 C1 Ob L Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 25X1C10b 6 December 19 5 WIDF The "illusion of peace" and the "spirit of hatred." Albanian radio November 1965 TASS reports of the October 1965 meeting in Salzburg do not mention the disruptive activities of the Chinese and their allies at the WIDF Council session; PRAVDA avoided the issue by briefly reporting only the opening of the session. Prague's RUDE PRAVO, on the other hand, reported that discussion of the meeting's "Message to Women throughout the World" was distributed by "The Chinese, Albanian, and Japanese delegates, par- ticularly the utterances of the Chinese delegates culminating in gross personal attacks against the representatives of the Federation." Pertinent excerpts of reports, illustrating the Sino-Soviet dissen- sion among the delegations, follow. Prague Domestic Service, 29 October 1965; Commentary by Jirina Brejchova, member of the Czechoslovak delegation: The federation was born from the women's longing for peace and for this reason was also a cofounder of the World Peace Council .... It is regrettable that the federation must counter many attacks, which in their substance, are directed against the unity of the inter- national democratic women's movement such as are again being witnessed here in Salzburg. Many matters can be discussed but discussion stops when women who fought, arms in hand against the fascist enemy, are being slandered, abused, and accused of having betrayed the common struggle. Discussion stops when the federation's program, which was enthu- siastically adopted in 1963 at the Moscow congress, is being described as a chapter of shame in the history of the federation. It was in this spirit that the Chinese and some other delegations took the floor in Salzburg. Tirana Domestic Service, 2 November 1965: WIDF Session Scene of Anti-imperialist Fight. At this meeting a sharp clash developed between the representa- tives of women's organizations, members of the WIDF, who stand on strong positions and defend the militant traditions of the federation, and representatives of women's organizations who have fallen under the influence of the modern revisionists and who want to deprive the fed- eration of its militant spirit and turn it into an instrument for im- posing on the masses of women their revisionist policy of submission Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00030005019) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 and capitulation to imperialism. ...Vito Kapo, Albanian delegation head, stated in part: "Since its founding, the federation has adopted a revolutionary antifascist and anti-imperialist policy of a widely democratic character whose program and (?aim) included the hundred- million-strong working masses." "However," she sai;i, "certain elements of the federation wanted to create the illusion of peace in women's minds, to disarm them mor- ally, and to erase the spirit of hatred and revolution against the imperialist, colonialist, and neocolonialist(s) ... thus recommending peaceful coexistence, economic competition, general and complete dis- armament, and the United Nations as the only means; and personalities -- especially those of the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which have also the Pope's blessing -- as the only force which can handle the destiny of mankind and settle everything and not the people themselves. "These elements began to say that imperialism and its leaders were popular and reasonable, that they would widely employ a strategy of peace and therefore are angels of peace, and so forth. Is this not a completely capitulationist policy? The facts are known. Yet we discover with regret that even here certain elements continue to toe this wrong, dangerous, and unacceptable line before the masses of women. They do not denounce imperialism as the main enemy of the people and decline to point out the source of war and hunger... It is an indisputable fact that all these incorrect views and attitudes have been imposed on the WIDF by representatives of a great power who occupy leading posts in the WIDF, by representatives of the Soviet Women's Committee to be precise. They are constantly and by all pos- sible means trying to remove the federation from the democratic and revolutionary traditions upon which it was founded and turn it into a supporter of the policy of their party and government whose aim is rapprochement and cooperation with the enemies of peace -- chiefly rapprochement and cooperation with imperialism. ... At the final session ... three documents were presented for approval: I) a message directed to the women of the world, II) a resolution supporting the struggle of the people of Vietnam, and III) a document on WIDF activities in the coming year. The representative of the Albanian Women's Union ... exposed the capitulationist course of this document and also the demagogy of the representatives of the Soviet Women's Committee. ".., the document presented for approval is completely permeated by a wrong concept not based on the militant, democratic, and anti- imperialist principle by which the WIDF was characterized in its found- ing. The document fails to consider the crucial aspirations and de- mands of the masses of women, intentionally deviates from the substance of the question, and makes erroneous evalutations of many problems which do not correspond to reality. 2 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 "The Albanian Women's Union delegation, ... taking the essential measures to turn the WIDF back on to its original path, made, just as did a series of other delegations, many important remarks and concrete proposals. ... these just requests were not considered because of the machinations of certain elements who hold leading posts in the WIDF. They tried to appear here not only as defenders of the democratic rules but also as resolute fighters against imperialism, headed by American imperialism, and against colonialism and neocolonialism. ... "The Albanian Women's Union delegation cannot reconcile itself with a document permeated wth a capitulationist nature dictated by those who support the policy of sabotaging the national liberation struggle of the people and conciliating and compromising with American imperialism to share the spheres of influence." The Albanian Women's Union delegation took the rostrum again to make its remarks on the document concerning WIDF future activities. On this occasion, the Albanian delegate wanted to answer Jeanette Vermeersch who, in her speeches, accused the Albanian People's Repub- lic, the CPR, and other countries which oppose the Moscow treaty of standing on the imperialist side. But the chairman of the session did not let her speak, switched off the microphones, and a great tumult ensued in the hall. Some of the representatives of the contemporary revisionists left the room. Peking NCNA, 8 November 1965: Revisionism Exposed at WIDF Council Meeting. At the meeting, the maneuvers of the Soviet delegation and some leaders of the federation in pursuance of Khrushchev revisionism and their capitulationist line were exposed and staunchly opposed by the delegations of China and a number of other countries. From its very beginning, the meeting plunged into a sharp battle of words over the issues of whether or not the women of all countries should be brought together to oppose U.S. imperialism's policy of aggression and war and whether or not support should be given to the national liberation movement. Rosa Jasovich, general secretary of the WIDF, delivered ... the report "Women's participation in the struggle for peace and national independence." She zealously preached "universal disarmament" and "a world without wars." She declared that "every step taken toward the consolidation of world peace, on the road to disarmament, was a new guarantee for the success of liberation movements." Playing up the nuclear horror, she lauded the infamous Moscow tripartite treaty and boosted the United Nations -- a tool in the hands of U.S. imper- ialism. 3 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 ... Nina Popova, chairman of the committee of Soviet women, strenuously played up the policy of "peaceful coexistence" which actu- ally means capitulation to U.S. imperialism. This policy, she said, "corresponds to the most ardent desire" of every woman. She called for "a world conference for general, complete disarmament" and "a more intense struggle for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons." ... The Chinese delegation pointed out that U.S. imperialism was now engaged in ever more rabid aggression and intervention throughout the world and was brutally cracking down on the independence struggles of the peoples, thereby gravely endangering world peace. Therefore in order to find out whether an international women's organization truly represented the fundamental interests of the masses of women, one had only to see whether it mobilized the women of all countries to wage a relentless struggle against U.S. imperialism -- enemy number one of women and all other people of the world, or capitulated to it., .. These leaders ... extolled the United Nations .... They arbitrar- ily declared that the overriding task of the international women's movement was to strive for "general complete disarmament" and "peace- ful coexistence." They discriminated against and attacked the women's organizations which stood firmly opposed to imperialism, and carried on anti-China activities. These WIDF leaders with unusual zest helped U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism in pursuing the policy of nuclear blackmail by play- ing up the nuclear horror, Kuo Chien continued. They vilified those who opposed imperialism unswervingly as "bellicose elements" and "adventurists." ... Unmasking the features of these leaders who were for real capitulation and sham anti-imperialism, she said they still refused to abandon their erroneous line. ... they then spread ener- getically the fallacies about "general complete disarmament" and "peaceful coexistence" which was what they really wanted -- their heartfelt desire. The Albanian delegation roundly repudiated the Khrushchev revi- sionists' preposterous ideas of "peaceful coexistence," "general com- plete disarmament" and "a world without wars, arms, and armed forces," accused the representative of the committee of Soviet women of press- ing the WIDF to betray its revolutionary, democratic tradition .... In defiance of the opposition of many delegations, the manipu- lators of the meeting outrageously forced upon the meeting a "message to the women of the whole world," which, proceeding from a capitula- tionist line, describes "general and controlled disarmament and peace- ful coexistence" as "the great demands of the peoples" and echoes the call for prohibition "nuclear proliferation" and "nuclear tests." It neither points to U.S. imperialism as the source of aggression and war and as the most ferocious enemy of all peoples and to world peace, nor does it mobilize the women all over the world to struggle against U.S. imperialism. This reveals most clearly the hideous features of certain 4 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 WIDF leaders who are following the baton of the Khrushchevite revi- sionists to push the line of sham anti-imperialism but real capitula- tion, sham support but real betrayal, sham unity but a real split. When the manipulators of the meeting operated the voting machine and put to vote paragraph by paragraph this document which has mistakes on principle, the delegations of China, Albania, and Japan refused to take part. When the document was put to final vote, the three delega- tions voted against it and the delegation of Korea, the DRV, and the South Vietnam Women's Liberation Union abstained. Jeanette Vermeersch, vice chairman of the Union of French Women, tried to justify the call for the "prohibition of nuclear prolifera- tion," which is designed for the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain their monopoly of nuclear weapons. She went so far as to slanderously compare China to imperialism. The head of the Chinese delegation immediately challenged her with the questions "Do you or do you not regard the People's Republic of China as imperialism?" and "Do you have the courage to tell the women and other people of France that China is imperialism?" In face of these stern questions, Vermeersch was at a loss to answer. Her slanders against China had enraged many of the delegates. ... Some leaders of the committee of Soviet women once again acted blatantly to split the international women's movement. Behind the back of the Federation of Japanese Women's Organizations -- a member organ- ization of the WIDF, they brought to the meeting the splitters of the Japanese women's movement. .. During the meeting the presiding chairmen arbitrarily manipulated it and suppressed democracy. To restrict others from expressing differ- ing views, they imposed on the meeting a rule of procedure which contra- vened the democratic spirit. Under this rule, each delegation could only speak for 10 minutes during discussions at the meeting. They cut short the speech of the head of the Albanian delegation on the pretext of "exceeding the time limit." But many other speakers, including the head of the Soviet delegation, could go on speaking despite their ex- ceeding the time limit. When the Albanian delegate commented on a pro- posal advanced by the general secretary of the WIDF, the executive chairman repeatedly rang the bell and shouted fiercely, "You are not allowed to continue speaking!" She then switched off the loudspeaker. A farce was enacted as the meeting hall resounded with boos. Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300.050006-9 Copy of article in Forum(Vienna) also reprinted in Ceske Slovo(Munich) The reader will understand why we cannot reveal the method through which we received this letter. The addressee is a high-ranking official in Prague. CPYRGHT Dear Comrade, I am addressing myself to you, as a Czech philosopher and scientist who during the past twenty years has studied and taught Marxist philos- ophy in Czechoslovakia. Only a year ago I was still a member of the Philosophical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Based on a decision of the Central Committee and the Academy Presidium, I was fired a year ago. This decision represented a repressive, administra- tive answer to certain critical opinions which I hold regarding Czech philosophy and culture. This decision was taken in spite of the fact that my co-workers on three occasions protested my dismissal and labeled the accusations as unfounded. The decision was taken only after a spe- cial measure was passed by the former chairman of the Ideological Com- mission, Koucky. My dismissal was followed by an order to dissolve the Party organization at the Institute, by the installation of an investi- gative commission and by an atmosphere of fear under the threat of dis- solution of the entire Institute. These stringent administrative methods in philosophical discussion are quite unusual even in Czechoslovakia. Publishers confiscated all my manuscripts, editorial offices of cultural publications confiscated ten of my articles, all my university lectures were banned, my passport was withdrawn, and I myself was attacked for seven sentences in an unpub- lished letter. At this point, I am without employment, since all my efforts to find work have failed. The reason is an order which states that I cannot be employed in any Czech cultural institution. The only -- and really offensive -- offer I have had from the Academy Presidium was some vaguely-defined work in Charita, a Catholic organization which man- ufactures religious (cult) objects and has nothing whatever to do with philosophy. You will be better able to understand these absurd measures against a scientist, if you recall that in the spring of .1964 -- for the first time in the history of socialist countries -- police dogs were used against the working youth during a May Day celebration. For the first time, peaceful citizens were chased out of public parks with police night- sticks. During the same period, a cartoonist was sentenced to a year in prison for a drawing which had been approved by the censor. It was dur- ing the time when the question of the unpunished political murders of the (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 ApppFb Ehl& Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 1950-52 era, was still unresolved. My dismissal thus coincides with a wave of repression against the intelligentsia which repeats itself in a regular four-year cycle in Czechoslovak cultural life. In 1948, members of the intelligentsia were sent to coal mines, in 1952 to the gallows, in 1960 many lost their positions, today they are only publicly denigrated. This unquestionably represents liberalization, for which however as a Marxist and humanist socialist, I find little ad- miration. The reasons for my arrest were contrary to justice, to the norms of scientist life, and served purely as an administrative measure within the theoretical controversy regarding the orientation of Czech philosophy. Any scientific defense became impossible. Through various mechanisms, threats and pressures, those who spoke out in my behalf were quickly silenced. The fact that I was released was to serve as a case of "exem- plary" punishment of "revisionist orientation" but was in reality an ex- pression of pure Stalinism and unreconstructed dogmatism on the part of certain leading officials, headed by Vladimir Koucky. The fact that this theoretical dispute among Marxists culminated in this manner, well illus- trates the tensions in current political life in Czechoslovakia. I re- spected the existing situation and stated openly that I have no intention of using my case against the Party, and that I don't want to exchange my citizenship for a good job abroad. In spite_of my expectations, pressure against my person continues and therefore I have decided to ask you for assistance. A week ago, the new chairman of the Ideological Commission and mem- ber of the Politburo, Jiri Hendrych, declared that he will have me prose- cuted for parasitism, even though I am an independent scientific worker, a translator and member of the World Federation of Scientific Workers. I therefore face arrest again. I put all pertinent documents at your disposal so that you will realize what methods are still employed by cul- tural dogmatics in 1965, and in Central Europe; what's more, in a social- ist state which had formally rejected the methods of the personality cult. I would be very grateful if you would intervene on my behalf in my request for a passport, so that I can continue my studies abroad. I cannot do so here since all scientific and publication activity is denied me. I do not intend to remain abroad permanently however because I am convinced the practical application of socialist humanism is much more important than mere philosophical theory. With sincere greetings Yours Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 25X1A5a1 pp 25X1 C3b1 roved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Next 12 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03 25X1 C10b 6 December 1965 "Communist Labor Tactics in the Colonial and Former Colonial Countries" by George Lichtblau NOTE: The material below is taken from chapter 3 of Everett Kassalow's (ed.) National Labor Movements in the Postwar World, published and copyrighted by Northwestern University Press in 1963. Since that year, communist popular front tactics in Africa have largely shifted from attempts to gain open affiliates for the WFTU (the commu- nist international labor front) to encouragement of popu- lar fronts with purportedly independent regional African trade unions, i.e., the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF). CPYRGHT Movement toward Unity In the prevailing favorable climate the WFTU sought to make its contribution to anti-Western solidarity by emphasizing the common interest of the Communist and nationalist unions in fighting imperialist exploita- tion and aggression. It even suggested that tactical unity of action should lead to the unification of the nationalist and Communist organiza- tions. Unity of action and unification on the national level, in turn, were presented as paving the way for eventual unification of the WFTU and the ICFTU, or failing this, to bring about the dissociation of the Afro-Asian neutralist unions from the ICFTU. Furthermore, it was claimed that the economies of the former colonial countries were evolving, if not directly toward "socialism as we scientifically understand it" at least toward something akin to it, i.e., "State capitalism." Therefore, this process must be supported through unity as a right step toward national emancipation from Western influence. As part of the new "unity" campaign, the class struggle, by being equated with the anti-imperialist struggle, was to become "outer directed" toward the international scene about which the masses in effect can do nothing. This meant its elimination from the party and trade-union pro- grams -- and in some cases even of the trade-unions themselves -- as a threat to the nationalist governments and the reduction of Communist trade- union activities to what might be called "sound business unionism." Accordingly in 1956 the Communist campaign for national and inter- national trade-union unity assumed a new dimension. The hitherto spurious appeals to the non-Communist unions and the ICFTU gave way in several African and Asian countries to actual mergers of Communist unions with their nationalist rivals, thus creating new pressures from below for more (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 rp -1qcf For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 international cooperation on all levels. Surprisingly enough such mergers were promoted regardless of whether the Communists stood to gain organiza- tional control of non-Communist unions or not. In several cases the mergers had to be sternly imposed with backing from abroad against heavy opposition of local party and trade-union cadres who saw their cause undermined by such a sacrifice to the remote interests of the Soviet Union. The WFTU con- tributed to these pressures by giving publicity to such "achievements of unity" and through publishing articles by the local leaders who conducted these unity moves, strongly criticizing those elements who tried to hold out against the liquidation of their organization. No doubt such articles reflected also behind the scene pressures for compliance. Communist Labor Tactics in Africa To turn to specific cases, between 1956 and 1958, Communist unions in Tunisia, French West Africa, and Algeria have merged with or have been absorbed by non-Communist trade-union centers. The most striking case was that of the Tunisian WFTU-affiliated USTT which in September, 1956 after a special congress, following a Communist party resolution on trade- union unity, dissolved to merge its rank-and-file with the Neo-Destour controlled, ICFTU-affiliated UGTT, from which the Communist USTT leaders remained excluded. At the time when the USTT disbanded it had about 6,000 members or about 15-20 per cent of the organized workers in the country. This act of local Communist self-negation was justified on "anti-imperi- alist" grounds, i.e., that working class unity would strengthen the deter- mination of the Tunisian nationalists to transform "formal" independence from France into "real" independence -- i.e., neutralism. In the case of Algeria, the Communist Union Generale des Syndicats Algeriens (UGSA) dissolved itself at the end of 1957, following the par- ticipation of the Union Generale du Travail Algerienne (UGTA), an organ- ization aligned with the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) and affili- ated with the ICFTU, at the Leipzig WFTU Congress. The Algerian Communist party announced this decision in a declaration calling for trade-union unity and urging UGSA members to join their rival nationalist movement. The UGTA, in turn, despite its continued affiliation with the ICFTU, has since then closely collaborated with the WFTU, particularly in the pro- motion of the International Trade-Union Committee for Solidarity with the Algerian Workers and People. It also has accepted money and training for its cadres from both the WFTU and individual Soviet bloc unions, especi- ally from the East German Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB). Perhaps the most effective Communist unity maneuvers took place in former French West Africa. Here the Communist Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) joined with autonomous non-Communist unions at Cotonou, Dahomey, to form in January, 1957 the neutralist and unaffiliated Union Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire (UGTAN). The new movement in- cluded the CGT, the Confederation Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique (CGTA), a nationalist labor movement aligned with the Reassemblement 2 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 ACPYRGHTor Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 W Democratique Africain (RDA); and several other autonomous unions, mostly of railways workers and teachers. As the price of unity -- approved and acknowledged by the French CGT and the WFTU -- the West African CGT leader,: despite resistance from their own cadres yielded control of their segment of the new labor movement to the CGTA. The CGT broke its affiliation with the WFTU in deference to Sekou Tour6, who as General Secretary of the CGTA became also General Secretary of the UGTAN, and surrendered to his drive to bring the entire nationalist and labor movement under his control. Toure is a dedicated but eclectic Marxist who, both as leader of the RDA and of a dissident section of the French West African CGT, had severed earlier associations with the Communists. Although he has increasingly aligned himself with the Soviet bloc since 1957, it is unlikely that at the time he would have, or could have, given the Communists any assurances that in return for their support he would detach Guinea from France and the Western political system, and instead look to the Soviet bloc for his main support and inspiration in restructuring the political and eccnomic system of his country. Abdoulay Diallo, ex-CGT chief in the Suday, former chairman of the CGT-Coordinating Committee for French West Africa, and ex-vice president of the WFTU, was virtually eliminated from the international activities of UGTAN. Although he was given a vice presidency of UGTAN, he no longer seems to have any real influence on the Guinean labor movement. A similar case was that of Cisse Alioune, another ex-CGT man, who at the UGTAN Unity Congress at Conakry in January, 1959 was nominally entrusted with UGTAN international relations. In effect, however, these were conducted by Diallo Seydou, a Tours man who became General Secretary for Organization, Press and Education. To justify this tactical self-negation, Communist propaganda declared that the unification of the French West African movement would lead to a Pan-African trade-union movement spreading from the French to the British areas of the continent. Furthermore, such unification would undercut the efforts of the ICFTU to establish an effective regional organization and would help speed up the process of detaching colonial Africa from the metropolitan powers through the strengthening of the nationalist movements. The effectiveness of this move in strengthening Communist influence on the growing African labor movement was soon proven. Despite the fact that the international policy of the UGTAN does not appear to be under the control of the ex-CGT leaders, the movement has become increasingly committed to the WFTU. Not only has the UGTAN attended the Fourth World Trade-Union Congress of the WFTU in Leipzig in October 1957, but subsequently has be- come a regular participant in all major WFTU affairs, including the meet- ings of the functional trade departments of that organization. By 1958 it joined, as a provisional member, the Technical Profession Forestry Section of the Trade-Union International of Agricultural and Forestry Workers. 3 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 g1 For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9. In July, 1960 the UGTAN played host to the Third World Teachers' Conference in Conakry, arranged by the Federation Internationale Syndicale de 1'Enseigment (FISE), the teachers' trade department of the WFTU, for which the Guinean teachers' union, a UGTAN affiliate, acted as co-sponsor and host. Toure personally welcomed the congress. Perhaps even more important for the Soviet drive toward influencing labor developments in Africa was the establishment of a UGTAN trade-union training school in Conakry with the financial and technical assistance of the WFTU and the. East German FDGB, both of whom provide instructors. With Guinea having become a base for the spreading of Soviet influence in Africa, the UGTAN was turned into an instrument for purveying this in- fluence among trade-unions. This was well-illustrated at the January, 1959 UGTAN Unity Congress at Conakry, when that organization proclaimed its intent of becoming a Pan-African labor movement. To emphasize this point the Ghana Trade-Union Congress, then one of the key ICFTU organiz- ations in Africa, declared itself affiliated with the UGTAN. Despite the stress on non-commitment and the attendance of both ICFTU and WFTU fra- ternal delegates, Toure in his report to the Congress on orientation and doctrine stated that the unique character of the African labor movement did not prevent the UGTAN from aligning its sympathy with the forces represented by the WFTU. Since their association at Conakry the Ghana TUC and the UGTAN have welcomed every support, not the least of which came from the WFTU, for their efforts of establishing an all-African trade-union movement associ- ated with the Ghana-controlled All-African Peoples' Movement and designed to crowd the ICFTU and Western trade-union influence from the continent. To dramatize this objective the Ghana TUC disaffiliated from the ICFTU in October, 1959 just prior to the establishment of the ICFTU's African Regional Organization (AFRO). At the same time it promoted jointly with the UGTAN and the WFTU, a split of the Trade-Union Congress of Nigeria over the issue of international alignment when that organization was about to affiliate with the ICFTU. This made it more difficult for the ICFTU to find in the Nigerian labor movement an effective alternate base to the Ghana TUC for its operations in Africa below the Sahara. Not only was the labor movement now divided, but the Pan-African neutralists to whom the so-called "unaligned" wing -- the Nigerian Trade Union Congress -- looked for guidance, could charge the ICFTU with the "responsibility" for the split. The impact of the Congo crisis in summer, 1960 on Pan-African nation- alism further strengthened the sentiment for a new all-African labor move- ment at the expense of the ICFTU. As a result this movement, with the backing of the Ghana TUC, the UGTAN, the U.A.R.-controlled Pan Arab ICATU, the Algerian UGTA, and the Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT), as well as the WFTU, became so attractive to African nationalists that, earlier dif- ficulties and rivalries notwithstanding, no leader of an African ICFTU 4 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 QM-d For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 affiliate dared to oppose it outright. Even the most prominently identi- fied African ICFTU leader Tom Mboya, the General Secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor, who had been one of the main targets of the African neutralists, felt compelled to associate himself with this movement at the expense of his ties with the ICFTU. While, of course, this trend within the African labor and political movement cannot be directly attributed to the WFTU and other Communist efforts in the field of labor, the African nationalists and neutralists themselves freely admit that under the influence of Soviet bloc foreign policy these activities and tactics have considerably affected not only the political attitudes but also the focus of trade-unionism developing in Africa. By providing training for trade-union cadres both in Africa and Europe, fraternal exchanges, roving representatives, money, propa- ganda, and various other forms of aid, the WFTU together with its Soviet affiliates and the Italian and French Communist unions seek to transform not only the African labor movements but also the social and political institutions in which they operate so that they will resemble those of the Peoples' Democracies. Developments in Guinea, Ghana, and elsewhere already indicate that such changes may make the restoration of normal relations -- be they commercial, political, or labor -- between these countries and the Western nations increasingly difficult. This trend toward the detachment of African labor from Western con- tacts and influence was further reinforced by the ability of the WFTU and its affiliates to promote ever-increasing international contacts and associations of the neutralists both with other Communist fronts, such as the World Peace, Youth, and Student movements, and with the regional neutralist movements which have emerged in recent years often with Com- munist help. Among these are the Afro-Asians, the Pan Arabs, the Pan- Africans, and the Pro-Castro Latin American, who are induced to collab- orate with the Communists over such issues as the Algerian independence struggle, the Suez or Congo crisis, the South African race riots, the Angola rebellion, etc. Thus, despite the fact that the number of WFTU affiliates in Africa remains insignificant, the association with and participation in the nationalist turmoil of Africa makes it an important instrument for under- mining the regional status quo. Consequently, the disintegration of the UGTAN outside Guinea as a result of the breaking up of French West Africa into separate states aligned in a pro-French and a pro-Guinean power bloc, has, if anything, strengthened the ability of the WFTU as an outside force to intensify the appeal for a Pan-African labor movement. Even though the pro-French "Entente" states remain suspicious of the Ghana-Guinea front against them and try to keep their trade-unions independent of the UGTAN, both official and unofficial contacts between their unions and the UGTAN continue. Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Fact Sheet 25X1 C10b December 1965 VIET CONG TERROR FORCES THOUSANDS FROM HOMES CPYRGHT by John T. McNaughton U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The greatest cruelty of war and the greatest crime of aggression is the suffering inflicted on the innocents. Innocents are felled and injured; innocents -- young and old, the healthy and infirm -- are up- rooted from their homes and set to wander in the ravaged countryside. In the struggles the world has known this century, perhaps no ele- ment has evoked more sympathy than the plight of those seeking refuge from conflict. Even more than the spectacle of physical pain, the spectacle of families separated, of homes destroyed, of hopes shattered -- has dis- turbed all men of good faith and all men who set about "to deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish." The policy of the United States in Southeast Asia is the same as it is for the rest of the world: to render assistance to those nations requesting aid to repel aggression, to promote peace, to build stability, and to protect the right of free people to choose their own destiny.. The assistance rendered is sometimes economic, sometimes military -- and sometimes, as in the case of Vietnam, both. This aid the United States gives out of humanitarian concern for others and for the protection of its own national security, which de- pends in no small part on the security and stability of the whole free world. For 11 years, the United States has been rendering the Republic of (South) Vietnam both economic and military assistance. This aid has increased in recent years as aggression against the free people of Viet- nam has increased. When the Geneva Accords of 195+ partitioned Vietnam into the free Republic in the South and the Communist-led state in the north, nearly seven percent of the population in North Vietnam sought refuge from Com- munism. By foot and by oxcart, carrying their former happiness and future hopes on their backs, they made the long, hot trek to freedom. (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 C i 'wd For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Even after the deadline for overt movement had passed, they risked grave dangers to board U.S. vessels waiting offshore. They voted with their feet. By 1957 -- just two and one-half years after the exodus -- the Gov- ernment of Vietnam, with assistance from the United States, had largely completed the important task of integrating these one million refugees into a free society. An important fact of this exodus was the direction of the mass refugee flow -- away from Communist domination. But while the Government of South Vietnam was undertaking its monu- mental task of relocating and caring for the million refugees from the North, that same North was beginning its aggression within South Vietnam. This aggression has since caused innocent civilians again to flee the inhumanity that man often inflicts on his fellow man. The mass emigration from the North to the South was "Phase I" of the refugee situation in Vietnam: seeking refuge for political reasons. The completion of Phase I of the refugee problem also marked the begin- ning of Phase I of the Communists' plan to subjugate the South. This was the creation of a basis for insurgency through political organization and subversion. Phase II of the Communists' plan to conquer South Vietnam -- terror and guerrilla warfare -- commenced in earnest in 1959. Because the new nation of South Vietnam was proving to be a success, North Vietnam trig- gered a reign of terror against local officials and civilians in the villages. As this blatant aggression, called by the Communists "national lib- eration," began to gnaw at South Vietnam's village structure, Phase II of the refugee problem began: exodus from the horrors of guerrilla war. This is the constant flux of refugees -- for the most part ethnic South Vietnamese -- who flee from insecure areas to seek safety near or in district and provincial capitals. In 1962 and 1963, about 100,000 refugees fled Viet Cong terror in Vietnam's rugged Central Highlands. Since late 1964, more than 600,000 refugees have left insecure areas. In September of 1965, the Government of Vietnam reported that there were about 400,000 Vietnamese in refugee status, with 300,000 of these being in the Coastal Plains and Central Highlands area. 2 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Cp' R6Red For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Why do these people flee? The first, and perhaps the most important basic reason for the present refugee flow is the terror campaign conducted in the villages by the Viet Cong. Since the beginning of the Viet Cong's terror-and-guerrilla Phase II, fleeing and hiding have become a way of life for much of the popu- lation at one time or other. The more the terrorism and the hit-and- run attacks, the greater the number of refugees. The alternative to fleeing is joining the Viet Cong -- submission. In 1964, 1,728 civic officials were killed, kidnapped or wounded by the Viet Cong. There were 11,746 plain civilians killed, wounded, or kidnapped. In the first eight months of 1965, casualties of officials through Viet Cong terrorism numbered more than 600, and other civilian casualties exceeded 6,000. Why do the Viet Cong pursue terroristic methods against the people whose minds they hope to win -- especially since the Viet Cong must de- pend on the farmers in the villages for funds, food, shelter, intelligence, and conscripts? When the Viet Cong enter a village, they immediately try to win the local inhabitants to their cause. Sometimes, however, to insure Com- pliance, terror is liberally used against all potential opposition. If the local teacher is teaching the children of his village to be loyal to their government, the Viet Cong sternly warn him to stop it. If the teacher continues, he is likely to be shot and his corpse may be mutilated. If the village chief does not cooperate with the Viet Cong, he too may be shot. In addition to enforcing compliance, terrorism serves the equally important function of disrupting the process of government and causing the villagers to lose faith in the ability of the central government to protect them. Partly out of disenchantment with the Viet Cong and partly from pure fear, many Vietnamese flee to areas where they hope to be safe -- sometimes only to have to take refuge again. In mid-1965, the Viet Cong studiously avoided large-scale contacts with U.S. and government forces because of their well-founded apprehen- sion of superior firepower and mobility. 3 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 8Qa1TFor Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006--9 But while avoiding large-ecale attacks, the Viet Cong, reinforced by infiltrators from the North, have maintained their terror attacks on individuals and whole villages. They have continued their inter- diction of roads and highways and have continued to prosecute the pro- tracted warfare of the guerrilla. There is, however, evidence of growing disenchantment among vil- lagers who have heretofore complied with Viet Cong demands. There are two reasons for this disenchantment: first, the Viet Cong have failed to make good their promises to the people, and second, the horrors of war are likely to follow wherever the Viet Cong intrude. Another major cause of the increased refugee flow is nature her- self. Natural disasters like floods often leave thousands homeless and swell the refugee rolls. With the heavy monsoon rains swelling Vietnam's rivers and swamps, there is a possibility of heavy flooding again in late 1965, and a subsequent large increase in the number of refugees. Current emergency needs created by the refugee movement have been met by assistance through relief centers of the Government of Vietnam, by U.S. voluntary agencies, and through a wide variety of regular gov- ernment provincial welfare and counterinsurgency programs supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development. The refugees assist the counterinsurgency effort by giving badly needed information. The refugees are questioned, one at a time, as they enter safe areas or camps, and information is obtained. In the interior of Vietnam, the refugee problem has been made more difficult by the harassment and interdiction by the Viet Cong of supply routes and lines of communication. This blocks the movement of sup- plies and causes the price of food to rise, creating further hardships for both refugees and villagers who choose to remain. If an area is under Viet Cong control temporarily, the government urges people to move out. But if only small numbers of Viet Cong are present, the government prefers that the people stay in the area. Re- lief supplies are available for the refugees in the provincial capitals. The refugee movement has had very little effect on the total war effort in Vietnam. Supplies generally have been adequate to handle the situation both for the civilian and military personnel. Most of the people have been fed, sheltered, and some medical care has been available. The U.S. Government is currently expanding its efforts to help solve the refugee problem. Approved For Release 1999/09/'7 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061'A000300050006-9 CPYRGHT DAILY NEWS, TII;JRSD. Y \TOVE)IBgt 11, 1965 t (New York) 25X1C10b Staff Correspondent of Two ;claws Half a world from Communist mortar burst and machine gun bullets that wracked their bodies, 56 paraplegic Viet Namese soldiers found hope Tuesday at Castle Point Veterans Hospital in the rolling hills overlooking,the Hudson River near Beacon, N.Y. Within minutes after their huge 4` - - -- + C-141 jet plane touched down at "I hope I can walk again, before 0 A.M. at Stewart Air Force Base, I go home," after a 26-hour flight from Viet Another soldier waved to news- Nam, the soldiers and 14 Viet men and said: "U.S. okay." A Namese medical corps personnel pretty Viet \amese nurse said were driven to the white brick the men were all se " hos ital. "happy" to be matches of gray fog swept the here. runway and a chill breeze cut, Dr. Rusk, director of the In- through the clothing of dignitaries stitute of Physical ;Medicine and waiting for the flying hospital. Rehabilitation of New York Uni- The Viet Namese ambassador to versity, watched closely. It was the U.S., Gen. Tien Thien Khiein, Rusk who had started the whole former U.S. Ambassador to Viet project during a trip to Viet Nam Maxwell Taylor and Dr. Nam. Howard Rusk, who initiated the Before, There Was No Hope new program, greeted the s' Idlers. He told how it was then, A crowd of 300 stood silent as "There was no hope. The men Air Force personnel lifted the were getting treatment in a small litt f h ers rom t e plane, brown hospital. The only piece of mod- blankets strapped over each man. ern equipment I saw was a niece They're Nervous at First Shy, confused and extremely boyish looking, the soldiers glanced nervously around as their litters were hoisted aboard buses for the 30-minute trip to the hos- pital. "I hope I can be cured," said 2d 1 at which they can lead a produc- Lt. Huynh Quang Nhuong softly. five life back home. Rusk will be L. I., president of the PVA's east- ern division. Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 in charge of their retraining and treatment here. After his trip, Rusk told Presi- dent Johnson of the soldiers' plight, and Johnson provided federal cooperation. The doctor said he knew of no plans to bring more here for treatment, though he estimated there were 600 more paraplegics in Viet Nast. Person-toPeraon Support Among the greeters, national officers of the Paralyzed Vet- erans of America, from their wheelchairs, promised person-to- person support. Vice President Robert T. Rohrer promised to take the Viet Namese 'Into our z +yau e attached to a ., a.. a ioo4 which he manipulated for exer- With him were Harry A. cise. The men were doomed unless , Schweikert Jr, of Washington, they got proper treatment." D. C., executive secretary; Robert If all goes well, he said, it will Classon of New York past na- take. 120 days to get the least tional president, an' Sanford injured of the men to the point Weinaimer of Valley Stream, Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-0 925X1 C10b Fact Sheet December 1965 Non-Military Role of U.S. in Vietnam [Excerpts from press coverage] CPYRGHT Beginning 4 November the U.S. began a massive air drop of 108,000 pounds of food to 5,000 people, mostly refugees, at Tanh Linh in Binh Tuy Pro- vince. The supplies originated with U.S. voluntary agencies including CARE, Catholic Relief, the Mennonites and the U.S. AID Mission. In the next few days this drop was followed by 9 A -123 drops into an area swarming with Viet Cong units. (First drop witnessed by numerous members of foreign and U.S. press.) The drop included over 49,000 blankets, 60,000 pounds of clothing, 665 tons of Bulgar wheat, 175,000 aluminum roofing sheets, 28 half tons of powdered milk, 132 tons of cooking oil, 650 tons of surplus corn in ad- dition to tools, fertilizer and other supplies. (The first drop was witnessed by numerous members of the foreign and U.S. press and details of the contents were given by US AID spokesman at a briefing on 4 November.) A total of four air shipments were completed on 30 October to families of FULRO trainees (organization of Montagnard tribesmen in SVN Y,igh-_ lands) in Banmethuot. The last shipment contained 2,250 blankets, and 25 metric tons of food. On 31 October three U.S. manufactured (GE) generators each producing 1,500-KW, arrived in Saigon for the South Vietnamese people. On 30 October Operation Friendship clothing arrived in Saigon. The clothing, an unspecified amount, will be distributed by U.S. Special Forces in the central coastal and highland provinces of Vietnam. SPECIAL NOTE: as of the end of October 1965 refugees in South Vietnam totalled 700,000. See BPG #875 of 15 February 1965 on"Free World Support for South Vietnam" and BPG #942 of 13 September 1965 on "The Refugee Problem in South Vietnam" Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 'Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00030005000621%X1 C10b Fact Sheet December 1965 The Venezuelan Communists are Losing The dramatic discovery on October 28, 1965 of an underground Communist arms factory near Caracas, Venezuela served to highlight two seemingly contradictory points: that the Venezuelan Government's anti- Communist campaign is highly successful, and that the Communists are far from beaten. The underground factory was used to manufacture weap- ons, explosives, and other armaments for the Communist guerrilla forces. Quantities of rifles, machine guns, grenades, bazookas, and explosives were found in the underground installation. The galleries containing the plant were three meters underground, lined with steel walls and roofs, and secured by an electrically controlled sliding door of rein- forced concrete. In the factory were expensive lathes, drill presses, and other machines imported from Europe, the total value of which was estimated at US $100,000. The entire installation was cleverly hidden under a peasant hut. In the surrounding village, classrooms decorated with flags bearing the Communist hammer and sickle were used for guer- rilla training classes. The discovery and capture of the underground plant constituted a further step in the government's increasingly effective anti-Communist campaign which has recently been marked by the capture of many of the guerrillas, including major leaders, and the surrender of one of the top rebels. But these successes also serve as reminders that the Com- munists are not out of business and still represent a major threat. The discovery of the underground factory probably did more than the capture of a hundred guerrillas to emphasize the danger--because it was the concrete proof of foreign support on a very large scale. No dis- contented peasants, much less the poverty-plagued Venezuelan Communist Party, ever built a $100,000 underground factory. This was clearly the work of a rich, large, and well-organized international operation. Venezuela is a country of some 8.7 million people, largely mestizos. Its economy is growing rapidly -- 7% in 196+ -- and thus keeping ahead of its burgeoning population, growing at 3% per annum. A notable problem of Venezuela is the enormous migration of people from the rural districts to the cities; today 71% of the people live in town and urban communities compared to 28% just 29 years ago. The oil industry is the nation's major source of income, contributing about 30% of the Gross National Product, 90% of the total export earnings, and 66% of the government rev- enues. This largely "unearned" income (the industry employs only 2% of the labor force) is being wisely invested by the government in measures for economic advancement. An impressive 25% of the national income has been invested during recent years in three major sectors: agrarian re- form to give land to the landless peasants; education -- to build schools (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 in city and countryside; and industrialization -- to decentralize wealth and population outside Caracas and the Maracaibo oil center. An entire new industrial complex is being built in the Orinoco River valleytsouth- east of Caracas where a large steel works, utilizing remarkably pure ore from an adjacent "iron mountain," and a large dam for hydroelectric power, which will eventually surpass in power output the Aswan Dam, are the key enterprises. Despite the progressive and democratic nature of the Venezuelan Government, and despite its solid achievements in bettering the lot of the people, it is bitterly opposed by a determined band of Communists intent on seizing power in order to rule the country according to their narrow, doctrinaire precepts. The Venezuelan Communist Party, which was founded in 1931, has spent most of its existence underground. It flourished legally for a period after helping in the overthrow of Marcos Perez Jimenez in January 1958. But it began losing ground to the aggressive left-wing (though strongly anti-Communist) government of Romulo Betancourt, leader of the Democratic Action (Accion Democratica -- AD) Party. The PCV became more and more in- volved in subversive and terrorist acts, to the point of attempting to overthrow the government in late 1961, early 1962. The PCV established a separate front for its more violent activities: the Armed Forces of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional -- FALN), which in turn collaborated very closely with the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento de la Ezquierda Revolucionaria -- MIR), an extremist group of outcasts from the AD. A brutal terrorist assault on an excursion train in September 1963, caused a full governmental crackdown on the PCV and MIR, resulting in the arrest of many of its leaders. In retaliation the subversives launched a campaign of intense violence which lasted during the entire period of the election campaign from 4 October to 1 December 1963. They used every means at their disposal to create disorder, sabotage the elec- tions, and cause the military overthrow of the government. In the middle of this period a cache of 3 1/2 tons of arms was found on a beach in northwestern Venezuela and it was subsequently traced to Cuba. The arms were intended for use in a planned terrorist assault on the central sec- tion of Caracas and their discovery further embittered the campaign. The chief Communist demand during the campaign was for boycott of the election, hoping thereby to demonstrate their strength and the illegiti- macy of the election. The turnout of'9O% of the eligible voters, despite an active intimidation campaign by the Communists, and the clearcut elec- tion of the AD candidate Raul Leoni as Betancourt's successor were severe defeats for the Communists. Further, their concentration on violence led to the loss of their residual popularity among the Venezuelan people and the depletion of their leadership and material resources. The violence has continued since the election, though never approaching the same scale. 2 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 The FALN has a current estimated strength of 1800 men, of whom approximately 500 constitute the rural guerrilla forces, 500 to 600 urban terrorist groups, and the remainder intelligence, support, smug- gling and study groups. Surprisingly, the Communists receive almost negligible support from the campesinos, and the rural guerrillas are dependent on the urban groups for support of every kind. Perhaps equally surprising is the fact that the urban Communist elements receive very little support from organized labor. Out of a labor force of 2.5 million, the Communist-dominated Single Central of Workers of Venezuela (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Venezuela -- CUTV) represents only about 100,000 workers. The single most important source of strength for the Venezuelan Communists is the student population. One-third of the membership of the PCV consists of members of the Communist Youth of Venezuela (Juventud Communista de Venezuela -- JCV), and it has been estimated that 70% of the FALN's strength is composed of JCV members. Key FALN positions are held by JCV leaders and many FALN units are made up exclusively of JCV members. The common Latin American tradition of university autonomy exists in Venezuela, whereby no authorities may enter the campus without the approval of the university authorities, even to apprehend known crimi- nals, and those other than students may seek refuge on the campus and be immune from the police. This has made universities an ideal base for leftist subversive operations. The Communists have taken full advantage of this situation to use the Central University of Venezuela in Caracas for holding party meetings and caucuses, printing and distributing propa- ganda, manufacturing and storing arms, conducting para-military training and terrorist operations, and hiding extremist refugees from the police. Of the 18,000 students at Central University, between 30% and 40% sup- port the PCV and MIR. Of the university's 2400 teachers, approximately half are Communist and extreme leftists. The key Communist figure at the university, and until 1964 head of the Department of Journalism, has been Hector Mujica, a member of the Central Committee of the PCV. Com- munist influence is accomplished chiefly through its control of the senior administrative organization for student affairs and through its domination of most of the university faculties. Certainly the major element preventing Communist growth in Venezuela has been the progressive and effective government of the country under Betancourt and Leoni. Venezuela has not had a long tradition of demo- cratic government. The election of Betancourt to the presidency was only the second free presidential election ever held in Venezuela. The in- auguration of Leoni as President in March 1964 marked the first success- ful transfer of power from one freely elected government to another in the nation's history. The Democratic Action Party of Betancourt and Leoni finds its main support among the peasants and workers and its "re- volutionary" programs have met with their continued approval. One of the major programs of the government during recent years has been agrarian 3 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9' reform, which has achieved the settlement of 78,000 families on an estimated 1.8 million hectares of land since its inception in 1960. In addition, in every Venezuelan state the government has embarked on programs of farm-to-market roads, rural aqueducts, new schools, and rural electrification. The campesino labor federation is one of the nation's largest and most effective and the main political parties vie with one another for campesino support. Up to now the ruling Democratic Action Party has found, and has maintained, its greatest strength among the campesinos. The government's successful program to invest profits from the oil industry to stimulate other economic development programs has been widely approved by labor groups and their support has been essential to the AD. There has also been an active slum clearance program, although the flood of migrants to the cities has limited its effectiveness. The government sponsored community improvement pro- jects, and the army's civic action program have all contributed to organized labor's confidence in the government. Concomitantly with these progressive economic and social pro- grams, Venezuela has initiated a large scale counter-insurgency cam- paign. The anti-guerrilla effort in the countryside has been chiefly carried out by the Army. After early mistakes in implementing this program, which often served to irritate and alienate the peasants, the Army has now developed an effective "neutralization" campaign de- signed to assert, and then continuously maintain, governmental authority over progressively larger areas in the key northwestern and northeastern states. The guerrillas have been systematically forced farther back in- to the hills and jungles and isolated from their urban support bases by highly effective mobile roadblock operations. The entire national police force was fired after the ouster of dictator Jimenez in 1958 and has since been replaced with a new, more honest, and reasonably efficient force which, with training and more modern equipment is becoming a highly professional organization. Its surveillance of the Communists has been a major factor in the Govern- ment's success in dealing with the rebels. It received credit for the arrest of several Communist couriers who were apprehended in April 1965 while trying to smuggle $300,000 into the country for the Communist underground. Thanks to the combined activities of the army and the police, over 100 guerrillas were captured in September alone and a number of their leaders were apprehended in Caracas and elsewhere. On 16 October six important leaders of the FALN from the states of Anzoategui and Bolivar were captured and large quantities of documents and equipment, includ- ing personnel records were seized. (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 That the government's counter-insurgency program is having its effect is evident from the Communist-front press. The August 31, 1965 edition of the Communist-controlled weekly Que features an article by PCV Secretary General Pompeyo Marquez (using the pen name Carlos Valencia) which provides the most authoritative call for a popular front which has been recorded so far. Marquez insists that the drive for what he calls "Democratic Peace" is a revolutionary line and de- nounces the dogmatists for lacking perspective and as guilty of "in- fantilism" in insisting on single-minded violence. He also acknowledges that the people reject civil war and are tired of armed struggle. In a later edition of Que (September 19), Marquez decries the critical situa- tion which exists within the revolutionary movement and admits that it has become "necessary to redirect the revolutionary cause to a zigzag course, instead of following a straight line." In plainer terms this means that the leadership of the PCV is coming to the conclusion that violence is not working, recognizes it is out of step with the people, and is about to change its emphasis by attempting to play up its non- violent facet, temporarily playing down the guerrilla effort. The Com- munist objective in the popular front policy obviously would be to lull the Government and populace back into complacency and expand Communist influence within the legal political party system until conditions are deemed favorable for a resumption of armed struggle. It is not certain to what degree the membership of the PCV and MIR will agree to diminish the guerrilla struggle. Early in November a band of seven armed guerrillas kidnapped and slew a locally prominent AD member who was first vice president of a municipal council of the district; an AD campesino leader was similarly assassinated on the same date. President Leoni decried these acts as "treacherous, monstrous, cowardly crimes." The Campesino Federation also denounced them and of- fered to provide campesino manpower to bolster police and military forces if needed. On balance it seems that the FALN actions more likely damaged their cause than bolstered it -- particularly with the important campesino population. There is good reason to believe that the Venezuelan government will not be deceived by this temporary shift in tactics. The very success of the counter-insurgency program seems to have whetted the government's appetite for winding up the Communist threat. The problems which remain, however, are impressive. A band of only a few guerrillas can gun down a traffic policeman or blow up an isolated pipeline with relative immunity. And the essential source of Communism, the universities and liceos, re- mains as acute a problem as ever, especially since 50% of the nation's population is now under the age of 20. Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 I Apvfor Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061 CPYRGHT [Summary of Government program presented to the National Assembly on 3 November by Premier Demirel] 25X1C10b We heartily believe that a transition period has been concluded and a new era, filled with light and hope, has opened in Turkey. This era will be created and survive as the joint work of all citizens, without regard to parties and factions. The main effort of our government in the political field will be directed at achieving this end. We rely on the Turkish nation and its faith in us to discharge these re- sponsibilities. We are also confident that we shall derive strength from the constructive criticism and timely warnings of other parties with whom we have entered the service of the nation under this roof at the same time as ourselves. It is our inalterable aim to implement our constitution in the letter and in the spirit. We consider it a leading duty to preserve the Ataturk re- forms in every way. A dignified and secure life can only be accomplished under a democratic regime and we consider the smooth operation of a regime of freedom in our country as the crux of the whole problem. Security and Freedom of Individual. We believe that the chief duty of the state lies in safeguarding the security of life and property of the citizen, and his freedom to work and to travel, and in preserving the security and peace of the country. It is necessary to bolster the authority of the po- lice and the gendarmerie, to promote reciprocal respect and trust in their relations with the people, and to strengthen the inadequately staffed ranks of the security forces in city centers and remote areas of the country. We shall always dwell sensitively on the question of rendering beyond suspicion the impartiality of the administration. Current expenditures of the public sector amount to an important slice of our budget and national income. We shall bring security of service to the mass of civil servants. One of our leading goals lies in the reorganization of the administration and, to develop independent rural administrations -- within the bounds of existing laws -- so as to provide speedy and effective services to the population. "It will be our most important duty to apply our laws in a manner befitting their aims and spirit to save our regime and security from being hurt by any kind of harmful tendencies -- particularly procommunist activities -- that were long known to operate by stealth but which recently were observed to have taken to open action, and never to allow freedoms deriving from the constitution to be used to annihilate freedom itself." (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 CPYR(4 roved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Freedom of Religion. Our government regards the freedom of religion and the freedom of worship as a natural right of the citizen and be- lieves that this right, like other natural rights, comes under the protection of our constitution. "Our government holds the belief that freedom of worship -- closely tied with the freedom of religion -- is among the most natural rights of citizens. It is not possible to in- terpret the principle of secularism of the constitution as aimed at suppressing the religious needs of the citizens and as restricting the freedom of religion and worship as well as of religious instruction." Freedom of Press. "In the past 29 years there have been important changes and developments in the Turkish press, and the Turkish press has come face to face with tough problems. We believe that the state must help out in solving these problems, without casting a shadow on the freedom of the press. It will be the greatest privilege for us to be a supporter of our press -- the greatest guarantee of a free society and of the democratic system -- in every way. We shall include in our legislation measures be- fitting the social security needs -- including unemployment insurance -- of the members of the press. The state will give the necessary support to render the distribution of newspapers more speedy, consistent, and rational. We are convinced of the necessity of an amnesty in offences connected with the press. Election Procedures. "While preserving the proportional representation system in the election of National Assembly deputies, we intend to submit to this great assembly a draft to prevent the defects clearly observed at the recent application of the electoral law and to return the Senate elec- tions to the majority system. "At the same time we shall improve legislation to regulate the present status which in practice subjects our country to the throes of elections every year in such a manner as to enable elections to be held once every two years at least." We shall change the basis of the implementation of our penal code from punishment to reform and education. Fiscal Policy. Our fiscal policy aims at increasing national savings to help in a speedy economic reconstruction, to prevent imbalances such as inflation and deflation in the economy, and to insure the distribution of increased national income among citizens in accordance with the principles of social justice. We shall subject to a detailed review our direct and indirect taxation systems and dwell on eliminating any aspects of taxation that have a nega- tive influence on production in general. We believe that we should improve the method of carrying out the provision of taxation laws. "We are determined to stop the rise of public spending, both in volume and in percentage of national income, and to put an end to a budget policy of high expenditures and costs." (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 ~gl For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 We shall operate state economic establishments in a more efficient manner and insure their working toward creating greater economic resources for our reconstruction. We shall insure that those of the state economic es- tablishments that no longer need to be under state control may be gradually passed to the control of the population and become their property as hold- ings companies. "We shall take in hand our foreign exchange legislation and the machinery for the preservation of Turkish currency -- the principles of which were laid down 25 years ago, but which remain essentially unchanged today. We shall attenuate and liberalize -- to the extent that we may improve our balance of payments -- the controls and restrictions in current transac- tions and capital movements." We shall make the necessary contributions from the state budget to meet the needs of local administrations and municipalities which have insuf- ficient sources of income to meet the services they have undertaken to perform. "In the matter of monetary and credit policy, we shall follow the road of holding ready for placing at the service of the economy pay- ment media in sufficient volume to meet the needs of the reconstruction and to preserve the internal fiscal stability of the country. We shall rearrange and reinforce -- in the light of past experience -- the credit control media of our central bank." Economic Reconstruction. We believe that our economic reconstruction can only be achieved in freedom. Our efforts in economic reconstruction aim at a speedy increase in per capita income, at a balance between regions and groups, and at the preservation of the stability of our economic and social order. "We strongly oppose the authoritarian mentality that turns individuals into slaves of the political authority under the pretext of economic re- construction and considers individuals a raw material that can be used without regard to sentiment." The path of the modern Turkish state will be entirely different from the methods of 19th Century capitalism. At the same time, this path also is quite different from the hardened be- liefs and systems of dogmatic socialism and communism that have been proven as ineffective in the solution of complex problems. Therefore, we believe in a system which does not pit the individual and the state against each other but insures their cooperation. "We oppose the view that a mixed economy is a transition period toward a system of full statism, or into full collectivism. All economies in the world are mixed economies. In our concept of the mixed economy, the eco- nomic activities of the state and the public sector are obliged to help and support the citizen in his efforts to achieve happiness and prosperity." 3 (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 CPYRGHT We believe that planned reconstruction is a constitutional institution and that the democratic planning technology is a very effective method in economic reconstruction. "We do not believe that there is any con- nection -- either in application or in mentality or theory -- between planning in democratic countries and statism. "We do not share the outlook that considers the plan as a pretext for irresponsibility, inactivity, and for turning one's back to the needs of the citizen." We consider the plan as a national document to be voluntarily accepted by the people as their own. Under a democratic regime and in an economic structure based on the machinery of the mar- ket, planning should be a guide, an illumination, and a spur to the private sector. "A plan that dictates is incompatible with democratic principles and the rule of the constitution." Industrialization. The speedy industrialization of Turkey will be one of the chief goals of our economic policy. We shall establish industrial regions and provide low cost land and buildings to investors in these re- gions. We shall work for the establishment and development of capital markets to assist in the financing of large investments. Cottage Industries. Attending to the difficulties and problems of cot- tage industries and minor industries which play an extremely important role in our country will be one of our main duties. The basis of our policy toward this duty: to facilitate the acquisition of machinery and tools by craftsnic.n, to assist in the acquisition of raw materials at a lower price, to assist in marketing and exports, to establish pro- totypes so as to control quality of products, to give every assistance for small businessmen and craftsmen to acquire their own homes and busi- ness premises, and finally to bring this community of workers within the provisions of the social security system. We shall continue expanding our factories for the production of cement, sugar, paper and fertilizer and we shall establish new ones where neces- sary. We shall take necessary measures designed to assist in supplementing im- ports and saving foreign exchange by making greater investments in vari- ous fields such as liquid fuels, iron and steel, motorized transportation, the oil industry, the aluminum industry, and the paper industry, and the chemical industry. We shall begin work immediately for the establishment of a third iron and steel works." Social Security and Unemployment. To save the citizens from worrying about the future is the basis of our social security ideal. "An unemploy- ment insurance system will be established." Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 CPYRGHT "In our view social justice does not mean citizens enjoying or being made to enjoy -- equal status in poverty and misery. It means insuring that everybody receives a fair share of the increasing income and rising prosperity, commensurate with his ability and the service he performs. Government efforts to secure social justice through the abolition of private ownership and by conducting a policy of enmity toward wealth and the distribution of accumulating income and capital among individu- als today have been relinquished even in the most doctrinaire countries. To implement social justice the modern state has under its disposition a number of tools, such as expanding social services in the service of the people, free trade unionism, the establishment of wages and profit sharing through collective bargaining, and so forth. "The greatest injustice and inequality today is that of unemployment, without a doubt. Therefore, we believe that a policy that creates a large volume of work and opens up employment opportunities for the masses is a policy that will stop unemployment -- the greatest source of misery and the greatest instance of inequality in our community." There are great differences in living and working conditions between many parts of the country, particularly in the eastern and southeastern regions. n increase in the prosperity of our people in poor regions will be pos- sible by increasing industrial investments in these areas. Transportation. Our government will attach great importance to the im- provement and expansion of our highways, railroads, ports, and airports. "The implementation of the project of the Istanbul Straits bridge, which will serve the important duty of securing a highway link between Asia and Europe, will be taken into consideration. The construction of the ferry- oat service installations on both sides of Lake Van and the railroad line etween Van and the Iranian border will be rapidly continued." oreign Capital Investment. The historic experiences of other nations and our very own experience clearly show the role and benefit of foreign capi- tal in economic reconstruction. No nation in history has been able to achieve a speedy reconstruction on the basis of the principle of autarky. "Today, almost all the underdeveloped countries are engaged in speeding p their development through foreign aid and foreign capital from one bloc or another. Recently we witnessed the sight of certain collectivist eastern European countries joining this movement in trying to secure capital from western countries. In the present phase of our economic reconstruction we ieed to supplement our internal resources by foreign capital in the form of foreign exchange, in the proportion of one part of foreign capital to four to five parts internal resources. "Turkey is obliged to continue to make use of foreign capital for some ime to come. Actually, there is no case of an autarkic policy based on economic chauvinism and a closing of borders to foreign trade and to the 5 (Cont.) A CPYR6Arroved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 flow of foreign capital being followed anywhere in the world today. The main goals of such organizations and institutions as GATT, the Interna- tional Trade and Tariff agreement, the International Monetary Fund, the European Economic Reconstruction Organization, and the Common Market -- in which Turkey currently participates as a member -- envisage the eco- nomic cooperation of our nation with the other countries on the widest possible scale. "As economic development speeds up so do foreign capital movements take place across the borders. Therefore, the movement of opposing foreign capital that certain circles in our country are trying to instigate is compatible neither with our short term reconstruction projects nor with the foundation-'goals of economic units such as the Common Market which we are preparing to join as a long-term aim. To speed up its economic reconstruction, Turkey is obliged to develop its foreign trade quickly and to strengthen its foreign exchange reserves by balancing its foreign payment deficits. We consider opposition to foreign capital as opposition to the speedy re- construction of the country and to the establishment of closer economic, commercial, and technical ties between Turkey and the Western World. National Resources: Oil. "The basis of our oil policy is this: To meet the country's complete needs for oil and oil products from our own na- tional resources as soon as possible; to save the great sums paid abroad for the importation of oil; and to turn Turkey, in a short time, into a exporter of crude and refined oil and oil products. Our oil resources will be developed -- taking all measures dictated by national interests. The investment of adequate and productive investments in areas of activity -- such as the determination of oil reserves, prospecting, production, transport, processing, and distribution of oil -- will be encouraged. "A new national refinery will be established to enable us to stop import- ing refined oil and to import crude oil from the most advantageous sources. "The oil we shall be obliged to import until national output reaches a level sufficient to meet national needs will be purchased at the most suitable prices possible. Priority will be given to investments in the petrochemical and artificial fertilizer industries to enable us to make use of oil industry byproducts. The construction of the oil pipeline will be quickly completed and our domestic oil production, which has been re- stricted by road transport, will be rapidly increased." Mining A new mining law will be prepared and brought to the assembly in the shortest possible time to encourage the development of mining in our country. A mining bank will be established. Unsatisfactory production will be replaced by high-productivity and high-capacity modern production. A long-term and comprehensive program will be drawn up to prevent the ob- jectionable use of wood and organic fertilizer for fuel and to use coal and oil products. 6 (Cont.) Approved or Release Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9 CPYRGHT "We consider it the most hallowed of all national duties to assist and support our armed forces to perform their noble duty in tranquillity -- removed from all kinds of political influence and currents and with- in their own order and command setup -- to defend the security of the country and of democracy. We shall take every measure to enable our armed forces to develop in accordance with modern practices and needs and to enable them to reach a satisfactory level of efficiency. Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050006-9