MEDIA LINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400010024-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: August 29, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/28: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400010024-2
SECRET
Media Lines
29 August 196E
"THE WORKING PRESS", Ruth Adler, ed. 287 pp. Putnam, New York, 1966.
$5.95. -- This is a collection of brief ar-hicles, originally prepared for
TIMES TALK, the house organ of THE NEW YORK TIMES. It tells how TLMES re-
porters gather the news, the difficulties-they have to overcome and how they
perform under emergency conditions (President Kennedy's assassination, Black=
out in New York, Sinking of the Andrea Doria, and others). Thq book conveys
a very lively behind-the-scenes picture of how a newspaper of the size, cir-
culation and the financial means of THE NEW YORK TIMES operates. Journalism
is practiced differently in other countries and few, if any, fa reign papers
can afford to send their own reporters (by chartered plane, if .necessary) to
any part of the world to obtain first-hand coverage of "all the news that's
fit to print." Moreover, the articles, though lively and very- readable --
some dramatic, some informative, a few quite odd --, do not add up to a text-
book of journalism: no attempt has been-made, to go seriously into the sub-
stance of the stories covered or to proceed methodically from-local events
to national and international policy developments. Nevertheless, editors and
other journalists are likely to enjoy this ":inside story." (Unclassified)
THIRTY-FIVE MILLION COPIES OF MAO. (Unclassified) According to a
recent New China News Agency dispatch, the Chinese government plans to
print 35,000,000 sets of "The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tun " (four volumes,
1,520 pages, price undisclosed), and to cease printing nearly all other books
for the next 17 months in order to accomplish the feat. This is expected to
place Selected-Works next to the Bible as the all-time best seller. (Of
course one wonders how many Chinese will actually read Selected Works.)
The recently deposed Vice Minister of Culture, Chou Yang, is reported to
have speculated, shortly before his dismissal, that very few Chinese had
read Mao~s collected works.
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29 August 1966
Also Symbol FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF
Of Despotism BERLIN WALL MARKED
AS ADMLSSION OF COM-
MUNIST FAILURE
On 13 August the Ber-
lin Wall erected .by-the Communist
East German regime was five years
old. Attention is invited to the
article on page 13 of the 4 August
PRESS COMMENT, "'Crimes' of East
Germans Listed" by Harry Ellis of
the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. He
notes'. that an East German corporal
had received from his government a
gold watch, cash payment,~a special
furlough, and a proclamation as a
hero for "but a few minutes work,"
having shot and killed an East Ger-
man citizen trying to escape to the
West.
Another report by Ellis, car-
ried .in the 2 August issue of-his
paper, notes that since the Wall
was erected 139 East Germans have
been killed attempting to es-cape:
71 in Berlin and 68 along the East-
Wes~t German interzonal border.
From August 1961 to the end of
1965, Ellis reports, 1,957 East
German soldiers and policemen fled
to the West. Thus far this year
58 soldiers have crossed the front-
ier, in addition to a slightly
smaller number in the Berlin area.
In a somewhat conflicting re-
port, the N.Y. TIMES on 3 August
reported-that 58 East Germans have
been killed, 54 wounded, and more
than 2,200 caught and arrested
since the Wall was erected,-while
466 East German guards escaped by
scaling the Wall.
Briefly Noted
Whatever the exact figures are
-- West Berlin police say it is im-
possible to establish them -- the
Wall today stands as mute testimony
to the fai,]~ure of Communism in East
Germany and a continuing example of
the Moscow-supported regime's in-
humanity and disregard for the legi-
timate rights and aspirations of the
German people. We recall that prior
to the erection of the Wall about
3.5 million East Germans chose to
leave their homes rather than live
under the despotic Ulbricht regime,
and we look forward to the day when
the East Germans will once again be
allowed to express their individual
preferences in a free society.
50X1-HUM
' w ~. w w
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~~ y n~ i G7 nuyu5 i i 7uv
CHINA'S EDUCATIONAL UPHEAVAL
SITUATION: On the 13 of June-1966 the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) Central Committee signaled the beginning of a radically new educa-
tional system affecting the lives of over a million senior middle school
students with this simple announcement:
"Tn order to carry out-the cultural revolution
thoroughly and completely reform the educational
system, it has been decided to reform the entrance
exam~,nation methods of higher education institutes
and to postpone the 1966 student enrollment pro-
grs,m for half a year . "
A month later (12 July) more details on the educational reform were
published by the People's Daily (Jen-min Jih-pao, the CCP's central organ)
in a letter presumably written to order by seven students. The letter was
addressed to Chairman MA.O and-the Central Committee of the CCP and eon-
tamed additional proposals for educational reform so drastic and far-
reaching that, if carried-out, they would eradicate from China's schools
most subjects and elements which the free world considers indispensable 50X1-H U M
for producing intellectually trained and productive citizens,-
The only firm steps actually taken at this writing to set the reforms
in motion have been the six-month postponement in the enrollment of the
1966 freshmen class at the universities and the retention~'of-.high school
and university students at their schools for indoctrination instead of
the usual working "vacation." Specifics coming to light on changes in
the entrance examination system (in part the reason for the six-month en-
rollment delay) show them to be rig-idly political. At their most extreme
the proposed reforms could shelve entrance examinations entirely and select
instead new college freshmen on the grounds of their class background and
ideological purity. The- student of bourgeois background or leaning-will'
presumably be left to fend for himself which may mean - without the neces-
sary party recommendation. - that his chances for higher education in China
are non-existent.
?~students have been actually restricted and the university areas closed
themselves. 50X1-H U M
SECRET
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The present system of examinations, although subjected to constant
reform since 19+9, has remained fairly impartial and has tended to give
preference to academic quality over social origin and to knowledge over
political leanings. However, after the 1955-57 "reforms" (see unclassi-
fied attachment) the percentage of students of bourgeois origin in uni-
versities had dropped to 50 per cent by 1959/60 and three years later
had dropped to 33 per cent. The newest reforms will open the university
doors to students of worker and peasant origin regardless of grades or
examination records, or even failure to graduate from high school.
The waiving of high school diplomas or entrance examinations for
young peasants, workers and demobilized soldiers has received the most
publicity to date, but the other proposed educational reforms, again all
attributed to students, are alarming in the extreme. They include recom-
mendations that liberal arts, agricultural and even scientific courses
be severely curtailed; that professors hold shorter classes in order to
teach twice as many students; that less emphasis be placed on reading
books and more on learning through physical labor; that political con-
siderations outweigh academic achievement in giving scholastic marks;
and that faculty titles be abandoned as were ranks in the armed forces.
As a grim harbinger of what may be expected in the future the seven
letter-writing students accused "certain authorities" (presumably uni-
versity presidents and faculties) of having thwarted the rise of a second
revolutionary generation (modeled on MAO and his Long March companions)
and of having created an "abyss" between the proletariat and the academic
youth. These accusations appear to be storm signals for increasing criti-
cism and further purges of teachers, professors and school officials de-
spite the 8 August Central Committee directive to party officials to mod-
erate their approach to students and teachers who have so far borne the
brunt of the cultural purge. There have already been repercussions at
the universities related to the educational reform which are similar to
those which cropped out during the 1955 and 19 reforms disorders
arrests, general unrest, and several suicides
50X1-HUM
~rnncr i i
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C, V, n t ~:
29 August 1966
SOVIET INDUSTRY'S GROWTH RATE
CONTINUES TO DECLINE
SITUATION: In spite of Soviet expressions of satisfaction with the
achievements of the economy during; the first half of 1966, recent sta-
tistics show that the growth rate of industrial production is still
falling. Furthermore, there is no sign that the downward trend of the
last 10 years will soon be reversed. Although many reasons for the
existence and continuance of this-trend can be found, the Soviets can
offer no valid excuses for their inability to make adequate progress
toward their oft-stated goal of rapid industrial advance.
Brezhnev, speaking at the 23rd Party Congress in A~Iarch 1966, noted
the official disappointment over industrial performance, which had been
fore-shadowed in September 1965 in a major speech when Kosygin had
pointed to shortcomings in the application of scientific and technical
advances to industry and also the outdated management, planning, and
incentive in effect in industry. The concern of the Soviet leaders was
undoubtedly spurred by the downward course of the rate of industrial
growth, which is estimated as follows':
1951-55' 11% per annum
1956--58: g 1/2% per annum
1959-61: 8 1/2% per annum
1962-65: less than 7 1/2% per annum
50X1-HUM
These growth rates differ from the rates stated by the Soviets because
of the flaws in Soviet calculations of what they term "gross industrial
production." The Soviets employ a statistical technique which permits
double--counting, i.e., the inclusion of both the value of semi-manu-
factures or intermediate products as such, as well as the total value of
the final product which is made of one or more semi-manufactures. For
instance, the Soviets count the value of cement as a product of the cement
industry, and the total value of concrete structures which again includes
the cost of the cement; Western economists place a value only on the
finished product. Western economists find that the Soviet method imparts
an upward bias of 2% to 3% per annum to the growth rate. Of particular
interest in this connection is the reported statement of a prominent
SECRET 50X1-HUM
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In the first half of 1966 Soviet industrial production was only about
6%~'~' greater than in the same period of 1965.
Th.e causes of the downturn in Soviet industrial growth are,
essentially, continuing inefficiency and the increasing difficulty of
finding new ways to stimulate productivity gains. The generally poor
planning and the inherently crude, unresponsive management of the
Soviet economy -- notably the investment program -- are widely recog-
nized by Soviets and foreign observers. Other influences have included:
waning opportunities to "borrow" Western=developed technology; a decline
in the previously high rate of growth of the general level of education;
agricultural shortfalls which limited the supply of goods to the food
and consumer goods industries; the shortening of the work week from 46
to 41 hours in the late 1950's; increased production of machinery for
military and space programs; disappointing results from the operation
of new industrial plants.
All this has resulted in a sharp drop in the rate of increase in
the productivity of labor and capital. The estimated growth trends in
the combined index of the productivity of these two factors of pro-
duction are~'~*:
1951-55: 4.5% per annum
1956-58: 5.7% per annum
1959-61: 5.4% per annum
1962-63: 2.2% per annum
1964-65: l.l% per annum
Soviet leaders and economists have long been aware of the need to
take decisive steps to arrest the downturn and restore the pace of
industrial development to that of the late 1950's.
~ (Cont.) Soviet economist, A.G. Aganbegyan, that Western economists, and
specifically CIA analysts, possess better data on the USSR than do Soviet
eeonomi st ~-.
~'~' Adjusted from the Soviets' announced figure of 8 percent for the.
increase in gross industrial production. This 8 percent figure can be
comna'directl~r with an increase of 9.3 percent in the first half of
1965 over the first half of 1964.
~'~'~' These estimates have been painstakingly arrived at by competent
Western economists who apply methodology worked out by, among others,
E.F. Denison.
2 50X1-HUM
crrncr
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JC41{CI
Towards this end Kosygin, at the CPS'Ufs Central Committee Plenum. in
.September 1965, proposed a series of reforms in economic organization
which would lead away from tight central direction of the economy and
toward a market socialism (featured, i.a., by realistic prices and the
allowance of greater play of the forces of supply and demand). Whereas
it is still too early to make a firm judgment of the effectiveness of
the measures taken so-"'far, it is nevertheless clear to well-informed
Western economists that the inifial'steps have been too timid and made=
quate to accomplish the stated purposes.
3 50X1-HUM
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