MALI: ANOTHER BROKAEN SHOWCASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1C10b
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March 1869
MALI: ANOTHER BROKEN SHOWCASE.
Since the early 1g6O's the phrase "West African Radicals" has become
the figure of speech used to describe the original leaders of that amalgam
known as Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. The African Radicals were those who
tried to keep equidistant from Moscow and Peking. Their radicalism was a
mixture of Marxist-Maoist slogans and "scientific socialism" heavily
trimmed with African culture, nationalism and anti-imperialism.
Now, at the end of the 196O's, only one of these former radical
leaders remains in power in West Africa: Sekou~Toure in Guinea.
Ghana extricated herself in February 1866 and Mali in November 1968
and joined those developing countries which try to stay uncommitted
between the Western and Communist alliances. Both former heads of
state, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Modibo Keita in Mali, are looked
to as symbolizing the "struggle for freedom from colonialism"; both
were victimized by a slow and subtle Communist subversion which led
their countries to economic chaos and which facilitated their own
overthrow by military coup.
Both Ghana and Mali went under in what President Nyerere of
Tanzania (himself a potential victim) described in 1863 as "the
second scramble for Africa." Dr. Banda, President of Malawi, has
dubbed the scramble as being on.e "not so much for the body of Africa
as for its soul." Both Ghana and Mali were losers in a Sino-Soviet
poker game in which "foreign aid" was used as chips.
The case of Ghana is public knowledge and Nkrumah's rule is
now synonymous with Communist (Soviet) exploitation designed to
foster the spread of militant revolution throughout Africa. The
story of Keita's eight-year flirtation with socialism is not as well
known. It is a story worth telling -- especially in the context
of Sino-Soviet designs on West Africa. The story warrants publi-
cizing throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America: the locale
could shift, the characters change, but the scenario would remain
basically the same.
Republique du Mali
The Republic of Mali became independent on 22 September 1860.
In December 1958, leaders of the French West African territories met
to decide various aspects of their future. Some leaders favored
forming a federation to recreate the old Mali empire which had
played an important part in northwest Africa in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. Disagreements arose over attitudes to be
adopted towards Pan-Africanism, positive neutrality, relations with
the Soviet Union, and a number of other matters. The outcome was
that the "grand" federation was not created, but, instead, Senegal
and the (French) Sudan formed the smaller, but still territorially
large, "Federation of Mali."
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Modibo Keita, a Moslem and a descendant of the emperors of
ancient Mali, was already the undisputed leader of the (French)
Sudan. Keita became Prime Minister of the Mali Federation and
Mamadou Dia, of Senegal, Deputy Prime Minister. The two had little
in common: Keita pushed for neutrality and Dia for closer ties
with France. Within months, the Federation was dissolved and the
independent state of Senegal and the Republic of Mali went their
separate ways.
Within twelve months, the USSR, Communist China, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Mongolia
had established diplomatic missions in Bamako and Modibo Keita had
begun accepting blandishments and advice from the Communist world.
In addition, Mali's ruling party, the Union Soudanaise, was
represented at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU), held in 1961. It was at this Congress that
the ruling parties of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali were introduced as
"national democratic parties" which had identified themselves with
the Communist cause.
The Phenomenon of Competitive Subversion
As early as the 1960 Moscow World Congress of Communist and
Workers Parties, a new type of state concept emerged which was accept-
able to Communist doctrine and applicable to the developing countries.
They were to be known as "autonomous states of national democracy"
and were defined as those states which: fought imperialism (that is,
tree West), opposed (Western) military bases on their soil, gave full
democratic rights to the people (that is local Communist Parties,
fronts and labor groups), and showed their readiness to introduce
democratic (that is, socialist) reforms that would pave the way for
Cammunism. However, even though the Congress delegates were all
good Communists, it proved impossible to keep quiet all members of
all delegations and it soon became known that it was the Soviets who
sponsored the concept of "national democracy" and the Chinese who
opposed it.
The divergence between Moscow and Peking, however, was only
tactical. Soviet theorists hoped that once a State embarked on a
"non-capitalist" path of development, it would eventually turn
Marxist. Mao Tse-tong, from his own experience, could not believe
in the two-stage revolutionary process and supported (and supports)
firm Communist control over revolutionary development and its expan-
sion into non-Communist countries by a militant-revolutionary vanguard.
However, there was (and is) no conflict between Chinese and Sov~,et
views when it came to the goal of cultivating and manipulating the
emerging revolutionary leaders to foster socialism and to facilitate
the spread of Communism.
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As a further refinement of the Soviet approach, the Moscow
Institute for World Econorr~y and International Relations in 1961 split
the developing countries into six groupings. The division was to
serve as a, guideline for the Soviet Union's differentiated political
approach to each delineated group. The nations evaluated as "the
most promising" from the standpoint of Soviet policy were those in
"Group Four" which included Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. They were the
countries where the leaders already were constructing a national
democratic nation and where there existed a "proletariat that is
becoming class conscious," As the case of Mali shows, the Chinese
did less theorizing than the Soviets, but sometimes proved themselves
more opportunistic in exploiting situations unforeseen in textbooks.
The "Aid" Agreements
The initial Mali-Soviet aid agreement for a loan of $~+~+ million,
at a 2.5 per cent interest rate, was signed 18 March 1961; it was
later increased to $61 million. To implement the agreement, some-
where between 300 and x+00 Soviet (and other Bloc) technicians came to
Mali. They surveyed for many projects: a roadbed for a rail line
to give Mali an independent (of Senegal) link to the sea; for oil, gold,
diamonds, and cement; and for development of the Niger River along
125 miles, including technical surveys for hydroelectric projects.
The railroad project was dropped and no oil, diamonds, or gold were
reported found.
Also during 1961 Mali contracted for a small number of Soviet
military trucks, jeeps, and small arms. Capital goods outlay from
the economic aid agreement went into the building and equipping of a
technical high school for 300 students and the allocation of $10
million for agricultural development, including equipment and a
Polytechnical and Agricultural Institute.
In Bamako, the Soviets built a small-scale impact project: a
25,000-seat stadium. Completed in 1967, the stadium was to be the
home of the 1969 Pan-African Gamesa For Mali, with her minuscule
reserve of technically qualified indigenous personnel, the "technical
services" debt to the USSR for all the surveys described above was
inordinately high and consumed a large share of the original outlay
of Soviet credits. Therefore, while the stadium is for Maligns a
symbol of pride, its presence and construction under Soviet auspices
(and with the use of Soviet credits) is illustrative of an "aid
project" hardly guaranteed to ease Mali's indebtedness to the USSR.
Indonesia, the UAR, Algeria, Burma, and Congo (Brazzaville) also
have at various times been placed in the Group Four, most "promising"
category.
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Mali's airline also received Soviet assistance and promptly went
into competition with the Soviet-aided Air Guinea. From the USSR,
Mali bought Soviet-built transports, including some IL-18 transports
that were so costly to run that the Soviet's initial subsidy of $6.~+
had to be increased the following year to $11 million. Granted that
some of Air Mali losses resulted from inept management and Mali's
insistence on a Bamako-Paris air link, but it was primarily Soviet
bungling of aircraft maintenance problems that caused Mali, by 1965,
to try and get the USSR to take back these same transports.
By an agreement concluded February 1961, Communist China had
been the first to promise substantial financial aid to Mali. However,
handicapped by a lack of available funds, as compared to the USSR,
the Chinese aid agreement was limited to $20 million -- but it was
interest-free. Of an additional $20 million extended by Communist
China in 196+, only about one-fifth of the amount had been seen in
Mali by mid-1967,
Early Chinese aid focused on the "agrarian class" (viewed as
part of the militant revolutionary vanguard) and Chinese technicians
devoted their efforts to building up sugar, cotton, tea, and rice
production. There has been no official nose count of the Chinese in
Mali under this early agreement, but it was undeniably the largest
Chinese mission in Africa -- at one early point numbering over 1,200.
I:t was once reported that the Chinese had proposed establishing
agricultural communes in Mali in which Chinese peasants would live
and work together with an equal number of Malian peasants.
In 1962, in a burst of nationalist enthusiasm President Keita
removed Mali from the West African Monetary Union, whose currency
was guaranteed by France, and established his own currency. In
foreign trade, the emphasis shifted to barter arrangements made
with Keita's new Communist trade partners. At the same time, 23
State enterprises were set up to run Mali's economy and industry.
But without experienced management or reserves of convertible cur-
rency to back it up, the Mali franc could not cope with Mali's
growing adverse trade balance and the need to service loans. The
barter deals prevented Mali, for example, from taking advantage of
preferential prices offered by France for ground-nuts since so
much of the Mali crop had been mortgaged against machinery and
services.
More Improverished Than Independent
The pinnacle of Modibo Keita's socialist venture probably was
reached in 1965. That year he went to Moscow and signed up for a
50,000-ton capacity cement plant and a full-b]_own. Soviet military
aid program to equip his 3,500-man army with Soviet T-3~+ tanks,
armored cars, grenade launchers, and other prestige-value materiel,
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For his six-man air force, pilots to be trained in the USSR, he
purchased four fighter aircraft: one MIG-15 and three MIG-17's.
The glamor was slightly tarnished, however, as Keita's delegation
tried unsuccessfully to get the Soviet Union to take back the costly,
inefficient IL-14 and IL-18 transports they had previously bought
for Air Mali?
Keita's 1865 Moscow visit was also a political victory; his
Union Soudanaise was one of the first accepted by the CPSU as a
"fraternal unity part ." The two parties issued a joint statement
declaring that: "The CPSU and the Union Soudanaise Party are of the
opinion that the expansion of interparty relations, the reciprocal
acquaintance with each other's experiences in the building of the
state, the reciprocal study of methods of party work and reciprocal
exchange of information will serve to fortify cooperation between
the two parties." (Pravda, 12 October 1965)
To mold the development of Mali's unity party along proper lines,
the Soviets also agreed to build in Bamako, and give the equipment
for, a school to train administrators for the Union Soudanaise Party.
It was further agreed that when the Soviets began construction of the
school, fourteen leading functionaries of the Union Soudanaise should
go to Moscow for training at the CPSU party school.
Hard currency credits were extended to Mali in mid~1965 by
Communist China. The amount was unspecified, but described as
"substantial." The grant did not halt Mali's economic deterioration
and as is usually the case with unsuccessful aid projects, the
blame fell to the creditor -- in this case, the Soviet Union. SovQ~t
aid was not as helpful as had been originally anticipated. Air Mali
was nearly bankrupt and much Soviet agricultural equipment was
unsuited to the rigors of the tropical climate. Many of the Soviet
projects did nothing to help increase productive capacity and others
were abandoned because of faulty preliminary planning.
In June 1966 arrived the first consignments of military equip-
ment that the Soviets had promised in October 1965. Transport of
the shipment from the West African Coast into landlocked Mali was
only feasible by using the Senegal-Mali rail link. Since this
arrangement would have been politically impossible, Keita arranged
for shipment through Algeria. The equipment arrived, following a
1,400 mile trek across the Sahara desert, in somewhat less than optimum
condition.
By mid-1966, the Soviet aid program was being viewed more
realistically in Moscow and Soviet planners were increasingly
reluctant to undertake projects that had little long-term economic
justification. Mali was one country that felt the pinch. A Malian
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delegation that went to Moscow in May 1966 to procure additional
Soviet aid was unsuccessful and returned with only the promise that
a small hard-currency loan would be extended. In June 1966 Communist
China and Mali signed a new agreement providing for an additional,
but less substantial, hard currency loan.
Since the overthrow of Keita it has become known that Communist
China offered to guarantee Mali's financial independence if Mali
would accept China's advice regarding "the proper road to socialism"
in Africa. It is to President Keita's credit that he turned to Paris
rather than Peking to seek a way out of his financial disaster.
On 16 February 1967, the Malian government signed economic and
financial accords in Paris providing for Mali's eventual return to
the franc zone, but calling for strict economic and fiscal reforms,
while the French Treasury guaranteed the convertibility of the Malian
franc, In May, the value of the Mali franc was halved and the
country adopted an austerity budget.
But the financial agreements with France cooled neither the
fervor of "revolutionary consciousness" nor Keita's socialist
orientation. Youth demonstrations which started in July, perhaps
partly brought on by the national austerity program, served as the
impetus to purge the Union Soudanaise of "corrupt elements." On 22
August, President Keita announced that Mali. had reached a "dangerous
turning point," dissolved the Politburo of his Union Soudanaise, and
replaced it by a Comite National de Defense de la Revolution (CNDR).
Keita organized the new CNDR along more orthodox Communist lines
than he had its predecessor party. Keita took even more power into
his own hands by assuming the posts of President, Party General, and
Minister of Economy as well as of Defense. The same period saw the
beginning of the "People's Militia" and Keita took a page from Mao's
book of cultural revolution to instigate "Operation Taxi." The
revolution purged the old party of some 177 "corrupt" officials who
supposedly supplemented their incomes by owning taxis. The aim was
to replace ideological moderates with revolutionary purists.
Meanwhile, by mid-1967 only about one-fifth of the aid promised
by China in 196+ had been seen in Mali. During 1967 the Chinese did
complete several projects: a cinema, a motel, a sugar refinery, a
match factory, and a textile plant and had started building a rice
mill, As had been the case with Soviet undertakings, none provided
for repayment of loans much less guaranteeing any foreign exchange
income. For the match factory, Mali was dependent on China for sulphur
supplies -- and both the match factory and textile plant could be
competitive with similar plants built in Guinea by Communist China.
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The Coup
19b8 found Keita economically hamstrung by his "Communist partners"
and revealed him as a frightened victim of his political commitments.
Mali was the only African Government to publicly support the Soviet-led
invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20-21 August 19b8. The fact that Mali's
public endorsement was not announced until 3 September is clear evidence
that it was elicited under political pressure from the Soviet Union,
(In June 1967 Mali had been one of the few countries in the world to
publicly applaud Communist China's announcement of her first successful
hydrogen bomb test.)
Early in 1968 China picked up the option for the Mali-Guinea rail-
road and committed herself to do what everyone else, including the Soviets,
had decided was economically unsound. Moscow Radio called the Chinese
offer an "extravagant propaganda gesture." China's ability to deliver the
needed technical skill and raw materials (including steel) remains in
doubt. Meanwhile, the "agreement" opened the way for additional Chinese
"technicians" to enter West Africa by the hundreds.
Despite Keita's public statements that he was "determined to imple-
ment the monetary agreements signed with France," he did not implement
that part of the accords calling for elimination of the inefficiencies
of state enterprises. Mali's austerity program was in force -- but there
were no tangible results. Even a X30 million infusion of French funds and
the presence of a French expert in the Finance Ministry could not halt
the deterioration of the economy. By mid-November only $~+ million of
the French fund remained,
Immediately after the student demonstrations of July 19&7, President
Keita had declared that "militants should always be allowed to express
their opinions even if they are contrary to those of the party leaders."
Nevertheless, his next step was to establish the People's Militia and to
accept the proferred aid of Communist China to equip and train his youth-
ful militia. By November 1968, the army,..ncreasingly alarmed at the
growing strength and unwieldiness of the President's militia, saw that
militia as a threat to their own security. A spate of rumors concerning
the imminence of a new, widespread purge of government and military
figures very possibly led the army to fear the militia might move first
-- and so, the army acted on 19 November.
Suggested Reading, in addition to the attached press articles:
Kurt Muller, Foreign Aid Pro rams of the Soviet Bloc and Communist
China: An Analysis, Walker & Co, New York, 19 7
Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign. Aid, Frederick A. Praeger,
New York, 1967
Brian Crozier, The Stru le for the Third World, The Bodley Head,
London, 19 6
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