STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020010-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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..,.._. .._.y_ March 1969
STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER:
Soviet Military Now Appear
To Be Reaching For More Power
"...From the memoirs of these Soviet
military leaders, J. V. Stalin, for all
the complicated and contradictory nature
of his character, appears before us as an
outstanding military leader;."
Doctor of Historical Sciences E. Boltin,
"The Moving Pages of the Annals of the
Great Fatherland War," Moscow, Kommunist
No. 2, 1969.
With these words historian Boltin concludes a review of 6 books by
Soviet military men who were prominent in their country's victory over
Hitler's forces in 1941 to 1945. (See the attached chart for essential
details from the review.) Earlier in the article Boltin asserts: "these
books allow us to recreate the distinguishing traits of the supreme com-
mander [Stalin] as the leader of the Soviet Armed Forces in the war years.
Not a stone remains in place of the irresponsible statements [by Khrushchev]
about Stalin's lack of military competence, of the claim that he conducted
the war with the help of a globe, of his alleged absolute intolerance of
the opinions of others, and other fabrications of this kind which have
been grasped and spread by foreign falsifiers of history."
Although the reviewed books are not all new -- four were published in
1968, one in 1967, one in 1966 -- their current impact in the USSR is
expected to be great, For one reason, as Boltin avows, they are treated
as a collection of historical sources which "carry an enormous charge of
patriotic feelings and educate our people in loyalty to the ideas of
communism, love for the socialist motherland, and readiness to defend the
great revolutionary victories of the working people." A far more important
reason is that Boltin's commentary is carried in the most authoritative
theoretical journal of the CPSU; few of Kommunist's 760,000 subscribers
will miss the immediate point that the Party now officially and unequiv-
ocally endorses Stalin's wartime leadership.
Many will ask: What does this mean? Why now? After all, it was clear
to observers that de-Stalinization ran out of steam not long after
Khrushchev was overthrown. Moreover, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has
taken several tentative steps since May 1965 to rehabilitate Stalin as a
wartime leader and has, since March 1965, been engaged in a step-by-step
campaign to reverse the damage to the Party's image which resulted from
Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization. In so doing, the Party has
resorted increasingly to Stalinist techniques and attitudes in executing
its own internal policies.
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Clues -- but only clues -- to the answers to these questions are
contained in Boltin's article, in other articles in the same issue of
Kommunist, and in articles in other recent Soviet publications, especially
in the Red Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star).
Boltin's piece is remarkable in that the author offers little sub-
stantiating testimony from the six war memoirs for his sweeping conclusions:
--Three of the reviews quoted no statement concerning Stalin;
--One review noted only that the book's author, Marshal
Meretskov, worked with seven named persons, including Stalin;
?--The review of Yakovlev's book noted that the author, an
aircraft designer, judged from Stalin's directives and remarks
that the latter showed a detailed knowledge of aircraft technology
~-
and assisted specialists and designers in finding new solutions to
scientific and technical problems;
--Boltin's review of Shtemenko's book mentioned Stalin in only
one paragraph, in which he states that Shtemenko described the
style and methods of the Stavka (Headquarters) leadership, and the
"strict and meticulously observed order of work established by
J. V. Stalin," or how preliminary discussions were carried out
by a number of commands with "the firm decisions finally made by
the supreme commander [Stalin];" Boltin comments that Shtemenko's
description will aid researchers to correctly assess Stalin's role
in achieving victory.
In contrast to Boltin's leap to an unsubstantiated conclusion regarding
Stalin is his presentation of pertinent information and his cogent reasoning
on other subjects, for example, the steps by which the Soviet. Air Force
overcame initial Luftwaffe superiority. Another notable point is that
Boltin simply ignores Khrushchev's charges that Stalin's leadership left
the USSR poorly prepared for the war and that Stalin ignored clear warnings
of Hitler's impending invasion thus causing heavy losses early in the war.
Boltin also conveniently ignores current Defense Minister Grechko's very
unkind article about Stalin's war preparations which was published in a
historical journal in June 1966, the 25th anniversary of the outbreak of
the war. One has the impression that Boltin was under pressure to produce
an article proclaiming Stalin's rehabilitation as a wartime military leader;
this rehabilitation will probably be the only aspect of the article which
will be remembered.
In trying to rehabilitate Stalin as a military leader, Boltin often
appears to be grasping at straws in order to justify Stalin's military-
strategic leadership abilities. But there is no mention of Stalin's
greatest wartime accomplishment as a symbol to the Soviet people and
k
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troops as a cohesive, spiritual force. Boltin obviously cannot praise
or even refer to this aspect of Stalin's war role without opening a
Pandora's box -- that is, opening up the Cult of Personality to dis-
cussion and scrutiny.
Two other articles in the same issue of Kommunist are notable because
they also present favorable views of Stalin. One article, entitled "New
Comintern Document" (the reprint of a document dated 1 April 1936), goes
to some lengths to describe the then contemporary world situation and the
aims and demands of the World Communist Movement. The article sets off,
evidently for purposes of emphasis, the following quotation of Stalin and
the lessons that should be drawn:
"'War can break out unexpectedly. Nowadays war does not announce
itself. It simply begins' (Stalin). Above all, this demands from
the Communists a clear understanding of the dimensions and nature
of the threat of war, the orientation of all party organizations
to the struggle to preserve peace, elucidation of the basic
provisions of the present resolution to the mass of party members,
the party's mobilization from top to bottom for the immediate
carrying out of the instructions and lines of this resolution."
Besides suggesting that Stalin was, after all, aware of the approach-
ing war and was ordering Communists to prepare for it, the article also
notes that March 1969 marks the 50th anniversary of the founding of the
Comintern (Communist International) by V. I. Lenin. This was apparently
an introduction to what thus far promises to be a low-key celebration in
the USSR of the anniversary of an organization that was so markedly an
emanation of Stalin's power that it has rarely been mentioned in the Soviet
press in recent years. The Comintern was used as an instrument for enforc-
ing the support of all Communist parties for the policies and objectives
of the USSR.
Another article in this issue of Kommunist, entitled "Maoism and the
Anti-Marxist Essence of its 'Philosophy,'" by A. Rumyantsev, contains a
passage criticizing Nikolay Bukharin, whom Stalin had executed in 1938
and whom Khrushchev was reportedly preparing to rehabilitate before being
overthrown in October 1964. Rumyantsev terms Bukharin "one of the
propagandists of the 'Theory of Equilibrium' and an extremely active
opponent of the Marxist dialectics." Could this be the first sound to
be raised in favor of tempering the excorciation of Stalin for the terror
of the 1930's?
These articles, unusual though they may be, nevertheless have been
preceded by abundant signs of re-Stalinization since early 1965. The
Western press has analyzed this phenomenon in considerable detail. The
points most commonly cited as evidence of the recrudesence of Stalinism,
(any one of which could be discussed separately in extenso) seem to be the
following:
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--Repression of intellectuals (arrest and trials of writers,
harsh criticism of journalists and artists);
--Repression of national minorities (Ukrainians, Tadzhiks,
Balts, so-called Zionists);
--A clamp-down on political activities of scientists;
--Slow-down in economic reform (major elements of the pro-
gram are not being implemented, significant discussions of key
problems no longer appear in the economic press);
--Restoration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD);
--The Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty" (asserting
the "duty" of socialist forces to intervene in the affairs of a
socialist country which the socialist community deems threatened
by ideological subversion);
--Attacks on "Revisionism," specifically the Rumanian and
Yugoslav practice of Communism;
--The persistently expanding political role of the Soviet
military leaders.
Perhaps the most interesting and significant of these is the latter
development. Not only were the military prominent in Kommunist's
rehabilitation of Stalin as a wartime leader, but they themselves --
apparently in a bid for increased influence -- have contributed several
striking and probably controversial articles to recent Soviet military
publications. Most notable is one written by Major General Konstantin
S. Bochkarev, a military theoretician, in the 14 February issue of the
Ministry of Defense Daily Red Star. (Krasnaya Zvezda). Bochkarev takes
it upon himself to unequivocally support the Brezhnev Doctrine, declaring
that no country "can be independent of the basic reality of our time:
the division of the world into two antagonistic camps, socialist and
imperialist, and the fierce class struggle between them. And the
circumstance that in such conditions the side of the class barricades on
which a country finds itself in decisive measure determines its fate,
including the fate of its sovereignty." Elsewhere in the article
Bochkarev was clearly directing criticism, and possibly even implied
threats, to the Rumanians and Yugoslavs. Whereas Brezhnev, in his
speech of 12 November to the Polish Party Congress, allowed for some
transient differences among Communist Parties, Bochkarev said that
deviation of socialist countries from military unity was impermissible
and declared:
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"A Leninist understanding of internationalism is the guide
for all genuinely revolutionary parties of the working class.
It is precisely reflected in the CPSU program, in the decisions
of the 23rd CPSU Congress and of the CPSU Central Committee
Plenums, in the documents of the Moscow conferences of communist
and workers' parties, and also in the Bratislava declaration of
the leaders of the six socialist countries."
Bochkarev's comments were consistently on the militantly orthodox
side of issues he discussed. On the other hand, non-military media like
the government daily Izvesti.ya and the Labor daily Trud have been
taking relatively more moderate positions on controversial issues and
have been extremely tight-lipped in connection with the Brezhnev Doctrine.
The Soviet military have advocated -- albeit often only indirectly
-- their own parochial positions on major policy issues. For instance
major Moscow papers reported several paragraphs from Gromyko's 3 October
speech to the UN concerning strategic arms control and the USSR's will-
ingness to begin talks with the U.S. on this subject, whereas Red Star's
report on the Gromyko speech was edited to omit any mention of the
paragraphs on strategic arms limitation. A similar indication of military
opposition to arms limitation talks is seen in press coverage of a foreign
ministry statement urging prompt action on the. arms limitation talks in
January 1969. While the Moscow dailies published faithful accounts of
the statement, Red Star only published excerpts which failed to reflect
the note of conciliation which the statement as a whole contained and,
to the contrary, stressed international uncertainties and the need for
undiminished vigilance.
A less publicized article, but one which stresses an autonomous role
for the military in the Soviet society, was published in December 1968
in the journal Communist of the Armed Forces* and entitled "The
Contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs and the Combat Readiness of
the Armed Forces." Its author, Lt. Col. V. Bondarenko, writes:
",.. Inasmuch as the military field is a relatively
independent area of social life, it has its own logic of
development.
"... In some studies, the sole cause of the revolution
in military affairs is declared to be politics, and some-
times individual political organizations alone, or even
just their leaders. Such a viewpoint is untenable....
*Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil, the organ of the Main Political
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.
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"The radical upheaval in military affairs is a natural,
objective stage in the development of military science on
the one hand, as is the development of society (its
economic, scientific power and political aims) on the other.
Political organizations and their leaders can merely make
use of this objective process for their political purposes
(then their activity accelerates, 'organizes' the
revolutionary transformations in military affairs), or
conversely, fail to utilize the available opportunities
(then their activity retards the process of revolution-
ization of military affairs)."
There will undoubtedly be many interpretations of the real significance
of neo-Stalinism in the light of recent developments in the USSR. The
interest in the subject by free world observers is demonstrated by the
attention focused on the current prolonged absences of several Soviet
leaders believed to advocate moderate policies and the mysterious 22
January shooting at a motorcade of party and government leaders and
astronauts just inside the Kremlin's Borovitaky gates. Essential to any
analysis of, or conjecture on, the murky political scene in the USSR is
some understanding of the actual and potential role within Communist
Party councils of the top military group. Whereas information on this
subject is scarce and imprecise, it is nonetheless clear from develop-
ments since 196+ that the role of the military has expanded substantially.
And the recent documents cited above provide ominous indications that the
military are bidding for a still greater role.
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Excerpts from article "V.I. Lenin and the Defence of the Achievements
of Socialism: The Great International Duty" by Major General K. Bochkarev,
in Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) 14 February 1969.
...As the April 1968 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized,
because they are not resolved on an open global clash with the main
forces of socialism (but have not stopped preparations for this), the
imperialists resort increasingly to new and more refined methods of
struggle and to organizing ideological and political sabotage calcu-
lated to undermine the socialist world from within and disunite the
states that are part of it. Socialist bases and socialist principles
have never before been subjected to such a concentrated attack as at
present, and not only from imperialist ideologists but also from
revisionism, whose splitting activities are in essence a connivance
in the efforts of imperialism.
...Hostile forces aim their poisoned arrows against the fundamental
positions of Marxism-Leninism and against its doctrine on socialist
revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the nature and fea-
tures of the socialist system, and the leading role of the working
class and its communist vanguard.
...In the situation obtaining last August in Czechoslovakia, the
ideas raised up on the shield of the antisocialist forces served as
nothing more than a cover, a smokescreen, for the criminal plans and
actions of the counterrevolution. And in the face of a direct threat
to the cause of socialism, the question is resolved by real opposition
to those forces that hide behind this screen and mask themselves with
it.
-The stake on the virus of nationalism is one of the chief means of
diversionary activity of all. enemies of the socialist world. Modern
revisionism and the contemporary authors of "new models" for socialism
and of "national variants" of Marxism-Leninism are also nibbling at
this bait. And the right and "left" opportunists are essentially re-
peating in different ways the old subterfuge of Kautskiyism, which
replaced proletarian internationalism with embellished bourgeois na-
tionalism.
_The CPSU is doing everything necessary to consolidate the self-
dependence and sovereignty of the socialist states and resolutely
opposes interference in the internal affairs of any people or coun-
try. But here it also takes into account the fact that there exist
common interests of revolutionary struggle and common law-governed se-
quences for socialist building, and that a retreat from these can lead
to a retreat from socialism, the defense of which is the subject of
active concern by all the socialist countries. This position of our
party has found vivid expression in its attitude toward events in the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, toward the intrigues of hostile forces
against the socialist system in that country, intrigues which affect the
fundamental. interests of the entire socialist community.
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...As L.I. Brezhnev said at the Fifth PZPR Congress: "Let those who
are inclined to forget the lessons of history and who would like once
more to engage in recarving the map of Europe know that the frontiers
of Poland, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia, and any other country which is
a member of the Warsaw Pact are unshakable and inviolable. These fron-
tiers are protected by the entire armed might of the socialist community.
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Excerpts from Khrushchev's Secret Speech to the Twentieth
Congress of the CPSU, 24 February 1956.
When we look at many of our novels, films and historical
"scientific studies," the role of Stalin in the. Patriotic War
apears to be entirely improbable. Stalin has foreseen every-
thng. The Soviet Army, on the basis of a strategic plan
prepared by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called
`factivc defense," i.e., tactics which, as we know, allowed
the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stal :red. Using
such tactics, the Soviet Army, supposedly, thanks only to
Stalin's genius, turned the offensive and subdued the enemy.
the epic victory gained through the armed might of the
]znd of the Soviets, through our heroic people, is ascribed
iq}Athis type of novel, film and "scientific study" as being
cortipletcly due to the strategic genius of Stalin.
?'\Ve have to analyze this matter carefully because it has
a ;rcmendous significance not only from the historical, but
especially from the political, educational and practical
point of view.
What are the facts of this matter?...
During the war and after the war, Stalin put forward the
thesis that the tragedy which our nation experienced in the
first part of the war was the result of the "unexpected"
attack of the Germans against the Soviet Union. But, com-
rades, this is completely untrue.. .
Documents which have now been published show that
by 3 April 1941 Churchill, through his Ambassador to the
U.S.S.R., Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Ger-
mans had begun regrouping their armed units with the
intent of attacking the Soviet Union...
We must assert that information of this sort concerning
the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory
was coming in also from our own military and diplomatic
sources; however, because the leadership was conditioned
against such information, such data was dispatched with
fear and assessed with reservation. ,
Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary
steps were not taken to prepare the country properly for
defense and to prevent it from being caught unawares.
Did we have time and the capabilities for such prepara-
tions? Yes, we had the time and capabilities...
Mad our industry been mobilized properly and in time to
supply the Army with the necessary materiel, our wartime
losses would have been decidedly smaller. Such mobiliza-
tion had not been, however, started in time. And already'
in the first days of the war it became evident that our Army
was badly armed, that we did not have enough artillery,
tanks and planes to throw the enemy, back..
Shortly before the, invasion ' of the Soviet
Union by the Hitlerite Army, Kirponos, who was chief of
the Kiev Special Military District (he was later killed at
the front) wrote to Stalin that the German armies were at
the Bug River, were preparing for an attack and in the very
near future would probably start an offensive. In this con-
nection, Kirponos proposed that a strong defense be organ-
ized, that 300,000 people be evacuated from the border
Moscow answered this proposition with the asscrtion ti:
this would be a p.rovoo tion, that no preparatory defc,.i , -^
work should be undertaken at the borders, that the GGr-
mans were not to be given any pretext for the initiation of
military action against tis. Thus, our borders wer insuffi-
ciently prepared to repel the enemy.
When the fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet
territory and military operation had begun, Moscow issued
the order that the German fire was not to bc. returned.
Why? It was because Stalin, despite evident facts, thought
that the war had notyct started, that this was only a pro-
vocative action on thr, part of several undisciplined sections
of the German Army, and that our reaction might serve as
a reason for One Germans to begin the war..
As you see, everything was ignored: warnings of certain
Army commanders, declarations of deserters from the en-
emy array, and even the open hostility of the enemy. Is this
an example of the alertness of the chief of the party and of
the state at this particularly significant historical moment?
And what were the results of this carefree attitude, this
disregard of clear facts? The result was that in the first
hours and days the enemy destroyed in our border regions
a Iarge part of our Air Force, artillery and other military
equipment; he annihilated large numbers of our military
.cadres and disorganized our military leadership; conse-
quently we could not prevent the enemy from marching
deep into the country.. ,
Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to
the beginning of the war followed Stalin's annihilation of
many military commanders and political workers during
1937-1941 because of his suspiciousness and through slan-
derous accusations. During these years repressions were
instituted against certain parts of military cadres beginning
literally at the company and battalion commander level and
extending to the higher military centers; during this time
the cadre of leaders who had gained military experience in
Spain and in the Far East was almost completely liquidated.
All this brought about the situation which existed at the
beginning of the war and which was the great threat to our
Fatherland..
It would be incorrect to forget that, after the first severe
disaster and defeats at the front, Stalin thought that thi,
was the end. In one of his speeches in those days he said:
"All that which Lenin created we have lost forever."
After this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct
the military operations and ceased to do anything whatever.
He returned to active leadership only. when some members
of the Political Bureau visited him and told him that it was
necessary to take certain steps immediately in order to im-
prove the situation at the front.
Therefore, the threatening danger which hung over our
Fatherland in the first period of the war was largely due to
areas and that several strong points be organized there: the faulty methods of directing the nation and the party by
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Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real
situation which was developing at the front. This was nat-
ural because, during the wlhole. Patriotic War, he never
united any section of the front, or any liberated city except
for" one short ride on the Mozhaisk highway during a
stabilized situation at the front. To this incident were dedi
gated many literary works full of fantasies of all sorts and
many paintings. Simultaneously, Stalin was interfering
with operations and issuing orders which did not take into
consideration the real situation at a given section of the
front and which could not help but result in huge personnel
lasses.
` A,All the more shameful was the fact, that after our great
victory over the enemy which cost us so much, Stalin began
to downgrade many of the commanders who contributed
so much to the victory over the enemy, because Stalin ex-
eluded every possibility that services rendered at the fror,;
should be credited to anyone but himself.. .
And, further, writes.;Stalm:
"Stalin's military mal3tocship was displayed both in`de-
fense and offense. Cons le Stalin's genius enabled bolt to
divine the enemy's plan and defeat them. The battles in
which Comrade Stalin directed the Soviet armies are bril-
liant examples of operational military skill."
In this manner was Stalin praised as a strategist. Who
did this? Stalin himself, not in his role as a strategist but
in the role of an author-editor, one of the main creators
of his self-adulatory biography.. Such, comrades, are the
facts. We should rather say shameful,facts..
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Some Recent Articles on Re-Stalinization
and Neo-Stalinism
"Soviets Try To Rewrite Stalin Role" by Charlotte Saikowski, Christian
Science.Monitor, 18. December 1968
"Re-Stalinization In the Soviet Union" by Michael Csizmas, Der Klare
Blick (The Clear View), Bern, 13 November 1968
"Stalin-Type Prison Camps Still Exist In USSR" by Anatol Martchenko
Corrispondenza Socialista, Rome, October 1968
"Czechoslovak Reforms Squashed by Soviet Neo-Stalinism" by Kx
Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Zurich, 25 September 1968
"$taline Rehabilite?" Le Monde, Paris, 6 February 1969
"The Heirs of Stalin", by Frank Hardy, Sunday London Times, London,
8. December 1968
"Stalin depicted as father figure", from_Edmund Stevens - Moscow,
February 4+, London Times, London, 5 February 1969
"Resurrecting Stalin, Despite Khrushchev", by Theodore Shabad
New York Times, New York, 9 February 1969
"Neo-Stalinism gains in Soviet Union", by Paul Wohl, Christian
Science Monitor, 22 October 1968
"Moscow Is Returning To Stalinism" An analysis of Mr. Brezhnev's speech at
the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Poland, by K. Fillippas
Eleftheros Kosmos, Athens, 20 November 1968
"Neo-Stalinism * An Inside Report of the New Reign of Fear", Sunday
Times, London, 12 January 1969
"Stalin a War Hero Again" Party Assails Khrushchev's 'Inventions'
by Anatole Shub, Washington Post, Washington, D.C., 4+ February 1969
"Neo-Stalinism", by Alexander Korab, Hannoversche Allgemeine, Hanover,
Germany, 6 September 1968
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Books Reviewed by Dr. E. Boltin in his article "The Moving Pages of
the Annals of the Great Fatherland War," Moscow, Kommunist, No. 2, 1969.
a) Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, "The Caucasus Battle,"
424 pages, Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1967.
b) Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, "1945," 280 pages, Military
Publishing House, Moscow, 1966.
c) Marshal of the Soviet Union K.A. 'ieretskov, "Serving the People,
Memoirs," 464 pages, Political P;:::,lishing House, Moscow, 1968.
d) Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovs'>y, "Soldier's Duty,"
380 pages, Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1968.
e) Army General.S.M. Shtemen:o, "The General Staff in the War Years,"
416 pages, Military Pub]ishin House, Moscow, 1968.
f) Colonel General of Engineering-Technical Services A.S. Yakovlev,
"The Purpose of Life, or Notes b?,r an Aircraft Designer," 624 pages,
Political Publishing House, Moscow, 1968. (revised edition)
Note: In his reviews of the above books, Dr. Boltin quotes no statement
concerning Stalin in a), b), and d). In book c), the review noted only
that the book's author worked with 7 named persons including Stalin.
The review of book f) notes concerning Stalin only that the author
judged that Stalin showed detailed knowledge of the scientific and
technical aspect of aircraft design, In Boltin's review of book e)
he devotes a paragra.sh to Shi,emenko's description of Stalin's role as
supreme commander.
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