WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030022-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: September 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs
(19 July-20 August 1968)
1. Soviet external and internal policies conflict.
Until twenty August, the Soviets pursued a dual policy of showing
a reasonable visage to the non-Commmunist world while continuing to tighten
the screws within their own borders. Kosygin's visit to Sweden in July
has been described as the "Swedish idyll." The Soviets seemed inclined
to take a more moderate stand in the Arab-Israeli dispute by not backing
Nasser 100% on his demands, and a number of reports suggest the Soviets
wish to see the Suez Canal opened again without requiring Israeli with-
drawal from their bank of the canal. Presumably at Soviet behest, Ulbricht
seemed to indicate a relaxation of his conditions for talks with the West
Germans on renunciation of force: he did not make it a pre-condition for
talks that Bonn recognize his regime. In the Far East, the Soviets and
Japanese have signed an agreement for the joint development of timberland
in Siberia, and there is some thought that this will be a prelude to a
wider range of collaboration in developing Siberia economically. While
all these moves on the part of the Soviet Union have at base a strong na-
tional interest, part of the picture is the continuing effort of the Soviets
to improve their image in the outside world. But one should not forget
their military diplomacy in supplying arms to Pakistan and the Sudan, nor
Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrey Grechko's visit in mid-July to
Algiers, which could result in supplying this Arab friend of the Soviets
with additional military hardware.
Contrasted with this generally amiable face shown to the free world,
the Soviet leadership continues to tighten ideological lines within its
own borders. In mid-July, Aleksandr Botvin, CP boss in the Ukraine, laid
down the law to Ukrainian writers who have grown increasingly vociferous
in venting traditional feelings of Ukrainian nationalism in recent writ-
ings. Botvin characterized their feelings as based on "putrid theories
spread by hostile propaganda" and promised to correct the error by closer
supervision and guidance of the wrong-thinking writers.
Similarly, the Moscow City Council late in July issued a decree (which
must appear dismal to theater producers) ordering the production of more
plays about the "heroes of our time," that is, workers, peasants, etc.
Such a decree was the result of the theatrical producers enlivening the
theatrical scene by putting on 19th century plays which, critical of the
society of the time, were presented so that the criticism applied to the
current scene.
These incidents, relatively minor by themselves, are, however, sympto-
matic of the noticeable and growing tendency to emphasize an ideological
orthodoxy and rigidity which some call (with consierable justice) "re-
Stalinization."
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2. Communist China
a. Curbing the Red Guards. Communist China continues to be almost
entirely absorbed in its own convulsions, allowing the rest of the world
to go by, but finding time to keep up its polemic with the Soviet Union
(the Soviets repay in kind and with an even heavier propaganda output de-
voted to denigrating Communist China). Once again there is a sign that
an end may be sought to the havoc created by the unbridled raging about
of the Red Guards in the name of the Cultural Revolution. The editorial
of 18 August of the main organ of the Chinese Communist Party, Jen Min Jih
Pao_ (People's Daily), while praising their pioneer work, suggests that the
time has come for Chinese students to listen to their worker-peasant elders
and learn from them. This is the latest in an accumulation of signs that
the leadership wants to curb the Red Guard. It remains to be seen whether
the regime can stop the Red Guard's destructive momentum.
b. Position on Czechoslovakia. At long last the Chinese Communists
have taken cognizance of the turmoil in the Communism of Eastern Europe.
Until this month, the Chinese Communists have ignored the Czech crisis, pre-
sumably because they have not been able to take sides. While undoubtedly
welcoming any embarrassment to the Soviets by an obstreperous Satellite,
they were reluctant to credit the Dubcek regime (which Peking has to regard
as super-liberal) with anything good. Hence silence was the best policy.
Now, however, the Chinese Communists have seen fit to publicize the Soviet-
Czech dispute, using an extensive analysis provided by the main organ of
the Albanian Communist Party. Zeri i Popullit of 24 July 1968 presented
its own unique version of the Soviet-Czech altercation in terms of a power
struggle in the Kremlin between two types of "revisionists" (in the Albanian
book everyone in the Soviet dominated Bloc is some kind of revisionist --
even Ulbricht, though he is admitted to present a "problem" at times to
the Bloc). There are the "liberal revisionists" and the "revisionist con-
servatives." In the Albanians' wondrous logic, the Soviet liberal revision-
ists dumped Novbtny and plotted the overthrow of Gomulka with the aim of
"encircling" East Germany in preparation fair asell-out of East Germany in a deal As
with the U.S. to unify Germany. Agreement to reunify Germany is alleged
to be the outstanding problem preventing full U.S.-Soviet rapprochement
which the Soviets are said ardently to be seeking. However, the liberal
plot failed in Poland, allegedly because Gomulka was able to rely on "healthy
elements" of Soviet military forces in Poland who were allied with the Soviet
"revisionist conservatives," and the situation got out of hand in Czechoslo--
vakia so that the Soviets are having trouble braking the chaotic liberaliza-
tion of Czechoslovakia.
This version of the Soviet-Czech dispute is accepted and publicized by
Peking, except that it omits Albania's reference to the Soviet military.
It does not serve the Chinese Communist purpose to admit that anything, even
separate elements of the Soviet military forces, is healthy in Soviet offi-
cialdom. The Chinese also show a certain delicacy in exempting the Ruman-
ians from the derogation that the Albanians heaped on them.
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3. New Pro-Chicom Groups in France and Colombia.
a. France. Early in August, a new journal appeared in France called
Drapeau Rouge (Red Flag), with the avowed purpose of spreading the treasure
of Mao's thought throughout France against the "antiquated revisionist ide-
ology" of the French Communist Party. The paper presumably will be the nu-
cleus of a new Maoist party to take the place of two groups disbanded by the
French authorities as result of the May-June disturbances. The groups were
the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of France and the Union of Communist
Youth. With the French authorities expecting new student disorders in the
fall, this can hardly come as welcome news.
b. Colombia. A pro-Chinese faction of the Colombian Communist Party
tries to claim Che Guevara as its own by asserting that both Moscow and
Castro betrayed Che, the latter cutting off his supplies in Bolivia and
leaving him to his fate unaided. The attached Washington Post article of
19 August gives a fuller account of the incident, pointing out the similar-
ity of this pro-Chinese line on Che to that propounded in July by a pro--
Chinese faction in Bolivia.
4. Communist World Youth Festival.
The Ninth World Youth Festival (WYF) held in Sofia, 28 July-6 August,
ended on a note of deep dissension. Even the Vietnam war,the one topic
which should have united the assembly, failed to do so. The WYF demonstrated
and aggravated the unorthodox and dissident dispositions of Czech and Yugo-
slav youth, and the European New Left openly clashed with the orthodox Com-
munist managers of the Festival, i.e., the Soviets, Bulgarians, and the
Preparatory Committee. Only Bulgarian strongarm tactics prevented protests
from turning into more serious clashes. The organizers probably made few
converts to the Communist cause and failed to create the image of the Festi-
val as a "united" get-together of world youth. Because of these failures
the holding of future festivals is in serious doubt.
5. The Unsettled Czech-Soviet Crisis
a. Principal documents. The key documents which give the most handy
and reliable guide to what has transpired in Czechoslovakia's relations
with the Soviet Blocl during the past dramatic month -- up to the moment
of invastion -- are:
(1) The letter of 14 July from the Warsaw Five (the Soviet
Union, Poland,.East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria) to the Czech-
oslovak Communist Party (CzCP) making intemperate accusations re-
garding the imminence of counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia and
making hysterical demands for measures to be undertaken immediately
by the CzCP to forestall counterrevolution.
1The "Soviet Bloc" for present purposes will be considered to include the
regimes of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, in addition to the
Soviet Union, but to exclude Rumania and Czechoslovakia.
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(2) The CzCP reply of 18 July, candidly admitting some of the
",anti-socialist" developments taking place in Czechoslovakia, but
rejecting in measured tones the dangers to the Czech Communist regime
from such developments and rejecting the propriety of the suggested
countermeasures.
(3) The Bratislava communique of 3 August, signed by the five
Soviet Bloc parties and the CzCP, which reiterated broad, familiar
generalities of international communism, permitting both sides to
claim, following the letter but hardly the spirit of the truth, that
their own views prevailed. (The brief, non-committal communique is-
sued at the end of the four-day talks, 29 July to 1 August, between
the Soviet Politburo and the CzCP Presidium was quite evidently a
temporizing document preceding the fuller Bratislava communique pre-
pared for the acquiescence and signature of the larger conclave.)
b. The Letter of the Warsaw Five. The hasty convening of the five
Soviet Bloc parties in Warsaw on 14-15 July resulted in what appeared to be
an equally hasty andill-advised document (but as the invasion shows, proves
to have been the most accurate reflection of the views of the wielders of
ultimate power in the Bloc); its hysterical tone tempts one to attribute it
to Ulbricht's inspiration if not his pen. Three passages characterize its
totally false reading of the realities of the Czech scene:
"In your country a whole series of events in recent months
indicates that counterrevolutionary forces supported by imperialist
centers have launched attacks on a broad front against the socialist
system.... Particularly great activity is being undertaken by lead-
ing circles of the German Federal Republic which, trying to make use
of the events in Czechoslovakia, seek to foster conflicts between so-
cialist countries, isloate the GDR, and realize their revanchist
intentions."
(Comment: No objective proof could have existed for the charge of outside
forces fomenting counterrevolution; such a statement was either the product
of a desperately frightened Bloc leader or, what is more likely, an invented
pretext in preparation for the eventuality of suppressing by force the free-
dom of expression in Czechoslovakia, which it was feared would spread be-
yond the borders and endanger the stability of the East German, Polish or
even the Soviet regime.)
"Do you, comrades, fail to see these dangers? Can one remain
passive in this situation, confining oneself purely to statements
and assurances about loyalty to the cause of socialism and obliga-
tions of alliance? Do you fail to see that counterrevolution is
taking away from you one position after another. Do you fail to see
that the party is losing control over the events and is tending more
and more to withdraw under pressure from anti-Communist forces?"
Ank
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(Comment: The tone is little short of hysterical and surely without pre-
cedent among Communist regimes maintaining normal diplomatic relations.
The tone would be more appropriate to the Stalin regime's castigation of
Tito after he had left the fold, or of current Sino-Soviet polemics.)
"The cause of the defense of the power of the working class
and of the workers, of socialist achievements in Czechoslovakia
demands: resolute and courageous attacks on the rightist and
anti-socialist forces; the mobilization of all defensive means
brought into being by the socialist state; cessation of the ac-
tivity of all political organizations acting against socialism;
that the party must take into its own hands the means of mass
communication -- the press, radio, and televison -- so that they
should be used in the interest of the working class, the workers,
and socialism; the rallying of the party ranks on the basis of
the principles of Marxism-Leninism; complete observance of the
principle of democratic centralism, and a fight against those
who, by their activity, help the hostile forces."
(Comment: Besides calling directly for control and censorship of the press
and suppression of non-Communist political organizing activity, this pas-
sage seems to call for a restoration of the powers of the secret police
Cmobilization of all defensive means...."], and disciplining of errant,
liberal Communists ["rallying the party ranks on the basis of principles
of Marxism-Leninism; complete observance of the principle of democratic
centralism, and a fight against those who, by their activity, help the
hostile forces."])
Finally, the situation is asserted to be "no longer your (the CzCP's)
affair alone. This is the affair of all Communist and Workers parties....
It is a common cause of our countries, united in the Warsaw Pact, to safe-
guard their independence ... against the schemings of imperialist, aggres-
sive, and revanchist forces.." This suggests a new use for the Warsaw
Pact: uninvited intervention in an allied country by force.
c. The Czechoslovak Presidium Replies. The letter of the Warsaw
Five was made public on 17 July by the Hungarians and the CzCP Presidium
published its reply on 18 July. It was sober, realistically reasoned, and
admitted the existence of "extremist tendencies, which the remnants of
anti-socialist forces ... are trying to take advantage of ..." but expressed
"astonishment" at "assertions describing the situation as counterrevolution-
ary" ... "all suspicions to this effect we must reject." The CzCP reply
also rejected the Warsaw Five's request for the re-institution of Novotny-
ite harshly repressive measures as a cure for an undesirable situation:
"Any sign of a return to these methods would arouse opposition from the
overwhelming majority of party members, opposition from the toiling workers,
cooperative farmers, and the intelligentsia. By precisely such a step the
party would endanger its political leading role and would give rise to a
situation in which a power conflict would indeed take place. This would
truly endanger the socialist achievements of the people and thus too our
common interest in the anti-imperialist front of the socialist community."
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This statement could be taken as a plea to the Warsaw Five to try to
understand that the reimposition of traditional Communist controls at this
uncture would indeed bring chaos. Time is needed, as is clearly stated
in the Czech leadership's immediately following remark:
"We agree that one of the foremost tasks of the party is to
thwart the intentions of the rightist and anti-socialist forces.
Our party elaborated its tactical political course in this matter
at the May plenum of the Central Committee, and it is now solving
these questions in accordance with it. This course consists of a
complex of measures which can be successful only if we have the con-
ditions to implement them gradually over a period of several months.
(Emphasis added.)
It would have been interesting to know what the "tactical political course"
consisted of and against what elements or phenomena on the Czech scene it
was to be directed, but it does suggest the Dubcek leadership was trying to
meet the Bloc's requirements.
These last two documents may be the foundation of what appears to have
been a temporary agreement that arose out of the Bratislava conference some
two weeks later. While there apparently was a real difference between the
protagonists as to the extent and seriousness of the threat of Communist
one-party rule, it was mutually understood that "anti-socialist elements"
should be suppressed. Again opinions differ as to how quickly this sup-
pression, must take place.
d. Interim Maneuvering. Between the exchange discussed above and the
Bratislava agreement a flurry of activity took place. The polemics between
Czech and Soviet Bloc news media raged on with accusations and counter-
accusations, and troop maneuvers by the Soviets and its allies continued in
Czechoslovakia and immediately outside its borders, giving rise to stronger
and stronger speculation (perhaps not wholly unwelcome to the Soviets as
possibly influencing the Czech leadership to compliance) that the differ-
ences between the Czechs and their fellow Communist regimes would be settled
by military intervention. The Warsaw letter in fact did what the Czech leader-
ship might not have been able to accomplish on its own -- it mobilized over-
whelming support from the Czech population, and apparently even from a sub-
stantial number of conservative Party and Central Committee members. (Some
were said to keep their powder dry by not attending the Central Committee
meeting in which Dubcek received his vote of confidence and thus avoiding
a commitment to support Dubcek.) The Czechs prevailed in their insistence
that bilateral meetings precede multilateral meetings and that the meetings
be held on Czech soil. Comradely pressure was applied on the Soviets by
most West European Communist Parties (privately or publicly) not to inter-
vene militarily (or by other crude means), most notably by the Italian Com-
munist Party and Waldeck Rochet, boss of the French Communist Party, who
travelled to both Moscow and Prague on his "honest broker" mission and
indicated his willingness to sponsor an all-European conference of Commu-
nists to iron out differences (This idea was abandoned, apparently by mutual
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wish of the Soviets and the Czechs.) European Communists, of course, stood
to lose much they had gained in-terms of respectability in the course of the
past decade if the Soviet Union should once again show itself the monster
that so savagely crushed Hungary in 1956. Yugoslavia's Tito and Rumania's
Ceaucescu contributed their bit to the Czech cause by explicit-support.
e. Results of the Cierna and Bratislava Conferences. It is not pos-
sible to speak authoritatively about the proceedings of the two conferences
(of which the Cierna meeting between Soviets and Czechs was by far the more
important), because there is no official or fully trustworthy private ac-
count of what transpired, but something can be made of the resulting commun-
ique. The Soviet-Czech conference was convened in Cierna near the Soviet
border on 29 July. Its importance to the Soviets may be measured by the at-
tendance of practically the whole Soviet Politburo, an assembly on foreign
soil without precedent, and of course Czechoslovakia reciprocated in the level
of its representation. The difficulty of reaching agreement may be measured
by the length of the meeting: four days (it was originally planned for two
days at the most). But some sort of accommodation apparently was reached,
though the communique issued at the end was non-committal and obviously pointed
toward an official statement to be issued after a meeting of the remainder of
the Warsaw Five on 2-3 August in Bratislava. At the latter meeting East
German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian leaders signed a communique which
probably had been prepared by the Soviets and Czechs during their earlier
negotiations. The remarkable fact about the Bratislava communique is that
it said everything (in.reiterating all the broad, familiar platitudes gov-
erning the relations among orthodox Communist parties) and yet said nothing
of the matter at issue, i.e. "counterrevolutionary developments" in Czechoslo-
vakia was not mentioned. Such a communique has the virtue of permitting
each side to claim triumph and unanimity of opinion. And each side has done
just that. The Soviets claimed that the designs of Western imperialism have
been frustrated, and the Czechs claimed that they have not yielded one iota
from their program for Czechoslovakia.
f. The calm before the storm. It may be useful to recall a similar
confrontation: that of the Soviet leadership with Gomulka in 1956 under
analogous circumstances. At that time the Soviets regarded the domestic
scene in Poland as chaotic, out of control, and threatening the continued
rule of the Communist Party. It seems clear now that Gomulka pleaded for
time to restore order, pointing out (as the Czechs did in their reply to
the Warsaw Five letter) that reimposition of controls immediately would
insure utter chaos and be a much more severe threat to Communist control.
However, contrary to Gomulka, Dubcek and his colleagues did not re=
treat from their position that they would not govern by arbitrary and re-
pressive methods, but rather would enlist voluntary popular cooperation.
Nor did they re-impose censorship, again appealing for the voluntary cooper-
ation of the Fourth Estate to write "responsibly" (i.e. to moderate criticism
of the Soviet Union). It may be that the Soviets saw more clearly than the
Czech leadership that one-party rule is incompatible with the basic freedoms
which the Czech people, having recently gained, would be very unwilling to
relinquish: freedom of press, speech, and assembly.
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Despite efforts of the Dubcek leadership to gain control of developments
it was evident that it would be difficult to limit the basic freedoms without
extinguishing them altogether. Tito, during his visitto Prague 9-10 August,
and Ceaucescu, visiting 15-17 August, each coupled warm expressions of support
with counsels of caution vis-a-vis the Soviets, but the Czech press continued
its critical stance and provoked retorts from the Soviet press, thus belying
Dubcek's and Smrkovsky's assurance that polemics would cease. The heavy flow
of Soviet anti-Czech propaganda before the Bratislava communique was turned
off abruptly like a faucet after Cierna, but the flow soon began again.
As events turned out, Soviet leaders decided to adopt far stronger
medicine than propaganda verbiage.
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