DISPELLING THE MYTH OF CHE GUEVARA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: September 4, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
 25X1A2G
Approved For Release 29
September 1968
The Life of Che Guevara: A Series of Failures
Failure To Find Himself
Although Che Guevara early adopted Marxism as his philosophy, and be-
came a self-styled Marxist theoretician, his background gives no indication
of what his motivation might have been. Although he saw and was infuriated
by the conditions of poverty throughout South America, he himself came from
an upper class Argentine family which at one time had considerable wealth
and conservative ties. He apparently had a happy and normal childhood and
adolescence, if in a somewhat unconventional and happy-go-lucky household.
Although he earned a degree in medicine in 1953 from the University of
Buenos Aires, he resented time spent in schooling and interpreted his studies
to travel. He never seriously embarked on a medical career. Rather, his
primary interest was in travel, when he lived by his wits and had no appar-
ent goal for the future.
Failure in Guatemala
Shortly after his graduation, he started on a trip north through the
continent, with Venezuela as his ultimate destination. There he planned
to work in a leper colony, having had experience in this work in Bolivia
the year before. He never got to Venezuela, for after working his way
through Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, he eventually turned up in Guatemala.
There he became involved for a time in the 195+ civil war where he tried
to organize workers into a resistance movement. He was persuaded to give
this up, however, when the Argentine Embassy learned of an insurgents' con-
spiracy against his life. He took refuge in the Embassy and then travelled
on a safe.-conduct to Mexico, where he met the Castro brothers.
Che's Role in Castro's Seizure of Power
In 1956 he arrived in Cuba where he joined the 26 July Movement and
became a close friend and right-hand man of Fidel Castro. With the suc-
cess of the uprising, Guevara emerged as one of the leading guerrilla
heroes. Unlike the later and disastrous Bolivian campaign, the Cuban op-
eration succeeded mainly because of the complete opposition of the people,
rich and poor alike, to the Batista regime. Not only did the local popu-
lace aid the insurrectionists in obtaining arms, food, transportation and
safe havens, but they also supplied the rebels with the military intelli-
gence they needed to effectively fight the Batista forces. Without this
the revolution would have failed, and Castro, Guevara and their rebel-
comrades would have met their end. Instead, Guevara was able to establish
a reputation as a bold and effective guerrilla leader, who recklessly and
unhesitantly cut down his opponents. (It has been noted that even as a
youth, Guevara was intrigued by the question of violence as a means to an
end, and maintained that no fight was worthwhile unless it were a fight
to the death. Likewise, he reportedly had only scorn for the Christian
concept of rejecting violence.)
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
Failure in Cuba
It is said that, following his seizure of power, when Castro was as-
signing the top government positions to his guerrilla leaders, he asked,
"Who is an economist?", whereupon Che raised a finger and Castro promptly
designated him President of the Bank of Cuba, a position he held for two
years. As the Minister of Industries from 1961-1964 he pushed strongly
for the industrialization of Cuba, even though most of Cuban foreign trade
came from the sale of sugar. This was one of several such schemes which
Cuban economy to near disaster, from which it never fully re-
covered, and provoked sharp criticism from Soviet advisers and old-line
Marxist economists. By late 1964, following dismissal from his post, Che's
relations with Castro deteriorated, his popularity among the Cuban people
had considerably diminished, and his repeated calls for exporting the rev-
olution to the underdeveloped countries throughout the world further strained
Soviet-Cuban relations. It thus became increasingly evident there was no
longer a real place for him in the Cuban heirarchy and he was virtually ex-
pelled from the island.
Failure in Africa
It was during a three-month trip to Africa in late 1964 and early 1965
that he made his plans to return there to wage the "struggle against colo-
nialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism." He chose the Congo for his area
of operation, but this venture, for which Castro had secretly supplied him
with men and equipment, also ended in failure. In fact, Che gave up in
disgust when he found he could not mold the Congolese rebels into effective
guerrilla fighters and thereby bring the rebellion to a successful conclu-
sion.
Failure in Bolivia
Following his return to Cuba in 1965, Che allegedly made detailed
preparations for the disastrous and final adventure in Bolivia, and in early
1966 sent in the first two guerrillas to lay the groundwork. It is now clear
that, if not before, from the time Guevara himself arrived at the Bolivian
guerrilla encampment in November 1966 until his futile death in October 1967,
disaster was inevitable. Not only were Che's efforts to organize and in-
crease his guerrilla band stymied at the outset by the pro-Soviet Bolivian
Communists, but support from Castro, never sufficient to begin with, gradu-
ally diminished to the point where even contact between Havana and Che's
group ceased entirely. This of course raises the whole issue of whether
Castro deliberately betrayed Guevara. Likewise, the presence in the group
of the female guerrilla, "Tania," recently revealed as an East German-Soviet
agent, and the inexcusable blunders she made for one of her experience and
skill, raises the question of whether her errors were, in fact, deliberate
betrayal.
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
Over and above these questions, however, remain the guerrillas' methods
of operation, which time and again violated Che's own precepts for waging
guerrilla war: Che's diary reflects his disappointment and concern at the
lack of recruits for his guerrilla band. The maximum number of guerrillas
apparently never exceeded fifty-one, and of these almost half were foreigners,
mainly top-ranking Cuban revolutionary officials. The first encounter with
the Bolivian Army was a victory for the guerrillas but, as it became evident,
premature, for it left them little time to plan their operations. Further-
more, they lacked any basic knowledge of either the terrain in which they
operated or of the movements of the Bolivian Army. When they had a military
advantage, they either lost it or did not press it; Che seemed to have
little overall concept of his objectives or the ability to plan a military
campaign. Contrary to its expectations, the group was unable to gain the
support of a single peasant; in fact, the peasants, fearful and suspicious,
became informers against The band. Finally, in the words of one reviewer,
the Guevara diary is an "unrelenting chronicle of the grubby, fear-haunted
existence" of Che and his band, whose problems were further compounded by
hunger, thirst, exhaustion, disease, desertions and, in the end, death.
Conclusion
Guevara's failures in the Congo and Bolivia, and also the failure of
a short-lived guerrilla movement he reportedly organized in northern Argen-
tina in 1964 (which is revealed in a book, My Friend, Che, by Ricardo Rojo,
published August 30th), were not merely personal failures, but also refute
the doctrines, shared by Castro and Debray that:
-- Latin America is "ripe for revolution," and that Bolivia is the
natural center a continent-wide "second Vietnam;
-- that guerrilla action must be rural, not dependent on the cities;
-- and that Communist party support is unnecessary and may even be
undesirable.
3
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
 25X1A2G
App roved For Release 200 /08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061 A000400030027-7
septiembre 1968
he" Guevara: Serie de fracasos
Fracaso consign mismo
El "Che" Guevara en sus primeros altos adopt6 el marxismo como
filosoffa y se autodesign6 te6rico marxista--no obstante lo coal su
historial en nada indica to que puede haber sido su m6vil. Observ6 y se
enfureci6 con las conditions de pobreza en toda la Am6rica del Sur; 6l
mismo, sin embargo, fue hijo de familia argentina de la clase alter que
una vez posey6 bastantes riquezas y vinculos entre los conservadores.
Parece haber gozado de felices y normales altos de niltez y adolescencia,
aunque en un hogar algo fuera de to comun y,_despreocupado. Se hizo de
un grado en medicina en la Universidad de Buenos Aires en 1953; no
obstante, le molestaba dedicar su tiempo a los estudios, los cuales
interrumpi6 para viajar. Nunca,se dedic6 seriamente a la prdctica de
la medicina. Su inter6s primordial era mds Bien viajar, viviendo de sus
ma?las y sin meta aparente para el futuro.
Fracaso en Guatemala
Paco despues de su graduac16n parti6 de viaje por el continente, diri-
gi6ndose hacia el norte con destino a Venezuela. A111 se proponfa trabajar
en una colonia de leprosos, habiendo adquirido experiencia en dicho trabajo
en Bolivia el alto anterior. No consigui6 llegar a Venezuela, ya que
despu6s de pasar gradualmente por B olivi.a, Per6 y Colombia apareei6 pox
fin en Guatemala. Alli por alg6n tiempo se vio envuelto en la guerra de
1954, en la coal trat6 de organizar un movimiento de resistencia de los tra-
bajadores. Sin embargo, se le hizo abandonar la idea cuando la embajada
argentina se enter6 de una ccnjura de los insurgentes contra su vida.
Se refugi6 en la embajada y luego viaj6 con salvoconducto a M6xico, donde
conoci6 a los hermanos Castro.
El papel del "Che" en la toma del Poder
En 1956 llegd a Cuba, uni6ndose al. Movimiento 26 de julio y hacidndose
intimo e indispensable de Fidel Castro. Al triunfar la rebeli6n result6
Guevara ser uno de los principales hdroes guerrilleros. Al contrario de
la desastrosa campalta en Bolivia mds tarde, la operaci6n cubana tuvo 6xito
principalmente debido a la completa oposicidn del pueblo pobre y rico
contra el r6gimen batistiano. La poblacidn local no s6lo ayud6 a los
irnsurrectos a obtener arenas, viveres, transportes y lugares seguros sino
que les suministrd la informacidn militar necesaria para combatir eficaz-
mente a la fuerzas batistianas. Sin esas cosas la revolucidn hubiera
sido un fracaso, y Castro, Guevara y sus compa?teros rebeldes 'hubieran
perecido. Por el contrario, Guevara consigui6 hacerse de reputaci6n como
jefe guerrillero arriesgado y eficaz que derribaba a sus contrincantes con
temeridad y sin titubeos. (Se ha hecho observar que hasta en su juventud
a Guevara le interesaba la cuesti6n de la violencia como medio de conseguir
objetivos y sostenta que ninguna lucha vale la pena a no ser una pelea a
muerte,. De igual manera seg6n se inform: tenia solamente desprecio por
el concepto cristiano del rechazo a la violencia.)
- 1 -
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
Fracaso en Cuba
Se dice que, a rafz de la toma del Poder, cuando Castro repartfa los
cargos principales de gobierno entre sus lfderes guerrilleros, preguntd
qui6n era economista, ante to cual el "Che" levant6 el dedo y Castro de
inmediato lo nombr6 presidente del Banco de Cuba, cargo que ocupd dos afios.
Como ministro de Industrias de 1961 a 1964 impuls6 mucho la industrializa-
cidn de Cuba, no obstante ser el azt5car el casi exclusivo artfeulo cubano
de exportacidn. Este fue uno de varios planes parecidos que llevaron la
economfa de Cuba al borde del desastre, sin que nunca se haya recobrado por
completo y mereciendo fuertes crfticas de los asesores sovidticos y econo-
mistas marxistas de la vieja escuela. pam. fines de 1961, luego de su
destitucic5:n del cargo, las relaciones del "Che" con Castro cayeron en dete-
rioro, su popularidad entre el pueblo de Cuba habfa disminuido bastante
y sus repetidas exigencias de que se exportara la revolucidn a los pafses
subdesarrollados de todo el mundo contribuyeron a empeorar aun mds las
relaciones entre la Unidn Sovid'tica y Cuba. Asf se fue haciendo mds y
mds claro que para 61 ya no habfa verdadero lugar en la jerarq ufa de
Cuba y fue virtualmente expulsado de la isla.
Fracaso en Africa
Fue clurante un viaje de tres meses a Africa a fines de 1961+ y prin-
cipios de 1965 que hizo sus planes de regresar allf para hacer la "lucha
contra el colonialism, el imperialismo y el neocolonialismo," Escogid
al Congo Como su zona de operaciones, pero la aventura, pars, la cual
Fidel secretamente le habfa suministrado hombres y equipo, tambi6n culmin6
en el fracaso. Es mds, el "Che" la abandond con desagrado cuando descubrid
qu.e le era imposible moldear a los rebeldes congole?Ios en guerrilleros
eficaces y asi llevar la rebeli6n al 6xito.
Fracaso en Bolivia
Despu6s de su regreso a Cuba a fines de 1965, se dice que el "Che"
hizo preparativos detallados Para su aventura final y desastrosa en Bolivia,
y que a principios de 1966 envid a los primeros dos guerrilleros a
preparar el, terreno. Ahora es evidente que, si no antes, desde el momento
mismo en.que el propio Guevara liege al campamento guerrillero en Bolivia
en noviembre de 1966 hasta su filtil muerte en octubre de 1967, el desastre fue
inevitable. No solamente fueron los esfuerzos del "Che" de organizar y
ensanchar au guerrilla frustrados desde el principio por los comunistas
bolivianos prosovi6ticos sino que el apoyo de Castro, que nunca fue
suficiente, disminuyd gradualmente hasta que el contacto entre La Habana
y el grupo del "Che" cesd pox completo. Esto por supuesto trae a colaciin
la cuesti3n de si Castro intencionalmente traiciond a Guevara. Tambidn,
la presencia en el grupo de la guerrillera "Tapia," a quien se reveld
pace poco Como agente de los germanoorientales y sovidticos, y los
disparates imperdonables cometidos por ella en vista de su experiencia y
pericia, suscitan el interrogante de si en honor a la verdad sus errores no
fueron traicidn intencional.
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
Por encima de estas cuestiones, sin embargo, permanecen los mdtodos
de operacidn de los guerrilleros, que en repetidas ocasiones contraveni!an
los preceptos del propio "Che" en la conducta de la guerra de guerrillas:
el dzario mismo del "Che" refleja su desenga?io y preocupacidn por la falta
de reclutas para su guerrilla. El total mdximo del bando parece que nunca
pas6 de 51, y de 4stos casi la mitad eran extranjeros, principalmente
funcionaxios revolucionarios cubanos de alto grado. El primer encuentro
con el Ejdreito de Bolivia fue un triunfo para la guerrilla, pero prematuro,
como se vio luego, ya que les dej6 poco tiempo para planear sus opera-
ciones. Adem#s carecian de todo conocimiento b6sico del terreno en que
operaban o de los movimientos del Ejdreito boliviano. Cuando tenfan alguna
ventaja militar, o la perdian o no la aprovechaban. El "Che" parec:ra tener
poca idea general de sus objetivos o la habilidad para planear una cainpala
militar. Al 1 contrario de to que se esperaba no consigui6 el apoyo de un
campesino siquiera; es m6s, los campesinos, temerosos y suspicaces, chiva-
teaban a la guerrilla. Finalmente, segi5n expresa un comentarista, el
diario de Guevara es "crc5nica inexorable de la existencia roYiosa y amedren-
tada" del "Che" y su bando, cuyos problemas se complicaron aun mds con el
hambre, la sed, el agotamiento, la enfermedad, las desercbones y por fin
la muerte.
Conclusion
Los fracasos del "Che" en el Congo y Bolivia, y tambi6n el fracaso del
breve movimiento guerrillero que segdn informes organiz6 en el norte argen-
tine en 1964 (dado a conocer en el libro "Mi amigo Che," de Ricardo Rojo,
publicado el 30 de agosto), no fueron sencillamente fracasos personales sino
que tambi6n refutan las doctrinas compartidas por Castro y Debray de que:
-- Amdrica Latina estd madura para la revoluci6n y Bolivia es el
centro natural de on "segundo Vietnam" continental;
-- la acci6n guerrillera deber6 sex rural, no dependiente de las
ciudades; y
- el respaldo del Partido Comunista es innecesario y puede hasta
resultar indeseable,
-3-
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
 LA NACION, San Jose
9 August 1968
Che Guevara: The Myth of the Man and the Reality of the Failure
The publication of the Dairy of Che Guevara reveals certain funda-
mental errors that were not so clearly perceived before the dairy was
made public. It is plainly noted that Guevara made mistakes that he
himself warns must not be ade and violated principles that, according
to him, are basic.
In his well known manual, "Guerrilla Warfare," he says that when a
government has attained power through some form of popular consent,
fraudu__ent or not, and maintains a system of apparent constitutional
legality, it is impossible to create favorable guerrilla conditions.
In Bolivia a constitutional government has existed since the elections
of 1966.
CPYRGH
T
In another part of his manual, he asserts that the guerrilla is an
agrarian revolutionary that interprets the wishes of the great rural
masses to own the land, the means of production, etc. What, then, was
Che Guevara doing in Bolivia if, in his work, he had categorized Bolivian
agrarian reform as one of the three great Anerican reform movements?
The sadly famous guerrilla also said that the "sine qua non" for
the guerrilla is the support of the people, but he never had it in
Bolivia, a fact that he recognized February 10, 1967, scarcely four
months after the campaign started, when he noted in his diary: "The
peasant is typical, but is incapable of helping us."
In his manual Guevara teaches that "At the outset, it is essential
that the guerrilla not allow himself to be destroyed." But reality has
shown that before Che's guerrilla band started fighting in the Bolivian
hinterland, the police had already identified his ranch-base, as he says
in his diary of January 19th.
But the fact that stands out more clearly is the open conflict
between Guevara, Fidel.'s followers and the Bolivian Communists. Che
entered Bolivia and began his campaign when the leading Bolivian Com-
munist was in Bul;_;aria. When he returned, they were never able to
agree, which was translated into an absolute lack of support by the
Bolivian Communists for the guerrillas. Guevara had always insisted
on the need to count on such support, which he was not able to benefit
from because of the deep-seated conflict and division between the two
leaders.
Fidel Castro himself did not forgive this attitude, and in the
introduction that he wrote to the Guevara diary, he harshly criticizes
the so-called "traditional parties." This conflict between Castro and
the older Communist parties continues as strongly now as before.
There is no doubt that Che Guevara roundly failed. His diary is
full of tales of errors great and small, some that he himself recognized
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
and others evident to the r`ader that the ill-fated guerrilla never
recognized.
Who knows what would have been the result if the Bolivian Communists
had been in agreement with Che? Perhaps the same, because the Bolivian
Reds did not accept the concept of guerrilla warfare, undertaken with
their participation, in their own country.
Guevara persisted and died, thus adding to various other Cuban
failures. The reading of his diary gives an opportunity to study the
details of this great failure and to learn why it happened.
CPYRGH
T
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
 CPYRGH
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
LA NACION, San Jose
9 August 1968
Che Guevara: El, mito del hombre
la rec9i cid del fr trio .r
La publication del "Diario del Che
Guevara"' revela ciertos errores fun-
damentales que no so conoclan tan
claramente antes de , que so hiciera
piiblico tal diario. Se nota a simple
vista, que Guevara cometi6 errores
que el mismo advierte qua no deben
cometerse y viola principios que segun
el, son basicos.
En su conocido manual "Guerra
de Guerrillas", dice que donde un go-
bierno haya subido al poder por algu-
na forma de consulta popular, frau-
dulenta o no, y mantenga un sistema
de aparente legalidad constituclonal,
el brote, guerrillero esta imposibilitado
de proclucirse. En Bolivia existe un re-
giinen constitucional deridado de ]as
elecciones de 1966.
En otra paste do su manual, afir-
ma que el guerrillero es un revolucio-
nario agrario que interpreta Jos de-
seas de la gran masa campesina, de
ser duena de la tierra, de sus medios
de production, etc. 1,Qu6 fue entonces
a hater en Bolivia el Che Guevara, si
en su obra habia calificado a la re-
fohia agraria boliviana como una de
Ias tres grandes de America?
Dijo tambien el tristemente cele-
bre guerrillero que es "sine qua non"
quo ]a guerrilla cuente con el apoyo
del pueblo, pero esto nunca lo tuvo
e1 on Bolivia, hecho que reconoci6 el
10 de febrero de 1967, apenas a los
cuatro meses de Iniciada la campana,
cuando anotO en su diario: "El cam-
pesino esta dentro del.',tipoj,, pero es
incapaz de ayudarnos".
Ensena Guevara en su manual que
"En el primer momento, lo esencial
para el guerrillero es no dejarso des-
truir". Pero la realidad ha demostrado
que antes do quo la guerrilla del Che
entrara en combate on ]as selvas boli-
base-finca, como to dice .en su diario
el 19 de enero.
Pero el' hecho que mas so clestaca
es el conflicto abierto entry Guevara,
los fidelistas y los comunfstas bolivia-
nos. El Che entry a Bolivia a iniclO
su campana cuando el maxhmo diri-
gente comunista boliviano 'estaba on
Bulgaria. Cuando este regres6, nunca
se pusieron de acuerdo, lo quo so tra-
dujo en una falta absoluta ire apoyo
para ]as guerrillas, per paste do los
comunistas de Bolivia. Guevara slem-
pre habia insistido en la necesidad de
contar con tal apoyo, que no to logro
por el conflict: planteaclo y la honda
division entre ambos liciere,
El mismo Fidel Castro no to per-
don6 esta actitud y en el pr6logo que
le hiciera al diario de Guevara, critica
duramente los liamados "partldos tra-
dicionales". Esta pugna entro Castro
y los mas antiguos partidos comunis
tas, continua tan fuerte ahora coma
antes.
Lo cierto es quo el Che Guevara
fracas: rotundamente. Su diario esta
,11eno de relates de errores mayores y
menores, algunos quo 61 mismo reco-
nocio y otros que son evidentes paral
el lector, que el fracasado guerrillero
no lleg6 a reconocer.
Quien sabe cual habria silo el re-
sultado si los comunfstas bolivianos se
hubieran puesto de acuerdo eon, el Cho.
,Quiz i el mismo, porque log bolivianos
._, rojgs no ereyeron aceptable el con-
.,cepto de una guerra do guerrillas, rea-
lizada con su participacibn, in Au pro-
; .,..:. n ,
pia patria.
Guevara insist16 y mur16, sum An-
dose a lcs otros varies fracasos cuba-
nos. La lectura de su Carlo dpi una
o ,ortunidad de estudia. 'c: detalles de
este magno fracaso y deterMinar por
vianas, la policia ya habia allanado su que ocurrieron.
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030027-7
 w