(Sanitized) GUIDELINES

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 14, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 1, 1968
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3.pdf5.12 MB
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/0472'1 C UATRDP7, 25X1 C May 1968 1 HANOI'S OTHER FRONTS IN ASIA COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WAR 3 INDIA: EARLY RUSSIAN INTEREST AND SOVIET PENETRATION (EUR,NE, a) 4 THE CURRENT STATUS OF CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS (EUR, AF, EUR, a) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 SECRET 25X1 C 1 C1 0B Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs (22 March to 18 April 1968) 1. Czechoslovakia a. Exit Novotny. The liberalizing trend in Czechoslovakia became noticeable late in 1967 and led to the ouster of Antonin Novotny as Party First Secretary on 5 January 1968. Now more of the Stalinist "Old Guard" have been removed from their positions of power. Novotny was obliged by public pressure to resign his remaining -- and largely ceremonial -- post of President on 21 March and was replaced on 30 March by 72-year old Gen- eral Ludvik Svoboda, who had already received some pointedly favorable pub- licity in the Soviet press. b. The Action Program. The Central Committee of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party held a Plenum which lasted a week (29 March-5 April). The Plenum approved the much discussed "Action Program." Though replete with typical Communist propaganda scoring imperialism, praising the Soviet Union, pledging support for North Vietnam, etc., it contains many promises of re- forms which, by totalitarian standards at least, are liberal. These in- clude pledges of greater freedom of speech and press, and promises for the rehabilitation of both Communist and non-Communist victims of past political purges. It also outlines economic and managerial reforms designed to mod- ernize the Czech economy which has fallen sadly behind Western European levels during the 20 years of Communist rule. Significantly, the Action Program proclaims a two-Germanies policy, saying that "realistic forces" in West Germany (presumably meaning the Social Democrats) deserve Czech support. c. Public comment in Czechoslovakia on the Action Program was not universally favorable. Some hard-liners criticized it, and so did some liberals who were disappointed that it did not go much further. The most distinguished among the liberal critics was Professor Ivan Svitak, a lead- ing intellectual and former professor at the Institute of Philosophy, who said in a lecture, excerpts of which were published on 10 April in the newspaper STUDENT: "The peculiarity of the current change is that no changes have occurred; the mechanism of total dictatorship remains intact." Pro- fessor Svitak commented that the Action Program contains no provision for true opposition parties. (It does make the statement that parties allied with the Communists in the National Front should be strengthened.) Svitak also noted that although the Action Program calls for abolishing press cen- sorship, it qualifies this by saying that the state should still be able to determine when publication of certain information can be forbidden. Sim- ilarly, the Action Program calls for freedom of speech, but with the reser- vation that this must be "within the framework of Socialist laws." d. General Bohumir Lomsky, Defense Minister and Deputy Commander of the Warsaw Pact forces, resigned on 3 April, One of the last of the No- votny men, Lomsky's resignation or dismissal had been expected since the defection to the U.S.A. in February of one of his close colleagues, Major General Jan Sejna. Lomsky's deputy, Colonel General Vaclav Janko, committed suicide in March. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 e. New Government Formed. An almost completely different government was formed shortly after the Plenum ended. Oldrich Gernik, one of the few hovers from the previous government, was named Premier. Although only 46 years of age, he has been a member of the Central. Committee for 10 years, and a member of the Presidium for 2 years. Professor Ota Sik, Director of the Economic Institute and author of many economic reforms instituted in recent years, is one of five Deputy Premiers in the new cabinet. He was a prisoner of the Nazis in the notorious Mauthausen concentration camp, 19)+0-1+5. Dr. Jiri Hajek, 51+, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, has YIeen a member of the Central Committee since 1948. He was the Czechoslo- vak Ambassador to Great Britain, 1955-58, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1958-62. The Party Presidium has also been. reorganized. Of the 10 full members of 5 January 1968, the date Novotny was dismissed as Par- ty First Secretary, only 3 remained (Alexander Dubcek, Oldrich Gernik and Z Ira,homir Kolder). In fact not one of the old conservative (Stalinist- ovotnyite) members remains. f. Bloc Pressure. Within forty-eight hours after the forced resig- nation of Novotny, Alexander.Dubcek was summoned to Dresden on 23 March to explain to leaders of the other Warsaw Pactl countries exactly how far he and his colleagues proposed to carry the "liberalization" program. Dubcek apparently at least partially assuaged his colleagues' alarm and assured them that Czechoslovakia, remained loyal to the Soviet Union and to the Warsaw Pact. The Czechs achieved a noteworthy victory at Dresden in dissuading other Warsaw Pact members from holing planned military maneuvers this summer on Czech territory, since the presence of Soviet and East German troops in Czechoslovakia at such a critical time would have put the new regime under great pressure. The harmony was soon bro- ken by Kurt Hager, leading ideologist of the East German Communist Party and a member of its Politburo. Speaking before a congress of Marxist philosophers, including some from Czechoslovakia at Karl Marx University in East Berlin on 26 March, Hager attacked "renewers" and revisionists, and singled out Josef Smrkovsky, one of the most dynamic Czech liberals, as a chief target. He was also extremely critical of Austrian Communist Ernst Fischer, who is frequently lauded by the new Czech leaders for his innovative ideas and for the fact that he led the 1963 fight for the id- eological "rehabilitation" of Franz Kafka, celebrated Czech writer. The Czech Government took a sufficiently grave view of the Hager speech to hake a formal diplomatic protest to the East Germans over this interfer- ence in Czech domestic affairs. In addition, many Czech Party and front Groups rebutted the East German's criticisms and expressed complete sup- port for Smrkovsky. Indicative of the current state of Czech-East German relations, there has been no public East German acknowledgment of the Czech protest in more than two weeks. 1Except Rumania, which did not participate in the meeting in Dresden. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 2. Poland a. Gomulka in trouble. Student unrest and widespread anti-Semitic campaigns continued to dominate news from Poland. However, these appear to be but symptoms of a growing political crisis within the Polish Party and Government. The present Party leadership under the direction of Wladyslaw Gomulka has now held power for nearly 12 years, and a number of influential Party men feel that that is long enough. Gomulka came to pow- er in 1956 as a symbol of resistance to Stalinist rule, but as the years have passed, he backslid increasingly to a very similar system of repres- sive government. During the past six months, there have been more and more frequent reports of pressures on-Gomulka from within the Party to make way for new and younger leadership. Meanwhile, Gomulka presents the somewhat pathetic figure of an aging, tired man, incapable of adjusting to, let alone controlling, the rapid course of events. General Mieczyslaw Moczar, the Minister of Interior, seems to be gathering some of the influ- ence and power Gomulka is losing. Another man who also is working hard to improve his position in the power structure is Edward Gierek, Presid- ium member and boss of the Party in Upper Silesia. Both Moczar and Gierek have made strongly anti-Semitic statements in recent weeks. Short biog- raphies of Moczar and Gierek are attached.' b. Governmental changes. Several changes which appear to be of only secondary significance have been made in the Polish Government. Edward Ochab, the ailing President (Chairman of the Council of State), resigned for reasons of health and was replaced on 11 April by General Marian Spychalski, previously Minister of Defense. Lieutenant General Wojciech Jaruzelski, formerly Deputy Minister of Defense, was-named Minister, replacing Spychalski. Spychalski's appointment was viewed as a compro- mise between the factions of Gomulka and Moczar and his departure from the Defense Ministry was considered more of a loss to the Gomulka faction because his replacement is thought'to be a less staunch Gomulka supporter than Spychalski, whose new job reduces him to a mere figurehead. 3. Soviet Union a. Brezhnev 29 March Speech. The CPSU line has been harder in re- cent months, particularly since the Budapest Conference, and on 29 March, at a congress of Moscow Communists, Brezhnev delivered a tough speech in which he declared that "Western imperialism is trying to weaken the ideo- logical unity of the socialist countries by relying mainly on revisionist and nationalist elements." He explicitly attacked dissident Soviet intel- lectuals and seemed to be aiming his remarks also at liberals and intel- lectuals in Eastern Europe. He made it clear that the Party would not tolerate Czech-type liberalization in the USSR. He,called for "iron dis- cipline" in the 13-million member CPSU and warned dissident Soviet intel- lectuals that they "cannot expect impunity if they fall into the net of Western ideologists." 3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 b. Central Committee Plenum. The Central Committee of the CPSU held a two-day Plenum in Moscow, April 9-10. Party chief Leonid Brezhnev gave the principal report of topical problems of the international situation and the struggle of the CPSU to rally the International Communist Movement, as well as the closing speech. A number of party leaders and other public figures also spoke, including the Minister of Culture, the Editor-in-chief of Pravda, the Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the First Secretary of the Komsomol, and the Secretary of the Board of the Union of Writers. c. The Plenum was deeply concerned over the potential impact on So- viet society of the Czechoslovak program, and over the political situation in Poland. The extent of Soviet concern over Czechoslovakia may be gauged from the fact that the Plenum was originally due to meet 20 March and, as promised by Brezhnev just last February, had been expected to discuss a~- riculture. The twenty-day postponement was evidently occasioned by the soviet CC's desire to have the benefit of the results of the Dresden Meet- ing of 23 March, as well as more information on the "Action Program" which was formally adopted by the Czech CC Plenum whose final session was held cp. 5 April. When the CPSU finally did give some prominence to Czech Party activity on 12 April in Pravda, it did so by stressing the views of the Czechoslovak old-guard Communists, who are worried by the current liberal- ization drive. d. The CPSU leaders are obviously determined to isolate the Soviet people as much as possible, not only from the freeworld, but also from he ferment in Eastern Europe. The resolution adopted by the 360-member central Committee"called for expansion of the entire ideological activi- ties of the Party" as one of the "most sacred duties of all party organi- zations." The resolution endorsed Brezhnev's intensive ideological cam- paign "to combat subversive efforts by the West" by tightening ideological control over Soviet literature and art as part of a program to strengthen the patriotism of the Soviet people, The resolution claimed that "the entire huge apparatus of anti-Communist propaganda is now directed at the unity of socialist countries, the international Communist movement, at splitting the front-ranking forces of our times, at undermining the social- ist society from inside." e. The CC Plenum expressed "full approval" for the decision taken 4t the Budapest Consultative Conference to hold a World Conference of Com- munist Parties in Moscow toward the end of this year and instructed the Politburo "to exert every effort" for the success of the world conference. The Plenum also approved Soviet actions at the Sofia summit conference of the Warsaw Pact in early March; it expressed support for North Vietnam and for the nuclear nonproliferation treaty now before the U.N.; and it approved Soviet actions in the Middle East. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 4. East Germany New Constitution Approved in Referendum. In a national referendum held with great fanfare on 6 April, the East German electorate ratified by a comfortable margin (9L.9% of the electorate favored it) a new Consti- tution drawn up by Walter Ulbricht and his colleagues on the Central., Com- mittee. The constitution attempts to legitimize the situation which has existed for 19 years, i.e., a separate East German state in which the So- cialist Unity Party (Communist) holds all political power. The new Con- stitution, which replaces a 19+9 Charter, guarantees all citizens the right, to an education and to a job, but omits mention of somepreviously approved rights, notably the right to strike. The new Constitution con- tains what amounts to voluntary restrictions on East German sovereignty, especially in Article VII, which speaks of "close brotherhood in arms with the armies of the Soviet Union and other socialist states." 5. Communist China a. Army Chief Purged. Purges of key people continue. The latest victim is Yang Cheng-wu, Acting Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army. Yang's fall is of special interest as he was said to have been Lin Piao's personal choice for the position when the previous Chief of Staff, Lo Jui-ching, was purged in May 1966. Yang has been replaced by Huang Yung-sheng who had been Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee in Kwant- gung Province, a post he had held only since 21 February 1968. (The rev- olutionary committees have been established in many provinces throughout the country to replace administrative bodies which either ceased to exist or were powerless to act as a result of the excesses of the Great Prole- tarian Cultural Revolution.) Huang Yung-sheng, 62 years old, has been an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party since 1956. b. Red Flag leading theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party,has apparently suspended publication, no issue having been seen since the first of the year. Chen Po-ta, member of the Central Committee and editor of Red Flag since its inception in 1958, was MAO'S personal secre- tary for many years and Red Flag was considered to be MAO's mouthpiece. It appears that Chen's star has fallen considerably, for he has not Ap- peared at public functions for some time, although his name has nbt'bee.n mentioned among those disgraced or purged. Red Flag has loudly and fre- q,uently criticized the Army during the past 2 years, and the Army is thought to be responsible for having forced the journal to suspend pub- lication. 6. Dissensions within the International Communist Movement a. Sino-Soviet. (1) Radio Peace and Progress, the Soviet Union's "unofficial" foreign propaganda broadcasting station, claimed in a broadcast beamed 5 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 to China on 3 April that China had halted all economic and military aid to North Vietnam and said that foreign observers attributed the cessation of aid to chaotic conditions prevailing in China. (2) Much in the manner of the North Korean detention of the Pueblo, the Chinese authorities in Whampoa.held a Soviet tanker for two weeks, accusing the Soviets of using its visit to Chinese ports to spy on Chinese ships and fortifications. b. Greece. Yet another recent example of dissension in the World Communist movement is the split in the exiled Greek Communist Party (il- legal in Greece since 1941). One faction under Nikos Zachariades, who was the Communist leader during the guerrilla war in Greece, 1946-49, is based in Moscow, while the other has its headquarters in Bucharest. (The group in Bucharest is reported to be further divided, with some members favoring the Chinese.) An important aspect of the split is the bitter disappointment of most Greek Communists over the surprisingly mild atti- tude of the Soviet Bloc towards the present military junta in Greece. In fp,ct the Soviet Union has given profitable contracts to Greece and East Germany has even offered the Greek government credits to the extent of $90,000,000. c. Iraq. The Soviets have cut off their support of the Voice of the Iraqi People (VOIP), a semi-clandestine broadcasting station believed to be based in Bulgaria, which has been broadcasting Communist propaganda to Iraq in Arabic and Kurdish for the past five years. On 24 February, only two days prior to the opening of the Consultative Communist Confer- ence in Budapest, which representatives of the pro-Soviet Iraqi Communist Party attended, VOIP announced that, "due to changed conditions in Iraq," it would cease broadcasting as of 27 February. The "changed conditions" in fact applied to Soviet foreign policy, not to conditions in Iraq. So- viet policy currently is to curry favor in the Moslem world, including the favor of such "reactionary" (by Communist standards) regimes as those of Jordan and Iran (both monarchies), and Iraq (a military dictatorship). Three days before VOIP announced its "suspension," it excoriated the Iraqi Government in these words: ."The regime's evil, reactionary whims have caused the imprison- ment, death, or dismissal from army ranks of thousands,of efficient national officers and soldiers. During the battle against Israel in June 1967, the regime sent only token units and resorted to a hypo- critical propaganda campaign instead of mobilizing the struggling forces against the enemy .... They frustrated the will of the people by their provocative, intimidatory policy and crushed the people's demonstrations by force .... Such behavior reveals their strong feel- ings of support for the reactionary agent regimes in the Arab coun- tries and their inclination to bargain with imperialism .... Those who ally themselves with imperialism and its supporters are actually placing themselves outside the national liberation camp's struggle against imperialism and Israel ...." Approved For Release 2005/04/216: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Such sentiments being directly contradictory to current Soviet official policy, it is understandable that the Soviet Government out off its support to VOIP. It is merely another instance in which the Soviets have sacrificed a~local Communist Party to Soviet national and foreign policy interests. 7 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY May 1968 Mieczyslaw Moczar: Poland's Minister of Interior Mieczyslaw Moczar (pronounced Mo-char) has frequently been mentioned as a possible successor to Wladyslaw Gomulka. He has also been called a "king-maker" because, although he prefers to operate behind the scenes and does not appeal to the majority of Poles, as Minister of Interior he controls the powerful state security apparatus and as head of the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (a veterans group referred to as ZBOWID) he controls one of Poland's largest mass organizations. (Moczar has expanded ZBOWID in recent years by opening up its member- ship to anybody affected in any way by World War II -- concentration camp inmates, civilian victims, fighters adhering to the anti-Nazi and anti-Communist Polish government in London. To perpetuate the organi- zation, he now includes the sons and daughters of qualified members.) With these instruments, Moczar can apply considerable pressure for or against contenders for the leadership of Poland's Communist Party. In any case, Moczar is deeply involved in Poland's current power struggle and will be a key figure in any decisions of that country's future. Moczar's background, like that of many Communist leaders, is obscure. He was born in Lodz on 25 December 1913. His Ukrainian parents had him christened Mikolaj Demko; he was known by his Ukrainian and Russian nick- name of "Wanks." He received little education, and when very young be- came a member of a gang of petty robbers and horse thieves. (He was once caught and badly beaten by some peasants while attempting to steal some horses.) He got a job in a textile factory, and became active in the Com- munist movement in Lodz in the 1930's. At the outbreak of World War II, Moczar fled to the USSR, where he received training from the NKVD, the predecessor of the present KGB (Com- mittee for State Security). He was sent back into German-occupied Polish territory by the NKVD, and joined the Polish resistance. He "miraculously" escaped the fate of the rest of his unit when the Germans overran the area and killed or captured them. There have been rumors that he had at times collaborated with the Gestapo. After the Germans were driven from Poland, Moczar participated in the liquidation of thousands of non-Communists, and is credited with hav- ing arranged the assassination of Boleslaw Scibiurek, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party, in December 1945. In fact, this particular crime led to the murder of a UB (Secret Police) lieutenant whom Moczar feared and ordered "removed" because-of'his knowledge of the affair. Moczar was so ruthless in his actions against any enemies of the Communist regime, real or imagined, that he was promoted to Colonel and placed in charge of the UB in Lodz. There he continued his repressive Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 activities and thousands of Poles were beaten and tortured, and many were killed -- usually in the same buildings previously used by the Nazi Gesta- po. Moczar was responsible for the bloody suppression of workers' strikes at Pabjanice and Moszczenice in 1945, in Lodz in 191+7. Moczar's career has been narked by ruthless opportunism. His willing- ness to employ force. stamped him as a "Stalinist" and was his primary quali- fication for the post of Minister of Interior, to which he was appointed in December 1961+. He has become particularly prominent in the news from Poland in early 1968. According to some reports, Moczar helped to provoke student upris- ings in early March by ordering that the play "Dziady"("Forefather") be closed in late January. (The play contained lines which, though written in the 19th century and directed against the Russia of tsarist times, were deemed insulting to the Soviet Union.) According to numerous reports, the Polish students denounced Moczar during their protests and regard him as the most serious obstacle to political and economic liberalization. In any event, Moczar reacted harshly to the demonstrations, and his UB plain- clothesmen played a large role in the numerous arrests which ensued. Moczar is'also regarded as a driving force behind the current campaign, against "Zionism.". It is felt that this campaign is at least partly an ex- pression of his hostility toward Poland's intellectuals, from whom he re- ceives no significant support and with whom he has little in common even though he has been trying to cultivate them by such standard techniques as conferring honors on them, going to writers' meetings and having his picture taken shaking hands with them. The picture of Moczar which emerges from his background, career, at- titudes, and policies is that of a "Stalinist." Unfortunately for Poland, Moczar is not an exception amongst leading Communist politicians; rather, he represents a sizable element of the Party. Whether Moczar can exploit his present strong position for himself or for a contender of his choice remains to be seen. Approved For Release 2009/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY May 1968 Edward Gierek: A Profile In nationally publicized speeches of 14 and 30 March 1968, Edward Gierek projected himself as a serious contender for the leadership of Poland in the event Wladyslaw Gomulka is forced to relinquish his 12 year hold on the country. In those speeches Gierek gave the impres- sion of a cautious advocate of reforms which would appeal to the Com- munist Party's younger members. Although he criticized students for their behavior in the riots of early March he did not endorse the re- gime's harsh reactions in putting the riots down, and as a general practice he rejected coercion as a means of solving problems. In the earlier speech he attacked "Zionists", but on 30 March he omitted them from his list of Poland's political opponents. Gierek also emphasized his strong support of the Polish-Soviet alliance. The combination of these positions and his reputation as a hard-driving, successful polit- ical leader and industrial administrator in Katowice Province establishes Gierek as a person who can appeal to moderate Party members and at the same time assure Party conservatives that they need not fear substantial political and economic changes if he assumes power. Edward Gierek is not an ordinary Communist leader. He spent 24 of his 55 years (he was born on 6 January 1913) in France and Belgium, where he worked as a miner. His activities in Poland since he returned in 1948 have been well publicized in the press and by radio reports. He turned down opportunities to live and work in comfortable circumstances in Warsaw, preferring a more difficult assignment in the remote province of Katowice, where he has been the first secretary of the Party organiza- tion since 1957. Gierek is also distinguished from most of his fellow leaders by his success in fostering industrial development in Katowice and by the support he received from the workers in his province. Highlights of Gierek's career are: 1948-56: Studied engineering and economics, performed Party work in Katowice Province, and became the Party's lead- ing expert on the political administration of heavy industry. 1956: Headed the commission of inquiry into the Poznan riots in July, and supported Gomulka in the confrontation with Khrushchev in October. Since 1957: Has headed the Party in Katowice Province. Since 1957: Has been a member of the Party Politburo. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Gierek's industrial achievements are evidenced. by statistics on Katowice: occupying only 3% of Poland's territory and containing 11% of the population, the province accounts for 20% of the dustrial production. country's in- Gierek has shown political. shrewdness in carrying out his assign- ments. For instance, he is credited with halting a trainload of food bound for Germany in the winter of 1963-64, a time of food shortages, and distributing the contents throughout his province. He has seen to it that workers in his province are paid better than in most other areas of Poland. In 1966 he undercut the national policy of restrict- ing celebrations of the Millenium of the Catholic Church in Poland by hinting that he did not agree with Warsaw, and thus gained some sym- pathy from Church leaders in his area. He also bolstered his image by appearing to oppose Gomulka's decision in the fall of 1967 to raise meat prices. One measure of the response to such political gestures was the March 1965 parliamentary election, in which Gierek's showing was as impressive as Gomulka's and better than anyone else's. Gierek also seems to have attained significant status in foreign relations. He has regularly accompanied Gomulka on major trips to Moscow and the Soviet press mentions him frequently. De Gaulle, dur- ing his trip to Poland in September 1967, spent considerable time with Gierek in Katowice and made flattering remarks about the "Polish- ness" of one of that province's formerly German towns. In national affairs Gierek has steadily broadened his appeal to Poland's various political groupings: the Communist Party apparatus, the "Partisans" (hard-line faction led by Minister of Interior Moczar), the moderate Catholics, the students, and the liberals. In addition, Gierek has developed extensive ties with the military by virtue of be- ing chairman of the parliamentary Commission on National Defense. In short, Gierek has worked hard to pave the way for his rise to the pinnacle of power in Poland. The question now seems to be when will he make his bid, rather than would he be able to do nation- ally what he has done for his province ... and for himself? Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 "Tokyo JIJI -A S.TS PF1 flG OVER ' KrTI[OD OF ATTACK' 1cP 59 'March 1968 "Tokyo--The Japan Communist Party in a formal statement Saturday blasted Communist Chi.na'for"resorting to the dirtiest method of attack" in a frantic move to discredit the Japanese party. It is now evident, the party averred, that Peking alread has no alternative but to have even Premier Chou En-lai pitch in to start a new campaign of sander in person against the Japanese party. The party's statement was meant as a rebuttal to the reported allegation by Premit,r Chou thnt the Japan Communist Party an wall quo Soviet rovinionintn, American imporialifm, and Japanese reactionaries are engaged in undercover act.vit'.cs to disrupt the situation in mainland China. The remark was made when he received a de'?egation of Japanese traders in Peking on Wednesday. The statement ma?trtaincd that "Mao Tse-tung and his cohorts" in the Chinese_ Conmunist Part had teen engineering various activities of intervention and itted to the lines of su'hyer>in against the Japan. Communist Fart , which is comm independence and international communist solidarity. Now that all these machinations have come to naught, the party asserted, they have started resorting to the dirtiest method of slander under the leadership of Premier Chou himself. 'The Japanese Communist Party, once Peking's protege, has washed its hands of the Chinese Communists' tough l1ne in recent years and has pursued an independent line In the international communist movement. Peking NCNA Te;:t of Minutes ' 19 March 1968 ?hollouinC is-the text of the minutes of talks between the China Council for tiro Promotion of International Trade and si;c organizations oolong- ina to the Japanese Association for the PL'or.rotion of International Trade: At the Invitation of the China Council. for the Promotion of International trade, :'eproscntativca of the Japanese Association for the Promotion of International Trade, the association':; Kansai head office, its Iahlkawa Prefectuurr- ;,ranch, l:,of;o ,ranch, Koou branch, and ToI:ai headquarters paid a fricndl;; vi sit to the reoplets Repu;,lic of China in tire: :;grit g of 19(u. They visited factorics, L)oot)le's corar.munes, schooland units of the People's Liberation Army, and ;cad o::tensivc contacts with workers, peasants, arnycien and Red Guards. DurinC their stay in Pcl:inl;, the represrntatives of the friendly Japanese trade or;;ancations wore received by Premier Chou En-lai in a cordial and friendly Representatives of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and the friendly Japanes1 trade organisations held friendly talks in a mares a'?:r,rosphore. They reached unanimity of opinion on questions of continuint to develop tile, friendly and trade relations between the Chincse and Japanese people in the future. The two sides unanimously point out that the present world situation is e;zcellent. with great pleasure, the Japanese side has been for itself that China's unprecedented great proletarian cultural revolution, initiated and led by the Chincsc people's great leader Chairman Mao, scored a decisive victory in 196'(. Guided by the wnole scrica of Chairran Mao's latest instruction;., tiro Chine no are :;trivint, for all-round victory in the great proletarian cultuual revolution. Mao Tse-tuna;';: thouCiit has ;,can popularized even more extensively in China's cities and countryside and has gone deep into the hearts of the people. It has become the source of strength for the hundreds of millions of revolutionary masses in their valiant march forward. The masses of ;r r'cerc and Pea ;: rc~+~edaF 0easep26 r/O4181thC1 - 8QPd i~IRs1IR+ Q,~4499OAgg9;-L ,r:r irr;ia n Liao "to Grasp revolution and promote production," and industrial and agricultural jAr - P 9L ~i~~ OQa0 00040002-3 ,rod~tc':ton i~ A Wj~y% 9 C!#bPnq~,.20PN0#4? 4a' c confidcncc and prosperity is seen everywhere. In the visit, w:&at itapre s:~d the Jopanrc,e side most was the extremely great achicvet:ents of thr. Cltin..~sc in `::air livin,; atuc~;; and application of Rio Tne-tunGls thou-,:it. The Japanese side points out that the great victories in China's great proletarian cultural revolution have greatly inspired the oppressed people and nations all over the world in their struggles for liberation, and have dealt heavy blows Soviet modern -revisionism and all reaction. at U.S. imperialism, The Chinese side warmly acclaims the Japanese people's patriotic Just, struggle against U.S. imperialism. During the past year, the Japanese people have repeatedly launched extensive mass struggles against U.S. imperialist aggression, for national independence, in support of the Vietnamese people's war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, in defense of Sino-Japanese friendship and in opposition to Sato's 'criminal activities in visiting the U.S., Taiwan, and South Vietnam. A new anti-U.S. storm recently swept the islands of Japan. The masses of the Japanese people have waged heroic struggles in powerful waves against the entering into Sasebo port of the U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise, against the U.S.-Japanese reactionaries building. of a military air field in Sanrizuka, and their building of a new U.S. Army field hospital in Tokyo, for recovering Okinawa, for abrogation of the Japan-U.S. "security treaty," and against U.S. imperialism's turning Japan into the biggest base for its :aggression in Asia. In the course of these struggles, a broad patriotic united front against U.S. imperialism is being formed and broadened. The Chinese side declares that the great struggles. waged by the Japanese people are a tremendous su pnort and inspiration to the people of China and the rest of the world. Chairman Alao says: Japan is a great nation. It will certainly not Allow U.S. imperialism to ride roughshod over it for long." "Among the Japanese, except for the pro-U.S. monopoly capitalists and the militarists, the broad masses of the people are our true friends." The Chinese side declares that the Chinese people follow the teachings of the great leader Chairman Mao, resolutely support the Japanese people in their struggle for independence, denooragy and peace, and are convinced that final victory assuredly belongs to the great people of Japan. Both sides unanihously point out that the people's war waged' by the heroic Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression and for national salvation is the greatest war for national liberation in the world today. The brilliant victories of the South Vietnamese people since their recent spring offensive once again demonstrate to the world that the Vietnamese people have completely taken the initiative in the war, and that the U.S. aggressor trobps have been badly beaten into an impasse and are sinking fast.- The great victories of the Vietnamese people have greatly enhanced the morale of the revolutionary people throughout the world and have put U.S. imperialism and its lackeys into chaos and confusion. The flames of the Asian, African, and Latin American people's struggles for national liberation are raging. The anti-U.S. struggle of the people throughout the world is growing, Tmperialism, modern revisionism, and all reaction are in a dead alley. :The capitalist world is sinking into an inescapable crisis. The devaluation of the British pound and the U.S. dollar crisis have greatly sharpened interimperialist contradictions. U.S. imperialism Is facing a serious crisis politically, economically, and militarily. The entire situation, as Chairman Mao points out, is this: "The enemy ot ith e r s w very passing day, while for us things are getting better daily." The two stales unardmousl.y hold that U.S imporial.ism i:; the number one enemy of the rams:; of 'htna. ;;.rui J~-pan and the whole wQrl.d; the Soviet modern. .revisionist e1igue is thr r,umr.r-. r One ar.,c,~c ul.~.ce of U .S. imperial ism- the reactionary Sato government, wY,1_h has : J t - cce Era eu its reactionary proU Sitith th ...-,. une we Soviet Union and anti., s ~?: ?:ir dF'r~r.fcMEnt nt' the Cr:S>??Jat~ane~r reactionaries. To continue strengthening the st rLg :ie araxnst these foul enemies conforms to the interests not only of the Japanese and Ch.i Fs ' r-i1NkI,9S4h200W64?2Rf. MaMP781030"AQW400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 DUr,i.ng the talks, the Japanese side gave an account of how the friendly Japanese trade personages, silo; g with the lapi?nese people, develop national integrity and fight shoulder to ;sheu].dcr against U, S. inpeviali.sm and its lackeys. The Chinese side exprensed firm support for the friendly Japanese trade personages in their struggles against U,3.-Japaneso reaction and paid tribute to the friends in the friendly Japanese trade circles for t'., it active effort's to develop the friendly and trade relations between the people of .1>,ina and ;rnpan, The two sides affirm that the "protocol on the promotion of friendship and trade between the Chinei and Japanese peoples" signed in Peking on 27 February 1967, was correct. It har played a great role in developing the friendship and trade between China and Japan and has been welcomed and supported by the people of China and Japan. During the talks., the two sides considered the prospects of expanding Sina-Japanese friendly' trade. They unanimously pledged that they will develop the militant spirit of the "protocol," continue to insist on the three political principles and the three principles for trade, and the principle of the indivisibility of politics and economics in Sino-Japanese relations and make concerted efforts to continue developing the friendly and trade relations between the peoples of China and Japan. These obstacles come from U.S. imperialism, the Sato reactionary government, and their accomplices. Therefore, the friendly contacts and trade relations between the peoples of China and Japan can grow smoothly only if tit for tat struggles are carried out against the four enemies headed by U.S. Imperialism, their various plots and subversive activities exposed, and the artificial obstacles they have placed removed. During-the talks, the two sides discussed matters concerning the strengthening of mutual friendly contacts, technological exchange and friendly trade, reaching a harmony of views, and they are determined to make further efforts for this end. The two sides discussed the question of holding a Japanese industrial exhibition in China and reached satisfactory agreement. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 TASS, M 3 April ved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 80ViET UNIbN PROTESTS CPR DETENTION OF 3HIP On 31 March and 3 April, the Soviet Government strongly protested to the CPR Governmen' against the unlawful detention from 27 March in port Wampu (near the town of Kwanchou) of the Soviet tanker Komsomolets Ukrainy carrying a cargo for embattled. Vietnam, It is officially announced here. .The Soviet Government demanded the adoption of measures to insure the safety the tanker's crow and the lifting of the )an on the shipts departure from port with `nll its crew. The USSP Oovorrpent stressed that the entire responsibility for the ;serious aftermath- of the acts of arbitrariness and rude violence regarding the tanker and Soviet seamen rests with the CPR Government. At is said in the announcement that the Chinese authorities are inventing various pretexts to prevent the ship from leaving port and are compii:ting facts off arbitrariness against its crew, There is information that armed CPR servicemen h;tre brok':> down donra and burst into the tanker's inner promises and are using force against. the captain and other members of the crew. These actions of the Chinese authorities are of a premeditated, provocative nature and are a rude violation of international law. They c'zn be assessed only as an intention to damage the cause of aid by the socialist countries to the Vietnamese people in their heroic struggle against the U.S. aggressors. Peking IWNA 5 'April 1968 5017T H11, SII:rr OFFICER ACCUSED OF PHOTO. ESPIONAGE Foreign,Ministry Protest -The Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China, in a note to the Soviet Embassy In Poking today, lodgbd a strong protest with the Soviet Government against the crime committed by Ponomarehuk, second mate of the Soviet ship Komsomolets Ukrainy, in carrying out espionage activities encroaching on China's sovereignty, and against the serious violation of law by Kosyakov, captain of the ship, Ukrainy was sailing from Laeewei Island of Whampoa [Huangpu] port of Kwangchow [Canton], China, to ITumen, Ponomarehuk, second mate of the ship, stealthily took photographs of Chinese naval vessels and the topography,of the Humen fortress. But when Chinese inspectors made an inspection, Ponomarchuk flatly denied his crime and tried to expose the negatives for the purpose of destroying the evidence. Kosyakov, captain of the ship, took an intolerable attitude of shielding the crime of Ponomarchuk, He openly opposed the lawful detention of Second Mate Ponomarchuk by the Chinese department exercising proletarian dictatorship for trial. In addition, he instigated other crewmembers to make unwarranted provocations against Chinese personnel, completely ignoring the dignity of Chinese law. The note said that at 1404 on 23 T-larch 1968, when the Soviet ship Komsololets While the Soviet ship Komsomolets Ulcrainy was at the Whampoa port, its captain illegally uned Ithe ship radio to transmit messages on many occasions, defying repeated warnings from the Chinese side and seriously violating China's port regulations, .The roc pointed out that S^4'e:; vessels and their crews had for a long tine engaged in espionage activities in Chi:ia'a territorial waters. In July 19 7 alone, the Soviet reconnaissance vessels Gidrolog and Gidrograf made six intrusions into cast China coastal waters to engage in espionage activities, flagrantly violating the sovereignty of the- P pdvealefewlRelogs% 2W /%2dnaUk-FOP-M4M61A0?94d0DQ4NP?*8ed Chinese pro'ests, the Soviet side continued suoh criminal activities. At a ticte t: en U,S.. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 inperialiau is taking new whops to expand its war in Vietnam, you act Just litre U.S. ir.:~c~^iali,rn and energetically carry out oapionage activities in The Pc.plels Republic o " C: ins, the rear area fee the Viotr:anesc people's stric;U;le against U.S. aggression and. 2ir nati :tal salvation, This clearly exposes the criminal aim of t:ie Sovic, rnvis:.o,$ist leading clique to collude with U.S. imperialism and Oppose, Cllina," the note said. T::e Chinese Government, it declared, hereby lodges strong protests with The Soviet Governncn. agai:ast ,e irides ^f The Soviet veasclc and their crews in oarryi.n^' out aspionsas activities and encroaching on China's soveroigntp. The Chinese Oovornmpnt sternly warns the Soviet' Goverment that it must immediately stop such criminal . activities by the Soviet vessels and, their' crews in China: otherwise, the Chih so Goverment will,. take severe .measures. L: conclusion, the note sa!d that the Chinese department concerned had made thesot decisions: Ponomarchuk, second' mate, Kosyalcov, captain, of the Soviet Ship Koms5nolets Ulcrainy, tare to be$ departed from China immediately and they are forbidden to ontor any Chinese port again; and the Soviet ship Komsomolets Uh:rainy should leave the port under armed escort. Peking NCNA Deportation of 2d Mato, Captain I;wa:tgct;aw, 4 Apr'-l--T.-.e Ahampoa frontier defense inspection statim in K:lan(;chow today announced a decision with regard to Pononarclnl:c, ccecond mate, and Kos;;akav, captain, of the Soviet ship Konsomolets Ukrainy. T-o )er,i ;ton said that Fcromar:.'hul" had angaf;ed in criminal eopionage activities,,, encroaching on C1;inar s sovereignty and Kosyakov had flagrantly violated C:iineee law. To safeguard the sovereignty,. of the People's Republic of China and defend the dignity of Chinese law and port. regulations, the decision announced the following measures to e :ahem ?--Immediately deport from Ch? a. Ponomarc:.uk, second mate, and Kosyakov, captain,; of Soviet slap Kartsomoleto Ul.rainy. They are forbidden to enter any Chinese port again. 2--Order the Soviet. Ship i:onsomole?ts Ukrainy to leave the port under armed esc.ort,. s., Corfisca a the cauora and t e.negatives which Ponomarthuk uted in his criminal. r:. activities, Tie, above decision has already, been carried out. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 2 1 C1 0B Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Hanoi's Other Fronts In Asia May 1968 For the past few years world attention has been riveted so closely on the war in South Vietnam that the steadily increasing pressures Hanoi and Peking are applying against North Vietnam's other neighbors have largely by- passed international notice. They have not, however, escaped the attention of the other Asian nations -- particularly those being subjected to such pressures or those who fear they might be next in line. The "Domino Theory" -- that the other states of Southeast Asia would be toppled, one by one, if South Vietnam should be conquered by the Communists -- never accepted. in many areas of world opinion, has not been ignored nor rejected in Asia. The statements of Asian leaders increasingly reflect their alarm over pos- sible developments should the U.S. and its allies pull out of Vietnam. Their concern is justified, for, as the pattern has developed over the past three years, it is clear that Hanoi and Peking have more extensive ambitions in Asia -- ambitions not confined to Vietnam, nor for that matter to the former French colonial area of Indochina, but extending to Thailand and Burma, Malaysia and Indonesia. What is Happening in Laos The nation most affected by a spill-over of the war in Vietnam is Laos, which has a little war of her own blazing despite her supposed neu- trality. Helping to keep that little war going are approximately 15,000 North Vietnamese troops who have been infiltrated into Laos to help the local Communist and pro-Communist rebels (the Pathet Lao) fight the Royal Laotian Army. An estimated 25,000 additional North Vietnamese troops are in Laos manning the extensive supply and infiltration routes that run from North Vietnam through Laos into South Vietnam. The most important of these routes is the famed Ho Chi Minh trail along which as many as 9,000 North Vietnamese Army troops have infiltrated into South Vietnam in a single month. Ho Chi Minh's troops are in Laos in direct defiance of the Geneva Agreements of July 1962 by which 13 nations (North Vietnam, Communist China, the U.S.A., Great Britian, the USSR, France, Canada, Burma, Cambodia, South Vietnam, India, Poland and Thailand) guaranteed the neutrality of Laos; however, the military terms of the Agreements, calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops except a small French training force, have never been observed by the North Vietnamese who have just recently increased their troop strength in Laos. Nor has North Vietnam cooperated with the International Control Commission in conducting investigations of charges of violations of their agreements. A combination of factors is probably involved in Hanoi's recent intensi- fication of activity in Laos: First, the possibility that Hanoi has decided to open a second front in Laos as indicated by increased troop deployments there, the direct attacks by North Vietnamese troops against Laotian gov- ernment positions and the introduction of heavier, more sophis- ticated field weapons into southern Laos; Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Second, the possibility that the North Vietnamese are enlarging or diversifying the Laotian routes they use to infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam, at the same time continuing to use areas close'to the Laotian-South Vietnam border for sanc- tuary, rest and food foraging; Third, the possibility that Hanoi plans to use Laos as a political pawn in the event of peace talks -- presumably by taking as much territory as possible in Laos to strengthen her bargain- ing power at the peace table. (See attachments 1 to 4 for Souvanna Phouma's protest speech and other de- tails.) Thailand is Also Vulnerable The recent increase of Communist insurgency in Northern Thailand is un- doubtedly connected with Hanoi's strategy in Vietnam: Hanoi's leaders must calculate that the growing military action in Laos, combined with increased insurgency in Thailand, may concern that country's leadership enough to af- fect Thailand's military and other support for the Allied effort in South Vietnam, Hanoi and Peking have long been implicated in Thailand's troubles with subversion. In late 196+ and again in early 1965 Peking's Foreign Min- ister Chen Yi told a visiting European that "we may have a guerrilla war , going in Thailand before this year is out." Chen told his fascinated visitor that Peking would furnish Chinese arms and supplies to Thai citizens to help them overthrow their government. In 1965 the Chinese Communists also spon- sored. the organization of the Thai Patriotic Front in Peking with the spe- cific aim of directing Communist subversive activities in the northeastern and souther provinces of Thailand. Prisoners and defectors have frequently testified. to guerrilla and other training given to Thai citizens by Hanoi and Peking. Hanoi has been conduct- ing such training at least since 1.962, concentrating on Thais from the North and Northeast areas of Thailand -- the traditional strongholds of the Communist-led insurgents. The major Communist training camp for Thais is reportedly near Hanoi. As many as 500 or 600 young men recruited in Thai- land have been trained in this school and have then returned to Thailand to carry out their terrorist operations. Documentary evidence on this training camp fell into the hands of Thai officials in April 1966 when a Thai guer- rilla, who had surrendered told about his class of 130 Thai citizens who had been exfiltrated from Thailand, trained by North Vietnamese Army personnel in guerrilla warfare and then infiltrated back into Thailand to operate against their government. Other defectors have told of being trained in Peking where they were taken, on tours of industrial and cultural sites, met with leaders of the Thai Patriotic Front, and were trained by Chinese experts in guerrilla tac- tics and in the use of American weapons. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Some of the "Thais" recruited by the Communists in Northeast Thailand have reportedly come from a group of refugees from Vietnam who became Thai citizens and settled in Northeast Thailand to a great degree retaining their pro-Vietnamese leanings. These individuals, estimated to number 30-40,000, furnished a convenient starting point for Peking's and Hanoi's ultimate ob- jective of setting up full-fledged training camps inside Thailand proper. Defectors have already reported a basic sabotage school in Northeast Thai- land whose top graduates were sent to Haiphong (North Vietnam) for advanced training. The number of Thais who have been trained in North Vietnam, China and more recently Laos is estimated to total about 2,000. (See attachments 5 and 6 for details.) Thailand's government quietly fought the insurgents for several years and finally protested to the United Nations, but with small success. In January 1967, Deputy Prime Minister Praphat bluntly said: "We can see clearly that danger of aggression comes from Red China and North Vietnam ... they have already started aggression ... by a campaign of subversion and incitement inside our country as they have already done in other countries, such as Vietnam, Laos and Korea." In October 1967 Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman told the United Nations' General Assembly: "Let us, the smaller and weaker nations, candidly face facts and realize that imminent dangers which may descend upon our nations are less likely to come from nuclear development than from combinations of military and political ventures which their proponents euphemist- ically call 'wars of national liberation'..." Cambodia Also Reacts to Recent Events Cambodia's mercurial Prince Norodom Sihanouk has also been moved to outbursts in the past few months protesting Communist encroachments against his land and people. For the moment, at least, he has forgotten his chronic displeasure with the U.S. in his indignation over the stepped-up activity of Cambodia's home-grown Communists, the Khmer Reds. Sihanouk claims these Khmer are being assisted by Thai Communist forces with Peking's backing in concerted attacks against widely spread areas, from Battambang on the Thai border to Kampot near South Vietnam. Vicious attacks have been mounted atainst outlying Cambodian police posts and the Khmer have used terror tac- tics to compel the cooperation of local officials. In at least one instance they summarily executed a loyal village chief. On 7 March 1968 Sihanouk wrote a letter to Le Monde in which he stated categorically that the Battam- bang attacks had been launched from "outside," that evidence of this "abounds" and that "Asian Communism strives to overthrow our regime from within." Sihanouk's letter to Le Monde appeared to represent a last straw. In January, it was reported that Viet Cong representatives were attempting to recruit Vietnamese residents in the vicinity of Phnom Penh and in rural areas Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : Cl -RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 in eastern and southeastern Cambodia. In February, stories circulated that the Cambodian Navy had captured a vessel carrying munitions to Communist guerrillas in southwestern Cambodia.; at about the same time, foreign news- men gave worldwide publicity to a North Vietnamese troop encampment within Cambodian borders. The Cambodian Government at that time denied that Cam- bodian territory was being violated by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong; but Sihanouk did say openly that "civil war is being imposed on Cam- bodia from outside" and ordered the execution of any hard core Communists captured by the Cambodian police. Finally, in early March, Sihanouk said in a radio broadcast that if a pro-U.S. government should take power in Cam- bodia "the supplies of the Viet Cong ... will be finished ... the sanctuary will be finished...." This was the first time that Sihanouk has frankly admitted that Cambodia is being used as a sanctuary by the Viet Cong and as a supply route by the North Vietnamese. (See attachments 7 to 9 for Sihanouk's letter to Le Monde and other details.) Conclusion There is little doubt that Vietnam's Asian neighbors would have cause for alarm should the Allied forces pull out of South Vietnam without first concluding a peace guaranteeing the right of the people of South Vietnam to have a. government of their own choosing. Those who have discarded the "Dom- i.n.o Theory" so lightly might do well to gather about their maps for addi- tionaly study. If they sketch on the maps those areas of Vietnam's neigh- bors already occupied or endangered by Hanoi, they will recognize what most Asian nations already know: that Hanoi and Peking have not limited their plans for Southeast Asia to South Vietnam. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 oulmein'? IENTIANE,r%,!L 4 )MADJUKUK Stung Treng lAMBO IA Battambang C .;J Kratie Gauhati INDIA mphal Ledo! Chiengmai ? vUdon ?ThaniI Savannakhe TH'AILAND Ubot Nakhon Ratchathani? .,Ratchasima ^ANDAMAN ISLANDS (India) } NICOBAR ISLANDS (India) SOUTHEAST ASIA Kuei-yang I N 'MAaiphong'? Hai-k'ou. ?7FP.anh jDemarceFlon Lioe Qui?~ Nhon SOUTNI) VIETNAM j -SAIGON r (~tiang Long z Wuchow' Canton Nan-ning li MACA ( .) (port.) pleiku t ^,NOT FOR REPRINT MALAYSIA, Chan: ~Yr4ng s0U7.1, NATUNA ISLANDS Spratly Island 1 r nnw >NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRES NTATION INDONESIA ,ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHO ITATIVE Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 FSIS: Vient' stic g i tea. 23 ~A pr corD9e~ease 206? /121 :rb A- OP7j?3061A000400040002-3 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 0130 GMT 23 Mar 68 D [Speech of Prince Souvanna Phouma delivered on the occasion of the Laotian National Armed Forces Day in Vientiane on 23 March 1968--presumably recorded] [Text,] His Majesty the. King, your excellencies, and dear compatriots, the national armed forces have just completed their 18th anniversary today. While we are celebrating ,the 18th founding*anniversary of the national armed forces today, we must know that p ly the situation in our country is (?deteriorating) critically. Since the earart of 1968; external aggression and invasion and internal revolt have been increasingly serious by degrees because the traitors '.[the NLHX] with the support of some.of our ne ghbors, have constantly (?violated and trampled underfoot) the 1962 Geneva !accords [on Laos]. ,This year the war in Laos is,getting more serious, and everybody knows very well that this war is undoubtedly connected with the Vietnam problem. Therefore, we can say ,that the NLHX is merely the tool manipulated by its alien bosses to serve their interests. They have cooperated with one another to wage a propaganda campaign by ,saying that the current war in Indochina is "a national liberation war." Under the above-mentioned pretext, the enemy recently launched fierce attacks against the Nam ?8ak area, which resulted in the involuntary withdrawal of the national armed forces from our positions there. Currently, the fighting in upper and lower Laos is noticeably (?improving) in Tha Thom, ,Lao Ngam, Attopeu, Saravane, Pha Lane, including the recent incident at Pha Thi. ?Although heavily mauled and suffering heavy losses, the enemy is still obdurate and continues to attack our strongholds, in accordance with his plan. The more serious the ;Vietnam situation becomes, the more tense the Laotian situation will become. This is the first time that we have seen the enemy use modern weapons, for example, some 120-millimeter rockets which the Lao-Viet forces never used before. In every battlefield, the enemy forces have (?deployed) a large number of modern weapons which some foreign countries have supplied them. This action, which is a violation of the `;1962 Geneva Accords, means that they do not respect (?this) legal Government of Laos. All these I mentioned are the important incidents concerning our Laotian problem which the government would like some (?international concerns), for example the United Nations and the signatories of the 1962 agreement, to know and to seek ways to solve and (?help protect the Laotian people). .,In addition, the Ho Chi Minh trail also passes through Laos for the benefit of North Vietnam, (?To the people who doubt what it is. I will tell you that) the trail is a very important route facilitating the flow of supplies, weapons, and men from North Vietnam to South Vietnam passing through Laos. We see that'the war in Laos is getting more serious by degrees and we see no end to it. :(?Even though outnumbered by the Lao-Viet forces), our national armed forces have bravely fought against the enemy and attained a number of successive victories, for example at Dong Hene, Lao Ngam, and Attopeu, and even though (?suffering some :leases), our national armed forces have bravely weathered many battles sacrificing ,the blood and lives of a number of heroic fighters. Dear generals, officers, noncommissioned officers, and rank-and-file soldiers, the overnm'nt of His hajest': the King would like to laud your highly praised duty [words indistinct] and our nation wilinever forget your ('conduct) when our nation was in critical situation. The government is concerned about and closely follows (Ithe prngress) of your activities every step. And the government is also trying to Approved For Release 2005/04/21 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 ?prava.de yopt~ oL FoY'R Ie ?65 /2t~ciLfiA!RbP7 f33 IA%MA0 EF 0 tieves .that the victories or defeats in battlefields are lessons for the national armed forces to study for military benefit. Once soldiers, officers, including commanders :of every level throughout the armed forces are united as a single unit, our (?suppres- 'sion operations) will be satisfactorily accomplished. The important duty of the national armed forces is to defend the independence, (sovereignty, and complete territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos without sany manipulation or serving the interest of any political parties. The national armed forces will always be strong if everybody, whether he is a soldier, an officer, or a general in the front or rear, enthusiastically carries out his assignment, whether hard or easy. Moreover, the orders of the command, especially the orders for (?troops in the front), must be clear and just without any personal interestaof the higher commanders. In accordance with the armed forces discipline and orders, all of you have the re:sp'nsibility to fight the enemy to the last in order to protect the honor and (?identity) of the national armed forces. Particularly, every officer must carry out his duty and discipline strictly so that he will become the good example to ,his subordinates and soldiers. Dear officers and soldiers, your current duty is now greater than before because the military movement in Laos as well as in surrounding countries is now (?more intense). It is a fight between the two ideologies competing to expose the influence of one another. [words indistinct] I appeal to all soldier compatriots to be united to fight the enemy of our nation in order to protect the territorial integrity, JAPAN SIia,S (2) 29 T'et;ruazy Ir'8 Communist Threat in Laos Tt Is now becoming evident that the' Vietnam war is spreading to neighboring Laos. This, indeed, had been bear expectation for some time past, not only because It is clear that Communist ambitions relate to Indochina as a Whole, and not solely td South Vietnam, but because it three distinct areas are involved in' the present fighting in !:sets that in the Communist view a widening of the area one of which the Communist forces are actually advancing Mfeeted by their guerrilla operations could best serve their ,in the direction of Paksane on the Mekong. immediate over-all military purposes. It Is stated that North Vietnam has about 40,()00 troops Laos is an cminentty suitable terrain for these Coin- in Lao!;. At least' half of the force is said to lie as igned monist purposes. Not only does Laotian territory provide ,.to security duty, along the Ho Chi ?IInh ;trail; the rest routes for the infiltration of troops and supplies from North arc intrgratcd with the I'athet Lao conlhat lrattali r oti "Vietnam to South Vietnam but the weakness of the Laotian arc taking part in fighting the Royal Government,' ica.0e Government in the face of the powerful local Communist when occasion arises. fnovement'tn Laos by the well organized and well armed eaacv i,tle the question of whether the Comnltintsto The Royal Laotian Government forces are "increasingly- hat ed bo th`.in_... I.a..atfa ,..n .._Cove r n ment circles an, ,l in crumbling" d}}77e to what the Pathet Lao said were "stagger- ~ti` >>'ning~ 1ng blows" ihlflicted by it and ton. prb?Communist forces in ;., It is, of course, possible that they may decide to refrain aos, the oft'iciril New China Nows"Agency In Peking swirl ;;from trying to do so at the present. juncture by the tb,'Alght Tuesday, quoting the Kharosan Pathet I io agenoy. It stated that the prevailing situation temporarily snits thetas bilk-t, that 3,594 "enemy" troops surrendered, deserted or were But it is clear that the people of Laos'are being suh;c.^ctr?wfi Captured in the first three months of the dry season begin- to unhsipliy experiences. I'rince Souvanna I'hounia, =Me ring last November. The Pathet Lao declared the morale' Prime minister, said recently he might appeal to the r?,igr,a of the "battered" Royal Government soldiers -had been Tories of the IP62 Geneva agreement if the situation detrr- tsinking lower and lower. "They often run away or Sur- ;orated. It appears he has not yet done so, nor can we ,render, even before the fight begins," it was claimed. In expect that it would prove of any avail if he slid. Nor the fighting in Nam Bac alone last month, It was alleged has he asked for American assistance In connection with 1,867 Royal troops were captured. the current Communist offensive in Laos. Acrordirig to The situation as naturally caused considerable alarm in Mr. McCloskey, however, the United States has l~r rvuir cl .Washington. "We are continuing to receive reports about military assistance to Laos for some time ;past althois,gh North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao attacks, and are serious-' he said nothing about the extent of this help. ly concerned over what may be a drive toward the lowly` . It crenas clear, however, that Ameri(*.an: aircraft !alive ;3ng parts of 14oa," the U.S. State Department said In a been bombing targets in Laos, including Corirr:,tani trots) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 CPYRGHT brief statement on Tuesday. "This and other recent nilli- tary moves by the North Vietnamese in Laos and the I'athet Lao represent further violations of the Geneve accords of IDG2." ' The "lowlying parts" referred to in this statement are j;resumably no other than the valley region along the Mekong River where most of the population dwells and the' best rice crops; of Laos are produced. According to Mr. Robert McCloskey, the State Department spokesman, ' rPv o . ~g 44 /R A : '~lAr iR1Pc7 tQt3A6flAOOa4 OO accuse other"; of the Fncam7~,t,..ttt~d, nt r 5. voyA.. Latest reports indicatF th ~ at for the first time the (.!.:_. crimes they' are themselves commttttng or Intending to aircraft have now supported the Royal Laotian troops in commit. battles with the Communists. In this latter connection, it is of interest to note that d '1ucud av that the United States Is e s we may expect at any time now to hear the cry ra at the Reds of "American aggression in.Laos," it being the t M posh their ofTensive the Americans will feet obiig;eti tit .usinLt t e t appears determined to Inirsue take sufficient military action to hold there up and we shallbile President Johnson apl -then be presented with a situation in Laos similar to that t e' struggle liIn South V team States until Govcrnrnent is isnehl?ina This prospect could hardly he pleasing to Washington,. for fresh wars. But no doubt the supposition to the con- already so extensively Involved In South Vietnam. But Mary appeals to the perfervid imagination of the Conirmt4 as a fine piece of propaganda!, d by it i Such then is the present situation with regard to Laos.-.North Korea charge nn It seeing clear that if the Communists are determined to.trying' to find a pretext for starting a war in Korea by' eblo incident. P C1'rtISTIAN SCIENCE .MONITOR 10 April 1968 ' (5) Chieng Khania, Thailand Though the talk may by of peace in,- hd C Viet-nam, here in Tailan theommunists have launched a new wave of ditty, deadly insure, gency. Incidents terrorists pounced 'on Thai border police patrols opcraung in the area, killing Y.....~ Arcas of Conunuztist yuC,-/-Life activi y : . Q U& bases uS air bases l I C A Initially, most'of the trouble was in Nan Province. But now the majpr action appears to be in the eastern part of Chieng Rai Prov- ince along the mountainous border with Laos. The Thai Third Army has been deployed in the area under the command of It. Gen. Aung Potinganit, who; served with distinc- tion as a battalion commander of Thai, troops in the, Korean confli.c,t. Now, although many Thai officers admit' they are thin on the ground, Thai troops are', nudging up into the mountains in a quest for Communist guerrillas. ~ . , They have been caught in a series of ame bushes, and in a quick, initial reaction they have used airpowei, including napalm strikes, on mountain villages considered) hostile. Western observers say no strikes were called on villages whose people had not been warned to leave, and who had not had time to get out. Certainly there has been a stream of Meo, Yao, and other tribesmen out of the mountains as Thai officials ordered them to' vacate. Some 3,000 of theiri now are located in schools and other makeshift camps in the- lowlands of Chieng Rii' Province. The idea is that they, should be held there, tvhile the Thai Army flushgs out Communist; terrorists left behind in the mountains, How ever, Thai officials frankly; admit they are, not yet sure whether.the eviction of tribes men from their mountain' 4omcs is to be' temporary or permanent. According to Thai intelligence, the terror-,. fists themselves are a mixture of mountain tribesmen, Thai Communists trained at the. guerrilla training center of Hoa Binh, 50 miles south of Hanoi, and North Vietnamese.' Regulations violated The Thais say they have killed some North Vietnamese but have not captured any. The tribesmen are exploitable by the Corn munists. As a 'minority group they have no particular loyally to l;,,ngl:ok, the Thai cap ital. They are addicted to the profitable n n efq#?fo 5/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 IsMor of ins> ~1~1-t~ve iFQ New area o/ `Red ;s.ubversiort In the mountainous areas of northern Thai- Innd, in and around Chieng' Itai and Chieng, ists n,' o I a t m Com iu ICl ` By John Ilughes Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor CPYRGHT bus", E c1~ yu I}gc 1~,~s y{ Tiiai ter toa'vcrnmcntfpo$y~y`~7i~~ird ' Ctfiii`fcd".'t`~6~u the a slash-and-burn type agriculture which northeast at about 1,500. means they run afoul of arious govern. Though the number of terrorists in the ment afforestation and conservation regula- north, however, may be less than that in the, tions. There are indications the Communists northeast, the Thais are taking the northern, have been playing upon all these "griev insurgency seriously. antes. Some observers argue that the 'Commu- The Thai military establishment is con- nists can never hope to be effective in Thai-, vlnced the terrorists are getting substantial land until they have successfully penetrated help from North Vietnam via neighboring the Thai populztce. Penetration of minority Lnos. Hero at Chiang Kham, intolligenco hill tribes cannot, they argue, carry much sources say they have located two Commu weight,with the purely Thai people of the ?nist camps just across the border in Lao `lowlands, and indeed might even antagonize territory. One, at Huey Phra, is believed to .them. Though this is certainly a valid argu- contain between 200 and 300 men. The other,, ment, it overlooks, in the view of other ob- at Huey Ngucnt!, is supposed to have be servers, the damage which might be wrought tween 300 and 500. by the hill tribes should they fall _substan- 4 tially under Communist sway. Forces eslintaled Meanwhile, there is not much doubt about Military men on the scene estimate there ;ultimate Communist ambitions for Thailand. are 500 Communist terrorists in Chieng Rai The manifesto of the Patriotic Front of ,Province. This is somewhat higher than the Thailand, the front organization of the Thai `estimate back in Bangkok, where the nvili?. Communist Party headquartered in Peking, Lary have other sources to tap for cross calls for the overthrow of the present "fast. checking. 'ist dictatorial administration which is sub. 'Lt, Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, chief of the servient to United States imperialism." Counter Subversion Operations Command,` The manifesto demands abolition of mils. for example, believes there are 150 hard- tary and economic agreements between core terrorists operating in the north, with' Thailand and the United States, the with perhaps several hundred more slipping back: drawal of Thailand from SEATO, and a ban and forth across the hor4lcr with Laos. on Thailand's participation in any military All sources ngtee that the number of ter bloc. It also calls for the restriction of for. rorisls operating in the ,northeastern prov. cign capital and the "assistance and pro= inccs, is considerably higher. Various in.. tection" of "national ;industry and, com- merce." .Excerpts from Bangkok newspapers (6) 15 November 1966 North Vietnam Runs Guerrilla School for Thais The North Vietnamese regime has been operating a secret guerrilla !warfare school for Thais for the past four or five years. One training ;school near Hanoi gives an eight-month course; other establishments for ;indoctrination of Thai farmers have been located in China and in Pathet Lao-held territory in Laos. A young Thai farmer revealed details of the school near Hanoi at a 'press conference in Bangkok in mid-October. Like many other Thais he had 'gone to North Vietnam, not knowing that he was to be given guerrilla instruc- tion. He had joined the "Farmers' Liberation Party" at the behest of a man from another Thai province, not realizing that this "Party" was a Communist front organization. Through this organization, he was offered a chance to go abroad to study, and he accepted this offer, hoping to receive medical training. The man who had induced him to join the "Farmers' Liberation Party" conducted him and four others from Thailand into Laos. There they were met and guided by Pathet Lao or Vietnamese soldiers. After 18 days of travel the group reached Hanoi, and proceeded to the training school. Our Thai farmer was given eight months of training in Communist doctrine and guerrilla warfare. A political course instructed the trainees in methods of persuasion to use to get villagers to "Join the revolution" and the regular Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : ClA-RDP78-03061A000400046002-3 courses wry>2aalflrser~%211is~~lc$~241'Yce of the People of Thailand," as well as to Hanoi radio. 130 Thais attended the school while the farmer was there; most of them were laborers and peasants from the south, middle and northeasterly sections of Thailand. The group in- cluded 18 women. Trainees were paid in Vietnamese currency at a monthly rate equivalent to 120 Thai baht. On leaving, they received a pair of pants and a final payment of 400 baht. The farmer said that he was in the fourth group 'of trainees, and since the school had been set up four or five years ago, his information indicates that there are by now a sizable number of potential 'guerrillas in Thailand, trained by Hanoi. They return to Thailand in the way they come, via Laos; the instructors tell them that they will be given instructions by the liberation movement after they reach home. In the case of this farmer, the indoctrination failed. On arriying home in.March 1966, he told his parents what had happened, and on their advice he gave himself up to the Thai police. Even before he got back to Thailand, he related, he had known that the Communists were trying to use him as a tool. Also, he had no desire to endanger his life for the sake of Communism. CPYRGHT MAINICHI ' (7) 9 March 1968 Commentary On Communism By Colin Johnstone :t - Cambodia's Internal Disturbances Cambodia's. Ilead of State, Prince Sihanouk, has issued ,another sharp warning against the growing threats to his ,co(uttry's security. Address- ing a Phnom Penh Press con- ;ference, he said that a rebel Cambodian "Viet Minh" move- tnent was trying to gain -con. trol of strategic areas In an 'attempt to cut Cambodia in 'two. Recently, he added, the subversives forced the 'inhabi- tants of several villages in Battambang province to leave their homes and take to the -jungle. Subversion had also :occurred In central Cambodia ,and the "Viet Minh" were try- ing to re-activate old cells in, !]'our southern provinces. It is now exactly a year' since the normally peaceful political climate of Cambodia was disturbed by agitation fomented by the Khmer (Cam- bodian) Communist Party, or Prachenchon, which has come to be known as the "Khmer 'Maoists" and "Khmer ' Viet 1 Minh " The Communists have sought to exploit economic f discontent . In some parts of the Bat.tambang province and i:h other areas for their own ?purposes, Phnom Penh Radio quoted Prince Sihanouk as saying that the Khmer Maoists had declar- ed war on Cambodia and be- gun hostilities. He revealed that these forces were receiv-. Ing supplies from the .self- styled Thailand Patriotic Front .(TPF), based in Pelting. Civil war was being Imposed on Cambodia because he had con- sistently rejected the lization" of the country and wanted to preserve its inde- pendence and neutrality. The. Communists, on the other hand, had decided to wage war until he and the Sangkum (the ruling People's Socialist Com- munity) had been overthrown. They did not say this in so many words, but their int.en- tionwas clear. The proof lay 'in their activities in' Battam- bang where they had attacked Isolated provincial guard posts, killed some of the personnel and rounded up nearly 500 families, driving them into the jungle. liattambang, 'in western Cambodia, has for some time been worrying the central gov- ernment. In February 1967, 'demonstrations arising from economic grievances developed into Communist-led unrest and violence. As a result, a para- chute battalion was sent to the town of Pailin and military units were 'put on the alert. A demonstration in Phnom Penh , y ere ;:believed to have been Corn-' summed up by the Prince on munist-inspired, demanded the withdrawal of the troops from Pau lo. In a broadcast to the nation on April 3, 19G7, Prince ` Sihanouk said that the Khmer l Reds were resorting to armed attacks because of the failure of their previous efforts( to ,of the resignation of the Lori Nol government then in power. The Battambang rebels and others had acted under orders from "their great chiefs .in Phnom Penh," he said. Official accounts of the un rest show that the Communists .have also been operating in the provinces of Kompong Chain, Kompong Thom, Kompong Speu, and Svay Rieng. After the Special National Congress on March 12, 1967, the rebels in Battambang were reported' to have murdered villagers and burned down the homes of peo- ple who had denounced. their activities at the meeting. In several provinces, the Com. munists distributed pamphlets strongly attackhig government policies, stole rifles and am- munition from the security forces, destroyed bridges and ransacked an agricultural camp.' According to the ofli- vial Agence Khmer Pres,e (AK)?), Cambodian troops en. Tgaged in mopping-up opera- tions encountered one group of some 500 armed rebels. Though successfully contain. ed by the army, the I3attam- bang troubles continued until ;June and have erupted' spora- dically since then. Their con. sequences and the challenge to Cambodia's stabilit w January 2Ap0$@ I ed, tar said that in some Press reports the Battambang rebellion had been described as a popular movement, whereas it was a purely Communist affair, The Khmer Communists ap- pear to have launched their campaign not from a position of strength but from the reali- zation that, unless they sue corded in carrying the masses with them, or better still in getting up a "liberated area" under their cotrol in the pro- vinces, they were likely to be j come progressively weaker. WASHINGTON STAR 8 March 1968 (8) Captured H asd-fore Redsl, s io sa'd.,,",C,l,,n~e a ?ain' I call 0VQiQafkEtiarW4 o stop their destructive action against our nation and surrender to our national society. At pre. sent, 99 per cent of the popu- lation are well organized. The government will grant. an amnesty to small groups who come over to the government side. :.If this appeal is not ef- fective, my government will take measures to suppress those who destroy our nation and will cooperate with those who follow the policy of the i Sau;kurn." , orders Execution lay BERNARD G%VERTZMAN . filar Suit WAur Cambodia's chief of state, No- roatom Sihanouk is stepping upf his anti-Communist campaign and has ordered the summary, execution of hard-core Commun-i Isis captured by his police. For the past three years, Si hanouk has striven for close re- lations with China, North Viet-. nam, and the Viet Cong, in the belief that being befriended,, they would leave his governmcnti alone. . Now, he Is reporting increased, efforts by these foreign Commu- nists to get local Cambodian Communists -- the so-called Khmer Reds -- to stir up troubles in western provinces of Cambo- dia, Sense of Urgency Enters Sihanouk has been making such complaints for about a year, but officials here notice that a sense of urgency has en- tered Sihanouk's language, and; he has sharply reduced the scale' al' his anti-American attacks,! which formerly were a mainstay of his public position. in a radio broadcast heard to- day in Bangkok, he was so an. gry at the Communists that he said he may "side truly with the Americans" and turn his own job over to his pro-American eaW;f~llo 03 reform and neutrality. Thee TPF is, however, a Communist front organization, whose only known members live in Pe- king, and which has never made any secret of its subser- vience to China. The TPF leader, Phayom Chulanont, re- cently described himself as '-a new pupil of. Chairman Mao Tse-tung." The Cambodian Prime Min- aster, I'enn Nouth, in an appeal to the nation over Phnom Penh Sihanouk said when and if a pro-U.S. government takes pow- er, "the supplies of the Viet Cong and Viet Ninh will be ttn- ished .. the sanctuary will be finished, . Diplomat le sources said it nas the first time Sihanouk had ad-, mitted his territory is used as a sanctuary and supply route by Vietnamese Communists. "Out of indignation with Reds, who do nothing but call others V.S. lackeys, I am inclined to .say that I want to side truly with the Americans," Sihanouk said. ii the of indignation I want to {submit really to the Americans ,because these people (Commu- nists) never stop speaking of my submission to the Americans." In a letter to Le Monde, the Paris newspaper. yesterday Si- hanouk said "it is perfectly clear that Asian communism does not permit us any longer to stay i cutral. He also accused Communist guerrillas in neighboring Thai- land of supplying arms to Com- munists in Cambodia. Reports Ship Capture In a speech Monday, Sihanouk reported that Khmer Reds had arrested and shot many village ,chiefs. "Therefore, I am also forced now to order the execution iith- out trial of the Khmer Reds," be f said. And today he reported the Cambodian navy has captured a vessel carrying munitions toj Communist guerrillas in south- western Cambodia. The prince just returned from a tour of the Communist rebel- infested Battambang area near the Thailand border where he said he found "proof of their collusion with the foreign power. which supplies them." 1 Another broadcast by govern-l ment radio In Phnom Penh said, that various rallies have been' held in Cambodia to show sup-' port of Sihanouk's policy against' Ithe Communists. In Sum officials here think iSihanouk probably is more sympathetic now to the prob- lems caused by the Viet Cong land North Vietnamese use of hurt territory, but there is little he can do to control it. Administration officials are Sihanouk's speeches lso savin g a ,to refute critics who say that 'Asian Communists are just nao tionalists with no aggressive ins tentions. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 :6CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 WASINGTON STAR -9 April 1968 (1{l) The Burma Threat In a recent public statement, his first In over a year, General Nc Win -- Bur- :ma's Defense Ministcr,;Prime Minister Lind Chief of State--rang an alarm bell. The Chinese Communists, he warned, were now apparently providing a sanc- tuary for traitorous Burmese guerrillas operating In the northern frontier area. "There Is much difficulty," he said, "in fighting these insurgents, as the locality is very close to the border. We have to be very' careful Iest our bullets go into the other country .' But "the other country" - Red Chi- na - Is not likely to be moved by Ne ' Win's effort to continue to be "the most neutral of the neutrals" in Asia. No land has tried harder than Burma to main- tatn good relations with Peking. Al- ,though historically distrustful of its plant neighbor, and although its own 'Communists are outlawed, it was the 'first non-Communist country to rccog- %ought. to adhere faithfully to the Sino- `13urmese treaty of friendship and non- a gresslon. All In vain, "however. Mao known to themselves, are following a CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 26 February 1968 Status- quo sltalres in "Laos .Laotians are searching for the meaning of .`!farces in Laos. Prince Souvanna rhnarlu route to South Vietnam in a more populated ;and more difficult to bomb area. By John Hughes Staff correspondent of The Clu'iatian; Scienre Jtf onitor Vicutiane, , Laos , course that mocks Burma's neutrality, The first clear'sign of this occurred last summer when Peking incited Com-' munist-led Chinese citizens of Burma to stage violent anti-Burmese demonstra bons. Next came open and repeated; Maoist assertions wholeheartedly sup- porting Burma's Illegal ComMunist party and strongly advocating a "revolution- ary people's war" to overthrow Na Win's government and bring about the coun- try's communization. So It is not surpris- ing that the guerrillas are able to flee to Red China's territory to escape pursuit, to be given food there, and to receive other forms of aid - Including presuma- bly weapons - from their patrons. These insurgent forces are not large at the moment, but they can grow, and they can become dangerous indeed in a coun- try, that shares a 1,200-mile border with so hostile and aggressivela neighbor. This is a matter of conceen, of course, or at least. It should be, to'othor coun- tries besides Burma. Every; land on or near China's periphery,' Including neu- tralist India, has a special stake in the situation. That is one of the lessons Vietnam teaches. Initial fragmentary reports Friday indi-' cote mortar' and small arms fire at the! southern town of Saravane, Communist' mortar fire on Attopeu and lighting at thet strategic little town of Lao Ngam. The hat. ter outpost was overrun Friday by Pathat Lao forces. Both Lao and American military men in. terpreted Communist move's at first as part of the routine seasonal Pathiet Lao oiTensive. j This is a fairly standard operation of him itcd scope to gather rice and crar..J tern tonal gains made earlier by fovcrnr;t^nt forces. It js a secsaw movement In )"h. eral areas which, in the view of ::eels military men "here, does not disturb the status quo under which Laos is virtually partitioned betWeen government and Com-'. munist, forces. This year, however, there has been a' much sharper edge to the Communist 'thrusts. The government is worried. In Jan- uary, the Communists overran the key posi- tion of Nam Bac north of the royal capital i of Luangprabang, inflicting a serious de-; 1est on the Lao Army. Now a force appar? i ently including four North' Vietnamese bat.' ttilions is threatening Saravane. A defector; from one of those battalions has given j 'While the tvar thunders on in Vietnam, the government in neighboring Laos isi pondering the meaning of new Communist; militancy in this landlocked kingdom. In recent weeks units of, the Communist Pathet Lao, stiffened by North Vietnamese troops, have moved aggressively on a num-1 of posts and towns held by, the govcrn Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 the. government Information on the deploy; anent of. Communist forces and the appar-; ,tilt plan of attack: But if the Communists should seize Sara. Vane, this would disrupt the whole deli. Cate arrangement by which war in Laos has! ,,been kept in low key. Though the Poles have boycotted an in? t vestigation, the Indian and Canadian mem? bers of the International Control Commis. sion In Laos have just made a survey of ,the situation in Saravane. But they are not ;talking publicly, and their report is yet to be submitted. The i 1eatio,t, of course, It, what are the Communist ohjertivcs? some military men; in Laos see it parallel with the Viet Minh; Prelude to the battle of Dien Bien -Phu 14 years ago. They point out that when North; Vietnam's Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap massed his; troops for that battle he swirled through! Laos, dispersing and disrupting the French! reserve forces. Others, however, argue that the situation' In Laos today is not parallel. There are no ltrnericnn reserves in La os, and it .is in South Vietnam that General Giap is nppar. ently tr};:u; to d+:-porse the Americans with Cer;c;~;:;,; =t ntt.ichs on the towns anti c;ticn. Anoti'er, theory is that the Communists are ronsolid:iting and extending their position In Laos in preparation for-any peace talks which might develop. But for North Victnam the main signifl? canoe of Lao4i is that it provides the infiltra- tion route O the south via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This year the traffic over the trail has been heavier than usual. One Lao general says allied IntcIligenco had detected the movement southward of Communist tanks and armored vehicles before these were thrown against Lang Vei. The Pathet Lao thrusts thus may be A diversionary ploy to protect the infiltration trail. The aggressive movement a Saravane is too far south to screen the Communist reinforcement of the North Vietnamese di- visions presently poised opposite Ithe Sanh. However, activity at Saravane might :lt into a pattern of Communist movement into the South Vietnam central highlands. Although attention has been focused on 'Khe Sanh, some military men have been :keeping an anxious eye on DAk To, scene of bitter fightin curlier. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : gIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 ~1-ffr.~vdedFor RLele se 2)005/04/ 3 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 (Tra a e rom an ian ) The Xat Lao Newspaper March 2, 1968 , No. 21+0 Mr. Pheng Norin at a Press Conference on General Situation in Laos On February 29, 1968, Mr. Pheng Norin, secretary of the cabinet meeting, gave an interview to reporters on the present military situa- tion resulting from the invasion of the PL and the North Vietnamese sol- diers. He also repeated the opinion of the Prince Premier that the war in Laos would be brought to an end the same time as the Vietnam war. Mr. Pheng Norin told reporters in French that Nambac, an important strategic area and a front door to the city of Luang Prabang was occupied in January 1968, by the PL forces with the cooperation of the North Vietna- mese 316th Division, a onetime famous division during the Dienbienphu bat- tle. Our forces had to retreat from the area because of the overwhelming forces of the enemies. The withdrawal of the government forces from the area ease the contact between the PL and Hanoi and at the same time in- tensify the situation of the battlefield in the North. Moreover, the enemies increased threats by launching attacks in the Central and Southern parts especially the areas in Khoueng Sedone, Saravane and Attopeu. In order to get more evidence, the RLG requested the ICC to send a delegation to investigate the situation in Pakse and Saravane. The Canadian and Indian delegates had agreed to conduct investigation but the Polish delegation refused to do so. PL Attacks: On February 23, 1968, 1 North Vietnamese battalions and 2 PL battalions attacked Lao Ngam and at 0300 hours the same day 3 PL battalions attacked Attopeu airfield by artillery. Casualties on the enemy side: The Headquarters in Lao Ngam which was occupied by the enemies at 0600 hours of February 23, was reoccupied by the government forces on February 24+, 1968. The enemies withdrew from the area leaving 186 dead soldiers, 2 antiaircrafts, 2 DK-82 cannons, 8 B-40 rocket launchers and more than a hundred of 'rifles and pistols. The enemies retreated to the areas of Narni and Phou Tid. 95 dead soldiers of the enemies were seen on the battlefield in the area of Khoueng Attopeu. The present situation in the area of Khoueng Saravane is in difficulty. General Situations: Tha Thom in the area of Khoueng Xieng Khouang was occupied by the enemies on February 21, 1968. The enemies also attacked the areas between Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Xieng Khouang and Borikhane. Three enemy battalions attacked and seized the stronghold in Sala Dendin. At 1900 hours of February 21, the above mentioned battalions attacked Muong Ngan. Enemy Aims: The enemy aims of the attacks are as follows: 1. to promote the influence and increase the PL occupation in order to strike a tough bargain during the future meeting on the problems in Indo-China, 2. to occupy the area of Phou Vieng which is a flourishing area in order to set up their Headquarters for sending troops into South Vietnam, 3. to take control of strategic routes of the National Army, 4. to help North Vietnam protect and broaden the Ho Chi Minh Trail to various villages and residential areas to increase moral irritation against the pilots in their air raids. 61 Prisoners captured: During the attacks from the enemies the National Army captured 61 North Vietnamese prisoners. These prisoners serve as evidences to confirm the North Vietnamese cooperation with the PL to infiltrate and invade Laos. The ICC also acknowledged the incidents. The War in Laos Depends upon the Vietnam War: At present it is obvious that the situation in Vietnam and the sit- uation in Laos cannot be separated. The Prince Premier had recently said that the war in Laos would be brought to an end the same as the Vietnam war. Q. Why doesn't the government hold an interview of prisoners in the presence of the concerned diplomats when some countries in the Socialist Bloc such as the Soviet Union, Poland and Red China deny the presence of North Vietnamese troops? Q. Mr. Pheng Norin said, "We do not care. The fact still is the fact." Questions and answers during an interview of three Vietnamese prison- ers are as follows: Q. Why does North Vietnam invade Laos? Because of hatred? A. (One of the prisoners answered) I don't know. We are soldiers. We fight according to the order of the government. Approved For Release 2005/04121 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Q. What will you do when the North Vietnamese Embassy does not recognize you as North Vietnamese soldiers being sent to fight in Laos? A. We are North Vietnamese from North Vietnam. We don't care what people say and we have requested the Lao government to save our lives. Q. How did you feel when you were captured? A. At first we were afraid of being killed. To the contrary, we all have been well treated by ordinary authorities. We don't know how the higher-ups will treat us. Q. Were you forced to fight in Laos? Did you volunteer to fight in Laos? Q. Radios of Hanoi and Peking deceive the world that North Vietna- mese soldiers have been sent to fight against American Imperialists. Did you see Americans in the battlefield? Q. If you are released, what will you do? Will you go back to North Vietnam? Or will you live in Laos? A. We would rather go back to see our parents. If the Lao govern- ment does not allow us then we have to live here. Q. How do your government and your families feel knowing that you are captured? A. We don't know what to say because we have never been captured. This is the first time. We know well that our families will feel ashamed for us Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : ?A-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 otovsd For Rele a 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 are. s (a9 s) 7 March 1968 A Letter from Prince Sihanouk We received from Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodian Chief of State, the following letter concerning an article that our contributor, Jacques Decornoy, wrote on the situation in his country [Cambodia], in the Monde, on 2 February 1968: "Mr. Decornoy implied that the revolt in the southern part of Battam- bang was not the result of foreign instigation, but originat(d essentially from discontent among the people, which was caused by a lack of employ- ment for young intellectuals, the 'burdensome' presence of the army, and other reasons, among which, of course, was corruption. This point of view seems very far from the truth, and I should like to explain to your readers what the real situation is. First of all, the people in this part of Battambang are not at all unhappy. As in the case of all inhabitants of remote areas, these people had received fertile land (2 to 5 hectares per family), fully equipped houses, animals for tilling soil and for breeding purposes, agricultural machinery, and seed. I believe that Cambodia is one of the very few countries to do as much for their small farmers. Further, roads have been opened, and schools, hospitals, and co- operatives have been set up in this area. There could not be any 'uprising' under such conditions; but this province has been occupied for many years by the Vietminh, which has seen to it that it has indoctrinated certain people, and has continued to be in contact with them. They are the ones who took up arms. They are headed by some former professors -- and perhaps also by some deputies 'who have disappeared.' They are the ones who have obliged the people, under threat of death, to leave their villages and to go to the forests. Has our army behaved badly toward the people? I should like to emphasize that no troops have ever been quartered in the area of Samlaut, which is the seat of the rebellion. The only soldiers that could have been seern.,there were there only occasionally, to open roads, to build bridges, and to bring supplies to the villages. And unemployment among the young people? There is not a single unemployed person in this area of small proprietors. The people live more comfortably and have more means than those in other provinces. I am not unaware of the problem of employment, which is of national inter- est. It is precisely in order to give work to young people that our government has increased the number of factories and of government plantations and settlements, which have furnished. some dozens of thousands of new jobs. Our training is now essentially technical and professional. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 We are a nation of many students (1,053,000 young people go to school, to the lycee, to the university, out of 6,300,000 inhabitants), and we must make an even greater effort to ensure work for everyone. One might ask if the other countries of the 'Third World' are resolving their unemployment problem better than we are. Permit me to doubt this, in view of what is obviously happening elsewhere. Whatever the case may be, there is not a single 'former unemployed person' among the Battambang rebels. Corruption? I do not deny that it still exists. It is an 'insti- tution' which not only afflicts our Asia, but which strikes very developed countries as well. But we are fighting against this. Our press, both governmental and private, denounces it with exceptional vigor. Sanctions are applied against the guilty each time their offenses are proven. The sanctions include censure, loss of job, and even imprisonment. It is precisely because we do not hide anything (in contrast to our neighbors) that we are accused of laisser-faire. The uprising in Battambang is essentially political and was started by outsiders. There is abundant proof: the discovery of propaganda leaflets printed in Siamese in Peking and bearing the image of Mao (this is material that was offered by the patriotic Thai Front who are loyal to the Chinese, which operates in the neighboring Thai provinces and supply our rebels with weapons and equipment). I should also like to emphasize the foreign origin of thousands of leaflets insulting Marshal Tito, which were distributed during the days preceding his arrival, of the weapons, and of the means of communication that were discovered among the Chinese terrorists who were preparing an attempt on the life of the Yugoslav Chief of State. And it was also at the request of a foreigner that an illiterate mountain dweller from Rattanakiri -- a province near Vietnam -- recently questioned me concern- ing the visit of Mrs. Kennedy and of Ambassador Chester Bowles. It is perfectly clear that Asiatic Communism no longer permits us to remain neutral and outside the conflict in which the Sino-Vietnamese and Americans are involved. Since they were not able to succeed in mak- ing us parties to unconditional surrender (we do not want to die for Hanoi or Peking -- nor for Washington, either), Asiatic Communism has attempted to overthrow our government, from within. As long as the great majority of my compatriots will put their trust in me, I will pursue the struggle for the independence and freedom of my country. Approved For Release 2065/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 1 C1 0B L Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Communist Military and Economic Support Of the North Vietnamese War Effort May 1968 On 23 September 1967, North Vietnam's Deputy Premier Le Than Nghi signed in Moscow a new agreement under which the USSR was to continue in 1968 to deliver military and economic goods, some free of charge and some on credit, to North Vietnam. During the previous month and a half, Le Than Nghi's dele- gation had signed military and economic aid agreements in Peking, Pyongyang, Sofia, Bucharest and Havana. Moscow was faced with a dilemma in announcing its agreement. For So- viet citizens, it was desirable to continue to tone down the military nature and the magnitude of the USSR's support of North Vietnam. As part of Mos- cow's continuing polemics with Peking, it was desirable to create the oppo- site impression: that the USSR was living up to its obligations to her em- battled Vietnamese ally by supplying large quantities of advanced weapons and armament. The result was that, in announcing the new aid agreement, the Soviet press for the first time emphasized the military aspect by stating that, at the request of the North Vietnamese Government, the USSR would de- liver aircraft, antiaircraft rockets, artillery and infantry weapons, and ammunition. However no figures were given, although it was indicated that the 1968 shipments would exceed the volume of previous years. Non-Communist journalists have attempted to ascertain, first, the ex- tent of the support the North Vietnamese were actually receiving from Com- munist countries, and, second, the significance of such support. Soviet and other Communist publications have. revealed little, because it would be undesirable for their citizens to be able to relate support of a far-away war to the shortages of goods at home. One clue has come from the Soviet press. In February 1967 Marshal Zakharov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, explained the military budget's 1.1 billion ruble increase (from 13.4 billion rubles in 1966 to 14+.5 billion in 1967) by referring to military aid to North Vietnam. Later, on 15 April 1967, Radio Moscow men- tioned "the current increase in Soviet weapons shipments by sea and espe- cially by land, to the Vietnamese Democratic Republic." Various estimates of the magnitude of Communist war aid have appeared in Western media. The Neue Zuercher Zeitung of 29 September 1967 cited form- er U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara as having estimated Soviet shipments to North Vietnam in 1967 at $1 billion and commented that:this figure would appear to be too low. On 5 November 1967, in the New York Times, Soviet aid in 1965, 1966 and 1967 was estimated at $1.5 billion. Other journalists point out that this figure may well be low, since the Soviets price their war goods for export at as little as a fourth of their cost. The USSR has pro- vided the preponderance of the aid to North Vietnam, perhaps three quarters of the total. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 . Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 The amount of materials shipped would be hard to estimate since rail movements from and across China can't be observed, as can ocean shipping. According to the New York Times of 27 December 1967, a record high of 17 deep-draft ships reached North Vietnam in January 1966; it also reported that 22-25 ships arrived each month in July, August and September 1967; a number of ships were also observed steaming into Cambodian waters. The scope of military aid received by North Vietnam is indicated by the fact that Communist countries have provided virtually all of the mili- tary supplies for the estimated 800,000 men in its armed forces. These forces include 7 North Vietnamese divisions in South Vietnam or on its bor- ders. In addition, North Vietnam supplies most of the needs of the 9 Viet Cong divisions, as well as numerous irregular forces in the South. Soviet shipments have included: -- jet bombers (IL-28) -- jet fighter planes (MIG-17, MIG-21) -- surface-to-air rockets -- antiaircraft artillery -- rifles (AK 47 and AK 50, the most modern in Soviet arsenals) -- 122 mm. rockets (5,000 according to one estimate) -- 140 mm. rockets -- 12.7 mm. heavy machine guns -- 120 mm. mortars -- two types of rocket-propelled grenades -- armored personnel carriers -- tanks. The Chinese Communists have supplied: -- 75 mm. pack howitzers -- 82 mm. mortars -- 102 mm. rockets -- AK L.7 rifles. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Large numbers of trucks have been provided to the North Vietnamese by the USSR, Communist China and several Eastern European countries. Also, the Chinese Communists have provided gunboats and the USSR has provided sub- marine chasers and motor torpedo boats to the North Vietnamese Navy,. Military aid has also been provided in the form of training. Hundreds of North Vietnamese military personnel are said to be in the USSR and East- ern Europe learning to operate modern weapons such as MIG jet fighter air- craft and surface-to-air rockets. Other military training 'was being given to many more of the 3,000 North Vietnamese in the USSR in 1967. According to an agreement signed in July 1967, 6,000 North Vietnamese (including military, industrial and other personnel) are to be trained in the USSR between 1967 and 1969. Similar agreements were reached with other Eastern European countries for the training of an additional 1+,000 North Vietnamese. Unknown numbers of military "advisors" and instructors from several Com- munist countries are reportedly in North Vietnam on training missions. Fur- thermore, the Chinese Communists are reported to have sent 50,000 to 100,000 engineer troops to help repair damages to airfields, bridges, rail lines and roads on which military supplies are delivered and to construct new military support facilities. Non-military aid in 1967 consisted mainly of food, but also included civilian transport equipment and small industrial plants. Food supplied in 1967 amounted to about a half million tons. The Soviets shipped flour and wheat (a substitute for rice and distasteful to the Vietnamese). The Chi- nese Communists shipped rice and the Eastern Europeans sent beans and grain. In summary, the Communist countries have contributed massive military and economic aid to the North Vietnamese war effort. Such aid has acceler- ated during the past year and, according to agreements now in force, it is expected to increase further. The significance of such outside support can be measured against the capability of the North Vietnamese economy to supply the wherewithal with which to fight the war in the South. To do this, it is helpful to take a look at a few pertinent features of the North Vietnamese economy: First, its gross national product at its high point in 1961+ was only 1.6 billion dollars, or less than $90 per capita.* Second, North Vietnam has practically no capacity to produce military equipment, not even small arms. North Vietnam's industrial production con- sists largely of minerals, cement and coal and thus is severely limited in its capacity to support war. *Most estimates of the North Vietnamese economy are based upon Soviet sta- tistical compii'lations and are believed to tend to exaggerate rather than to underestimate its magnitude. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 2 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Third, North Vietnam's industry has been almost totally dependent upon foreign aid for its development, which lagged far behind planned goals, even in the period 1954-6L when it was not hindered by the bombing. Fourth, and of great significance, the country's agricultural produc- tion has been sufficient to feed its people in only one year since 1956. North Vietnam's rice production, for example, reached a peak in 1959; by 1963 it had declined by 17%. (South Vietnam outstripped North Vietnam in increasing rice production by a ratio of more than 4+ to 3 in the late 1950's and early 1960's.) North Vietnam's economic history from 1954 to 196+ was characterized by failures and disappointments which were relieved only by grants and credits from Communist countries amounting to approximately $1 billion. The orga- nization and management of industry suffered from difficulties very similar to those prevailing in the Eastern European satellites during their early at- tempts to adopt Soviet-style economies. As stated in September 1960 by Nguyen Duy Trinh, Minister of State for Economic Planning, "... in planning, we have been more or less subjective; some in- dices were too high, thereby bringing about a tense situation in the course of their implementation. A number of departments did not ful- fill their plans, thus causing a measure of discouragement in these departments. A number of concrete policies were not formulated or amended in time; control was not very strict; cases of corruption and waste are still rather numerous." One specific failure was witnessed in the construction of the Thai- Nguyen Steel Plant: The Vietnamese reduced the size of the French-planned project by one half, and still hadn't completed it 7 years after construc- tion had begun. In agriculture the regime was confronted not only with serious organi- zational problems, but also with a peasant revolt in 1956 over the regime's poorly planned and clumsily executed land reform. This revolt resulted in the execution of close to 50,000 people and the arrest and detention at forced labor of more than 100,000, according to Bernard Fall in The Two Vietnams. The current shakiness of the North Vietnamese economy is underscored by the fact that the regime has refused since 1963 to issue reports on the sta- tus of its economy. Recently Far East observers have noted -North Vietnamese reports of labor waste in industry and agriculture caused by absenteeism, bad organization, inefficiency, "freedomism" (a term used pejoratively), cor- ruption, and an unwillingness of minor officials to work in the rural areas. Even from such a brief survey of the economy it is possible to conclude that North Vietnam falls far short of the capacity to wage or support a sus- tained war beyond its borders. North Vietnam could hardly get started on such a war without large-scale aid; and it would certainly be obliged to abandon its efforts in the South if the military and economic aid of the Com- munist countries were stopped. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 1 C1 0B Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY India: Early Russian Interest and Soviet Penetration May 1968 In the late fifteenth century a Russian merchant named Atanasiy Nikitin arrived in India to explore possibilities of Indo-Russian trade. After spending four years on the sub-continent, he returned home completely dis- enchanted with his enterprise. "Brethren, Russian Christians ... the infi- del dogs have lied to me, for there is nothing to be found in India for us; pepper and colors, these are cheap but bringing them by sea costs taxes and there are many pirates on the sea," he reported to his compatriots. Some years later -- in 1579 -- a Jesuit priest, Thomas Stevens, arrived in Goa on a Portuguese ship. The first Englishman to set foot on Indian soil, he devoted the next forty years to missionary work among the natives. He is remembered less for his evangelistic accomplishments, however, than for the impetus for Eastern trade which his letters are said to have pro- vided to London merchants. That interest culminated in the foundation in 1599 of the East India Company, which-lster".became'instrumental'in:the British-conquest'of'.India. It was not until 1675 that Russia made an earnest attempt to open rela- tions with India. Tsar Aleksis sent a large delegation to Emperor Aurangzeb, but the Moghul ruler refused to establish inter-state contacts, reasoning that there had never been an embassy from Russia to Delhi before, that there was not and never had been a dispute between the two countries, that the Tsar's religion was different from the Moghul's, and that the Tsar, with no other possible excuse for establishing an embassy in far-off India, was therefore interested in Indian wealth. Russian interest in India took a new turn under Peter the Great (1682- 1725) with his policy of expeditious westernization and territorial expan- sion. While the English and French East India Companies were engaged in a contest for commercial and political supremacy in India,* the Russian Tsar dreamed of extending his influence toward the Oxus and the Indus, but his death prevented his actual quest for India's riches. Neither Peter's aspi rations nor those of his successors caused any chasm in Anglo-Russian rela- tions until the end of the eighteenth century. Friction developed when Catherine the Great (1762-1796) launched a policy of southward expansion *In 1664, the French formed La Compagnie des Indes under the patronage of Louis XIV to begin trading operations in India. The first French settle- ment was founded in Pondicherry around 1674, and for the next hundred years and more, Britain and France fought continuously to get the upper hand in India. Portuguese influence in India was at a low ebb at the time the Bri- tish arrived; Dutch interest lay in the East Indies (now Indonesia). Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 with the ultimate objective of seizing Constantinople from the decaying Ottoman Empire. Britain, a traditional ally of Russia, viewed this as a threat to the balance of power in Europe and to her dominant position in the Levant and the Mediterranean. Tension flared up in 1791 when. Britain unsuc- cessfully tried to make Russia give up to Turkey the Ochakov fortress on the Black Sea which the Russians had captured after costly combat, and marked the beginning of Anglo-Russian rivalry not only in the Near East but also in India: the first Russian plan for the invasion of India was hammered out in the heat of the Ochakov affair. Incensed at Britain's opposition to her territorial ambitions, Russia decided to threaten the British position in India, This strategy was fre- quently although never successfully employed by Russia through the ensuing years in the ebb and flow of Anglo--Russian rivalry. The Russian strategy of keeping Britain passive in the Dardanelles by threatening the Indian Em- pire failed, while the British policy of defending India beyond India's borders on the periphery of the Russian Empire from the Pamirs to the Straits bore fruit. After some sixty years of such maneuvering, the end of the Angle-.Sikh wars (1849) marked the extension of the British frontier to the mouth. of the Khyber, and the British conquest of India became complete. As the size and scope of Britain's commitment in India grew, the admin- istrative apparatus of the East India Company changed. Its headquarters became the seat of governmental power, headed by a governor general respon- sible only to the Company's board of directors in London, After the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, which for a time threatened to bring down British rule in India, the colony was transferred from the Company to the Crown on 1 Igo- vember 1858. To a large extent, the foundations of present-day politics in India, the pattern of government and parliamentary practices, the liberalism of the ruling elite and its preference for representative institutions modeled on Western lines were laid during the next ninety years ... from 1858 until British rule ended with the transfer of power in August 1947. For the Brit- ish, the first half of this period proved a time of consolidation and re- form; for the Indians, the second half was a time in which to give shape and substance to their growing sense of nationalism. In August 1907, Britain and Russia, confronted by the German threat in Europe, decided to bury mutual rivalries in Asia by concluding the Anglo- Russian Entente., As a result, Persia (Iran) was divided into three spheres of influence, China's suzerainty over Tibet was recognized and its to rri- torial integrity acknowledged, and Russia recognized that Afghanistan was within the British sphere of influence. The entente cordiale, effected without consultation with or the consent of the countries concerned, re- mained in force until November 1917 when the Bolshevik Revolution overthrew the Romanov regime and annulled its treaties and commitments. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 2 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 In order to allay Indian unrest, the British dramatically announced on 20 August 1917 their pledge to "the progressive realization of responsible self-government to India as an integral part'of the British Empire." Shortly, therefore, with the Bolsheviks' rise to power in November 1917, Anglo-Russian relations with regard to India underwent a radical change. Tsarist Russia, whose expansionist ambitions often came into conflict with those of Britain, had been a military threat to the security of the British Empire; Soviet Russia, whose Communist principles and practice clashed with Britain's imperialist interests, became additionally an ideological threat which was even more destructive to the status quo than Tsarist arms had been. Tis.arist Russia craved for the control of Constantinople and the Straits, while Soviet Russia aspired for the establishment of a Communist common- wealth embracing the entire globe. The opening gun in the propaganda,.wax over India between the Soviet Union and the West was fired on 7 December 1917, when the Council of People's Com- missars appealed to the Moslems of Russia and the East, alleging: "Even far-off India, that land which has been oppressed by the 'enlightened' European robbers for so many centuries, has raised the standard of revolt, organizing its councils of deputies, throw- ing the hated yoke of slavery from its shoulders, and summoning the peoples of the East to the struggle and to freedom. The empire of capitalist plunder and violence is falling in ruins. The ground is slipping from under the feet of the imperialist robbers." Whether or not this early insurrectionary appeal ever reached the in- tended audience is debatable, but it did not pass unnoticed by the British Government, whose envoy in Russia issued a rejoinder to the press in which he commented that "Mr. Lenin spoke of us as rapacious extortioners and plun- derers, while he incited our Indian subjects to rebellion." It took forty months of tumultuous Anglo-Soviet politicking over India before England first established relations with the Soviet Union, marked, of course, by the circumstances of World War I. While Allied statesmen were discussing the Russian question, Churchill's War Office, in a statement on 15 January 1920, described the extent of Soviet threat in the East, high- lighting the danger to the British Empire in India. "... The Tashkent So- viet ... at a recent meeting, determined to concentrate efforts first on India, and it is intended to open propaganda centers there as soon as pos- sible." On 16 March 1921 an Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement was signed which, in effect, constituted de facto recognition by Great Britain of the Soviet Gov- ernment. The rapprochement between two diametrically opposed systems of gov- ernment which had been arch adversaries was an agreement in name only; in reality, it was a move which placed mutual animosity on a different footing. The Trade. Agreement was subject to the condition: Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 "That each party refrains from hostile actions or undertakings against the other and from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions of the British Empire or the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt, by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda, to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests of the British Empire, espe- cially in India and the Independent State of Afghanistan...." Meanwhile the Soviets were not letting down their efforts to keep the "General Staff of World Revolution" in a state of readiness. On 19 July 1920, the Second World Congress of the Communist International convened in Moscow. Prominent among the Asian delegates was Manabendra Nath Roy, a rev- olutionary Brahmin from Bengal., whc became the first Soviet link with India. Soon after, Roy organized the handful of Indian exiles in Europe into an 'emigre' Communist Party of India and started his crusade against the Brit- ish raj, ably assisted by his American wife. The political situation on the Indian sub-continent became more tense than ever. Gandhi was preparing India for a momentous struggle against the Government; under his leadership, the Indian National Congress had decided to support the Khalif at movement (to preserve the sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey). However, the Treaty of Sevres (June 1920), which decimated the Turkish Empire, inflamed extremist Moslems who decided on hijrat (religious migration from one country to another). From the standpoint of Anglo-Soviet relations, the important sequel to this pilgrimage was the arrival in Soviet Central Asia of some 300 Moslems. A small number eventually became Bolshe- vik converts under the tutelage of M.N. Roy. It was these who returned to India to work toward the foundation of the Communist Party of India in the late 1920s. Founded under the auspices of the Communist International, it was originally set up under the general supervision of the Communist Party of Great Britain and made its first appearance on the political scene as an autonomous organization around 1938. However, Indian passions did not turn to Communism, but were fixed on gaining national independence. On 25 November 1922, the political Bureau of the Russian Communist Party issued a secret circular, signed by Stalin among others, which stated in part: "A mistake was made by the Communist International in its first efforts to promote a revolution in India ... the real aspirations of these peoples to emancipate themselves from the foreign yoke were con- sequently used merely as an argument to induce them to accept Commu- nism. It has now been realized that Communism is completely unaccept- able to the Hindus in their present state of development ... and inde- pendence is a condition which must precede it. Our propaganda agents did not realize this...." Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 4 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union did not improve. Nevertheless, after changes of government in Britain, and in spite of in- creased fears of Soviet policies and mutual accusations of having broken the propaganda agreement of 1921, the British Labor Government did extend de ure recognition to the Soviet Government on 1 February 1924. Two interesting, and now familiar, diplomatic and propaganda exercises were instigated soon after. On 24 May 1927, after a deliberate raid by London police on a Russian trade corporation and the premises of the Soviet Trade Delegation (in an abortive attempt to obtain incriminating documents), Prime Minister Baldwin charged the Soviet Government with espionage, sub- versive propaganda and intrigue. Disregarding Soviet denials, the British Government on 26 May renounced the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement and severed diplomatic relations. Great Britain and the USSR resumed formal diplomatic relations on 20 December 1929, allegedly with the approval of India, in spite of recur- ring problems over continued hostile propaganda by the Soviet Union and b the Comintern. When Foreign Secretary Henderson assured Parliament in No- vember 1929 that cessation of propaganda was guaranteed by the Soviet Union, his interpretation of Soviet promises with respect to propaganda brought criticism from the official organ of the USSR, Izvestia: "It is futile ... to pretend that this undertaking in any way concerns the Comintern, as the Soviet Government can neither speak for the Comintern,nor undertake any responsibility for the Comintern's activity." (That 1929 disavowal of Soviet Government control over "unofficial" propa- ganda organs holds true in the current Government of India complaints about Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, and over the recently concluded propa- ganda exchange agreement between NOV and India's governmental Press Information Bureau.) The pattern of Anglo-Soviet relations vis-a-vis India remained more or less unaltered until 1934. The Soviets and the Comintern kept'on with the kind of anti-British propaganda and activity they had been conducting since the October Revolution, while the conservative press and parliamentarians, who seldom ceased their own tirades against the Soviets, maintained their protests against Moscow's violations of the commitments not to engage in propaganda attacks. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : Cl -RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 In April 1930 London and Moscow signed a temporary commercial agree- ment which could be extended by mutual consent to any part of the British Empire including India. In the meantime, India was once more astir with the Civil Disobedience Movement, and the revolutionary ferment in India caused the Soviet press to publish glowing accounts of the whole affair. At the same time the Soviets were apprehensive that the British might wrongly impute Indian disturbances to Soviet machinations. The Soviet press (naturally) published a warning that the Indian revolutionaries might be found bearing Russian arms ... and warned that any such discov- ery would be a plot against the Soviet Government by its imperialist foes! A change in Soviet attitude occurred following Hitler's rise to power in 1933: the danger of Fascism took the place of the much-advertised threat of an imperialist offensive against the Soviet Union. In February 1934 Great Britain and the USSR signed a new trade agreement; seven months later, the Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations. In the summer of 1935, the Comintern inaugurated the policy of the United Front Against Fascism; instructions went to the CPI, which had been declared illegal in July 1934 (and remained illegal until 1942), to give up its "left-sectarian" policy and to adopt the new line. This policy remained in full force until the conclusion of a Treaty of Non-Agression between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939. It was then that Winston Churchill said (October 1939) that the key to the Soviet policy, which he described as a "riddle wrapped in mystery inside an enigma," was "Russian national interests." In spite of all the twists and turns in domestic and foreign policies of Soviet Russia, there was but one determining factor behind them all ... to safeguard and increase the power of the Soviet State. Moreover, the increase in tempo of the Indian nationalist movement under Mahatma Gandhi, from .1919 on, provided circumstances hand-tailored for the penetration of skillful propaganda from the Soviet Union. When most other countries were negative or neutral in their support of the Indian nationalist aims, the Soviet leaders were firm supporters -- at least until the Nazi attack upon the Soviet Union in 1941. when the Soviets again became British allies. Soviet leadership then decreed that all communists within the British Em- pire should support the British war effort, a demand that was very unpop- ular in India; today the Soviet Union is doing all it can to consign these events to oblivion. At the end of World War II, the Indian Communists tried to lessen the gap between them and the Congress Party. They supported Nehru, hoping this would make him adopt policies friendly to the Soviets. But Moscow did not approve this policy -- and it had to be abandoned. The Soviet press criti- cized the cooperation of the Congress Party with the British authorities during the independence preliminaries. Moscow then suggested the formation of an anti-imperialist front to mobilize public opinion against Great Brit- ain and the U.S. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 This was consistent with Soviet interest at the time: in 19+7 the So- viets started the Cold War, broke their wartime alliances with the West and started to consolidate the Communist satellite empire in Eastern Europe, and the new governments of India and Pakistan were promised Communist sup- port. References: The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China: An Analysis; by Kurt Muller; 1967; Walker and Company, New York. Moscow's Hand in India; by Peter Sager; 1966; Swiss Eastern Institute, Bern. India and the Future of Asia; by Patwant Singh; 1966; Alfred A. Knopf, New York. India and the West; by Barbara Ward; 196+; W.W. Norton & Company, New York. India and Anglo-Soviet Relations; by Chattar Singh Samra; 1959; Asia Publish- ing House, Bombay. Foreign Affairs; April 1968: "India - Economic Development," by Max F. Millikan. "India - Friends and Neighbors," by William J. Barnds. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 7 A>pyeyedkFor Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 22 April 1968 The Russians Are Coming Their "goodwill" call at the ports of Madras and Bombay at an end, three Russian warships-including the Drnitri Pozhar:skiy, flagship 'of the Soviet Far Eastern fleet-pulled up anchor and headed home to Vladivostok last week. Scarcely had they cleared Indian waters before the New Delhi government pub- ' licly denied rumors that it might grant the Russian Navy refueling rights in In- dian ports. But the disclaimer in no way lessened the long-term significance of the visit. Not only did it mark the first time Soviet warships had appeared in Indian harbors; it was also the first oc- casion on which the Rod Navy had shown the flag in the Indian Ocean. All this was part of a little-noticed aspect of the growing Soviet effort to rival the U.S. as a conventional global power. Over the past few years, without fuss or fanfare, the Russians have been determinedly seeking to expand their influence throughout Southeast Asia and the western Pacific. And now, with all British military forces save the Hong Kong garrison scheduled to leave Asia by 1971, the Soviet drive cast of Suez is stepping up. The primary purpose of the Soviet ef- fort in Asia is presumably to counter the influence of Connnurhist China. In any case, much of that effort has been mili- tary. The Soviet Pacific fleet, with more than 100 submarines, 50 destroyers and destroyer escorts and some 250 shore- based navy planes, now regularly ma- neuvers in the western Pacific, once regarded as a "U.S. lake." The Rus- sians have also mended their fences in Communist North Korea and North Vietnam, sending them massive amounts of military aid, including some of the most sophisticated weapons in the So- vict arsenal, At the same time, the Russians are also making an energetic attempt to will friends among the. 'neutral" nations of Asia. Cone are the days when Moscow supported local Communist movements in Iheir attempts to overthrow Asian gov- ermnents by force. Now, while Peking- backed Corm unists air. in the field against the governments of Cambodia and Burma, the Russians are sending significant amounts of aid to both coun- tries. And in Laos, they have serupu- lousiy refrained from interfering with the efforts of the U.S.-backed govern- ment of Souvasna Phouma to fend off the Communist-led Pathet Lao. It is, however, in the avowedly "pro- Western" countries of the area that the Soviet Union is slaking its biggest pitch- and that is primarily an economic one. More and more, Russian consumer goods from marmalade to matches are appear- ing in the markets from Tokyo to Bom- bay, and, in return, Soviet imports from the area are soaring. The Soviet Union, for example, is now the largest single im- porter of Malaysi:uh raw rubber, and re- Gently \loscow contracted for an enor- mous purchase of Indian manufactured goods. Trade with Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan has also risen significanth', and recently the Russians have shown an in- terest in working out joint-venthn?e deals with private and public Asian capital. For the past eight months, in fact, Japan Air Lines and Russia's Aeroflot have been cooperating amicably in the opera- tion of a trans-Siberian route. Along with all this economic activi- ty, the Soviets have also been busily strengthening their diplomatic network in the area. In the past year. they have set up new embassies in Malaysia and Singapore, both of which have strongly and-Communist governments. And so cor- rect has Soviet diplomatic behavior been that even the Philippirws, one of the most outspoken anti-Communist nations in the world, is said to he considering the estab- lishment of relations with .Moscow. Rivalry: What this expansion of Soviet influence will ultimately mean for the U.S. is still uncertain. Quite conceivably, if the U.S. were to withdraw its troops from Vietnam, Moscow might bid for an even larger role in Southeast Asia. But this is a prospect which appears to leave many U.S. diplomats supremely nncon- eerned. In the foh?esccable future, they contend, Russia simply will not have the power, prestige or money to replace the U.S. as the major outside power there, No doubt, these diplomats add, there will he a heightening of the economic and diplomatic rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Asia over the year's ahead. Still, as one perhaps overoptimis- tic U.S. official noted last week: "The major hostile force in Asia is China. And, the Russians can be a counterweight to the Chinese along with us. They can help us promote stability in the area. They may make life more complex for us, but 1. hardly think they are going to make it more dangerous." Approved For Release 2005/04/21: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 ie Times Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 ew 13 March 1968 WHAT CHANGE 9$ HE British government's retrench- meat treasures Were not really a - .surprise. The cutbacks in expenditures had been debated long in advance, and proposals and counter-proposals had been aired in the press and over the ra- dio and TV. Yet when Prime Minister Wilson told a packed House on Janua- ry 16 that under the economy programme the British bases in SouLlicast Asia and the Persian Gulf would be given up and British troops withdrawn from these areas by the and of 1971, he creat- ed a sensation. For the announcement was hard to reconcile with all that had been said earlier from the same parlict- mentary rostrutit about the British pre- sence Last of Suerr_ For two days Parliament was in tur- moll. The government was criticized from the Right and from the?Left. But it carried the day. The 1)10118 became law. Now a detailed exposition of them id available In the Defence White Book .published on February 22. The history of the British presence in the area from Suez to Singapore dates back to the clays of which Kipling sang, "Ship me somewheres Post of Suez," and when Britannia ruled not only the waves but vast possessions stretching from Cairo to Hongkong. In those years it was not merely a facet of po- licy but intrinsic in Britain's over-all policy of empire. ' With the disintegration of the Brl- llsh Empire and the liberation of Bri- Lain's Asian and African colonies, the formula "East-of-Suez policy" came to denote specifically the complex of mili- tary and political measures in Asia constituting a new "imperial defence" system designer[ to protect the inte- rests of British imperialism in the liar slan Gulf and Southeast Asian coun- tries rich in oil, tin, rubber and other resources. One might have thought that the breakdown of the colonial system would introduce far-coaching changes in Lon- don's military and political strategy. Ac- tudilly, however, only the tactical methods were refurbished and Kip- ling's poetry was supplanted by the prose of agreements with Washington. In recent years Britain's last-o1-Suez policy came to hinge on her "overseas commitments" arising from participation In the Scale and Canto blocs and her bilateral military treaties with Malay- sia, Singapore, the Sultanate of Biunci, the South Arabian sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia. . There were also the "coatntitments" to EAST OF SUEZ? L. TABROV Austra1iaand New Zealand, with which Britain has secret military agreements. An important factor too was her "spe- cial relations" with the U.S.A. As Sunday Times noted in the summer of 1907, Braairi's own as those of the United State., Which has virtually monopolir.ed oil extraction in this area. C:haractcristic too was 1110. art;nntcnt that l;main rct,nned itt ta)ntha'ht in Asia ,rile wily to prevent the,; pall Of the world from fatlin; c,'utpletcly under U.S, military control uul in older to he able to influence %Vashingfoll. How f,-,r this policy could be traced directly to this is (tom the truth is ctvi,lent Roam the understanding reached long ago the tact that it is \Vashirt U.iii which is between Prime Minister lviicmillan attd now most displeased with the plans President Kennedy that the "strategic gap" between the American Sixth Fleet for British withdrawal. For in reality in the Mediterranean and the Seventh throughout the entire area cast of Suer. Fleet in the Western Pacific would he debilitated British iniperialisnt is less filled by Britain. a rival of American iutpetialisnt than fit practical terms this meant a chain its ally in suppressing the national-li. of British military bases stretching front beration movements. Aden and the Persian Gulf to Ilong- Underlying all this cant Was the kung. At present, after the withdrawal striving of British Imperiolrsnt to cluig, from Aden, there still are at least twelve such bases, the biggest of them I? cis llic, anti in Ih,; poclopinnoun- in Hongkong, Singapore, Malaysia (lint- tiles. 'flip Last-nf?Sur;. policy was nour- terworth, Malacca, Johore and Kota (8110.( by the illusion that auucd torte Tinhgi), the Persian Gulf area (Bahrein could halt the march of history. The and the sheikhdom of Sharja), and the Economist said two yews ago that Mascarene and Maldive islands. The the British forces in this area were in- troops at these bases run to more than landed "[or counter-inuIgency , pera- 90,000, Some 70 ships of the Royal tious, preferably ill tile blul-Ilippms" Navy and 300 combat aircralt are sla- slage, which Britain Kapp ens to he tioned its the Indian Ocean area. pretty good 0.i." At th, Unison 'G1 Slti- Official London has resorted to a Wide variety of argttmoitis to cover up rly at Caniheiley, attended by "senior the Imperialist essence of its Easl-of- 131itish and CunnnonwCaillt olhce?rs, the Suez policy, above all to the plea that l:rii.ish reported that in ti,e picviii;a Britain could not give up her image as seventeen years -4 nun Iti?ttt to Inoti-- a great power. British troops hid taken pall. in 115 "\Ve cannot afford to relinquish our Ccnipaigns, mostly against so-called world role, sometimes described in "insurgents." And ot, .tat aty 251111-i shorthand, its 'our role Last, of Suer,''' year no less all authority than P ii cign Wilson said In Parliament in late 1'Jh4, Sccretaly Ueorgo Brown lr iiitIy aahnit- shortly after Labour came to power. tea ill Parliament Ihat Brit,, ti fiat[ shcnit. Another common argument. was that tiered over the yeair, it "w'oild poaciug Britain maintained, her foreign bases role" she could no longer attor,l. exclusively in. the interests of the local population, shouldering the burden be- cause of her moral obligation; to the peoples of her former colonies. And to counter criticism emanating from some WVest-European capitals, it wad . Said that the East-of-Suez policy was design ell to protect the interests of the E?uro- pean powers. "Our military presence in this area," Michael Stewart, then Foreign Secrcl i- iy in tine Labour government, said in 106G in an interview given to the German Spiegel, "serves not only. Bri- tish interests, but all who need oil." This statement eontainc,l an element of truth. Sifcguanlirg tin: position; of the oil monopolies was ,always the ,'h- ject of Britain's Middle Fist policy, thtnif*h the prime con, erii watt of tour:,;. The Last-ol-Buhl. policy has ailwayi laid it gravy hurd,'n in the trcasn.y. Sunday Times estimates that it:; annual cost exceeds # 120 million. \Vts,'u .anal members of his Cabinet have l"o-:1 l,nh- llcly complaining ever since they took over office that Britain is carrying a financial load in Asia which she can hardly afford. Bill for a long time they slid little more than, deplore the fact. The policy remained the same while its cost kept soaring. Besides the direct ci:penditures, Britain also incurred in- direct losses. For instance, stippoit of the Israeli aggression against the Atab countries, also dictated by the East-of- Suez policy, cost London more than #100 million in 1967 owing to the clo- sure of the Suez Canal and the boycott of British goods in Arab countries. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 2 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 ' Christopher Mayhew,, former Navy Minister, makes the relevant point in his book "Britain's Role Tomorrow," published last year, that the British mi- litary. presence in the 101ddie East and Southeast Asia "hinders rather than helps, commercial 'interest." "The cost of military presence there," ,he said In the house of Commons in ,January ?1967, "is far greater than any economic benefits received from our military presence east of Suez." What has prompted the Labour go- vernment to decide to withdraw British troops from Asia and to dismantle its milltai'y bases aqd Installations there? Can the step be regarded as genuine abandonment of the East-of-Suez policy, as do some of the government's more Vociferous Opposition critics? Neither Wilson's January 16 announcement nor statements made by members of his government, not to speak of other at- tendant circumstances, give grounds for such a conclusion. True, Wilson did say in Parliament that review of miii- tary expenditure means "reassessing" Britain's role in the world and "reali- stically limiting our commitments and outgoings to our true capacities." But at the same time Foreign Secretary Pirown said "there could he British in- flucnce without British armies on the spot," and Commonwealth Secretary Thomson assured the governments of Malaysia and Singapore of "Britain's continued interest In the maintenance of security in Southeast Asia with the forces which will be available here." And Defence Minister Healey, stress Ing that the . British government was displaying due realism in its foreign and military policy, made it cleat that if the circumstances required it. Britain would draw on her potential in Europe to send armed forces to Asia. Moreover, no immediate or early withdrawal is contemplated. The time limit sot Is December 1971, and much can happen In four years. For one thing, the stateients made by Tory leadois heath, Macleod and Maudlirlq that If returned to power the Conser- ?vatives would maintain the British presence in the East should not be lost sight of, , Noteworthy are the alterniaivea envisaged by the Labour leaders to the direct military presence they are giving tip not for political reasons, but owing to Britain's economic straits. Firstly, not all British military bases are to be abo- lished. Bases and military stations will remain In Hongkong, on, Mauritius and Approved the Maldive Islands, and some' minor strongpoints in the Chagos Archipelago in the Indt n Ocean. Further, Britain planned to he held within the no.".. f.rx months. k1alaysian Prime n,st 1?: AUdcil Rahman has already acct;;rc;i fc.: intends to maintain special mobile units the esiablislunent of e defence o ;,- based orry the smaller islands and air- lion of these countries to "iii: lira craft carriers in readiness for dispatch vacuum" created by the withdrawal of to "trouble spots." Besides, the British British forces. Moreover, Britain has are already busy arming puppet troops undertaken to build up ?i joint air of the type of the Trucial Oman Scouts defence system for Malaysia and Sin- and the sultans' armed forces in Muscat gapore and to train the personnel for it, and Oman. Hopes are also being pin- The Wilson government, then, is by ned on Saudi Arabia, to which, ac- no means completely discarding it e Old cording to the Spectator, Britain Ili, East-of-Suez policy, but merely modify- tends to bequeath her role in that part ln2 it to adapt it to the new conditions. of the world. Contracts concluded to This, generally speaking, is typical of date for British military supplies to postwar Britain, which has had to Saudi Arabia exceed #100 million, and relinquish the old military-colonial King Faisal has already pledged his forms of domination throughout its "support" to Bahrein. The proposals former empire and go over to neo- advanced in Teheran, Kuwait and Riy- colonialist 111106- ad in January by the British Minister of Time will show %%hat the announced State for Foreign Affairs Roberts should changes will really amount to. One be regarded in the same light. The idea thing is unquestionable: Britain's was to establish under British tutelage of-Suez policy has no future, irreapec- a Persian Gulf regional ?"defence sys- live of whether she can afford it or not. tem" envisaging the conclusion of mili- The national-liberation nluvenrr.nt can- tary agreements between Iran, Saudi" not he stopped. By taking ambiguous Arabia, Kuwait and the federation of and half-hearted deciraons and cultivot- Arab sheikhdoms in the area. ing new forms of colonialism while The peace forces have condemned remaining in the "special rel,itions" these plans. merry-go-round with the United "The Soviet Union," a TASS stale- States, the British rulers are Only steer- meat of March 4 declares, "true to Its in; their country into deepening pohli- policy of defence of the national late- cal and economic difficulties, rests of sovereign states and nations against imperialist encroachment, and aware that these neo-colonialist plans are aimed also a,aitnt the security of the southern frontiers of the U,S.S.R., takes a firm stand against the latest attempts by aggressive U.S. and British circles to intervene in the affairs of the Persian Gulf countries and to impose their diktat on them." Measures have also teen outlined for compensating for the withdrawal from Southeast Asian bases. The govern- merits of Singapore and Malaysia are particularly disquieted by the prospect of the British pulling out, not only because of economic considerations (the British bases here provide employ. merit for large numbers of local people, and it would not be easy to find other work for them, especially with unemployment at its present ? high level), but also because of . apprehen- sions as regards the recklessness the Peking leaders are apt to display in their policy towards their Southeast Asian neighbours. A special regional conference of Coin nlonwealth countries to be attended by Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Britain is For Release 2005/04121 : CIA-RpP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 NEW TINSS-MOSCOW No. 42 18 October 1967 X_t be of good int on his return to Uur Southern Ra% alp ndi Pres dentsAyubdKh an said that his talks with the Soviet leaders had been hold not T IxE Soviet visits of President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. merely in an atmosphere - of formal good will, in a spirit of sincerity and friendship." and Kin, Hussein of Jordan have again turned the ,but spotlight on the Soviet Unon's relations with the nations That spirit of sincerity and friendship is of the area to the south of it. Equal interest was aroused by spreading to relations between other Asian the earlier Moscow visits of Prime Ministers Demirel of Here is an illustration. The two- thousand-kilometre Turkey and Hoveida of Iran and by Soviet President Pod- countries too. network of modern motor- horny's trips to Afghanistan and a number of Arab coup- ways built with Soviet assistance in Afghanistan tries. has not only given a fillip. to domestic While each of these meetings was primarily designed to trade and economic life but. provided . the discuss relations between the two countries concerned; facilities for large-scale Afghano-Pakistani trade, together they reflected the general new atmosphere that and also for the transit of goods between Paks- has developed in these past years around the Soviet Union's atart and Iran, and Pakistan and the Soviet southern borders. Union. The opening of the new transport net- It isn't so very long ago that only India and Afghanistan work of the countries in this area resisted Washington's schemes roughly coincided with a noticeable im- of fettering Asia with its war-bloc chains. Not really so provement in the previously extremely strained Af-hano-Pakistani relations. And in August Ian f; ago that the notorious U-2 took off from a Peshawar engineers from Pakistan, India, Iran, ti'epal,' airfield, heading for Sverdlovsk. Not so long ago that the Load eBurn;a, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, 'Turks were being incited to enmity towards their Eulgar- Thailand and Indonesia all came to Kabul to tart, Arab, Soviet neighbours .... draw up joint plans for a great Trans-Asian Now these cold-war abominations area thing of the highway. This project, which it is hoped to ac past. Our southern neighbours are increasingly s}raking of complish by 1973, will be the realization of a the American-inspired anti-Soviet nightmares. True, l'akis- dream dating back to the 'days of Marco Polo' tan remains a member of Canto and Seato, Turkey of Nato and Afanasy Nikitin, and a valuable contribu- tion Canto, Iran of Cento; but friendliness and trust towards to peaceful co-operation in the area. the Soviet Union are growing in all these countries. With- out such trust, would Pakistan ever have asked Premier A similar beneficial influence is being' exert- Kosygin to act as mediator in producing the Tashkent Dec- ed by the project for the construction in Iran, laration? with Soviet help, of a large port on the Caspian And the Tashkent Declaration is by no means the Soviet and a railway leading to it from the south. This. leaders' only contribution to the cause of peace in the will revive the old-time trade route from Persia' East. The useful results of the visits by L. I. Brczhnev to to Russia, and will also make it easier for neigh- Iran and N. V. Pocigorny and A. N. Kosygin to Turkey are bouring Iraq to transport its goods to the Soviet g.-'nerally known. To quote the verdict of the Iranian and Union. There have already been negotiations on Turkish press, these visits scaled the improvement of re- the subject between Iran and Iraq, whose vela= latinns with the Soviet Union and opened up prospects of .tions long left much to be desired, and the T.eh- further mutual und, rstanding. ran Journal (October 5) writes that after years: No one today can help seeing how greatly the interne-_ of quarrelling, Iran now has a chance to achieve tional atmosphere between the Bosphorus and the Indus both political agreement and mutually'advanta- has changed, The Soviet-Pakistani communiqu'i of Octo- genus trade relations with her Arab neighbour. ber 4 says, for example, that the "friendly and neighbourly The Turkish press notes ' with satisfaction relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan" allow that the oil refinery to be erected shortly near, them to draw up a plan of economic co-operation and trade Izmir in co-operation with the Soviet Union will- for the period up to 1975. A plan of economic co-operation end the Western monopoly of the sale of petro- for eight years ahead-what more telling proof could there Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 4 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 leum products in Turkey. The refinery will get its oil at acceptable prices from Iran. Ankara and -Teheran are already discussing the matter, ,and ;both sides see this co-operation as another step towards economic independence. The atmosphere of peace and stability in tho north of the Moslem East contrasts sharply with the tense situation in the south in the wake of the Israeli aggression against the Arab states. Israel continues to threaten the Arabs, and-they' can see who are their true friends. During King Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union-the first .ever paid by a king of Jordan- the Amman Al. Fajr el Jadid wrote editorially that recent events in the Middle East had "radically altered pre- vious political conceptions, clarified Arab rela- tions v-r! th different countries, and shown the Arabs who is their friend and who their enemy." Amman, the paper said, had "come to appreciate the importance of a policy of non-alignment and the fact that the Soviet Union and the socialist states are friends of the Arab and his liberation struggle against. imperialism." The joint Soviet-Jordanian communiqu6 is- .sued at the end of the visit states that "the Jor-~ danian side is deeply grateful to the people and government of the Soviet Union for the genuine and valuable support and assistance which the U.S.S.R. has rendered and actively continues to render to the Arab victims of aggression." The communique: describes the Israeli ag- gression as being imperialist in character. And as the earnest of the Arab countries' success, it proclaims their unity on an "anti-imperialist and anti-colonial basis." It also says that "the Soviet Union, like other socialist states, will continue to render the Arab states the necessary support in' their just struggle for their lawful rights, in the rehabilitation and development of their eco nomy, and in strengthening their defences." The young developing nations have had many, opportunities to see the invariable friendliness of the Soviet people and government towards them. And the Soviet leaders'..recent meetings with statesmen of our southern neighbour countries furnished added, and cogent proof of it. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 5 1 C1 0B L Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 FOR BA i$Qt; i ypkeQg.We 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002Jyne 1968 Castro's Continued Attempts to Export His Revolution Background of Failure Since 1959 Castro has tried to export his revolution throughout much of Latin America, or, as he himself has said, to convert the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of South America. Since 1959 Castro's doctrine of rev- olutionary war, or guerrilla warfare, has been tried in sixteen or seven- teen countries, and it has failed in all of them. Only a small, extrem- ist minority has heeded Castro's and the late Ernesto "Che" Guevara's call for "two, three or many Vietnams." Inherent in the guerrilla failures have been deficient leadership, inadequate training, poor support mechanisms and frequent internal strug- gles over leadership or tactics which, among other reasons, have led to disillusionment, low morale and desertions from the ranks. External fac- tors in these failures have been the increasingly effective counter-action of the. threatened government security forces, and the complete lack of support, or even interest, on the part of the local peasant population. On a broader level, the Castroite movement in Latin America has been generally weakened by the increasing strains and, in some cases, outright breaks in cooperation between the pro-Cuban elements and the orthodox Com- munist groups, especially since the 1967 LASO Conference -- when Castro attacked the pro-Soviet parties as being in the "rearguard of the struggle against imperialism" -- which caused strains even within the orthodox parties themselves. Since then, Castro's continued insistence that Latin America is ripe for revolutionary war, and his continued attacks on the old-line Communist parties have further strained relations and weakened his cause. Castro's Calls for Revolution In spite of the basic handicaps of the guerrilla groups and their repeated failures, and notwithstanding the apparent lull in guerrilla activ- ities following the spectacular failure and death of "Che" Guevara in Bolivia, the Castro forces are clearly determined to continue their ef- forts to create periodic, if not sustained, unrest throughout a number of countries in the area. Castro himself, in fact, announced his intention to continue export- ing his revolution even as he delivered his eulogy of Guevara in October 1967. Although he acknowledged the "tremendous blow to the revolutionary movement" of "Che's" death, at the same time he said, "they are mistaken who believe that his death is the defeat of his ideas, the defeat of his tactics, the defeat of his guerrilla concepts, the defeat of his theses...." Likewise, Castro's use of the January 1968 Havana Cultural Congress to propagandize the Cuban revolutionary theme, and his vow to "fulfill his duty of solidarity" with revolutionaries throughout the world was yet another demonstration of his intent to export the revolution. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Bolivia: Guerrilla Activity Continues After the death of "Che" Guevara in October 1967, the remnants of his guerrilla band went into hiding. The three surviving Cubans crossed the Andes into northern Chile during February and were arrested by Chilean authorities at the village of Camina. Although extreme leftists in Chile demanded the group be granted political asylum, they were deported to Cuba. Because of the absence from the group of Guido "Inti" Peredo, the leading Bolivian member, it wasn't clear whether he had escaped arrest in Chile or had remained in Bolivia, but the Chilean left-wing newspaper, Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, published an interview with one of the Cuban mem- bers, Daniel Alarcon Ramirez, in which he said Peredo had left the others during a clash near La Siberia, in Bolivia. The newspaper also quoted another report that Peredo had stayed in Bolivia with his lieutenant, David Adriazola, to try and revive Guevara's Army of National Liberation (ELN) and to reorganize urban support groups. At a press conference on 27 April, President Barrientos said the Bolivian army was on the lookout in the northern department of Beni, where Peredo may be organizing another guerrilla movement. r The Case of Julio Dagnino Pacheco The most startling recent example of Cuban subversives still at urge in Latin America came on 19 April 1968, when the Bolivian Govern- ment announced the arrest in late March of Julio Dagnino Pacheco, a Per- uvian Communist journalist who acted as chief support agent for the Gue- vara guerrilla group in Bolivia. He had used the alias Gernando Herrera Fernandez in Bolivia, but was also known as the "Peruvian Sanchez," and was referred to by this name in Guevara's diary. Interrogation of Dagnino revealed extensive Communist/Cuban links: He joined the Communist Party of Peru in 1959 and in 1961 went to Cuba where he was trained in guerrilla warfare for over a year. He arrived in Bolivia in 1963 where he joined the Peruvian guerrilla groups attempt- ing to foment revolution in Peru. The next year he returned to Cuba with Nestor Guevara, alias "Negron," to seek support for guerrilla operations in Peru. In September 196+ he returned to Lima to organize support for Guevara's ELN. In March 1966 Dagnino was ordered by the Cubans to travel to La Paz to serve as a communications link and paymaster in the advance group of Cuban guerrillas preparing for."Che's" arrival, and he subse- quently visited Guevara in the Nanchauazu guerrilla camp on 31 December 1966 with the Bolivian Communist Party leader, Mario Monje Molina. After guerrilla warfare broke out in Bolivia in March 1967, Dagnino's contacts were restricted. He claimed to have had neither contact with guerrilla groups nor instructions since Guevara's death in October 1967. Dagnino's testimony has provided the Bolivian government with consid- erable information on the Cuban apparatus and membership in Latin America. In addition to valuable information on guerrilla activities, the Bolivian Approved For Release 20Q5/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Colombia: Sporadic Incidents and Divided Guerrilla Forces There has been no major guerrilla action in Colombia for several months, although minor incidents occur from time to time. The signifi- cant let-up is doubtless due not only to the successful military and civic action programs of the Colombian security forces in 1967, which considerably reduced guerrilla effectiveness, but also to the formal opening of diplomatic relations in January between Colombia and the So- viet Union. This obviously places restraints on the pro-Soviet, Commu- nist Party-controlled Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest guerrilla force, with an estimated several hundred members. The smaller, Castro-supported Army of National Liberation (ELN) has been involved in minor activity since the beginning of the year and a new guerrilla movement, called the Popular Army of the Liberation (EPL), has recently been formed and reported as operating sporadically in the northwestern region of the country, There have been numerous reports on the Colombian peasants' dislike of Communism and their lack of cooperation with the guerrilla groups, which has been attributed to the government's reform programs. But the guerrillas (many of whom are little more than bandits) are able to engage in periodic harassment actions. Guatemala: Guerrilla Forces Regrouping The situation has been relatively quiet since the end of March, in contrast to the early months of 1968 when violence and bloodshed increased. This upsurge in violence followed a lengthy period in which the Guatemalan guerrillas had turned increasingly to urban terrorism and sabotage, after suffering severe setbacks in their rural campaigns. In February the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) split with the pro-Soviet Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT), blaming the "rightist leadership clique" of the PGT for guerrilla failures over the past four years. The earlier merger of the FAR with the smaller, weaker but extremist guerrilla Revo- lutionary Movement of 13 November (MR 13), lea, by Yon Sosa, may well have contributed to its ultimate split with the PGT, although it is certain the Cubans played a major role in promoting the split, including publica- tion of the FAR leaders' attacks on the PGT leadership in the official newspaper Granma., The situation in Guatemala now is probably the most striking example of the growing polarization between the pro-Castro and pro-Soviet Communists in Latin America, and will undoubtedly mean continued Cuban support for the movement, now rumored to be reorganizing its appar- atus and its tactics in preparation for launching new guerrilla offensives at a later date, In addition to its strong urban leaning, the Guatemalan guerrilla movement has acquired a religious aspect in the involvement of the Melville group, the former Maryknoll missionaries who were expelled from the country Approved For Release 20045/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 authorities confiscated $20,000 from Dagnino which had been destined for subversion in Bolivia and Peru. Venezuela: Guerrillas Suffer Setbacks On 22 April, a Venezuelan Defense Ministry official announced that at least ten Castroite guerrillas had been killed and many more wounded in a period of only three days, when significant clashes broke out for the first time in several months between the army and the guerrillas in western Venezuela. Army units, supported by military aircraft, had pursued the guerrillas in the States of Yaracuy, Falcon and Lara, where Douglas Bravo's Armed Forces of National Liberation (FLN-FALN) operate. An army guide reportedly identified one of the dead guerrillas as a Cuban naval officer. On 21 April, a group of Venezuelan Castroite terrorists blew up an oil pipeline belonging to the Creole Petroleum Corporation near Mara- caibo and then reportedly scattered leaflets describing the action as "Operation Che Guevara." In early May, government officials confirmed that specially-trained army ranger units captured several more members of the Bravo group and by mid-May, following further skirmishes, an estimated fifteen guerrillas had been killed, with at least several captured. This should leave only about forty remaining members in the Bravo band, which is also said to be weak- ened by a split between Bravo and his chief lieutenant, Leuben Petkoff, on the issue of rural warfare versus urban terrorism. In spite of these solid successes of the Venezeulan forces, the guer- rilla threat remains in the East, where the forces of the Castro-supported extreme Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) number over 100. Accord- ing to a published interview withone of its leaders, Moises Moleiro, the MIR group will continue to concentrate on classical rural warfare rather than engage in. urban terrorism, as the FLN-FALN tried unsuccessfully to do several months ago. Recently, at least a part of the MIR force has been active in the area of the Bachiller Mountains in Miranda State. A third group of guerrillas, under the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), has been inactive the past year, in line with party policy, although a newspaper story of mid-May says they may now step up their "armed preparations." The recent increase in Venezuelan guerrilla activity has been con- nected with rumors that Francisco Camaano Deno has been appointed to re- place Guevara as head of the Latin American guerrilla movement. (Camaano was the Constitutionalist leader in the Dominican crisis of April 1965 and later was Dominican military attache in London. His sudden disappear- ance, while on a visit to Madrid, has led to repeated rumors he defected. to Cuba.) There have been unsubstantiated but published reports that Camaano had actually made a recent, secret visit to Venezuela. and Columbia, as well as to Bolivia,to direct the organization of new guerrilla actions, but the Venezuelan government has denied any knowledge of this. 3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 for collaborating with rebel groups. They are now attempting to organize their own "Christian Front" group from a base in Mexico near the Guatemalan border, intending to re-enter the country to help overthrow the present gov- ernment. Uruguay While Uruguay has been free of the usual Castro-type rural guerrilla warfare, Montevideo was the site in February of a meeting of pro-Cuban ex- tremists who are endeavoring to recruit Catholics with a strong social conscience for guerrilla warfare. Calling itself the "Camilo Torres Move- ment," after a defrocked Colombian priest turned guerrilla, the group at- tacked the orthodox Communist parties and the social reform programs of the Church, and asserted that Castro's revolutionary strategy is the only valid strategy. It praised Camilo Torres, who died in a guerrilla attack on a Colombian army patrol, as the symbol of "Christian-reovlutionary strug- gle." The marked increase in leftist activity in Uruguay in recent months is the result not only of the steadily deteriorating economic situation, but also of the splits which have occurred in the orthodox Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU), following internal disputes over resolutions passed at the 1967 LASO Conference. There has been a noticeable increase in the activity of the more extreme groups, the pro-Cuban Revolutionary Movement of Uruguay (MRO), led by Ariel Colazo, and the National Liberation Movement (MLN). The MRO has apparently-concentrated on putting out extreme revolu- tionary propaganda, although there have also been rumors it is preparing to turn to more traditional guerrilla activity in the countryside. The MLN, or "Tupamaros," is a leftist urban terrorist group with has become notor- ious for bank robberies, gunfights and other violence. There has been speculation that both groups may now be vying for support from Cuba. In early April Castro made a speech which is noteworthy because in it he appeared to modify his theory that rural-based revolution is the only valid revolutionary struggle. By acknowledging that "different points of view, different theses" exist within revolutionary movements, and also by claiming that a "mass movement" had been developing in Cuba before 1958, he was apparently trying to concede to the urban populace, in Cuba, to the urban guerrilla elements in Latin America and to orthodox Communist critics abroad that urban masses, too, have a significant role to play in carrying out revolutions. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : SCIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 SARA INFORr?1~~70 or ~se 2005/04/21: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 o 1968 CONSTANTES TENTATIVAS DE CASTRO DE EXPORTAR SU REVOLUCION Antecedentes de Fracaso Desde 1959 Castro ha tratado de exportar su revolucidn por toda Amdrica Latina o, como 61 mismo ha expresado, hacer de los Andes la Sierra Maestra de Amdrica del Sur. Desde 1959 la doctrina de Castro de la guerra revolucionaria, o guerra de guerrillas, ha sido ensayada en 16 6 17 passes, y en todos ellos ha fracasado. Salo una peque?la minoria extremista ha obedecido la consigna de Castro y del difunto Che Guevara con respecto a "dos, tres o muchos Vietnams." Motivos inherentes del fracaso de los intentos guerrilleros han sido la direcci6n deficiente, adiestramiento inadecuado, mecanismos de apoyo ineficaces y frecuentes luchas internas sobre la direcci6n o la tdctica, los cuales, entre otros motives, han llevado al desaliento, la moral poco elevada y las desercio- nes de las filers. Entre los factores externos de dichos fracasos se cuentan la reaccidn mds y mds eficaz de las fuerzas de seguridad de los Gobiernos amenazados y la ausencia absoluta de respaldo y hasta de interds por parte de las poblaciones campesinas locales. A un nivel nags amplio el movimiento castrista en Amdrica Latina ha sido debilitado en general por las tensiones en aumento y,en algunos casos, las rupturas abiertas en la cooperaci6n entre los elementos procubanos y las agrupaciones comunistas tradicionales, especialmente a partir de la Conferencia de la OLAS de 1967--durante la cual Castro arr.emetid contra los partidos pro- sovidticos acusdndolos de estar en la "retaguardia de la lucha contra el imperialismo"--que provoc6 tensiones hasta en el seno de los propios partidos comunistas tradicionales. Desde entonces la constante insistencia de Castro de que Amdrica Latina estd lista para la guerra revolucionaria y sus persis- tentes ataques contra los partidos comunistas de viejo cu?io han hecho mds tensas las relations y debilitado su causa. La Llamadas de Castro a la Revoluci6n No obstante las desventajas bdsicas de las guerrillas y sus repetidos fracasos, y no obstante la aparente pausa en las actividades guerrilleras a partir del espectacular fracaso y la muerte del Che Guevara en Bolivia, las fuerzas castristas estdn claramente resueltas a proseguir sus esfuerzos por crear des6rdenes de manera periddica si no constante en varios parses del Continents. En efecto, Castro mismo anunci6 su intenci6n de seguir exportando la revo- luci6n precisamente cuando hacia la despedida al finado Guevara en octubre de 1967. Al propio tiempo que reconocia el "tremendo golpe al movimiento revolu- cionario" ocasionado por la muerte del Che, declaraba: "Se equivocan quienes crean que su muerte es la derrota de sus ideas, la derrota de su tdctica, la derrota de sus concepciones guerrilleras, la derrota de sus tesis..." Del mismo modo, al aprovechar el Congreso Cultural de La Habana de enero de 1968 para hacer propaganda al tema revolucionario cubano y hater la promesa de Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 "cumplir el deber de solidaridad" para con los revolucionarios de todo el mundo, Castro demostr6 de nuevo su intenci6n de exportar la revoluci6n. Bolivia: Prosigue la Actividad Guerrillera Despuds de la muerte de Guevara en octubre de 1967 los restos de su guerrilla se escondieron. Los tres supervivientes cubanos pasaron por los Andes al norte chileno en febrero y fueron detenidos por las autoridades chilenas en el pueblo de Camina. La gente de extrema izq.uierda de Chile pre- tendi6 que se concediera asilo politico al grupo, Pero dstos fueron deportados a Cuba. Por faltar del grupo Guido (Inti) Peredo, el principal boliviano, no se supo de cierto si habia evadido ladetenci6n en Chile o habia permanecido en Bolivia, Pero "Las Noticias de Ultima Hora," diario de izquierda chileno, public6 una entrevista con uno de los guerrilleros cubanos, Daniel Alarcdn Ramirez, en la cual dste declaraba que Peredo se habia separado de los otros en un encuentro cerca de La Siberia en Bolivia. El diario se refiri6 tambidn a otro info:rme que decfa que Feredo habia pernanecido en Bolivia con su lugarte- niente, David Adriazola, para tratar de reconstituir el Ejdreito de Liberaci6n National (ELN) de Guevara y reorganizar grupos urbanos de apoyo. Enrueda de prensa el 27 de abril, el presidente Barrientos declar6 que el Ejdreito boli- vi.ano estaba alerta en el departamento de Beni en el norte de Bolivia, donde Peredo puede estar organizando otro movimiento guerrillero. El Caso de Julio Dagnino Pacheco El caso reciente mds sorprendente de agente de subversi6n cubano en liber- tad en Amdrica Latina se produjo el 19 de abril de 1968, cuando el Gobierno de Bolivia anunci6 la detenci6n a fines de narzo de Julio Dagnino Pacheco, periodista conunista peruano que fungfa de principal agente de apoyo de la guerrilla de Guevara en Bolivia. Habia empleado el alias de Fernando Herrera Ferndndez en Bolivia pero tambidn se le conocfa como "el peruano Sdnchez," nombre con el cual se le designa en el diario de Guevara. El interrogatorio de Dagnino dio a conocer sus extensas relaciones con oaunistas y cubanos. Se afili6 al Partido Comunista del Peril en 1959, fue a Cuba en. 1961 y alli recibi6 mds de un ario de adiestramiento guerrillero. Arrib6 en Bolivia en 1963 y se unid a lasguerrillas peruanas que trataban de fomentar la revoluci6n en el Peril. Regresd a Cuba en 1964 con Ndstor Guevara, alias Negrdn, en busca de respaldo Para las operations guerrilleras en el Perd. En septiembre de 1964 volvi6 a Lima a organizar el apoyo Para el ELN de Guevara. En marzo de 1966 los cubanos dieron orden a Dagnino de trasladarse a La Paz a servir de enlace y pagador del grupo avanzado de guerrilleros que se apresta- ba Para el arribo del Che, y luego visit6 a Guevara en el campamento guerrillero del IGacahuasu el 31 de diciembre de 1966 en compatfa de Mario Monje Molina, dirigente del Partido Comunista boliviano. Con el comienzo de la campafia guerri- llera en Bolivia en marzo de 1967, se redujeron los contactos de Dagnino. Manifesto no haber tenido contacto con las guerrillas ni instructions desde la muerte de Guevara en octubre de 1967. El interrogatorio de Dagnino ha provisto al Gobierno boliviano bastantes datos sobre el aparato cubano y los que lo constituyen en Amdrica Latina. Ademds de obtener valiosa informaci6n sobre las actividades guerrilleras las autoridades bolivianas le confiscaron a Dagnino 20 mil d6lares que habian sido destinados a laAp*vuez~5nr4telbatib 2M5/04X,2'Pe A-RDP78-03061 A000400040002-3 upA rovecLFor Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Vene a; eveses a los Guerrilleros El 22 de abril un funcionario del ministerio de Defensa de Venezuela dio a conocer que por lo menos diez guerrilleros castristas habian sido muertos y muchos otros heridos en tres dias solamente en que se produjeron choques de importancia por primera vez en varios meses entre el Ej6rcito y los guerrilleros en el occidente de Venezuela. Unidades del Ej6rcito apoyadas por aviacidn militar habian perseguido a los guerrilleros en los Estados Yaracuy, Falcdn y Lara, donde estdn en acci6n las Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n National (FLN- FALN) de Douglas Bravo. Un gufa del Ej6rcito se supone haber identificado a uno de los guerrilleros muertos comp oficial de la Marina de Cuba. El 21 de abril un grupo de terroristas venezolanos castristas hizo estallar un oleoducto de la Creole Petroleum Corporation cerca de Maracaibo y luego, segdn se infor- ma, derram6 volantes describiendo la acci6n como "Operaci6n Che Guevara." " A principios de mayo funcionarios oficiales confirmaron que unidades de rangers del Ej6rcito adiestradas especialmente habian capturado a varios miembros del grupo de Douglas Bravo, y a mediados de mayo, en nuevas escara- muzas, un total calculado de 15 guerrilleros habian sido muertos y por to menos unos cuantos capturados. Esto debe haber reducido a unos 40 la Banda de Bravo, la cual se dice estar debilitada aun mds por una escisi6n entre Bravo y su prin- cipal lugarteniente Lublin Petkoff sobre la cuestidn de la guerra rural y el terrorismo urbano. No obstante los 6xitos ya relatados conseguidos por las fuerzas venezo- lanas, la amenaza guerrillera prevalece adn en el sector oriental, donde las fuerzas del extremista Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIIR) cuentan md.s de un centenar. De acuerdo con una entrevista de prensa con uno de sus lideres, Mois6s Moleiro, el grupo del MIR continuara con el tipo cldsico de guerra rural sin adentrarse en el terrorismo urbano, como tratd de hater el FLN-FALN sin 4xito hace varios meses. Recientemente por lo menos parte de la fuerza del. MIR ha estado en actividad en la zona de las monta?fas Bachiller del Estado Miranda, Un tercer grupo de guerrilleros dirigidos por el Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV) ha estado inactivo el pasado ato, de acuerdo con la linea del partido, aunque a mediados de mayo se informaba que podia ser que incremen- tara sus "preparativos armados." En el reciente incremento de la actividad guerrillera en Venezuela se ha visto relaci6n con los rumores de que Francisco Caama?io DeT16 ha sido desig- nado en reemplazo del Che Guevara como jefe del movimiento guerrillero latino- americano. (Caamano fue el lider constitucionalista en la contienda en la Repdblica Dominicana en abril de 1965, y luego fue agregado militar dominicano en Londres. Su repentina desaparici6n durante una visita a Madrid ha suscitado reiterados rumores de que hizo defecci6n a Cuba.) Se han publicado sin confir- macidn noticias de que CaamaTIo realiz6 hace poco una visita secreta a Venezuela y Colombia asi Como a Bolivia para dirigir la organizaci6n de nuevas actions guerrilleras, pero el Gobierno venezolano niega tener conocimiento de ello. Colombia: Incidentes Esporddicos y Fuerzas Guerrilleras Divididas Por varios meses Colombia no ha teni_do i.ncidentes guerrilleros en grando escala, aunque si se producen algunos menores de vez en cuando. La signifi- cativa disminuci6n se debe sin duda no sdlo al 6xito de los programas de accidn Approved For Release 2005/04/21 6A-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 cfvica y militar de las fuerzas de seguridad colombianas en 1967, que redujeron bastante la eficacia de las guerrillas, sino tambi6n al inicio formal de rela- ciones diplondticas entre Colombia y la Unidn Sovidtica en enero. Esto sin duda pone freno a las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC), agrupaci6n prosovi6tica controlada por el Partido Comunista y que constituye la fuerza guerrillera mds numerosa del pars con un total calculado en varios centenares de miembros. El Ej6rcito de Liberacidn Nacional (ELN), respaldado por Castro y de menor tama!io, ha estado en actividad en menor escala desde principios de ato. Un nuevo movimiento guerrillero conocido como el Ej6rcito Popular de Liberaci6n (EPL) ha sido creado hace poco y se informa que es-td operando esporddicamente en el sector noroeste del pars. Ha habido numerosos informes sobre el desagrado del campesino colombiano por el comunismo y su no cooperaeidn con los grupos guerrilleros, que ha sido atribuida a los programas de reforma del Gobierno. Pero los guerrilleros (de los cuales muchos son poco mds que bandidos) consiguen llevar a cabo periddica- mente acciones de hostigamiento. Guatemala: Se Reagrupan las Guerrillas La situaci6n ha estado relativamente en calma desde fines de marzo, en contraste con los primeros meses de 1956 en los cuales aumentaron la violencia y el derramamiento de sangre. Dicha erupcidn de violencia ocurr16 despu6s de un prolcngado perrodo durance el cual los guerrilleros guatemaltecos se habran dedicado mds y mds al terrorismo y el sabotaje en el sector urbano luego de haber^:padecido fuertes derrotas en sus campaTlas rurales., En febrero las Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) se separaron del Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), prosovi6tico, culpando a la "camarilla derechista dirigente" del PGT por los fracasos de las guerrillas los dltimos cuatro affos. La fusi6n de las FAR anteriormente con el Movimiento Revolu- cionario 13 de Noviembre (MR 13), mds reducido y ddbil pero extremista, encabezado por Yon Sosa, puede haber ccntribuido a su ruptura definitiva con el PGT. Pero tambi6n es cierto que los cubanos jugaron papel principal en la promoci6n de la ruptura, incluyendo la publicaci6n en su diario oficial "Granma" de los ataques de los lyderes de las FAR contra la dirigencia del PGT. La actual situacidn en Guatemala es probablemente el ejemplo mds vrvido de la, creciente polarizacitn entre los comunistas castristas y los prosovi6ticos en Am6rica Latina, y sin duda significa que Cuba seguird respaldando el m prepa'rativocparaslanzarrnuevaseofensivasaguerridlleraspe afechasfutuura. covo Ademds de su fuerte tendencia urbana, el movimiento guerrillero guate- malteco ha adquirido un aspecto religioso con la intervenci6n de los Melville, exmisioneros Maryknoll que fueron expulsados del pars por colaborar con grupos rebeldes. Actualmente estdn tratando de organizer su propio "Frente Cristiano" desde una base en M6xico cerca de la frontera guatemalteca, proponi6ndose reingresar al pars Para ayudar a derrocar al actual r6gimen. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 - 4 - Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 Uruguay Uruguay ha estado exento de la acostumbrada guerra de guerrillas rural tipo Castro, pero Montevideo fue la sede en febrero de una asamblea de extremistas procubanos que estan tratando de reclutar catdlicos de fuerte conciencia social para crear guerrillas. Ilacidndose llamar "Movimiento Camilo Torres," por el nombre de un sacerdote colombiano expulso que se convirti6 en guerrillero, el grupo atac6 a los Partidos Comunistas y a los programas de reforma social de la Iglesia, declarando que la estrategia revolucionaria de Castro es la dnica estrategia vdlida. Ensalz6 a Camilo Torres, que muri6 en un ataque guerrillero contra una patrulla del Ejcrcito colombiano, corm el si'mbolo de la "lucha cristianorrevolucionaria." El notable aumento en la actividad de izquierda en Uruguay en meses recientes se debe a la situacion econdmica en constante deterioro pero tambidn a las escisiones que se han producido en el traditional Partido Comunista del Uruguay (PCU) a rai'z de rencillas internas con respecto a resoluciones aprobadas en la conferencia de la OLAS en 1967. Se ha compro- bado una mayor actividad entre los grupos mds extremos, el Movimiento Revolucionario Oriental (MRO) procubano encabezado por Ariel Collazo y el MWimiento de Liberacidn Nacional (NETT). El MRO parece haberse dedicado a difundir propaganda revolucionaria extremista, aunque tambi6n se ha dicho que se estd preparando a dedicarse a la actividad guerrillera tradicional en el campo. EL IvvTLN, o "Tupamaros," es un grupo terrorista urbano de izquierda que se ha hecho notorio por los asaltos a los bancos, tiroteos callejeros y otras formal de violencia. Se han hecho conjeturas de que ambos grupos estdn rivalizarcb por el apoyo de Cuba. A principios de abril Castro pronuncid un discurso que as digno de notar pox que en cal parece haber modificado su teoria de que la revolucidn basada en el campo es in unica lucha revolucionaria vdlida. Reconociendo que existen "diferentes puntos de vista, diferentes tesis" dentro de los movimientos revo- lucionarios, y asegurando que un "movimiento de masas" se habia estado desarro- 'irn llando en Cuba antes del 1958, parecfa estar tratando de admitir ante el pueblo urban de Cuba, los elementos guerrilleros urbanos de Amdrica Latina y los crfticos comunistas tradicionales del exterior que las masas urbanas tambi6n tienen un papel significativo que jugar en la realizacidn de las revoluciones. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : Cl1 RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 WAS HINGMIf May proved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 ExDoinmican Red Describe dBaisin' oCounist organization.,, smuggle into the Dominican After completing his ln!'s- d d thetic, but said he was already o the Dominican Communist 6-the- By Carlos Martinez Chicosa Peilf News service MIAMI-After three years of training in guerrilla tactics, urban agitation, and military Intelligence, Luis Genao Es. palllat was ready to go home to the Dominican Republic. This was the final briefing, and it was long after midnight when the bearded man in olive green walked with Genao to the door. "Remember, Luis." said Fidel Castro, "the Dominican Republic is a primary objec- tive to us." It was late In 1962 when the Dominican Communist leader met in Havana with Castro for the last time. In September, 1965, Genao broke with the Castrolst 14th of June Move- ment in the Dominican Re- public. Tells of Plotting Genao has now described how he plotted with Castrolfor a communist takeover in the Dominican Republic. Ile also told of meeting with Mao Tse- tung, Ho Chi Alinh and Nikita Khrushchev to seek financial and technical aid for Commu- nist revolutionaries In Santo Domingo. ? Genao, soft-spoken .33-tear- old bachelor, was interviewed during a brief stay in Miami. He was among the Commu- nist leaders who fought in the civil war in the Dominican Re- public In April, 1965. His name was high on a list of '77 Domin- Ican Communists compiled by U.S, intelligence sources and issued during the revolt as part of t 'c justification for U.S. Intervention. The visit to Miami marked the first time U.S. officials have permitted Gcnao to enter the country. Since leaving the hospital seven months ago after being wounded In an as- FLORIDA hi . e Republic, has been provi sion, Genao flew to Paris.,}n . by Castro. The Cuba govern ment periodically provides the codes used In the broadcasts. Deported to Lisbon Onnao was among the lead. ers of an abortive guerrilla UP- (rising in the Dominican Re-, public in 1963 that he and Cas? ~tro had planned in Havana. He and several dozen guerrillas were captured and In 1964, a leading organizer of the ' cen Genao was deported to Lisbon. th 14th f Ti was there, Genao said, o f mid-1965. From there he re- turned to the Dominican le- public clandestinely with the help of Iced Chinese agents. .y Experts from the Chinese! embassy in Paris changed GAn? no's features by mounting di'n .tures over his natural ke th and coloring his hair. He ed they taught him to talk slid act like a wealthy Spaniard-on a business trip. He made- it easily through Dominican cus- e tral committee o June Movement. that he was given his "mostetams. From 1959 to 1962, he was delicate" assignment by the' the group's permanent dele? 14th of June=orders to visit gate to Cuba, and met with Communist China, North V1eb { _ __ xt__.~? V ea . Albania or 30 to 40 times--as often as the circumstances required.,". Genao said Castro bag 'been the 14th of June tin , g suppor group financially for the last he spoke to, Genao said, wash eight years. He also has pro- Mao Tse-tung. Mao quteklyi vided Instruction in Cuba for agreed to provide .the 14th of "several hundred" movement June with a monthly allow- ar- members who traveled to Ha? ance, which still exists, vana on phony i passports, ying between $10,000 and Genao said. 1 $20,000, Genao said. "Castro is still subsidizing Mao also agreed to provide the 14th of June on a monthly guerrilla training, but refused money--contributions are in dollars, in bills of small de- nominations--but he demands Itemized descriptions of how the money will be used," Genoa noted. Money Conies From Paris A delegate from the move- a na once' H t ava o nt travels me month to thect with Maj. Man- uci (Barba Roja) Finciro Lo- sada, 35, head of the General direction of intelligence, in charge of planning and financ- ing subversion in Latin Amer- sassination attempt, Genao has, lived In virtual seclusion In a. small apartment in Santo 'Domingo. "I know they will try It again because I know too much," Genao said. Before defect] AppIEOMedal=~ and the Soviet Union to e,_s~ aid for the Dominican revolui tionaries. Most generous of the leaders a request for training o tors and engineers belonging to the movement, Genao said Mao told him: "Comrade, the fundamental task Is to seize power. After that, we will have time to' worry about engineers and. doctors." Ho Chi Minh, Genao said, was "harder to deal with" than Mao. 4 "He said it would be of great ,Importance to Latin American evolutionarles to receive theo- retical and practical guerrilla Ica. training in Vietnam, but Gcnao . said sometimes Pi- pledged no financial help. neiro hands out the money "He. maintained that the set. himself. Other times the cash zuro of power could only be is made available in Paris Y,1 achieved through armed ac? the intelligence officer at the tion, and said that anyone. Cuban embassy there. planning to do It otherwlsel "The actual delivery of the was not a good Communist." u money never takes place in- side the embassy," said Genao., Genao' said Ho kept his "It's always done at some prohiise to train Dominican! small cafe or 'at the Intelii- revolutionaries. . gence officer's private apart- Genao said Khrushchev ex?1 ment.f, Even the 14th of June's pow- pressed Interest in the Domint- r i s litter re oxement but turned e~e ~d TP -~MGn -Y ~tl4flt00fti~>m1~ tllil'AMAM" , roved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 C ~i'1'SI-I1 SCIE11CI; MONITOR 3.5 Alarch 1968 Foul play discounted r't Cawna flU disappearance Perplexes DominLcans Dy James Nelson Goodsell Colonel Caamaflo disappeared Just 15 dnyi' Latin imcrtcn rarrespnndent ai' after the death of Mr. Cuevas In Eollvin.i The Christian Science Monitor This has led,some -Dominicans to suggest that the Colonel may have taken over "Elf Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic Che's" role as leader of Cuban-sponsored Francisco Caamano Denb has replaced guerrilla movements in Latin America. But, Ernesto "Che" Guevara as No. I man of But, to many otn . These sources such !r% Latin America's missing person's list. possibility seo un]ikely. These urces in-? dicate that . Coolo lonel Caamrtno might have l The 'Lieutenant Colonel who headed tlid had contact with Cubans in Europe where her constitutionalist forces in the Dominican Re' went in early 1966 as Dominican military' public's 1965 civil war has been missing attache to Britain, but they doubt that ho, since last October. His whereabouts are an is In Cuba or that he has been tapped torj increasing mystery. the guerrilla role. Here in the Dominican Republic, the elites. Still the question of. Colonel Canmai5o'gi tion has become a, leading topic of discus-whereabouts nags these sources. They Jim- sion. The humor magazine Cachafu i~ its' ply have no answers. i current issue calls it "the 64,000 jeso in some circles, composed largely of; question. ' former supporters of the constitutlonalist' In the cafes along El Conde Street, mil h' cause in the civil war of 1965, there Is mount-,, of the conversation of Dominican busingsi log concern that the colonel's mysterious ab- men, politicians, and others revolves around' sence may hurt their cause among many the unanswered question. And if any of the Dominicans who were on the fence in the former associates of Colonel Caamano have civil War. any idea of his whereabouts they aren't . This seems to be the view'takcn by Agora, saying. A weekly magazine which subscribes In coat siderable measure to the constitutionalist Speculation burgeons cause for which Colonel Caamafio fought In All this has led to lively speculation cen. 19115. tered on. the possibility that the civil-War In its issue this week, Agora carries a, leader is in Cuba preparing for some sort exploring g the the Caamano ducstisnnt Na of return here, perhaps as leader of a guer.; whereabouts, exploring generally rejecting the t the heory ry rills band. , gennerally that he is in Cuba and suggesting instead But this speculation is only that -- and' that he might be in Europe or Australia or nothing more, the Soviet Union or the United States, the Dominican President Balaguer other Do- magazine calls on Colonel Caamafio to come rninican leaders, and foreign observers say forward and show himself. they have no concrete information on Colonel Caamano since he disappeared when he Reap;'pcarazicc expected . went for a walk last October in The Hague. "The former constitutionalist chleftan He was in the Dutch capital visiting a ought to clear up the situation," it says, "be- friend. J. cause not to do It would be equivalent to' President Balagucr, however, subscribes failing to comply with his sacred duty." to the theory that the Colonel is in Cuba.' It There is one school of thought here which Is "my impression," he says, "that Colonel holds that Colonel Caamano's absence is es-1 Caamano is in Cuba." But he hastens to sentially an effort to keep his many enemies; add that he has no information to confirm off base-and that he will eventually sur- the impression. face to lead the constitutionalist cause again."Logic dictates his presence in Cuba," Those holding to this idea suggest that he is'. President Balaguer adds, "preparing some. actually in Europe, Perhaps in Spain, wherthing against the country." former Dominican President Bosch, Ini the contrary, there is a general belief that But like other Dominicans with otheri he is alive and that he is merely using his speculations, they have no proof to back up;. absence as a vehicle for some political pur- this theory. ip'ti Pose. e. And that is what ~elease 14064/71 , 664A~00 -01 OgAf1? . T,HE MI AMA 2 May 19 es ate d Bath of Guevura evolution Crackles By WILLIAM MONTALSANO Herald Lann America Correspondent 'no flow of Cuban nteney, arms, agents and moral sup- port for violent revolution in Latin America has continued unchecked since Ernesto (Che) Guevara died in Bolivia nearly seven months ago. This is the conclusion drawn from Increasing re- ports - of revived guerrilla activity In the region. The general situation Is no worse than It was at the time of Guevara's death last October. But neither is it substantially improved,' although no Latin government' is In danger of a guerrilla takeover. Even In Bolivia 'the guerril- la movement survived Gue- vara. Survivors of his band eluded pursuing troops for more than four months be- fore passing Into Chile, where they were granted asylum and deported. One member of the band. a Bolivian named "Inti" Pere- do, was thought to have re- mained In the country, And this week Bolivian author- ities were investigating re- ports Peredo had formed a new group of guerrillas and was operating in the north- eastern province of Beni on the border with Brazil. Substantial caches of arms, supplies and possibly money are thought to have been left in southeastern Bolivia where Guevara oper- ated. Peredo, a veteran of Guevara's campaign, presu. mnhly would know the loca. tion or most of the caches. In the period since Gue- vara's death, the most seri- ous threat to stability from Communist guerrillas has continued to exist in Guate- mala. Reports from Guatemala Indicate control of the guer- rilla movement has passed from Cesar Monies, basically a theoretician, to Marco An- `Intl' Peredo ... guerrilla leader? A rural guerrilla movement has moved largely into the cities and has triggered right- wing counter-terrorism. Two U.S. military attaches were murdered in January, and the archbishop of Guatemala was kidnapped by terrorists who demanded the resignation of President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro. A guerrilla band surfaced in the mountains of Yaracuy' state in Venezuela last month after a long period of Inactivity. T h e gperrillas seized two small settlements briefly, and then fled In the face of specially trained army units. By last week, the army had ' claimed 15 guerrillas slain. It said the survivors were fleeing to join another band operating in the moun- tains of neighboring Falcon State. The guerrillas who seized the settlements were report- ed under the command of Luben Petkoff, and those In Falcon State under the com- mand of Douglas Bravo. Both men are said to have close ties with Cuba, and observers consider the renewed activity is a prelude to an election year terrorist campaign In Venezuela. tonto Yon S l rFbr Reieat> r2QD&O4/21 primarily an ac i ist. &10or Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040002-3 mountains of neighboring dreamed of. It Is npparcnt. CrylotiiblA, A Cuban-trained however, that for Castro, the Colombian named Antonio detemInatlnn to export reve- Dahut has reportedly as- lution did not die with Gue- sumed command of guerrillas vars.. operating in the Alto Sinu region of Cordoba Depart- Dahut was believed to have at one time led Fidel Castro's guerrilla forces at Minas Del Rio in Cuba's Oriente Province. Apart from the Operating guerrillas, Castro Is also reported to be taking an active Interest in fomenting unrest In Haiti, the Domin- ican Republic, Nicaragua, and possibly Peru, where rural guerrillas were wiped out within months about five years ago. In, Cuba Itself, training of Latin Americans In guerrilla warfare Is continuing. Persis- tent but unconfirmed reports indicate that one of those being trained is Col. Francis- co Caamano.Deno, the leader of the "constitutionalist" forces during the 1965 civil war in the Dominican Repub- lic.. One Cuban agent was un- covered while posing as a delegate to a United Nations conference In Panama early this year,' and others have been reported travelling else- where in Latin America, Including southern Brazil. Several new landings of guerrilla parties have been reported in the Colombia- Venezuela border area, but none have been confirmed. Latin security forces have been keeping close watch on the Cuban fishing fleet, which Is believed to he play-. Ing a greater role in subver- sion efforts. BALTIMORE SUN 15 May 1968 Venezuela Reds To Seek Arms Caracas, Venezuela, May 14 (A'+-Venezuela's Communists have moved to Increase their armed preparedness almost a year from the date on which they announced an abandon- ment of terrorism as a means of achieving power. A "political report" issued af- ter an underground meeting of. the Venezuelan Communist par-i ty's Central Committee says it was decided to "take maximum! advantage of legal possibilities' and accelerate armed prepara- tions." Although the level of Cu ban activity has not dimin- ished, It has not provided any spectacular successes, or t'he "new. Vietnams" Guevara