BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 85
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 5, 1967
• Content Type: PERRPT

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~~? IgnIfIcant Dates
[ASTERISK DENOTES ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]
JUL
30 (to 5 August) PEN (Poets, Essayists, Novelists -- non-Communist) International
Conference, Abidjan, Ivory Coast.
AUG
I* Warsaw Uprising begins; later crushed by Germans while Red Army refuses and
blocks assistance. 1944.
2-9 World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession, 16th Assembly,
Vancouver, Canada. (Non-Communist.)
6* U.S. drops atomb bomb on Hiroshima. 1945.
8* Soviet Union declares war on Japan. 1945.
1
14* Japan surrenders to Allies. 1945.
15* Republic of Indonesia proclaimed. (After four years of intermittent warfare,
Netherlands transferred sovereignty to interim Indonesian government 2 Novem-
ber 1949.) 1950.
20* Leon Trotsky murdered in Mexico City. 1940.
23* Soviet Union and Nazi Germany conclude non-aggression pact, opening way for
German attack on Poland, and its partition'between Germany and the USSR. 1939.
25* Paris liberated by Free French forces with U.S. Army. 1944.
27* Kellogg-Briand Pact (Treaty of Paris) signed, renouncing war as instrument
of policy.
28 Aug-Sept 2. 10th International Congress of Linguists, Bucharest. (Includes
non-Communist participants.)
SEP
I* Germany invades Poland; World War II begins. 1939.
3-8 17th Pugwash Conference on "Scientists and World Affairs," Ronneby, Sweden.
8 Summit meeting of Organization of African Unity, Kinshasa, Congo.
II* Constituent Assembly election, South Vietnam. Despite Viet Cong threats,
80.8% of voters turn out. 1966.
13-15 Conference on Portuguese Colonies, South and South-WestAfrica, Zimbabwe, and
Rhodesia, Conakry, Guinea. Sponsored by the World Peace Council (Communist
front).
17* Soviet Union invades Poland, proceeds to occupy eastern half of country.
(See under I September above.) 1939.
18* 'UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold dies in plane crash near Ndola,
Northern Rhodesia. 1961.
25 (to I October) Fourth General Conference of BITEJ (Travel Bureau of World Fed-
eration of Democratic Youth -- Communistl meets in Budapest in conjunction
with FIYTO (federation of non-communist commercial travel agencies).
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5 June 1967
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Briefly Noted
The Chang- Moscow Rewrites Tibetan
ing Soviet History
Line
The following two quota-
tions illustrate the change in Mos-
cow's line on Tibet in the light of
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Small Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 9
(1990):
"With the support of imperialist
circles and the Chiang Kai-shekites,
Tibetan reactionaries organized a
plot against the Central People's
Government and in March 1959, began
an armed uprising... The defeat of
the reactionary rebels by units of
the People's Liberation Army, which
was actively supported by broad sec-
tions of the Tibetan population,
foiled the dangerous plot by the
internal and external enemies of the
Chinese People's Republic and opened
up the prospect of building a new,
democratic and Socialist Tibet before
the Tibetan people."
Tashkent Radio, 3 April 1967:
"Blood is flowing again and
hundreds of Tibetans have been killed
or have committed suicide after tor-
ture. Monasteries and shrines are
being desecrated and sacred books
destroyed. The Tibetans fought for
their national freedom and indepen-
dence in 1959, when tens of thousands
of Tibetans were killed by the Chi-
nese and tens of thousands more were
forced to flee. In January 1965, the
Tibetans rose again against 'Peking's
policy; for Peking's proclamation of
sham national autonomy has not satis-
fied them. The Tibetans will con-
tinue their struggle for survival
and independence and their libera-
tion struggle, like that of other
nationalities, will never be subdued."
Moscow's pious sympathy for the
Tibetan people seems even more-eyni-
cal when contrasted with the 1960
statement and in view of her own
policy of offering "sham autonomy"
to various nationalities within her
own boundaries. 25X1C1Ob
Miscellaneous More on 50th Anni-
Notes on Con- versary Celebrations
sumer Benefits
As part of the 50th
Anniversary celebrations, the Soviet
government has promised its citizens
more consumer goods. The following
items are just two of the myriad
which appear in the Communist and
Western press, pointing up economic
shortcomings in the Soviet Union.
(UNCLASSIFIED) Flour Returns to State
Stores in Moscow. Flour is being
sold in state stores for the first
time since the autumn of 1963. This
is partially due to the favorable
wheat crop of 1966 but is also an
extra bonus for the jubilee year.
While importing wheat, Russia had
also made selected exports for politi-
cal purposes while denying her own
citizens the privilege of purchasing
flour for their own use.
More and Better Shoes. According to
EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA and IZVESTIYA
the shoe industry is beset by a
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shortage of modern plant equipment
and quality raw material. The annual
output of shoes is scheduled to
increase from 522 million pairs in
1966 to 760 million in 1971. In
order to meet this schedule new fac-
tories will have to be built and
modern equipment imported. Improve-
ment in the quality of domestic hides
and artificial leather will also be
necessary. Artificial leather is, of
such poor quality that it can only be
used for sandals and summer footwear.
Modern facilities for treating, stor-
ing and shipping hides are also lack-
ing. Consequently, the regime has
had to import large quantities of
shoes from "Socialist" countries as
well as the decadent West.
ADVERTISEMENT
+ + + + + + + + + +
50TH ANNIVERSARY
Soviet Revolution
25X1(}1 Ob
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#14
Propagandist's Guide -to
WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS
25 April-22 May 1967
1. Although Soviet media continue to acclaim the Karlovy Vary conference of
European CPs (#13) as a great triumph and demonstration of unity with world-wide
significance (media of other participants are generally much more restrained on
the subject), the hollowness of the victory quickly becomes apparent. Immedi-
ately after its close, the participating British CP releases (A 27) a major
new policy document which differs widely from Soviet policy in important as-
pects. Ten days later, the non-participating Rumanian CP boss Ceausescu pub-
lishes a major statement which expands on that Party's previously expressed
stance of independence, including a strong affirmation of the right of any
party not to participate in any international meeting. He strongly reiterates
Rumanian opposition to any form of "an international coordinating center" and
to the setting up of compulsory norms of conduct for CPs." And in a surpris-
ing new thrust, he brands it as inadmissible for any member of one party to
maintain relations with any other party "over the head of the leadership" and
for any party to establish relations with any members or groups in another
party (in the view of the most observers, a thinly-veiled charge of underhanded
Soviet relations with sympathizers within the Rumanian CP).
2. Meanwhile, true to form, the Chinese and Albanians scathingly denounce KV
as deceitful, hackneyed, and sterile, -- "symbolic of the utter bankruptcy of
Europe's new scabs."
3. Soviet media continue to report statements by other parties calling for the
convening of a world CP meeting, and they join in the call with the Greeks
(A 29), but clandestine reporting indicates that in the aftermath of KV most
parties see the prospects for one deferred indefinitely.
4. Bilateral meetings between European parties continue, producing two more
new 20-year friendship treaties, USSR-Bulgaria (M 10-13) and Hungary-E. Germany
(M 18-21): neither departs notably from the pattern of the recent series.
5. Castro's relations with the established CPs of Latin America are further
inflamed by increased Cuban militance -- and the publicity caused by a series
of "red-handed"captures: one of Castro's closest political theorist
collaborators with the guerrillas in Bolivia (A 25); a courier in Colombia
(M"3); an agent with a clandestine radio and full paraphernalia in the Domin-
ican Republic (M 8); and three Army officers attempting a landing on the coast
of Venezuela (M 12). Unabashed, he boastfully acknowledges the landing at-
tempt and declares he'll continue to aid "fighters against imperialism" any-
where in the world. (M 1, 4, 18)
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6. Radio Tirana broadcasts to Poland purported extracts from two more sedi-
tions documents of an underground, anti-Gomulka "Polish CP." (M 8 & 14)
7. Chinese media attack the Soviet revisionists heavily along many lines and
expel a PRAVDA correspondent from Peking, while Soviet media reciprocate on a
somewhat lower key.
8. report from a usually reliable source states that the Chi-
nese have indefinitely postponed their attempt to hold a rival AAPSO conference
in Peking this year -- an intent which they announced after the Soviet-
dominated Council meeting in Cyprus (#11, Feb. 13-16) voted to change the venue
for the 5th conference to Algiers. The postponement probably reflects China's
difficulties in rounding up delegates. Actually, the prospects for the Algiers
AAPSO conference now appear doubtful, too.
9. Castro is confidently proceeding with plans for his own Latin American
Solidarity Organization (LASO) conference in Havana July 28.
10. The new Maoist drive to crush opposition loyal to Liu (#13) gains little
or no ground during this period: on the contrary, the regime's media again
warn against anarcay and violence as reports of clashes and even "large-scale,
bloody repression" of Maoists increase. (Note: a number of experts on China
believe that the poster and Red Guard bulletin reports of strife and massacres
are intentionally exaggerated by the Maoists to provide grounds for ousting
oppositionist leaders who can be held responsible, -- and there is little "hard"
evidence to prove or disprove such views.)
11. As Maoist-led rioting breaks out in Hong Kong, the Chicom regime delivers
stern demands to the British Govt, stirs massive demonstrations in Peking,
maltreats a British consul in Shanghai, etc. The British ignore the :Peking
demands; the Hong Kong police (largely Chinese) remain loyal and handle the
crowds firmly; and the situation is again relatively calm as the period ends.
(M 6. and continuing)
12. Chinese media continue their heavy barrage of attacks on the Soviets on:
collusion with U.S. imperialism (dragging this into articles on other subjects
and other countries), India, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Pope; on the Soviet
"new system" of economic management and agriculture; on practicing economic
imperialism in milking the socialist camp and countries of Asia and Africa; etc.
(Chrono, A 26 & continuing)
13. Chinese-Indonesian political strife continues, but on. a somewhat lower
key. (A 25 & continuing)
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14. On the 2nd anniversary of Mao's statement supporting the Dominican rebels,
PEOPLE'S DAILY sounds the call to armed struggle to "the Dominican and other
Latin American people." (M 12)
15. Soviet media continue extensive criticism of Chinese events, though per-
haps less intensely than last month. (A 29 & continuing, and M 7, 8 )
16. An IZVESTIYA attack on W. German-Japanese talks is rebuffed by the
Japanese. (M 16 & 18)
17. Appointment of CC/CPSU Secretary Andropov to relieve Semichastny at the
head of the security police (KGB) is seen as resulting from a series of failures
in recent months but indicates also closer party control of intelligence opera-
tions. (M 19)
18. The June issue of ATLANTIC MONTHLY contains an essay on the Russian people
written by Svetlana Alliluyeva (Stalina) in Switzerland after she had read
DR. ZHIVAGO. (M 21)
19. The long-delayed 4th Congress of Soviet writers convenes on the last day
of the period, with indications that it will be as bland, non-controversial,
and conservative as can possibly be managed. (M 22)
20. The USSR increases to $122 million its long-term loan for reconstruction
of the Cuban sugar industry. (M '7) This is an increase of
almost 50% over the September 1966 agreement.
21. Further deliveries of Soviet military hardware to Cuba,
the UAR, Algeria, Morocco, and Uganda are reported during this period.
22. The Deputy Chairman of the Soviet-Japan Friendship Society
in Japan in April reportedly makes some progress in efforts to woo the JCP
and JSP and to encourage the two to form a common front in Japan.
23. EAST GERMANY: Despite Ulbricht's "hard" speech at the SED Congress
(#13, A 17-;22), the E. German regime sends 3 communications to Bonn in apparent
efforts to draw the W. German Govt into intergovernmental negotiations; Bonn
appoints a special commission to consider answers. (M 1 & 17)
E. German Foreign Minister Winzer visits UAR, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria and Iraq
on a hurried trip apparently intended to exploit what they believe is Arab
disenchantment with Bonn, but returns emptyhanded. (See also item #1131, this
issue)
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24. ALBANIA: The Albanian regime decrees a set of harsh new "revolutionary
initiatives" to "revolutionize the life of our country, -?- including reduction
or abolition of personal plots for peasants, abolition or reduction of pro-
duction material incentives in favor of moral incentives, intensifying of work
and reduction of high wages. (A 30)
25. Czech expenditures for defense and security in 1967 will
be 14.2% above 1966.
26. SWEDEN: At its 21st Congress, the Swedish CP reelects Chairman Hermansson
and decides to continue to follow his "liberal" ways: it even changes the
party's name to "Left Party -- Communist," which it admits is an effort to
identify itself more closely with the socialist left. (M 13-16)
27. FRANCE: "Bloody strife" between pro-Moscow and pro-Chinese local Commu-
nists reaches Paris, according to the Chinese. (M 7)
28. JAPAN: The JCP continues to struggle against Chinese--supported "split-
ters," expelling two more prominent members. (M 8 & 13)
29. MONGOLIA: Mongolia again protests a "new provocation organized by the
Chinese Embassy" in Ulan Bator and expels the Chinese school-teacher offenders.
(M 22)
30. THAILAND: The premier announces further Communist terrorist activities in
the northeast. (M 1 & 8) Communist activities show a 30% 4-11001 mifibi&W increase in armed clashes in March over February, with an accommpanying
increase in village propaganda activities. ____.__ 111P OW
31. INDIA: The Soviet-aligned Indian CP seeks collaboration with the Chinese-
line CPI(L) and a political coalition to win power from the Congress Party at
the central level, -- with Soviet blessing and Chinese denunciation. (M 7)
32. PHILIPPINES: A battle with Hukbalahap (Communist) guerrillas in Bataan
kills 4 soldiers and 3 Huks.
33. CUBA: A 1-0000 report on the debriefing of the Cuban Army officers
captured during the May 8 landing attempt in Venezuela describes a special
commando unit formed in Cuba a year ago to promote and support armed clandes-0011-0 --iftiMb
tine penetration of LA countries.
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34. VENEZUELA: .Guerrillas ambushed a Venezuelan Army truck
convoy on May 17 near the site of the Cuban-supported landing, killing 4
soldiers. The V. Govt is preparing a strong case for action by OAS. EU UI
35. BOLIVIA: The Bolivian Govt expects to bring Castro's
French friend and theoretician of guerrilla war, Debray, to trial.
36. ECUADOR: 2,000 pro-Chinese students storm the Central University of
Ecuador in Quito in an unsuccessful attempt to take control. (M 17)
37, GUATEMALA: :The Security situation in Guatemala is reportedly
deteriorating;further trouble is expected. Guerrilla activities since last
August have killed at least 100 victims, and Govt forces have killed some 80
alleged guerrillas in the field. 25X1 C10b
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#1t 25 April-22 May 1967
WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS
Continuing from preceding r?Llbers: The situation in China appears to be
more coizfused and t:4ap.>ledictablethan ever: we treat it again in outline
summary.
A. The new Maoist drive to eliminate the opposition headed by Liu & Co.
apparently makes liti-.< or no headway. Regime media in Peking and the
relatively few ?'Maoi!-seized" provinces continue to attack the number
one Party person in authority taking the capitalist road`' (Liu Shao-chi),
his book, and the "handful of persons" supporting him, -- but with no dis-
cernible concrete progress towards ousting him. On the contrary, with
increased reporting of bloody strife among Maoists as well as between
Maoists and their opponents, regime media are again warning against anarchy
and violence and solemnly predict a long, hard struggle ahead, with ''many
other" cultural revolutions before China is safe from a `capitalist restora-
tion." Noteworthy items include:
(1) A 26 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, "Down with Anarchism," admits:
At this very moment, anarchism has again appeared to scatter the
targets of our struggle and divert the general orientation of the
struggle."
(2) Wall posters in Peking on April 28 reveal that "under Mao's instruc-
tions the Party CC's cultural revolution group on 22 April released from
prison 139 middle school Red Guards affiliated with the United Action Commit-
tee, which is comprised mainly of sons and daughters of high cadres," as
reported by Tokyo SANKEI Bureau Chief Shibata. Some posters attack and
others laud the release of the UAC Red Guards.
(3) May Day brings an unprecedented turnout of the top leaders (Mao's
first MD appearance since 1962), including several who have been subjected
to repeated poster attacks in recent months, such as the 81-year-old mili-
tary veteran Chu Teh, standing in 4th position, after Mao, Lin Piao, and
Chou En-lai. None of those closely identified with Liu are seen, however,
nor any regional chiefs other than Li Hsueh-feng of the North China Party
Bureau and Chang Kuo--hua of Tibet. The large turnout was undoubtedly
intended to convey an impression of unity, but, as Tillman Durdin reports
to the NYTIMES from Hong Kong, "it did not, on balance, represent the
accretion of much real strength for the Maoists."
(1k) Red Guard media report the ousting of two important anti-Maoist pro-
vincial chiefs shortly after May Day: Ulanfu, top Party, government, and
military chief of Inner Mongolia reportedly relieved by a relatively
unknown Liu Hsiang--chuan: Ulanfu is accused of wanting to turn Inner
Mongolia into an independent kingdom. THE EAST IS RED, student newspaper
of the Peking Geological Institute, on May 9 reports a May 7 CC decision
to oust Li Ching-chuan, CC Politburo member, Southwest China Party Bureau
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chief, and political commissar of the Chengtu Military Region, and appoint
a preparatory committee to set up a Szechwan Provincial Revolutionary
Committee. It contains detailed` charges of the use of PLA troops in "large-.
scale bloody repression of the revolutionary masses" in that province
which has 100 million people and vast grain producing areas(. Thus far,
the regime's formal media have made no mention of these reported ousters ---
while wall posters and other sources increasingly depict bloody clashes in
Szechwan,Heilungkiang, and elsewhere.
(5) The most systematic attack of Liu's book (HOW TO BE A GOOD C0124 MIST,
or ON SELF-CULTIVATION) to date comes in a joint RED FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial on May 7. Among other charges, it claims that Liu in his 1962
edition "deleted Stalin's name and,all the passages he originally quoted...,
and that "nowhere does it so much as mention Mao Tse-tung's thought." (A
review of the 1962 edition shows that it does retain some passages attri-
buted to Stalin and actually adds numerous Mao quotes not in the earlier
versions.)
(6) The CCP on May 16 releases the text of a hitherto secret CC circular
dated 16 May 1966: "this great historic document, drawn up under Chairman
Mao's guidance, smashed the scheme of the Peng Chen counter-revolutionary
revisionist clique for a capitalist restoration. For the first time it
systematically presented the theory, line, principles, and policy of the
GPCR...." All papers front-page it on the 17th, and a joint RED FLAG/
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 18th emphasizes its "tremendous significance."
The latter concludes: "The present GPCR is only the first, and in the
future there are bound to be many others."
(7) PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on May 21 warns:
`'Lately an, evil wind of struggling by force is seen in some
places and units and among some mass organizations... We must firmly
curb this evil wind...."
Toronto GLOBE AND MAIL correspondent Oancia on the 22nd describes security
measures in Peking verging on martial law, with troops carrying fixed
bayonets on their rifles patrolling the streets "in addition to the usual
guards on duty.'
B. Names in the news: In addition to those mentioned above, the following
prominent CCP names warrant special note:
(1) Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) is boosted in prestige as all papers on
May 10 front-page the text of a militant speech she allegedly made almost
3 years ago, at the July 196+ Festival of the Peking Opera. (Observers
point out that her name was not even mentioned in any of the reporting
associated with the Festival in 1964.)
(2) Chen Yi continues to be attacked by Red Guard posters and a Guard
detachment broke into the Foreign Ministry building on May 13, apparently
attempting to ransack the files for material to be used against him.
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However, he is reported still performing at least his ceremonial duties as
Foreign Minister receiving the Cambodian Foreign Ministry's secygen as
late as May 16.
C. Miscellaneous: The Chinese on May 6 expel PRAVDA correspondent Pasen-
chuk: NCNA says that P, who has always assumed a hostile attitude toward
China, went so far as to attack by name, open and virulently, Chairman
Mao ... and to smear China's GPCR in his dispatch of 14 April."
April 25 and continuing: Bolivian Army patrols operating against Communist
guerrillas (who had ambushed them on March 23 and April 10) capture 3
foreigners and identify one as Jules Regis Debra, a militant French Commu-
nist friend and writers-collaborator of Cuban Premier Castro, author of a
1965 article, "'Castroism, the Long March of Latin America," and a 1967
Havana-published book, REVOLUTION WITHIN A REVOLUTION. Confirming the
capture of Debray and his companions in a May 4 interview with WASHINGTON
POST's Goshko., armed forces commander Ovando adds that many guerrillas in
Bolivia "were trained in special guerrilla schools in Cuba and that others
received training in similar schools in Russia." Be concludes that "the
situation is grave because they are backed and financed by international
sources bent on the overthrow of the Bolivian Government."
April 25 and continuing: Chinese-Indonesian political strife continues,
while the Indonesian Govt attempts to dissuade and prevent its people from
actions against Chinese residents in I. Highlights include:
-- While Djakarta Radio on the 25th accuses the Chinese of "tampering with
the facts about events in Indonesia involving Communist Chinese elements,"
ANTARA on the 26th admits that I. youths in Medan on the 24th stormed and
ransacked a number of Chinese houses, adding that security
troops rushed to the scene - arrested the suspected instigators and pro-
mised "stern measures'` against culprits. ANTARA adds, though, that a group
of Chinese awaiting repatriation had marched demonstratively to the Chinese
Consulate, chanting and yelling in Chineselapparently provoking the I youths.
- NCNA May 13 charges that "the Yugoslav Tito renegade group is stepping
up its collusion with the I. fascist regime," citing "'secret meetings held
from 8 to 11 May between Y. Deputy Foreign Minister Pavicevic and Suharto,
Adam Malik, and other butchers of the I. people."
_M, A May 18 Chinese Embassy note to the I. Foreign Ministry protests new
"bloody atrocities" against Chinese nationals in Malang, East Java, on
May 12 and 13.
April 26 and continuing: Media of the participants generally extol the
results of the April 24+-26 Karlovy Vary conference of European CPs (see
#13), led by the Soviets, who expand on its "international significance''
and declare that its decisions "will become an increasingly important factor
not only in the struggle for security in Europe but also for improving the
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international atmosphere in the whole world." (PRAVDA, May 17). On a
more restrained note, however, Italian CP SecyGen Longo in a televised Rome
press conference May 12 sees the new significance" of KV in its recogni-
tion of the autonomy and independence of each party. (See major Rumanian
statement May 7.) The Chinese and Albanians, of course, scathingly denounce
it. PEOPLE'S DAILY May 4 calls it symbolic of the utter bankruptcy of
Europe's new scabs":
"The meeting was convened by the Soviet revisionists to engineer
further actions against China. At the meeting Brezhnev led the attack.
Outside the meeting the gang undertook intense anti-China activities....
On the question of European 'peace and security,' the KV meeting fell
back on a lot of hackneyed phrases, some picked up from the old revi-
sionists, some from Khrushchev, some from Tito, and some from the
imperialists. This lengthy 7,000-word statement is crammed with
deceitful phrases....
What Brezhnev, Kosygin, and company call "security in Europe"' means
security for the privileged bourgeois stratum in the countries where
the revisionist groups are in power....
The KV meeting was a meeting in the service of U.S. imperialism...."
April 27: Immediately after Karlovy Vary, the British CP releases a
major policy statement on "Questions of Ideology" which differs widely from
Soviet policy in advocating complete freedom of religion, artistic expres-
sion, and "the free confrontation of different scientific theories and,
when necessary, prolonged debate." It also recognizes the.need for a
diversity of democratic parties, "including these which do not accept, or
oppose, the advance of socialism."
In Paris, a state security court convicts two couples of s in on
NATO for E. GermanX and sentences them to terms ranging from 12 to 20 years.
April 27 and continuing: Chinese media attack the Soviet revisionists
heavily and repeatedly throughout the period: the ch} arge of Soviet collu-
sion with U.S. imperialism against China is now commonly included even
in articles on other subjects, and even in tirades directed primarily
against other countries -- the USA, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
The "new sy stem" ' in Soviet economic management (production geared to
profitability and in Soviet agriculture also comes under exceptionally
heavy attack, interpreted as further evidence of Soviet revisionist degen-
eration toward the restoration of capitalism. Noteworthy items include:
?- PEOPLE'S DAILY Observer April 30, "Soviet Revisionist Ruling Class Are
Rank Traitors to the Vietnamese Revolution," responding to Brezhnev's public
complaint at the East German Party Congress April 18 of Chinese Chinese
refusal to take "united action" to help Vietnam, lists ten examples of
how, over the last two years, the Soviets have "worked hand in glove with
U.S. imperialism in a series of conspiratorial activities, unscrupulously
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resorting to the 'peace talks' hoax and alternating this with war black-
mail. "
?_- A Chinese Defense Ministry May 2 accusation that 4 U.S. fighter planes
had intruded into Chinese airspace includes the charge that the U.S.
imperialists are expanding their aggressive war in Vietnam `'with the coordi-
nation and instigation of the Sovi'pt revisionist leading clique." PEOPLE'S
DAILY takes up the theme on May 3 ,'.following which 500 Chinese demonstrate
at the Soviet Embassy, pasting up slogans accusing the Soviets of conspir-
ing with the U.S. to bomb China. (Reuters, from "Soviet sources.")
-- PEOPLE'S DAILY May 5 devotes half a page to extracts from Soviet pub-
lications "revealing the extent to which capitalism is being restored in
accelerated tempo in the Soviet countryside." Same issue of PD has a short
commentary, "Renegades Peddle Opium," based on Soviet publication of Bible
stories for children, concluding that
"you should also include that one about Judas Iscariot, It
would be a great help to the Soviet people in recognizing your dirty
features as a handful of renegades if you acquaint the Soviet readers
with the story of that traitor who betrayed Jesus Christ for 30
pieces of silver."
..?.W NCNA May 6 reports that the Soviets have banned the distribution of
PEKING REVIEW in the USSR, saying: "Always timid as mice, the Soviet rev.
ruling clique stands in mortal fear of the dissemination in the S.U. of
Mao Tse-tung's thought, M.-L at its highest level in our era...." PEOPLE'S
DAILY same day brands Soviet implied accusations of Chinese-West German
collusion as "lies fabricated in league with U.S. imperialism to slander
China."
PEOPLE'S DAILY article May 7 exploits a statement by Soviet Foreign Trade
Minister Patolichev to TRUD, in which he :"smugly declared: 'I would like
to make it perfectly clear that neither in the Asian countries, in the
countries in the.Near East, nor in any other country have we been running
at a loss in selling commodities."'
"That is to say Soviet revisionist foreign trade must never 'run
at a loss,' which means putting financial interests first. Thisone
sentence really speaks volumes. But where has it the least flavor of
socialism! Where is the difference between it and the foreign trade
of imperialism, capitalism! ...
The Soviet revisionist leading clique frequently boasts of its
'aid' through foreign trade to the EE countries and countries in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. Patolichev's statement has now poked
another hole in the disguise covering such 'aid.' In the Soviet revi-
sionists' foreign trade activities, 'aid' is a lie while the earning
of profits is true,;, 'mutual benefits' and 'support' is a lie while
exploitation and profits is true....
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Most severely exploited by the Soviet revisionists' unequal value
exchange are the 'fraternal' countries and a number of other countries
in Asia and Africa... markets for industrial goods and sources of
agricultural products and consumer commodities....
Of course, the Soviet revs' foreign trade does not exist merely
for the sake of profits.: it is the Soviet rev. clique's tool for
pushing their policies of rev. and great--power chauvinism, and it
servestheir general line of 'Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world
domination.'..."
NCNA May 17 says that the mass demonstrations in Peking over the situa-
tion in Tong Kong (see below) included "big character posters and cartoons
deriding U.S. imperialism, British imperialism, and Soviet revisionism
as paper tigers."'
- A thousand demonstrators outside the Soviet Embassy in Peking on May 20
carry oversize caricatures depicting Liu Shao-chi and Khrushchev as great
friends.
-.,. "Routine" collusion charges include: collusion with the Pope (A 27);
collusion with the U.S. in betrayal of the Arabs over Palestine (M 15);
with the U.S. in European troop redeployment; with the U.S. in a proposed
"international anti-ballistic missile defense" (M 10, 17); with India and
Indonesia in SE Asian defense (M i6); etc.
A r l 29: All Moscow papers feature a communique on an April 28 Moscow
meeting of a Greek CP delegation headed by First Secy Koliyiannis with
Suslov and Pelshe, at which both "condemned the splitting activities" of
the Chinese and "stressed the necessity of convening an international con-
ference" of CPs.
April-29-.and continuing: Soviet media continue to give considerable atten-
tion to events in China, mostly through critical reporting of chaos and
strife resulting from the "political bacchanalia taking place there ... by
the Mao Tse-tung group in its unprincipled struggle for power." (Quote
from Radio Moscow April 29.) They cite other sources when possible: e.g.,
PRAVDA on A 29 publishes a Jordanian CP statement condemning "the crimes
of the Mao Tse-tung group and his pernicious 'thought' "which have brought
``complete anarchy'" to China, "unleashed a case campaign of hatred against
the CPSU, the Soviet people, and the USSR Govt," etc.
April 30: Albanian papers publish an Albanian Party--Govt statement "On
the Further Development and Intensification of the Revolutionary Movement
and the Working Masses' Creative Initiatives." Emphasizing the need to
'?revolutionize the life of our country," it decrees 4 ""revolutionary ini-
tiatives":
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"I. On the Reduction in Size of Cooperative Members' Plots in the Agri-
cultural Cooperatives and the Abolition of Personal Plots on State Farms.
II. On Intensifying Direct Cadre Participation in Productive work and
on the Reduction of High Wages, without Affecting Low and Medium Wages.
III. On the Abolition or Limitation of Several Incentives and on the
Priority of Moral Incentives over Material Incentives.
IV. Some Palliative Measures for Agricultural Cooperatives and on an
Eventual Drop in the Price of Consumer Goods for all the People."
May l: May Day is celebrated by Communist govts and parties (and also by
some non-Communists) around the world. The celebration in Moscow is rela-
tively low--key, with the French Chief of General Staff, Gen. Ailleret, as
the first Western military guest on the Lenin Mausoleum since Gen. Eisen-
hower in 1945: the Chinese diplomats again walk out when Marshal Grechko
implies that they are hindering united action in Vietnam. In contrast,
the militant celebration in Havana is keyed to the guerrilla struggle in
Latin America, extols Che Guevara as a leader in this struggle, broadcasts
recordings of his last major speech, and displays signs with his words:
We must create two, three, and four Vietnams in LA."
May 1 & 8: At his regular press conferences, Thai Premier Kittikhachon
describes stepped-up Communist terrorist activities in the northeast.
May 1 & 17: In West Germany Chancellor Kiesinger's May Day speech in West
Berlin, he challenges East Germany to test his proposals for easing rela-
tions between the peoples of the East and West (see #13, April 17-22).
On the 17th West German spokesman Ahlers announces that Bonn is ending its
policy of returning E. German communications unopened and has formed a
special committee to deal with answers to three recent letters: one from
E.G. Premier Stoph to Kiesinger announced on May 11; and one each from
the E.G. Ministers of Transport and post to their W.G. counterparts.
May 3: The Colombian Govt announces the capture of a courier involved in
smuggling counterfeit passports to Cuba.
May 4: Cuban CP daily GRANMA publishes a full-page summary of Uruguayan
CP SecyGen Arismendi's Lenin Day speech in Montevideo, a version which
acknowledges but tones down A's stress on the continuing possibility of
bloodless revolution. Observers see the act as intended to repair Castro's
strained relations with the Soviet-line CPs in LA on the eve of the con-
ference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) scheduled to
open in Havana July 28.
May 6, 7: Radio Moscow announces that the Chinese have decided to expel
PRAVDA correspondent Pasenchuk, the fourth Soviet journalist since the CR
began last summer. PRAVDA's editorial next day is on the theme expressed
by its heading, '`Fear of Truth.'' (A play on words: " pravda" means "truth.")
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NTa 6 and continuing: tong Kong is thrown into a major crisis potentially
threatening British control. The: disturbances begin with a clash between
police and Maoist-led sympathizers with workers at an artificial flower
factory and are rapidly expanded into violent riots and orderly demonstra-
tions. Peking first reacts on the 15th with a strong Foreign Ministry '
protest to the British Embassy denouncing large-scale "bloody atrocities
which "are the result of long premeditation and are a component part of
the British Govt's scheme of collusion with U.S. imperialism against China"
because the British authorities "mortally fear and bitterly hate China's
GPCR. `'
The Chinese Govt demands in all seriousness that the British Govt
instruct the British authorities in Hong Kong as follows:
Immediately accept all the just demands put forward by the Chinese
workers and residents of Hong Kong;
Immediately stop all fascist measures;
Immediately set free all the arrested persons...;
Punish the culprits responsible for these sanguinary atrocities, offer
apologies to the victims, and compenstate for their losses;
Guarantee against the occurrence of similar incidents." Anti-British demonstrations in Peking build up to a rally of 100,000 on
the 18th attended by Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, Chen Yi, and Kuo Mo-jo. In
Shanghai, demonstrators break into the residence of the British Consul on
the 16th and destroy the furnishings. The British ignore Peking's threats,
and the Hong Kong police (largely Chinese) seem to be controlling the situa-
tion as the period ends, in the face of loudspeaker appeals to them to turn
against the British.
M7, Rumanian CP daily SCINTEIA features a major theoretical article
by SecyGen Ceausescu, "The Leading Role of the Party in the Stage of the
Completion of Building Socialism," which, in its long international section,
expands on the RCP's independence views (with apparent reference to recent
Soviet pressures):
Each CP has the legitimate right to participate in an interna-
tional meeting if it considers it necessary and useful, just as it has
the legitimate right not to participate. Internationalist solidarity
is not a conference.... CPs who uphold that non participation in a
conference must not affect, in any way whatsoever, comradely relations
between parties... are perfectly correct.
Such an approach ... contributes to eliminating old practices of
linking inter--party relations to the acceptance or non-acceptance of a
point of view and of exerting pressure in one form or another, all of
which result in sharpening divergencies in the Communist movement.
8 (WCA Chrono Cont.)
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...he normal development of the communist movement and the assertion
of each CP as a vanguard political force of the working class and its
people are incompatible with the existence of an international coordi-
nating center, with the practice of setting compulsory norms of conduct
for CPs....
... It is inadmissible under any form for a party member to establish
or maintain, over the head of the leadership, relations with other
parties, to supply information, and to participate in actions against
the political line of his party....
... Relations must unfold in an organizational framework, from party
to party. An attempt Uy a_party to establish relations with members
or groups within another party outside the organized frameowrk means
an encroachment upon the principle of proletarian internationalism,
an action splitting the unity of that party....
... It is the essential duty of each party not to undertake anything
which might aggravate the divergencies in the Communist and workers
movement, which might further deepen the abyss of division....
Indian Chi weekly NEW AGE publishes a resolution of its National Council
with proposals aimed toward developing a 'democratic"coalition capable of
winning power from the ruling Congress Party at the central government
level. In an April resolution, the CP had called for steps toward collabor-
ation with the Chinese-oriented CPI (L). Moscowblesses and Peking denounces
these moves.
The USSR increases to $112 million its long--term loan for reconstruc-
tion of the Cuban sugar industry.
L47 8: Most authoritative of the continuing Soviet attacks on Chinese
treatment of national minorities comes in a K0I49UNIST article signed by
ursun Rakhimov (Turkic origin) denouncing "the chauvinist, nationalist
policy of the present CPR leaders" with their "attempts at forced assimi-
lation of minority groups." Next day the leading independent Vienna news-
paper KURIER supports the Soviet line in an interview by its chief editor
Hugo Portisch with "Former Cultural Affairs Minister of Sinkiang Zia Samedi,"
conducted "in a small cafe in the hills at the foot of the Altaj Mountain
range" (Soviet Turkestan). Subject describes Chinese forced assi-ilation,
"Sinozation," forced marriages, starvation, genocide. He says that since
he entered the S.U. he has published two novels and is working on a third-,
all about the various Uighur uprisings aaainst the Chinese during the past
century.
"Question: The content of your novels reveals that there have
been continuous clashes between Uighurs and Chinese. Would you inter-
pret this to mean that Sinkiang is striving for independence?'
Samedi did not reply directly. Instead he said: 'I am not authorize,
t_o say anything about this,; But he added: 'This is an affair of the
Uighurs in Sinkiang....I",
9 (WCA Chrono Cont.)
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May 7: NCIA May 7 reports from Paris that the "revisionist group in the
French CP on 5 May sent hooligans to make trouble and sabotage a mass
meeting called to express solidarity with the Vietnamese people's struggle
against U.S. aggression" which was "organized by the Paris regional committee
of the French Communist Movement M--L."
"... Using clubs and iron bars, they assaulted the defenseless French
revolutionaries ... Regis Bergeron, chief editor of L'HUMANITE NOUVELLE,
was attacked and injured...., A dozen others were seriously injured
and hospitalized. The hooligans attacked wildly. They tore up por-
traits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Chairman Mao Tse.-tung, as
well as a portrait of President Ho Chi Minh...."
May 8: Japanese CP daily AKAHATA complains that since the split 12th World
Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs last summer the 15 million yen
which the Chinese had been sending to Gensuikyo for relief of atomic victims
has been going instead to "those who bolted from the Japan-China Friendship
Association." These "splitters" are now using the Chinese funds in "des--
"r+ perate efforts to split the anti--nuclear movement and the atom-bomb victims
movement in Vietnam."
Radio Tirana in Polish describes "a brochure entitled 'The CF of
Poland (KPPrFights and Calls to Fight,'"" which was "recently published in
Poland."
"The establishment of the KPP enables all true revolutionaries
to detach themselves ... from the Gomulkaites, from the traitors of
socialism.... All true revolutionaries should join the struggle in
the ranks of the NPP.... The political struggle against the traitors
of socialism must be merciless....
Dominican Republic President Balaguer announces the capture of an
agent of Cuban intelligence, with a clandestine radio and other espionage
paraphernalia.
May 10, 13: Brezhnev visits Sofia to sign a new 20-year treaty of friend-
ship, cooperation and mutual assistance. The treaty includes much the
same provisions as the treaty which it succeeds, though it is milder in its
references to the German menace.
May 12: PEOPLE'S DAILY articles claim support in an article signed by a
CC member of the "CP of Brazil" and by "the broad masses of the Soviet
people." while NCNA describes a letter of "firm support and warm acclama-
tion" from "the CC of the Revolutionary CP of Chile." And in its turn, PD
on the 2nd anniversary of Mao's 'statement supporting the Dominican people's
resistance to U.S. armed aggression" incites revolution:
The Dominican and other Latin American people have come to realize
that they have no alternative but to wage armed struggle.... Only by
taking up the rifle will they be able to wipe out U.S. imperialism and
its lackeys...."
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May 12 & 17: Radios Moscow and "Peace and Progress" cautiously express
concern at the rightist drift in Indonesia.
"Official circles in Djakarta usually affirm that the anti-
Communism carried out in I. has nothing to do with anti-Sovietism.
This explanation can be taken with a grain of salt.... The belligerent
anti-Communism being pursued undermines normal relations of I. with
its old and reliable friends, the socialist nations...."
May 12, 17, 18: Venezuela announces May 12 that she has captured two Cuban
Army officers and killed two in a landing attempt on the 8th. On the 17th,
the Venezuelan CP publishes paid newspaper advertisements denouncing the
"insurrectional line" being followed by Cuban-backed guerrillas, while
simultaneously the Central University is plastered with leaflets signed by
the pro-Cuban Revolutionary Leftist Movement denouncing the Govt's charges
against Cuba as a "farce" to justify repression. Next day, however, a
Cuban CP statement boastfully acknowledges that 3 Cubans whom it names were
in fact involved in the attempt: "We are lending and will continue to lend
aid to all those who fight against imperialism in any part of the world.''
May 13: Radio Tirana broadcasts to Poland an "excerpt from 'The Polish
October -- A Betrayal of Socialism,' a pamphlet distributed throughout
Poland by the Polish CP."
Japanese CP daily AKAHATA announces the expulsion of another two
prominent members who, while holding high positions in the Japan Interna-
tional Trade Promotion Council, "became agents of -Li certain foreign country'
clearly indicated to be ComChina.
May 13-16: The Swedish CP holds its 21st Congress in Stockholm -- and
decides to change its name to "Left Party -- Communists" as part of its
effort to disassociate itself from the old Communist image and identi
itself with the Oocialist left, according to its statement issued on the
15th. It reelects Chairman Hermansson and indicates it will continue to
follow his "liberal" ways.
May 16 & 18: IZVESTIYA comment by V. Kudryavtsev on W. German Foreign
Minister Brandt's visit to Japan recalls "the old wind of pre-war years"
and concludes: "as the Miki Brandt consultations showed, Tokyo and Bonn
are not against returning to their old game now...." On the 18th, at a
press conference of the Japanese Foreign Office, Public Information Director
Kinya Niiseki states that IZVESTIYA had regrettably distorted the facts.
May 17: 2,000 pro--Chinese Communist students storm the Central University
of Ecuador in Quito in an unsuccessful effort to take control, the second
failure in 3 days of rioting. (Reuters)
May 18: Manila announces that l soldiers and 3 Huk guerrillas were killed
in a battle in Bataan province. (NYTIMES)
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May 18--21: An Ulbricht-led E. German Party/State delegation goes to Budapest
and signs . a new 20-year treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual
assistance which contains no notable departures from the old or from the
series concluded with other EE states in recent months.
Maur 19 & 21: Moscow announces on tho 19th that Yuri Andropov, CPSU/CC
Secretary in charge of relations with foreign ruling parties, formerly a
Komsomol (Youth League) official and Soviet Ambassador to Budapest during
the 1956 uprising, will take over the Committee of State Security (KGB),
relieving Vladimir Semichastny, former Komsomol chief. On the 21st, it
announces that S. will be a Deputy Premier of the Ukrainian "Union Republic."
Journalists speculate that Semichastny's ouster is the direct result of a
nimber of obvious failures in recent months, especially the repeated
exposure of Soviet espionage activities and personnel in all parts of
the world (as chronicled in our regular installments).
May 21: The June issue of the Boston-published ATLANTIC MONTHLY contains
an es_ a, which Svetlana Alliluyeva (Stalina) wrote in Switzerland after
she had read Pasternak's DOCTOR ZHIVAGO and which "contains her reflections
on the spirit of the Russian people and particularly the yearnings of
Russian writers under the restrictions of the present Soviet regime."
A long, Ignatyev-signed PRAVDA article on Latin America promises
Soviet backing for LA "patriots" in their struggle against "U.S. imperialism
and local reaction" and approving implicitly of kruerrilla struggle as well
as constitutional opposition.
May 22: Ulan Bator Radio announces a Mongolian Foreign Ministry protest
over a "new provocation organized by the Chinese Embassy on 21 May" at the
railway station, where Chinese teachers from their school in U.B. rioted
violently, shouted "provocative slogans and threats and curses addressed
at our country" and physically assaulted Mongolian militiamen. The offenders
are expelled.
May 22 and continuing: The long-delayed fourth congress of the Soviet
Union of Writers convenes in Moscow on the 22nd. Before Brezhnev and most
of the Politburo, the Party Secretary charged with ideological matters,
P. Demichev, delivers a message from the leadership calling on the writers
to continue as "fighters for Party spirit and allegiance to the people, for
the unshakeable ideological principles of Soviet literature." Soviet
writers should intensify their "offensive against bourgeois ideology," strike
hard against "vulgarizers of Marxism," and "help those misled by hostile
propaganda to find the right track." Editor Tvardovsky of the most liberal
Soviet library journal NOVY I`MIR is elected to the Congress Presidium, as
well as Editor Kochetov of the most conservative OKTYABR. Pasternak's name
is included when Congress Chairman Fedin asks for a moment of silence in
memory of about 20 Soviet writers who have died since the last congress in
1959. Earlier, the most prominent writers of the French left, Louis Aragon
and Jean-Paul Sartre, announced they rejected invitations to the Congress
in protest over the Union's stand with the Government in its harsh treat-
ment of Sinyavsky and Daniel last year.
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/ -03061A000400060OZ file 1967
HANOI'S AIMS REVEALED, IN DOCUMENT
25X1C10b
(Editor's Note: Three days after Hitler became Chancellor, he
gave a lecture to top German military leaders, telling them
that his over-riding aim was to restore German power, particu-
larly military power: pacifism and socialism should be "rooted
put"; the people should be so indoctrinated that there could
not be another collapse of morale on the home front; and the
army should be strengthened by every possible means. He stated
his view that the only solution to German economic problems was
to conquer territory in the East and "ruthlessly to Germanize"
it, and he clearly implied that Germany would go to war unless
the French took action before German rearmament was completed.
One of the generals present took extensive notes on this meet-
ing, but they were not available to the public for 20 years.
Had they been known and publicized at the time, it seems possible
that subsequent history might have been somewhat different.
The record of General Nguyen Van Vinh's lecture, now avail-
able to us one year after the lecture took place, appears to be
just as valuable a document. It needs to be made more widely
known.)
SITUATION: On 28 January 1967, elements of the US 101st Airborne
Division operating in Ninh Thuan province seized the notebook of a People's
Revolutionary Party cadre member who had attended the 4th COSVN (Central
Office, South Vietnam) Congress in April 1966*. This notebook contained
*The PRP is the Southern arm of the Lao Dong (North Vietnamese Workers'--
read Communist--Party) which nominally split off from the Lao Dong in 1961,
evidently for purposes of concealment. The COSVN is the PRP's Central
Committee and functions as headquarters for military operations and for the
National Liberation Front, which includes non-PRP elements but is controlled
at each level by the PRP. The'location of COSVN is believed to be Tay Ninh
province, on the Cambodian border northwest of Saigon. (For details, see
unclassified USIA report R-13-67, 20 April 1967: "The Viet Cong: The Front
Technique.")
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(1130 Cont.)
 Approved For release 2 IA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2
a record of two speeches made at the Co ress, one an emotional diatribe
by a leader believed to be General Nguyen Chi Thanh, the Commander of NLF
i'orces in the South., the other a discussion of-North Vietnamese-Viet Cong
policy by General Nguyen Van Vinh, who is Chairman of both the R~?eunifica-
"tion De mr went, of the Lao Dung Central Committee and the Reunification
Commission. of the North Vietnamese sovernmentu w^he latter document merits
The
i speech
to the press in E
red Washing-
ton and has
ton by any qu(_rstion
been distributed -widely
USIA., If there is any
about the authenticity of the document, due to its being circulated-by the
U.S., this should be dispelled by the unflattering rema'ks it, contains
about the United States. So far as we know, Hanoi has 7iade no attempt to
deny the authenticity of the document. And most important, there is_ in
existence another less complete, bu, confirmatory account of Vinh's remarks.
In his speech, Vinh began by discussing the resolutions of the 9th,
11th and l?th plenums of the Lao Dong Central Committee (referred to in
the translation?as "Resolution #9ft ,"Resolution #11", and "Resolution #12"),
which took,place, in the summer-fall of 1964, the summer-fall of J965,, and
January February 1966; from this springboard, he then -proceeded to outline
the military situation,' the North V:etnamese strategy f,?r negotiations, the
state of North Vietnamese defenses, and the support and policies of other
Communist governments. When reading the speech, it isimportant to remember
that Vinh was somewhat in the position of having to jus,ify Lao Dong-?NLF
policy, which had failed to anticipate the large-scale intervention of the
United States; also, while Vinh was quite frank about some problems and
shortcomings, especially those which his listeners could be expected,tQ
remedy, he had no intention of allowing any doubts to arise on the possibil-
ity of ultimate success, the situation in the North Vietnamese support area,
or the backing being received from other "socialist" countries. The speech
contains many interesting points, but the most important is perhaps the
long description of Hanoi's plans for continuing to fight while negotia-
ting-- a plain indication that a truce would riot in prt.ctice be honored
by Hanoi and the NLF. In this, the document completely knocks the props
from under 'criticisms of U.S. policy as being -too firm in demanding a
halt to infiltration from the North prior to negotiations and in refusing
A guide to'important points in the Vinh lecture is given in an_un-
classified attachment.
25X1C10b
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2
(1130 Cont.}
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25X1C1Ob
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(1130)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/ ^ 03061A00640006OOO1-2967
EAST GERMANY CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR
THIRD WORLD RECOGNITION
25X1C10b
SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED): While East Germany has brought pressure to
bear on the other East European Satellite countries not to follow Rumania's
move in recognizing the West German Government, it has also been beseeching
the uncommitted governments of the Middle East and North Africa to recognize
its own regime. In the latter instance, there have been no immediate signs
of success thus far.
Foreign Minister Otto Winzer recently returned to East Berlin from a trip
to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, and Iraq without having made any concrete
gains in East Germany's long-standing quest for diplomatic recognition. The
trip was obviously timed to take advantage of what East Germany hoped was
Arab disenchantment with the Bonn Government:, Arab League Secretary General
Hassunah had recently gone to West Germany in an apparently unsuccessful bid
to get more aid for the Arabs and to prevent any increase of'German assistance
for Israel. Before leaving on his trip, Winter denounced Bonn's policies
toward the Israelis and the Arabs and stressed East Germany's common interests
with the latter. But while. on the trip, during which he offered economic aid
in exchange for diplomatic recognition, it soon became apparent that recogni-
tion will not come until some time in the future -- if at all. See the at-
tached interview which Winzer gave the East Berlin radio correspondent in
which he speaks of his discussions only in terms of results which "will bear
fruit in the future."
Arab propagandists reported Winzer's trip with varying degrees of accu-
racy: some papers reported that Egypt would grant diplomatic recognition to
East Germany within two months while others stated Lebanon was not even con-
sidering recognition. In actual. fact, Winzer returned emptynanded. The
Arab League is scheduled to consider the entire German question when it meets
in September, but it seems unlikely that even Egypt and Syria, the two coun-
tries most favorably disposed toward the Communist regime in East Germany,
will press full diplomatic recognition of it.
Meanwhile, it can be expected that East Germany will continue its quest
for recognition not only in the Arab World but also in other nations of the
"developing" areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America -- as outlined in the
(attached) article from the FOREIGN AFFAIRS BULLETIN published 25 January 1967
by the Press Department of the East German Foreign Affairs Ministry: "scien-
tific and industrial" feet in the door aiming toward "long-term relations."
(END UNCLASSIFIED)
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PROPAGANDA NOTE #154+ (E), 19 May 1967, "Ernst Wollweber: The Career of
,An Outstanding Communist Sabotage and Espionage Chief" (unclassified
attachment useful wherever East Germany attempts to gain diplomatic
recognition or infiltration via trade and aid as a glaring example of
the long history of its role in international subversion)
BIWEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE Item #1101, 27 February 1967, "East Germany
Maintains 'Die-Hard' Opposition to European Mainstream"
BIWEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE Item #1020, 9 May 1966, "East Germany:
Soviet Spearhead in Central Europe"
(Copies of all available from Headquarters upon request)
THE REPORTER Magazine, 20 April 1967 (a report from Leipzig which says
East German efforts to'persuade the world of great economic achievements
are' contradicted by facts)'
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1132-c. COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION OF BAPTISTS
25X1C10b
"Churches must be free from the
interference of the states, and
all churches should, as far as
their principles permit, abide by
the laws of the state." (From
the statement issued by the 1955
London Conference of the Baptist
World Alliance)
"Baptists are one of the most
widely spread Christian sects...
In their overwtelming majority
they were hostile toward the Great
October Socialist Revolution and
the Soviet State. [Nevertheless]
the Soviet Government, which sepa=rated State and Church, granted the
Baptists freedom to practice their
cult." (From the Great Soviet
Encyclopedia, 2nd Edition)
`-SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED) How do the Baptists in the Soviet Union
and other Bloc countries fare under Communist domination? There is grow-
ing evidence, even in the Soviet press, that some of them are carrying on
militant activities "underground" and that the encouragement they receive
from publications abroad is having a telling effect on the Communist
regimes' atheistic campaigns. Last summer there was an unusual number of
items in Soviet media reporting on the Moscow Government's efforts to
quash the activities of Baptists who live in the USSR and of those who
visit there and bring religious literature with them from the Free World.
Two examples of this follow. The 16 July KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA published
an article about the domestic activities of the Baptists under the head-
line "Thieves with a Prayerbook -- Spiritual 'Pastors' as They Are." It
said in part:
"Baptist pastors daily rob children of their youth, poisoning
their immature minds and hearts with religious narcotics. For the
crimes they have committed, the presbyter of the Evangelical-Christian
sect, V. Golub, and the preachers N. Butkov and A. Balatski have been
brought before the People's Court of the Kamennobrodeki region of
Lugansk. These are not grey-bearded old men but quite young: Golub,
the oldest, is only 36...These beguilers of souls decided to organize
a school of their own to teach religious music. Here, under the pre-
text of learning to play stringed instruments, the children were
taught psalms... The 'prophets' got what they deserved -- not for their
faith but for the evil they had committed."
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Ten days earlier, in another typical report aimed at denigrating
Baptists, TASS distributed for its worldwide outlets this report about
tourists "smuggling religious books" being expelled from the USSR:
"Three British motor tourists and a Dutch subject have been
expelled from the USSR for attempting to smuggle in Baptist religious
literature, TRUD reports today. Anthony Richard iippisZey and his
wife Anne Marie tried to smuggle through the border checkpoint in
Brest 400 religious books donated by the British Z'oreign Biblical
Society for illegal circulation in the USSR. These books were con-
cealed in eight secret compartments in their specially equipped VoZks-
wagon. Driving an Opel Rekord, two Baptist priests -- Murrey John, a
British subject, and Fisser Johannes, a Dutch subject -- tried to
smuggle 300 similar books into the USSR across the ryausheny check-
point in Soviet Moldavia, TRUD, the newspaper of Soviet trade unions,
writes that the religious literature and the cars with secret compart-
ments have been confiscated and the smugglers expelled from the USSR."
(See the attached unclassified selection of clippings from Free World
papers on other cases in 1966, as well as the translations of the 5 June
and 30 August articles in IZVESTIYA attacking the Baptists.)
The 29 March 1967 issue of the Swiss Radical Democratic NEUE ZURCHER
ZEITUNG gives the background of the Baptist controversy in the Soviet
Union. The officially recognized Baptist leadership is the A1.1--Union
Council of Evangelical-Christian Baptists; as=ide from the Russian Ortho-
dox Church, this is the only church organization. permitted to function
legally on a USSR-wide basis.* Like the official Orthodox hierarchy,
this All-Union Council is controlled by the Soviet regime. In 2_960,
the All-Union Council (no doubt at the insistence of the regime) decreed
new statutes which were designed to discourage missionary activities and
the introduction of children into service. Obviously, the aim of these
statutes was to let the Baptist church gradually wither away for lack
a new members. Many church members became aroused not only at the content
of the statutes, but also at the undemocratic way in which they were im-
posed from outside. The result was a counter-movement, launched by
A. F. Prokofiev and G. K. Lriutchkov in 1961; the movement calls itself
the "I:nitsiativniki" ("Initiators"). The Soviet regime has responded
*The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists was formed in
1944 and today claims a membership of around 500,000 believers. In 1927,
following the initial increase in many religious sects in the decade after
the Revolution, there were 500,000 members of the Baptist Union and 4,000,000
members of the Union of Evangelical Christians. The two groups steadily
declined under pressures brought about by the Soviet regime and today their
combined membership totals only that of the 1.927 Baptist segment. (Not
treated in this Guidance, but nevertheless a problem of similar magnitude,
is the fate suffered by Baptists in other Communist countries, including
90,000 in Rumania, 35,000 in Hungary, 9,000 in Bulgaria, and lesser numbers
in East Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Cuba --- the latter having arrested
in recent years several Baptist mi:zisters on espionage charges.)
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with, among other things, two decrees (of 18 March and 22 September 1966)
which place new restrictions on worship and the religious instruction of
children, and forbid religious demonstrations of any kind. The two news
stories quoted above are reflections of the Soviet policy of trying to
make religion die out.
(Further information on the history of confrontation between the
Baptists and the Communists is contained in the attached article, "Russian
Baptists Quote Lenin in Plea for Religious Tolerance," an unclassified item
prepared by USIA which may be used for background purposes.)
Attention was again focused on the Baptist problem last fall when
the Government-sanctioned Evangelical-Baptist Church leadership held an
All-Union Congress in October in an attempt to bring the dissident
"Initsiativniks" back into the fold. (Note -- This
may have been partially successful, but the American Embassy in Moscow re-
ports that "the seriousness of the Government's continued concern is well
reflected by repeated references in the press to public demonstrations by
the schismatics and to the apparent willingness of their leaders to accept
martyrdom rather then submit to the demands of the Soviet authorities.")
PRAVDA VOSTOKA reported on 22 October a trial of four Baptists in
Tashkent, the chief defendant being N. P. Khrapov, described as the head
of the South Asian Branch of the dissident Union of Churches of Evangeli-
cal Christians-Baptists. The article said Khrapov had recently served
three years in:prison for "antisocial activity" and it gave considerable
details of illegal publications allegedly being distributed by the "Initia-
tors". The group's journal VESTNIK SPASENIYA (Herald of Salvation) and
a number of underground pamphlets were said to contain "slander against
Soviet society."
How serious a problem the Soviet Government considers the dissident
Baptists today is perhaps best illustrated by an article in the September
1966 issue of the official atheistic propaganda organ NAUKA I RELIGIYA
(Science and Religion) which complained that the "Initiators" are produc-
ing a number of illegal publications and have adopted a policy of such
o v e r t defiance' to authority as :
"...collective singing of psalms in buses and at bus stops,
in railway cars and at stations, religious processions and services
in the streets, in squares, and in buildings of state institutions,
and the creation of special schools and groups for instructing child-
ren in religion."
Another problem which the Baptists present to the Soviet Government
is their stand on military service: see unclassified attachment to BPG
Item # 1057 of 12 September 1966, "Communist Exploitation of Conscientious
Objectors," which notes reports of Baptists being arrested in Moscow for
demonstrating against military service and sentenced to prison terms in
Cherkessk for refusing on religious grounds to serve in the Army. (END
UNCLASSIFIED)
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(1132 Cont.)
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Book Dispatch #6027, 24 April 1967, "Comrmnunism and Religion" (for
section on Baptists in attached booklet of selected translations from
the Great Soviet Encyclopedia).
BPG #196 Item 1045, 1 August 1966, "Communists and Religion" (for
listing of previously available material on this subject).
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(1132 Cont.)
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BPG #211 Item 1105, 13 March 1967, "The Ciristian Peace Conference"
(for background on how Communists exploit this group),
Kurt Hutten, "Iron Curtain Christians," Augsburg Publishing House,
Minneapolis,l967 (a translation of "Christian hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang"
published by Quell-Verlag, Stuttgart, Germany, 1962 -- useful for its
treatment of Communism vs. Religion in general and in this instance for
its individual sections on Baptists in various Bloc countries),
"Religion in Communist Dominated Areas," a periodic newsletter distri-
buted by the International Affairs Commission of the National Council
of Churches in New York (for the report on the 5 June 1966 IZVESTIYA
article and for continuing reports of this nature -- yearly subscription
costs $10.00).
"The Russian Baptists -- Propagandists for Stalin and Khrushchev,"
Christian Beacon Press, Collingswood, N.J., 1960 ( a profusely illustrated
booklet containing many press clippings reporting how the Communists
exploited Baptists at home and abroad for propaganda purposes in'the 1950's).
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(1132)
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1133. VIETNAM WAR: CONTINGENCY PLANNING
25X1C10b
SITUATION: In the event that the U.S. decides it is necessary to
mine or bomb Haiphong Harbor or its approach channels, we can expect a
major propaganda barrage from the opposition. Hard intelligence has
indicated that the East Germans are even planning to send a camera team
to Haiphong to film the bombing of the harbor for propaganda purposes.
To date U.S. planes have not bombed the Harbor and the SS Dartford,
which was flying the British flag when recently damaged in Haiphong Har-
bor, is now believed to have been hit by North Vietnamese antiaircraft
fire or debris from exploding SAMs. The SS Dartford was not the bbject
of accidental U.S. bombing as was feared when the news first broke.
The U.S. has apparently refrained thus far primarily because of
the foreign shipping (mostly Soviet and Chinese) that regularly offloads
in Haiphong Harbor. The great bulk of supplies for North Vietnam comes
from the USSR rather than from closer-by China and much of this materiel
moves by sea past U.S. warships into Haiphong. Aerial reconnaissance
suggests that the Soviets have limited sea-borne goods to those usable
for peaceful as well as military purposes such as oil, trucks, medicines,
pontoon bridges, structural steel, machine tools, etc. Soviet equip-
ment whose war use is unmistakable such as radar sets, antiaircraft guns,
SAMs, aircraft and the like is believed to be routed by rail through
China.
According to experts, the most reliable recent figures in open
sources on Soviet and other foreign equipment shipped to North Vietnam
appeared in a WALL STREET JOURNAL article of 14 February. The WSJ staffer
had been briefed by State and Defense experts and the text into which
he wove the statistics they gave him can supply the basis for discussion
on the subject. The article is included as an unclassified attachment.
25X1C10b
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(1133)
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001 21y67
Guide to Lecture by_NE;y_en Van Vinh, Chairman
of Reunification Department, Lao Dong Central Committee
Vinh's remarks in his lecture to the 4th COSVN Congress, held in
April 1966, were wide-ranging, Some sections remain somewhat obscure, as
they refer to doctrinal positions taken at the earlier plenums of the Lao
Dong Central Committee. Moreover, the treatment of various subjects in
the lecture often overlaps. Nevertheless, Vinh's lecture provides clear
and decisive evidence on questions of major interest.
The following are major points which emerge from the record:
1) There is close control by the North Vietnamese regime over the
Viet Cong, and the former closely supports the latter. The existence of
Hanoi control is evident from the very fact that the speech was given by
a North Vietnamese leader and recorded by a Viet Cong member, and also from
the whole tone and setting of Vinh's remarks, accompanied as they were
by remarks by the NLF Commander, Nguyen Chi Thanh. Specifically, Vinh
expounds the significance of the resolutions of the Lao Dong Central
Committee (pp. 1-5). He says, for example: "Execution of the resolution
is a major requirement," (p. 3)--evidently a requirement for his Southern
listeners as well as for the North. He uses the first person plural, clear-
ly including his audience among the "we" or "our" (e.g., "Our advance must
pass through many transitory steps"- p.5). On page 7, Vinh says: "We have
main force units, regional troops, guerrillas, and the masses..." On page 9,
Vinh claims that "the enemy" will have to increase his strength to 700;000
or 800,000 men "in order to be able to stop reinforcements from North Viet-
nam. Without doing so they will be unable to stop our growth in the
South." This is a frank statement of the importance of North Vietnamese
infiltration to the war. Further on, Vinh says (p. 11) that one of the
goals is to "advance toward national unification." In discussing negotia-
tions, Vinh envisages close coordination between Hanoi and the Viet Cong;
one might negotiate while the other continues fighting (p. 15). Towards
the end of his remarks, Vinh states:
"We can thus conclude that even if the Americans intensify their
air raids, we will still stand firm to protect the North and re-
inforce the South...The Northern citizens have clearly realized
their responsibility with regard to this matter. Therefore, they
have provided reinforcements to the best of their ability." (pp.20-21)
2) Although Hanoi refuses to be dominated by any particular Bloc country,
it receives large quantities of supplies from Communist states. Indeed,
Hanoi seems to profit by playing off` the Soviet and Chicom rivals against
each other. It is possible that, in the interests of boosting morale,
Vinh may have somewhat exaggerated the quantity of material aid (pp. 18-21)
or the willingness of the big Communist powers to spring to the defense of
North Vietnam (p. 9). But attention should be given to his statement that
China provides nearly half the budget of "the South" (presumably the NLF) and
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that Soviet aid became extensive after the fall of Khrushchev (p.21).
One may wonder if the Chinese provide such support without making some
effort to use it to increase their influence.. And it appears that the
step-up in Soviet aid preceded t;se big increase in U.S. aid and support
to Saigon in early 1965, which ob" course was a response to ominous Viet
Cong successes.
A rather striking series of` revelations appears on p. 15:
"China holds the view that Condit-ions for negotiations are not yet
ripe, not until a few years from now, and, even worse, seven years
from now., In the meantime, we should continue fighting to bog down
the enemy, and should wait until a number of so ialist countries
acquire adequate conditions for strengthening their main force
troops to launch a strong, ail-out, arid rapid offensive, using all
types of weapons and heeding no borders. What ;,e should do in the
South today is to try to restrain the enemy and. make him bogged
down, waiting until China has built strong forces to launch an all-
out offensive,"
In other words, Hanoi and the Viet Cong should confi:c.e themselves to
guerrilla warfare and await liberation by modernized Chicom forces In
seven years. It is easy to see why this Chicom proposal has little
attraction for Hanoi; aside from uncertainty as to ?;~hether China can
meet any such timetable (an uncertainty which has increased since Vinh
spoke), such a procedure would tend to weaken Viet G:ong morale and
make Hanoi a vassal of Peking. Vinh says, "We must achieve decisive
vict_or1r within the next four years" (p. 21), a,nd he admits that "we
are worried" over the disunity in the "socialist camp" (p. 21,).
3) While Vinh assumes an a__r of confider(-,e va,ious remarks indicate
some of the problems facing Hano:. and the Viet Cone On page 5, he admits
that, "at certain moments, certain people underestima:~ed the U.S. imperial-
ists and overestimated. the heroism of the Southern p,eeople." "Cur strength,"
he says, "does not suffice to de'ea.t the Americans," (p. 7) On. page 13,
he says that ARVN troops occupy "over 250 districts": it is believed
likely that he meant 250 district capitals, as there are only about 250
districts in all. (On p. 1b, Vinh says that forces must be introduced into
the cities.) Vinh indicates that quite a number of "nationalist countries
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America" have doubts about the ability of Hanoi
and the Viet Cong to defeat the Americans (p. He complains that the
build-up of forces on his side has been slow; in say.a.ng that, the guerrillas
were previously 10 percent or the population, and that now the proportion
is as small as 1 percent in some areas, he seems to imply that, the over-
all proportion of guerrillas to population has declined (p. 16). In
another place (p. 17) he says the building of guerrilla forces has been
unsatisfactory. There are d.itficulties with the recruitment of youth:
"It is necessary to carefully consider why we cannot recruit youths to
replenish our forces." The enemy would have been defeated if he had been
unable to replenish his forces, but (unlike the VC guerrilla.sj he was
able to replace and supplement his strength (p. 17). ]Remarks on pp. 16 and
17 also suggest that the Viet Cong has often failed to retain control of
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areas it has "liberated." Vinh makes no mention of napalm or poison gas,
but the use of chemical defoliants, he says, has made the Lao Dong Central
Committee "very concerned" (p. 18). While claiming that transportation
capabilities have doubled, Vinh says transportation on roads is almost
nonexistent in daylight, and that the requirements of the 14th Zone (the
North Vietnamese area bordering on the Demilitarized Zone) and the South
are: not being met (p. 20). He indicates that North Vietnamese missile
units have failed to meet the 100 percent "kill rate" set by the Soviet
Union. Although MIG 21's are dodged by the enemy, "the MIG 21's have
not yet been widely used" (p. 19). As already noted, Hanoi is worrried
over the lack of unity in the "socialist camp"--yet North Vietnam itself
insists on pursuing an independent line.
4+) For Hanoi, the war-is not merely a military struggle, but a
political one, and success depends on deceiving the enemy, particularly
by pretending to negotiate while continuing the fighting. Like other
Communists, the leaders in Hanoi turn the formula of Clausewitz around;
they believe that politics is the continuation of war by other means.
It had been necessary to defeat the French colonial army militarily to
get the French out of Vietnam, but in 1966, the Lao Dong believed that
"after defeating a greater bulk of the puppet army and an important
part of American troops, we can push the Americans out of South Viet-
nam by coordinating the political struggle with diplomacy" p. 5). In
an interesting passage, Vinh says that a situation in which the "puppet
troops" have not been completely annihilated provides a condition for the
Americans to withdraw, while if the "puppet administration" is completely
eliminated, there are no conditions for the Americans to withdraw; this
seems to mean that in the former case, the Americans could withdraw with-
out a complete loss of face and with some self-deception as to an agree-
ment being possible "between Vietnamese" (between the Saigon government
and the Hanoi-directed National Liberation Front), while in the latter
case, there would be a simple military contest between Vietnamese Communists
and the United States, which the Communists would be unable to win. (p. 5).
The Americans must be forced to "eat rice with chopsticks" (engage in a
political-guerrilla competition), and the Vietnamese Communists should
avoid "eating rice with spoons and forks" (engaging in a war of position)
(p.8). Vinh says: "Under these conditions [of politico-guerrilla war-
fare], if they force us to surrender while we are not defeated, then they
are defeated" (p. 8); this epigram appears to signify that if there was
a Viet Cong military surrender which did not involve an end to the VC's
political struggle, the U.S. would have failed to achieve its political
objecti.e.
Vinh reveals that the 11th (1965) Lao Dong Resolution foresaw the
possibility of a situation where fighting and negotiations were conducted
simultaneously (pp. 13-16).
"Fighting while negotiating is aimed at opening another front
with a view to making the puppet army more disintegrated, stimulating
and developing the enemy's internal contradictions, and, thereby,
making him more isolated in order to deprive him of the propaganda
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weapons, isolate him further, and make a number of people who mis-
understood the Americans clearly see their nature" (p. iii).
Such tactics, Vinh notes, were used during the Vietnamese war against the
French and in China (i.e., prior to 1949). They cannot, however, be employed
"as long as we have not yet acquired adequate strength" (p. 14). Further
on, 9inh indicates that the required conditions for negotiation amount to
conditions overwhelmingly favorable to his side: e.g., enemy troops should
be withdrawn and their bases dismantled, or in a slightly di:rfe.rent version,
the "puppet forces" must be concentrated in barracks, must not herd people
into strategic hamlets, and the Americans must be stationed at the wharves.
(p. l6).
Fn the Lao Dong system of teought, "fighting while negotiating also
represents a principled step in tee evolution of the war" (p. 11+). This
exercise in bad, faith might take place in several ways: "It is possible
that the North conducts negctiations while the South [the National Libera-
tion Front] continues fighting, aed that the South also participates in
the negotiations while continuing to fight" (p. 15). As the Lao Dong sees
it, no considerable success can be achieved in negotiations if fighting
stops while the negotiations are going on. But--"if we conduct, negoti.a-
tions while fighting vigorously, we can also take advantage of the opportun-
ity to step up the political struggle, military proselyting (sic), and
activities in the cities. Thus, we will take advantage of the opportunity
offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks,
political struggle and military proselyting (sic)" (p. 15). Vi.nh :indicates
that "a number of East European socialist countries" .gold similar views:
they think "that conditions do prevail, and are ripe for achieving success
(.The Americans would withdraw their trope and we wi l_1. continue the
strug ;le to achieve total success). These socialist countries also posed
a number of conditions? cessation of the bombing of the North; gradual with-
drawal of U.S. troops from the South" (p~ 14).
Note: Various letters are used in the Vinh document as cover for different
organizations or units. They may be translated as follows:
C -.- Company
1) - Battalion TW Lao Dong Central Committee
E - Regiment TCK - General offensive
F - Division TKN - General uprising
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5 June 1967
Comrade Vinh's Talk
I. Presentation of the spirit of resolutions.
II. Some additional ideas
III. Defense situation in North Vietnam-aid for South Vietnam.
IV. Support of the socialist camp.
V. Relationship among countries in the socialist camp.
x x
x
I. Presentation of the spirit of resolutions.
1) Introduction of the contents of resolutions.
2) Necessary conditions to be held fast.
3) Some ideas on the nature and characteristics of the war.
+) Strategic missions and guidelines.
- Resolution #9 assessed the balance of forces between us and the
enemy and set forth plans and guidelines to win the special war.
- Resolution #11 assessed the situation of the special war developed
to a high degree and having the factors of a limited war.
- Resolution #12 noted the characteristics and nature of the special
war developed into a limited war which still have the character of the
special war. Determination of the party'to win the limited war.
B. Necessary conditions to be held fast.
There are two points to be held fast:
a) Dialectics on ideological methods.
b) Steadfast determination and spirit of thorough revolution.
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a) Dialectics on ideologLcal methods:
It is necessary to pay attention to the difference between the
natural world and the development of human society.
The rules concerning the development of the natural wor~_d can be
asserted. For example, at 99.5 degrees water does not boil. It will
boil at a fixed temperature. At zero degrees it will freeze and become
_.ce.
As for the development of human society, there may be this possi-
bility or the other. For example, we assert that when 200,000, 300,000
or 1+00,000 Americans have been annihilated, the enemy will be defeated.
Yet, sometimes when a small number of the enemy has been annihilated, he
is defeated; sometimes when a large number of the enemy has been anni-
hi.:Lated, he is not yet defeated. The former resolution (11th) stated
that victory would be won in a relatively short period of ti:are, from
s.:several to four years. It was a flexible statement. The latter resolu?-
tion (12th) also stated that decisive victory would be won i:ri a vela=
Lively short period of time (a few years). This must also be understood
.uus a flexible statement, since it is impossible to ascertain one or two
years. However, the time must not be spoken of as unlimited? and in
speaking of a protracted struggle one may not "'say it is protracted.,
unlimited."' As far as thinking methods are concerned, if one thinks
mechanically and inflexibly he will be unjustifiably optimistic, or be-
come pessimistic when he Las not yet seen victory. How long a time
depends on subjective and objective factors, and on the evolution of
these factors.
b) It is necessary to have a steadfast determination and a _!pir:it of
thorough revolution.
Speaking of war is speaking of the worst; difficulties and hardships
in life. To win the war is a very difficult undertaking which requires
boundless energy. When we spea., of achieving success within a relatively
short period of time., it means that we assert our determination, and when
we saw so, the difficulties have been taken into consideration. When
we say that even if the Americans introduce such and such number of
troops we still can defeat them, it means that we assert our determina-
tion to overcome all difficulties in order to achieve success. When we
speak of winning the war, even -:hough the Americans increase the number
of their troops, and achieve decisive success within a relatively short
period of time, it means that we are determined to overcome countless
difficulties before success is achieved. Such a statement is not theo-
retical, but is 50 percent prac7;ical. It is on the basis of this state-
merit that we strengthen our determination to defeat the U.S. aggressors.
"herefore, it is necessary to have the spirit of thorough revolution and
a very high determination.
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With regard to the general offensive (TCK) and general uprising
(TKN), it was requested that a concrete plan, including the quantity
of weapons needed, the number of armed force's needed, etc., be made
known in order to carry out the undertaking confidently. For secrecy's
sake, it is not yet necessary to reveal information on these matters.
Therefore, we must firmly grasp the above two matters and. express
unanimous agreement with the TW (the Lao Dong Party Central Committee),
and, in the process of struggle, try to understand them better and supple-
ment the resolution.
Execution of the resolution is a major requirement. Yet, the
greater requirement is to execute the resolution creatively in the days
ahead. In the course of the war, it is possible that some locality,
district, or province may be levelled and may sustain serious losses.
3. Some matters concerning the characteristics and nature of the war.
There has been much discussion on the nature of the war--special,
limited, colonialist, and neocolonialist. The matters which we discuss
here have also been discussed in the North.
Speaking of the special war, limited war, colonialist, or neo-
colonialist war is trying to find answers to the following questions:
Do the political and military war and the three-pronged offensive still
exist? Do TCK and general uprising (TKN) still exist?
In general and unified terms, to speak of a just war and an unjust
war. When a war develops, it is called variously an aggressive war, a
national liberation war, a war among the imperialists, or a war between
the two camps.
Formerly, we spoke only of limited war and world war. The scope
of the war was then understood likewise. When we spoke of limited war,
we took into account i:s scope. And when the U.S. imperialists began
to change their war strategy (the "flexible reaction strategy"), they
defined war as follows: world war, limited war, and the war whose scope
is inferior or to that of the limited war (special war). When they
spoke of special war, we did not just follow him. In fact, the enemy
actually changed his strategy.
The TW resolution said: in the Americans' view, the conduct of
the special war relics mainly on the puppet army and administration. With
the characteristics of the present situation, the war that is most
3 (Cont.)
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appropriate for a neocolonia._is, policy in a country where there exists
a national liberation movement is the specia_ war. The special war is
just a type of limited war, but its scope is inferior to that of the
limited war, And since the special war takes place in South Vietnam, it
bears the character of a conflict between the two camps, gradually
becomes a limited war, ana will develop to a higher intensityr and larger
scope. it is now obvious that the war has become a, limited war, since
the enemy has increased the number of his troops tc more than 200,000.
At this point, how must the "spe2ial?' concept be understood? Special
war must be understood yn the sense that it is a "separate" type of war,
not in the sense ascribed by the Americans. Ere'alously, there was an
erroneous analysis: if the imperialists increase the number of their
troops to 200,000, the war will become an old-type aggressive war. (In
calling a war special the Americans take into cons_deration its scale
--large or small-while we understand "special" or? "separate" as the
nature of the war). To speak of (words uninteilig_i_ble) is to speak of
the purpose of the war: _,t ha-_ a neccolon c.at.st na.?ure. Even if the
number of enemy troops is increased t.o 300,000, `500,000 or 600,000, the
purpose of the war remains to :.mpose neocoi.cnlaiism.
The fact that the imperia._lsts firmly rr,aintain neocolonialism. is
di.:re to the following reasons:
- Old-type colonialism has been opposed and cursed by the peoples
in the world and the oppressed peoples, aid theref:ire, has no conditions
for survival; and colonial sys-tems have continuously disintegrated every-
where. The U.S. imperialists realized that it they id not resort to
new-type colonialism they wouli not be able to maintain colonialism.
- Science and techniques nave developed. Various countries which
had won independence but which were under the bourgeois' control also
needed aid to maintain their regime,:-. 1'h e.r?c fore, the Americans have
taken advantage of --.his situation to penetrate into these countries and
gain net profits.
- The U.S. imperial.:.sts are wealthy :rmp)erla.ii.sts. They have engaged
in .large-scale business, retail business. They possess ample capital,
and could use money and iaerchandise to ir.:fluence, dominate, and exploit
many other countries using neocolon__alist methods, and, thereby gain
greater net profits. WhLle no imperialists whatsoever could wage aggres-
sion through old colonia ism, the imperialists could still deceive a
number of people by wagi:ig aggression through neocolonialism.
Although the present, limited war in the South still has its "sepa-
rate" nature and still ties within the category of implementation of a
r..ceocolonialist policy, it sti._i relies upon the puppet army and adminis-
t ration.
ii (Cont.)
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Formerly, during the French domination period, we had to defeat the
French expeditionary troops, and only by basically defeating these troops
could the French be defeated, whereas at present we must crush mainly
the puppet army. As far as the American troops are concerned, we do
not fight them in the same way as we did against the French.
To defeat the enemy in the South is to basically defeat the puppet
army and to defeat part of the American troops, and, thereby, smash
the Americans' aggressive will. If we fail to see the role of the pup-
pet army and administration, we will fail to use our own forces to a
certain extent to basically smash the puppet forces, and, thereby
deprive the Americans of their military and political base. Likewise,
without defeating an important part of the American forces we cannot
crush their aggressive will. In reality, today the relations between
fighting the Americans and fighting the puppets have become increasingly
clearer. In the old colonialist period, only by defeating the aggres-
sive army would the imperialists consent to being defeated. With neo-
colonialism, after defeating a greater bulk of the puppet army and an
important part of American troops, we can push the Americans out of South
Vietnam by coordinating the political struggle with diplomacy.
With regard to strategy, the situation in which the puppet troops
have not yet been completely annihilated does also provide a condition
for the Americans to withdraw. This is true with regard to the question
of sovereignty: if we completely eliminate the puppet administration,
there are no conditions for the Americans to withdraw. If we speak only
of a local war, there may be errors in strategy and possibly im leader-
ship over the strategy. Our advance must pass through many transitory
steps.
Evaluation and comparison of the enemy forces and our forces:
So far, our evaluation has been correct. But at certain moments,
certain people underestimated the U.S. imperialists and overestimated
the heroism of the Southern people. Evaluation of the Americans is very
difficult. Some people believe that it is difficult to defeat the U.S.
imperialists, because it is often said that the U.S. imperailists are
the most powerful imperialists: their manpower is great, their forces
are large, and they have atomic weapons. In expressing this view,
these people create the impression that the imperialists are strong.
This is also a reality. The people who believe in this view are not few.
For years, there has been a constant discussion of this problem in
our camp. Without the war in Vietnam, how can this problem be solved?
How can one explain our victories over the U.S. imperialists who have
gross national product of 650 billion dollars against our gross national
product of 3 billion, who have a population of 200 million against our
population of 30 million, who have 3 million men in their armed forces
against our armed forces of 1 million men in both zones?
(Cont. }
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Yet despite this big difference between the two sides--one side is
t;wo large and other too small--our small country dares fight the Ameri-
cans and defeat them. It is difficult to make people believe that a
small country such as ours can defeat the U.S. impe=rialists who have
great economic and military potentialities. Therefore, our struggle is
a great contribution to the discussions of the evaluation of and. com-
parison between our forces and the enemy's. Usually, people easily
discern the enemy's strong points and do not see his weak points. Only
through defeating him can we see his weak points. For instance, intelli-
gence services of various countries--no matter how clever they are--
cannot know all the techniques of the U.S. planes. We know them
because we have downed these planes and studied these aircraft, we have
interrogated the captured pi,iots.
We know the enemy's material strength, his tactics and techniques.
But there are things we cannot know even through our intelligence ser-
vice or through documents which have been supplied to us in order that
we could understand and evaluate the enemy better.
it is said that U. S. planes are modern. If wer do not attack them,
they remain modern. However, if we attack and down them, they become
outmoded. (The enemy has said that his planes have become outmoded)
Summarily appraising a small country such as curs which dares to
fight against and win over the Americans is an important problem. As
for estimating how many troops the enemy will introduce and a-1 what
rate, this task sometimes cannot be done thoroughly. Basically, our
Party has evaluated the U.S. imperialists relatively accurately.
(At that time) our Party made such an evaluation, But later it
changed its mind from time' to time. Thus, it was afraid of the Ameri-
c?an.s dared not fight them. It,.cept on discussing and, arrived at no con-
elusion. If it dared fight them, it would have been able ".,o understand
ahem better and evaluate them. more correctly.
Under the present war situation, the forces of both sides have
increased greatly. U.S. and satellite troops have increased quickly.
Ours have increased too. Both rides have used these force., to fight
,ac::h other. Now the problem consists of finding the best way to com-
pare the two forces. The fact that U.S. forces are. strong ie_, obvious to
a.1__. But against whom are they fighting? They are strong., but are they
capable of defeating us? To which side does the evaluation c_:f the com-
parative balance of forces swing? It is obvious that the comparative
balance of forces gradually swings in our favor. We may not imagine
that we only have endurance. We must see that our strength is growing.
6 (Cont. )
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The Americans are stronger than us militarily and materially. Yet, how
do they use this strength, and how are they fighting against us? We
have main force units, regional troops, guerrillas, and the masses,
whereas they cannot introduce into the South as large military forces
as they want. As far as the material factors are concerned, we have to
use a weak force to fight, against a, strong force. Yet, considering all
factors combined, it is we, not the enemy, that are strong. Thus, a com-
parison of the forces of both sides shows that we are stronger than the
enemy. Our victory over him is not chancy, nor is it temporary. Pre-
viously, we said we could defeat the Americans even if they had 150,000
or 200,000 troops. It was a theoretical statement. However, this state-
ment has now become a fact which has been proved by realities.
In short, (two words unint,el:ligi.ble), why are we victorious?
- We have the correct leadership of the Party.
- The Southern people and army, and the Vietnamese people and army
are heroic.
- We firmly grasp the rules of the people's war.
- We insure self-reliance.
-? We enjoy the wholehearted supported of the peoples in the world,
and of our camp.
If we speak only of the quantity of forces, other countries also have
forces. Yet, if we go deeply into the realities, we find that the
quality and combat value of our people are very great. Our fourteen
million people are better than 70 million (Indonesian) people and the
200 million American people. This fact cannot be explained by the matter
of quantity.
It does not suffice to say that we use a weak force to fight against
a strong force. We must also understand how strong our main points
are, and must explain under what conditions we are strong. Thus, we
must say that our. South is strong. Yet, our strength does not suffice
to defeat the Americans. It is now fit to say that there can be no
unlimited escalation in the North, and there can be no complete destruc-
tion in the present situation in the South.
In the Korean War, what was different from the situation in South
Vietnam was that when the Americans -introduced (520,000) troops (includ-
ing satellite troops) into Korea, they sent them all to the frontline
because their rear base was secure, whereas in South Vietnam, when the
Americans introduce 300,000 or 1!00,000 troops they cannot send them all
to the frontline. Taylor recentLy said that "we should calculate the
7 (Cont.)
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number of troops we :rust :_ntrocuce, and w?en and under what circumstances
these troops must be introduced in order to defeat the enemy," and that
11 if we introduce our troops at a time when. the adversary is strong, we
cannot defeat him." Therefore, the Americans have realized that they
did not, introduce their troops at the right time.
The second condition is that when troops are introduced there must
be a strong administration, which is nonexistent in South Vietnam. At
present, the Americans st..l1 hold that because the number of Americans
introduced into the South is insufficient they cannot win. Therefore,
as long as they still bel:;eve that if they introduce more troops they
can win, they will pursue the war. As soon as they see that no Matter
how many troops they introduce they are still. defeated, then their aggres-
:cive will be crushed.. Formerly, the French sent 2,0,000 troops to fight
against us. After a period of time, they realized that they could not
win even if they introduced more troops, In Algeria., with 700,000
French troops and 100,000 puppet troops, the French could not, win the
war. They realized that. to win the war, the most important factor is
not. strength, but tactics.
Now we are fighting the Americans with existing number of troops
and weapons. In a war of position, they can defeat us. But with our
present tactics, we will win, and they will be defeated. It is the same
as if we force them to eat. rice with chopsticks (if' we eat rice with
spoons and forks like them., we will be defeated; if' chopsticks are-
used, they are no match for US).
-
Under these conditions, if they force us to surrender while we are
riot defeated, then they are defeated.
In combat, a number of localities and comrades may be hurt. But
it is incorrect to base oneself' on the fact '..hat when some localities
are damaged and. some comrades are sacri:=seed, we are then defeated.
In South Korea, the enemy sent all his troops to the front. In
;Uou.th Vietnam, he has introduced between 300,000 to 600,000 troops who
must fight on the frontline and, at the same time, protect the rear.
But the latter can fulfill only one of these tasks. If they oppose our
,people's movement in the South, they will be unable to stop reinforce-
ments from North Vietnam. If they concentrate their force to stop rein-
t:'o:rcements from North Vietnam, they cannot stand firm on the front in
the .rear. If all their troops are sent to the front, their rear will be
Left unguarded. If they leave part of their troops in the rear, they
will. not be strong enough to fight us on the front. To fulfill both
tasks, they must have a million troops. To :.ntroduce a million troops
into South Vietnam, the United Mates must double its mobilisation rate.
8 (cont.)
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If the war is expanded to North Vietnam, the balance of forces will
be changed. The front will be changed too. The enemy will have to
fight not only the Vietnamese people, but also the Chinese people. The
enemy is still afraid of this outcome. Establishing their front in Laos
is not an easy task. If the Americans attack Laos, because of the 1962
Geneva Accords they will face North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China
which will join the war to a certain extent. they are planning to send
their troops to Laos. But does this mean the opening of a new front?
The Americans are capable of doing this. But they are weighing the pros
and cons because if they send troops there, the form of the war will
change.
The enemy has not achieved unanimity concerning the problem of
expanding the war to Laos and North Vietnam; but they have achieved
relative unanimity concerning the problem of introducing troops into
South Vietnam.
Thus, they introduced troops at a moment when their special war had
failed and they were in a state of strategic passivity. If they raise
their strength to 400,000 men, this means that their 300,000 men have
been defeated. But the introduction of 400,000 men into South Vietnam
means that they would raise their strength to 700,000 or 800,000 men in
order to be able to stop reinforcements from North Vietnam. Without
doing so they will be unable to stop our growth in the South. That is
why the Americans cannot thoroughly use their power in the war against us.
4. Strategic missions, guidelines, and leadership:
There are some misunderstandings concerning the strategic missions,
guidelines, and leadership and the relations among the three problems.
Strategic missions are clearly stated in the resolution of the 12th
Party conference. There are two strategic missions: the general stra-
tegic mission, and the strategic mission in South Vietnam. The strategic
mission in South Vietnam consists of defeating the imperialists and
feudalists, and achieving land reforms. Its'immediate task consists of
overthrowing the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys.
To what extent the war will develop? How must the Americans be
restrained and defeated? The exertion of strategic leadership varies in
each period of time. Yet, the strategic mission remains unchanged no
matter how many troops the Americans may introduce into the South. Each
time the enemy introduces more troops, some people contend that the enemy
has not been fully evaluated, and that the strategic missions have not
been clearly set forth. In fact, the strategic mission has already been
,set forth, and it remains unchanged. We continue to pursue it. As long
as the war remains within the South, the strategic mission remains
unchanged. When the war is extended to the North, the strategic mis-
sion will be different. Some people asked why we did not assert in
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advance that limited war would break out, so that -:.he mission we had set
forth would become out of date. This problem is not like having an
ample shirt made so that it suits one when he grown up. That is not
correct.
When the war in the ~3outh remains within the __.imits of a special
war, we must restrain and defeat the enemy in thin, and must at the
same time take precautionary measures against limited war. When the
war has become alimited war, we must restrain and defeat the enemy in
this war, and, at the same time, take precautionary measures against
the enemy's expansion of the war throughout the country.
As far as the leadership is concerned, it is necessary to restrain
and defeat the enemy in the above types of war in the South, not to
allow the enemy to expand the war, and to restrict the losses he inflicts
on the people. This effort is ours to exert. It, is wrong to say that
we failed to restrain and defeat the enemy in. the South. We must see
that we defeated the enemy's special war, and, as result, -the enemy
cad to introduce more troops -to wage the :limited war..
in speaking of winning victory over the enemy in the special war
we did not mean a total victory, but a decisive victory. Today, in
restraining and defeating the enemy in the limited war in the South, we
also speak of achieving decisive success within a, relatively short
period of time. The contents of the guidelines anci strategy involving
protracted fighting and the contents of achieving c.ecisive success
within . relatively short pericd of time are not mutually contradictory.
'[hey are the same. In indoctrinating the cadres and party members
ideologically, we must speak of protracted. fighting; and the determina-
tion to fight and win, and must not disseminate to the lower echelons
the idea of achieving dec=.sive success within a feti,- years.
It is wrong to say that the Party leadership is not correct when
the enemy sent part of his forces to the 4th zone or farther., while we
estimated that there was little possibility of the enemy sending troops
to the North.
At present, in terms of restraining and defeating the enemy in the
south, the Party's s-nrategic leadership remains correct. Although the
enemy has not yet acquired the conditions for sending his troops to the
[Vo:rth, we have to take precautionary measures. At present, we must
understand that fighting a protracted war and achieving decisive success
within a relatively short period of time remain the same. In a resis-
tance war, it is right to speak of protracted war and self-reliance, and
the urge to fight and win quickly represents a rightist tendency.
10 (Cont.)
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Today, is a great error not to speak of achieving decisive success in a
relatively short period of time. Therefore, we must achieve and are
determined to achieve that objective. If we fail to achieve that objec-
tive, it is because of ourselves, not because of the socialist camp. We
may not speak of protracted fighting as unlimited fighting. It is erron-
eous to understand protracted as unl:i_mited.
Contents of the significance of decisive victory:
These contents are stated in the resolution. To achieve the same
solution as that in Laos, the contents of which we have already realized,
the U.S. imperialists will agree immediately.
We want to achieve decisive v:ict:ory which is: to exterminate and
disintegrate the puppet authorities and troops to the point that the
puppet force is no longer the military and political leaning point for
the Americans, that the U.S. troops must play the main role and resort
to political measures. When such a situation occurs the puppet troops
will not be strong enough to protect their regime.
But U.S. troops have been introduced. Thus we must wipe out an
important part of them in order to defeat them.
There are three ways to achieve decisive victory:
- Wipe out the majority of puppet troops and foil the enemy's
political goals;
- Wipe out an important part of U.S. troops and crush their aggres-
sive will;
- Achieve the goals: national independence, democracy, peace,
neutrality, and advance toward national unification. On the basis of
wiping out puppet troops, we can, to a certain extent, wipe out part of
U.S. troops. If the war is pursued for two or three years, we can do
what the Koreans did: overcoming 380,000 Americans. The fact that
southern guerrillas can wipe out the Americans--although not many Ameri-
cans have been killed--is an optimistic event.
Ba's ideas: The introduction of U.S. troops into the South was not
wanted by us. But it is an opportunity for us to defeat them. Some-
times the enemy can understand this only after fighting with us for
several years. Thus, shortening this time is very important.
Some individuals have asserted that since the Americans have intro-
duced their troops we cannot defeat them and that the Americans have
caused us heavy casualties. These assertions are obviously belied by
realities.
Li (Cont.)
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To achieve decisive victor^y in a relatively snort period, we must
concentrate our forces in both zones. We must not speak only of an
unlimited period.
We will not do what A.]_ger_.a has done, And we will not do what Korea
did in using armed troops to liberate the South Ko:'eans. We will do
what the Soviet Union, did in. the war against Gernany.
To achieve decisive victory, it is necessary to have very high
determination. We must endeavor to achieve it and be convinced that we
are able to achieve it. To do so, we must; face very great difficulties,
even difficulties we cannot anticipate.
The task of wiping out and. disintegrating a large number of puppet
troops must go along with the task of foiling the enemy's reinforcement
plan. Therefore, this task must be accom-oanied by mass struggle and
military proselyting.
Our achievements in =_965 were very great. They can be regarded as
big leaps, as a great progress (defeating from 8 pt:ppet D in 1964 to
46 I) is a great victory, causing the Americans to be frightened and to
.rush in to rescue the puppets).
It is necessary to prevent the enemy from increasing his troops,
thus causing him to stop. In. 165, he wanted to increase his troops,
but could not. In the future, it is necessary to prevent him from
supplementing his troops in time. When the casualties of the puppets
reach between D and regiments a:-id battle groups and those of the Arr~eri-
cans between C and D, the war will be settled? The enemy will be unable
to stand firm in the rear, to pacify it. These are the basic causes of
his defeat.
The greatest desire of the U.S. and other imlaerialists is to occupy
the South, apply the neocolonialist policy, and check our Southern
people's movement.
We will defeat the enemy: in several years, we will be able to
wipe out and disintegrate 300,000 to 400,000 puppet troops and 200,000
U.S. troops. The Americans will be unable to introduce sufficient troops
to fill the gaps left by the wiped out and disi.nteg:r.?ated U.S. and. puppet
troops.
On the other hand, in introducing more troops the Americans must
develop their logistic service. But, at the same time, we intensify our
attacks against their logistic establishments. isolate their bases, cut
off their transport roads. In the future, In certain areas puppet troops
will have to eat soup for months. U.S. troops will also encounter diffi-
culties. Thus, in the future, the attacks against logistic bases will
be intensified by 10 times. This is a very important strategic mission.
L;_'
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The problems of general offensive and general uprising and fighting and
negotiations.
General offensive and general uprising: uprisings have been car-
ried out. Now with the arrival of the Americans, what are the problems
of the general offensive and general uprising?
In the past, we did not have any doubt about this capacity in the
puppet-controlled areas. Now the areas where this capacity still exists
are still large. The U.S. troops occupy only 15 important districts.
Puppet troops occupy over 250 districts. We realize that since we have
the capacity to defeat puppet troops, we have the capacity to carry
out general uprisings and liberate these areas. We do have the capacity
to liberate the district capitals and a number of provinces.
In the old-type colonial war, the enemy would not consent to being
defeating and withdrawing until his vitality had been annihilated to a
certain degree. In the new-type colonial war, when the greater bulk of
the puppet army and an important part of the American troops will have
been annihilated and disintegrated, the enemy has to agree to withdraw
under definite conditions. For example, with regard to areas where
American troops are stationed we use military and political means to
attack them; in areas where they are still strong, we encirble them.
When negotiations are held, the American troops may agree to withdraw
from these areas, under definite conditions. We then proceed to solving
the problems of the remaining areas. With regard to the centers such
as Saigon and Cholon we must combine the old experiences with creative
ideas to carry out the task.
Fighting and Negotiating:
The resolution of the Party's 11th conference clearly stated that
in the process of achieving success, a situation where fighting and
negotiations are conducted simultaneously may arise. At present, the
situation is not yet ripe for negotiations. Fighting while negotiating
is aimed at opening another front with a view to making the puppet army
more disintegrated, stimulating and developing the enemy's internal
contradictions, and, thereby, making him more isolated in order to
deprive him of the propaganda weapons, isolate him further, and make a
number of people who understand the Americans clearly see their nature.
13 (Cont.)
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In a war between a powerful. country which wages aggression and a
weak country, as long as we have not yet acquired adequate strength a
situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously
does not exist. Fighting continues until the emergence of a situation
where both sides are fighting indecisively. Then., a situation where
fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may emerge. in
fighting while negotiating, the side which fights more strongly will
compell the adversary to accept his conditions. Considering the compara-
tive balance of forces, the war proceeds through the following stages:
--The fighting stage.
--The stage of fighting while negotiating.
--Negotiations and signing of agreements.
Whether or not the war will. resume after the conclusion of agree-
ments depends upon the comoarative balance of force:;. If we are capable
of dominating the adversary, the war will not break out again., and conversely.
Therefore, fighting while negotiating also represents a principled step
in the evolution of the war. Thus, a situation where fighting and
negotiations are conducted simultaneously will unmistakably emerge. In
cur anti-French resistance, there were also times when fighting and
negotiations were conducted simultaneously. The same situation had emerged
in China.
At present, there are three viewpoints with regard to war and peace.
--The Americans find it necessary to negotiate, but negotiate from
a strong position, partly because they have deceitful motives, and partly
because the situation has compelled them to negotiate. Yet, they want
us to make concessions to ,hem.
--A number of countries want us to enter into negotiations, any form
of negotiations--so that a big war does not break out and that the war
can be ended--regardless or the interests or' Vietnam. Some ether countries
wonder whether we can defeat the Amer-weans., and if not, we should enter
into negotiations. (Most of these countries are nationalist countries
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.) A number of East European socialist
countries hold the view that conditions do -prevail., and are ripe for
achieving success (The Americans would withdraw their troops, and we will
continue the struggle to achieve total success.) These socialist countries
also posed a number of conditions: cessation of they bombing of the North;
gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South.
(Cont. )
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--China holds the view that conditions for negotiations are not yet
ripe, not until a few years from now, and, even worse, seven years from
now. In the meantime, we should continue fighting to bog down the enemy,
and should wait until a number of socialist countries acquire adequate
conditions for strengthening their main force troops to launch a strong,
all-out, and rapid offensive, using all types of weapons and heeding no
borders. What we should do in the South today is to try restrain the
enemy and make him bogged down, waiting until China has built strong forces
to launch an all-out offensive.
--Our policy: to continue fighting until a certain time when we can
fight and negotiate at the same time,
This is also a fighting method: repulsing the enemy step by step,
and achieving decisive success.
The Party Central Committee entrusts the Politburo with the task of
deciding on the time for negotiations.
The problem of choosing the opportunity and deciding to negotiate:
-Basing ourselves upon the actual situation in the South.
--Considering the opinions of the friendly countries which have
provided us with quite a large volume of assistance, in order to gain
their maximum support.
The future situation may lead to negotiations. Yet, even if there
are negotiations, they are conducted simultaneously with fighting. While
negotiating, we will continue fighting the enemy more vigorously. (It
is possible that the North conducts negotiations while the South continues
fighting, and that the South also participates in the negotiations while
continuing to fight). Those who are in charge of conducting negotiations
negotiate and those in charge of fighting continue fighting, because
the decisive factor lies in the battlefield. The enemy wants us to stop
fighting to his advantage. But we have to fight. Therefore, the enemy
also fights. We must fight to win great victories with which to compell
the enemy to accept our conditions. If we stop fighting (at that stage),
no considerable success can be achieved in negotiations. If we conduct
negotiations while fighting vigorously, we can also take advantage of the
opportunity to step up the political struggle, military proselyting, and
activities in the cities. Thus, we will take advantage of the opportunity
offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks,
political struggle, and military proselyting., At present, the Americans
have put forth deceitful arguments. Therefore, we must put forth conditions
to prove that we fight for the aspirations and interests of the people, and,
thereby, to win the support of various countries,
i.5 (Cont.)
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.If the enemy wants to negotiate, he must accept a number of conditions,
such as, to permanently cease their war of destruction against the North,
withdraw his troops from the South, and dismantle his military bases. The
failure to pose the above conditions is tantamount to implicitly accepting
the Americans' presence in the South.
Depending on the situation prevailing at the time, we will impose
conditions. For exam-ole, the puppet forces must be concentrated in barracks,
must not repress the people, must not carry out espionage activities, must
allow the people to move about freely or choose their places of residence,
must not herd the people into strategic hamlets and concentration centers;
the American troops must be stationed at the wharf's.
The basic situation prevailing in the South for the past years requires
that we attack the enemy more vigorously. This front involves millions of
people. While attacking, we must concentrate all our forces on fighting
the enemy.
11. Some additional opinions:
Generally speaking, this is a difficult task, which must be con_,
tinned. However, guerrilla warfare must be stepped up and developed further.
In the recent past, the building of the regional forces, main force units,
and guerrillas, on the whole, has continued to develop. Yet, considering
the proportion, the building of these forces has been slow.
Previously, the guerrillas comprised 10 percent of the population.
In the western highlands, the highest proportion is only 3.5 percent,
and, in some areas, the proportion is 1 percent.
Formerly, the French imperialists tried to find out why we had
numerous mobile units while we had only '(5 F's), whereas they had only
a small number of mobile units ( only ten to 15 percent) although they
had large forces. The greater part (60 to 70 percents of enemy forces
have been dispersed to cope with the guerrillas, and 20 percent have to
cope with the regional troops. Thus, only 10 percent of enemy forces are
available to cope with our main force units,.
As the Americans have increased the number of their troops, we must
develop our guerrilla and regional forces to restrain and fight the enemy
everywhere. We must thin out 60 to 70 percent of the enemy regular
forces in order to enable our main force units to carry out their task of
annihilating the enemy on the main battlefields.
We must firmly maintain and broaden our control over areas which
have been liberated and which will be liberated. We have to do so because
of the following reasons.
;Cont.)
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--In China, it was said that the annihilation of enemy vitality
resulted in the liberation of the land.
--In our country, we must speak of annihilating enemy vitality and
firmly maintaining our control over the liberated areas and enlarging
the liberated areas.
If we speak solely of annihilating enemy vitality, and not of control
over the liberated areas, sometimes a situation may emerge where the enemy
has been annihilated but the areas under our control cannot be enlarged.
In such a case, if the enemy is still strong he may still be capable of
re-occupying these liberated areas. 'Therefore, after liberating an area,
we must immediately organize its defense, and must enlarge it.
How should we best develop and deploy our forces to maintain our
control? What has enabled certain areas to maintain their control?
Experiences must be drawn.
By developing guerrilla warfare and pinning the enemy down, we will
create conditions for our main force units to annihilate him.
The experience drawn is that it must be insured that the Party
chapters and branches thoroughly understand the necessity of leading the
guerrillas, and developing guerrilla warfare. The Party branch committee
must build up the guerrilla force.
At present, there is a contradiction between the build up of the guerrilla
forces, the regional troops and the main force units. The building of the
guerrilla force to supplement the main forces has not been satisfactory.
There was a situation when the enemy would have been defeated if he could
not supplement his forces Yet, he could replace and supplement his forces.
Although we have achieved successes and have the just cause, we have
encountered difficulties in recruiting youths to supplement our forces. It
is necessary to carefully consider why we cannot recruit youths to replenish
our forces.
2. The enemy's use of aircraft and artillery, and spraying of poisonous
chemicals.
How have the people endured and coped with the enemy's air attacks,
shelling, and spraying of poisonous chemicals? What experiences have been
acquired?
In addition to the ideological measures, it is necessary to:
--Dig trenches.
---Insure that dwellings are widely spread out.
(Cont.)
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--Narrow the enemy-controlled areas, herd him into the cities, and
not allow him to concentrate his forces to attack areas under our control.
The TW is very concerned about the enemy's spraying of poisonous
chemicals. It is necessary to collect the chemicals sprayed so that we
can. ask friendly countries to analyse them, and, thereby to find appropriate
preventive measures. Party members in areas which are not subjected to
the spraying of poisonous chemicals, or which are lightly sprayed, are urged
to step up their production, and. to cultivate many kinds of plants and
many crops.
3. The cities:
We should introduce our forces into- the cities in order to strengthen
our forces there. We must conduct investigations of the urban situation.
Everyone must carry out propaganda activities and enlighten the masses to
a certain extent. We must take advantage of the enemy's internal contra-
dictions to lead the masses' struggle, and make the masses understand the
political significance of the struggle for the improvement of their living
conditions and for democracy.
III., Situation of the defense of the North and. reinforcement of the
South.
The enemy advocated attacking us vigorously at the beginning of the
year (February 1965) so that he could put forth his peace negotiations
policy and compell us to negotiate. The enemy was firmly confident he
could compell us to sit down at the conference table and the socialist
camp would force us to negotiate. Taylor proposed, that the Americans
attack us continuously, so as to exert, pressure on.L.s.. But the reality has
emerged contrary to the enemy's expectations, and has made him more passive.
At first, due to lack of experience, we encountered difficulties
and confusion. The greatest difficulty arose from. the blockade of roads.
After some months, we acquired experiences, and have, strengthened our
national defense forces.
At present, the air defense force in the North is a rather strong force
in Asia. The density of the anti-aircraft net with conventional weapons
is even higher than that of countries in our camp. The enemy himself said.
that "we danced on the muzzles of their anti-aircraft guns" when he ran :into
a dense fire net formed by conventional weapons. Our missile force also
constitutes the strongest anti-aircraft -force, as compared with Asian
countries, including China.
We have MIG 17's and MIG 21's. MIG 21's have a speed comparable to
that of the various types of modern aircraft used by the Americans to attack
us. Yet, the above two forces are still insufficient. It is necessary
to have a greater force, with better long range weapons, at least medium-
range rockets. (We are trying to get these.)
(Cont.)
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At present, the enemy conducts his heaviest raids against the 4th
military zone. In other areas, he only attacks us suddenly and then flees.
Captured enemy pilots states: "If we want to attack a wide area, we must
have eight aircraft carriers, and many more air tankers and airfields.
With five more aircraft carriers we can fly only 500 sorties at the most.
If we want to attack Hanoi, we must have even more aircraft and must attack
it in many phases."
Recently, our anti-aircraft force has achieved good results. The
conventional weapons have contributed to fighting enemy aircraft flying at
the lowest altitude. The missiles have an effective range from 800 meters
to 35 or 50 kilometers. Recently we have downed many enemy aircraft with
mobile missiles. (We have shot down a large number of enemy aircraft, but
reported a small number). Though newly formed, this armed serivce has
scored fairly good achievements. At the beginning, it took one to eight,
or one to five missiles to shoot down one enemy aircraft. Now it takes
one to two missiles to shoot down one enemy aircraft. The kill rate set
by the Soviet Union was 100 percent. Due to the rapid training they
had received, our missile units have failed to react in time in complex
cases.
A missile has a bigger diameter than two arms' length, and is twenty
meters long. It is radar-guided when launched, It pursues and catches
up with the target because its speed is faster than that of the target.
When firing missiles, members of missile units acclaim: "Dragons are
pursuing aircraft." Although the speed of the MIG l7's equals 60 percent
of that of enemy aircraft, they have scored great achievements, and, in
some cases, downed two enemy F-105's. The enemy did not think that we
dared use MIG 17's to fight him. Technically speaking, if our equipment
is poor we cannot identify the enemy. Enemy aircraft always dodge our
MIG 21's. Yet, the MIG 21's have not yet been widely used.
The enemy is afraid of us because we are both heroic and bold. We
can counter enemy aircraft at any altitude. Cuba, the Soviet Union, China,
and Korea, have voiced their readiness to help us, but we see that we
are still able to fight alone.
There are some conclusions I want to present so that we can rejoice:
--The enemy has been unable to destroy our agricultural economy.
Despite the fact that the youths have gone to the battlefields, the women
and aged people have insured production and attained the planned norm of
five tons per hectare. The youths have gone to the battlefield, the women
have assumed the three responsibilities, engaged in all fields of activity
in the rural areas, and simultaneously engaged in production and combat.
9
~ (Cont.)
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A team of women from a fruit factory, commanded by women cadres and equipped
with machineguns, heavy machineguns, and 20mm and l2mm guns, put up a
demonstration for women from foreign countries. The latter said that
"l.f we were Americans we would have left Vietnam long ago." Another
example: when she saw enemy aircraft appear, Miss Hang, a female
guerrilla, rushed into the combat trench. But there was a snake in the
trench. She wondered if she shculd fight the snake or shoot at enemy
aircraft. She jumped into the trench and shot enemy aircraft. Only
after shooting down an enemy aircraft did she return to kill ,he
snake. The comrade Party Secretary concluded that Miss Hang had held
firm to the Party's viewpoint. to direct the spearhead at the main
enemy.
--Now we can conclude that no matter what the enemy does, he
cannot destroy us. During the past year, our brother countries gave
us a quantity of equipment larger than that provided during the previous
five years.
Despite the present intensity of the war, the cost of living in
the North has not risen. The masses' daily life remains normal. Our
lines of communication are uninterrupted. At the beginning, we learned
from the Korean Engineer Corps, but now the progress, we have made far
exceeds that of the Korean Engineer Corps. Owing to our strong defense
system, the enemy has encountered difficulties in bombing our installations.
Although the Ham Rong bridge has been riddled with bullets, it is still
standing, and the people living in the surrounding area have not :moved
away.
Transportation is possible. Despite the fact that we are in
a war situation, our transportation capabilities have doubled, and
we are using all means available. Yet, we still fail to meet the
requirements of the 4th zone and of the South. The transportation
operations on the roads are almost non-existent in. daylight. But at
night, there are all kinds of transportation means, such as floating
bridges, rafts, cable chains, rails installed on rafts for trains to
cross over rivers, and so forth.
Although the Americans can destroy our industry to a certain
extent, they cannot destroy our national defense industry, because we do
not yet have a major one. The socialist ccuntries' aid has been increased.
We can thus conclude that even if the Americans intensify their
air raids, we will still stand firm to protect the Torth and reinforce
the South.
20 (Cont.)
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Reinforcements to the South:
The Northern citizens have clearly realized their responsibility
with regard to this matter. Therefore, they have provided. reinforcements
to the best of their ab.Llity.
1V. International support
On the one hand, we find that international support is fairly
good, and, on the other hand, we are worr.ie-d. The reason for this is
that we are fighting the enemy at a time when there is a lack of unity
within the socialist camp. This is a reality. Disunity still exists.
We cannot just sit by and wait until the socialist camp is united to
achieve decisive victory. On the -ontrary, we must achieve decisive
victory within the next four years. Therefore, it is necessary to
try to win maximum support. We say that our Party's leadership is
correct and our people are heroic. Yet, without international support,
our success would be limited although we still can achieve it. Generally
speaking, the countries in the socialist camp unanimously agree with
our line, and wholeheartedly assist us.
Since the downfall of Khruschev, the Soviet Union has provided
us with much assistance in all, fields. Three fourths of the weapons
sent to the South have been received from the socialist camp. Half of
the South's budget has been provided by our camp, mainly China. The
quantity of weapons provided has been so large that we could not
transport all of them. During the past year, the quantity of equipment
provided for the building of the North equalled that received during
the five previous years. We have sent back those materials for which
we did not yet have requirements, so that we do not lose them or have
to maintain them,. The socialist camp has agreed to construct mobile
missile launching pads, and to establish factories to construct mobile
missile launching pads for us
Nevertheless, we are riot satisfied in certain respects. If there
were no disunity within the socialist camp, our success would have been
greater. Yet, we also rind that if we did not obtain the great assistance
from our camp, we would not have been able to achieve such great successes.
Our party has highly evaluated the support of the socialist camp. If
we do not try to gain the support of the socialist camp, we will be guilty
of our duty to our people We cannot accept the line of this country
or that country in order to obtain aid, nor can we accept aid from one
country without accepting aid from another, because otherwise we will
be guilty before the entire camp, and before our people.
(Cont.)
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V. Realtions within the Socialist Camp
China said: We must unite and insure the purity of Marxism-Leninism.
Yet, only a number of countries have sided with China. The same situation
also exists with regard to the Soviet Union. As for us, all countries
in the camp, except Yugoslavia, are siding with us. Recently, our party
did its best to contribute to the unity within the socialist camp.
At a time when there is a -polemic among various countries, we
must have an independent line. We must be confident in no one but our
own Party. We advocate opposing revisionism, and, at the same- time, must
take precautionary measures against dogmatism, and must constantly pre-
serve international solidarity.
China said: To positively oppose imperialism without positively
opposing revisionism will finally lead to compromise with imperialism.
That is not true. If one is revisionist., he does not oppose imperialism,
and advocates peaceful coexistence with imperialism.
We do not hold the view that the Soviet leadership is as revisionist
as the leadership under Khrushchev, and that it is somewhat more dangerous
than Khrushschev.
We hold that the Soviet leadership still contains some rEvisionists,
some indecisive elements, and al3o active elements.
We do not think so. We think that Khrushchev fell because of internal
causes, and, of course, the external struggle also was a very important
contribution to his downfall.
According to China, things do not have two or three characteristics.
This is true. Yet, in a transitionary period when we are not yet
positive about everything, we cannot attribute to environmental things
this characteristic or another. Instead., we must continue to follow them
up before we can draw a correct conclusion.
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:-11.3r GMtti!Y lad
R.Y. TfiiiE5
19 April 1967
The Fearful Ulhricht
Walter Ulbricht seems to have exceeded even his
own previous records for cant and hypocrisy in his
four-hour speech to the congress of East Germany's
"Socialist Unity" party. Herr Ulbricht now says Ger-
many can be united only after the West German
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
bet not unexpected; Ulbricht is a frightened man. m
He is frightened less of the kind of uprising thatt
took place in- 1953 than of the creeping Isolation of
East Germany even within the Soviet bloc. -He pan-,,
ieked at the prompt, positive response of other!*
Communist regimes to the initiatives launched by then
Kiesinger-Brandt coalition.
Panic accounts for his abrupt trip to Moscow, for l
the feverish conclusion or renewal of bilateral treaties ;
with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and for East Ger-
many's blasts at Rumania after that regime had'
accepted diplomatic relations with Bonn.
Herr Ulbricht has slowed Bonn's diplomatic of-
fensive but is doubtful that he can sidetrack' It. "
i- The Soviet bloc is no longer a monolith taking orders
from the Kremlin. Even the Poles and Czechs may one
day find compelling'the advantages of closer.relations
with West Germany.
working class has seized control, overthrowing "mili-
tarism, neo-Nazism and the power of-the monopolies."
As Herr Ulbricht may recall, the. authentic revolt
of German workers erupted not in the Federal Repub-
lie but In his own "German Democratic Republic"
fourteen years ago on June 17-and was crushed by
Soviet tanks while the Communist leaders hid for
their lives.
Herr Ulbricht's sterile response to Chancellor
Kiesinger's sixteen specific proposals for closer links
:,,.between the two parts of Germany Is disappointing
'?'~ SR C~1~Tr'Pl !cT;?R
23 - April 190
7
App
East Zornie Reds Elect Fuchs,
Eiser to Cenaral Committee
BERLIN ~ (AP)-Atom spy
Klaus Fuchs and propagandist
Gerhart Eisler, once regarded
as the No. I Communist spy in
the United States, were elected
yesterday to the Central Com-
mittee of the East German
Communist party, the official
news agency ADN reported.
Walter Ulbricht was unanimous-
ly re-elected first secretary.
Eisler was convicted and
sentenced to prison terms in the
United States for contempt of
:Congress ' and falsifying visa
information, but jumped bail
and sailed to East Germany
aboard the. Polish liner Batory
on May 7, 1949. He is now 7u
years old.
Fuchs, 55. who worked as an
atomic scientist in the United
States and Britain during and
after World War II, was convict
oyflaw=IR ad aawft 20W
and was sentenced to 14 years In
prison. He was released after
serving nine years and returned
to East Germany, where he now
is deputy director of a nuclear
research center.
New Politburo Named
The elections took place at the
seventh Communist party con-
gress in East Berlin. It wound
up yesterday.
The 2,000 delegates elected a
new 15-member Politburo, plus
six candidate-members, and a
new Central Committee.
Delegations from 67 nations
were present. The'Soviet delega-
tion was led by Leonid I. Bre-
zhnev and that of Poland by
party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka,
both of whom were present for
Ulbricht's closing speech.
oug cou get around
such Communist demands as
recognition of East Germany
and of existing borders, includ-
ing the border between East and
West Germany.
West Berlin Mentioned
Ulbricht brought up the mat-
ter of the neutralization of West
Berlin. In his speech earlier in
the week . Brezhnev hardly,
mentioned West Berlin.
One Western source evaluated';
the contrast in the reference to
West Berlin this way: "Ulbricht
was reminding his Soviet com-
rades that the problem of West
Berlin is still there and that
despite the present days of East-
West detente in Europe in
Europe, it will have to be settled
one day. He restated his govern-'
need's chin to sovereignty in*;
caw )0'06000.1
CPYRGHT
i
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' E1.emriIize Nazis in der
CPYRGF-1' T_;-Fiihriing
Vy. BERLIN.-. Mai. Lem neuen Zen-
tralkomitee der SED. das von zwei Wo-
then auf dem Parteltag derSED gewahlt
worden fst, gehoren mindestens dreizehn
ehemalige Nationalsosialisten an. Nadi
einer Mittetlung des Untersurhungsaus=
schusses freiheitiicher Juristen sind dar-
unter zwei Minister sowwie ein Staats
sekretar. Von den 131 Vollmttgttedern
des Zentralkomitees nerint der Unter-
suchungsausschud sechs ehemallge Na- _
tlonalsoziaiisten, den Minister and Vor-
sitzenden des Komitees der Arbelter
and Bauerninspektion, :Heinz Matthes,'
den Staa.tssekretar fir rorschung uind
Technik, Herbert Weiz, den Prssidentten,
des Turn- and Sportbundes der DDIV,:
Manfred Ewald. den Vizeprasidenten der:
Akademie der Landwlrtschaftswissen-e
schaften, Erich Rilbensam. das PrBsidi-
umsmitglted der Einheitsgewerkschaft:
FDGB, Horst Heintze, and den Sdu9it-
steller Bernhard Seeger., Unter den 50,
Kandidaten des Zentralkomitees der.
SED.befinden aich weitere Sieben else-
rpalige Parteigenoasen.
T'Y rlr. zIS Irr S
IM 1) :E-7 , ~. tip: '
erlin, 7 ,day. .Lt least .3 former National Socialists are wion
1.1ae raeriborz of the new SE) Central Committee elected two weeks ago
et the S) :arty Congress , According to a report by the IzTu esti,,ating
Committee of Free Jurists, they include two iinisters and one State
,ecretary. Of the 131 full nemters of the Central. Odrahittee, the
Investigating Committee has identified six. former
Heinz Matthes, :iini.ster and Chairrnian of the Comaittee of
'?Zor]cer and Peasant Inspection
:- rLert ?Teiz, State Secretary for Research and Technology
::ta red I .-tald, President of the Gym mastics and Sports
:1j.;ocint:ion
Erich Ruebensatn, Vice President of the Acadeny of
iigricult'iral )ciences
:=orst Heintze, :ember of the Presidium of the Free German
Trade Union :association (FDGB)
l er nhard Seeger, Aut. for
;;n additional seven former Nazis are among the 50 Candidate ]::embers
of the S2 Central Committee.
:~ ''~IIKFGRI'E t ALI,(}E^ IN!E MIMI T
8 iay 196?'
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orenAffairs
ulletin
published by the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
Volume 7
January 25th 1967
Collaboration with Developing Countries.
The GDR's scientific and industrial
relations with a great number of
developing countries, which have
shown a very favourable trend
particularly during 1965-86, form a
substantial part of the country's
economic exchanges. They are a
decisive means of promoting and
deepening the collaboration with
these countries which in the new
stage of their development have.
taken steps to strengthen and safe-
guard their national Independence.
Arrangements to send specialists
(outside commercial contracts) have
helped these countries a great deal
in building up and strengthening
their own economies.
Training of Technical Personnel
When sending specialists and train-
ing local staff the Interests of the
country concerned are taken into
consideration and due regard is
being paid to the principle of
equality and mutual respect of sov-
ereignty.
Thus, in 1965, advisers and spe-
cialists were sent to 19 develop-
ing countries and the number of
trainees which came to the GDR
from 48 countries to acquire tech-
nical knowledge, had nearly doubled
.as against 1964.
opmen o e a ons
In '1968 the GDR has made further
CPYRGHT
sur-essfuI efforts in expanding her 'Along the Lines of theist
relations with the Arab and African UNCTAD Conference
countries. As a result, agreements on
scientific and industrial collaboration The GDR considers the cultly
were signed. of this type of relationship to be e a
a
Experience made so far shows that essential contribution towards t
on the basis of such long-term agree- realization of the requests voiced b
meats the developing countries- can the developing countries at the eve
be granted manysided and effective UN Conference for Trade and Deve
help in widely varying held in 1964.
scientific and Most favourable results have bee
industrial fields. achievbd in scientific and industri
On the other hand, a number of collaboration with the UAR, Syri
developing countries have built up Mali and Guinea. In the spirit
successfully certain branches of genuine equality of the partners th
Industry and thereby gathered a GDR aims at a long-term -
great deal of valuable experience operation, utilizing In the best pos
from which the corresponding sible way the discoveries made b
sectors of the GDR's industry can science and industry.
benefit through the exchange of
knowledge and experts. Collaboration is growing in im
Moreover, it is possible to take up portance also in the field of planning
favourable cooperative activities in Under Under the conditions of the scientifi
various industrial fields, including revolution all-round economic, scien
agriculture. tific and industrial exchanges are it
line with the fundamental require
Government agreements concluded meats of International contracts.
with a number of countries, includ- ,,,,,__- _- __ _, ....,
trig the UAR, Syria, Yemen and Mali,
have shown good results. Other
examples are the arrangements made
with Algerie, Kongo-Brazzaville,
Guinea and Burma,; which form a
sound basis for developing scien-
tific and industrial exchanges.
entering into long-term relation
involving a division of labour
tween the GDR and the African
Asian and Latin American eountriwhich have embarked upon the noth
capitalist way of development.
GDR FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES ARAB TOUR
Bait Dcrlin Deutschlandsender in German to Germany 2040 GRIT 16 May 1967
(Intervi.ew g,.von by GDR Foreign Minister Otto Winner in Beirut to our Middle
Eat;t correspondent Horst Kae4bler-recorded)
('Iextl Itaeubler: itr. Foreign Minister, in the past few days you visited the
UAR, the Syrian Arab itcpublic. and the Republic of Lebanon. Would you
kindly onllane the notit?en for your mission to a number of Arab states before
the mierophonc of the GDR radio'
Apprp @4 Q-'yR-? e ,sQQOIJiQ 7tlieCJA-t c7l8aQ22kl AQQO/4OO igi1Q2
the beginning of this year. For health reasons.I Was unfortunately compelled
 Approved-- erRelsase-20= =Rt?fi' '8=t?30-
to put it off a little while. Meanwhile, the Seventh SED Congress has opened
new perspectives for developing th^ GDR 'z foreign policy. It made good sense
to talk with the statesmen of the Arab states about these new perspectives of
our foreign policy, our domestic development, the great plans of the GAR? and
to inform them of and discuss some of the problems. I can say that these
talks were extremely fruitful, fruitful. for me and the GDR inasmuch as we
became anquainted with the now problems ',-i the Arab States ve visited.
The statesmen of the LIAR, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Lebanon
used the opportunity to expound the fundamentals. of their foreign policy,_some
tio
l
ns
a
problems of their domestic development, and questions of international re
in th^ Arab area. Summing up, I may say that the motives for my mission were.
to develop good relations between the (GDR and the Arab states and to open up
now horizons.
aa.uwledgeof the problems of the Arab states. So there was an extremely wide range
-D foreign policy as outlined at the Seventh SE,D Congress. A knowledge o e g
Wacubler: Mr. Foreign Minister, you had conversations in Cairo, Damascus,
and Beirut with the leaders of these three states. Can you tell our listeners
sonething about the substance of your talks?
;nzer; it is general knowledge that she economic,isa.ritime, and aviation relations
the cultural, sci.ent.ific, and tech:lical cooperation between the GDR and the
':cob states = visited are developing very well. It is necessary further to develop
1o[trical relations between our states. This requires primarily a knowledge of ~` .
f th rear'
Kaeutler: After this first stage of your mission and shortly before your departure,
may I ask your impressions of the states you have visited?
.)f topics in my conversations in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut. I may say that, my
dis4-?4sdions will bear fruit in the course of time; that is, our relations will
develop in the political a;; well as in the economic and cultural field.
tlinzer: I can say- that m:r impressions are extremely good. 1. can say that on the
whole the mutual understanding between the statesmen with whom I had an opportunity
to speak and the GDR government is developing increasingly,. It should be mentioned
that my visit to the Republic of Lebanon was the first in many years which offered.
nr opportunity for detailed and thorough talks with the foreign siinister and Premier
of the Republic of Lebanon, with many parliamentarians and other representatives.
of economic life.
Here In Beirut, I gave information about our policy and my partners briefed us on
the polic"T of neutrality and nonalinement of the Republic of Lebanon. On this
basis, we discussed how political relations will develop in addition to our economic
and cultural relations.
gumming up, after the first stage of my visit to Arab countries, I can say that it
was fruitful and will bear fruit in the future.
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 -Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 CPYRGHT
CC ?1Ui?:IST PERSEC?L! TICir OF E.:'TISTS
LOS 11NGLLi s TIMES
24 August 1966
;Sid Baptist Leaders
Soviet Imprisons
BY VINCENT J. BURKE
MOSCOW-Forty young Soviet
men and women. were baptized In
the 'Don River on May 2 and the six
,Baptist leaders who organized the
inass religious rite havdt been sen-
tend;ed to prison.
In disclosing th1, Tuesday, a So.
net. newspaper reported that' the
Baptist leaders also were convicted
of illegally operating a Sunday
school and printing religious tracts
on an-underground printing press.
'After the Orthodox Church, the
aptlsts are the second largest reii-
`~gious group in-.the Soviet Union
-with mare than half a million adher.
The article said without elabora-
tion that the six defendants were
sentenced to prison terms of varying
length.
The mass baptism occurrgd In
Rostov on the Dori and the defen-
clants were tried by a regional court
fat~Rostov, the newspaper said.
An account of the trial, published
In Teachers Gazette, indicated that
youthful believers who ware called;
''as witnesses were defiant and con'
temptuous of the court.
"They behaved angrily and fanatt
ally, the?article said.
Moreover, among the spectators at'
+ the trial some. young women gazed,
"with admiration at, the, defendants
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the atheistic pablic.".
The author r~ot.ed that
this display of youthful ad
F?i f? HTChri9tiait;;1ic
refs does not correspond
with the conventional So.
4 Met view of the .BaptSt,-irt
the Soviet. Union.,.
"We think of them ,as
(quiet old people who have'
not' .got rid of 'the ret '
slants of the past," the tit+-
title noted,
The success of the. Bap.
fin group In propagating
the: ,faith among Soviet.
youth was cited as conclu4
give' evidence of serious,
hortcotn.ings'ot thde;
overnment's program' of i
"atheistic education." The:
uthor said it wag too late
o Indoctrinate youths in
theism if they are be-,j
fevers at the age of 17
nd 18.
Student Baptism
't~hoie baptized at thEi,
ass immersion rite were'
aid 'to have included' - a
f4I'student ae'a.construc-"
ion:. engineering college at.
.ostnv, who `is'a aihembetY
f the---Xomsomol (Young
ommunist League
What is the ?. otigin. nt
h is rcllggious attitude
mong "yesterday's school
iris, who live among our,
oviet youth and study,'
cience' w;i.th all the
l.hers?" the.aeticle' asked,
It 'said the trial testimo'
gat a the' nswer:
?In . the underground.'
tinting house in, the .su-,
u r? b > of. ' flostov the,
brothers and sisters in
,hrist ? 's are, diligently"
ultiplying in hundreds
f copies Baptist maga t
Ines, entitled; "Herald of
aving," "Rule' of Behavi-
r of Children"and "'file-,
rothers' Papers.",
A -government I witness;
Id the court that the ina-%
azines constituted "active.
rohadauda ' of religion,"1
skint; bow else one could
escribe a passage. which,
t' ailed ' n'i You+h to ? "take;
;ay 1967
ibaptism, t~rpanized wi,th-'
out knowledge of local au-,
tthorities, "violated social`
order and called forth in
1WIgnatiori of thb people off,
;Rostov." .
At the "illegal" Sunda3lp
'schools, the article. said,
"I I 1 i t e'r ate and fanatic/-
teachers taught children"
tot 8 to 7Y of God's teachal,
ing,. systematically educat. `
!ng in them a relf ious';?
World butltrok." g
Call. for Disobedience
e're lLIgiaus tracts
were said, to have some-
t I'M e s contained "direct'+
''calls to the believers not to';
obey Soviet 'laws."
The group accused of il-
legal activities was termed.
a faction within thb regu?i"
ar Baptist organisation.
Within` this group, the
rticle afd, parent&.forbid,y
hildren -to attend the
inema, to ? participate In t
'egular social life, to be ac.;
Ive in` *Young 'Pioneers 14
he Soviet'organizatlon fors
hildren,.:'and''make their,
hildrek "real;lh~Bible,;~
PPYRGHT
? , WASHINGTON POST
CF2$ber 1966
Soviets Jail 3 '
MOSCOW - Three women
members of it Fundamentalist
Baptist sect have been sen.
tenced to three-year jail
terms for secretly holding re-
ligious classes for children in
Yzhny, a village on the Volga
River east of Moscow. It was
the fourth such case reported
this year.
The Baptist Church, offl.
dally registered with Soviet
:authorities, estimates there
are about 250,000 "unrcgis.
tried" Baptists in the nation.
,The newspaper Sovictskaya
;Rossiya said the women were
not sentenced for their re.
ligious views, but for organiz.
ing classes to teach Christian.
lty to, children.
otd0oV q?ma"ss6r A000400060001-2
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RUSSIAN BAPTISTS QUOTE LENIN IN PLEA FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE
By Arthur Channing
Back in 1903, when he was seeking popular support: for his revolutionary
cause, V. I. Lenin made an eloquent defense of religious freedom in Russia.
After his Bolsheviks gained power in 1917 and established the world's first
Communist regime, however, he discarded. his seemingly liberal views and helped
to launch the campaign against all religions that his successors are still waging
today.
The-Russian Church of Evangelical Christians-Baptists recently
reminded the present Soviet leadership of Lenin's previous stand in an appeal
for religious freedom addressed to the USSR's highest party and governmental
authorities.
This quotation from a 1903 Lenin statement was included in the, Baptists'
"Each person must have complete freedom not only to observe any faith
but also (to) propagate any faith.... None of the officials should even have a
right to ask anyone of his faith: this is a matter of conscience and nobody
should dare to interfere in this field?"
The Baptists cited. a number of other instances in which Communists
have taken public positions that are now being contradicted by the party's day-
to-day persecution of religious believers throughout the USSR.
Their letter, written in April, 1965 but unknown. outside of the Soviet
Union until a copy reached contacts in Western Europe in July, 1966 -- pointed
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-3-
out that the original Soviet constitution of 1918 professed to recognize the
right of each citizen to immunity from both "religious and anti-religious
propaganda." Later, however, the constitution was changed to fit the present
policy of denying believers the right to propagate their faith but giving the
party's atheist agitators a free hand in conducting anti-religious propaganda.
The Baptist appeal also charged that Soviet authorities had violated
provisions of the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (ratified
by the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1962) dealing with freedom of conscience, con-
victions and religious beliefs. Specific reference was made to Article 5 of
the Declaration which states that parents "must have the possibility of
securing for thcir children a religious and moral upbringing in conformity
with their own convictions."
Since 1929, the letter said, the revised Soviet constitution has
permitted the wholesale persecution of believers, thousands of whom perished
in prisons and labor camps.
"Can one say that all these nightmares are of.things of the past?"
the Baptist appeal asked. "No! The crime has not yet ended. It still con-
tinues. And here is a vivid example of this: At the very time you are reading
this letter, hundreds of believers are being deprived of liberty illegally.
They are languishing in prisons, labor camps and in exile. Some of them died
in agony as martyrs. The children are being taken away from their parents.
Thousands of Evangelical Christian-Baptist communities are deprived of all
rights. Their meetings are being held in private homes which sometimes can
accommodate only 25 to 30 percent of a Baptist community, and even under these
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001; 2
trying conditions the believers cannot get together without harassment. Quite
often their meetings are dispersed by police and volunteer militia? and their
homes confiscated. All this testifies to the fact that the crime has not yet
ended."
The letter included a plea for restoration of the original wording
of the constitution and for the honoring of its provisions concerning religion.
It was addressed to L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Constitutional Committee
of the Supreme Soviet (parliament); legislative committees of the Supreme
Soviet; the USSR Council of Ministers; and the Presidium of the USSR,Supreme
"As:rulers," the Baptist spokesmen said in conclusion, "you carry
the responsibility before God, not for the violation of church canons, but
for the violation of natural laws of truth, liberty, equality and fraternity."
Although there has been no indication of an official Soviet reply
to the Baptists' plea for religious tolerance, press reports from Moscow in
late August revealed that six of the church's leaders had been sentenced to
prison for taking part in a baptismal ceremony for 40 young men and women.
The Baptists, according to these reports, also were charged with giving
religious instruction and secretly printing religious tracts.
In an earlier incident, two young parish priests of the Russian
Orthodox Church, Fathers Nicholas Eshliman and Gleb Yakunin, were suspended
from performing their religious duties after writing similar letters of protest
to Soviet and church officials. The priests charged, in December 1965,? that
Soviet officials had undermined the church's own leadership and, in effect,
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-5-
held the power of veto over all religious activities. .They pointed out that
no priest can be ordained without approval of the regime's Council on Affairs
of the Church. More than ten thousand churches and dozens of monasteries,
training seminaries and convents were closed by Communist authorities between
prohibited by Soviet law.
1961 and 1964, the priests added, although such actions supposedly are
CPYRGHT
ZHE SUNDAY TIMES .
10 July 1966
01 11, lists
by a Special Correspondent ?;
THE EXPULSION of four West-,
'ern naptists, three British and one
Dutch, from Russia last week for
trying to "smuggle" Bibles into
the country follows a spate ofs
trials and -mass arrests of Soviet'
Baptists. 1
Baptist women accused of run-
ning illegal Bible classes and.
Sunday schools have, recently;
been put on trial in places as fan
apart as We,tcrn Ukraine and.
Soviet Kirghizia in Central Asia,
Sentences were harsher than
usual, with none under five years,
hard labour:
Last month there were anti-
Baptist riots in the town of`
Mtsensk, Russian Federation, and;
special militia units had to be'
called out to control potential'
lynching parties determined to'
" get the Baptists." i
The wave of anti-Baptist inci-.
dents is believed to be linked'
with the emergence of a militant
group within the Russian Evan-
gelical Christian Baptist Churchl,
following dissatisfaction among'
the faithful with the present
Church leadership. One.of their
leaders summed up their dispute
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ussia" pus:
Uueeze
way: We abide by God's Laws
only, and the leadership of the
Evangelical Baptist Church',has
bowed to the temporal too.".
Long-term aims'.'
The new group want to. oust';
the, present leadership, which
,is recognised by the Council fort
Religious Affairs, and hope 'to
achieve-this in a democratic way'.
at an all-unlon , congress of
Igo Baptists. But their aims'
go further than changing a church'
'leadership that "has tu'ned'
`'its back on Christ's teachings." l`
The ' Baptist Organisational,;',
rCommittee, as the leaders of the*'
tmilitant-group call themselves,''{
?demand an Immediate .. end to.
kState interference in the upbring-
ing of Baptist children and claim,:
tthe right ' to withdraw their"
children from, anti-religloui',
instruction classes at- school:
c Unlike 'the official Church':`
leadership, the, organisational:
committee does not seem' to
believe' in passive - resistance:
SIllegally printed 'leaflets have'
"urged the faithful to "fight term
poral laws" and to be, guided
,in all their ;actions by- "God's
.laws alone.'
" Speakers " of the group have:
been calling on officials of district,;!
regional and republican ,'councils'
as well as the Council of.Religious'
Affairs in Moscow, petitioning they
'Convocation of Baptist Congress.i
Soviet officials believe- there- ir.?
already a big enough religiot ,n
revival going. on In the Soviet
Union without, British, Baptists;
distributing Bibles in the country
h-2
CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
Ifuroyadou on &ptist Schism and Lr,s on Religion
interview at Readers' Request: SOME QUF;STiONS ON REI.1-
r,1ON AND THE CIIURCII. (izvestia, Aug. a0, p. 4. Complete
text:) From time to time izvestia publishes articles concern-
Ing religion, the church, and atheist work. They usually evoke
many letters from readers.
The editors, feeling that the thoughts expressed in the let-
ters are of interest of the public, asked Vladimir Alekseyevich
Kuroyedov, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers'
Council for Religious Affairs, to answer some of the questions
raised by reactors.
question.-Are there many believers in our country? What
status do Soviet laws grant to religious organizations and what
procedure do they provide for these organizations' activities?
Answer.-It is impossible to answer the question of how
many believers there are, since our country conducts no state
census of citiz.;,,is in regard to their attitude toward religion.
No official documents contain indications of whether a person
professes a religion or is a nonbeliever. It Is very important
to emphasize this circumstance, for it is one of the conditions
for ensuring freedom of conscience in the U.S.S.R. Under the
Soviet Constitution, the church in our country is separated from
the state, and the schools from the church, in order to ensure
freedom of conscience. In conformity with this, state agencies
do not interfere In the internal devotional activities of religious
organizations. Religious organizations. In turn, do not inter-
fere in any state affairs.
The soviet state, taking into account the fact that a part of
the population consists of believers, permits church associa
lions to function freely in order to satisfy the religious needs
of the believers, These associations are granted the use of
church buildings without charge and are granted the possibility
(if training clergymen, publishing religious literature, manu-
facturing articles of worship, etc.
Our laws strictly protect the rights of believers, An Insult
to the feelings of helievers or any kind of discrimination
;c ainst them is prosecuted according to law.
ft is precisely in these conditions, which have been created
in our country, that it is possible genuinely to ensure every
citizen the freedom to believe or not believe in God, the free-
clon- to perform religious rites or to spread antircligious prop-
aganda.
Everything stated above is a commonly known truth. Foreign
church delegations visiting the Soviet Union acknowledge that
the church in our country exists freely and independently.
Yet from time to time some Western publications print
islander and various insinuations about the status of religion in
the U.S.S.R. For example, the newspaper Lo Parisien Libere,
in its issue of April 4, 1966, presented as a sensation a report
of new Russian Itcpublic legislation concerning the church and,
in so doing, offered the peremptory conclusion that 'a new of-
fensive against Christian worship" was being organized in our
country.
Let us see how matters actually stand.
At the beginning of this year the Presidium of the Russian
Republic Supreme Soviet adapted two decrees and a resolution
concerning legislation on religious cults. Similar resolutions
:out decrees were adopted by the Presidiums of the Supreme
Soviets of other Union republics. Any unbiased person, after
reacting these documents (published in Vcdomosti Verkhovnovo
Soviea RSF'SII, No. 12, March 24, 1966), will recognize that
there can be no talk of an 'offensive" against the church and
against believers' rights or of any infringement of these rights.
These decrees and resolutions were adopted to clarify the
prevailing legislation on cults; they concern chiefly the ques-
tion of combating violations of the law on the separation of
church and state and of schools and church, and they clarif it
along the followtppm'Ye Po v, Releases20 /
set forth specifically which violations of the above law entail
criminal liability. The Itussian Republic Criminal Code (Art.
142) had not previously defined these specific violations. It
should be particularly emphasized that the sphere of criminal
punishment has been considerably narrowed. And for various
types of violations an administrative penalty has been intro-
duced in place of criminal responsibility.
Essentially, it is a matter of reducing the punishment of per-
sons who are first offenders against the law on separation of
church and state. However, increased responsibility is estab-
lished for citizens who had previously been convicted of such
violations and also for those who have undertaken organized
activities aimed at the committing of such violations.
From all this it is apparent that the new judicial acts do not
at all infringe upon the rights of believers, all the more so
since the resolution of the Presidium of the Russian Republic
Supreme Soviet states that discrimination against believers is
punished according to criminal procedure. In particular, this
concerns such instances as 'refusal to hire citizens or to admit
then. to educational institutions, dismissal from work or expul-
sion from educational institutions, and the deprivation of citi-
zens' privileges and benefits that have been established by law,
as well as other substantial limitations of the rights of citizens
because of their attitude toward religion."
It is not fortuitous that believers and also the clergy correctly
understood these new normative acts of the Union republics and
approved them.
To the credit of certain foreign church publications, it should
be said that they gave an objective Interpretation of the new So-
viet acts on religion and the church. Such an influential church
publication as the Bulletin of the World Council of Churches do-
clared in No. 17, May 26:
'At the beginning of April various news services carried re-
ports from Moscow that a decree of the Supreme Soviet in Rus-
sia (the Russian Republic) introduced restrictions on freedom of
religion. A study of the text, actually containing three decrees,
showed that these decrees on the whole confirm, clarify and In
some cases introduce greater flexibility into existing laws.
Contrary to what was printed in the newspapers, none of these
decrees forbids freedom to collect JrontributionsJ for the needs
of the church or sanctions discrimination against persons be-
cause of their religion,
'To illustrate the alleviation of previous conditions, it may
he noted that some law violations previously punished by im-
prisonment now only entail a fine of up to 50 rubles."
The bulletin goes on to give, on similar aspects. a concrete
analysis of each of the new normative acts of the Presidium of
the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet concerning religious cults.
Thus, no matter how much Le Parisien Libere wanted to
slander the Soviet government's policy toward religion, it failed.
The new legislative acts in the sphere of religion and the church
are in no way a persecution of religion or a violation of the i
principle of freedom of conscience in the U.S.S.It.
Of course, freedom of conscience in our country does not
mean, as some clergymen would like, that the activities of
religious orl;anizalions should be completely unrestricted and
that they may do whatever they wish, without regard for the
laws and customs of our country.
Every state has special laws on religion and the church, es-
tablishing a definite framework for the activity of religious
associations. It is natural that we too have laws on religion and
the church. The basic one is the Soviet government decree 'On
Separation of Church From State and of Schools From the Church," '?
issued Jan. 23, 1918, and signed by V. I. Lenin.
The chief requirement which the law sets for religious organi-
zations is that hey( corfi h i c iXit "WA g nc
7roi fl~ i IdirAWa er
and without infringing upon the person or rights of citizens.
The law forbids the use of meetings of believers for addresses
rntnnginrr this Intnrnet.t of Qn.rent cn..inI , nc .nn11 n- 11... t! Ilaptlstcri in der
Sowjctunion, zn loser and nicltt den gesamten
Komplex in don Iliinden dcs Unionsrdtes zu be-
lessen, dem sio eino zn starke staatlicho Gebuudea-
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-17
Widerstand
Der Tnllait sowio die Art, die notion Instruk-
tionen den Gli.ubigen . auf so . undemokratisclie
Weise aufzuerlegeu, gentigten, cino Protestbcwc-
gung auszuliisen. A. F. Prolcof jcw and G. K. Krjtc-
t.3chkow warcu 1361 die Initiatoren einor Gegen.
;boweguug, (lie sich rxl+sitsiativnikin nanntc. In
illrer tl. 13otschaft~, veriangten sio" dio sbfortigo
Linbtirufung clues Kongresses alter Baptisten, um
auf dem Wego demokratiscber Abstinunung3-
metho(len, das lieil3t durch des Votum allor toil-
'uohmenden I3aptisten, cine V enordnung des All-
!uniousrates zu crzielen, in , dessen Iiandlungs-
iweiso sic cia Diktat des Staates sateen. Taints der,
tllaupttraktanden des Kongresses solute die Neu
1 walll des AUunionsrates sein, dessen Mitglieder.
!bisher aus'cinem sorgfiiltig ausgewabltcn Gremium
bcstanden. Will achr man bestrobt war, den Ril3
wieder gutzamnchon, ist aus der Rcaktion auf den
Protest crtsichtlich: tier KongreB wurde cinborufen,
rlie oberste Mbrltng des Rates ncu gewuhlt lid
these and jone wenig bedeutende Konze.ssion ge-
f
maeht,
urn,rlie im Lanfe der uliebsten Jahre einsetzten.
1.)cl ?Clt anti do #iir knnn man wohl in der fur die
t
ti