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June 5, 1967
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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 ; CIA RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved or Release 2000/08 ' UA-ruJP78-03061A000400060001-2 ~~? IgnIfIcant Dates [ASTERISK DENOTES ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS] JUL 30 (to 5 August) PEN (Poets, Essayists, Novelists -- non-Communist) International Conference, Abidjan, Ivory Coast. AUG I* Warsaw Uprising begins; later crushed by Germans while Red Army refuses and blocks assistance. 1944. 2-9 World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession, 16th Assembly, Vancouver, Canada. (Non-Communist.) 6* U.S. drops atomb bomb on Hiroshima. 1945. 8* Soviet Union declares war on Japan. 1945. 1 14* Japan surrenders to Allies. 1945. 15* Republic of Indonesia proclaimed. (After four years of intermittent warfare, Netherlands transferred sovereignty to interim Indonesian government 2 Novem- ber 1949.) 1950. 20* Leon Trotsky murdered in Mexico City. 1940. 23* Soviet Union and Nazi Germany conclude non-aggression pact, opening way for German attack on Poland, and its partition'between Germany and the USSR. 1939. 25* Paris liberated by Free French forces with U.S. Army. 1944. 27* Kellogg-Briand Pact (Treaty of Paris) signed, renouncing war as instrument of policy. 28 Aug-Sept 2. 10th International Congress of Linguists, Bucharest. (Includes non-Communist participants.) SEP I* Germany invades Poland; World War II begins. 1939. 3-8 17th Pugwash Conference on "Scientists and World Affairs," Ronneby, Sweden. 8 Summit meeting of Organization of African Unity, Kinshasa, Congo. II* Constituent Assembly election, South Vietnam. Despite Viet Cong threats, 80.8% of voters turn out. 1966. 13-15 Conference on Portuguese Colonies, South and South-WestAfrica, Zimbabwe, and Rhodesia, Conakry, Guinea. Sponsored by the World Peace Council (Communist front). 17* Soviet Union invades Poland, proceeds to occupy eastern half of country. (See under I September above.) 1939. 18* 'UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold dies in plane crash near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia. 1961. 25 (to I October) Fourth General Conference of BITEJ (Travel Bureau of World Fed- eration of Democratic Youth -- Communistl meets in Budapest in conjunction with FIYTO (federation of non-communist commercial travel agencies). Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (Significant Dates) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 5 June 1967 . t .l P78-03061 A000400060001-2 Briefly Noted The Chang- Moscow Rewrites Tibetan ing Soviet History Line The following two quota- tions illustrate the change in Mos- cow's line on Tibet in the light of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Small Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 9 (1990): "With the support of imperialist circles and the Chiang Kai-shekites, Tibetan reactionaries organized a plot against the Central People's Government and in March 1959, began an armed uprising... The defeat of the reactionary rebels by units of the People's Liberation Army, which was actively supported by broad sec- tions of the Tibetan population, foiled the dangerous plot by the internal and external enemies of the Chinese People's Republic and opened up the prospect of building a new, democratic and Socialist Tibet before the Tibetan people." Tashkent Radio, 3 April 1967: "Blood is flowing again and hundreds of Tibetans have been killed or have committed suicide after tor- ture. Monasteries and shrines are being desecrated and sacred books destroyed. The Tibetans fought for their national freedom and indepen- dence in 1959, when tens of thousands of Tibetans were killed by the Chi- nese and tens of thousands more were forced to flee. In January 1965, the Tibetans rose again against 'Peking's policy; for Peking's proclamation of sham national autonomy has not satis- fied them. The Tibetans will con- tinue their struggle for survival and independence and their libera- tion struggle, like that of other nationalities, will never be subdued." Moscow's pious sympathy for the Tibetan people seems even more-eyni- cal when contrasted with the 1960 statement and in view of her own policy of offering "sham autonomy" to various nationalities within her own boundaries. 25X1C1Ob Miscellaneous More on 50th Anni- Notes on Con- versary Celebrations sumer Benefits As part of the 50th Anniversary celebrations, the Soviet government has promised its citizens more consumer goods. The following items are just two of the myriad which appear in the Communist and Western press, pointing up economic shortcomings in the Soviet Union. (UNCLASSIFIED) Flour Returns to State Stores in Moscow. Flour is being sold in state stores for the first time since the autumn of 1963. This is partially due to the favorable wheat crop of 1966 but is also an extra bonus for the jubilee year. While importing wheat, Russia had also made selected exports for politi- cal purposes while denying her own citizens the privilege of purchasing flour for their own use. More and Better Shoes. According to EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA and IZVESTIYA the shoe industry is beset by a Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (Briefly Noted Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08f J flP78-03061A000400060001-2. shortage of modern plant equipment and quality raw material. The annual output of shoes is scheduled to increase from 522 million pairs in 1966 to 760 million in 1971. In order to meet this schedule new fac- tories will have to be built and modern equipment imported. Improve- ment in the quality of domestic hides and artificial leather will also be necessary. Artificial leather is, of such poor quality that it can only be used for sandals and summer footwear. Modern facilities for treating, stor- ing and shipping hides are also lack- ing. Consequently, the regime has had to import large quantities of shoes from "Socialist" countries as well as the decadent West. ADVERTISEMENT + + + + + + + + + + 50TH ANNIVERSARY Soviet Revolution 25X1(}1 Ob 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 2 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (Briefly N Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 #14 Propagandist's Guide -to WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS 25 April-22 May 1967 1. Although Soviet media continue to acclaim the Karlovy Vary conference of European CPs (#13) as a great triumph and demonstration of unity with world-wide significance (media of other participants are generally much more restrained on the subject), the hollowness of the victory quickly becomes apparent. Immedi- ately after its close, the participating British CP releases (A 27) a major new policy document which differs widely from Soviet policy in important as- pects. Ten days later, the non-participating Rumanian CP boss Ceausescu pub- lishes a major statement which expands on that Party's previously expressed stance of independence, including a strong affirmation of the right of any party not to participate in any international meeting. He strongly reiterates Rumanian opposition to any form of "an international coordinating center" and to the setting up of compulsory norms of conduct for CPs." And in a surpris- ing new thrust, he brands it as inadmissible for any member of one party to maintain relations with any other party "over the head of the leadership" and for any party to establish relations with any members or groups in another party (in the view of the most observers, a thinly-veiled charge of underhanded Soviet relations with sympathizers within the Rumanian CP). 2. Meanwhile, true to form, the Chinese and Albanians scathingly denounce KV as deceitful, hackneyed, and sterile, -- "symbolic of the utter bankruptcy of Europe's new scabs." 3. Soviet media continue to report statements by other parties calling for the convening of a world CP meeting, and they join in the call with the Greeks (A 29), but clandestine reporting indicates that in the aftermath of KV most parties see the prospects for one deferred indefinitely. 4. Bilateral meetings between European parties continue, producing two more new 20-year friendship treaties, USSR-Bulgaria (M 10-13) and Hungary-E. Germany (M 18-21): neither departs notably from the pattern of the recent series. 5. Castro's relations with the established CPs of Latin America are further inflamed by increased Cuban militance -- and the publicity caused by a series of "red-handed"captures: one of Castro's closest political theorist collaborators with the guerrillas in Bolivia (A 25); a courier in Colombia (M"3); an agent with a clandestine radio and full paraphernalia in the Domin- ican Republic (M 8); and three Army officers attempting a landing on the coast of Venezuela (M 12). Unabashed, he boastfully acknowledges the landing at- tempt and declares he'll continue to aid "fighters against imperialism" any- where in the world. (M 1, 4, 18) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIARDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (WCA Cont.) Approved For Release RDP78-03061A000400060001--2 6. Radio Tirana broadcasts to Poland purported extracts from two more sedi- tions documents of an underground, anti-Gomulka "Polish CP." (M 8 & 14) 7. Chinese media attack the Soviet revisionists heavily along many lines and expel a PRAVDA correspondent from Peking, while Soviet media reciprocate on a somewhat lower key. 8. report from a usually reliable source states that the Chi- nese have indefinitely postponed their attempt to hold a rival AAPSO conference in Peking this year -- an intent which they announced after the Soviet- dominated Council meeting in Cyprus (#11, Feb. 13-16) voted to change the venue for the 5th conference to Algiers. The postponement probably reflects China's difficulties in rounding up delegates. Actually, the prospects for the Algiers AAPSO conference now appear doubtful, too. 9. Castro is confidently proceeding with plans for his own Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) conference in Havana July 28. 10. The new Maoist drive to crush opposition loyal to Liu (#13) gains little or no ground during this period: on the contrary, the regime's media again warn against anarcay and violence as reports of clashes and even "large-scale, bloody repression" of Maoists increase. (Note: a number of experts on China believe that the poster and Red Guard bulletin reports of strife and massacres are intentionally exaggerated by the Maoists to provide grounds for ousting oppositionist leaders who can be held responsible, -- and there is little "hard" evidence to prove or disprove such views.) 11. As Maoist-led rioting breaks out in Hong Kong, the Chicom regime delivers stern demands to the British Govt, stirs massive demonstrations in Peking, maltreats a British consul in Shanghai, etc. The British ignore the :Peking demands; the Hong Kong police (largely Chinese) remain loyal and handle the crowds firmly; and the situation is again relatively calm as the period ends. (M 6. and continuing) 12. Chinese media continue their heavy barrage of attacks on the Soviets on: collusion with U.S. imperialism (dragging this into articles on other subjects and other countries), India, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Pope; on the Soviet "new system" of economic management and agriculture; on practicing economic imperialism in milking the socialist camp and countries of Asia and Africa; etc. (Chrono, A 26 & continuing) 13. Chinese-Indonesian political strife continues, but on. a somewhat lower key. (A 25 & continuing) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 2 (WCA Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08 3061A000400060001-2 14. On the 2nd anniversary of Mao's statement supporting the Dominican rebels, PEOPLE'S DAILY sounds the call to armed struggle to "the Dominican and other Latin American people." (M 12) 15. Soviet media continue extensive criticism of Chinese events, though per- haps less intensely than last month. (A 29 & continuing, and M 7, 8 ) 16. An IZVESTIYA attack on W. German-Japanese talks is rebuffed by the Japanese. (M 16 & 18) 17. Appointment of CC/CPSU Secretary Andropov to relieve Semichastny at the head of the security police (KGB) is seen as resulting from a series of failures in recent months but indicates also closer party control of intelligence opera- tions. (M 19) 18. The June issue of ATLANTIC MONTHLY contains an essay on the Russian people written by Svetlana Alliluyeva (Stalina) in Switzerland after she had read DR. ZHIVAGO. (M 21) 19. The long-delayed 4th Congress of Soviet writers convenes on the last day of the period, with indications that it will be as bland, non-controversial, and conservative as can possibly be managed. (M 22) 20. The USSR increases to $122 million its long-term loan for reconstruction of the Cuban sugar industry. (M '7) This is an increase of almost 50% over the September 1966 agreement. 21. Further deliveries of Soviet military hardware to Cuba, the UAR, Algeria, Morocco, and Uganda are reported during this period. 22. The Deputy Chairman of the Soviet-Japan Friendship Society in Japan in April reportedly makes some progress in efforts to woo the JCP and JSP and to encourage the two to form a common front in Japan. 23. EAST GERMANY: Despite Ulbricht's "hard" speech at the SED Congress (#13, A 17-;22), the E. German regime sends 3 communications to Bonn in apparent efforts to draw the W. German Govt into intergovernmental negotiations; Bonn appoints a special commission to consider answers. (M 1 & 17) E. German Foreign Minister Winzer visits UAR, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria and Iraq on a hurried trip apparently intended to exploit what they believe is Arab disenchantment with Bonn, but returns emptyhanded. (See also item #1131, this issue) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 IT.TnA /, ......4 Approved For Release A-RDP78-03061 A000400060001-2- 24. ALBANIA: The Albanian regime decrees a set of harsh new "revolutionary initiatives" to "revolutionize the life of our country, -?- including reduction or abolition of personal plots for peasants, abolition or reduction of pro- duction material incentives in favor of moral incentives, intensifying of work and reduction of high wages. (A 30) 25. Czech expenditures for defense and security in 1967 will be 14.2% above 1966. 26. SWEDEN: At its 21st Congress, the Swedish CP reelects Chairman Hermansson and decides to continue to follow his "liberal" ways: it even changes the party's name to "Left Party -- Communist," which it admits is an effort to identify itself more closely with the socialist left. (M 13-16) 27. FRANCE: "Bloody strife" between pro-Moscow and pro-Chinese local Commu- nists reaches Paris, according to the Chinese. (M 7) 28. JAPAN: The JCP continues to struggle against Chinese--supported "split- ters," expelling two more prominent members. (M 8 & 13) 29. MONGOLIA: Mongolia again protests a "new provocation organized by the Chinese Embassy" in Ulan Bator and expels the Chinese school-teacher offenders. (M 22) 30. THAILAND: The premier announces further Communist terrorist activities in the northeast. (M 1 & 8) Communist activities show a 30% 4-11001 mifibi&W increase in armed clashes in March over February, with an accommpanying increase in village propaganda activities. ____.__ 111P OW 31. INDIA: The Soviet-aligned Indian CP seeks collaboration with the Chinese- line CPI(L) and a political coalition to win power from the Congress Party at the central level, -- with Soviet blessing and Chinese denunciation. (M 7) 32. PHILIPPINES: A battle with Hukbalahap (Communist) guerrillas in Bataan kills 4 soldiers and 3 Huks. 33. CUBA: A 1-0000 report on the debriefing of the Cuban Army officers captured during the May 8 landing attempt in Venezuela describes a special commando unit formed in Cuba a year ago to promote and support armed clandes-0011-0 --iftiMb tine penetration of LA countries. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (WCA Cont.) . Approved For Release 2000/08/2 IDiii8-03061 A000400060001-2 34. VENEZUELA: .Guerrillas ambushed a Venezuelan Army truck convoy on May 17 near the site of the Cuban-supported landing, killing 4 soldiers. The V. Govt is preparing a strong case for action by OAS. EU UI 35. BOLIVIA: The Bolivian Govt expects to bring Castro's French friend and theoretician of guerrilla war, Debray, to trial. 36. ECUADOR: 2,000 pro-Chinese students storm the Central University of Ecuador in Quito in an unsuccessful attempt to take control. (M 17) 37, GUATEMALA: :The Security situation in Guatemala is reportedly deteriorating;further trouble is expected. Guerrilla activities since last August have killed at least 100 victims, and Govt forces have killed some 80 alleged guerrillas in the field. 25X1 C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (WCA Cont.) Approved For Release 20 -RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (WCA) Apppproved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 #1t 25 April-22 May 1967 WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS Continuing from preceding r?Llbers: The situation in China appears to be more coizfused and t:4ap.>ledictablethan ever: we treat it again in outline summary. A. The new Maoist drive to eliminate the opposition headed by Liu & Co. apparently makes liti-.< or no headway. Regime media in Peking and the relatively few ?'Maoi!-seized" provinces continue to attack the number one Party person in authority taking the capitalist road`' (Liu Shao-chi), his book, and the "handful of persons" supporting him, -- but with no dis- cernible concrete progress towards ousting him. On the contrary, with increased reporting of bloody strife among Maoists as well as between Maoists and their opponents, regime media are again warning against anarchy and violence and solemnly predict a long, hard struggle ahead, with ''many other" cultural revolutions before China is safe from a `capitalist restora- tion." Noteworthy items include: (1) A 26 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, "Down with Anarchism," admits: At this very moment, anarchism has again appeared to scatter the targets of our struggle and divert the general orientation of the struggle." (2) Wall posters in Peking on April 28 reveal that "under Mao's instruc- tions the Party CC's cultural revolution group on 22 April released from prison 139 middle school Red Guards affiliated with the United Action Commit- tee, which is comprised mainly of sons and daughters of high cadres," as reported by Tokyo SANKEI Bureau Chief Shibata. Some posters attack and others laud the release of the UAC Red Guards. (3) May Day brings an unprecedented turnout of the top leaders (Mao's first MD appearance since 1962), including several who have been subjected to repeated poster attacks in recent months, such as the 81-year-old mili- tary veteran Chu Teh, standing in 4th position, after Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai. None of those closely identified with Liu are seen, however, nor any regional chiefs other than Li Hsueh-feng of the North China Party Bureau and Chang Kuo--hua of Tibet. The large turnout was undoubtedly intended to convey an impression of unity, but, as Tillman Durdin reports to the NYTIMES from Hong Kong, "it did not, on balance, represent the accretion of much real strength for the Maoists." (1k) Red Guard media report the ousting of two important anti-Maoist pro- vincial chiefs shortly after May Day: Ulanfu, top Party, government, and military chief of Inner Mongolia reportedly relieved by a relatively unknown Liu Hsiang--chuan: Ulanfu is accused of wanting to turn Inner Mongolia into an independent kingdom. THE EAST IS RED, student newspaper of the Peking Geological Institute, on May 9 reports a May 7 CC decision to oust Li Ching-chuan, CC Politburo member, Southwest China Party Bureau Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (WCA Chrono Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 chief, and political commissar of the Chengtu Military Region, and appoint a preparatory committee to set up a Szechwan Provincial Revolutionary Committee. It contains detailed` charges of the use of PLA troops in "large-. scale bloody repression of the revolutionary masses" in that province which has 100 million people and vast grain producing areas(. Thus far, the regime's formal media have made no mention of these reported ousters --- while wall posters and other sources increasingly depict bloody clashes in Szechwan,Heilungkiang, and elsewhere. (5) The most systematic attack of Liu's book (HOW TO BE A GOOD C0124 MIST, or ON SELF-CULTIVATION) to date comes in a joint RED FLAG/PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on May 7. Among other charges, it claims that Liu in his 1962 edition "deleted Stalin's name and,all the passages he originally quoted..., and that "nowhere does it so much as mention Mao Tse-tung's thought." (A review of the 1962 edition shows that it does retain some passages attri- buted to Stalin and actually adds numerous Mao quotes not in the earlier versions.) (6) The CCP on May 16 releases the text of a hitherto secret CC circular dated 16 May 1966: "this great historic document, drawn up under Chairman Mao's guidance, smashed the scheme of the Peng Chen counter-revolutionary revisionist clique for a capitalist restoration. For the first time it systematically presented the theory, line, principles, and policy of the GPCR...." All papers front-page it on the 17th, and a joint RED FLAG/ PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 18th emphasizes its "tremendous significance." The latter concludes: "The present GPCR is only the first, and in the future there are bound to be many others." (7) PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on May 21 warns: `'Lately an, evil wind of struggling by force is seen in some places and units and among some mass organizations... We must firmly curb this evil wind...." Toronto GLOBE AND MAIL correspondent Oancia on the 22nd describes security measures in Peking verging on martial law, with troops carrying fixed bayonets on their rifles patrolling the streets "in addition to the usual guards on duty.' B. Names in the news: In addition to those mentioned above, the following prominent CCP names warrant special note: (1) Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) is boosted in prestige as all papers on May 10 front-page the text of a militant speech she allegedly made almost 3 years ago, at the July 196+ Festival of the Peking Opera. (Observers point out that her name was not even mentioned in any of the reporting associated with the Festival in 1964.) (2) Chen Yi continues to be attacked by Red Guard posters and a Guard detachment broke into the Foreign Ministry building on May 13, apparently attempting to ransack the files for material to be used against him. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A04 000*d2 ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 However, he is reported still performing at least his ceremonial duties as Foreign Minister receiving the Cambodian Foreign Ministry's secygen as late as May 16. C. Miscellaneous: The Chinese on May 6 expel PRAVDA correspondent Pasen- chuk: NCNA says that P, who has always assumed a hostile attitude toward China, went so far as to attack by name, open and virulently, Chairman Mao ... and to smear China's GPCR in his dispatch of 14 April." April 25 and continuing: Bolivian Army patrols operating against Communist guerrillas (who had ambushed them on March 23 and April 10) capture 3 foreigners and identify one as Jules Regis Debra, a militant French Commu- nist friend and writers-collaborator of Cuban Premier Castro, author of a 1965 article, "'Castroism, the Long March of Latin America," and a 1967 Havana-published book, REVOLUTION WITHIN A REVOLUTION. Confirming the capture of Debray and his companions in a May 4 interview with WASHINGTON POST's Goshko., armed forces commander Ovando adds that many guerrillas in Bolivia "were trained in special guerrilla schools in Cuba and that others received training in similar schools in Russia." Be concludes that "the situation is grave because they are backed and financed by international sources bent on the overthrow of the Bolivian Government." April 25 and continuing: Chinese-Indonesian political strife continues, while the Indonesian Govt attempts to dissuade and prevent its people from actions against Chinese residents in I. Highlights include: -- While Djakarta Radio on the 25th accuses the Chinese of "tampering with the facts about events in Indonesia involving Communist Chinese elements," ANTARA on the 26th admits that I. youths in Medan on the 24th stormed and ransacked a number of Chinese houses, adding that security troops rushed to the scene - arrested the suspected instigators and pro- mised "stern measures'` against culprits. ANTARA adds, though, that a group of Chinese awaiting repatriation had marched demonstratively to the Chinese Consulate, chanting and yelling in Chineselapparently provoking the I youths. - NCNA May 13 charges that "the Yugoslav Tito renegade group is stepping up its collusion with the I. fascist regime," citing "'secret meetings held from 8 to 11 May between Y. Deputy Foreign Minister Pavicevic and Suharto, Adam Malik, and other butchers of the I. people." _M, A May 18 Chinese Embassy note to the I. Foreign Ministry protests new "bloody atrocities" against Chinese nationals in Malang, East Java, on May 12 and 13. April 26 and continuing: Media of the participants generally extol the results of the April 24+-26 Karlovy Vary conference of European CPs (see #13), led by the Soviets, who expand on its "international significance'' and declare that its decisions "will become an increasingly important factor not only in the struggle for security in Europe but also for improving the Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :3CIA-RDP78-03061AO(IM00 .80de2t. ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 international atmosphere in the whole world." (PRAVDA, May 17). On a more restrained note, however, Italian CP SecyGen Longo in a televised Rome press conference May 12 sees the new significance" of KV in its recogni- tion of the autonomy and independence of each party. (See major Rumanian statement May 7.) The Chinese and Albanians, of course, scathingly denounce it. PEOPLE'S DAILY May 4 calls it symbolic of the utter bankruptcy of Europe's new scabs": "The meeting was convened by the Soviet revisionists to engineer further actions against China. At the meeting Brezhnev led the attack. Outside the meeting the gang undertook intense anti-China activities.... On the question of European 'peace and security,' the KV meeting fell back on a lot of hackneyed phrases, some picked up from the old revi- sionists, some from Khrushchev, some from Tito, and some from the imperialists. This lengthy 7,000-word statement is crammed with deceitful phrases.... What Brezhnev, Kosygin, and company call "security in Europe"' means security for the privileged bourgeois stratum in the countries where the revisionist groups are in power.... The KV meeting was a meeting in the service of U.S. imperialism...." April 27: Immediately after Karlovy Vary, the British CP releases a major policy statement on "Questions of Ideology" which differs widely from Soviet policy in advocating complete freedom of religion, artistic expres- sion, and "the free confrontation of different scientific theories and, when necessary, prolonged debate." It also recognizes the.need for a diversity of democratic parties, "including these which do not accept, or oppose, the advance of socialism." In Paris, a state security court convicts two couples of s in on NATO for E. GermanX and sentences them to terms ranging from 12 to 20 years. April 27 and continuing: Chinese media attack the Soviet revisionists heavily and repeatedly throughout the period: the ch} arge of Soviet collu- sion with U.S. imperialism against China is now commonly included even in articles on other subjects, and even in tirades directed primarily against other countries -- the USA, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The "new sy stem" ' in Soviet economic management (production geared to profitability and in Soviet agriculture also comes under exceptionally heavy attack, interpreted as further evidence of Soviet revisionist degen- eration toward the restoration of capitalism. Noteworthy items include: ?- PEOPLE'S DAILY Observer April 30, "Soviet Revisionist Ruling Class Are Rank Traitors to the Vietnamese Revolution," responding to Brezhnev's public complaint at the East German Party Congress April 18 of Chinese Chinese refusal to take "united action" to help Vietnam, lists ten examples of how, over the last two years, the Soviets have "worked hand in glove with U.S. imperialism in a series of conspiratorial activities, unscrupulously Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CAA-RDP78-03061A0Q040Oi66O0'C4t? ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 resorting to the 'peace talks' hoax and alternating this with war black- mail. " ?_- A Chinese Defense Ministry May 2 accusation that 4 U.S. fighter planes had intruded into Chinese airspace includes the charge that the U.S. imperialists are expanding their aggressive war in Vietnam `'with the coordi- nation and instigation of the Sovi'pt revisionist leading clique." PEOPLE'S DAILY takes up the theme on May 3 ,'.following which 500 Chinese demonstrate at the Soviet Embassy, pasting up slogans accusing the Soviets of conspir- ing with the U.S. to bomb China. (Reuters, from "Soviet sources.") -- PEOPLE'S DAILY May 5 devotes half a page to extracts from Soviet pub- lications "revealing the extent to which capitalism is being restored in accelerated tempo in the Soviet countryside." Same issue of PD has a short commentary, "Renegades Peddle Opium," based on Soviet publication of Bible stories for children, concluding that "you should also include that one about Judas Iscariot, It would be a great help to the Soviet people in recognizing your dirty features as a handful of renegades if you acquaint the Soviet readers with the story of that traitor who betrayed Jesus Christ for 30 pieces of silver." ..?.W NCNA May 6 reports that the Soviets have banned the distribution of PEKING REVIEW in the USSR, saying: "Always timid as mice, the Soviet rev. ruling clique stands in mortal fear of the dissemination in the S.U. of Mao Tse-tung's thought, M.-L at its highest level in our era...." PEOPLE'S DAILY same day brands Soviet implied accusations of Chinese-West German collusion as "lies fabricated in league with U.S. imperialism to slander China." PEOPLE'S DAILY article May 7 exploits a statement by Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev to TRUD, in which he :"smugly declared: 'I would like to make it perfectly clear that neither in the Asian countries, in the countries in the.Near East, nor in any other country have we been running at a loss in selling commodities."' "That is to say Soviet revisionist foreign trade must never 'run at a loss,' which means putting financial interests first. Thisone sentence really speaks volumes. But where has it the least flavor of socialism! Where is the difference between it and the foreign trade of imperialism, capitalism! ... The Soviet revisionist leading clique frequently boasts of its 'aid' through foreign trade to the EE countries and countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Patolichev's statement has now poked another hole in the disguise covering such 'aid.' In the Soviet revi- sionists' foreign trade activities, 'aid' is a lie while the earning of profits is true,;, 'mutual benefits' and 'support' is a lie while exploitation and profits is true.... Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : cIA-RDP78-03061A0 OQQ 0j t. ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Most severely exploited by the Soviet revisionists' unequal value exchange are the 'fraternal' countries and a number of other countries in Asia and Africa... markets for industrial goods and sources of agricultural products and consumer commodities.... Of course, the Soviet revs' foreign trade does not exist merely for the sake of profits.: it is the Soviet rev. clique's tool for pushing their policies of rev. and great--power chauvinism, and it servestheir general line of 'Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world domination.'..." NCNA May 17 says that the mass demonstrations in Peking over the situa- tion in Tong Kong (see below) included "big character posters and cartoons deriding U.S. imperialism, British imperialism, and Soviet revisionism as paper tigers."' - A thousand demonstrators outside the Soviet Embassy in Peking on May 20 carry oversize caricatures depicting Liu Shao-chi and Khrushchev as great friends. -.,. "Routine" collusion charges include: collusion with the Pope (A 27); collusion with the U.S. in betrayal of the Arabs over Palestine (M 15); with the U.S. in European troop redeployment; with the U.S. in a proposed "international anti-ballistic missile defense" (M 10, 17); with India and Indonesia in SE Asian defense (M i6); etc. A r l 29: All Moscow papers feature a communique on an April 28 Moscow meeting of a Greek CP delegation headed by First Secy Koliyiannis with Suslov and Pelshe, at which both "condemned the splitting activities" of the Chinese and "stressed the necessity of convening an international con- ference" of CPs. April-29-.and continuing: Soviet media continue to give considerable atten- tion to events in China, mostly through critical reporting of chaos and strife resulting from the "political bacchanalia taking place there ... by the Mao Tse-tung group in its unprincipled struggle for power." (Quote from Radio Moscow April 29.) They cite other sources when possible: e.g., PRAVDA on A 29 publishes a Jordanian CP statement condemning "the crimes of the Mao Tse-tung group and his pernicious 'thought' "which have brought ``complete anarchy'" to China, "unleashed a case campaign of hatred against the CPSU, the Soviet people, and the USSR Govt," etc. April 30: Albanian papers publish an Albanian Party--Govt statement "On the Further Development and Intensification of the Revolutionary Movement and the Working Masses' Creative Initiatives." Emphasizing the need to '?revolutionize the life of our country," it decrees 4 ""revolutionary ini- tiatives": Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A0O4CO1 690ftj2 ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 "I. On the Reduction in Size of Cooperative Members' Plots in the Agri- cultural Cooperatives and the Abolition of Personal Plots on State Farms. II. On Intensifying Direct Cadre Participation in Productive work and on the Reduction of High Wages, without Affecting Low and Medium Wages. III. On the Abolition or Limitation of Several Incentives and on the Priority of Moral Incentives over Material Incentives. IV. Some Palliative Measures for Agricultural Cooperatives and on an Eventual Drop in the Price of Consumer Goods for all the People." May l: May Day is celebrated by Communist govts and parties (and also by some non-Communists) around the world. The celebration in Moscow is rela- tively low--key, with the French Chief of General Staff, Gen. Ailleret, as the first Western military guest on the Lenin Mausoleum since Gen. Eisen- hower in 1945: the Chinese diplomats again walk out when Marshal Grechko implies that they are hindering united action in Vietnam. In contrast, the militant celebration in Havana is keyed to the guerrilla struggle in Latin America, extols Che Guevara as a leader in this struggle, broadcasts recordings of his last major speech, and displays signs with his words: We must create two, three, and four Vietnams in LA." May 1 & 8: At his regular press conferences, Thai Premier Kittikhachon describes stepped-up Communist terrorist activities in the northeast. May 1 & 17: In West Germany Chancellor Kiesinger's May Day speech in West Berlin, he challenges East Germany to test his proposals for easing rela- tions between the peoples of the East and West (see #13, April 17-22). On the 17th West German spokesman Ahlers announces that Bonn is ending its policy of returning E. German communications unopened and has formed a special committee to deal with answers to three recent letters: one from E.G. Premier Stoph to Kiesinger announced on May 11; and one each from the E.G. Ministers of Transport and post to their W.G. counterparts. May 3: The Colombian Govt announces the capture of a courier involved in smuggling counterfeit passports to Cuba. May 4: Cuban CP daily GRANMA publishes a full-page summary of Uruguayan CP SecyGen Arismendi's Lenin Day speech in Montevideo, a version which acknowledges but tones down A's stress on the continuing possibility of bloodless revolution. Observers see the act as intended to repair Castro's strained relations with the Soviet-line CPs in LA on the eve of the con- ference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) scheduled to open in Havana July 28. May 6, 7: Radio Moscow announces that the Chinese have decided to expel PRAVDA correspondent Pasenchuk, the fourth Soviet journalist since the CR began last summer. PRAVDA's editorial next day is on the theme expressed by its heading, '`Fear of Truth.'' (A play on words: " pravda" means "truth.") Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-03061A6~uc~OOh~b ~(~' Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 NTa 6 and continuing: tong Kong is thrown into a major crisis potentially threatening British control. The: disturbances begin with a clash between police and Maoist-led sympathizers with workers at an artificial flower factory and are rapidly expanded into violent riots and orderly demonstra- tions. Peking first reacts on the 15th with a strong Foreign Ministry ' protest to the British Embassy denouncing large-scale "bloody atrocities which "are the result of long premeditation and are a component part of the British Govt's scheme of collusion with U.S. imperialism against China" because the British authorities "mortally fear and bitterly hate China's GPCR. `' The Chinese Govt demands in all seriousness that the British Govt instruct the British authorities in Hong Kong as follows: Immediately accept all the just demands put forward by the Chinese workers and residents of Hong Kong; Immediately stop all fascist measures; Immediately set free all the arrested persons...; Punish the culprits responsible for these sanguinary atrocities, offer apologies to the victims, and compenstate for their losses; Guarantee against the occurrence of similar incidents." Anti-British demonstrations in Peking build up to a rally of 100,000 on the 18th attended by Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, Chen Yi, and Kuo Mo-jo. In Shanghai, demonstrators break into the residence of the British Consul on the 16th and destroy the furnishings. The British ignore Peking's threats, and the Hong Kong police (largely Chinese) seem to be controlling the situa- tion as the period ends, in the face of loudspeaker appeals to them to turn against the British. M7, Rumanian CP daily SCINTEIA features a major theoretical article by SecyGen Ceausescu, "The Leading Role of the Party in the Stage of the Completion of Building Socialism," which, in its long international section, expands on the RCP's independence views (with apparent reference to recent Soviet pressures): Each CP has the legitimate right to participate in an interna- tional meeting if it considers it necessary and useful, just as it has the legitimate right not to participate. Internationalist solidarity is not a conference.... CPs who uphold that non participation in a conference must not affect, in any way whatsoever, comradely relations between parties... are perfectly correct. Such an approach ... contributes to eliminating old practices of linking inter--party relations to the acceptance or non-acceptance of a point of view and of exerting pressure in one form or another, all of which result in sharpening divergencies in the Communist movement. 8 (WCA Chrono Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 ...he normal development of the communist movement and the assertion of each CP as a vanguard political force of the working class and its people are incompatible with the existence of an international coordi- nating center, with the practice of setting compulsory norms of conduct for CPs.... ... It is inadmissible under any form for a party member to establish or maintain, over the head of the leadership, relations with other parties, to supply information, and to participate in actions against the political line of his party.... ... Relations must unfold in an organizational framework, from party to party. An attempt Uy a_party to establish relations with members or groups within another party outside the organized frameowrk means an encroachment upon the principle of proletarian internationalism, an action splitting the unity of that party.... ... It is the essential duty of each party not to undertake anything which might aggravate the divergencies in the Communist and workers movement, which might further deepen the abyss of division.... Indian Chi weekly NEW AGE publishes a resolution of its National Council with proposals aimed toward developing a 'democratic"coalition capable of winning power from the ruling Congress Party at the central government level. In an April resolution, the CP had called for steps toward collabor- ation with the Chinese-oriented CPI (L). Moscowblesses and Peking denounces these moves. The USSR increases to $112 million its long--term loan for reconstruc- tion of the Cuban sugar industry. L47 8: Most authoritative of the continuing Soviet attacks on Chinese treatment of national minorities comes in a K0I49UNIST article signed by ursun Rakhimov (Turkic origin) denouncing "the chauvinist, nationalist policy of the present CPR leaders" with their "attempts at forced assimi- lation of minority groups." Next day the leading independent Vienna news- paper KURIER supports the Soviet line in an interview by its chief editor Hugo Portisch with "Former Cultural Affairs Minister of Sinkiang Zia Samedi," conducted "in a small cafe in the hills at the foot of the Altaj Mountain range" (Soviet Turkestan). Subject describes Chinese forced assi-ilation, "Sinozation," forced marriages, starvation, genocide. He says that since he entered the S.U. he has published two novels and is working on a third-, all about the various Uighur uprisings aaainst the Chinese during the past century. "Question: The content of your novels reveals that there have been continuous clashes between Uighurs and Chinese. Would you inter- pret this to mean that Sinkiang is striving for independence?' Samedi did not reply directly. Instead he said: 'I am not authorize, t_o say anything about this,; But he added: 'This is an affair of the Uighurs in Sinkiang....I", 9 (WCA Chrono Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 May 7: NCIA May 7 reports from Paris that the "revisionist group in the French CP on 5 May sent hooligans to make trouble and sabotage a mass meeting called to express solidarity with the Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. aggression" which was "organized by the Paris regional committee of the French Communist Movement M--L." "... Using clubs and iron bars, they assaulted the defenseless French revolutionaries ... Regis Bergeron, chief editor of L'HUMANITE NOUVELLE, was attacked and injured...., A dozen others were seriously injured and hospitalized. The hooligans attacked wildly. They tore up por- traits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Chairman Mao Tse.-tung, as well as a portrait of President Ho Chi Minh...." May 8: Japanese CP daily AKAHATA complains that since the split 12th World Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs last summer the 15 million yen which the Chinese had been sending to Gensuikyo for relief of atomic victims has been going instead to "those who bolted from the Japan-China Friendship Association." These "splitters" are now using the Chinese funds in "des-- "r+ perate efforts to split the anti--nuclear movement and the atom-bomb victims movement in Vietnam." Radio Tirana in Polish describes "a brochure entitled 'The CF of Poland (KPPrFights and Calls to Fight,'"" which was "recently published in Poland." "The establishment of the KPP enables all true revolutionaries to detach themselves ... from the Gomulkaites, from the traitors of socialism.... All true revolutionaries should join the struggle in the ranks of the NPP.... The political struggle against the traitors of socialism must be merciless.... Dominican Republic President Balaguer announces the capture of an agent of Cuban intelligence, with a clandestine radio and other espionage paraphernalia. May 10, 13: Brezhnev visits Sofia to sign a new 20-year treaty of friend- ship, cooperation and mutual assistance. The treaty includes much the same provisions as the treaty which it succeeds, though it is milder in its references to the German menace. May 12: PEOPLE'S DAILY articles claim support in an article signed by a CC member of the "CP of Brazil" and by "the broad masses of the Soviet people." while NCNA describes a letter of "firm support and warm acclama- tion" from "the CC of the Revolutionary CP of Chile." And in its turn, PD on the 2nd anniversary of Mao's 'statement supporting the Dominican people's resistance to U.S. armed aggression" incites revolution: The Dominican and other Latin American people have come to realize that they have no alternative but to wage armed struggle.... Only by taking up the rifle will they be able to wipe out U.S. imperialism and its lackeys...." Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : L?IA-RDP78-03061Ad6 6 b6f-'d Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061AO00400060001-2 May 12 & 17: Radios Moscow and "Peace and Progress" cautiously express concern at the rightist drift in Indonesia. "Official circles in Djakarta usually affirm that the anti- Communism carried out in I. has nothing to do with anti-Sovietism. This explanation can be taken with a grain of salt.... The belligerent anti-Communism being pursued undermines normal relations of I. with its old and reliable friends, the socialist nations...." May 12, 17, 18: Venezuela announces May 12 that she has captured two Cuban Army officers and killed two in a landing attempt on the 8th. On the 17th, the Venezuelan CP publishes paid newspaper advertisements denouncing the "insurrectional line" being followed by Cuban-backed guerrillas, while simultaneously the Central University is plastered with leaflets signed by the pro-Cuban Revolutionary Leftist Movement denouncing the Govt's charges against Cuba as a "farce" to justify repression. Next day, however, a Cuban CP statement boastfully acknowledges that 3 Cubans whom it names were in fact involved in the attempt: "We are lending and will continue to lend aid to all those who fight against imperialism in any part of the world.'' May 13: Radio Tirana broadcasts to Poland an "excerpt from 'The Polish October -- A Betrayal of Socialism,' a pamphlet distributed throughout Poland by the Polish CP." Japanese CP daily AKAHATA announces the expulsion of another two prominent members who, while holding high positions in the Japan Interna- tional Trade Promotion Council, "became agents of -Li certain foreign country' clearly indicated to be ComChina. May 13-16: The Swedish CP holds its 21st Congress in Stockholm -- and decides to change its name to "Left Party -- Communists" as part of its effort to disassociate itself from the old Communist image and identi itself with the Oocialist left, according to its statement issued on the 15th. It reelects Chairman Hermansson and indicates it will continue to follow his "liberal" ways. May 16 & 18: IZVESTIYA comment by V. Kudryavtsev on W. German Foreign Minister Brandt's visit to Japan recalls "the old wind of pre-war years" and concludes: "as the Miki Brandt consultations showed, Tokyo and Bonn are not against returning to their old game now...." On the 18th, at a press conference of the Japanese Foreign Office, Public Information Director Kinya Niiseki states that IZVESTIYA had regrettably distorted the facts. May 17: 2,000 pro--Chinese Communist students storm the Central University of Ecuador in Quito in an unsuccessful effort to take control, the second failure in 3 days of rioting. (Reuters) May 18: Manila announces that l soldiers and 3 Huk guerrillas were killed in a battle in Bataan province. (NYTIMES) Approved For Release 2000/08/27: C1A-RDP78-03061AOo 4Abi M 1? ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061AO00400060001-2 May 18--21: An Ulbricht-led E. German Party/State delegation goes to Budapest and signs . a new 20-year treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance which contains no notable departures from the old or from the series concluded with other EE states in recent months. Maur 19 & 21: Moscow announces on tho 19th that Yuri Andropov, CPSU/CC Secretary in charge of relations with foreign ruling parties, formerly a Komsomol (Youth League) official and Soviet Ambassador to Budapest during the 1956 uprising, will take over the Committee of State Security (KGB), relieving Vladimir Semichastny, former Komsomol chief. On the 21st, it announces that S. will be a Deputy Premier of the Ukrainian "Union Republic." Journalists speculate that Semichastny's ouster is the direct result of a nimber of obvious failures in recent months, especially the repeated exposure of Soviet espionage activities and personnel in all parts of the world (as chronicled in our regular installments). May 21: The June issue of the Boston-published ATLANTIC MONTHLY contains an es_ a, which Svetlana Alliluyeva (Stalina) wrote in Switzerland after she had read Pasternak's DOCTOR ZHIVAGO and which "contains her reflections on the spirit of the Russian people and particularly the yearnings of Russian writers under the restrictions of the present Soviet regime." A long, Ignatyev-signed PRAVDA article on Latin America promises Soviet backing for LA "patriots" in their struggle against "U.S. imperialism and local reaction" and approving implicitly of kruerrilla struggle as well as constitutional opposition. May 22: Ulan Bator Radio announces a Mongolian Foreign Ministry protest over a "new provocation organized by the Chinese Embassy on 21 May" at the railway station, where Chinese teachers from their school in U.B. rioted violently, shouted "provocative slogans and threats and curses addressed at our country" and physically assaulted Mongolian militiamen. The offenders are expelled. May 22 and continuing: The long-delayed fourth congress of the Soviet Union of Writers convenes in Moscow on the 22nd. Before Brezhnev and most of the Politburo, the Party Secretary charged with ideological matters, P. Demichev, delivers a message from the leadership calling on the writers to continue as "fighters for Party spirit and allegiance to the people, for the unshakeable ideological principles of Soviet literature." Soviet writers should intensify their "offensive against bourgeois ideology," strike hard against "vulgarizers of Marxism," and "help those misled by hostile propaganda to find the right track." Editor Tvardovsky of the most liberal Soviet library journal NOVY I`MIR is elected to the Congress Presidium, as well as Editor Kochetov of the most conservative OKTYABR. Pasternak's name is included when Congress Chairman Fedin asks for a moment of silence in memory of about 20 Soviet writers who have died since the last congress in 1959. Earlier, the most prominent writers of the French left, Louis Aragon and Jean-Paul Sartre, announced they rejected invitations to the Congress in protest over the Union's stand with the Government in its harsh treat- ment of Sinyavsky and Daniel last year. Approved For Release 2000/08/27: 0194-RDP78-03061A00040006b fifono. ) Approved For Release 2000/08/ -03061A000400060OZ file 1967 HANOI'S AIMS REVEALED, IN DOCUMENT 25X1C10b (Editor's Note: Three days after Hitler became Chancellor, he gave a lecture to top German military leaders, telling them that his over-riding aim was to restore German power, particu- larly military power: pacifism and socialism should be "rooted put"; the people should be so indoctrinated that there could not be another collapse of morale on the home front; and the army should be strengthened by every possible means. He stated his view that the only solution to German economic problems was to conquer territory in the East and "ruthlessly to Germanize" it, and he clearly implied that Germany would go to war unless the French took action before German rearmament was completed. One of the generals present took extensive notes on this meet- ing, but they were not available to the public for 20 years. Had they been known and publicized at the time, it seems possible that subsequent history might have been somewhat different. The record of General Nguyen Van Vinh's lecture, now avail- able to us one year after the lecture took place, appears to be just as valuable a document. It needs to be made more widely known.) SITUATION: On 28 January 1967, elements of the US 101st Airborne Division operating in Ninh Thuan province seized the notebook of a People's Revolutionary Party cadre member who had attended the 4th COSVN (Central Office, South Vietnam) Congress in April 1966*. This notebook contained *The PRP is the Southern arm of the Lao Dong (North Vietnamese Workers'-- read Communist--Party) which nominally split off from the Lao Dong in 1961, evidently for purposes of concealment. The COSVN is the PRP's Central Committee and functions as headquarters for military operations and for the National Liberation Front, which includes non-PRP elements but is controlled at each level by the PRP. The'location of COSVN is believed to be Tay Ninh province, on the Cambodian border northwest of Saigon. (For details, see unclassified USIA report R-13-67, 20 April 1967: "The Viet Cong: The Front Technique.") Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (1130 Cont.) Approved For release 2 IA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 a record of two speeches made at the Co ress, one an emotional diatribe by a leader believed to be General Nguyen Chi Thanh, the Commander of NLF i'orces in the South., the other a discussion of-North Vietnamese-Viet Cong policy by General Nguyen Van Vinh, who is Chairman of both the R~?eunifica- "tion De mr went, of the Lao Dung Central Committee and the Reunification Commission. of the North Vietnamese sovernmentu w^he latter document merits The i speech to the press in E red Washing- ton and has ton by any qu(_rstion been distributed -widely USIA., If there is any about the authenticity of the document, due to its being circulated-by the U.S., this should be dispelled by the unflattering rema'ks it, contains about the United States. So far as we know, Hanoi has 7iade no attempt to deny the authenticity of the document. And most important, there is_ in existence another less complete, bu, confirmatory account of Vinh's remarks. In his speech, Vinh began by discussing the resolutions of the 9th, 11th and l?th plenums of the Lao Dong Central Committee (referred to in the translation?as "Resolution #9ft ,"Resolution #11", and "Resolution #12"), which took,place, in the summer-fall of 1964, the summer-fall of J965,, and January February 1966; from this springboard, he then -proceeded to outline the military situation,' the North V:etnamese strategy f,?r negotiations, the state of North Vietnamese defenses, and the support and policies of other Communist governments. When reading the speech, it isimportant to remember that Vinh was somewhat in the position of having to jus,ify Lao Dong-?NLF policy, which had failed to anticipate the large-scale intervention of the United States; also, while Vinh was quite frank about some problems and shortcomings, especially those which his listeners could be expected,tQ remedy, he had no intention of allowing any doubts to arise on the possibil- ity of ultimate success, the situation in the North Vietnamese support area, or the backing being received from other "socialist" countries. The speech contains many interesting points, but the most important is perhaps the long description of Hanoi's plans for continuing to fight while negotia- ting-- a plain indication that a truce would riot in prt.ctice be honored by Hanoi and the NLF. In this, the document completely knocks the props from under 'criticisms of U.S. policy as being -too firm in demanding a halt to infiltration from the North prior to negotiations and in refusing A guide to'important points in the Vinh lecture is given in an_un- classified attachment. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 2 (1130 Cont.} Approved For Release 2000/08/ -03061 A000400060001-2 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (1130) Approved For Release 2000/08/ ^ 03061A00640006OOO1-2967 EAST GERMANY CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR THIRD WORLD RECOGNITION 25X1C10b SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED): While East Germany has brought pressure to bear on the other East European Satellite countries not to follow Rumania's move in recognizing the West German Government, it has also been beseeching the uncommitted governments of the Middle East and North Africa to recognize its own regime. In the latter instance, there have been no immediate signs of success thus far. Foreign Minister Otto Winzer recently returned to East Berlin from a trip to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, and Iraq without having made any concrete gains in East Germany's long-standing quest for diplomatic recognition. The trip was obviously timed to take advantage of what East Germany hoped was Arab disenchantment with the Bonn Government:, Arab League Secretary General Hassunah had recently gone to West Germany in an apparently unsuccessful bid to get more aid for the Arabs and to prevent any increase of'German assistance for Israel. Before leaving on his trip, Winter denounced Bonn's policies toward the Israelis and the Arabs and stressed East Germany's common interests with the latter. But while. on the trip, during which he offered economic aid in exchange for diplomatic recognition, it soon became apparent that recogni- tion will not come until some time in the future -- if at all. See the at- tached interview which Winzer gave the East Berlin radio correspondent in which he speaks of his discussions only in terms of results which "will bear fruit in the future." Arab propagandists reported Winzer's trip with varying degrees of accu- racy: some papers reported that Egypt would grant diplomatic recognition to East Germany within two months while others stated Lebanon was not even con- sidering recognition. In actual. fact, Winzer returned emptynanded. The Arab League is scheduled to consider the entire German question when it meets in September, but it seems unlikely that even Egypt and Syria, the two coun- tries most favorably disposed toward the Communist regime in East Germany, will press full diplomatic recognition of it. Meanwhile, it can be expected that East Germany will continue its quest for recognition not only in the Arab World but also in other nations of the "developing" areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America -- as outlined in the (attached) article from the FOREIGN AFFAIRS BULLETIN published 25 January 1967 by the Press Department of the East German Foreign Affairs Ministry: "scien- tific and industrial" feet in the door aiming toward "long-term relations." (END UNCLASSIFIED) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (1131 Cont.) Approved For Release A-RDP78-03061 A000400060001-2 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 2 (1.131 Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/ -03061A000400060001-2 PROPAGANDA NOTE #154+ (E), 19 May 1967, "Ernst Wollweber: The Career of ,An Outstanding Communist Sabotage and Espionage Chief" (unclassified attachment useful wherever East Germany attempts to gain diplomatic recognition or infiltration via trade and aid as a glaring example of the long history of its role in international subversion) BIWEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE Item #1101, 27 February 1967, "East Germany Maintains 'Die-Hard' Opposition to European Mainstream" BIWEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE Item #1020, 9 May 1966, "East Germany: Soviet Spearhead in Central Europe" (Copies of all available from Headquarters upon request) THE REPORTER Magazine, 20 April 1967 (a report from Leipzig which says East German efforts to'persuade the world of great economic achievements are' contradicted by facts)' Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA3RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (1131.) Approved For Release 2000/08 -03061A00040QQ 011927 1132-c. COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION OF BAPTISTS 25X1C10b "Churches must be free from the interference of the states, and all churches should, as far as their principles permit, abide by the laws of the state." (From the statement issued by the 1955 London Conference of the Baptist World Alliance) "Baptists are one of the most widely spread Christian sects... In their overwtelming majority they were hostile toward the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Soviet State. [Nevertheless] the Soviet Government, which sepa=rated State and Church, granted the Baptists freedom to practice their cult." (From the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 2nd Edition) `-SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED) How do the Baptists in the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries fare under Communist domination? There is grow- ing evidence, even in the Soviet press, that some of them are carrying on militant activities "underground" and that the encouragement they receive from publications abroad is having a telling effect on the Communist regimes' atheistic campaigns. Last summer there was an unusual number of items in Soviet media reporting on the Moscow Government's efforts to quash the activities of Baptists who live in the USSR and of those who visit there and bring religious literature with them from the Free World. Two examples of this follow. The 16 July KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA published an article about the domestic activities of the Baptists under the head- line "Thieves with a Prayerbook -- Spiritual 'Pastors' as They Are." It said in part: "Baptist pastors daily rob children of their youth, poisoning their immature minds and hearts with religious narcotics. For the crimes they have committed, the presbyter of the Evangelical-Christian sect, V. Golub, and the preachers N. Butkov and A. Balatski have been brought before the People's Court of the Kamennobrodeki region of Lugansk. These are not grey-bearded old men but quite young: Golub, the oldest, is only 36...These beguilers of souls decided to organize a school of their own to teach religious music. Here, under the pre- text of learning to play stringed instruments, the children were taught psalms... The 'prophets' got what they deserved -- not for their faith but for the evil they had committed." Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (1132 Cont.) Approved For Releas - _261100. 1110' A-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 " Ten days earlier, in another typical report aimed at denigrating Baptists, TASS distributed for its worldwide outlets this report about tourists "smuggling religious books" being expelled from the USSR: "Three British motor tourists and a Dutch subject have been expelled from the USSR for attempting to smuggle in Baptist religious literature, TRUD reports today. Anthony Richard iippisZey and his wife Anne Marie tried to smuggle through the border checkpoint in Brest 400 religious books donated by the British Z'oreign Biblical Society for illegal circulation in the USSR. These books were con- cealed in eight secret compartments in their specially equipped VoZks- wagon. Driving an Opel Rekord, two Baptist priests -- Murrey John, a British subject, and Fisser Johannes, a Dutch subject -- tried to smuggle 300 similar books into the USSR across the ryausheny check- point in Soviet Moldavia, TRUD, the newspaper of Soviet trade unions, writes that the religious literature and the cars with secret compart- ments have been confiscated and the smugglers expelled from the USSR." (See the attached unclassified selection of clippings from Free World papers on other cases in 1966, as well as the translations of the 5 June and 30 August articles in IZVESTIYA attacking the Baptists.) The 29 March 1967 issue of the Swiss Radical Democratic NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG gives the background of the Baptist controversy in the Soviet Union. The officially recognized Baptist leadership is the A1.1--Union Council of Evangelical-Christian Baptists; as=ide from the Russian Ortho- dox Church, this is the only church organization. permitted to function legally on a USSR-wide basis.* Like the official Orthodox hierarchy, this All-Union Council is controlled by the Soviet regime. In 2_960, the All-Union Council (no doubt at the insistence of the regime) decreed new statutes which were designed to discourage missionary activities and the introduction of children into service. Obviously, the aim of these statutes was to let the Baptist church gradually wither away for lack a new members. Many church members became aroused not only at the content of the statutes, but also at the undemocratic way in which they were im- posed from outside. The result was a counter-movement, launched by A. F. Prokofiev and G. K. Lriutchkov in 1961; the movement calls itself the "I:nitsiativniki" ("Initiators"). The Soviet regime has responded *The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists was formed in 1944 and today claims a membership of around 500,000 believers. In 1927, following the initial increase in many religious sects in the decade after the Revolution, there were 500,000 members of the Baptist Union and 4,000,000 members of the Union of Evangelical Christians. The two groups steadily declined under pressures brought about by the Soviet regime and today their combined membership totals only that of the 1.927 Baptist segment. (Not treated in this Guidance, but nevertheless a problem of similar magnitude, is the fate suffered by Baptists in other Communist countries, including 90,000 in Rumania, 35,000 in Hungary, 9,000 in Bulgaria, and lesser numbers in East Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Cuba --- the latter having arrested in recent years several Baptist mi:zisters on espionage charges.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 2 (11:32 Cont.) " Approved For Release 2000/08727=1@ W141910 - 3061 A000400060001-2 with, among other things, two decrees (of 18 March and 22 September 1966) which place new restrictions on worship and the religious instruction of children, and forbid religious demonstrations of any kind. The two news stories quoted above are reflections of the Soviet policy of trying to make religion die out. (Further information on the history of confrontation between the Baptists and the Communists is contained in the attached article, "Russian Baptists Quote Lenin in Plea for Religious Tolerance," an unclassified item prepared by USIA which may be used for background purposes.) Attention was again focused on the Baptist problem last fall when the Government-sanctioned Evangelical-Baptist Church leadership held an All-Union Congress in October in an attempt to bring the dissident "Initsiativniks" back into the fold. (Note -- This may have been partially successful, but the American Embassy in Moscow re- ports that "the seriousness of the Government's continued concern is well reflected by repeated references in the press to public demonstrations by the schismatics and to the apparent willingness of their leaders to accept martyrdom rather then submit to the demands of the Soviet authorities.") PRAVDA VOSTOKA reported on 22 October a trial of four Baptists in Tashkent, the chief defendant being N. P. Khrapov, described as the head of the South Asian Branch of the dissident Union of Churches of Evangeli- cal Christians-Baptists. The article said Khrapov had recently served three years in:prison for "antisocial activity" and it gave considerable details of illegal publications allegedly being distributed by the "Initia- tors". The group's journal VESTNIK SPASENIYA (Herald of Salvation) and a number of underground pamphlets were said to contain "slander against Soviet society." How serious a problem the Soviet Government considers the dissident Baptists today is perhaps best illustrated by an article in the September 1966 issue of the official atheistic propaganda organ NAUKA I RELIGIYA (Science and Religion) which complained that the "Initiators" are produc- ing a number of illegal publications and have adopted a policy of such o v e r t defiance' to authority as : "...collective singing of psalms in buses and at bus stops, in railway cars and at stations, religious processions and services in the streets, in squares, and in buildings of state institutions, and the creation of special schools and groups for instructing child- ren in religion." Another problem which the Baptists present to the Soviet Government is their stand on military service: see unclassified attachment to BPG Item # 1057 of 12 September 1966, "Communist Exploitation of Conscientious Objectors," which notes reports of Baptists being arrested in Moscow for demonstrating against military service and sentenced to prison terms in Cherkessk for refusing on religious grounds to serve in the Army. (END UNCLASSIFIED) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (1132 Cont.) Approved For Release -RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 ft, 25X1C10b Book Dispatch #6027, 24 April 1967, "Comrmnunism and Religion" (for section on Baptists in attached booklet of selected translations from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia). BPG #196 Item 1045, 1 August 1966, "Communists and Religion" (for listing of previously available material on this subject). Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 4 (1132 Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27`AA.i Rib-03061A000400060001-2 BPG #211 Item 1105, 13 March 1967, "The Ciristian Peace Conference" (for background on how Communists exploit this group), Kurt Hutten, "Iron Curtain Christians," Augsburg Publishing House, Minneapolis,l967 (a translation of "Christian hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang" published by Quell-Verlag, Stuttgart, Germany, 1962 -- useful for its treatment of Communism vs. Religion in general and in this instance for its individual sections on Baptists in various Bloc countries), "Religion in Communist Dominated Areas," a periodic newsletter distri- buted by the International Affairs Commission of the National Council of Churches in New York (for the report on the 5 June 1966 IZVESTIYA article and for continuing reports of this nature -- yearly subscription costs $10.00). "The Russian Baptists -- Propagandists for Stalin and Khrushchev," Christian Beacon Press, Collingswood, N.J., 1960 ( a profusely illustrated booklet containing many press clippings reporting how the Communists exploited Baptists at home and abroad for propaganda purposes in'the 1950's). Approved For Release 2000/08/27 5CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (1132) Approved For Release 2000/08/27`18 8-03061 A00040006jOOQ21967 1133. VIETNAM WAR: CONTINGENCY PLANNING 25X1C10b SITUATION: In the event that the U.S. decides it is necessary to mine or bomb Haiphong Harbor or its approach channels, we can expect a major propaganda barrage from the opposition. Hard intelligence has indicated that the East Germans are even planning to send a camera team to Haiphong to film the bombing of the harbor for propaganda purposes. To date U.S. planes have not bombed the Harbor and the SS Dartford, which was flying the British flag when recently damaged in Haiphong Har- bor, is now believed to have been hit by North Vietnamese antiaircraft fire or debris from exploding SAMs. The SS Dartford was not the bbject of accidental U.S. bombing as was feared when the news first broke. The U.S. has apparently refrained thus far primarily because of the foreign shipping (mostly Soviet and Chinese) that regularly offloads in Haiphong Harbor. The great bulk of supplies for North Vietnam comes from the USSR rather than from closer-by China and much of this materiel moves by sea past U.S. warships into Haiphong. Aerial reconnaissance suggests that the Soviets have limited sea-borne goods to those usable for peaceful as well as military purposes such as oil, trucks, medicines, pontoon bridges, structural steel, machine tools, etc. Soviet equip- ment whose war use is unmistakable such as radar sets, antiaircraft guns, SAMs, aircraft and the like is believed to be routed by rail through China. According to experts, the most reliable recent figures in open sources on Soviet and other foreign equipment shipped to North Vietnam appeared in a WALL STREET JOURNAL article of 14 February. The WSJ staffer had been briefed by State and Defense experts and the text into which he wove the statistics they gave him can supply the basis for discussion on the subject. The article is included as an unclassified attachment. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2 . lA-RDP78-03061 A000400060001-2 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 2 (1133) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001 21y67 Guide to Lecture by_NE;y_en Van Vinh, Chairman of Reunification Department, Lao Dong Central Committee Vinh's remarks in his lecture to the 4th COSVN Congress, held in April 1966, were wide-ranging, Some sections remain somewhat obscure, as they refer to doctrinal positions taken at the earlier plenums of the Lao Dong Central Committee. Moreover, the treatment of various subjects in the lecture often overlaps. Nevertheless, Vinh's lecture provides clear and decisive evidence on questions of major interest. The following are major points which emerge from the record: 1) There is close control by the North Vietnamese regime over the Viet Cong, and the former closely supports the latter. The existence of Hanoi control is evident from the very fact that the speech was given by a North Vietnamese leader and recorded by a Viet Cong member, and also from the whole tone and setting of Vinh's remarks, accompanied as they were by remarks by the NLF Commander, Nguyen Chi Thanh. Specifically, Vinh expounds the significance of the resolutions of the Lao Dong Central Committee (pp. 1-5). He says, for example: "Execution of the resolution is a major requirement," (p. 3)--evidently a requirement for his Southern listeners as well as for the North. He uses the first person plural, clear- ly including his audience among the "we" or "our" (e.g., "Our advance must pass through many transitory steps"- p.5). On page 7, Vinh says: "We have main force units, regional troops, guerrillas, and the masses..." On page 9, Vinh claims that "the enemy" will have to increase his strength to 700;000 or 800,000 men "in order to be able to stop reinforcements from North Viet- nam. Without doing so they will be unable to stop our growth in the South." This is a frank statement of the importance of North Vietnamese infiltration to the war. Further on, Vinh says (p. 11) that one of the goals is to "advance toward national unification." In discussing negotia- tions, Vinh envisages close coordination between Hanoi and the Viet Cong; one might negotiate while the other continues fighting (p. 15). Towards the end of his remarks, Vinh states: "We can thus conclude that even if the Americans intensify their air raids, we will still stand firm to protect the North and re- inforce the South...The Northern citizens have clearly realized their responsibility with regard to this matter. Therefore, they have provided reinforcements to the best of their ability." (pp.20-21) 2) Although Hanoi refuses to be dominated by any particular Bloc country, it receives large quantities of supplies from Communist states. Indeed, Hanoi seems to profit by playing off` the Soviet and Chicom rivals against each other. It is possible that, in the interests of boosting morale, Vinh may have somewhat exaggerated the quantity of material aid (pp. 18-21) or the willingness of the big Communist powers to spring to the defense of North Vietnam (p. 9). But attention should be given to his statement that China provides nearly half the budget of "the South" (presumably the NLF) and Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00040006000lnt. ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 that Soviet aid became extensive after the fall of Khrushchev (p.21). One may wonder if the Chinese provide such support without making some effort to use it to increase their influence.. And it appears that the step-up in Soviet aid preceded t;se big increase in U.S. aid and support to Saigon in early 1965, which ob" course was a response to ominous Viet Cong successes. A rather striking series of` revelations appears on p. 15: "China holds the view that Condit-ions for negotiations are not yet ripe, not until a few years from now, and, even worse, seven years from now., In the meantime, we should continue fighting to bog down the enemy, and should wait until a number of so ialist countries acquire adequate conditions for strengthening their main force troops to launch a strong, ail-out, arid rapid offensive, using all types of weapons and heeding no borders. What ;,e should do in the South today is to try to restrain the enemy and. make him bogged down, waiting until China has built strong forces to launch an all- out offensive," In other words, Hanoi and the Viet Cong should confi:c.e themselves to guerrilla warfare and await liberation by modernized Chicom forces In seven years. It is easy to see why this Chicom proposal has little attraction for Hanoi; aside from uncertainty as to ?;~hether China can meet any such timetable (an uncertainty which has increased since Vinh spoke), such a procedure would tend to weaken Viet G:ong morale and make Hanoi a vassal of Peking. Vinh says, "We must achieve decisive vict_or1r within the next four years" (p. 21), a,nd he admits that "we are worried" over the disunity in the "socialist camp" (p. 21,). 3) While Vinh assumes an a__r of confider(-,e va,ious remarks indicate some of the problems facing Hano:. and the Viet Cone On page 5, he admits that, "at certain moments, certain people underestima:~ed the U.S. imperial- ists and overestimated. the heroism of the Southern p,eeople." "Cur strength," he says, "does not suffice to de'ea.t the Americans," (p. 7) On. page 13, he says that ARVN troops occupy "over 250 districts": it is believed likely that he meant 250 district capitals, as there are only about 250 districts in all. (On p. 1b, Vinh says that forces must be introduced into the cities.) Vinh indicates that quite a number of "nationalist countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America" have doubts about the ability of Hanoi and the Viet Cong to defeat the Americans (p. He complains that the build-up of forces on his side has been slow; in that, the guerrillas were previously 10 percent or the population, and that now the proportion is as small as 1 percent in some areas, he seems to imply that, the over- all proportion of guerrillas to population has declined (p. 16). In another place (p. 17) he says the building of guerrilla forces has been unsatisfactory. There are d.itficulties with the recruitment of youth: "It is necessary to carefully consider why we cannot recruit youths to replenish our forces." The enemy would have been defeated if he had been unable to replenish his forces, but (unlike the VC he was able to replace and supplement his strength (p. 17). ]Remarks on pp. 16 and 17 also suggest that the Viet Cong has often failed to retain control of Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 (font,) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 areas it has "liberated." Vinh makes no mention of napalm or poison gas, but the use of chemical defoliants, he says, has made the Lao Dong Central Committee "very concerned" (p. 18). While claiming that transportation capabilities have doubled, Vinh says transportation on roads is almost nonexistent in daylight, and that the requirements of the 14th Zone (the North Vietnamese area bordering on the Demilitarized Zone) and the South are: not being met (p. 20). He indicates that North Vietnamese missile units have failed to meet the 100 percent "kill rate" set by the Soviet Union. Although MIG 21's are dodged by the enemy, "the MIG 21's have not yet been widely used" (p. 19). As already noted, Hanoi is worrried over the lack of unity in the "socialist camp"--yet North Vietnam itself insists on pursuing an independent line. 4+) For Hanoi, the war-is not merely a military struggle, but a political one, and success depends on deceiving the enemy, particularly by pretending to negotiate while continuing the fighting. Like other Communists, the leaders in Hanoi turn the formula of Clausewitz around; they believe that politics is the continuation of war by other means. It had been necessary to defeat the French colonial army militarily to get the French out of Vietnam, but in 1966, the Lao Dong believed that "after defeating a greater bulk of the puppet army and an important part of American troops, we can push the Americans out of South Viet- nam by coordinating the political struggle with diplomacy" p. 5). In an interesting passage, Vinh says that a situation in which the "puppet troops" have not been completely annihilated provides a condition for the Americans to withdraw, while if the "puppet administration" is completely eliminated, there are no conditions for the Americans to withdraw; this seems to mean that in the former case, the Americans could withdraw with- out a complete loss of face and with some self-deception as to an agree- ment being possible "between Vietnamese" (between the Saigon government and the Hanoi-directed National Liberation Front), while in the latter case, there would be a simple military contest between Vietnamese Communists and the United States, which the Communists would be unable to win. (p. 5). The Americans must be forced to "eat rice with chopsticks" (engage in a political-guerrilla competition), and the Vietnamese Communists should avoid "eating rice with spoons and forks" (engaging in a war of position) (p.8). Vinh says: "Under these conditions [of politico-guerrilla war- fare], if they force us to surrender while we are not defeated, then they are defeated" (p. 8); this epigram appears to signify that if there was a Viet Cong military surrender which did not involve an end to the VC's political struggle, the U.S. would have failed to achieve its political objecti.e. Vinh reveals that the 11th (1965) Lao Dong Resolution foresaw the possibility of a situation where fighting and negotiations were conducted simultaneously (pp. 13-16). "Fighting while negotiating is aimed at opening another front with a view to making the puppet army more disintegrated, stimulating and developing the enemy's internal contradictions, and, thereby, making him more isolated in order to deprive him of the propaganda Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A0004000600p10 . ) 3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 weapons, isolate him further, and make a number of people who mis- understood the Americans clearly see their nature" (p. iii). Such tactics, Vinh notes, were used during the Vietnamese war against the French and in China (i.e., prior to 1949). They cannot, however, be employed "as long as we have not yet acquired adequate strength" (p. 14). Further on, 9inh indicates that the required conditions for negotiation amount to conditions overwhelmingly favorable to his side: e.g., enemy troops should be withdrawn and their bases dismantled, or in a slightly version, the "puppet forces" must be concentrated in barracks, must not herd people into strategic hamlets, and the Americans must be stationed at the wharves. (p. l6). Fn the Lao Dong system of teought, "fighting while negotiating also represents a principled step in tee evolution of the war" (p. 11+). This exercise in bad, faith might take place in several ways: "It is possible that the North conducts negctiations while the South [the National Libera- tion Front] continues fighting, aed that the South also participates in the negotiations while continuing to fight" (p. 15). As the Lao Dong sees it, no considerable success can be achieved in negotiations if fighting stops while the negotiations are going on. But--"if we conduct, negoti.a- tions while fighting vigorously, we can also take advantage of the opportun- ity to step up the political struggle, military proselyting (sic), and activities in the cities. Thus, we will take advantage of the opportunity offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks, political struggle and military proselyting (sic)" (p. 15). Vi.nh :indicates that "a number of East European socialist countries" .gold similar views: they think "that conditions do prevail, and are ripe for achieving success (.The Americans would withdraw their trope and we wi l_1. continue the strug ;le to achieve total success). These socialist countries also posed a number of conditions? cessation of the bombing of the North; gradual with- drawal of U.S. troops from the South" (p~ 14). Note: Various letters are used in the Vinh document as cover for different organizations or units. They may be translated as follows: C -.- Company 1) - Battalion TW Lao Dong Central Committee E - Regiment TCK - General offensive F - Division TKN - General uprising Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 5 June 1967 Comrade Vinh's Talk I. Presentation of the spirit of resolutions. II. Some additional ideas III. Defense situation in North Vietnam-aid for South Vietnam. IV. Support of the socialist camp. V. Relationship among countries in the socialist camp. x x x I. Presentation of the spirit of resolutions. 1) Introduction of the contents of resolutions. 2) Necessary conditions to be held fast. 3) Some ideas on the nature and characteristics of the war. +) Strategic missions and guidelines. - Resolution #9 assessed the balance of forces between us and the enemy and set forth plans and guidelines to win the special war. - Resolution #11 assessed the situation of the special war developed to a high degree and having the factors of a limited war. - Resolution #12 noted the characteristics and nature of the special war developed into a limited war which still have the character of the special war. Determination of the party'to win the limited war. B. Necessary conditions to be held fast. There are two points to be held fast: a) Dialectics on ideological methods. b) Steadfast determination and spirit of thorough revolution. Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-13ont. ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 a) Dialectics on ideologLcal methods: It is necessary to pay attention to the difference between the natural world and the development of human society. The rules concerning the development of the natural wor~_d can be asserted. For example, at 99.5 degrees water does not boil. It will boil at a fixed temperature. At zero degrees it will freeze and become _.ce. As for the development of human society, there may be this possi- bility or the other. For example, we assert that when 200,000, 300,000 or 1+00,000 Americans have been annihilated, the enemy will be defeated. Yet, sometimes when a small number of the enemy has been annihilated, he is defeated; sometimes when a large number of the enemy has been anni- hi.:Lated, he is not yet defeated. The former resolution (11th) stated that victory would be won in a relatively short period of ti:are, from s.:several to four years. It was a flexible statement. The latter resolu?- tion (12th) also stated that decisive victory would be won i:ri a vela= Lively short period of time (a few years). This must also be understood .uus a flexible statement, since it is impossible to ascertain one or two years. However, the time must not be spoken of as unlimited? and in speaking of a protracted struggle one may not "'say it is protracted., unlimited."' As far as thinking methods are concerned, if one thinks mechanically and inflexibly he will be unjustifiably optimistic, or be- come pessimistic when he Las not yet seen victory. How long a time depends on subjective and objective factors, and on the evolution of these factors. b) It is necessary to have a steadfast determination and a _!pir:it of thorough revolution. Speaking of war is speaking of the worst; difficulties and hardships in life. To win the war is a very difficult undertaking which requires boundless energy. When we spea., of achieving success within a relatively short period of time., it means that we assert our determination, and when we saw so, the difficulties have been taken into consideration. When we say that even if the Americans introduce such and such number of troops we still can defeat them, it means that we assert our determina- tion to overcome all difficulties in order to achieve success. When we speak of winning the war, even -:hough the Americans increase the number of their troops, and achieve decisive success within a relatively short period of time, it means that we are determined to overcome countless difficulties before success is achieved. Such a statement is not theo- retical, but is 50 percent prac7;ical. It is on the basis of this state- merit that we strengthen our determination to defeat the U.S. aggressors. "herefore, it is necessary to have the spirit of thorough revolution and a very high determination. Approved For Release 2000/08/2J : CIA-RDP78-03061A0004099c=~~q041-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 With regard to the general offensive (TCK) and general uprising (TKN), it was requested that a concrete plan, including the quantity of weapons needed, the number of armed force's needed, etc., be made known in order to carry out the undertaking confidently. For secrecy's sake, it is not yet necessary to reveal information on these matters. Therefore, we must firmly grasp the above two matters and. express unanimous agreement with the TW (the Lao Dong Party Central Committee), and, in the process of struggle, try to understand them better and supple- ment the resolution. Execution of the resolution is a major requirement. Yet, the greater requirement is to execute the resolution creatively in the days ahead. In the course of the war, it is possible that some locality, district, or province may be levelled and may sustain serious losses. 3. Some matters concerning the characteristics and nature of the war. There has been much discussion on the nature of the war--special, limited, colonialist, and neocolonialist. The matters which we discuss here have also been discussed in the North. Speaking of the special war, limited war, colonialist, or neo- colonialist war is trying to find answers to the following questions: Do the political and military war and the three-pronged offensive still exist? Do TCK and general uprising (TKN) still exist? In general and unified terms, to speak of a just war and an unjust war. When a war develops, it is called variously an aggressive war, a national liberation war, a war among the imperialists, or a war between the two camps. Formerly, we spoke only of limited war and world war. The scope of the war was then understood likewise. When we spoke of limited war, we took into account i:s scope. And when the U.S. imperialists began to change their war strategy (the "flexible reaction strategy"), they defined war as follows: world war, limited war, and the war whose scope is inferior or to that of the limited war (special war). When they spoke of special war, we did not just follow him. In fact, the enemy actually changed his strategy. The TW resolution said: in the Americans' view, the conduct of the special war relics mainly on the puppet army and administration. With the characteristics of the present situation, the war that is most 3 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 appropriate for a neocolonia._is, policy in a country where there exists a national liberation movement is the specia_ war. The special war is just a type of limited war, but its scope is inferior to that of the limited war, And since the special war takes place in South Vietnam, it bears the character of a conflict between the two camps, gradually becomes a limited war, ana will develop to a higher intensityr and larger scope. it is now obvious that the war has become a, limited war, since the enemy has increased the number of his troops tc more than 200,000. At this point, how must the "spe2ial?' concept be understood? Special war must be understood yn the sense that it is a "separate" type of war, not in the sense ascribed by the Americans. Ere'alously, there was an erroneous analysis: if the imperialists increase the number of their troops to 200,000, the war will become an old-type aggressive war. (In calling a war special the Americans take into cons_deration its scale --large or small-while we understand "special" or? "separate" as the nature of the war). To speak of (words uninteilig_i_ble) is to speak of the purpose of the war: _,t ha-_ a neccolon na.?ure. Even if the number of enemy troops is increased t.o 300,000, `500,000 or 600,000, the purpose of the war remains to :.mpose neocoi.cnlaiism. The fact that the imperia._lsts firmly rr,aintain neocolonialism. is di.:re to the following reasons: - Old-type colonialism has been opposed and cursed by the peoples in the world and the oppressed peoples, aid theref:ire, has no conditions for survival; and colonial sys-tems have continuously disintegrated every- where. The U.S. imperialists realized that it they id not resort to new-type colonialism they wouli not be able to maintain colonialism. - Science and techniques nave developed. Various countries which had won independence but which were under the bourgeois' control also needed aid to maintain their regime,:-. 1'h e.r?c fore, the Americans have taken advantage of --.his situation to penetrate into these countries and gain net profits. - The U.S. imperial.:.sts are wealthy :rmp)erla.ii.sts. They have engaged in .large-scale business, retail business. They possess ample capital, and could use money and iaerchandise to ir.:fluence, dominate, and exploit many other countries using neocolon__alist methods, and, thereby gain greater net profits. WhLle no imperialists whatsoever could wage aggres- sion through old colonia ism, the imperialists could still deceive a number of people by wagi:ig aggression through neocolonialism. Although the present, limited war in the South still has its "sepa- rate" nature and still ties within the category of implementation of a r..ceocolonialist policy, it sti._i relies upon the puppet army and adminis- t ration. ii (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Formerly, during the French domination period, we had to defeat the French expeditionary troops, and only by basically defeating these troops could the French be defeated, whereas at present we must crush mainly the puppet army. As far as the American troops are concerned, we do not fight them in the same way as we did against the French. To defeat the enemy in the South is to basically defeat the puppet army and to defeat part of the American troops, and, thereby, smash the Americans' aggressive will. If we fail to see the role of the pup- pet army and administration, we will fail to use our own forces to a certain extent to basically smash the puppet forces, and, thereby deprive the Americans of their military and political base. Likewise, without defeating an important part of the American forces we cannot crush their aggressive will. In reality, today the relations between fighting the Americans and fighting the puppets have become increasingly clearer. In the old colonialist period, only by defeating the aggres- sive army would the imperialists consent to being defeated. With neo- colonialism, after defeating a greater bulk of the puppet army and an important part of American troops, we can push the Americans out of South Vietnam by coordinating the political struggle with diplomacy. With regard to strategy, the situation in which the puppet troops have not yet been completely annihilated does also provide a condition for the Americans to withdraw. This is true with regard to the question of sovereignty: if we completely eliminate the puppet administration, there are no conditions for the Americans to withdraw. If we speak only of a local war, there may be errors in strategy and possibly im leader- ship over the strategy. Our advance must pass through many transitory steps. Evaluation and comparison of the enemy forces and our forces: So far, our evaluation has been correct. But at certain moments, certain people underestimated the U.S. imperialists and overestimated the heroism of the Southern people. Evaluation of the Americans is very difficult. Some people believe that it is difficult to defeat the U.S. imperialists, because it is often said that the U.S. imperailists are the most powerful imperialists: their manpower is great, their forces are large, and they have atomic weapons. In expressing this view, these people create the impression that the imperialists are strong. This is also a reality. The people who believe in this view are not few. For years, there has been a constant discussion of this problem in our camp. Without the war in Vietnam, how can this problem be solved? How can one explain our victories over the U.S. imperialists who have gross national product of 650 billion dollars against our gross national product of 3 billion, who have a population of 200 million against our population of 30 million, who have 3 million men in their armed forces against our armed forces of 1 million men in both zones? (Cont. } Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Yet despite this big difference between the two sides--one side is t;wo large and other too small--our small country dares fight the Ameri- cans and defeat them. It is difficult to make people believe that a small country such as ours can defeat the U.S. impe=rialists who have great economic and military potentialities. Therefore, our struggle is a great contribution to the discussions of the evaluation of and. com- parison between our forces and the enemy's. Usually, people easily discern the enemy's strong points and do not see his weak points. Only through defeating him can we see his weak points. For instance, intelli- gence services of various countries--no matter how clever they are-- cannot know all the techniques of the U.S. planes. We know them because we have downed these planes and studied these aircraft, we have interrogated the captured pi,iots. We know the enemy's material strength, his tactics and techniques. But there are things we cannot know even through our intelligence ser- vice or through documents which have been supplied to us in order that we could understand and evaluate the enemy better. it is said that U. S. planes are modern. If wer do not attack them, they remain modern. However, if we attack and down them, they become outmoded. (The enemy has said that his planes have become outmoded) Summarily appraising a small country such as curs which dares to fight against and win over the Americans is an important problem. As for estimating how many troops the enemy will introduce and a-1 what rate, this task sometimes cannot be done thoroughly. Basically, our Party has evaluated the U.S. imperialists relatively accurately. (At that time) our Party made such an evaluation, But later it changed its mind from time' to time. Thus, it was afraid of the Ameri- c?an.s dared not fight them. It,.cept on discussing and, arrived at no con- elusion. If it dared fight them, it would have been able ".,o understand ahem better and evaluate them. more correctly. Under the present war situation, the forces of both sides have increased greatly. U.S. and satellite troops have increased quickly. Ours have increased too. Both rides have used these force., to fight ,ac::h other. Now the problem consists of finding the best way to com- pare the two forces. The fact that U.S. forces are. strong ie_, obvious to a.1__. But against whom are they fighting? They are strong., but are they capable of defeating us? To which side does the evaluation c_:f the com- parative balance of forces swing? It is obvious that the comparative balance of forces gradually swings in our favor. We may not imagine that we only have endurance. We must see that our strength is growing. 6 (Cont. ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 The Americans are stronger than us militarily and materially. Yet, how do they use this strength, and how are they fighting against us? We have main force units, regional troops, guerrillas, and the masses, whereas they cannot introduce into the South as large military forces as they want. As far as the material factors are concerned, we have to use a weak force to fight, against a, strong force. Yet, considering all factors combined, it is we, not the enemy, that are strong. Thus, a com- parison of the forces of both sides shows that we are stronger than the enemy. Our victory over him is not chancy, nor is it temporary. Pre- viously, we said we could defeat the Americans even if they had 150,000 or 200,000 troops. It was a theoretical statement. However, this state- ment has now become a fact which has been proved by realities. In short, (two words unint,el:ligi.ble), why are we victorious? - We have the correct leadership of the Party. - The Southern people and army, and the Vietnamese people and army are heroic. - We firmly grasp the rules of the people's war. - We insure self-reliance. -? We enjoy the wholehearted supported of the peoples in the world, and of our camp. If we speak only of the quantity of forces, other countries also have forces. Yet, if we go deeply into the realities, we find that the quality and combat value of our people are very great. Our fourteen million people are better than 70 million (Indonesian) people and the 200 million American people. This fact cannot be explained by the matter of quantity. It does not suffice to say that we use a weak force to fight against a strong force. We must also understand how strong our main points are, and must explain under what conditions we are strong. Thus, we must say that our. South is strong. Yet, our strength does not suffice to defeat the Americans. It is now fit to say that there can be no unlimited escalation in the North, and there can be no complete destruc- tion in the present situation in the South. In the Korean War, what was different from the situation in South Vietnam was that when the Americans -introduced (520,000) troops (includ- ing satellite troops) into Korea, they sent them all to the frontline because their rear base was secure, whereas in South Vietnam, when the Americans introduce 300,000 or 1!00,000 troops they cannot send them all to the frontline. Taylor recentLy said that "we should calculate the 7 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 number of troops we :rust :_ntrocuce, and w?en and under what circumstances these troops must be introduced in order to defeat the enemy," and that 11 if we introduce our troops at a time when. the adversary is strong, we cannot defeat him." Therefore, the Americans have realized that they did not, introduce their troops at the right time. The second condition is that when troops are introduced there must be a strong administration, which is nonexistent in South Vietnam. At present, the Americans st..l1 hold that because the number of Americans introduced into the South is insufficient they cannot win. Therefore, as long as they still bel:;eve that if they introduce more troops they can win, they will pursue the war. As soon as they see that no Matter how many troops they introduce they are still. defeated, then their aggres- :cive will be crushed.. Formerly, the French sent 2,0,000 troops to fight against us. After a period of time, they realized that they could not win even if they introduced more troops, In Algeria., with 700,000 French troops and 100,000 puppet troops, the French could not, win the war. They realized that. to win the war, the most important factor is not. strength, but tactics. Now we are fighting the Americans with existing number of troops and weapons. In a war of position, they can defeat us. But with our present tactics, we will win, and they will be defeated. It is the same as if we force them to eat. rice with chopsticks (if' we eat rice with spoons and forks like them., we will be defeated; if' chopsticks are- used, they are no match for US). - Under these conditions, if they force us to surrender while we are riot defeated, then they are defeated. In combat, a number of localities and comrades may be hurt. But it is incorrect to base oneself' on the fact '..hat when some localities are damaged and. some comrades are sacri:=seed, we are then defeated. In South Korea, the enemy sent all his troops to the front. In ; Vietnam, he has introduced between 300,000 to 600,000 troops who must fight on the frontline and, at the same time, protect the rear. But the latter can fulfill only one of these tasks. If they oppose our ,people's movement in the South, they will be unable to stop reinforce- ments from North Vietnam. If they concentrate their force to stop rein- t:'o:rcements from North Vietnam, they cannot stand firm on the front in the .rear. If all their troops are sent to the front, their rear will be Left unguarded. If they leave part of their troops in the rear, they will. not be strong enough to fight us on the front. To fulfill both tasks, they must have a million troops. To :.ntroduce a million troops into South Vietnam, the United Mates must double its mobilisation rate. 8 (cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 If the war is expanded to North Vietnam, the balance of forces will be changed. The front will be changed too. The enemy will have to fight not only the Vietnamese people, but also the Chinese people. The enemy is still afraid of this outcome. Establishing their front in Laos is not an easy task. If the Americans attack Laos, because of the 1962 Geneva Accords they will face North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China which will join the war to a certain extent. they are planning to send their troops to Laos. But does this mean the opening of a new front? The Americans are capable of doing this. But they are weighing the pros and cons because if they send troops there, the form of the war will change. The enemy has not achieved unanimity concerning the problem of expanding the war to Laos and North Vietnam; but they have achieved relative unanimity concerning the problem of introducing troops into South Vietnam. Thus, they introduced troops at a moment when their special war had failed and they were in a state of strategic passivity. If they raise their strength to 400,000 men, this means that their 300,000 men have been defeated. But the introduction of 400,000 men into South Vietnam means that they would raise their strength to 700,000 or 800,000 men in order to be able to stop reinforcements from North Vietnam. Without doing so they will be unable to stop our growth in the South. That is why the Americans cannot thoroughly use their power in the war against us. 4. Strategic missions, guidelines, and leadership: There are some misunderstandings concerning the strategic missions, guidelines, and leadership and the relations among the three problems. Strategic missions are clearly stated in the resolution of the 12th Party conference. There are two strategic missions: the general stra- tegic mission, and the strategic mission in South Vietnam. The strategic mission in South Vietnam consists of defeating the imperialists and feudalists, and achieving land reforms. Its'immediate task consists of overthrowing the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys. To what extent the war will develop? How must the Americans be restrained and defeated? The exertion of strategic leadership varies in each period of time. Yet, the strategic mission remains unchanged no matter how many troops the Americans may introduce into the South. Each time the enemy introduces more troops, some people contend that the enemy has not been fully evaluated, and that the strategic missions have not been clearly set forth. In fact, the strategic mission has already been ,set forth, and it remains unchanged. We continue to pursue it. As long as the war remains within the South, the strategic mission remains unchanged. When the war is extended to the North, the strategic mis- sion will be different. Some people asked why we did not assert in Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-14DP78-03061A000400060001 ( font. ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 advance that limited war would break out, so that -:.he mission we had set forth would become out of date. This problem is not like having an ample shirt made so that it suits one when he grown up. That is not correct. When the war in the ~3outh remains within the __.imits of a special war, we must restrain and defeat the enemy in thin, and must at the same time take precautionary measures against limited war. When the war has become alimited war, we must restrain and defeat the enemy in this war, and, at the same time, take precautionary measures against the enemy's expansion of the war throughout the country. As far as the leadership is concerned, it is necessary to restrain and defeat the enemy in the above types of war in the South, not to allow the enemy to expand the war, and to restrict the losses he inflicts on the people. This effort is ours to exert. It, is wrong to say that we failed to restrain and defeat the enemy in. the South. We must see that we defeated the enemy's special war, and, as result, -the enemy cad to introduce more troops -to wage the :limited war.. in speaking of winning victory over the enemy in the special war we did not mean a total victory, but a decisive victory. Today, in restraining and defeating the enemy in the limited war in the South, we also speak of achieving decisive success within a, relatively short period of time. The contents of the guidelines anci strategy involving protracted fighting and the contents of achieving c.ecisive success within . relatively short pericd of time are not mutually contradictory. '[hey are the same. In indoctrinating the cadres and party members ideologically, we must speak of protracted. fighting; and the determina- tion to fight and win, and must not disseminate to the lower echelons the idea of achieving dec=.sive success within a feti,- years. It is wrong to say that the Party leadership is not correct when the enemy sent part of his forces to the 4th zone or farther., while we estimated that there was little possibility of the enemy sending troops to the North. At present, in terms of restraining and defeating the enemy in the south, the Party's s-nrategic leadership remains correct. Although the enemy has not yet acquired the conditions for sending his troops to the [Vo:rth, we have to take precautionary measures. At present, we must understand that fighting a protracted war and achieving decisive success within a relatively short period of time remain the same. In a resis- tance war, it is right to speak of protracted war and self-reliance, and the urge to fight and win quickly represents a rightist tendency. 10 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Today, is a great error not to speak of achieving decisive success in a relatively short period of time. Therefore, we must achieve and are determined to achieve that objective. If we fail to achieve that objec- tive, it is because of ourselves, not because of the socialist camp. We may not speak of protracted fighting as unlimited fighting. It is erron- eous to understand protracted as unl:i_mited. Contents of the significance of decisive victory: These contents are stated in the resolution. To achieve the same solution as that in Laos, the contents of which we have already realized, the U.S. imperialists will agree immediately. We want to achieve decisive v:ict:ory which is: to exterminate and disintegrate the puppet authorities and troops to the point that the puppet force is no longer the military and political leaning point for the Americans, that the U.S. troops must play the main role and resort to political measures. When such a situation occurs the puppet troops will not be strong enough to protect their regime. But U.S. troops have been introduced. Thus we must wipe out an important part of them in order to defeat them. There are three ways to achieve decisive victory: - Wipe out the majority of puppet troops and foil the enemy's political goals; - Wipe out an important part of U.S. troops and crush their aggres- sive will; - Achieve the goals: national independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and advance toward national unification. On the basis of wiping out puppet troops, we can, to a certain extent, wipe out part of U.S. troops. If the war is pursued for two or three years, we can do what the Koreans did: overcoming 380,000 Americans. The fact that southern guerrillas can wipe out the Americans--although not many Ameri- cans have been killed--is an optimistic event. Ba's ideas: The introduction of U.S. troops into the South was not wanted by us. But it is an opportunity for us to defeat them. Some- times the enemy can understand this only after fighting with us for several years. Thus, shortening this time is very important. Some individuals have asserted that since the Americans have intro- duced their troops we cannot defeat them and that the Americans have caused us heavy casualties. These assertions are obviously belied by realities. Li (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 To achieve decisive victor^y in a relatively snort period, we must concentrate our forces in both zones. We must not speak only of an unlimited period. We will not do what A.]_ger_.a has done, And we will not do what Korea did in using armed troops to liberate the South Ko:'eans. We will do what the Soviet Union, did in. the war against Gernany. To achieve decisive victory, it is necessary to have very high determination. We must endeavor to achieve it and be convinced that we are able to achieve it. To do so, we must; face very great difficulties, even difficulties we cannot anticipate. The task of wiping out and. disintegrating a large number of puppet troops must go along with the task of foiling the enemy's reinforcement plan. Therefore, this task must be accom-oanied by mass struggle and military proselyting. Our achievements in =_965 were very great. They can be regarded as big leaps, as a great progress (defeating from 8 pt:ppet D in 1964 to 46 I) is a great victory, causing the Americans to be frightened and to .rush in to rescue the puppets). It is necessary to prevent the enemy from increasing his troops, thus causing him to stop. In. 165, he wanted to increase his troops, but could not. In the future, it is necessary to prevent him from supplementing his troops in time. When the casualties of the puppets reach between D and regiments a:-id battle groups and those of the Arr~eri- cans between C and D, the war will be settled? The enemy will be unable to stand firm in the rear, to pacify it. These are the basic causes of his defeat. The greatest desire of the U.S. and other imlaerialists is to occupy the South, apply the neocolonialist policy, and check our Southern people's movement. We will defeat the enemy: in several years, we will be able to wipe out and disintegrate 300,000 to 400,000 puppet troops and 200,000 U.S. troops. The Americans will be unable to introduce sufficient troops to fill the gaps left by the wiped out and disi.nteg:r.?ated U.S. and. puppet troops. On the other hand, in introducing more troops the Americans must develop their logistic service. But, at the same time, we intensify our attacks against their logistic establishments. isolate their bases, cut off their transport roads. In the future, In certain areas puppet troops will have to eat soup for months. U.S. troops will also encounter diffi- culties. Thus, in the future, the attacks against logistic bases will be intensified by 10 times. This is a very important strategic mission. L;_' Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00040(dOdbt01-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 The problems of general offensive and general uprising and fighting and negotiations. General offensive and general uprising: uprisings have been car- ried out. Now with the arrival of the Americans, what are the problems of the general offensive and general uprising? In the past, we did not have any doubt about this capacity in the puppet-controlled areas. Now the areas where this capacity still exists are still large. The U.S. troops occupy only 15 important districts. Puppet troops occupy over 250 districts. We realize that since we have the capacity to defeat puppet troops, we have the capacity to carry out general uprisings and liberate these areas. We do have the capacity to liberate the district capitals and a number of provinces. In the old-type colonial war, the enemy would not consent to being defeating and withdrawing until his vitality had been annihilated to a certain degree. In the new-type colonial war, when the greater bulk of the puppet army and an important part of the American troops will have been annihilated and disintegrated, the enemy has to agree to withdraw under definite conditions. For example, with regard to areas where American troops are stationed we use military and political means to attack them; in areas where they are still strong, we encirble them. When negotiations are held, the American troops may agree to withdraw from these areas, under definite conditions. We then proceed to solving the problems of the remaining areas. With regard to the centers such as Saigon and Cholon we must combine the old experiences with creative ideas to carry out the task. Fighting and Negotiating: The resolution of the Party's 11th conference clearly stated that in the process of achieving success, a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may arise. At present, the situation is not yet ripe for negotiations. Fighting while negotiating is aimed at opening another front with a view to making the puppet army more disintegrated, stimulating and developing the enemy's internal contradictions, and, thereby, making him more isolated in order to deprive him of the propaganda weapons, isolate him further, and make a number of people who understand the Americans clearly see their nature. 13 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 In a war between a powerful. country which wages aggression and a weak country, as long as we have not yet acquired adequate strength a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously does not exist. Fighting continues until the emergence of a situation where both sides are fighting indecisively. Then., a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may emerge. in fighting while negotiating, the side which fights more strongly will compell the adversary to accept his conditions. Considering the compara- tive balance of forces, the war proceeds through the following stages: --The fighting stage. --The stage of fighting while negotiating. --Negotiations and signing of agreements. Whether or not the war will. resume after the conclusion of agree- ments depends upon the comoarative balance of force:;. If we are capable of dominating the adversary, the war will not break out again., and conversely. Therefore, fighting while negotiating also represents a principled step in the evolution of the war. Thus, a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously will unmistakably emerge. In cur anti-French resistance, there were also times when fighting and negotiations were conducted simultaneously. The same situation had emerged in China. At present, there are three viewpoints with regard to war and peace. --The Americans find it necessary to negotiate, but negotiate from a strong position, partly because they have deceitful motives, and partly because the situation has compelled them to negotiate. Yet, they want us to make concessions to ,hem. --A number of countries want us to enter into negotiations, any form of negotiations--so that a big war does not break out and that the war can be ended--regardless or the interests or' Vietnam. Some ether countries wonder whether we can defeat the Amer-weans., and if not, we should enter into negotiations. (Most of these countries are nationalist countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.) A number of East European socialist countries hold the view that conditions do -prevail., and are ripe for achieving success (The Americans would withdraw their troops, and we will continue the struggle to achieve total success.) These socialist countries also posed a number of conditions: cessation of they bombing of the North; gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South. (Cont. ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 --China holds the view that conditions for negotiations are not yet ripe, not until a few years from now, and, even worse, seven years from now. In the meantime, we should continue fighting to bog down the enemy, and should wait until a number of socialist countries acquire adequate conditions for strengthening their main force troops to launch a strong, all-out, and rapid offensive, using all types of weapons and heeding no borders. What we should do in the South today is to try restrain the enemy and make him bogged down, waiting until China has built strong forces to launch an all-out offensive. --Our policy: to continue fighting until a certain time when we can fight and negotiate at the same time, This is also a fighting method: repulsing the enemy step by step, and achieving decisive success. The Party Central Committee entrusts the Politburo with the task of deciding on the time for negotiations. The problem of choosing the opportunity and deciding to negotiate: -Basing ourselves upon the actual situation in the South. --Considering the opinions of the friendly countries which have provided us with quite a large volume of assistance, in order to gain their maximum support. The future situation may lead to negotiations. Yet, even if there are negotiations, they are conducted simultaneously with fighting. While negotiating, we will continue fighting the enemy more vigorously. (It is possible that the North conducts negotiations while the South continues fighting, and that the South also participates in the negotiations while continuing to fight). Those who are in charge of conducting negotiations negotiate and those in charge of fighting continue fighting, because the decisive factor lies in the battlefield. The enemy wants us to stop fighting to his advantage. But we have to fight. Therefore, the enemy also fights. We must fight to win great victories with which to compell the enemy to accept our conditions. If we stop fighting (at that stage), no considerable success can be achieved in negotiations. If we conduct negotiations while fighting vigorously, we can also take advantage of the opportunity to step up the political struggle, military proselyting, and activities in the cities. Thus, we will take advantage of the opportunity offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks, political struggle, and military proselyting., At present, the Americans have put forth deceitful arguments. Therefore, we must put forth conditions to prove that we fight for the aspirations and interests of the people, and, thereby, to win the support of various countries, i.5 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 .If the enemy wants to negotiate, he must accept a number of conditions, such as, to permanently cease their war of destruction against the North, withdraw his troops from the South, and dismantle his military bases. The failure to pose the above conditions is tantamount to implicitly accepting the Americans' presence in the South. Depending on the situation prevailing at the time, we will impose conditions. For exam-ole, the puppet forces must be concentrated in barracks, must not repress the people, must not carry out espionage activities, must allow the people to move about freely or choose their places of residence, must not herd the people into strategic hamlets and concentration centers; the American troops must be stationed at the wharf's. The basic situation prevailing in the South for the past years requires that we attack the enemy more vigorously. This front involves millions of people. While attacking, we must concentrate all our forces on fighting the enemy. 11. Some additional opinions: Generally speaking, this is a difficult task, which must be con_, tinned. However, guerrilla warfare must be stepped up and developed further. In the recent past, the building of the regional forces, main force units, and guerrillas, on the whole, has continued to develop. Yet, considering the proportion, the building of these forces has been slow. Previously, the guerrillas comprised 10 percent of the population. In the western highlands, the highest proportion is only 3.5 percent, and, in some areas, the proportion is 1 percent. Formerly, the French imperialists tried to find out why we had numerous mobile units while we had only '(5 F's), whereas they had only a small number of mobile units ( only ten to 15 percent) although they had large forces. The greater part (60 to 70 percents of enemy forces have been dispersed to cope with the guerrillas, and 20 percent have to cope with the regional troops. Thus, only 10 percent of enemy forces are available to cope with our main force units,. As the Americans have increased the number of their troops, we must develop our guerrilla and regional forces to restrain and fight the enemy everywhere. We must thin out 60 to 70 percent of the enemy regular forces in order to enable our main force units to carry out their task of annihilating the enemy on the main battlefields. We must firmly maintain and broaden our control over areas which have been liberated and which will be liberated. We have to do so because of the following reasons. ;Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 --In China, it was said that the annihilation of enemy vitality resulted in the liberation of the land. --In our country, we must speak of annihilating enemy vitality and firmly maintaining our control over the liberated areas and enlarging the liberated areas. If we speak solely of annihilating enemy vitality, and not of control over the liberated areas, sometimes a situation may emerge where the enemy has been annihilated but the areas under our control cannot be enlarged. In such a case, if the enemy is still strong he may still be capable of re-occupying these liberated areas. 'Therefore, after liberating an area, we must immediately organize its defense, and must enlarge it. How should we best develop and deploy our forces to maintain our control? What has enabled certain areas to maintain their control? Experiences must be drawn. By developing guerrilla warfare and pinning the enemy down, we will create conditions for our main force units to annihilate him. The experience drawn is that it must be insured that the Party chapters and branches thoroughly understand the necessity of leading the guerrillas, and developing guerrilla warfare. The Party branch committee must build up the guerrilla force. At present, there is a contradiction between the build up of the guerrilla forces, the regional troops and the main force units. The building of the guerrilla force to supplement the main forces has not been satisfactory. There was a situation when the enemy would have been defeated if he could not supplement his forces Yet, he could replace and supplement his forces. Although we have achieved successes and have the just cause, we have encountered difficulties in recruiting youths to supplement our forces. It is necessary to carefully consider why we cannot recruit youths to replenish our forces. 2. The enemy's use of aircraft and artillery, and spraying of poisonous chemicals. How have the people endured and coped with the enemy's air attacks, shelling, and spraying of poisonous chemicals? What experiences have been acquired? In addition to the ideological measures, it is necessary to: --Dig trenches. ---Insure that dwellings are widely spread out. (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 --Narrow the enemy-controlled areas, herd him into the cities, and not allow him to concentrate his forces to attack areas under our control. The TW is very concerned about the enemy's spraying of poisonous chemicals. It is necessary to collect the chemicals sprayed so that we can. ask friendly countries to analyse them, and, thereby to find appropriate preventive measures. Party members in areas which are not subjected to the spraying of poisonous chemicals, or which are lightly sprayed, are urged to step up their production, and. to cultivate many kinds of plants and many crops. 3. The cities: We should introduce our forces into- the cities in order to strengthen our forces there. We must conduct investigations of the urban situation. Everyone must carry out propaganda activities and enlighten the masses to a certain extent. We must take advantage of the enemy's internal contra- dictions to lead the masses' struggle, and make the masses understand the political significance of the struggle for the improvement of their living conditions and for democracy. III., Situation of the defense of the North and. reinforcement of the South. The enemy advocated attacking us vigorously at the beginning of the year (February 1965) so that he could put forth his peace negotiations policy and compell us to negotiate. The enemy was firmly confident he could compell us to sit down at the conference table and the socialist camp would force us to negotiate. Taylor proposed, that the Americans attack us continuously, so as to exert, pressure on.L.s.. But the reality has emerged contrary to the enemy's expectations, and has made him more passive. At first, due to lack of experience, we encountered difficulties and confusion. The greatest difficulty arose from. the blockade of roads. After some months, we acquired experiences, and have, strengthened our national defense forces. At present, the air defense force in the North is a rather strong force in Asia. The density of the anti-aircraft net with conventional weapons is even higher than that of countries in our camp. The enemy himself said. that "we danced on the muzzles of their anti-aircraft guns" when he ran :into a dense fire net formed by conventional weapons. Our missile force also constitutes the strongest anti-aircraft -force, as compared with Asian countries, including China. We have MIG 17's and MIG 21's. MIG 21's have a speed comparable to that of the various types of modern aircraft used by the Americans to attack us. Yet, the above two forces are still insufficient. It is necessary to have a greater force, with better long range weapons, at least medium- range rockets. (We are trying to get these.) (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 At present, the enemy conducts his heaviest raids against the 4th military zone. In other areas, he only attacks us suddenly and then flees. Captured enemy pilots states: "If we want to attack a wide area, we must have eight aircraft carriers, and many more air tankers and airfields. With five more aircraft carriers we can fly only 500 sorties at the most. If we want to attack Hanoi, we must have even more aircraft and must attack it in many phases." Recently, our anti-aircraft force has achieved good results. The conventional weapons have contributed to fighting enemy aircraft flying at the lowest altitude. The missiles have an effective range from 800 meters to 35 or 50 kilometers. Recently we have downed many enemy aircraft with mobile missiles. (We have shot down a large number of enemy aircraft, but reported a small number). Though newly formed, this armed serivce has scored fairly good achievements. At the beginning, it took one to eight, or one to five missiles to shoot down one enemy aircraft. Now it takes one to two missiles to shoot down one enemy aircraft. The kill rate set by the Soviet Union was 100 percent. Due to the rapid training they had received, our missile units have failed to react in time in complex cases. A missile has a bigger diameter than two arms' length, and is twenty meters long. It is radar-guided when launched, It pursues and catches up with the target because its speed is faster than that of the target. When firing missiles, members of missile units acclaim: "Dragons are pursuing aircraft." Although the speed of the MIG l7's equals 60 percent of that of enemy aircraft, they have scored great achievements, and, in some cases, downed two enemy F-105's. The enemy did not think that we dared use MIG 17's to fight him. Technically speaking, if our equipment is poor we cannot identify the enemy. Enemy aircraft always dodge our MIG 21's. Yet, the MIG 21's have not yet been widely used. The enemy is afraid of us because we are both heroic and bold. We can counter enemy aircraft at any altitude. Cuba, the Soviet Union, China, and Korea, have voiced their readiness to help us, but we see that we are still able to fight alone. There are some conclusions I want to present so that we can rejoice: --The enemy has been unable to destroy our agricultural economy. Despite the fact that the youths have gone to the battlefields, the women and aged people have insured production and attained the planned norm of five tons per hectare. The youths have gone to the battlefield, the women have assumed the three responsibilities, engaged in all fields of activity in the rural areas, and simultaneously engaged in production and combat. 9 ~ (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 A team of women from a fruit factory, commanded by women cadres and equipped with machineguns, heavy machineguns, and 20mm and l2mm guns, put up a demonstration for women from foreign countries. The latter said that "l.f we were Americans we would have left Vietnam long ago." Another example: when she saw enemy aircraft appear, Miss Hang, a female guerrilla, rushed into the combat trench. But there was a snake in the trench. She wondered if she shculd fight the snake or shoot at enemy aircraft. She jumped into the trench and shot enemy aircraft. Only after shooting down an enemy aircraft did she return to kill ,he snake. The comrade Party Secretary concluded that Miss Hang had held firm to the Party's viewpoint. to direct the spearhead at the main enemy. --Now we can conclude that no matter what the enemy does, he cannot destroy us. During the past year, our brother countries gave us a quantity of equipment larger than that provided during the previous five years. Despite the present intensity of the war, the cost of living in the North has not risen. The masses' daily life remains normal. Our lines of communication are uninterrupted. At the beginning, we learned from the Korean Engineer Corps, but now the progress, we have made far exceeds that of the Korean Engineer Corps. Owing to our strong defense system, the enemy has encountered difficulties in bombing our installations. Although the Ham Rong bridge has been riddled with bullets, it is still standing, and the people living in the surrounding area have not :moved away. Transportation is possible. Despite the fact that we are in a war situation, our transportation capabilities have doubled, and we are using all means available. Yet, we still fail to meet the requirements of the 4th zone and of the South. The transportation operations on the roads are almost non-existent in. daylight. But at night, there are all kinds of transportation means, such as floating bridges, rafts, cable chains, rails installed on rafts for trains to cross over rivers, and so forth. Although the Americans can destroy our industry to a certain extent, they cannot destroy our national defense industry, because we do not yet have a major one. The socialist ccuntries' aid has been increased. We can thus conclude that even if the Americans intensify their air raids, we will still stand firm to protect the Torth and reinforce the South. 20 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Reinforcements to the South: The Northern citizens have clearly realized their responsibility with regard to this matter. Therefore, they have provided. reinforcements to the best of their ab.Llity. 1V. International support On the one hand, we find that international support is fairly good, and, on the other hand, we are The reason for this is that we are fighting the enemy at a time when there is a lack of unity within the socialist camp. This is a reality. Disunity still exists. We cannot just sit by and wait until the socialist camp is united to achieve decisive victory. On the -ontrary, we must achieve decisive victory within the next four years. Therefore, it is necessary to try to win maximum support. We say that our Party's leadership is correct and our people are heroic. Yet, without international support, our success would be limited although we still can achieve it. Generally speaking, the countries in the socialist camp unanimously agree with our line, and wholeheartedly assist us. Since the downfall of Khruschev, the Soviet Union has provided us with much assistance in all, fields. Three fourths of the weapons sent to the South have been received from the socialist camp. Half of the South's budget has been provided by our camp, mainly China. The quantity of weapons provided has been so large that we could not transport all of them. During the past year, the quantity of equipment provided for the building of the North equalled that received during the five previous years. We have sent back those materials for which we did not yet have requirements, so that we do not lose them or have to maintain them,. The socialist camp has agreed to construct mobile missile launching pads, and to establish factories to construct mobile missile launching pads for us Nevertheless, we are riot satisfied in certain respects. If there were no disunity within the socialist camp, our success would have been greater. Yet, we also rind that if we did not obtain the great assistance from our camp, we would not have been able to achieve such great successes. Our party has highly evaluated the support of the socialist camp. If we do not try to gain the support of the socialist camp, we will be guilty of our duty to our people We cannot accept the line of this country or that country in order to obtain aid, nor can we accept aid from one country without accepting aid from another, because otherwise we will be guilty before the entire camp, and before our people. (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 V. Realtions within the Socialist Camp China said: We must unite and insure the purity of Marxism-Leninism. Yet, only a number of countries have sided with China. The same situation also exists with regard to the Soviet Union. As for us, all countries in the camp, except Yugoslavia, are siding with us. Recently, our party did its best to contribute to the unity within the socialist camp. At a time when there is a -polemic among various countries, we must have an independent line. We must be confident in no one but our own Party. We advocate opposing revisionism, and, at the same- time, must take precautionary measures against dogmatism, and must constantly pre- serve international solidarity. China said: To positively oppose imperialism without positively opposing revisionism will finally lead to compromise with imperialism. That is not true. If one is revisionist., he does not oppose imperialism, and advocates peaceful coexistence with imperialism. We do not hold the view that the Soviet leadership is as revisionist as the leadership under Khrushchev, and that it is somewhat more dangerous than Khrushschev. We hold that the Soviet leadership still contains some rEvisionists, some indecisive elements, and al3o active elements. We do not think so. We think that Khrushchev fell because of internal causes, and, of course, the external struggle also was a very important contribution to his downfall. According to China, things do not have two or three characteristics. This is true. Yet, in a transitionary period when we are not yet positive about everything, we cannot attribute to environmental things this characteristic or another. Instead., we must continue to follow them up before we can draw a correct conclusion. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 * Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060 %3-2 :-11.3r GMtti!Y lad R.Y. TfiiiE5 19 April 1967 The Fearful Ulhricht Walter Ulbricht seems to have exceeded even his own previous records for cant and hypocrisy in his four-hour speech to the congress of East Germany's "Socialist Unity" party. Herr Ulbricht now says Ger- many can be united only after the West German CPYRGHT CPYRGHT bet not unexpected; Ulbricht is a frightened man. m He is frightened less of the kind of uprising thatt took place in- 1953 than of the creeping Isolation of East Germany even within the Soviet bloc. -He pan-,, ieked at the prompt, positive response of other!* Communist regimes to the initiatives launched by then Kiesinger-Brandt coalition. Panic accounts for his abrupt trip to Moscow, for l the feverish conclusion or renewal of bilateral treaties ; with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and for East Ger- many's blasts at Rumania after that regime had' accepted diplomatic relations with Bonn. Herr Ulbricht has slowed Bonn's diplomatic of- fensive but is doubtful that he can sidetrack' It. " i- The Soviet bloc is no longer a monolith taking orders from the Kremlin. Even the Poles and Czechs may one day find compelling'the advantages of closer.relations with West Germany. working class has seized control, overthrowing "mili- tarism, neo-Nazism and the power of-the monopolies." As Herr Ulbricht may recall, the. authentic revolt of German workers erupted not in the Federal Repub- lie but In his own "German Democratic Republic" fourteen years ago on June 17-and was crushed by Soviet tanks while the Communist leaders hid for their lives. Herr Ulbricht's sterile response to Chancellor Kiesinger's sixteen specific proposals for closer links :,,.between the two parts of Germany Is disappointing '?'~ SR C~1~Tr'Pl !cT;?R 23 - April 190 7 App East Zornie Reds Elect Fuchs, Eiser to Cenaral Committee BERLIN ~ (AP)-Atom spy Klaus Fuchs and propagandist Gerhart Eisler, once regarded as the No. I Communist spy in the United States, were elected yesterday to the Central Com- mittee of the East German Communist party, the official news agency ADN reported. Walter Ulbricht was unanimous- ly re-elected first secretary. Eisler was convicted and sentenced to prison terms in the United States for contempt of :Congress ' and falsifying visa information, but jumped bail and sailed to East Germany aboard the. Polish liner Batory on May 7, 1949. He is now 7u years old. Fuchs, 55. who worked as an atomic scientist in the United States and Britain during and after World War II, was convict oyflaw=IR ad aawft 20W and was sentenced to 14 years In prison. He was released after serving nine years and returned to East Germany, where he now is deputy director of a nuclear research center. New Politburo Named The elections took place at the seventh Communist party con- gress in East Berlin. It wound up yesterday. The 2,000 delegates elected a new 15-member Politburo, plus six candidate-members, and a new Central Committee. Delegations from 67 nations were present. The'Soviet delega- tion was led by Leonid I. Bre- zhnev and that of Poland by party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka, both of whom were present for Ulbricht's closing speech. oug cou get around such Communist demands as recognition of East Germany and of existing borders, includ- ing the border between East and West Germany. West Berlin Mentioned Ulbricht brought up the mat- ter of the neutralization of West Berlin. In his speech earlier in the week . Brezhnev hardly, mentioned West Berlin. One Western source evaluated'; the contrast in the reference to West Berlin this way: "Ulbricht was reminding his Soviet com- rades that the problem of West Berlin is still there and that despite the present days of East- West detente in Europe in Europe, it will have to be settled one day. He restated his govern-' need's chin to sovereignty in*; caw )0'06000.1 CPYRGHT i Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061 A000400060001-2 ' E1.emriIize Nazis in der CPYRGF-1' T_;-Fiihriing Vy. BERLIN.-. Mai. Lem neuen Zen- tralkomitee der SED. das von zwei Wo- then auf dem Parteltag derSED gewahlt worden fst, gehoren mindestens dreizehn ehemalige Nationalsosialisten an. Nadi einer Mittetlung des Untersurhungsaus= schusses freiheitiicher Juristen sind dar- unter zwei Minister sowwie ein Staats sekretar. Von den 131 Vollmttgttedern des Zentralkomitees nerint der Unter- suchungsausschud sechs ehemallge Na- _ tlonalsoziaiisten, den Minister and Vor- sitzenden des Komitees der Arbelter and Bauerninspektion, :Heinz Matthes,' den Staa.tssekretar fir rorschung uind Technik, Herbert Weiz, den Prssidentten, des Turn- and Sportbundes der DDIV,: Manfred Ewald. den Vizeprasidenten der: Akademie der Landwlrtschaftswissen-e schaften, Erich Rilbensam. das PrBsidi- umsmitglted der Einheitsgewerkschaft: FDGB, Horst Heintze, and den Sdu9it- steller Bernhard Seeger., Unter den 50, Kandidaten des Zentralkomitees der. SED.befinden aich weitere Sieben else- rpalige Parteigenoasen. T'Y rlr. zIS Irr S IM 1) :E-7 , ~. tip: ' erlin, 7 ,day. .Lt least .3 former National Socialists are wion 1.1ae raeriborz of the new SE) Central Committee elected two weeks ago et the S) :arty Congress , According to a report by the IzTu esti,,ating Committee of Free Jurists, they include two iinisters and one State ,ecretary. Of the 131 full nemters of the Central. Odrahittee, the Investigating Committee has identified six. former Heinz Matthes, :iini.ster and Chairrnian of the Comaittee of '?Zor]cer and Peasant Inspection :- rLert ?Teiz, State Secretary for Research and Technology ::ta red I .-tald, President of the Gym mastics and Sports :1j.;ocint:ion Erich Ruebensatn, Vice President of the Acadeny of iigricult'iral )ciences :=orst Heintze, :ember of the Presidium of the Free German Trade Union :association (FDGB) l er nhard Seeger, Aut. for ;;n additional seven former Nazis are among the 50 Candidate ]::embers of the S2 Central Committee. :~ ''~IIKFGRI'E t ALI,(}E^ IN!E MIMI T 8 iay 196?' Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 d For; Release 2000/08727, `CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 orenAffairs ulletin published by the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC Volume 7 January 25th 1967 Collaboration with Developing Countries. The GDR's scientific and industrial relations with a great number of developing countries, which have shown a very favourable trend particularly during 1965-86, form a substantial part of the country's economic exchanges. They are a decisive means of promoting and deepening the collaboration with these countries which in the new stage of their development have. taken steps to strengthen and safe- guard their national Independence. Arrangements to send specialists (outside commercial contracts) have helped these countries a great deal in building up and strengthening their own economies. Training of Technical Personnel When sending specialists and train- ing local staff the Interests of the country concerned are taken into consideration and due regard is being paid to the principle of equality and mutual respect of sov- ereignty. Thus, in 1965, advisers and spe- cialists were sent to 19 develop- ing countries and the number of trainees which came to the GDR from 48 countries to acquire tech- nical knowledge, had nearly doubled .as against 1964. opmen o e a ons In '1968 the GDR has made further CPYRGHT sur-essfuI efforts in expanding her 'Along the Lines of theist relations with the Arab and African UNCTAD Conference countries. As a result, agreements on scientific and industrial collaboration The GDR considers the cultly were signed. of this type of relationship to be e a a Experience made so far shows that essential contribution towards t on the basis of such long-term agree- realization of the requests voiced b meats the developing countries- can the developing countries at the eve be granted manysided and effective UN Conference for Trade and Deve help in widely varying held in 1964. scientific and Most favourable results have bee industrial fields. achievbd in scientific and industri On the other hand, a number of collaboration with the UAR, Syri developing countries have built up Mali and Guinea. In the spirit successfully certain branches of genuine equality of the partners th Industry and thereby gathered a GDR aims at a long-term - great deal of valuable experience operation, utilizing In the best pos from which the corresponding sible way the discoveries made b sectors of the GDR's industry can science and industry. benefit through the exchange of knowledge and experts. Collaboration is growing in im Moreover, it is possible to take up portance also in the field of planning favourable cooperative activities in Under Under the conditions of the scientifi various industrial fields, including revolution all-round economic, scien agriculture. tific and industrial exchanges are it line with the fundamental require Government agreements concluded meats of International contracts. with a number of countries, includ- ,,,,,__- _- __ _, ...., trig the UAR, Syria, Yemen and Mali, have shown good results. Other examples are the arrangements made with Algerie, Kongo-Brazzaville, Guinea and Burma,; which form a sound basis for developing scien- tific and industrial exchanges. entering into long-term relation involving a division of labour tween the GDR and the African Asian and Latin American eountriwhich have embarked upon the noth capitalist way of development. GDR FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES ARAB TOUR Bait Dcrlin Deutschlandsender in German to Germany 2040 GRIT 16 May 1967 (Intervi.ew g,.von by GDR Foreign Minister Otto Winner in Beirut to our Middle Eat;t correspondent Horst Kae4bler-recorded) ('Iextl Itaeubler: itr. Foreign Minister, in the past few days you visited the UAR, the Syrian Arab itcpublic. and the Republic of Lebanon. Would you kindly onllane the notit?en for your mission to a number of Arab states before the mierophonc of the GDR radio' Apprp @4 Q-'yR-? e ,sQQOIJiQ 7tlieCJA-t c7l8aQ22kl AQQO/4OO igi1Q2 the beginning of this year. For health reasons.I Was unfortunately compelled Approved-- erRelsase-20= =Rt?fi' '8=t?30- to put it off a little while. Meanwhile, the Seventh SED Congress has opened new perspectives for developing th^ GDR 'z foreign policy. It made good sense to talk with the statesmen of the Arab states about these new perspectives of our foreign policy, our domestic development, the great plans of the GAR? and to inform them of and discuss some of the problems. I can say that these talks were extremely fruitful, fruitful. for me and the GDR inasmuch as we became anquainted with the now problems ',-i the Arab States ve visited. The statesmen of the LIAR, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Lebanon used the opportunity to expound the fundamentals. of their foreign policy,_some tio l ns a problems of their domestic development, and questions of international re in th^ Arab area. Summing up, I may say that the motives for my mission were. to develop good relations between the (GDR and the Arab states and to open up now horizons. aa.uwledgeof the problems of the Arab states. So there was an extremely wide range -D foreign policy as outlined at the Seventh SE,D Congress. A knowledge o e g Wacubler: Mr. Foreign Minister, you had conversations in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut with the leaders of these three states. Can you tell our listeners sonething about the substance of your talks? ;nzer; it is general knowledge that she economic,isa.ritime, and aviation relations the cultural, sci.ent.ific, and tech:lical cooperation between the GDR and the ':cob states = visited are developing very well. It is necessary further to develop 1o[trical relations between our states. This requires primarily a knowledge of ~` . f th rear' Kaeutler: After this first stage of your mission and shortly before your departure, may I ask your impressions of the states you have visited? .)f topics in my conversations in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut. I may say that, my dis4-?4sdions will bear fruit in the course of time; that is, our relations will develop in the political a;; well as in the economic and cultural field. tlinzer: I can say- that m:r impressions are extremely good. 1. can say that on the whole the mutual understanding between the statesmen with whom I had an opportunity to speak and the GDR government is developing increasingly,. It should be mentioned that my visit to the Republic of Lebanon was the first in many years which offered. nr opportunity for detailed and thorough talks with the foreign siinister and Premier of the Republic of Lebanon, with many parliamentarians and other representatives. of economic life. Here In Beirut, I gave information about our policy and my partners briefed us on the polic"T of neutrality and nonalinement of the Republic of Lebanon. On this basis, we discussed how political relations will develop in addition to our economic and cultural relations. gumming up, after the first stage of my visit to Arab countries, I can say that it was fruitful and will bear fruit in the future. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 -Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 CPYRGHT CC ?1Ui?:IST PERSEC?L! TICir OF E.:'TISTS LOS 11NGLLi s TIMES 24 August 1966 ;Sid Baptist Leaders Soviet Imprisons BY VINCENT J. BURKE MOSCOW-Forty young Soviet men and women. were baptized In the 'Don River on May 2 and the six ,Baptist leaders who organized the inass religious rite havdt been sen- tend;ed to prison. In disclosing th1, Tuesday, a So. net. newspaper reported that' the Baptist leaders also were convicted of illegally operating a Sunday school and printing religious tracts on an-underground printing press. 'After the Orthodox Church, the aptlsts are the second largest reii- `~gious group in-.the Soviet Union -with mare than half a million adher. The article said without elabora- tion that the six defendants were sentenced to prison terms of varying length. The mass baptism occurrgd In Rostov on the Dori and the defen- clants were tried by a regional court fat~Rostov, the newspaper said. An account of the trial, published In Teachers Gazette, indicated that youthful believers who ware called; ''as witnesses were defiant and con' temptuous of the court. "They behaved angrily and fanatt ally, the?article said. Moreover, among the spectators at' + the trial some. young women gazed, "with admiration at, the, defendants Approved For Release 2000/08/ the atheistic pablic.". The author r~ot.ed that this display of youthful ad F?i f? HTChri9tiait;;1ic refs does not correspond with the conventional So. 4 Met view of the .BaptSt,-irt the Soviet. Union.,. "We think of them ,as (quiet old people who have' not' .got rid of 'the ret ' slants of the past," the tit+- title noted, The success of the. Bap. fin group In propagating the: ,faith among Soviet. youth was cited as conclu4 give' evidence of serious, hortcotn.ings'ot thde; overnment's program' of i "atheistic education." The: uthor said it wag too late o Indoctrinate youths in theism if they are be-,j fevers at the age of 17 nd 18. Student Baptism 't~hoie baptized at thEi, ass immersion rite were' aid 'to have included' - a f4I'student ae'a.construc-" ion:. engineering college at. .ostnv, who `is'a aihembetY f the---Xomsomol (Young ommunist League What is the ?. otigin. nt h is rcllggious attitude mong "yesterday's school iris, who live among our, oviet youth and study,' cience' w; all the l.hers?" the.aeticle' asked, It 'said the trial testimo' gat a the' nswer: ?In . the underground.' tinting house in, the .su-, u r? b > of. ' flostov the, brothers and sisters in ,hrist ? 's are, diligently" ultiplying in hundreds f copies Baptist maga t Ines, entitled; "Herald of aving," "Rule' of Behavi- r of Children"and "'file-, rothers' Papers.", A -government I witness; Id the court that the ina-% azines constituted "active. rohadauda ' of religion,"1 skint; bow else one could escribe a passage. which, t' ailed ' n'i You+h to ? "take; ;ay 1967 ibaptism, t~rpanized wi,th-' out knowledge of local au-, tthorities, "violated social` order and called forth in 1WIgnatiori of thb people off, ;Rostov." . At the "illegal" Sunda3lp 'schools, the article. said, "I I 1 i t e'r ate and fanatic/- teachers taught children" tot 8 to 7Y of God's teachal, ing,. systematically educat. ` !ng in them a relf ious';? World butltrok." g Call. for Disobedience e're lLIgiaus tracts were said, to have some- t I'M e s contained "direct'+ ''calls to the believers not to'; obey Soviet 'laws." The group accused of il- legal activities was termed. a faction within thb regu?i" ar Baptist organisation. Within` this group, the rticle afd, parent&.forbid,y hildren -to attend the inema, to ? participate In t 'egular social life, to be ac.; Ive in` *Young 'Pioneers 14 he Soviet'organizatlon fors hildren,.:'and''make their, hildrek "real;lh~Bible,;~ PPYRGHT ? , WASHINGTON POST CF2$ber 1966 Soviets Jail 3 ' MOSCOW - Three women members of it Fundamentalist Baptist sect have been sen. tenced to three-year jail terms for secretly holding re- ligious classes for children in Yzhny, a village on the Volga River east of Moscow. It was the fourth such case reported this year. The Baptist Church, offl. dally registered with Soviet :authorities, estimates there are about 250,000 "unrcgis. tried" Baptists in the nation. ,The newspaper Sovictskaya ;Rossiya said the women were not sentenced for their re. ligious views, but for organiz. ing classes to teach Christian. lty to, children. otd0oV q?ma"ss6r A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 RUSSIAN BAPTISTS QUOTE LENIN IN PLEA FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE By Arthur Channing Back in 1903, when he was seeking popular support: for his revolutionary cause, V. I. Lenin made an eloquent defense of religious freedom in Russia. After his Bolsheviks gained power in 1917 and established the world's first Communist regime, however, he discarded. his seemingly liberal views and helped to launch the campaign against all religions that his successors are still waging today. The-Russian Church of Evangelical Christians-Baptists recently reminded the present Soviet leadership of Lenin's previous stand in an appeal for religious freedom addressed to the USSR's highest party and governmental authorities. This quotation from a 1903 Lenin statement was included in the, Baptists' "Each person must have complete freedom not only to observe any faith but also (to) propagate any faith.... None of the officials should even have a right to ask anyone of his faith: this is a matter of conscience and nobody should dare to interfere in this field?" The Baptists cited. a number of other instances in which Communists have taken public positions that are now being contradicted by the party's day- to-day persecution of religious believers throughout the USSR. Their letter, written in April, 1965 but unknown. outside of the Soviet Union until a copy reached contacts in Western Europe in July, 1966 -- pointed Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061 A000400060001-2 -3- out that the original Soviet constitution of 1918 professed to recognize the right of each citizen to immunity from both "religious and anti-religious propaganda." Later, however, the constitution was changed to fit the present policy of denying believers the right to propagate their faith but giving the party's atheist agitators a free hand in conducting anti-religious propaganda. The Baptist appeal also charged that Soviet authorities had violated provisions of the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1962) dealing with freedom of conscience, con- victions and religious beliefs. Specific reference was made to Article 5 of the Declaration which states that parents "must have the possibility of securing for thcir children a religious and moral upbringing in conformity with their own convictions." Since 1929, the letter said, the revised Soviet constitution has permitted the wholesale persecution of believers, thousands of whom perished in prisons and labor camps. "Can one say that all these nightmares are of.things of the past?" the Baptist appeal asked. "No! The crime has not yet ended. It still con- tinues. And here is a vivid example of this: At the very time you are reading this letter, hundreds of believers are being deprived of liberty illegally. They are languishing in prisons, labor camps and in exile. Some of them died in agony as martyrs. The children are being taken away from their parents. Thousands of Evangelical Christian-Baptist communities are deprived of all rights. Their meetings are being held in private homes which sometimes can accommodate only 25 to 30 percent of a Baptist community, and even under these Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001; 2 trying conditions the believers cannot get together without harassment. Quite often their meetings are dispersed by police and volunteer militia? and their homes confiscated. All this testifies to the fact that the crime has not yet ended." The letter included a plea for restoration of the original wording of the constitution and for the honoring of its provisions concerning religion. It was addressed to L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the Supreme Soviet (parliament); legislative committees of the Supreme Soviet; the USSR Council of Ministers; and the Presidium of the USSR,Supreme "As:rulers," the Baptist spokesmen said in conclusion, "you carry the responsibility before God, not for the violation of church canons, but for the violation of natural laws of truth, liberty, equality and fraternity." Although there has been no indication of an official Soviet reply to the Baptists' plea for religious tolerance, press reports from Moscow in late August revealed that six of the church's leaders had been sentenced to prison for taking part in a baptismal ceremony for 40 young men and women. The Baptists, according to these reports, also were charged with giving religious instruction and secretly printing religious tracts. In an earlier incident, two young parish priests of the Russian Orthodox Church, Fathers Nicholas Eshliman and Gleb Yakunin, were suspended from performing their religious duties after writing similar letters of protest to Soviet and church officials. The priests charged, in December 1965,? that Soviet officials had undermined the church's own leadership and, in effect, Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 . Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 -5- held the power of veto over all religious activities. .They pointed out that no priest can be ordained without approval of the regime's Council on Affairs of the Church. More than ten thousand churches and dozens of monasteries, training seminaries and convents were closed by Communist authorities between prohibited by Soviet law. 1961 and 1964, the priests added, although such actions supposedly are CPYRGHT ZHE SUNDAY TIMES . 10 July 1966 01 11, lists by a Special Correspondent ?; THE EXPULSION of four West-, 'ern naptists, three British and one Dutch, from Russia last week for trying to "smuggle" Bibles into the country follows a spate ofs trials and -mass arrests of Soviet' Baptists. 1 Baptist women accused of run- ning illegal Bible classes and. Sunday schools have, recently; been put on trial in places as fan apart as We,tcrn Ukraine and. Soviet Kirghizia in Central Asia, Sentences were harsher than usual, with none under five years, hard labour: Last month there were anti- Baptist riots in the town of` Mtsensk, Russian Federation, and; special militia units had to be' called out to control potential' lynching parties determined to' " get the Baptists." i The wave of anti-Baptist inci-. dents is believed to be linked' with the emergence of a militant group within the Russian Evan- gelical Christian Baptist Churchl, following dissatisfaction among' the faithful with the present Church leadership. One.of their leaders summed up their dispute Approved For Rel ?et 9OFO8/21eTs@IAhRD ussia" pus: Uueeze way: We abide by God's Laws only, and the leadership of the Evangelical Baptist Church',has bowed to the temporal too.". Long-term aims'.' The new group want to. oust'; the, present leadership, which ,is recognised by the Council fort Religious Affairs, and hope 'to achieve-this in a democratic way'. at an all-unlon , congress of Igo Baptists. But their aims' go further than changing a church' 'leadership that "has tu'ned' `'its back on Christ's teachings." l` The ' Baptist Organisational,;', rCommittee, as the leaders of the*' tmilitant-group call themselves,''{ ?demand an Immediate .. end to. kState interference in the upbring- ing of Baptist children and claim,: tthe right ' to withdraw their" children from, anti-religloui', instruction classes at- school: c Unlike 'the official Church':` leadership, the, organisational: committee does not seem' to believe' in passive - resistance: SIllegally printed 'leaflets have' "urged the faithful to "fight term poral laws" and to be, guided ,in all their ;actions by- "God's .laws alone.' " Speakers " of the group have: been calling on officials of district,;! regional and republican ,'councils' as well as the Council of.Religious' Affairs in Moscow, petitioning they 'Convocation of Baptist Congress.i Soviet officials believe- there- ir.? already a big enough religiot ,n revival going. on In the Soviet Union without, British, Baptists; distributing Bibles in the country h-2 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 CPYRGHT Ifuroyadou on &ptist Schism and Lr,s on Religion interview at Readers' Request: SOME QUF;STiONS ON REI.1- r,1ON AND THE CIIURCII. (izvestia, Aug. a0, p. 4. Complete text:) From time to time izvestia publishes articles concern- Ing religion, the church, and atheist work. They usually evoke many letters from readers. The editors, feeling that the thoughts expressed in the let- ters are of interest of the public, asked Vladimir Alekseyevich Kuroyedov, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' Council for Religious Affairs, to answer some of the questions raised by reactors. question.-Are there many believers in our country? What status do Soviet laws grant to religious organizations and what procedure do they provide for these organizations' activities? Answer.-It is impossible to answer the question of how many believers there are, since our country conducts no state census of citiz.;,,is in regard to their attitude toward religion. No official documents contain indications of whether a person professes a religion or is a nonbeliever. It Is very important to emphasize this circumstance, for it is one of the conditions for ensuring freedom of conscience in the U.S.S.R. Under the Soviet Constitution, the church in our country is separated from the state, and the schools from the church, in order to ensure freedom of conscience. In conformity with this, state agencies do not interfere In the internal devotional activities of religious organizations. Religious organizations. In turn, do not inter- fere in any state affairs. The soviet state, taking into account the fact that a part of the population consists of believers, permits church associa lions to function freely in order to satisfy the religious needs of the believers, These associations are granted the use of church buildings without charge and are granted the possibility (if training clergymen, publishing religious literature, manu- facturing articles of worship, etc. Our laws strictly protect the rights of believers, An Insult to the feelings of helievers or any kind of discrimination ;c ainst them is prosecuted according to law. ft is precisely in these conditions, which have been created in our country, that it is possible genuinely to ensure every citizen the freedom to believe or not believe in God, the free- clon- to perform religious rites or to spread antircligious prop- aganda. Everything stated above is a commonly known truth. Foreign church delegations visiting the Soviet Union acknowledge that the church in our country exists freely and independently. Yet from time to time some Western publications print islander and various insinuations about the status of religion in the U.S.S.R. For example, the newspaper Lo Parisien Libere, in its issue of April 4, 1966, presented as a sensation a report of new Russian Itcpublic legislation concerning the church and, in so doing, offered the peremptory conclusion that 'a new of- fensive against Christian worship" was being organized in our country. Let us see how matters actually stand. At the beginning of this year the Presidium of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet adapted two decrees and a resolution concerning legislation on religious cults. Similar resolutions :out decrees were adopted by the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of other Union republics. Any unbiased person, after reacting these documents (published in Vcdomosti Verkhovnovo Soviea RSF'SII, No. 12, March 24, 1966), will recognize that there can be no talk of an 'offensive" against the church and against believers' rights or of any infringement of these rights. These decrees and resolutions were adopted to clarify the prevailing legislation on cults; they concern chiefly the ques- tion of combating violations of the law on the separation of church and state and of schools and church, and they clarif it along the followtppm'Ye Po v, Releases20 / set forth specifically which violations of the above law entail criminal liability. The Itussian Republic Criminal Code (Art. 142) had not previously defined these specific violations. It should be particularly emphasized that the sphere of criminal punishment has been considerably narrowed. And for various types of violations an administrative penalty has been intro- duced in place of criminal responsibility. Essentially, it is a matter of reducing the punishment of per- sons who are first offenders against the law on separation of church and state. However, increased responsibility is estab- lished for citizens who had previously been convicted of such violations and also for those who have undertaken organized activities aimed at the committing of such violations. From all this it is apparent that the new judicial acts do not at all infringe upon the rights of believers, all the more so since the resolution of the Presidium of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet states that discrimination against believers is punished according to criminal procedure. In particular, this concerns such instances as 'refusal to hire citizens or to admit then. to educational institutions, dismissal from work or expul- sion from educational institutions, and the deprivation of citi- zens' privileges and benefits that have been established by law, as well as other substantial limitations of the rights of citizens because of their attitude toward religion." It is not fortuitous that believers and also the clergy correctly understood these new normative acts of the Union republics and approved them. To the credit of certain foreign church publications, it should be said that they gave an objective Interpretation of the new So- viet acts on religion and the church. Such an influential church publication as the Bulletin of the World Council of Churches do- clared in No. 17, May 26: 'At the beginning of April various news services carried re- ports from Moscow that a decree of the Supreme Soviet in Rus- sia (the Russian Republic) introduced restrictions on freedom of religion. A study of the text, actually containing three decrees, showed that these decrees on the whole confirm, clarify and In some cases introduce greater flexibility into existing laws. Contrary to what was printed in the newspapers, none of these decrees forbids freedom to collect JrontributionsJ for the needs of the church or sanctions discrimination against persons be- cause of their religion, 'To illustrate the alleviation of previous conditions, it may he noted that some law violations previously punished by im- prisonment now only entail a fine of up to 50 rubles." The bulletin goes on to give, on similar aspects. a concrete analysis of each of the new normative acts of the Presidium of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet concerning religious cults. Thus, no matter how much Le Parisien Libere wanted to slander the Soviet government's policy toward religion, it failed. The new legislative acts in the sphere of religion and the church are in no way a persecution of religion or a violation of the i principle of freedom of conscience in the U.S.S.It. Of course, freedom of conscience in our country does not mean, as some clergymen would like, that the activities of religious orl;anizalions should be completely unrestricted and that they may do whatever they wish, without regard for the laws and customs of our country. Every state has special laws on religion and the church, es- tablishing a definite framework for the activity of religious associations. It is natural that we too have laws on religion and the church. The basic one is the Soviet government decree 'On Separation of Church From State and of Schools From the Church," '? issued Jan. 23, 1918, and signed by V. I. Lenin. The chief requirement which the law sets for religious organi- zations is that hey( corfi h i c iXit "WA g nc 7roi fl~ i IdirAWa er and without infringing upon the person or rights of citizens. The law forbids the use of meetings of believers for addresses rntnnginrr this Intnrnet.t of cn..inI , nc .nn11 n- 11... t! Ilaptlstcri in der Sowjctunion, zn loser and nicltt den gesamten Komplex in don Iliinden dcs Unionsrdtes zu be- lessen, dem sio eino zn starke staatlicho Gebuudea- Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060001-2 -17 Widerstand Der Tnllait sowio die Art, die notion Instruk- tionen den Gli.ubigen . auf so . undemokratisclie Weise aufzuerlegeu, gentigten, cino Protestbcwc- gung auszuliisen. A. F. Prolcof jcw and G. K. Krjtc- t.3chkow warcu 1361 die Initiatoren einor Gegen. ;boweguug, (lie sich rxl+sitsiativnikin nanntc. In illrer tl. 13otschaft~, veriangten sio" dio sbfortigo Linbtirufung clues Kongresses alter Baptisten, um auf dem Wego demokratiscber Abstinunung3- metho(len, das lieil3t durch des Votum allor toil- 'uohmenden I3aptisten, cine V enordnung des All- !uniousrates zu crzielen, in , dessen Iiandlungs- iweiso sic cia Diktat des Staates sateen. Taints der, tllaupttraktanden des Kongresses solute die Neu 1 walll des AUunionsrates sein, dessen Mitglieder. !bisher aus'cinem sorgfiiltig ausgewabltcn Gremium bcstanden. Will achr man bestrobt war, den Ril3 wieder gutzamnchon, ist aus der Rcaktion auf den Protest crtsichtlich: tier KongreB wurde cinborufen, rlie oberste Mbrltng des Rates ncu gewuhlt lid these and jone wenig bedeutende Konze.ssion ge- f maeht, urn,rlie im Lanfe der uliebsten Jahre einsetzten. 1.)cl ?Clt anti do #iir knnn man wohl in der fur die t ti