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November 17, 2016
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June 19, 1967
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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Approved For Release 2000/0 '8-03061 A000400060002-1 Signhicant Dates [ASTERISK DENOTES ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS] AUG 20* Leon Trotsky murdered in Mexico City. 1940 23* Soviet Union and Nazi Germany conclude non-aggression pact, opening way for German attack on Poland, and its partition between Germany and the USSR. 1939. 25* Paris liberated by Free French forces with UOS. Army. 1944. 27* Kellogg-Briand Pact (Treaty of Paris) signed, renouncing war as instrument of policy. 1928. 28 Aug-Sept 2. 10th International Congress of Linguists, Bucharest. (Includes S EP non'-Communist participants.) " I* Germany invades Poland; World War II begins. 1939. Now 3-8 17th Pugwash Conference on "Scientists and World Affairs," Ronneby, Sweden. 8 Summit meeting of Organization of African Unity, Kinshasa, Congo. II* Constituent Assembly election, South Vietnam. Despite Viet Cong threats, 80.8% of voters turn out. 1966. 13-15 Conference on Portuguese Colonies, South and South-West Africa, Zimbabwe, and Rhodesia, Conakry, Guinea. Sponsored by- the World Peace Council (Com- munist front). 17* (Old Style: 4 Sep) Trotsky released from jail. Becomes head of Petrograd Soviet, sets stage for "October Revodition." 1917. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY. 17* Soviet Union invades Poland, proceeds to occupy eastern half of country. (See under 23 Aug and I Sept above.) 1939. 18* UN Secretary General Dag Hanm arskjold dies in plane crash near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia. 1961. 25 (to I October) Fdurth General Conference of BITEJ (Travel Bureau of World Federation of Democratic Youth -- Communist)meets in Budapest in conjunction with FIYTO (federation of non-communist commercial travel agencies). OCT I* Indonesia Communist attempt coup, defeated by army. Sukarno's power reduced. 1965. ...2* Mohandas Gandhi born. (Assassinated 30 January 1948.) 1862. 4* USSR launches first artificial earth satellite ("Sputnik"). 1957. 10th Anniv. 10* Wuchang Uprising begins revolution, leading to end of Chinese monarchy. Chinese Nationalist holiday: 1911. 14* Coup in Kremlin removes Khrushchev from power. Succeeded by Leonid Brezhnev as'CPSU First Secretary and Aleksei Kosygin as Premier. 1964. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061AO00400060002-1 c r (Significant Dates) Approved For Release 2000/08/ A6W6 6W8-03061 A000400060002-1 Unsolicited French Initiative Showed Wel- come Results Briefly Noted 0001" Popular Support of U.S. Policy Reflect- ed in Letters Soviet Asset WORLD MARXIST REVIEW Not Unilateral An effective method of encouraging expressions of appreciation for what the United States is doing in Vietnam and in other world trouble spots is the "Letter to the editor" of local news- papers signed by citizens of the foreign country. An excellent example of this is the letter (see attached reproduction) in the 25 April L'AURORE of Paris signed by a certain Monsieur Hummel urging Frenchmen to send cards to the American Embassy to show that demon- strations of antipathy toward the United States actually come from only a minority of Frenchmen. (The Embassy subsequently reported that it had received, as a result of this private initiative, a flood of mail supporting U.S. policy in Vietnam and saying "Merci" to Americans for their assistance in World Wars I and II.) O b For the second time in five months, the Rumanian edition (March 1967) of WORLD MARXIST REVIEW (PROB- LEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM) omitted the lead article contained in the Eng- lish, Russian and other language editions. The article in question, attributed to Gus Hall, American Communist leader, was entitled "The Foe Does not Succumb to Slogans". The Rumanians objected to it because of remarks it contained which were highly critical of the Chinese Commun- ist Party leaders (specifically naming Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao). In Novem- ber 1966, the Rumanians also omitted the lead article in their edition. Entitled "October and Progress", it dealt with the differences between the more industrially developed countries of the Soviet Bloc such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the essentially agrarian countries, which certainly included Rumania. That article also contained oblique remarks intended to be critical of Red China, such as a reference to the "nihilistic theories of Bakunin". Another article dealing with South and Southeast Asia was also omitted from the November Rumanian edition, apparently because of critical remarks concerning India, Ceylon, and other countries with which the Rumanians would like to maintain cordial rela- tions. As WMR is the authoritative Soviet international review -- though published in Prague, it is Soviet- supported, and its editor is a high CPSU official -- these instances of Rumanian censorship are undoubtedly highly displeasing to the Soviet Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 _' " ? r r (Briefly Noted Cont. ) Approved For Release 2000%0S L27_: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 propaganda, bosses and further evi- dence of the widening split between the Rumanian and Soviet Communist Parties. (Unclassified) 25X1C10b Communist United Nations to Consider Nations Draft Convention on Elim- Put on mating Religious Intoler- the Spot ance Also Attacks New Clandestine Radio Socialist Urges Danish Support Government for Viet C, This :fall the U.N. General Assembly w.:il.L discuss implementation machinery for an International Conven- tion, unanimously adopted by the human Rights Commission at its last session, on the "Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance." Nations which ratify the Convention would be committed to give individuals freedom to believe or not to believe, to change their belief, to manifest it to acts of worship, and to teach it to their children without threat of civil sanctions. These nations would also be obligated to adopt immediate and effective measures to combat ^eligious prejudice. Quite obviously nations of the Communist Bloc will be reluctant to append their signatures to such a document, or if they do it certainly will be with a considerable amount of mental reservation. During the next few months, therefore, assets should he encouraged to play up evidence of religious persecution and exploitation in Communist countries in an effort to throw as much light as possible on this unsavory aspect of life under Communism before the world community of nations votes on the issue. Suitable back- ground material for this is carried regularly in PRESS COMMENT, and the latest in the series of BPG items in the series on "Communism vs. Religion" On 22 May a clandestine :radio broadcast was heard-in Denmark call- ing for donations for the Viet Cong and urging that demonstrations be held to protest against the visit of Secretary of State Rusk t:o Copenhagen 15-16 June. The broadcast also de- nounced Denmark's Socialist Govern- ment as "a faithful lackey of the capitalists." (See BPG :[.tem #1043 of 1.8 July 1966 for details of how the Communists were courting the Danish Social Democrats last year in the obvious ' l:iope , not since real-- ized., of infiltrating the Government via the "popular front" strategy.) AP on the follow- ing day said the clandestine station is run by "extreme leftists" who say they w`_11 soon have a transmitter strong enough to reach all of Denmark. Danish authorities said, they would attempt to trace the transmitter and if it is located on Danish soil they will close it down since the law for- bids all radio stations except Govern- ment owned ones While the possibility exists that local activists of the Danish C.P. are operating a portable transmitter either inside the country or from a ship anchored offshore., there is also reason to believe that transmitters located in East Germany might be used for this Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/0 78-03061A000400060002-1 25X1C10b the Communist clandestine radio "net- work" operates from transmitters in East Germany and elsewhere.) Assets may speculate on either loca- tion, but in any case should make the point that this is just one more piece of evidence that the Communists continually flaunt all types of international agreements (in this respect international broadcasting regulations) in their campaign to denigrate the United States and all Free World nations which support its policies in Vietnam. Professional Communist and Free Meeting Con- World Journalists verted Into Debate in Europe_ ideological Forum A five-day so-called "international con- ference of European journalists" end- ed in the Italian resort of Lignano on 16 May. TASS reports that it was attended by some 120 delegates from Italy, France, West Germany, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Ger- many, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, "and other countries". Representatives of the Communist-front International Organization of Journalists, head- quartered in Prague, and its Free World counterpart, the Brussels-based International Federation of Journal- ists, met for the first time to dis- cuss such purely professional matters as salaries, social insurance, medical services, and information gathering. As to be expected in any such forum, however, the Communist dele- gates seized the opportunity to ex- pound their own political ideology and, as TASS put it, the professional discussions went beyond their "narrow framework and developed into a wide conversation about the future of Europe, European security, and Europ- ean unity." The ensuing debates be- tween East and West representatives were marked, according to the TASS report, by a "spirit of mutual toler- ance" and highlighted by the remarks of the head of the Soviet delegation, IZVESTIYA Editor in Chief, L. N. Tolkunov, who said: "No one will deny that we have fundamental ideological differences, but the fact that they did not be- come a stumbling block in our contacts testifies to the high sense of res- ponsibility for the destinies of European and universal peace as shown in Lignano. This proves that the all-European political barometer can indicate fair weather with more con- fidence and with less fluctuations and zigzags." In view of the fact that the conference set up working commissions to maintain contacts with journalists' organizations in various European countries the advice given in BPG Item #1126 of 22 May on the Inter- national Organization of Journalists becomes all the more timely, espec- ially since European media comment on the situation in Vietnam gets such worldwide play. The TASS report notes that (unspecified) "major racial problems" were surfaced during the Lignano debates, but we can con- fidently predict that every Communist wile -- or to use Comrade Tolkunov's word, "zigzag" -- will be employed henceforth to overcome these problems and infiltrate as many sectors of public opinion molding as possible. Attached is an article from the 17 May issue of Rome's Socialist Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 3 (Briefly Noted Cont.) Approved For Release 20001Q$f I -RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 AVANTI (with translation) contain- ing some further details on the Lignano session, which apparently passed re:_a- tively unnoticed in the West European press. Note that the Rome newspaper version, says the meeting heard a speech by Italian Minister of Tourism and Entertainment Corona on "the close correlation between tourism and the press." A short news item in the 1E6 May issue of Milan's CORRIERE DELLA SERA reported that the Lignano meeting had been organized by the Italian Press Federation and local enterprises in the overnight lodging business. Selected assets might speculate that the tourism angle is not mentioned in the TASS report, perhaps among other reasons because of Communist sensitivities concerning their own tourists who have fled to the Free World while on foreign tours. Egypt Use of Poison Gas Verified Bombs by Red Cross Yemen-is With Gas The International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva issued on 2 June a press release, reporting that its delegates in Yemen had gone on 15 and 16 May to a vil- lage in northern Yemen, and had found there evidence indicating the use of asphyxiating poison bombing. Many inhabitants of the village had died of asphyxiation, and the Red Cross team had itself been delayed in reaching the site by an air attack (apparently not involving use of gas). There have been reports of use of poison gas in Yemen for some time, but this is the most authoritative and impartial. report to appear so far. The Red Cross did not name the culprit government, but other reports make it clear that the Egyptian government bears the blame in this situation. (For text of Red Cross: statement and other coverage, see PRESS COMMENT, 5 and 6 June 1967.) The report of the Red Cross did. not receive as much attention as it otherwise might have, due to its appearance just before the outbreak of Near Eastern Arab-Israeli hostili- ties, though West German and U.S. sales of gas masks to Isra.el were widely linked with this report. Where the situation permits and assets have not previously played the Red Cross and other reports, we recommend play on this subject. Egypt signed (in 1928) the Geneva protocol!- of 17 June 1925 against the use of poison and asphyx- iating gases. It also voted in November 1966 for a Hungarian- originated UN resolution outlawing the use of poison gas. In the case of Yemen, unlike the use of gas in World War I,those attacked are inno- cent civilians, including women and children, not soldiers. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 4 -.Approved For Release 2000/08/ 8-03061A000400Oa60002-11967 25X1C1Ob Ap Approved For Release 20DDLQBL27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 2 (Cont. ) Approved For Release 2000/0 8-03061A0004000609g~I1 1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Approved For Release CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Lt (Cont. Approved For Release 2000/nRjWI-fO RDP78-03061 A000400060002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061AO00400060002-1 5 (Cont. Approved For Release 20 8/27 : Cam-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 6 MMRPEPINNNNMMMM. Approved For Release 2000/08/ - P78-03061 A000400060002-1 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 7 I -*mm Approved For Release 2000 7 ? CIA-RDP78-03061 A000400060002-1 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 8 Approved For Release 2000/0 P78-03061A00040060?0-617 1135 FE. ASIAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 25X1C10b SITUATION: Europe's sensationally successful Common Market has put a new luster on the concept of'regional organizations. Other brands of regional organizations -'political military, etc. - have their parts to play at various stages of regional development, but eventually seem to be surpassed in impact and viability by effective economic organizations. Asia has no equivalent to the Common Market, nor indeed has it Europe's post-war remains of a developed industrial base and communications system. However, despite Asia's diversity of races, culture, languages and economic development - a variety greater than that of any other continent - there are indications that Asia is able and even willing to work at regional cooperation. In reviewing progress made along these lines in 1966, the conservative and influential TOKYO SHIMBUN told its 1,600,000 daily readers that "1966 has been a year when awareness and confidence in Asia for the Asians germinated" citing as evidence the establishment of the 32-member billion-dollar Asian Development Bank', Japan's hosting of a regional economic conference, economic construc- tion in South Korea and Taiwan, etc. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 (1135 Cont.) Approved For Release 1aGa148L27- CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 2 Approved For Release 2000/^m7= _RDP78-03061A0004QQO60002-1 v et Government $1 billion to :;72 billion for military equipment. According to Baic1:w:in, Syria had. received about 400 tanks and self-propelled guns and about 150 aircraft from the USSR. Other sources, including NEWSWEEK and U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, refer to similar amounts of Soviet Aid in tvae r art,a.cIes. A detailed listing of tanks, aircraft, and naval ves-^els, With by type, is given in, the London publication FORUM WORLD FEATURES (FACTS TO FILE) of May 27, 1967. Quality and. Effectiveness Although military commentators usually term Soviet military equipment good, some of them are raising serious questions about the suitability of such equipment for Middle Eastern conditions. For example it has been widely publicized that the Israelis modified their old World War II tanks by widening the tracks, raising the suspension, and increasing the fire- power by replacing the 9O-mm guns with 105-mm guns. There is no indication that the Soviets made extensive modifications of their all-climate tanks in order to adapt them for desert warfare Analogous information tends to bear out the possibility that the Soviets were negligent in this regard. For example, a recent article from Informations d'Outre-Mer (Paris, May 24, 1967) states: The motors with which the Soviet trucks of the Algerian Army are equipped are too fragile and consume too much fuel; moreover, it is difficult to use them in the Sahara. For this reason, they will be an me~1t'4eAo-`$S~3'i~Of0~1 Appr Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Earlier, the Egyptians, when building the Aswan High Dam, found they had to replace large amounts of Soviet construction equipment (including caterpillar-type tractors) with British and American equipment. Furthermore, there have been persistent reports that the Soviets have sent tractors and trucks to equatorial Africa with elaborate enclosures and heating facilities for the cabs. The age of the tanks supplied by the USSR is considered by some to have been a factor of possible significance in the poor performance of the UAR's tanks. About half of them were Soviet World War II models, and thus manufactured between 1942 and 1917. Considering the Soviets' generally poor record on the maintenance of all kinds of equipment, and the fact that the maintenance manuals for Soviet tanks were in English, it is not hard to understand that the Arabs would find it difficult to keep the tanks in operating condition. The matter of inadequate Soviet instruction in the use of equipment may have been a major factor in the inability of the Arabs to use the Soviet equipment effectively. Publication of the manuals in English, a language foreign to Russian instructors and Arab trainees alike, undoubtedly resulted in inadequate understanding. This is illustrated by the Soviet S.AM which was captured on the Sinai. Besides instructions in Russian, the missiles had written on them in English, these words: "By operating with plunger the drive should be engaged to reduction gear. It is not allowed to operate with plunger at accelerated gear."' Would any two people interpret these instructions the same way? Not only were the manuals unclear, but frequently they were non-existent. Often the equipment had to be repacked and kept in crates for months while the Arabs awaited the arrival of the manuals. Doctrinal and Tactical Training Very likely, the Soviets' military training of the Arabs will be found upon investigation to have been woefully inadequate and even misleading. By virtue of the differences in terrain between the USSR and the Middle East, the Soviet instructors probably had an inadequate'grasp of desert warfare. But the Soviets' major short--.comings probably arose from a tend- ency to refer to their own military experience when instructing the Arabs. For example, the Egyptians dug pits for their T--54 Soviet tanks and were using them as stationary artillery to cover the town of Gaza in the early stages of the conflict. Later, in the Sinai, the UAR troops again dug their tanks in in a vain effort to protect them against air bombardment. This tactic deprived the UAR tanks of mobility, the cardinal principle of tank warfare, while the Israeli tanks could freely manuever. This tactic is similar to that used by Soviet tank forces in World War II, as shown in Soviet films of the war. It is possible that the Soviet training officers prepared the Arab military for today's war by teaching them the successful tactics of yesterday's war. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the conduct of the UAR mili- tary effort reflected Soviet tactical doctrine, which necessitates central Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 2 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 direction. This doctrine is considered ineffective against any foe which relies on the use of initiative. Moreover, the UAR's situation may have been aggravated by communications which were inadequate to the desert con- ditions. A major oversight in the Soviets' preparation of the UAR may have been in the arrangement of the radar network. Soviet tactics in antiaircraft warfare are focused -- almost exclusively -- on defense against assaults over land approaches. This may explain the disastrous gap which the UAR left in its radar defense against an air assault from the direction of the Mediterranean. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 June 1967 Soviet Trade and Aid In 1954 the USSR launched a trade and aid program in the developing countries* with the announced or evident intention of providing material needed for its own economy, expanding and increasing its influence world- wide, and reducing non-Communist influence in the developing countries. While the USSR's program embraces some 45 countries, it has concentrated on Asia and the Middle East, and about two thirds of its exports to develop- ing countries have gone to India, the UAR, Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Communist countries, in gaining access to the markets of the developing countries, have used a classic commercial approach. They offer- ed goods at lower prices and on more favorable terms (deferment of first payment; more years to pay; low interest rates). They offered to trade industrial products for what would otherwise be surplus raw materials unsalable at an acceptable price in Western markets. Furthermore, the Soviets dangled industrialization and economic independence in front of the leaders of the developing countries. Through 1966 the total amount of Communist credits and grants to developing countries was about $9 billion, of which the USSR accounted for roughly four fifths. However, only about $3 billion, or one third, of the total amount has been put into effect; the balance remains to be drawn. This large discrepancy actually between offers and drawings results mainly from typically prolonged construction schedules on foreign aid projects. The composition of the USSR's trade with developing countries is similar to that of other industrialized (or, in Soviet terms, "imperialist") countries.- even if the intent differs. About 85% of its imports are comprised of raw materials and food. The USSR's shipments of machinery and equipment and manufactured goods have made up about two-thirds of its exports to developing countries. The military part of the Soviet program is much less publicized in the recipient countries than is economic aid. Nevertheless, the monetary value of military aid actually rendered is 12 to 2 times as much as the economic aid. The emphasis on military aid to certain countries is much more pronounced; for example, in the UAR military aid had amounted to almost 3 times as much as economic aid, and in Syria to more than 4 times as much. Almost half of the Communist military aid is provided to developing countries as outright grants or with discounts from the list price of the military hardware. *Developing countries also called less developed, underdeveloped or emerging countries) include: All African countries except the Republic of South Africa; all Asian countries except Japan; most Latin American countries; Middle East- ern countries, including Cyprus, Greece, Syria, Turkey and the UAR. Designa- tion as a developing country is based on a number of factors, including: per- sonal consumption per capita; per capita national product (gross national pro- duct, national income); share of labor force in agriculture. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 1 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Benefits to the USSR: The Kremlin's continued expanson since 1964 of aid agreements with developing countries clearly indicates that the Brezh.nev-Kosygin regime views the trade and aid program as a satisfac- tory means of obtaining raw materials and foodstuff useful to the Soviet economy and, more significantly, of pursuing Soviet foreign policy objectives. Using economic means, the Soviet leaders evidently hope to continue to exploit the USSR's recently acquired or increased. presence in the developing countries by: --propagandizing its contributions of technology, skilled manpower, and materials; --gaining influence over economic planning and administration; --working to introduce Soviet methods and ideas to replace Western- inspired traditions; --increasing the developing countries' dependence on the USSR for credit, new machinery and equipment, spare parts, and technicians to operate new plants. Through military aid the Soviet leaders will undoubtedly continue to try to enhance the USSR's position as a supplier of arms and a trainer of the armed forces of developing countries. The lure of low Soviet prices and quick delivery of military equipment is often irres:istable. The acceptance of weapons results in the need to send trainees to the USSR and to receive military instructors from the USSR; furthermore, ammunition and spare parts need to be supplied on a continuing basis. Thus, the acceptance of Soviet military aid is often a first step towards dependence on the USSR. The Soviet leaders have varied their approach to target countries. To gain a foothold in some countries (Eqypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen) military aid was offered first. More frequently, however, the initial agreement with a developing country is based on economic assistance. The use of either approach has often been followed by the other, as indicated by the fact that about half the developing countries receiving economic aid from the USSR also receive military aid. In combination, economic and military aid is a potent tool to increase the dependence of a. developing country on the USSR and other Bloc countries. The ultimate benefits the USSR hopes to derive from its aid program are political. Support for Soviet policies in the UN by developing; countries, for example, has risen sharply since the launching of the Soviets' aid program in the mid-50's. More important, the Soviets have thereby acquired greater contact and communication with leaders of the developing countries and have also built up their influence with large numbers of potential leaders who are now middle-rung officials or military officers. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-030~J, 09400060002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Drawbacks for the USSR: Although the trade and aid program has so far absorbed only a very small share (according to one estimate .1%) of the Soviet economy's gross national product, it will require increasingly advanced industrial and military equipment during the next several years. Thus, instead of involving industrial equipment that is generally obsolescent or surplus to the USSR's needs, the Soviet export program will -have to compete with domestic industrial programs for the relatively scarce tech- nologically-advanced equipment produced by the USSR. Similarly, future shipments of military hardware will consist far less of surplus or discarded goods and more of the equipment being currently manufactured for the Soviet armed forces. A far more threatening drawback of the program, from the Kremlin's standpoint, is the possible adverse affect of unsatisfactory performance of Soviet aid commitments. On the economic side, the Soviets' record is spotty and is marred by long delays in carrying out construction projects, the poor quality of industrial equipment and consumer goods, failure to supply enough spare parts of the needed sorts, and the glaring errors in the planning of industrial development. The quality of Soviet military aid, for many years unassessed, now appears to be deficient to some ex- tent with respect to equipment and to be woefully low with respect to training in military tactics, use of weapons, and maintenance of equipment. (See attachment for details). On balance, the Soviet leaders probably view their trade and aid program as a commitment they couldn't avoid even if its costs should begin to outweigh the foreseeable benefits. For a withdrawal in the face of adverse developments would compound their problem. Attractiveness to developing countries: Soviet offers of trade and aid are hard for leaders of developing countries to resist. The kind of goods offered--industrial and transport equipment, industrial materials such as steel and petroleum--in exchange for surplus raw material and food which can't be absorbed in Free World markets, appears to represent a clear-cut gain for the developing countries. The deferment of initial payments and the stretch-out of the repayment of credits at 22 percent interest has added to the attractiveness of Soviet aid offers, especially prior to 1966. Furthermore, Soviet prices usually seem to be low. Finally, Soviet aid seems to offer leaders of developing countries a means of countering the economic influence of their traditional trading partners (usually the former colonial power). Military aid is usually even more attractively presented than economic aid. Very little, if any, down payment is demanded. The price of the equipment is reduced by almost half by means of discounts and outright grants. The equipment can usually be shipped soon after ordered because of the large portion of Soviet merchant ships specializing almost exclusively in arms shipments. Finally, comprehensive instruction is offered in the use of the military equipment, and in military doctrine. Thus, leaders of developing countries have painted for them a picture of rapid development of a powerful military force with modern weapons and led by well-trained officers. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 3 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Detractions of Soviet aid: Soviet performance has tarnished the apparent attractiveness of Soviet economic arid. First, -the quality of Soviet goods usually does not meet what the Soviets term "world standards." This is particularly true of machinery and equipment used. in-production lines. The machinery itself is usually outmoded, and thus the products of the machinery are also outmoded and cannot be sold at world market prices. Second, the real cost of Soviet goods is nowhere near as low as the price tags indicate, when the poor quality is taken into account. Furthermore, Soviet-built plants are more expensive than their estimated cost because of the added expenses* incurred by the exceptionally long duration of construction. (See below). Third, the reliability of the USSR is open to serious question. As a trading partner the USSR has not been dependable, in that it has attached post-agreement political conditions to its aid ( in spite of pretenses to the contrary) and. in that it has not been able to sustain its deliveries of commodities (for example, Soviet wheat was not available in the amount required. by developing countries after the poor Soviet harvests of 1963 and .1965). The USSR, faced with budget problems at home, has trimmed some of the attractive features of its aid program; for example, in 1966 the Kremlin extended almost a billion dollars in aid, over 40% of which was in the form of commercial credits. The significnace of this lies in the change from state credits (12 years at 21-2% interest) to commercial credits (5 to 10 years at up to 4% interest). At the same time the Soviets increased their requirements of hard currency for down payments. Developing countries have also mis- takenly relied on Soviet economic advice and, as a result, have committed themselves to courses of industrial. development not in keeping with their own economic realities. The Soviets seem to have recognized their mis- takes in this regard, inasmuch as they now subject new projects to pro- tracted scrutiny before approving them; yet the Soviets still give no in- dication that they grasp the proven methods for establishing economic feasibility of industrial programs. Some of the most serious deficiencies in the Kremlin's aid program show up in the performance and quality of industrial construction projects. The time actually required for construction has exceeded the contracted duration by an average of more than a third, and has in some cases stretched out to double the contracted duration. Furthermore, Soviet aid projects have taken much longer than comparable U.S. aid projects. For example: a Soviet aid fertilizer plant in Indonesia took 3 years longer than a U.S. aid project of the same kind in the same country; a Soviet aid oil refinery in India took 40 months to build, or 26 months longer than the construction of an oil refinery of almost the same capacity built under the U.S. aid program in South Korea. The poor quality of Soviet construction has been transmitted to developing countries through the aid program; this is largely attributable to inferior designs of the structures and. inept supervision of construction. Equally serious is the general backwardness of the industrial facilities the Soviets have provided. For example, the !Soviets admit to themselves that their pharmaceutical industry lags far behind that industry in the West, yet the Soviets are building pharmaceutical -;The cost of Soviet "experts" sometimes amounts to up to a quarter of aid spendipg on a project. Approved For Release 2000/0?/27 : CIA-RDP78-030C1QQ9400060002-1 & 11 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 plants for developing countries under their aid program. Similarly, Soviet fish canneries are obsolete by Western standards; still, the Soviets are sponsoring the construction of such plants under their aid program. Parenthetically, it should be borne in mind that showcase Soviet aid projects are of high quality. For example, the Aswan High Dam on the Nile is a credit to Soviet engineering, even though the Egyptians found they had to replace Soviet heavy construction equipment with British and U.S. equipment. Also, the Bhilai steel mill in India is one of the most modern in the world, so modern in fact that at the time of its construction the Bhilai plant had the very best of Soviet equipment, such as no single Soviet plant could equal.. The use of such modern equipment at Bhilai appears extravagant, however, when it is considered that it cost more and took almost twice as long to build Bhilai with a capacity of 1 million tons as the expansion of India's privately owned Tata steel mill with a capacity increase of up to 2 million tons. Until recently, Soviet military aid has been held in high regard by most developing countries. Such a regard is considerably clouded, however, by preliminary assessments of the value of such aid to the UAR recently. The Soviet-supplied equipment was not effective. For example, almost half of the UAR's tanks were manufactured in the USSR between the middle of World War II and 1947. There is no indication that the Soviets modified the tanks adequately for the particular rigors of desert warfare. The Soviet-supplied radar and anti-aircraft weapons, including expensive surface-to-air missiles (SAM's), failed to prevent the Israeli air force from making devastating attacks. Also ineffective, apparently, was the Soviets' training of UAR officers in military doctrine and tactics. It is reported, for example, that UAR tanks were dug in and used as stationary artillery; this violates the cardinal principle of modern armored warfare that mobility should be maximized. This tactic used by the UAR's armored units is identical to the one used by Soviet forces in World War II, as portrayed in Soviet films of the war. It is thus indicated that Soviet training officers may have tried to prepare the Arab military for today's war by teaching them the successful tactics of yesterday's war. Some conclusions concerning Soviet aid: On the economic aid side, it is cltear that leaders of the developing countries were mistaken when they expected Soviet aid to benefit them substantially. In the final analysis, the economic balance sheet may even show that the developing countries have had to pay a high price in terms of their own products and hard currency in exchange for goods and plants which they can't employ effectively. On the military aid side it may dawn on these same leaders ( as it un- doubtedly occurred tra the LIAR's Nassar) that the net result of Soviet aid has been their own false sense of confidence. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Prensa Latina, Havana June 1967 23 February 1967 LASO Solidarity Conference Agenda The draft agenda for the first solidarity conference of the Latin American countries, which will be held in Havana from 28 July to 5 August this year, has been made public. The text of the draft agenda follows: 1--The anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle in Latin America. A. Experiences of the several forms of revolutionary struggle; armed insurrection in the national liberation process for Latin America. B. Consideration of the specific struggles of the working class, the peasantry, the students, the intellectuals, and the rest of the progres- sive sectors in relation to the national liberation process. C. Eradication of all forms of colonialism in Latin America. 2--Common position and action against imperialism's political-military intervention and economic and ideological penetration in Latin America. A. The political-military intervention of Yankee imperialism in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries; the imperialist policy of repressive coordination against the liberation movements: the OAS, the inter-American peace force, the Central American Defense Board, the bases, missions, and other military pacts. B. The imperialist economic policy of submission and exploitation of the Latin American countries; its control mechanism; financial resources and foreign trade. C. The imperialist policy of ideological penetration on the socio-cultural level as part of its continental strategy; the struggle against all forms of discrimination in Latin`'America. D. The policy of reform as a means to lessen social conflicts and deflect the peoples from their true path; economic and political independence. E. The oligarchic and .coi4pist policy of open aggressiont ;against the national liberation movements and for the preservation of exploitation of the Latin American peoples. F. The need to achieve a common strategy for all the Latin American revo- lutionary movements in order to defeat continental strategy, which im- perialism has drawn up in its determination to maintain domination over the Latin American peoples. 3--The solidarity of the Latin American peoples with the national libera- tion struggles. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 A. Anti-imperialist solidarity in Latin America. B, The most effective aid for the peoples who are waging the armed struggle against imperialism and colonialism. C. Support for the Negro people of the United States in their struggle against racial segregation and for their rights to equality and freedom. D. Defense of the Cuban revolution: struggle against the economic blockage, isolation, and other forms of Yankee imperialist aggression against the Cuban revolution. 4--Statutes of the Latin American Solidarity Organization. A. The organizing committee of the Latin American Solidarity Organiza- tion is made up of: Cuba: Haydee SANTAMARIA Cuadrado, delegate. Brazil: Aluisio PALLANO, delegate. Colombia: Manuel CEPEDA` Vargas, delegate. Guatemala: Oscar Edmundo PALMA and Francisco MARROQUIN, delegates. Guyana: Lial BAHADAR, delegate. Peru: Jesus MAZA, delegate. Venezuela: Silvia MORENO, delegate. B. The national committees will be made up in each Latin American country by the revolutionary organizations which meet the following requirements: .1. Anti-imperialist. 2. Unitarian. 3. Representative. 4. Accept the resolutions of the First Tri-Continental Conference. 5. Accept the bases or principles of the Latin American Solidarity Organization. Approved For Release 2000/68/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Prensa Latina Havana, 4 March--An exhaustive anti-imperialist sociological survey is being conducted in 27 Latin''American countries by the national commit- tees participating in the First Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) conference. Jesus Maza Peruvian representative to LASO told the Cuban press: "Above all, the questionnaire aims to ascertain the degree of awareness of the people's liberation struggle against imperialist domination." He added that the questionnaire deals with six fundamental points and has been sent to outstanding figures, historians, researchers, sociologists, and progressive organizations on the American Continent. About 1,000 persons are working in Cuba on this survey with the partici- pation of organizations and institutes of the Revolutionary Government and under the guidance of the Communist Party. Maza added that this LASO project is directed toward finding out the real situation in each country and measuring the extent of enemy infiltration of Latin American society. He said that the data produced by this survey will contribute valuably to the first LASO conference "because there we will pool all experiences of the revolutionary struggle within the American Continent." (Excerpts from) LASO Questionnaire I. Questions in the Political and Social field A. Political system and imperialist penetration:composition of the government, from the viewpoint of the class situation and class ties of its members, as determined by listing members of the following organiza- tions: Presidency of the Republic, Cabinet or council of Ministers, Legislative power or body (not including the local legislators, where any exist), and governors of state, province or department. Place these members in one of the following categories: land ownerfy farmer (large, medium, or small), farm worker, businessman (importer or exporter, large, medium or small), industrialist (large, medium or small), income receiver, banker, professional man, attorney (of national or foreign enterprises, large, medium or small), labor union leader, worker, military (officer, non-commissioned officer, soldier), public employee, housewife, and clergyman. Is there security for the exercise of universal and direct suffrage and if they exist, for what,'osition? What percent of the population represents those excluded from the exercise of suffrage? To what social strata do they belong and what are the causes of their exclusion? How many women's organizations exist, what is their composition, international affiliation and what are the tasks they develop? Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A0004000609 1. ) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Which are the strata of the bourgeoisie whose specific interests are harmed by imperialist penetration and to which activities of produc- tion do these strata belong? In the national economy- what is the compara- tive importance of the independent entrepreneurs not associated with imperialism? How do the armed forces and other repressive instruments operate within the bodies of state power and in relation to the political-social process of the country? Border conflicts: Countries and Regions. Origins. Do such con- flicts arise from given national interests? How do the imperialist nations, and especially the United States, participate in such conflicts? B. Class Organization Which are the dividing factors of the labor union movement and how do they operate? Which organized sectors of the labor class have won the right, both to participate effectively in national policy, and to free expression regarding the events of a continental or world order? What social victories has the organized labor class won? How have stikes developed as an instrument of struggle during the pat 10 years? Has?'bhe organized labor movement carried out work stoppages of a political nature? Were these stoppages done with demands of interest for the class or out of solidarity with student and professional sectors? Are there any peasant organizations and what is their nature? Do the peasants, under law, enjoy the same rights as the urban working class, or no rights? How much have peasant women participated and do they participate in the jieoplets and national liberation struggles? How are the student movements repressed? Which are the class organizations of a national character which com- prise the native industrial bourgeoisie? C. Native Population What is its economic: and cultural importance? Is it the target of special forms of discrimination and exploitation? Approved For Release 2000108/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A0004QQO P002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 What is the relationship between the social castes and the holding of the land? What class interests are represented by agrarian legislation and whom do they favor? How much land has been expropriated from the large land holders, individuals or enterprises, national or-foreign? II. Social Problems What is the status of women? Does political imprisonment exist? Are political prisoners tortured? What is the extent of juvenile delinquency? What is the index of prostitution, alchoholism, gambling and other vices and similar phenomena resulting from the social structure? How and to what degree is begging manifest? Are children used to beg? To what extent are scientific methods applied to intensify the exploitation of human labor? What are the effects df such methods as to physical and moral degradation of the worker? How is the child labor exploited? III. Migration and Tourism Is there heavy migration from the countryside to the city? What is the reason? What are its economic and social effects? To what extent does income from tourism, by its volume, constitute an indirect factor of imperialist political pressure? Which churches with headquarters in the United States have: influence in the country? What is the amount of state subsidies which the churches receive? Which societies, associations, establishments, enterprises, founda- tions, etc. have relations, are subordinate to, or are controlled by the churches? Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : clA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Havana,Cuba 2 June 1967 The anti-imperialist delegations of the 27 Latin American nations attending the First Tricontinental Conference founded, on 16 January 1966, in Havana, Cuba, the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO). Its aims, according to the constitution of the organization., are to ur+ite, coordinate, and give impetus to the struggle against North American imperialism by all the exploited peoples of Latin America. AALAPSO-..the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization--was created by the First Tricontinental Conference, while LSO was created by a special and exclusive meeting of the Latin American delegations participating in its debates. They are two distinct organizations, utterly independent of each other. .There is no organic or functional subordination between them. .Sven though they' ,were born almost at the same time and place and established headquarters in the same country, they could have been born on distinct occasions and places, and could have established distinct headquarters. The international climate created by American imperialism's global strategy as well as that of other colonialist powers for the forceful domination of all the underdeveloped nations of the world, and the need of the underdeveloped, colonialized, and dependent nations to help each other effectively, to coordinate their efforts in the national, liberation struggle, to shore up the liberated nations, and to give a united reply to imperialist aggression and to defeat its aims, made the creation of the two organizations necessary and possible. AALAPSO aims to unite, coordinate, and press forward the struggle against colonialism and imperialism in the sphere of three continents; LASO, in the sphere of a single continent--Latin America. Hence, relations between the two are those of fraternal support and cooperation. On 16 January an organizing committee was designated including Brazil, Cuba, Colombia, Guyana, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Its basic tasks are the orientation of the work of the new organization in cooperation 'with the national committees of each nation and the organization of the first Latin American Peoples Solidarity Conference. The internal structure of the organizing committee is not based on permanent secretariats but rather on work groups whose life is only as long as necessary to complete assigned tasks; once completed, new groups are immediately staffed to implement new tasks. Only the General Secretariat, ,a post filled by the representative of the Cuban national committee, Haydee Santamaria, and the work group for the LASO bulletin, are permanent. The organizing committee holds weekly meetings to.approve, disapprove, or amend what is resolved by the work groups. Unanimous resolution is the ever present aim, but if unanimity is impossible, a resolution may pass with a two-thirds majority. So far, however, it has not been necessary to apply this rule for substantive resolutions. Among many other tasks, the organizing committee has accomplished the following: Early this year it revised the makeup of the national committees of the large majority of nations that comprise the organization, and consulted with them on the ;date of the conference, the criteria to be followed in constituting and revamping the national committees, agenda topics, and other proposals that they could make. On this basis, the month of July 1967 was selected as the date for the first Latin ,American Peoples Solidarity Conference. The draft agenda and rules for the-- .conference, have already been prepared. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 T A 9,YP4FQ~r ~e~ s2 ~se~r~ 'tF QPoZB QAIAQP9AQMOOOr 1 cultural realities in the countries of the continent, a research which must be done by the national committees, within the limits of their potential, with the objective of contributing sufficient information to the conference for evaluation. The national committees represent the most active anti-imperialist sectors with the deepest roots among the people in each of the Latin American countries. They consist of one or more truly anti-imperialist, representative, unitarian organizationa accepting the general. declaration of the First Tricontinental Conference and the bases on which Laso was formed. The starting point for the formation of each national committee was established by the international preparatory committee of the First Trioontinental Conference. This in principle is the, way the national .committee of any one* country is formed by the organizatiots that were invited to ,participate in it. However, some important organizations were not invited to the First Tricontinental Conference, and perhaps some others which did not meet entry requirements were invited. It also happens that some political forces which were taken into account have disappeared and others may go the same route. Some organizations--and there may be more in the future--merged, and new anti-imperialist movements with popular support have risen. These realities have determined the dynamic character of the composition of the national committees. No organization may belong in perpetuity to the national committee if it loses the qualities which .made possible its admission. On the other hand, organizations acquiring those qualities must be admitted. The national committees must always represent the most active anti-imperialist sectors, and those with the most profound and extensive roots among the people in each of the Latin American countries. The dynamic character of the national committees is also a characteristic of LASO and is its contribution to the international revolutionary institutions. The first review of the national committees was carried out in accordance with this basic criterion. Today their composition is determined by the results of that work and no longer only by the decisions of the international preparatory committee of the First Trioontinental Conference. Every anti-imperialist organization aspiring to become part of the national committee of its country presents entry applications simultaneously to the pertinent national committee and to the LASO organizing committee. In its application it indicates that it fulfills the requirements for admission. Once it is received, the national committee sends its favorable or ,unfavorable decision, based on confirmation of entry requirements, to the organizing committee. If the favorable decision on the new applicant is unanimous, the organizing committee, after also confirming the fulfillment of entry requirements, recognizes the integration of the new organization into the national committee. If there is an objection, it makes a decision by itself. In like manner, this procedure is followed when an organization is expelled which has lost the necessary qualities for belonging to a national committee. This request must come from the organizations making up the national committee or from the organizing committee itself. Rational committees consist basically of anti-imperialist political organizations since they are organizations which perform,'and will perform, political functions. However, in certain cases, mass organizations may belong to them when, in addition to fulfilling entry requirements, they bring in essential sectors of the population, contribute toward attracting new political forces to the national committee, and help to develop and consolidate the unifying work of the organizations that make it up. The fact that basically political organizations make up the national committees does not mean any restrictions ri their work. When they hold meetings, demonstrations, conferences, roundtables, when hey publish something, and so forth, they act in the same manner as any regular political organization. They take advantage of the influence each of them has in mass organizations to promote their work. Campaigns of solidarity are convoked directly by the national committee, separately by each of Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP7.8-03061A000400060002-1 2 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 the organizati s in it, or by mass organization in whicu they have influence. Like- w:i..^.e, they create committees of solidarity or other forms of organization to achieve their objectives, all in accordance with the existing situation of the anti-imperialist organizations in each country. ,The difference between the national committee and the organizations through which :.t performs its work is the some as that between the political organizations and'the mass organizations. Organizationally the national committee is also flexible. It functions, whenever possible, on the basis of periodic meetings of the delegates of the va -Lous organizations which make it up, but also when the situation of clandestine- ness or repression prevents organic functioning, it functions on the basis of contacts >or liaison with the memb:r organizations. The agreement on the foundatiot:.c?i LASO was adopted by the national committees of the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guadaloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, French Guiana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, ,Dominican Republic, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Surinam joined later. LASO and the national committees that make it up carry out, and must carry out in the future, an intensive campaign for the unity of anti-imperialist movements in .each"of our countries. They must prevent sectarianism from causing the havoc that is, known in Latin America and the proliferation of division among anti-imperialist organizations. With their practical activity they must instill the conviction that only the most determined unity will make the anti-imperialist movement in each country strong. They must also demonstrate by their policy that only by uniting, coordinating, giving impetus to the anti-imperialist struggle in all Latin American countries, and giving each other support and solidarity, particularly to the people engaged in armed struggle, can an effective reply be made to the continental strategy of domination by .North American imperialism. By knowing each other, helping each other, coordinating, and giving impetus to the scattered efforts in the anti-imperialist struggle, our people will find the path to victory. If the Latin American Solidarity Organization and the national committees that make it up advance in the fulfillment of these tasks, the future of our a future of joint struggle and solidarity, a future of success for our present efforts. "The duty of all revolutionaries is to make revolutiont Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 3 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061 A000400060002-1 THE ARAB WORLD MAY 9, 1967 TODAY'S MAIN NEWS .AND TRENDS From Today's Latest News&Reoorts] S Lrj a. SYRIAN GOVERNMENT DECLARES TWO ShUDI DIPLOMATS PERSONA NON GRATA RR THEIR ALLEGED CONNECTION WITH "CONSPIRACY" Assets of Sheikh Habanakah and 45 Merchants Are Seized Under Order Of The Military Governor Khalid Al Jundi, Labour Leader, Says Religion Is "Opiate of People", Disagrees With Official Line Atheistic Article W..s of CIA Making, Notes That W -iter of Article In Army W.:ekly "Sincere" The Syrian Government has declared the First and Second fe cretaries of the Saudi Embas&y in Damascus persona non grata and asked them to leave the country within 24 hours. They were accused of playing a role in the right-wing "?lot" which the Sy- rian Regime said it has crushed. This was announced today by the state-run Damascus press. The Syrian newspapers, furthermore, reported that assets of Sheikh Hassan Habanakah, head of the Syrian League of Ulema now under arrest for anti-regime sermons and activity, and 45 prominent merchants in Damascus have been seized by the state. The seizure was by order issued by the Syrian "Military Gov- ernor." t , proclamation by the Military Governor earlier char- ged the US, Jordanian and Saudi rulers of being behind L. plot against the.Syrian revolutionary regime. A Syrian army offic- er who has returned to e-'mman from Jordan, where he had def- ected last September, claimed in a radio and television inter- view that Habanakah was' agent in Damascus of Lt-Col. I-elim Hf.toum, the escaped Syrian officer said to be plotting a come- back to Syria from Jordan. E.heikh Habanakah had earlier been accused of working for the Saudis, and sponsoring, inside Syria, King Feisal' s alleged bid to create an Islamic alliance. Sheikh Habanakah is now posed by the Lyrian regime as the sy- mbol of "reaction" in Syria. According to press reports from the Syrian capital,Habanakah was arrested last Friday after he Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060.00,2-1 Today'- Main News & Trends, Cont'd delivered a sermon at the mosque of his quarter, Al Midan, in Damascus, in which he denounced the Baathist regime as "Godless." Although shops in other Damascus souks were forced open by the "Workers Militia", of the Fe- deration of Labour, shops at Al Midan remained closed yesterday. Khalid Al Jundi, President of the Federation of Labour, declared in an interview with three foreign correspondents last night that he had sent a warning to merchants and residents of the Al Midan quarter that if shops and wort shops did not open by 9 a.m. today men of the Workers Militia would reopen them by force. Workers Militia and N~_.tionLl Guardsmen had already reopened shuttered shops in the central town souks Sunday and yesterday, using sledge hammers to break padlocks, according to press re- ports this morning. "Opiate Of the People." Khalid Al Jundi, who, with his bderation of L...bour and Workers r tia, is symbol of the extremist faction of a regime already considered extreme by Arab standards, made rather interesting remarks in his interview with the three forei gn correspondents last night. He declared that he disc ;reed with the "belief" by some of the B. ath party leaders that the US Q nt- ral Intelligence Agency (CIA) was behind the atheistic article which had appeared in the military weekly, AL JAISH AL SHAABI --the article which had triggered off the current crisis in Syria. Jundi said that he rather thought the author had been sincere but that the article had been publish- ed without any clearance with the Governmert. The author and editor of the magazine had been arxested and will be referred to trial. The pro- clamation by the Military Governor Sunday night (see our bulletin yesterday) accused CIA of being behind the article. ' Jundi, in the interview, indicated that he himself was an atheist. He said that he adhered to Marxist doctrine that religion "is the opiate of the people." Jundi' statements were an example of extremism that characterizes the present regime in Sy- ria, --although the other Baath leaders now in power may be milder. In fact, Jundi, in the inter- view, said that he disagreed with the government "mildness" in dealing with the "counter-revolut- ionaries." He said that some blood-letting -"makes good revolutionary medicine", adding that he kind of hopes the strikers at Al Midan today would not respond to his call to open their shops, so strict measures could be applied against them. He said that they must be shown that the revolution will brook no interference. No Neutralism. Jundi declared that "neutralism" in the world struggle between socialism and capitalism meant a partial victory for reaction. Socialist Syria, he said, must be completely wed- !ded to the socialist camp. He said that the Ba. th Party doctrine of neutralism had been written by the right-wing leaders and founders of the Party, Michel Aflak and Salah Bitar, who were oust- ::ed in the mii(QIYlroomd FoPR?fease 12N0%0'8127 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 Executions. Yesterday, the weekly AL ISHTIRAKI, which speaks for Jundi's F.:deration of La- bour, demanded in an editorial that reactionaries in Syria should be treated in the same manner Egypt had treated leaders of the Moslem Brotherhood, when they plotted against the regime of Pre- sident Nasser in 1965. Since three of the Brotherhood leaders were executed after a court found them guilty of conspi- racy against the regime, Beirut's independent right-wing AL JA RIDA , reproducing excerpts from A L ISHTIRA KI' s article, concluded that several right-wing Syrian leaders may be headed for exe- cution. In fact, the pager's D~mascus correspondent reported that the Syrian authorities have pre- pared a list of persons who will be referred to trial and executed. Press Reports. Newspapers here today continued to lead with Syrian developments, End carried various reports about what is allegedly happening there. According to AL NAHi R, the Syriac Ca- thrlic and Greek Catholic bishops in D,:.mascus were released after questioning by the authorities, afWthat more than ten CLtholic clergymen in Damascus have been placed under house arrest. Also, there were reports that a number of Greek Orthodox clergymen were arrested in Hama after they ha tried to march in a demonstration with Moslem Ulema under Hama Is Mufti, ;,heikh Mohammed Al Ha- med. Both AL NAHAR and AL HAYAT reported that about 129 civil servants have been arrested for signing a note protesting against the atheistic article in AL JAISH AL SHAABI. The movement, AL NA HA R said, had spread to the northern town of Aleppo. The paper said that Aleppo citizens ment- ioned that the real reason for the call for strike in the city was not only because of the article in question but also due to the general discontent which had spread among merchants and businessmen because of the regime's' policies. AIL, HAYA T said that clashes took place between the demonstrators in Damascus and security men,and that Damascenes Sunday and t.aturday night heard explosions, which were said to have takes place near the head office of the Ruling Bath Party. AL HA YA T said that tanks and other military vF' `cles were sent to Damascus to try to keep order, and that Syrian leaders had been holding con- sc..rt meetings at the Baath Party headquarters. At its meeting yest erday, the Syrian Council of Ministers, under Premier Dr Youssef Zayyen, .discussed whatt SANA , the Syrian official news agency, called "the conspiracies being prepared by imperialism and its agents in the area". The Council, the agency added, also discussed the "firm stand taken by the revolution to -crush the plot and liquidate the remnants of reaction." FIVE ESCAPE FROM JORDAN N. Meanwhile, A L NA HA R reported in a private dispatch from A m- man, that five Syrian army officers, who had defected to Jordan with Lt-Col. Hatoum, tried to es- cape to Syria last .`unday --but that only three made it. The escapees exchanged fire with the Jor- danian border guards. One was hit, and another captured. The other three managed to cross into Syrian territory. [The three presumably include Hardan Al Zu'bi, the officer who appeared on Sy- rian television Sunday night to tell about H&.toum's alleged conspiracy against the Syrian regime -- see details on Pages 6&71. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-1 3 -,Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060002-(iPYRGHT ARMY OF THE PEOPLE APRIL 25, 1967 I ., - - 00 .a a y:J l r,44 Jf 3 ? &jUJ1 it t+J e.d; ,,1 t:,L c :I;i+t,.J1 e_W V*3 c s.u.{3 4w.i S3~' 1JL * 4.w%lJl C1"V1! jut (,ta+Yl 434 41x.3 4. _ .. ,,ate YI J Y : Ji1 ,,1..4;11 o9m .t:' u 3 er~ it f-WO di}" s+ iUJ.ll .ud~Ylul33~Z+- J3.1J s lit ~. W J,, + .~,rl.riYi 4. 4 .ALL !. jf 41 yl . w. wca t;L.;t ;,I(c 4r`Le..~u 4:s Jti ~J!3 VL+: 4L.JY I 4M.1. L:..J 4x'3 ca.J.J 41JW1J 4-JJl V l ti