BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 27, 1967
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Significant Dates 1
[ASTERISK denotes ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]
APR
14 Day of Aid to Spanish Youth. Celebrated by World Federation of Democratic
Youth and International Union of Students (WFDY and IUS: Communist fronts).
16* USSR and Germany sign Treaty of Rapallo; secret military accord enables Ger-
rnany to evade Treaty of Versailles by training men and testing and building
weapons in USSR. 1922. FORTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY.
17* Lenin delivers "April Theses" in first public appearance after return to
Russia. 1917. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
18-27* First Bandung Conference: 29 Afro-Asian countries participate. 1955.
24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and For Peaceful Coexistence. Celebrate
by WFDY and IUS. (Communist fronts).
26* 19 Foreign Ministers meet at Geneva on Indochina; 21 July, agree on armistic
effective II August. Vietnam partitioned, Laos and Cambodia recognized as
neutral. 1954.
28 "Expo 67" opens in Montreal with Bloc participation.
I May Day -- International Workers' Day. First designated by Second Inter-
national (Socialist Congress) in 1889.
7* V-E Day, end of World War II. 1945.
15* Third International declared dissolved by Soviets; 1943. Announcement on 22
May 1943 declares other Communist Parties to be autonomous.
16* Treaty of Aigan, first of "Unequal Treaties," cedes Chinese territory east
of Amur River to Russia. Treaty never ratified, but confirmed by Treaty of
Peking, 14 November 1860. 1858.
20* Date for Commemoration of Birth of Buddha. 563 B.C.
25* Josip Broz Tito born. 1892. SEVENTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY.
31* Hungarian Premier Ferenc Nagy, in Switzerland for health and threatened by
Communists with arrest if he returns, resigns; son held hostage until
resignation received. 1947. TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
JUN
I International Childrens' Day, celebrated by Women's International Democratic
Federation (WIDF; Communist front).
5* Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposes European Recovery Plan
("Marshall Plan") in speech at Harvard. 1947. TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
6* Nicola Petkov, leader of agrarian opposition in Bulgaria, arrested. 1947.
TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
II-12* Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other top Red Army generals arrested; later
tried secretly and executed. 1937. THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
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M ediA Lines
27 February 1967
"Deutsche Welle" Plans More and Stronger Signals. The German
Federal Republics plan to make "Deutsche Welle one of the Free World's
leading international broadcasting services is beginning to materialize.
Additional transriitter facilities are already under consideration for
the new relay base opened at Kigali, Rwanda, in October, 1966; and funds
have been approved for the construction of bases at sites to be selected
in Portugal and Central America, the latter possibly on Bonnaire,
Netherlands Antilles. A search 1s also underway for a base site in
South Asia, and new domestic facilities are projected to service the
enierged overseas relay capabilities as well as for direct broadcast.
This' decentralized relay network, when completed, will provide "Deutsche
Welle" strong competitive signals in the developing areas of Africa,
Asia and the Western Hemisphere, and in the Communist World as well.
East German Film and Television -- Coexistence, "Ja"; Collaboration,
"Hein". Members of the East German Film and Television Workers' Associ-
ation were told at their founding congress in late January 1967 that
collaboration with their West German counterparts might lead them into
"illusions of a third road independent of capitalism and socialism".
"We must rid ourselves of illusions", said Kurt Hager-, Head of the
Ideological Commission of the SED Politburo. "Today, films and tele-
vision of the German Democratic Republic serve the cause of Socialism
and combat West German imperialism and militarism; and West German
films and television are the instruments of a reactionary regime ...
Democratic forces in the Federal republic must effect changes that will
achieve a peaceful:boexistence of the two German states".
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 27 February 1967
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1101 AF,EUR,NE. EAST GERMANY MAINTAINS "DIE-HARD"
OPPOSITION TO EUROPEAN MAINSTREAM
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SITUATION: A three-day meeting in Warsaw of the Warsaw Pact foreign
ministers, originally scheduled to be held in East Berlin, closed on 10
February 1967. The Soviet news agency TASS reported that evening that the
representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Rumania, the
USSR, and Czechoslovakia had met "in an atmosphere of comradely cooperation
and full mutual understanding." That this was not actually the truth can
be surmised from the TASS communique's} striking omission of the subject of
Germany. TASS merely announced without further detail: "At the meeting, a
friendZy exchange of views was held on q uestions connected with the e orbs
of socialist countries aimed at easing international tensions; consolidatz_
peace, security, and cooperation in Europe; and connected with the develop-
ment of the situation in the European continent since the adoption in Bucha-
rest in July 1966 of the declaration on the strengthening of peace and
security in Europe."
Rumania, following its recognition of the West German Government on 31
January and its refusal to attend the Pact meeting if it were held in East
Berlin, sent only a Deputy Foreign Minister to Warsaw (its Foreign Minister,
Corneliu Manescu, pointedly was in Belgium 6-10 February discussing the "con-
solidation of peace and security" in Europe). There have been indications
that other East European countries -- notably Hungary and Bulgaria -- will
continue to explore possibilities for reaching individual agreements with
West Germany.
The East German propaganda campaign against West Germany has received
something less than enthusiastic support from the USSR; Poland has gone
along to some extent, and Czechoslovakia has also been somewhat critical of
West German militarism. Soviet notes to the United States, the United King-
dom, and France in late January warning of the alleged revival of Nazism in.
West Germany appear, however, to be a weak sop to the Ulbricht regime. For
its part, the East German Foreign Ministry had issued a statement two weeks
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ITT (1101 Cont . )
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prior to the opening of the Warsaw Pact meeting pointedly reminding the
other East European countries that they had concurred in last July's
Bucharest communique demanding West German recognition of East Germany
-- thus implying that such recognition by Bonn should be a precondition
of East European recognition of Bonn. (Rumania's recognition followed
this East German warning six days later.) On 26 January, the day after
the East German Foreign Ministry statement, the leading Party daily,
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (see attachment), specifically criticized France for
withholding recognition of the Ulbricht regime. In contrast to genuine
West German efforts to seek more normal relations in Europe, the East
Germans have unleashed a vitriolic propaganda campaign and have dropped
former calls for reunification, now maintaining that a "Socialist" state
can never merge with "capitalist-militarnist West Germany.
Meanwhile, East Germany has increased its efforts to gain recognition
by third world states, e.g., it has reportedly offered a sizable credit to
Algeria in exchange for at least consular representation. At the same
time, however, its representatives abroad continue to be exposed for their
attempts to subvert the very governments which East Berlin is ostensibly
wooing, e.g., last year the official East German news agency (ADN) corre-
spondent in Kenya was decl
d
are
persona non grata for his dealings with 25X1C10 b
Kenyan leftists, and the ADN correspondent in Ghana was expelled for sub-
versi
d
ve an
other activities incompatible with his Journalist?
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1103. SOUTH VIETNAM'S CONSTITUTIONAL
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SITUATION: In early 1965 the political and social fabric of SVN
was on the verge of dissolution, with Catholic against Buddhist and the
Army in poor repute. Today there is a relatively stable albeit military
government in Saigon and a draft constitution is just around the corner.
This constitution is being written by a constituent Assembly of
117 delegates who were popularly elected in September 1966 in a remark-
ably large (80%) and orderly voter turnout. The election was a triumph
for the hard-pressed Ky government, but the primary test will be whether
the military and the assembly, in the midst of war, can finally compro-
mise their differences, produce a scheme for an elected government,
proceed to presidential and legislative elections and then effect a
peaceful transfer of power.
The success of the Constituent Assembly is especially important for
two reasons:
a. It will enable the South Vietnamese government to develop into
a popularly elected body which will present a favorable image abroad for
those who see no particular virtue in the present military dictatorship.
b. It will make the South Vietnamese government a more attractive
alternative to those elements of the Communist-dominated National Libera-
tion Front who are not hard-core Communists. 25X1C1Ob
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(1103 Cont.)
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1104. HEALTH PROBLEMS IN THE USSR
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SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED) The USSR is experiencing an influenza
epidemic for the third year in a row and for at least the 6th time in
the last 11 years. The nation's health services have not been able to
contain and minimize the effects of the 1967 outbreak. Such a failure
is significant in the light of recent revelations that the 1965 influenza
epidemic caused approximately 100,000 deaths, a misfortune which would
have induced most governments to take vigorous preventive measures.
Some of the causes of the more frequent and more severe epidemics
in the USSR cannot be eliminated in the short run. For example, extremely
crowded conditions in housing*, bus and subway transportation, and at
work sites make it difficult to isolate the sick from the well. Further-
more, the Soviet diet, though substantial in calories, is low in fruit,
vegetables, meat, and dairy products and thus (particularly from fall
until spring) provides insufficient vitamins for many citizens. Solu-
tions to these problems are far from imminent.
It was, however, within the Soviets' power to moderate the 1967
epidemic by forecasting the onset and area of the disease and providing
the populace with mass immunization against influenza. But the Soviets
had placed too great reliance on a nasal spray immunization which, in
spite of the reams of publicity given it in 1962 and 1963, was found
after large-scale trials to be ineffective. A. Smorodintsev, a leading
Soviet virologist writing in PRAVDA of 16 January 1967, blames the
Government for failing to provide equipment for research on and produc-
tion of an effective influenza vaccine. In belated recognition of the
*According to T. Sosnovy, an American expert on Soviet housing, there were
an average of 2.33 occupants per room in the USSR in 1965. The average
living space per person (in terms of living rooms and bedrooms) in the
Russians Republic in 1965 was 6.6 square meters, or an area approximately
10 ft. x 7 ft. (source: S.A. Alekseyev, "The Economics of Housing
[(Ekonomika Zhilishchnogo Khoz a stva)], Moscow, 1966). This compares
with the USSR's "sanitary norm" of 9 square meters (96.8 square feet) of
living space.
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need and the possibility of combatting influenza, the USSR recently
announced plans to build an influenza institute in Leningrad where 500
scientists are expected to be doing research on all respiratory diseases.
The Soviets' mishandling of the influenza problem calls for an
examination of the over-all situation of health care in the USSR,
especially in the light of the above-cited Soviet claims to superiority
in this sphere. Evidence, both from Soviet sources and from visiting
foreign experts, reveals that Soviet medical practices and services are
mediocre, and that Soviet medical technology lags far behind the West's.
Furthermore, Soviet medical research has not produced a single finding
worthy of any major international award. The bases for these conclu-
sions are given in the unclassified attachment, which contains further
information on the influenza epidemics and a survey of some major aspects
of Soviet health care, such as: number and quality of doctors, adequacy
of facilities, quality of instruments, administration, effectiveness of
medical treatment, medical research, pharmaceutical production, and
sanitation problems.
Not to be ignored is the Soviets' frequent assertion that their
Government provides the entire range of medical care free of charge to
all Soviet citizens. This is true, except that there are some "poly-
clinics" where fees are charged and where a person can choose his doctor
according to his own taste and judgment. Such polyclinics, according to
an 8 Dec 66 article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, are extremely popular.
(Probably, though the article does not so imply, only with the better-
off Soviet citizens). The writers of the article propose that fees
should also be charged for a new kind of nursing home in order to fill
a gap in the state's care of the chronically sick or disabled. Per''
haps this germ of an idea will spread. The very advancing of this
proposal, at any rate, suggests that Soviet citizens are not fully
satisfied with their routine health care. Those suffering from influ-
enza this winter can hardly be any less dissatisfied with the Government's AWk
job in caring for what now appears to be a routine yearly epidemic. 25X1C10 b
*For example, between 1901-25 (scientists of Russia/USSR were awarded
4+% of all Nobel Laureates in medicine and physiology, the same share as
US scientists were awarded. Between 1926-66, however, no Soviet was
awarded such a prize; US scientists in these spheres were awarded 68% of
the Nobel Laureates in 194+6-65.
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Hospital Services in the USSR (report of the U.S. delegation on
hospital systems planning, June 26-July 16, 1965): not for attribution
World Health Organization Bulletin, Vol 34, #6, 1966
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CPYRGHT
N.Y. T12ES
27 January 1967
Soviet Said to Refuse to Back
CPYRGHT
East Germany on Bonn's Ties
B DAVID BINDER This, according to a report of study in West Germany,
By From Bucharest, was prominent- while 173 more came for short-
Special to The New York Timea y displayed in today's edition, er periods under sponsorship of
BONN, Jan. 26 - Observers Today also, Rolf Lahr, State the service. Czechoslovakia sent
fairs think that the Soviet Un- Foreign Ministry and Bonn's
ion may have declined to sup- special envoy, returned from East Germans Score France
Budapest with the prophecy Specal to The New York Times
port East Germany's efforts to that Hungary would be the BERLIN, Jan. 26 - The East
block the West German drive second East European country, Germans attacked France to-
in establishing diplomatic ties after Rumania, to exchange em- -r
in East Europe
bassles with West Germany
d
i
i
th
i
f
t
governments last evening. that the Kiesinger Government Lion of tension.
The sources reported that the' wished to avoid. playing off one The new Communist move fit
Soviet leadershin was preoc- i communist government against into a attern of activity
Communist China and wished Rumania and Hungary have at retaining for East Germany
to avoid causing new points of sharp differences on a variety )the status of a Sovereign and
friction between its European of issues, not the least of which
Communist allies. Noting that sepou. tide of tran-
Communist policy toward the Soviet strian e In in Euro o e a
four Eastern European coun- Union. pe
tries were interested in diplo- Repeated Warnings Given Neues Deutschland, the Com-
mabic relations with West Ger- monist party newspaper, car-,
many, the sources declared, the Prior to yesterday's East ried pages of declarations of
Russians decided to stay out of Berlin declaration, envoys of the
the matter.. regime of Walter Ulbricht ac- loyalty by East Germans under)
Yesterday the East Gorman credited to East European cap- the headline "No unification isi
Foreign Ministry Issued a dec- itals repeatedly warned their possible between our Socialists
laration warning East Euro- host governments against Bonn's fatherland and the capitalist!
pean governments against "le- diplomatic initiatives. Federal Republic." j
galizing" the Bonn Govern- Communist sources said last In Its attack on France the;
ment's "aggressive and expan, week in Budapest that similar paper said the French refusall
sionist program" by accepting East German interventions had to recognize East Germany "Ise
diplomatic relations with it. also occurred at the party level.in drastic contrast with the
The 300-word declaration also between representatives of the programmatic declarations byl
indirectly criticized Rumania foreign-party relations depart- the French President in favor of
for receiving a West German mcnt. a detente between East and
Government delegation last fall The representations were saidI West."
and for her decision to send to have included demands that
Foreign Minister Corneliu Ma- the East European allies dem-
nescu to Bonn next week.
Today a spokesman for Chan-;onstrate "absolute solidarity
cellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger's with the [East] German Dem-
coalition Government declared eratic Republic" against West,
that Mr. Manescu's visit would Germany and insistence on re-
conclude with an agreement to spect for the "prestige" of the
exchange ambassadors between Ulbricht regime.
(Bonn and Bucharest. The West German academic
While Neues Deutschland, the exchange service reported to-
official East German Commu- day that it had greatly, enlarged
nist newspaper, was preparing its invitation program for East
to carry the Foreign Ministry European scholars.
declaration, Scinteia, the Ru-. The service disclosed that
manian party organ, was send- the program had expanded 10
ing to press an editorial hailing ;times since 1963 and that last
the forthdoming diplomatic ties year 339 East European schol-
!with Bonn. liars spent two or three months
.
ay
or no
recogn
ng
r
z
e
The East German Govern-
ment suddenly resorted to pub- East European observers were Communist regime and warned
lie warnings and implicit at- especially pleased by this report that this could impair efforts
tacks against allied Communist since it was a further indication to achieve a European relaxa-
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Dispatch transmitted by the East German news agencyyDN 26 January:
Berlin--NEUES DEUTSC.ILLAIID, the leading iewspaper ,f the GDR, remarks
on Thursday, commenting on a statement by French Foreign Mini.-ter Maurice Couve
de Murville, that the absence of settled relations between France and the GDR
must be described as anomalous. In his broadcast C,uve de Murville presented
embarrassing subterfuges concerning his reserved ateitudc in regard to normal
relations with the GDR.
No state must be excluded from cooperation. for peace and security, the newspaper
says, 'a truth which has been rer,eatedly stated by "resident C'-arles de Gaulle."
The absence of diplomatic relations "i"s not in acct d uitr. the state of economic
and cultural relations between the two countries." French in,onsistency in
diplomatically recognizing European socialist countries, but rat the GDR, "is
in-sharp contrast to the pr:.)grasusat.LC statements by the Frenc?h President con-
cerning tension between East and West."
The paper adds that French policy in recent years u.-.doubtedly deserves apprecia-
tion for its realism. "That this policy is ineompi to and in .>nsistent on one
important point is detrimental to general European ,_nterests, as well'as to
cooperation between France and the GDR."
THE ECONGi11:IST (London)
28 January 1967
CPYRGHT
Germany and Eastern Europe
Push it out and
CPYRGHTSee if it floats
News of visiting mayors from foreign parts
ordinarily passes through one ear and out of
the other. Yet not when it concerns the
four Rumanians-from Bucharest, Brasov,
Ploesti and Timisoara-who arrived in west
Germany on January loth. They are being
welcomed as especially heartening pheno-
rnena. For back home their rulers seem to
be showing a much more amiable interest
than those of other east European countries
in what Herr Kiesinger described last week
as the "little ships of good will" which
the west German government is busily
launching in eastern waters.
On Thursday the Kiesinger-Brandt coali-
tion cabinet (east German propaganda calls
it the Kiesinger-Strauss coalition) swallowed
a hefty chunk of these scruples that have
taken shape hitherto in the Hallstein
doctrine. It agreed that west Germany
should grasp the approaching opportunity
of establishing normal diplomatic relations
with Rumania, notwithstanding Rumania's
full recognition of the east German regime.
Annrnwnrl Gnr C?nlnncn Iac
If neither side changes its mind, Bonn
and Bucharest will undertake to elevate
their respective trade missions into full-
blown embassies when the Rumanian
foreign minister, Mr Coreliu Manescu, is
in Bonn next week. He is expected to
arrive on Monday. Mr Manescu was
invited last September by the then German
federal minister for economics during talks
a delegation was sent to Bucharest on
January 7th to continue soundings. It
reported encouragingly on January 16th:
Rumania's price was not recognition of east
Germany and of the Oder-Neisse frontier
what it wanted a as chiefly more trade.
Naturally the rcw,:rds of closer economic
collaboration w th west Germany are much
before the eyes of eastern Eurete. and Bonn
knows it. Herr Reif Lahr, the stat secre-
tary at the foreign ministry who specialises
in economic questions, spent three days in
Budapest this week, primarily discussing
trade possibil*ties. But he was also trying
to persuade the Hungarians to promote
business relations into diplomatic ones. By
Thursday it had not become clear in Bonn
how far he had succeeded-he may hardly
know yet himself-but it did not seem that
the Hungarians were setting exorbitant poli-
tical conditions. Nor is it reckoned that
Jugoslavia and Bulgaria, in their present
mood, would discourage Bonn from further
shedding of the Hallstein doctrine.
nQ11A - rIA_DnD7Q_n1zna1 AnnnAnn
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CPYRGHT
Poland and Czechoslovakia, too, would
like more trade. But, having a common
frontier with Germany, both are influenced
by considerations of security, that can be
and are usefully given highly righteous ideo-
logical expression. Warsaw, which has con-
sistently played even its commercial dealings
with Bonn pronouncedly cool, shows no
sign yet of meeting Herr Kiesinger an inch
of the way. And Prague, where German
foreign ministry scouts were reconnoitring
again last week. is still using the status of
west Berlin and of p ople directly affected
by the Munich agreement as awkward bar-
gaining counters. In theory Czechoslovakia
has no official trade relations with west
Germany. In practice there is an office in
Frankfurt manned by " representatives of
Czechoslovak foreign trade companizs."
There is no illusion in Bonn that the
exercise of " normal diplomatic relations "
will automatically engender sweetness and
light between the practitioners, But it is
held that, given the right men and the
right policies, it may help to reduce
antagonisms, and in the long run to bring
the Germans a stage nearer to being given
TIME Magazine
17 February 1967
EASTERN EUROPE
Pattern of Disintegration
Unabashedly chauvinistic, the peoples
of Eastern Europe have always. been
bitterly quarrelsome. During more than
20 years in power, their Communist
leaders have tried to make much of so-
cialist unity, but the effort created only
a patina beneath which the old aninros-
ities still raged. Last week the patina
visibly cracked. When the representa-
tives of the Warsaw Pact countries met,
they argued vociferously and unproduc-
tively. The fiasco proved with new force
what has been clear for a long time:
the Warsaw Pact, somewhat like its
NATO equivalent, is now an artifact
rather than a fact.
The backdrop for the meeting was
Rumania's decision to break the East-
ern European deepfreeze on diplomatic
relations with Bonn, which is aggressive-
ly seeking new ties to the East (TIME,
Jan. 27). Alarmed by Rumanian recog-
nition of the hated Bonn regime and
fearful that the whole socialist camp
might too quickly follow suit, East Ger-
many's Walter Ulbricht demanded that
the Eastern Europeans come to a con-
clave in East Berlin. The meeting had
to be shifted to Warsaw when Rumania
bridled at Ulbricht's criticism of its
move and refused to come to his city.
CPYRGHT
the choice of living together in one state.
Bonn's moves have visibly shaken the ill-
founded east German regime's peace of
mind. Herr Ulbricht promptly despatched
his foreign minister, Herr Winzer, to
Moscow, and his deputy foreign minister
to Prague. His terms for humbling the
" revanchists and neo-Nazis of Bonn "
include de jure recognition of his own
regime and of the Oder-Neisse frontier,
and renunciation of all nuclear pretensions.
It is just possible that with Moscow's sup-
port he may persuade his seemingly soften-
ing partners to steel their hearts once more.
A fierce statement on Wednesday showed
that he is doing his best.
Herr Brandt told the Council of Europe
on Tuesday that the Russians did not for
the time being want to discuss German
unity. He should know. He has had
several frank talks lately with the Russian
ambassador to east Berlin. But the more
the west Germans extend their contacts, the
more encouraged they are to find how little
credibility and sympathy the shrill east
German regime has won for itself.
CPYRGHT
Rumanian Foreign Minister Corneliu
Manescu sent an underling to Warsaw,
MT f-
lions in Brussels, where he boldly pro-
claimed that a bloc like Eastern Europe
has become an "anachronism left over
from the time of the cold war."
According to leaks from the suppos-
edly secret Warsaw meeting (among
those present: Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko, who decided not to
accompany Premier Kosygin to Britain
in order to attend), the Poles and East
Germans urged their neighbors to stop
an unseemly rush to Bonn. If they must
establish relations, ran the advice, they
at least ought to support East Germany
in rejecting Bonn's claim to be the sole
legitimate representative of the German
people. The pleas did not have much ef-
fect, and the communique issued at the
meeting's end was so bland that it did not
even mention the central issue of Ger-
many. The Warsaw meeting revealed an
intriguing pattern of disintegration in
what used to be the Communist bloc.
' Russia, which is having enough trou-
bles with Red China, is angry at the UI-
bricht regime for its attack on Rumania,
which forced the transfer of the meeting
and embarrassed the Soviet leadership.
10- East Germany is furious at the Ru-
manians for 1) recognizing West Ger-
many, 2) robbing Ulbricht of the nres-
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tige of an East Berlin meeting, and 3)
making fun of his regime in its press.
- Rumania is equally furious at the
East Germans for 1) making a direct
attack On its government, 2) washing
the socialist camp's dirty linen in pub-
lic, and 3) adopting the general attitude
that all socialist foreign policy must be
aimed at pleasing Ulbricht.
- Hungary is chagrined at the East
Germans and the Poles for creating a
commotion over the issue and thus mak-
ing it more difficult for Budapest to go
ahead (as it wants to) and recognize
West Germany.
- Czechoslovakia is alarmed at the
CPYRGHT
signs of tension within the alliance, and
irked that, to keep on good terms with
East Germany, it now must re-examine
its intention to open diplomatic relations
with Bonn.
- Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary re-
sent the Soviet Union's pointed remind-
er last week that they were on the Nazi
side during World War II and had only
the Soviet Union to thank for escaping
"harsh Allied treatment."
- Poland feels reduced and abandoned
amid the general movement toward
Bonn. Except for Ulbricht & Co., the
Poles alone retain the East Bloc's old
anti-West German spirit.
WASHINGTON STAR
18 February 1967
Bucharest and Bonn
Romania has demonstrated once
,Again that the unity of Europe's Com-
munist countries is more mythical than
real. In varying degrees, these one-time
.servile satellites of the Kremlin are
divided among themselves, and acting
,separately, on issues that affect them
'all. The latest example involves the
:question of East Germany's status and
:the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions with West Germany.
Responding to the initiatives of the
"grand coalition" headed by Chancellor
-Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt,
:Romania has agreed to an exchange of
:ambassadors and a normalization of all
ties with the new Bonn government.
-The reaction from Walter Ulbricht's
>Communist East German regime has
been a shrill statement condemning
Bucharest's "deplorable" decision. And
Bucharest, in reply, has castigated this
criticism as the work of "reactionary
circles who are cold-war advocates try-
ing to poison international relations."
- What bothers Ulbricht is that the
,Romanians have worked out their agree-
,ment with Bonn without challenging
"13onn's claim that it is the sole legal rep-
;tesentative of the entire German people,
East and West. Ulbricht's argument is
that all members of the seven-nation
CPYRGHT
Warsaw Pact-East Germany, Poland,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Ro-
mania and the Soviet Union-are on
record as being committed to the Idea
that the West Germans must meet two
basic conditions before relations with
them can be normalized: (1) Bonn must
recognize Poland's present borders,
which embrace prewar German territory
and (2) it must accept East Germany's
legitimacy as a separate state.
These conditions have been com-
pletely ignored by the Romanians, who
have already declared themselves as be-
lieving that the Warsaw Pact should be
dissolved. There are Indications, more-
over, that Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Bulgaria would like to follow the Bucha-
rest lead. And the Russians, of course,
though protesting against West Ger-
many's "absurd" legitimacy claims, In-
tend to continue maintaining the dip-
lomatic relations they have long had
with Bonn. Only Poland seems unre-
servedly in support of Ulbricht's plain-
tive position.
In the circumstances, it is not sur-
prising that the Warsaw Pact people
displayed considerable confusion, hesi-
tancy and noncommunicativeness at
their meeting last week to discuss the
problem.
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 -5-
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NEr1 STATESAIAN (London)
10 February- 1967
Crisis in the Warsaw Pact
GABRIEL LORINCE
Appro
CPYRGHT
While Mr Kosygin has been continuing members, less afraid of a German military
the East-West dialogue in London, the revival, made cautiously approving noises.
tither member of the Kremlin leadership Further, Ceausescu's suggestion that all
team, Leonid Brczhnev, has been making military blocs should be abolished hewas
n
strenuous efforts to patch up a 'growing rift countered by Soviet attempts to strengthen
n
in the Warsaw Pact. Rumania's flat refusal meilitary Warsaw
forces. Nonetheless less the R he Rumanian
to attend a meeting of Pact foreign military Nonuman
to ates in Eaingn, following egn moves towards greater 'independence and
tar blocs in Europe
East German public criticism of Bucharest's have, rev in revision
fact, h fact, helped military
decision to send a minister to Bonn, for elped to start a disintegration
the first time laid bare the depth of the trend d in the Warsaw Pact not dissimilar to
division and the clash are interests between De Gaulle's Nato-busting, if on a different -
scale. northern and southern 'tiers' of the have But made it the i the East exactly Germans, these Poles trends which
communist alliance. East Germany, Poland to a certain extent the Czechs momo and,
and Russia, incensed by Rumania's flagrant to , thhe Czecre in-
disregard for common policies towards transigent, as they fear that the weakening
West Germany and frightened by the of the Warsaw Pact's military strength
Hungarian and Bulgarian flirting with Bonn, would leave them prey to a 'revenge-seeking'
called a meeting for last Monday to sort Bonn. Rumania's aspirations to independ-
out the differences threatening the alliance. ence have thus proved to be against the
Neues Deutschland, the East German The rests in Poles sebitte ytres membm nia's u.
Communist Party organ, saw fit to chide the lateral T actieosn over over diplomatic resentRr relations ni-
Rumanians over the weekend for the trend iplomatic rellations with
Bonn and fear that Hungary and Bulgaria
of their foreign policy and to lecture them will follow their economic interests without
on internationalist duties. Not unexpectedly, insisting on West German concessions on
the Rumanians reacted violently to the East vital issues, such as the recognition of the
German charges. Scanteia, the Rumanian Oder-Neisse line, recognition of East Ger-
Communist Party newspaper, openly ac- many and renunciation of nuclear arms.
cused East Germany of interference in the Official Warsaw has refrained from public
affairs of another socialist country and re- invective, but privately it has made abund-
marked that East Berlin's stand 'on antly clear what it thought of 'the gesture
Bucharest-Bonn relations 'accords with the of a country which was Hitler's ally until
attitude of reactionary circles, which are 1944'. Polish newspapers have confined
followers of the cold war and strive to themselves to calls for a common East
poison inter-state relations'. Subsequently, European policy towards Bonn, but, pre-
Bucharest refused to send a delegation to cisely because of the ease with which West
the East Berlin meeting. After hurried high- Germany's diplomatic drive eastwards suc-
level consultations, the meeting was trans- ceeded, there is a feeling of isolation and
ferred to Warsaw, where it is scheduled to weariness in Warsaw.
open this weekend. Meanwhile Brezhnev, Polish officials, who reportedly agreed to
the Soviet Communist Party leader, paid a support Russia's call for an anti-Chinese
surprise visit to Prague to work out, with international communist conference in ex-
Czech help, a not too damaging compromise change for a firm Soviet stand against East
course between the northern and southern European recognition of Bonn, are under-
members of the alliance, stood to be disappointed over the hesitant
Although the establishment of West and ineffective Soviet posture on this ques-
German-Rumanian diplomatic relations has, tion, so vital for Poland. But the Soviet
apparently, brought the simmering crisis of position on ties with Bonn is complicated
the Warsaw Pact alliance to the boil, it did by the fact that Moscow ha,v recognised both
not create the underlying stresses and clash- East Berlin and Bonn and could hardly
ing national interests. Already last summer deny the same right to the Rumanians or
the Rumanian party leader Nicolas Hungarians. Thus Russia has to confine
Ceausescu had raised the question of the herself to questions of European security
cost of Soviet troops stationed in East and the problems of unity within the social-
Germany, asked for more command posts ist camp in the present round of exchanges
for non-Soviet generals and demanded a with Bucharest, Sofia , and Budapest.
bigger say on the deployment and possible Moscow's decision to allow the West Ger-
use of nuclear weapons. These 'Gaullist' de- man offensive to take its course is also be-
mands resented by hA-RL 7t8 0 0~ t
t Qi , i;
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at a time when Soviet-Chinese relations are
nearing breaking-point.
The Rumanian independence moves and
the ensuing disarray among Pact member-
countries have left East Germany. with its
vested interest in the status quo, alarmingly
isolated and in a dangerous mood. Czech-
oslovakia, on the other hand, has suddenly
become the key country in the eyes of the
Russians and the northern and southern
tier nations alike. Because of their bitter war-.
time experiences, the Czechs are unlikely
to follow Bucharest's lead in establishing
diplomatic relations with Bonn without try
ing to wring some serious political con-
cessions from the West Germans, such as the
recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and
some modus vivendi with East Germany.
After the recent exploratory talks be-
tween Prague and Bonn, Czechoslovak of-
ficials said they still held the view, despite
Bucharest's precipitate action, that West
Germany would have to meet certain ad=
N.Y. TDIES
PYRGH 1 Februar.- 1967
CPYRGHT
East German Regime Widens Breach ,With Bonn
Special to The New York Tim
BERLIN, Feb. 20 - East widespread moves 'for
of Germany today by introduc-
ing separate "nationality of the
German Democratic Republic"
for the 17 million East Ger-
mans.
I l kammer (Parliament) scrapped
East Germany and West Ger-
many. Under the bill, East Ger-
the G.D.R."
The bill, passed unanimously
in the presence of Walter U17
Fleeing Is a Crime
It was not clear whether the
mast Germans would try to en-
laid claim to millions of refu-
rees who have fled East Ger-
many since the Communist statel
was founded on Oct. 7, 1949.
The opening paragraph of the
bill stipulates that German na-
tionals who resided on the ter-
ritory 'ef East Germany on Oct.
7, 1949, ,are citizens of the
G.D.R. no matter where they
reside at present "
CPITRGHT
fear that forces from within
and without could combine to
sxcrcise pressure on Mr. Ul-
vast majority of East Germans
consider themselves "German"
rather than "citizens of _the
,city government declared, "Ger-i
Renaming Expected
According to repeports from
East Germany, the regime plans
to rename the state the "Social-
ist German Democratic Repub-
lic" at the communist party
convention scheduled for April.
The term "Socialist," already
used regularly by East German
leaders in connection with the
G.D.R., was seen to imply a con-
it taut reminder to the world,
and to the Soviet Union in par-
ticular, of East Germany's in-
tegration in the orbit of the
Soviet Union's "socialist camp."
In another bill today, the East
Germans laid claim to what they
described as their "continental
shelf" in the Baltic Sea and re-
served the right to exploit, use
and research the shelf for pos-
get hold of a former ug e. bring difficulties with East
Under East German laws, it is Germany's neighbors, West Ger-
a punishable crime to flee the many and Poland as well as
$
ill 11 by with
w~' r- ~ e~eaacr :+
across the Baltic.
vance conditions before there could be talk
of diplomatic ties. Prague's ostentatious de-
claration of loyalty was, however, somewhat
softened by the very fact that it did accept
Bonn's overtures to explore the possibilities
of normalising relations between the two
countries. Enlightened economic self-
interest, the main force behind the present
rift within the conimunist camp, will in
the long run prove stronger in Prague, too,
than fraternal duty towards fellow com-
munist nations.
As the division deepens between the
northern hard-liners, gathering around the
East Berlin-Warsaw axis, and the southern
doves, the Rumanians continue to loosen
the alliance. Removing the legacies of the
Second World War, initiating better rela-
tions, talks and trade with nations of differ-
ing social order are not Russian prerogatives,
they claim. That is what peaceful .co-.
existence is about. But they still have to
convince their colleagues in Warsaw.
DP78-03061 A000400070007-5
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1102 WH. "VOLUNTARY" AND FORCED
LABOR IN CUBA
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Although the basic facts on forced labor in Cuba have
been published in the Free World press, they have most often been pre-
sented in bits and pieces and, as a result, the subject has not received
the propaganda attention it merits. For if two prime hallmarks of Com-
munist tyranny are a secret police and "thought control," the third is
certainly compulsory labor, forcing large parts of the citizenry to work
in undesirable jobs without adequate compensation.
Compulsory labor in Cuba is backed by varying degrees of force.
The strongest coercion is applied to the prison inmates. Some of them
are ordinary criminals and they are obliged to perform prison labor,
as in every country. Others are political prisoners, some imprisoned
without trial, others duly tried and convicted for what can only be
defined as political crimes. These political prisoners live under ex-
treme privation and are forced to do hard physical labor, primarily on
farms.
The second degree of forced labor is exemplified by the "Military
Units for Aid to Production" (UMAP), which are army batallions composed
of "social misfits" (priests, religious militants, drug addicts, homo-
sexuals, etc.) who are drafted into service for three years to be "edu-
cated and transformed into useful members of society." During their
service they are virtual prisoners, forced to perform 14+-16 hours of
punishing labor each day.
Finally, a large number of Cubans is dragooned into agricultural
work, mostly on the sugar cane plantations. While not compelled by
police or draft, the farm workers "volunteer" rather than face the many
economic and social sanctions which the regime will otherwise mount
against them.
Women are not exempt from forced labor. They are being recruited
by the Cuban Women's Federation (FMC) and sent to work camps already in
operation in Camaguey Province, and women's units are an integral part
of the "voluntary" farm worker brigades. Moreover, Castro has announced
that a nationwide system of full-time nurseries and boarding schools is
being established to free women for production and agricultural work
... and to separate the children from the possibly "corrupting influence"
of their parents.
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1 (1102 Cont.)
 25X1C10b
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February 1967
For.. ed Labor in Cuba
Compulsory labor seems to be as much of a hallmark of Communism as
secret police and "thought control." Cuban Communism is no exception. Com-
pulsory labor in Cuba closely follows the patterns established by older
Communist regimes, especially the.Soviet Union and Communist China. As in
those countries, there are varying degrees of force backing the varying
types of obligatory labor in Cuba$ ranging from social and economic pres-
sures to outright imprisonment.
The strongest coercion is applied to prison inmates. Some of them are
common criminals who are obliged to perform prison labor as in other coun-
tries around the world. However, there are also many political prisoners
in Cuban jails, some imprisoned without trial, others duly tried and con-
victed for that can only be defined as political crimes -- such as daring
to criticize the leaders of the Communist Party. These prisoners live under
conditions of extreme privation and hardship -- conditions which in our
century have existed only under the harshest dictatorships.
Not only do the prisoners live in squalid quarters, brutally mistreated
by the guards, but they are forced to labor each day in the fields, cutting
and weeding sugar cane, planting, cultivating and harvesting other crops,
and performing other equally difficult labor for up to 16 hours a day.
The conditions have been testified to by numerous refugees who have escaped
Cuba. Sad to say, the plight of these prisoners has not attracted the
sympathy it deserves beyond the immediate circle of persons closely inter-
ested in Cuban affairs.
A new form of compulsory labor was established in Cuba with the crea-
tion of the "Military Units for Aid to Production" (Unidades Militares de
Aruda a la Production - UMAP) in November 1965, more aptly described as
forced labor camps. While it is not possible to give an exact figure on
the number of persons thus far interned in such camps, the most recent
estimates range from 25,000 to 30,000. It was announced early in 1967 that
the number of UMAP camps will soon be doubled. The camps are composed of
approximately 120-conscripts, with four camps composing a battalion. The
prisoners are what the Cuban Communist regime calls "social misfits":
priests, religious militants (especially members of some of the more fun-
damentalist sects such as Jehovah's Witnesses and the Pentecostal Church),
petty thieves and dope addicts, homosexuals, and those who have displayed
an "incorrect attitude" toward "the Revolution." (According to recent
refugees the people sneeringly refer to this as"the crime of revolutionary
apathy.") Among other activities, requesting a passport is interpreted as
displaying an "incorrect attitude" and as a consequence many applicants
for exit visas immediately lose their jobs and are sent to the UMAP camps
until it is their turn to leave on the daily refugee flights to the United
States.
The inmates are drafted into service for three years. Since the camps
are now only a year old, however, it is not certain that the internees will
in fact be discharged at the end of three years.
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The stated objective of the 0,1AP, according to the Castro regime, is
to educate and transform the conscripts into useful members of society."
The regime hopes to accomplish this by "sacrifice" (according to the Marx-
ist theory of education through work), by indoctrination in Marxism-
Leninism during daily classes, and by violence if necessary. Another --
though unstated -- objective of the UMAP is to create battalions of laborers
to do agricultural work for minimum. pay.
The [.'NEAP camps are now the prime topic of conversation of the exiles
arriving daily in Miami, Florida. Since many of them have personally served
in the camps, it is possible to gain an accurate view of conditions there.
According to these refugees, conditions vary among the camps, some being
more harsh than others, largely dependent on the whim of the camp director,
who is usually an army lieutenant. A typical daily regime, according to
the refugees, would be:
01+00 Reveille
0410 Breakfast (hot water sweetened
with sugar)
0430 Agricultural labor
1130 Lunch (thin soup or beans with one
half of a boiled banana)
1230 Agricultural labor
1830 Supper (beans, one slice of pressed
meat, half of a boiled banana)
1930-2130 "Indoctrination" class
The prisoners live in wooden barracks without furnishings except perhaps
canvas or burlap hammocks, without running water, in extremely unsanitary
conditions. The compounds in which the barracks are located are surrounded
by barbed wire fences, six to ten feet tall. Armed guards are posted at
all times and they are instructed to shoot anyone attempting to escape
from the compound. The inmates' families are usually allowed to visit them
once a month, provided they have not infringed any of the rules of the
camp. After a lengthy trial period, and provided that they have not been
in any trouble in the camp, the inmates are permitted a leave of 10 days to
visit their families; however there are wide variations in this matter and
in some of the camps there is practically no leave. UMAP conscripts are
paid the extravagant sum of 7 pesos a month -- again, if they stay out of
trouble.
Typical employment of the UIIZAP conscript labor battalions includes:
planting, weeding, fertilizing, cutting and processing sugar cane, beans,
rice, tobacco, bananas, and other fruits and vegetables; reforestation;
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070007-5
cutting trees and processing thaia for lumber; repairing, patching, and
extending roads; and digging trenches near coastal areas.
The Cuban army also uses its regular draftees who are performing their
Compulsory Military Service (Servicio Militar Obligatorio -- SMO) for agri-
cultural labor; and the regular draftees are also only paid 7 pesos per
month. However these draftees receive military training and do perform
normal military duties when they are not being employed in agriculture.
The difference between SMO duty and UMAP duty, as noted by one refugee who
reached Florida, is that if one gets into trouble while serving in the SMO
units he is sentenced to prison, whereas in the UMAP he is sentenced to
further time in the UMAP! In a speech on 30 January 1967 Fidel Castro
referred to the "'tens of thousands of soldiers" who are doing agricultural
work this year and stated that "next year it will have to be a general order.
The greater part of the men in the armed forces will join in."
Although the prison laborers, the UMAP conscripts and the army draftees
provide a fixed source of manpower for the Castro regime, an even larger
supply of laborers is the so-called "volunteer" battalions who perform the
major part of agricultural work, this being essentially sugar cane harvest-
ing. These workers range from "permanent volunteers" to schoolchildren.
For several reasons the regime has concentrated principally on the nation's
youth in building up this labor force. The first reason is that the youth
have not yet become essential elements in the country's economic apparatus
and can be sent to work in the fields without too seriously disrupting the
economy. Secondly, the work is so hard that youth produce more than older
citizens. Perhaps most importantly, Castro desires to separate the youth
from their families, social background, religion, and other "remnants of
the past," in order to remake them entirely in the Communist mold. He
inaugurated on 29 January 1967 a new scheme to take children from their
mothers at the age of one month and place them in special nurseries during
the day. Later they will go to boarding schools, returning to their fami-
lies only on the weekends. Castro said that these boys and girls will
devote 50 percent of their time to study, 30 percent to productive work,
and 20 percent to physical education, sports, and recreational activities.
Vacations will be completely organized and controlled by the state.
The students sent to the fields come from the technical, secondary
and preparatory schools, as well as from the universities. In a speech on
February 20, 1967, Fidel Castro bragged that the target figure of 1+0,000
students from the technical schools alone, which had been set for 1970,
will now be met in 1968. The new goal for 1970, he indicated, will be
100,000.
The non-student youth of Cuba are being forced into "volunteering"
for two year's service in agricultural work. This campaign is being orga-
nized by the Union of Young Communists. The alternative for the Cuban
youth is a three--year hitch in the UMAP.
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Although the emphasis is on the employment of youth, older persons are
also widely used. An effort has been made to establish "reserve battalions"
among the Cuban workers, which can be sent to the cane fields during har-
vest time (up to six months). This, of course, seriously disrupts the
economy and has been opposed by managers of state enterprises who are
responsible for meeting production quotas set by the government. Typical
of the problems caused by this mass mobilization is the impressment of
20,000 workers in the construction industry into sugar cane cutting ...
despite the acknowledged shortage of 1 million homes.
Women are not exempt from obligatory labor in Cuba. Castro recently
acknowledged a plan for drafting more women into agriculture -- 15,000 to
be added to the "permanent volunteers" and over 100,000 for the completion
of special tasks. The `'volunteering" will be made easier by the plans for
communal nurseries and boarding schools. The president of the Cuban Fed-
eration of Women, Vilma Espin, stated that the plan for enlarging the agri-
cultural labor force was a step towards the "full emancipation" of women.
Even more ominous were reports from refugees that feminine equivalents of
the UMAP camps are being built, to be called "Unidades Femeninas para Ayuda
a la Produccion.`'
One conclusion indicated by Castro's impressment of so many workers
is that the Cuban economy is in severe straits. It is already heavily
dependent on the Soviet Union for more than one million dollars per day in
outright aid. The impression grows that this does not suffice, but that
the Soviets are balking at granting larger sums. Castro is therefore try-
ing to compensate for the bungling and mismanagement of the economy by
desperation measures. Indeed the economy has apparently reached the point
where it can only be saved by the schoolchildren. Such is the impression
left by the announcement of the Provincial Education Director of Cuba's
Matanzas Province on 5 January that 8,000 children in that province will
have their studies interrupted for six weeks during February and March so
that they can help with the harvest. The Director said that sweet potatoes,
potatoes, yucca, squash, and other secondary crops could not be harvested
without the children's help!
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FTHI'; WASHINGTON POS
Monday, ,tan, 30, 1961
"Stable Regime
CPYRGHT
BY Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer
this nation now so divided by today in fact rules this nation servers think will be : the case !whether the military and the'
;war and politics can have an and on 'whose goodwill de-the new legislature being Assemblymen, In the midst of
elected government. created by the Assembly will; war, their can finally differences, The delegates to the Constit- to pends
something themething hoped thafor t at can betransitioe have Important powers. of , produce a
- .?
went Assembly ? sit in seven 'Called an elected government. 1.check and balance . Ischeme for an elected govern-
rows of leather chairs behind Organized in Blocs ment, proceed to presidential
broad desks facing the P0- Democracy is Aim Perhaps half of the- Astem? and legislative elections and
dium, behind which hangs 'a 'What we need is an elect-, blymen have had meaningful, then effect a peaceful transfer
.massive South Vietnamese ed government, not neces-; political experience at the na? of,power..
fl it i i
l
s
a ou a future role of the Dan Is an optimist. He bc- Nguyen" Cao Ky e:ld their
hem
meeting daily now In tilitary remain to be decided. Directo
cavernous white one -time But the bulk of the Assembly- lieves that compromises with rY colleagues has been
opera house built by the men, it is evident' from' inter- the military directorate can in power now for 18 months
French in 1892, views at length with drvpTni~ be worked out to avoid a con and has lust weathered what
V-ivVl\, ann. ZIP Tnere Even more
touchy
are
t t e
m y a c v
ag-three red stripes length-
ien government, tional, provincial , or local
`Wise on a yellow field. The says Dang Van Sung, editor level. Most of them have or-I
average age is 41. and publisher of the most in- ganized in blocs.. But these
Delegates come to the po- fluentlal Vietnamese daily., blots are based more on er
Alum to speak their pieces +,To defeat the Vietcong," he` sonal relationships than policy
into a microphone and Chair- adds, "we must have a visible ! agreements and despite ' taut
man Phan Khac Suu, himself elected government With ap-I cuses the bloc members gen.
it former chief of state, is not peal to the people and we erally split up when the time
very strict about the time must separate the non-Com- comes to vote by a show of
though he Is about the ger+ munists among the Vietcong hands.
maneness rule, from the hard-core Coinmu- One of the trickiest pro.
nists by adopting their ;Plat-
t Touchy Questions Come Up form on land reform and lams is how t see that delj
So far the decorum has against rnrruptinn Party system o emerges and d del-
k f
i
ates ofte
ore
gners
n as
oven exemplary but last eve- ' "A stable democratic' gov- g
T n1ni-thpv nnw moat frnm .A --d- t ' at_ I. for suggestions on how to lets-f
islate such an end. But n
to 8 P.M. o?`
to allow for caucuses year?ald Nguyen Van' 'N ai i
l in the mornings-the Issue who is the floor leader of the body seems really to have an;
Was touchy and some dale- Greater People's bloc, the answer as yet. Perhaps there
gates were shouting into the' largest In the Assembly. 1s a clue In the current re-1
mike so loudly they were dif "Mott' important, says grouping of the AssembiyI
ea"-. blocs into more conservative,
ficult to understand. Nguyen Him Thnno a 34-
y
'""_' ' ' F"Y""vs"a" thin wedge of democracy.
create the framework of . a chi- warfare here Is for the people1
vilian government in the midsti to feel the can set th i ! Probably no comparison to
were now debating the future "Another coup would be ter Vietnamese Assembly' resem?1
quang bits more the writing of the
role of the military In civilian.,rible," says Dr. Phan
politics. In thr rod thorn +,.e,.., rlnn mh? 111.,...,...1.-.,_ Articles of Confederation dur-.
of power that is in the tiandsq future and not have an oifn ,the American experience isl
- really valid, but if any is, the;
of a military Directorate. They! posed government 11
barely enough votes to rim
Prove A provision saying that
i11military personnel on ct1.,
jailed during the Ngo Dinh
Die'T regime
than of the Constitution aftei"
l duty may not fake part in pp!
Mica"
The present military go-
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is
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ArANCH 'STi':R r:c-,tnni,im wii?:rkr,Y?
7'Itirl-NIOU Jntttrap 15 1967-1-
I CPYRGHT
ti1E'I',NAM TODAY---tlio Ihird of four nrticlcs by itICIIAi"T, WALE
1! $sem7 I ...i wt ?a Puppet fr-1 'ITIrs
0.-: physical change made In Further, It has asked the
Saigon since I was there nine Government to delete the article
months ago has been the crec- which would automatically end
lion of a vast and extra- the Assembly's life once the
ordinarily ugly statue of two I Constitution Is passed. It wants
Vietnamese soldiers advancing, to stay in existence until the
Assembly on the other side of September 27 got off to a slow
the city's main square. start as it had first to scrutinise
It will be acldc'r t
o recognise that any Govern- success in stabilising prices.
;](A by a dullly, ment will need to have emerg- Since the devaluation of the
elected Government -which will ency powers, but it has to 1 Vietnamese piastre by 50 per,
be bound by the Constitution to devise the proper checks on cent, the cost -of-living index
defend and respcct" the rights I their use. has levelled out. This itself was
of the individual, e s) stunt debate
Article 20 of the law sulking; th
top (he Constituent Assembly draftint; conrnhtltee was equally
gives the present Government divided on whether there should
the right to amend any part of be a presidential system as In
the Constitution presuntecl by the United States or a President
(lent, whether he be in or out of
uniform, a dangerous enough
step which could relight the
latent rivalries between Ilia
', generals, but in view of the
wide ditergcnce of interests of
prospective politicians it may
be hard to. find opposing candi.
dates who could attract
Buddhists and Catholics,
Northerners and Southerners.
Meanwhile, the political situa?
tion remains as stable or as
unstable as it has during the
past 17 months, Ky has shown
a surprisin dexterity in keep.
ing himself afloat. Ile survived
the struggle with the Buddhists
last spring and emerged with an
uovernment, but n the end
their departure teas qulet.
Ilya removal of Gencrat
CZuang, cnnunander of the
Fourth Corps ?wra, which com-
prises the ;Mekong (fella, front
active command In Minister of
Industrial Devclnpineut also
passed off without a ripple of
trouble.
But the Government's
greatest scourco of strength
stems from the success. of
September's elections. .1 1
On the economic front the
Government, pushed by_Anierl-
?tnd, together with the decision
to grant open Import licences, it
has meant that consumer goods
have flowed in to mop tip tho
the Assembly, and these amend- and Pointe lttinister as in excess money In circulation and
menu will stand unless they aro France. Some men)ber; (ear the put an -end to speculation in
latter system would present two coinnrorlities (the exception is
tejcet by " a two-thirds ready-made sinus for Genera; the motor-scooter which nearly
majority of the e Assembly's; every Vietnamese k determined
members. I Thicu and Air Vice-A[:ushaI icy, to possess).
The Grtvernntcut naturally It has been St it rest Ie;'edislatithevo re
should be two The political erystat ball Is
believed that, with 20 Army cloudy, but Mil will, tell
officers n the Assembly, thero ifouses, both elected dirccty, whether the Government is
would be no difficulty In gettin an independent, fudiciary serious in its der.lared, Intention
the support of a further It hoided ,by a Sutn?eme Court.. to build a democratic South
members wliteh would lie and, an .,independent Inspec, .Vietnam
larger majority than two thirds,; too honesty of the " Adnthtis?
the Assembly has passed p? tration.
resolution asking the Goworn?I The Ariny. will certainly put
ment to amend Article 20. .:-..t up it? own- candidate for Presi
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February 1967
A Time Magazine article in the 23 December 1966 issue had the
following to say about persisting rumors regarding the assassination of
Constituent Assemblyman Tran Van Van:
"To Saigon's compulsive intriguers, the rumor had a certain
superficial plausibility. Scarcely a month before the murder, Ky's
Cabinet had very nearly collapsed in a dispute between the northern-
born generals around Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and the native southerners,
who felt that they were losing out in power and patronage. Tran
Van Van had been the most articulate southerner in the Assembly and
the strident leader of its antigovernment, antimilitary faction, and
in recent weeks had increasingly antagonized the ruling generals.
He had led a bitter struggle against the generals' power to veto or
amend the new constitution that the Assembly is writing.
"Strong President. In one of his last acts, Van had tried to
ram through the Assembly an article setting the minimum age for South
Viet Nam's chief executive at 40 rather than the anticipated 35.
His target, of course, was Premier Ky, who is only 36, and would thus
be prohibited from running for President. So it was only natural for
many a southerner to suspect Ky of complicity in Van's death -- the
kind of divisiveness that could only please the Viet Cong. Ky
hardly helped matters last week by closing down the Viet Nam Guardian
and the Saigon Post, two daily newspapers that had defied government
censorship to print some of the rumors.
"The Assembly, on the southern bloc's urging, took time out
from its rulemaking to condemn "with energy the savage deed of the
assassins from whatever origin," and set up its own miniature Warren
Commission, chaired by a southerner, to investigate Van's death.
The Deputies' real task, however, proceeded apace toward the Assembly's
February deadline for presenting the nation with a draft constitution.
With Van's southern colleagues dissenting, the Assembly voted for a
Korean-style governmental outline for the nation's future. It pro-
vides for a strong, popularly elected President who will choose his
own Premier. The Premier and his Cabinet will be subject to parlia-
mentary control, and can be ousted by the legislature if need be
while the President continues to provide a shield of stability over
the fledgling nation's growth."
Facts from newspaper material re Constituent Assembly.
Deadline for the Assembly to complete draft: 27 March 1967.
Deadline for Directorate to proclaim constitution after it submitted: 30
days.
Deadline for elections after promulgation of constitution: 3 to 5 months
(Premier Ky has announced it to be 3 months).
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Completion of first draft of constitution: end of January 1967.
Included in first draft, provisions for:
1. an Executive with a strong president and vice president
elected by direct popular vote, prime minister appointed
by president;
2. a Parliament composed of a Senate (30-50,members) repre-
senting regional interests (provincial) and a House of
Representatives (120-200 members) with the powers to demand,
by a 2/3's majority vote, that the president dismiss
individual ministers or the whole cabinet; Senatorial
power to control the appointment of high officials, in
particular of ambassadors and generals;
3. a Judiciary with strong powers composed of a Supreme court,
a Council of Magistracy, a Special Court and a Board of
Censors
4. formalising the right of opposition and of setting up
parties, as well as freedom of the press and habeas corpus
5. election of province and district chiefs by people instead
of the military - (a centuries old custom).
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2
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Excerpts from Press
February 1967
Local Elections in South Vietnam
The South Vietnamese government recently issued two decrees provid-
ing' for the election of village councils and hamlet chiefs, and govern-
ing the reorganization of local administration. This means that popular
control in the form of elected officials and assemblies could bring back
relatively broad autonomy and fiscal responsibility to the rice roots
level.
The elections will begin in April and be staggered through early
June 1967 so that security forces can be concentrated area by area to
enable as broad a vote as possible despite disruptive attempts by the
Viet Cong. Each village - depending on size - will elect six to twelve
citizens to serve three-year terms on a village council, a deliberative
body. These councilmen will then make one of their number village chief.
The village chief will also act as chairman of the community's adminis-
trative committee, which is the executive body at the hamlet level. The
hamlet chief, who is elected by the people of the hamlet, represents his
hamlet before the village committee along with three or four other chiefs
of the hamlets comprising that village. The hamlet chief also represents
village authority in the hamlet.
The South Vietnamese government decrees also provided for a secret
ballot and universal suffrage.
Local government has been largely appointive ever since the Diem
regime abolished elected village administrations in 1956 in order to
centralize its power. There are dangers in reinstituting self-rule in
rural areas: the peasantry may lack sufficient experience to govern it-
self; elected officials are at the top of Viet Cong assassination lists;
the village councils could be infiltrated by those who do not believe in
self government; there are also advantages that could accrue: an increased
popular base in even a portion of the nation's 500 villages and 11,000
hamlets would establish a foundation for political evolution; with farmers
making up 85% of the nation's population, it would be difficult for the
opponents of self government to use the old arguments about the central
government being oppressive and insensitive to the aspirations of the
people; the example of elections freely held in numerous areas could pro-
vide a useful contrast for Viet Cong-controlled areas where the Viet
Cong has rigidly dominated the villagers and never provided any segment
of the good life; giving the peasant a greater stake in his existence
would also help combat the political apathy prevalent in so much of the
countryside; if the citizen had a say so instead of being told, he could
be helpful in seeing that foreign aid funds and materials were used more
constructively;: villagers responsible to their own people could be more
interested in weeding`out'corruptioh; there is increased. likelihood of
increased: cooperation with the central government, especially in areas
such as mi.li.tary,intelligence where,the farmer could so often have helped
in the past had he cared enough to do so.
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Science Surveys February 1.967
Chicago, Illinois
All reports reviewed to date concerning the current influenza
epidemic in the USSR seem designed to reassure the populace that the
situation is under control. and that there is no cause for alarm. As
expected, no morbidity or mortality figures have appeared in either the
central or. provincial press. Most articles are didactic in tone, dis-
cussing the disease in general, reiterating past epidemics, and advocating
various protective measures; no present danger is mentioned specifically.
Noteworthy among these reports is an article by A.A. Smorodintsev,
Leningrad virologist, published in Pravda, 16 January, in response to
readers' queries about the increase of flu cases in Moscow. Smorodintsev
discusses modern. research methods in the control of influenza and mentions
a decision to establish an All-Union Scientific Research. Institute of
Influenza, which will be the first institution of its kind. He also notes
with regret that the "material needs of biological and medical. science"
required to develop and manufacture antivirus vaccines and medicines are
far from satisfied, and lists a number of sophisticated devices needed
by researchers in addition to "elementary equipment and reagents."
V.M. Zhdanov, another prominent Soviet virologist, purports to discuss
"the new epidemic" in Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 24+ January, but devotes his
article to virus mutability and different types of immunity, admitting
only that influenza can be a dangerous disease.
A representative sampling of other articles indicates that the first
outbreaks occurred in Central Asia at the end of December 1966 and that
the disease spread to Moscow subsequently. Sovetskaya Estoniya, 22 January,
published in Tallin, notes that the epidemic is proceeding without compli-
cations and that outbreaks are being reported in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
and "other European countries." This article also cautions that although
the danger of an increase in the incidence of the ongoing epidemic should
not be exaggerated, it cannot be ignored. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 25 Jan-
uary (Alma-Ata) and Sovetskaya Latviya, 27 January (Riga) attribute the
epidemic primarily to type B virus but state that type A has also been
encountered. Type A2 has been implicated in Latvia. O.V. Baroyan, director
of the Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology imeni Gamaleya, states in
Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 14 January, that type B influenza virus does not
cause "severe" disease and that no threat of a pandemic: exists. Kommunist,
1 February, attributes most cases in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia to A2
virus. An article in Vechernyaya Moskva, 27 January, addresses itself to
the proposition that flu is easier to prevent than to cure, and recommends
cleanliness, intranasal powders (sulfonamide, streptocide) to be taken
following contact with patients, avoidance of crowds, aspirin at the first
sign of malaise, and other measures to attenuate the course of the disease.
(Cont.)
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Most authors agree that constant mutation of influenza viruses and
the impermanence of immunity constitute impediments to the development
of a "radical" agent for controlling the disease.
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27 February 1967
Soviet Medicine and Public Health
"The safeguarding of the health of the populace is one of the major
tasks of the Soviet state, which cares for the high level of the physi-
cal well-being of the populace, for the prolongation of life and the
flourishing of its citizens. The care of the state for the safeguard-
ing of the people's health has been ordained in the basic law of the
Soviet state: the Stalinist Constitution. Not in a single one of the
constitutions of the bourgeois states is there even mention of the obli-
gation of the state to safeguard the health of the citizens." Bolshaya
Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Second Edition,
vol. 16, page 597.
In their publications and pronouncements the Soviets try to convey
their thesis that the over-all care of the health of citizens of the
USSR is superior to that of any other country. Soviet spokesmen do not
hesitate to ascribe such superiority to the system of the USSR. Whereas
in making these assertions to foreigners they rarely offer qualifications,
the Soviets are obliged by circumstances to speak very carefully when
addressing their own populace. For Soviet citizens are far too aware of
the shortcomings of health care in the USSR to accept extravagant claims
of Soviet superiority in this sphere. Soviet citizens would be skepti-
cal of such claims due to the extraordinary frequency of influenza epi-
demics in the USSR and because of their own everyday experiences with
medical practices and hospitals, as well as by their observations of
Soviet backwardness in medical technology and the absence of significant
accomplishments in medical research.
Influenza epidemics in the USSR: Reports by foreign doctors, dip-
lomats, official visitors, and tourists visiting the USSR provide abun-
dant evidence that there have been at least 6 influenza epidemics in the
past 11 years. The Soviet press, by issuing warnings to stay indoors
and discussing research on influenza and occasionally providing indica-
tions of the existence of epidemics, have indirectly confirmed the re-
ports by foreigners. However, the Soviet government and its press has
been very reticent in reporting e:3sential facts about the epidemics.
The epidemic of February-March 1965 illustrates the inadequacy of
Soviet reporting on medical problems. After the epidemic had struck a
city, local newspapers and radio broadcasts warned people to stay away
from crowds and take other precautions. But neither the local nor the
national press provided significant information that would indicate the
number of cases, the geographical incidence, or the severity of the
sickness. In contrast with this almost blank picture of the situation
is the revelation on page 80 of the December 1966 issue of the Statisti-
cal Herald (Vestnik Statistiki) that there were 109,000 more deaths in
1965 than in 196+ and that, according to a footnote to the 1965 figure,
the increase in the population's mortality "was caused by the grippe
[synonymous with influenza] epidemic in February-March 1965."
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The Soviet press handling of the 1967 epidemic is somewhat fuller,
yet still does not provide Soviet citizens and non-Soviet epidemiologists
with useful information. The attached survey of the'Soviet press on this
subject confirms only that there has been an epidemic in 1967, and that
it is widespread. (Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltic republics, and Central
Asia have already been afflicted; in addition, the epidemic may have
spread to the Georgian and Azerbaydzhan Republics in the Trans-Caucasus
region).
An absence of information on the use or effectiveness of nasal
spray immunization against influenza seems to confirm that this techni-
que has proved to be a failure. It will be recalled that the Soviets
gave publicity to this technique in the early 1960's, but later on they
curtailed reporting as the large-scale trials showed that the technique
was ineffective. In this context it is significant that the government
has not provided adequate equipment and supplies for the development and
manufacture of antivirus vaccines and medicines. For, according to the
prominent virologist A. Smorodintsev:
"Developing and manufacturing anti-influenza vaccines and drugs
requires a great deal of complicated apparatus and reagents. Unfortu-
nately, the material demands of medical and biological science are far
from fully met. This is true of the complicated apparatus of the ul-
tracentrifuge type, ultrarefrigerators, instruments for vacuum drying of
live vaccines, precise thermostats, varied instruments for automatic
recording of the results of biochemical and immunological research.
There is an even more acute shortage of elementary equipment, materials
and reagents. And after all, only the alchemists were able to 'create
science' out of thin air....
There is no doubt that a good supply of materials to scientific
establishments would make it possible for Soviet science to quickly and
successfully solve the many problems of the treatment and prevention of
various diseases." [Pravda (Truth) Jan 16, 1967]
Although Smorodintsev mentioned in that same article that the Sov-
iets are planning to build an influenza institute in Leningrad (reported
elsewhere to be a center for research by 500 scientists on all respira-
tory diseases) there is no indication that the Soviets are currently
making progress towards filling this wide gap in their health program.
General status of Soviet health care: Other deficiencies in medi-
cal services have been reported from a variety of sources. Foreigners
tend to contrast their findings in the USSR with the generally more favor-
able situation in their own countries. The Soviets' own medical journals
and newspapers reflect criticism of many aspects of health care, reveal-
ing discrepencies between the planned or desired situation and the real
situation in the USSR. The Soviet citizen is rarely heard from; but
when he voices his opinions, he tends to be critical of the medical care
he receives.
2 (Cont.)
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The most forthright foreign criticism of Soviet health care was
levelled in Time of 30 Sept. 1966 by Dr. Robert M. Hall, a Pittsburgh
surgeon who was invited to the USSR to visit what he believed to be
some of the best Soviet hospitals, in which he observed 15 operations.
Dr. Hall is quoted as follows:
"There is no area of equipment or instrumentation that comes
close to that in the United States. I saw no hospital or institute
as well equipped as any hospital or institute in the U.S. ... I
was appalled by the primitive conditions... Diagnostic work is
primitive... X-ray equipment is antiquated. Blood-chemistry
analysis is inefficient. [Electronic devices are] virtually un-
available. Medical technology, as we know it, is non-existent."
Furthermore, Dr. Hall stated that the lack of cleanliness was appalling,
that surgical instruments'were crude, that the daily number of, operations
at Soviet hospitals was as little as one-third of that of comparable U.S.
hospitals, and that there was no evidence of a transfer of the medical
competence developed in support of the Soviet space program to uses for
the people.
Other foreigners have couched their criticism in milder terms, but
they frequently criticize Soviet health care for:
- inefficiency in the use of hospital facilities (hospital stays
are prolonged and sometimes not necessary);
- inferior quality of hospital structures and equipment, and poor
maintenance and sanitation;
- over-specialization of medical institutions (for babies, maternity
care, adults) instead of general hospitals where services and equipment
can be concentrated;
- ineffective administration of hospitals (haphazard records, use
of doctors for routine clerical duties, slow service, poor scheduling);
- inadequate and technologically backward equipment and instruments
for diagnosis and treatment;'
- limitations on doctors' ability to do research and produce inno-
vations in the practice of medicine.
Criticism in the Soviet medical press is constant yet selective.
Rarely does an article condemn more than a limited aspect of medical
care in the USSR. Yet, as surveys of Soviet science reveal, the totality
of these press criticisms leads to the conclusion that general Soviet
health care is, at best, of mediocre quality. Some of these criticisms
point to:
3 (Cont.)
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Quality of doctors: Few doctors have received adequate training in
the use of instruments and modern technology, as was revealed in Medi-
tsinskaya Gazeta (Medical Gazette) of Dec. 17, 1965. Furthermore, there
has been a scarcity of specialists such as surgeons in the USSR in spite
of the large number of licensed medical doctors. Indifference affects
"some doctors," who reportedly "act rather carelessly towards influenza."
(Moskovskaya Pravda [Moscow Pravda] June 29, 1966.). An absence of out-
standing medical ability is attested by the failure of any Soviet doctor
or medical researcher to win a Nobel Prize since the early 1920's.
Equipment and instruments: Current reports indicate that substan-
tial improvements have not been made in the quality of Soviet medical
equipment and instruments since the publication in Meditsinskaya Gazetta,
July 21, 1964, of a detailed study which revealed general deficiencies
in quality, reliability, and durability. In 1963 alone, health insti-
tutions submitted 1,200 complaints to producers of medical equipment.
Flaws in technological design were noted; in Moscow, "50 percent of the
new electrocardiographs were shown to be unsuitable for thier specified
purpose." The medical instrument industry was scored for failing to
apply advances in electronics. Laboratory and pharmacy equipment such
as hypodermic needles, centrifuges, distillation apparatus are severely
criticized, as are a wide range of surgical tools including cutting
instruments and clamps. Major blame for this state of affairs has been
attributed to the failure of Soviet research institutes and manufacturers
to work together for improvement.
Use of available equipment: Poor organization has resulted in a
generally low rate of use of equipment for diagnostic and research work.
Indifference sometimes allows costly equipment to be misused; for example,
a vehicle with X-ray equipment was used for ordinary hauling in Kirov
Oblast, according to Meditsinskayya Gazette of September 9, 1966.
Administration: Repeated changes in over-all organization reflect
dissatisfaction with the administration and management of health pro-
grams. The research program is a case in point, having been decentra-
lized in 1957 and recentralized in 1965: both times for the sake of
increasing efficiency. A major complaint was that research findings
were not being translated into practice. As an illustration, Soviet
researchers determined that Type B influenza virus recurs every 3-4
years; yet this forecast did not result in measures prior to the recent
epidemic to alleviate its effects.
Availability of pharmaceuticals: In the early 1960's there were
repeated indications in the press of an nation-wide shortage of drugs
and health care products such as bandages and disinfectants. More
recently, the supply of basic drugs appears to be adequate, although
many of the more advanced pharmaceuticals have not been reported to be
in use. The Soviets have virtually confirmed their shortage by suppres-
sing all data on quantities or values of drugs produced, both totals for
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the economy and of particular kinds of drugs. The present Soviet goal,
according to Izvestiya (News) Mar. 12, 1966, is to-increase pharmaceutical
production between 1965 and 1970 by 70 percent', including more than a
trebling of vitamin production for an increase of 220 percent). But,
pending publication of basic statistics, it still must be concluded that
a shortage of-many pharmaceuticals will continue.
Popular criticism of the USSR medical program is rarely publicized,
yet there is some reason to . believe that Soviet citizens are not
completely satisfied with the health care they receive. Such dissatis-
faction was expressed in Literaturnaya Gazet~ (Literary Gazette) of
Dec. 8, 1966 by 2 citizens making a plea for fee-charging nursing
homes. They said:
"We need not fear the word 'fees.' There are polyclinics
that charge fees; out of embarrassment we call them economic-
accountability clinics. These polyclinics are extremely popular,
partly because here a person can choose his doctor according to
his own taste and judgment. Experience shows that the modest fees
frighten off no one. Incidentally, the term 'economic accountabil-
ity' isemployed only in official documents. The patients never
call it anything but a 'paid polyclinic.'
Why not take the next step and, along with fee-charging poly-
clinics, set up paid nursing homes? We do not propose to replace
free medical aid, but to establish parallel with this another type
of medical institution. These would differ, not only in the fact
that they charge for their services but also in their particular
function."
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