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January 30, 1967
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved Fo Release 1999/08/24 :151191M115P78-03061A000400070009-3 Significant Dates [ASTERISK denotes ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS] MAR 21-28 World Youth Week celebrated by World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY: Communist front). 25* Treaties creating European Economic Community (EEC) and European Community of Atomic Energy (Euratom) signed in Rome by France, West Germany, Italy, Bel- gium, Netherladds and Luxembourg. 1957. TENTH ANNIVERSARY. 27* Khrushchev succeeds Bulganin as Premier of USSR. 1957. 27-5 International Union of Students Congress at Ulan Bator, Mongolia. (IUS: Soviet-line Communist front) 29 Martyrs' Day and Youth Day. (Communist China) APR 1* Berlin Blockade begins. In 15 months, US and Britain airlift 2.34 million tons of vital supplies to city. (Blockade lifted by Soviets, 12 May 1949) 1948. 4* North Atlantic Treaty signed, including US, Canada and 10 West European countries. 1949. 16* USSR and Germany sign Treaty of Rapallo; secret military accord enables Ger- many to evade Treaty of Versailles by training men and testing and building weapons in USSR. 1922, FORTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY. 17* Lenin delivers "April Theses" in first public appearance after return to Russia. 1917. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY. 18-27* First Bandung Conference: 29 Afro-Asian countries participate. 1955. 24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and For Peaceful Coexistence. Celebrated by WFDY and 1US. (Communist fronts) 26* 19 Foreign Ministers meet at Geneva on Indochina; 21 July, agree on armis- tice effective 11 August. Vietnam partitioned, Laos and Cambodia recog- nized as neutral. 1954. 28 "Expo 67" opens in Montreal with Bloc participation. MAY 1 May Day -- International Workers' Day. First designated by Second Inter- national (Socialist Congress) in 1889. 7* V-E Day, end of World War II. 1945. 15* Third International declared dissolved by Soviets; 1943. Announcement on 22 May 1943 declares other Communist Parties to be autonomous. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 PPIPIPPI (Significant Dates) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: Clikir01#16/18-03061A000400070009-3 30 January 1967 "The Chinese Red Guards Don't Know Lenin" Communist Writings Which Communists Can't Read Briefly Noted V TASS on Nov. 19 an- nounced that a delegation of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society headed by PRAVDA observer V. Mayevsky had been forced to cut short its tour of China by Chinese provocations and insulting, hostile attacks as reported in our Propagandist's Guide to WCA, #8. IZVESTIYA on the 22nd carries the text of a long statement by M. to a press conference on the 21st. De- ploring the senseless "great-Khan chauvinism and anti-Sovietism" in Red Guard actions to eradicate foreign culture, M. says: "...The major part of the CR Committee at the University have been educated in the humanities: they are philosophers, lawyers, etc.... All of them call them- selves M-Ls. Nevertheless, dur- ing the sharp discussion, it be- came evident that they had only the very scantest knowledge of the opinions of Marx, Engels, and Lenin on culture." After the RG stated their criti- cal view of Beethoven, M. asked them what they find "specifically unaccept- able" in the Appassionata, to which they reply: "We have not heard it, but we regard it critically." M. comments: "The words of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, who called this work an amazing, wonderful creation of human genius, were a surprise to them. They sincerely admitted that they did not read Lenin's works on proletarian culture and that they did not know about L's talks with Klara Zet- kin in which he called the widest possible proletarian culture could be built and the really new and great Communist society grow. ...The library collabor- ators announced: 'Pushkin was a non-proletarian writer.' Upon our mentioning that V.I. Lenin called Piishkin a classic, that he valued his works and read them again and again, they remained silent.... (Etc.)" We have long emphasized that the Communists are vulnerable where they do not -- or are not allowed to -- study their own "classics." Now a prominent Communist journalist gives assets a fresh peg for new commen- taries on the subject. Leftist and revisionist assets might stress the utter incompatability of the parrot- style learning of Mao's thought with real study of Marxist classics, add- ing that this parrot-learning recalls similar practices in Russia under Stalin, and that Russia has not yet recovered from its own intellectual straitjacket. Lenin read Pushkin; how many of today's Soviet Commu- nists have read Kafka? A First-Hand Report on Com- munist China A A * Interview With A Former Chinese Communist On 26 July 1966 a young member of Peking's economic mission to Damascus, Syria quietly took his first open steps to escape Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 (Briefly Noted Cont.) Approved For Release 19991018112ff: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 from the Chinese Communist mission. Miao Chen-pal had been thinking about this move for some time - in fact, he had a suitcase packed for fully a week before he saw his chance to make a break. And when it came he took the suitcase from the shelf above his bed and headed straight for the U.S. Em- bassy in Damascus. In the suitcase were two suits, four shirts, a trans- istor radio and a Chitese-English dictionary. He explained that he wanted to wear his own clothes and be able to study English and find out independently what was being said about him and his exploit. U.S. officials reported that in hotels en route to Washington, he even insisted on making his own bed. The attachment from U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT's 7 November 1966 issue tells the reader a great deal more about this engaging yound Chinese. He appears intelligent, thoughtful, practical and objective - qualities which come through very clearly in the attached. It is suggested that distribution of the interview in whole or part should appeal to an audience much wider than that of the youth stu- dent or intellectual. * * * Authoritative "What is U.S. Policy, Speaker Spells Anyway?" Out Answer Although our business is covert, not overt, propaganda, we are often confronted with questions from contacts and others as to what U.S. policy really is, especially in Vietnam. Even friendly people often pro- fess to be puzzled as to what the U.S. is trying to do; less friendly individ- uals sometimes imply or state openly that they doubt that the U.S. knows it- self what is is doing. Beyond this, there is a tendency to think that the U.S. lacks confidence in its policy, and is unsure whether or not suc- cess in Vietnam is possible. This latter belief in turn encourages Hanoi to refuse any curtailment of its activities and demands. Excerpts from an informal speech by W.W. Rostow, given at confer- ence of educators in Washington, 16-17 June 1966, and reproduced in PRESS COMMENT, 7 February 1967, are well-suited to answer these questions and doubts. Rostow is, of course, the former M.I.T. economist and author of many books, including STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH more recently the chief of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State, and now Special Assistant to the President, work- ing in the White House. His remarks are clear, authoritative, and confident. Particularly note- worthy is Rostow's emphasis on the positive economic goals of the U.S. government. Rostow's speech is suitable for showing to appropriate indi- vidual contacts or for our own background information for use in person-to-person discussion. Out- lets should not in general be asked to publish all or portions of the speech, but may use it, together with other more recent information, as background for discussions of economic growth, development programs, or U.S. aims and policies, especially with regard to Vietnam. All such pub- lic discussion, of course, should be written or broadcast from a point of view appropriate to the country in which the outlet is - located or to which it addresses itself. Approved For Release 1999/98/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 ?Mr"ET (Briefly Noted) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: ditht.M-03061A000480070006 -3967 1092. THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE: TWENTY YEARS LATER SITUATION: "This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious.... 25X1 C1 Ob The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world - and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation." President Harry S. Truman, in his Message to Congress, March 12, 1947. On March 12, 1947, President Truman asked Congress to appropriate 000,000,000 for economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. That Presidential Message to Congress, more popularly known as the Truman Doctrine, signaled the end of American hopes of tranquil relations with the Soviet Union. It marked the beginning of the open struggle between the free world, led by the United States and communism. Before the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, and even before the San Francisco meeting that established the United Nations Organization (April 1945), President Truman's encounters with Molotov had given him premol.- nitions of serious trouble. The Potsdam Conference supplied the President and his advisers with further qualms about the intentions and the future behavior of the Soviet Union, and from that juncture to the end of the Truman administration (and during the ensuing years) the Soviets pursued with increasing consistency a course of secretiveness, duplicity, obstruc- tive hostility, and tacit repudiation of agreements, of which their pro- longed blockade of Berlin and their fomenting of war in Korea were the extreme manifestations. With staggering rapidity the Soviet Union built up a ring of satellites in Eastern Europe. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 'MINK (1092 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Under stresses that seemed at times to be leading straight into a third world war, President Truman was forced into improvising the radi- cally new policy of containment -- a flexible holding operation along the entire far-flung periphery of Soviet domination, with aid supplied as needed to whatever forces were resisting communization. The three crucial tests of the policy of containment were Greece, the Berlin Block- ade and Korea. Greece was pacified, and the communist threat quashed; the Berlin blockade was roundly beaten by the airlift, and Korea, a stalemate by military criteria, was a success in the sense that Southern Korea remains independent and prosperous today. The initial hopes for a successfully functioning United Nations were quickly dashed in the earliest days of that body by the obstructionism of the Soviet Union. The veto, the walkout, the boycott, and calculated rudeness became standard Soviet tactics, and there was widespread fear that the United Nations seemed doomed to failure. It was in this context that President Truman, in proclaiming his Message to Congress, stated "The United Nations is designed to make possible Lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objec- tives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to main- tain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian re- gimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes, imposed on free peoples by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the secu- rity of the United States." (See unclassified attachment for complete text). Affairs in Greece had been in varying states of crisis since the coun- try's liberation-TT-744. The British, whose forces had come in when the Germans moved out, had tried unsuccessfully for three years to restore stability and to cope with the communist-fomented civil war. On February 24, 1947, the British Ambassador in Washington informed the Department of State that after March 31 Great Britain would have to discontinue her eco- nomic assistance to Greece and also to Turkey. Subsequently, the British Government announced that its troops in Greece would have to be altogether withdrawn. President Truman did not take the matter to Congress until nearly three weeks after the British notification. One reason for his delay was his deliberate intention to make his message coincide with the arrival of Secretary of State Marshall in Moscow for conferences; Marshall was to im- press upon the Soviets that the days of the soft policy were over, and that Soviet good faith would no longer be taken for granted by the United States. What President Truman meant by the Marshall mission and the message of aid to Greece and Turkey was a double-barreled declaration that the United States would stand up to the Soviets and resist their continuing subversion and grabbing of areas vital to our security. 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 44011141Pq lino Approved For Release 1999/08/24344144DP78-03061A000400070009-3 Legislation was introduced and adopted in Congress (which formally approved the request for aid on May 15) to provide that the program of aid should lapse whenever the General Assembly or the Security Council should decide that action taken by the United Nations had rendered the continuance of US aid unnecessary or undesirable and that, if the ques- tion came before the Security Council, the US would waive its right of veto. Other provisions of the legislation passed by Congress called for aid in the form of loans or grants and for the dispatch to Greece and Turkey of civilian and military advisers to help the recipient govern- ment make effective use of the aid. The President was required to with- draw any or all aid if requested to do so by either the Greek or Turkish governments. The recipient governments were required to give free access to US officials and to the press so that they might observe how the aid was being used. Full publicity was to be given to the programs within each country. The Truman Doctrine, although faced with formidable difficulties, achieved its fundamental aim of keeping Greece and Turkey out of the Soviet orbit. By the end of January 1948, over 90,000 tons of American military equipment had been sent to Greece. At the request of the Greek government American military advisors were sent into the field to advise directly in operations. Toward the end of 1949 hostilities came to an end in Greece, and attention shifted to the country's very serious eco- nomic problems - disastrous inflation, severe unemployment, and the almost desperate circumstances of wage earners and white-collar workers. As to Turkey, the quarterly reports submitted on the program in 1949 expressed satisfaction with the progress toward the objective of a smaller but more effective Turkish armed force - one better matched to the resources of Turkey. The Truman Doctrine first set the terms and the pattern for US finan- cial, economic and military assistance to nations of the free world, as later developed under the Marshall Plan and various subsequent foreign aid programs. 25X1 C1 Ob 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24s~DP78-03061A0004000700094Dnt ) Approved For Release 1999611611INICIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 25X1 C1 Ob References The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practice. Edited by Louis W. Koenig, New York University Press, Documents of American History. Edited by Henry Steele Commager. Appleton- Century-Crofts. 1963. 4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 (1092.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: Clifeeft78-03061A0004030?OioW3 1967 1093 EUR. FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS 25X1 C1 Ob SITUATION: The 18th Congress of the French Communist Party (PCF) was held in an industrial suburb of Paris from 4 to 8 January 1967. The sessions were marked by little enthusiasm and no spontaneity, and the closing statements included no surprises or innovations. These four themes ran through the discussions at the Congress: 1. The PCF rank-and-file should realize that the Party's agreement with the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS)* solidified the PCF's emergence from political isolation and therefore justified the compromises which have been made with the non-Communist left. 2. A campaign must be mounted to oppose the domestic policies of the Gaullist government and voters must be encouraged to vote for the PCF in the legislative elections now scheduled for 5 and 12 March 1967. 3. The organizational and ideological unity and discipline of the PCF must be reemphasized. 4. On the international plane, the Chicoms and their French supporters must be attacked while the PCF at the same time should lead the movement calling for an international Communist conference. *The FGDS (Fdgration de la Gauche De, Mocratique et Socialiste) includes the Socialists, the Radicals, and an assortment of left-wing political conventions and clubs which initially took shape in late 1965. Its aim was to present one candidate from the left against de Gaulle in the Presidential elections in December of that year; the PCF decided not to run its own candidate but to support the FGDS candidate, Franiois Mit- terrand. An agreement between the FCP and the FGDS was formalized in December 1966 in preparation for the forthcoming legislative elections; see attached articles from the 21 December NEW YORK TIMES and the 5 January LONDON TIMES. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070M-33 cont. ) 444440 Approved For Release 19$8.198102T4 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 The first day of the Congress was taken up almost entirely by the report of General Secretary Waldeck RochW who admitted that there had been opposition within the PCF to the recently concluded agreement with the FGDS. Some French press observers recalled that the language he used ("sectarianism," "dogmatism," "right opportunism") was similar to that used by the Party before a purge, but when the Congress closed, the new Central Committee and the Politburo showed little change and Waldeck Rochet appeared to be still in control of the Party apparatus. As expected, the Congress paid considerable attention to the sub- ject of Vietnam, but it showed more fervor in condemning the Chicoms for hampering Soviet aid to Hanoi and interfering in the internal affairs of fraternal parties. Waldeck Rochet asserted that the PCF favored a world conference of Communist parties; the Soviet delegate, CPSU Central Com- mittee Politburo member Arvid Pelshe, was more cautious in noting that such a conference would have to be "thoroughly prepared", -- a theme echoed by the Finnish CP delegate; Italian CP Secretary General Luigi Longo expressed his party's reservations on the conference question. The final resolution on the proposed world conference, however, declared that the PCF "will work so that conditions for this convocation, which have ripened recently, will be realized as soon as possible." The most important relected amendment to the final political reso- lution would have made it more critical of Gaullist foreign policy. The rapporteur, Etienne Fajon, asserted that even a reactionary government like the Gaullist one could take certain measures favorable to peace, and to attack them would discourage the "forces of peace" and make the PCF misunderstood by the "popular masses." According to the Soviet news agency TASS, Waldeck Rochet's opening speech, after noting that de Gaulle's visit to the USSR and Kosygin's visit to France had been "received with satisfaction by the majority of Frenchmen", stated: "At the same time, as pointed out in the draft resolution sub- mitted to the Congress, the PCF, while unhesitatingly supporting all steps in the direction of peace, 'comes out against the nega- tive and dangerous aspects of de Gaulle's foreign policy which serve the interests of monopolies and not the national interests.' Analyzing the political situation in the country, Waldeck Rochet noted the intensification of the economic and political struggle waged by the working class and other social strata. He particularly stressed the need for unity of the workers and the democratic forces and agreement between them on the basis of a joint program with a view to putting an end -,V) the regime of personal power [the standard *For the fullest available reportage in English translation of this and subsequent material concerned with the Congress see the,EBIS DAILY REPORT for West Europe 4 to 13 January. Also see the attached article from the 8 January NEW YORK TIMES. Approved For Release 1999198124 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 4040114144? (1093 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : =8-03061A000400070009-3 PCF terminology for de Gaulle's system of government] and estab- lishing genuine democracy." Five days after the Congress closed, the Executive Committee of the FGDS met under the leadership of Franiois Mitterrand and, according to TASS, "endorsed" the agreement on joint action with the PCF in the March elections. Under thisagreementa Communist or Federation candidate who receives more votes in the first round of the elections will be backed by both organizations in the second round. The FGDS was reportedly "not displeased" with the results of the PCF Congress and plans to pro- pose a continuing series of private talks with the PCF after the elec- tions to discuss and widen the areas of agreement between them. The FGDS also reportedly hopes that "more liberal elements" in the PCF will gain more influence and that "in a decade or so" a real dialogue might become possible. 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/08124: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 440114.14 (1093 Cont.) 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: .1000111,1678-03061A00040007E0002y31967 1094 FE. NORTH VIETNAM TRAINS THAIS IN SUBVERSION 25X1 C1 Ob SITUATION: In early 1965 Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi told a visiting diplomat that "we may have a guerrilla war going in Thai- land before this year is out." Chen went on to say that the Thai govern- ment would be overthrown with the aid of Chinese arms and supplies sent to the insurgents operating in Thailand. The same year China presided over the organization of the Thailand Patriotic Front in Peking with the spe- cific purpose of directing Communist subversive activities in the north- eastern and southern provinces of Thailand. (Begin SECRET NOFORN) Now there is new evidence that Thailand's Communist Party, with support from Peking and Hanoi, is penetrating areas in northeast, northern and southern Thailand. According to a source with good contacts in the area, the Com- munists have brought eight villages in northern Thailand under their con- trol since early 1966. In response to these activities the Thai government is giving renewed attention to these areas - both to oppose Communist ac- tivities and to expand civil programs aimed at bringing the government closer to the people. Although government forces have been searching out Communist strongholds in two provinces (Nakhon Phanom and Sakhon Nakhon) they have been unable to establish contact with terrorist bands operating there. The rugged terrain of such areas, their accessibility to Communist- controlled areas in Laos, and the absence of effective Thai government con- trol and contact with the people have made these areas natural targets for Communist subversion. Peking is making capital on the situation and has actually been training some Thai insurgents in Communist China. The extent to which Hanoi and Peking may be coordinating their efforts in this field is not known. (End SECRET NOFORN) It is known, however, that Hanoi has been conducting such training of Thais in North Vietnam since at least 1962. On 1 April 1966 a Thai farmer surrendered to the Thai government- operated counter-subversion center in northern Thailand and reported that he had been one of a class of 130 Thais taken to North Vietnam and trained by North Vietnam (NVN) army personnel in guerrilla warfare against the gov- ernment of Thailand. His details of training, indoctrination, the location and physical layout of the school etc., were corroborated and surfaced to the press in October 1966 (see unclassified attachment). In November two other Thais, trained at the same school, were also surfaced to the press as Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 S E IMPET (1094 Cont.) Approved For Release 19%WitlifrCIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 a second step in the field's exploitation of the discovery that North Vietnamese are training Thai insurgents. This training and indoctrina- tion is only one part of the developing pattern of Peking-and Hanoi- directed action against Thailand. 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/08124: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 46.611?1144, U. S. NewAbrYilertg&c1P8rrt Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Interview A FIRST-HAND REPORT ON RED CHINA TODAY With a Chinese Who Grew Up Under Communism CPYRGHT Behind the turmoil in Red China? Are the Communists riding for a fall? Is their tight control slipping? What do China's millions really think of their rulers? A vivid picture of today's China emerges from this interview with a Communist defector, Miao Chen-pai. He has only boyhood memories of China before the Reds. But his knowledge of his homeland since is sharp and perceptive. Miao Chen-pai, now in the United States, was interviewed by two members of the staff of "U. S. News & World Report" who have lived in China. Both were struck by his intelligent, ob- jective answers to their questions. Q Mr. Miao, where were you and what were you doing when the Communists came to power in China in 1949? A I was living with my parents about three hours' train ride from Shanghai. I was 13 then. My parents were both schoolteachers. I was in school. Q As a 13-year-old boy, what did you think of the Communists and Mao Tse-tung? A Mao Tse-tung was a hero to me. I believed in him, and in the Communists. I believed their ideas were right and gopd for China, so later I joined the Communist Party. Q Ilow long did you continue to believe? A For many years. That's why I went on to join the Communist Party. I could see some things that were good for my country. Conditions improved for the lowest of the peasants?the ones who never owned any land. The country was unified, too?brought under one Government. Q What advantages do you get by being a member of the Communist Party? A We don't get any immediate material advantages from being a member of the party. A party member, for example, gets the same pay as a nonparty member doing vpie the same job. But all Chinese know that, in the long run, the party member does benefit. Nobody talks about this, but we can see it. Party mem- bers are promoted faster, move up to higher jobs. Of course, as you move up the ladder, you get better living quarters MIAO CHEN-PAI, 29, joined China's Young Com- munist League in 1949 and the Communist Party itself in 1956. He was in China's armed forces from 1950 until 1957. Then he went to work for the Min- istry of Foreign Trade. Last year, Mr. Miao was as- signed by the Communists to the commercial mis- sion of the Chinese Embassy in Damascus, Syria. It was there that he walked into the U. S. Embassy last July 26, asked for political asylum and got it. 58 Approved For ReletisvritY9V108114s.. eilk-R13111/31845061A000400070009 -3 INTERVIEW: a First-Hand Report on China Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : GIA-RDI'/8-03061A0004000/UUU9-3 CPYRGHT and better food. So, if you want to get ahead faster, you try to get into the party. Q Why don't people talk about this? A You don't like to talk about anything like that in China. For example, students in the universities are not only graded for their work, but also are graded for their loyalty. The party does the grading on loyalty. So, if the party committee at your university hears that you have said something that sounds disloyal, that is put in your record when you graduate. This is bad for you, because it means you are sent to an unsatisfactory job or to some faraway place. All students know this, so they try to show how loyal they are. Q When did you, Mr. Miao, begin to have doubts about Mao Tse-tung and the Communists?and why? A Almost all Chinese trusted Mao Tse-tung, thought of him as being almost infallible, until 1957. They believed him when he said he wanted a hundred flowers to bloom and a hundred thoughts to contend. Because they trusted him, many expressed their ideas and criticisms. Then we found out that the "hundred flowers" was a trap. Mao Tse-tung used this trap to get people to tell their thoughts. In this way, Mao Tse-tung found out who opposed him?and got rid of these people. Still, many people continued to believe in Mao Tse-tung. They said the trap had been a smart move by him?to get rid of people who were bourgeois and antiparty. Personally, my doubts began in 1959, when it became obvious to me and others that the "Great Leap Forward"? a creation of Mao?was a failure. Then, afterward, Mao never criticized himself for this error?although he had al- ways said that members of the party should criticize them- selves. Then, when Marshal Peng Teh-huai [former Defense Min- ister] was purged for criticizing Mao's "Great Leap For- ward," I realized that Mao would not criticize himself, nor would he accept the criticism of others. Instead, he blamed others for the failure. This strengthened my doubts. Not only did Mao Tse-tung refuse to accept criticism, but he also was trying to make himself appear infallible, a man who could make no error. ? Did others feel this way? Did people talk about it? A I am certain many people felt this way. But nobody talked about it. We were afraid. Ever since the trap of the hundred flowers, we Chinese keep our discontent in our hearts. We are afraid to speak of these things to each other. ? Then how can you be certain others felt this way? A It came out later, in the last few years. It came out in literary work. It came out in criticisms by economic peo- ple and the educated classes. It came out even inside the party?which is why you now see the purges and the "great proletarian cultural revolution." O How did you learn about these events inside the party in China while you were in Syria? A Beginning last May, while I still was in the Embassy in Damascus, our Ambassador received 9rders from Peking to implement the cultural revolution. Peking began sending him a number of documents on the situation in China. These were studied and discussed in long sessions held every day in the Embassy. Some of the documents and reports were shown only to the relatively few Communist Party members in the Em- bassy. As a party member, I was shown these documents. From them, I learned what happened to Peng Chen. Peng Chen was one of the six most-powerful men in the Politburo of the Communist Party?the mayor of Peking, the capital, and also head of the party organization there. The documents showed that he was removed primarily because he was anti-Mao. In September of 1965, Peng Chen made statements at a national meeting of provincial propaganda workers. The state- ments were considered anti-Mao. What Peng Chen said was that everyone should be given freedom to speak?and that, even if it is Chairman Mao who is wrong, he, too, must be criticized. Mao Tse-tung no doubt has made many errors, but as long as he retains power, no one will be allowed to criticize him. Peng was purged a few months later. Q Peng and others must have known the fish's they were taking when they dared to criticize Mao. Why did they do it? A Peng and other high leaders in the party and the mili- tary have their own followers. [don't know, but it may have been that they felt strong enough, politically, to voice their opinions. But this I do know: The reason for the existence ail% widespread opposition to Chairman Mao's policies is the many setbacks the country has suffered. Both domestically and in the field of foreign relations, the policies of Mao have not succeeded. But these policies have no chance of being changed so long as Mao Tse-tung is alive, and so long as anyone who questions the policies is purged. O Do you believe, Mr. Miao, that the purges and mobs of young Red Guards will make everyone obedient to Mao Tse-tung now? A No, I don't. As long as Mao's policies are followed, whether by Mao himself or by his successors, there will be opposition. There are other groups besides the Mao Tse-tung group. As I said, Peng Chen had many followers, and many of these have not been purged. There are groups in the mili- tary, too. As long as there are groups who believe that Mao Tse-tung's policies are wrong for China, the struggle will continue. Q What in your mind are the main policies of Mao that are causing the problems? A There are two main policies: At home, there is the pol- icy of continued class struggle; abroad, there is the policy of world revolution. o Are these policies popular? A I don't think so. The class struggle at home means con- tinuing war against the bourgeoisie and the people with bourgeois thoughts. Chinese suspected of having bourgeois thoughts are those who are not opposed to the bourgeoisie. As for world revolution, I don't think the Chinese are en- thusiastic or very much interested. They are more interested in getting a better life for themselves. They do not like to make sacrifices to help "liberate" people far away. People ask why we have to send help to foreign "liberation move- ments" when we don't have enough money for our own de- velopment. U.S. NEWS Arittffleer,For7Rtilease 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 59 INTERVIEW: a First-Hand Report on China Approved For Release 1999/08/24 ? ?? "Thought cont CPYRGHT : GIA-RDP to-U.5061 A000400070009-3 rol is hated. People are unhappy" Q What do rhe Chinese think they should have to make their lives better? A Personal freedom is the main thing. Thought control is hated. People are unhappy with the way Communism is breaking up traditional family life. They want time in the evening to spend with their families?instead of attending study groups and self-criticism meetings and listening to propaganda lectures. People want time for themselves. Q What do they think of things like the law against mar- riage before a fairly advanced age? A The law isn't too bad. It says men can marry at age 20 and women at age 18. But the party says men shouldn't marry until they are 27, and women until they are 25. And you must understand that, in China, what the party says is more important than the law. So, generally, in the cities, men don't marry until they are 27. In the countryside, however, more people get married earlier?following the law rather than the party. ? Chinese propaganda also discourages sexual relations before marriage. Is this accepted? A Many people do accept this. They work hard, practice self-restraint. But many people do not obey?particularly in the universities. You never hear about it in China, but there ,.re a great many babies born out of wedlock. AweQ How effective is the party propaganda in China? A Very effective. Remember, we hear nothing from the outside world that the party doesn't want us to hear. As a result, Mao Tse-tung has been able to make the Chinese be- lieve one thing at one time, and just the opposite at another time. In 1956, for example, Mao Tse-tung told us that Russia was the great leader and teacher of the revolution. Then a few years later, after Khrushchev had gone to Camp David to see Eisenhower, he made us believe that Khruslichey no longer was a Marxist-Leninist, and Russia no longer was the leader of the revolution. AS MAO'S TROUBLES GROW? () Well, if Mao's propaganda is that effective, why does he now need the cultural revolution and the Red Guards and the purges of party leaders? A Mao Tse-tung needs all this because of the opposition that has developed to his policies?and because of his failures. -le started the cultural revolution because of this opposition. 4100' Then he found that many members of the Young Communist League were not supporting the cultural revolution, or were not enthusiastic. So then he had to turn to the Red Guards. These are the younger people, who are most easily swayed and controlled by the propaganda. ? Who are the Red Guards? How did they get started? A The Red Guards started in the universities in Peking. That was well after the cultural revolution had been started. At first, the Red Guards were not publicly formed in the name of the party. The party element behind Mao and Mar- shal Lin Piao wanted it to appear that the Red Guards had been formed by student leaders in the universities. But, in fact, the Red Guards were backed, instructed and developed by this element of the party. ? Do you think the Red Guards can be controlled?or that they might turn out to be some kind of "Frankenstein monster" and turn on their creators? A I don't think it is possible that they will get out of control, like a "Frankenstein monster." That is because Mao and Lin have created them, would make sure to have means of control over them. Chinese Communist Party leaders have had great experience in creating and stopping such move- ments, you know. ? Is the present situation connected in any way with the results of the break with Soviet Russia? A I don't think it is, in the minds of the people. When it became realized that there was a break, people were happy, in a way. Now, they thought, China can show the world that it can progress on its -own, without help. We Chinese had confidence that we could progress on our own, although we realized it would take longer. But we felt that the accomplishment would be more satisfying, because it would be ours. Besides, there was dissatisfaction with the type of help Russia was giving us. Engineers told me that the automobile plant the Russians helped us build in Changchun was not good. I didn't see the Russian plants myself, but many peo pie who did told me the same kind of story. "CHINA CAN PUSH AHEAD"? ? Can China, in fact, progress on its own? A I think China basically can push ahead economically. Of course, China is still economically weak. Because of this, she hopes to supplement her own technological and scien? tific capabilities with the technological and scientific capa- bilities of the Western countries. She is seeking to do this now by developing her foreign trade with these countries. Though she has shown she can do things on her own?the atom bomb, for example?China has a long way to go, still, in many, many fields. Such things as bombs, of course, are not everything. China in recent years has refused development aid from Russia, and there have been no new developments or changes on this. I don't believe China needs aid from Russia or anybody else. As a matter of national pride, and because China is a vast country and full of resources, I believe China can do it on her own?though it will take time. And, of course, she needs to develop her foreign trade in order to strengthen her- self economically and technologically. ^ What will be the effects of the development of a nuclear-carrying missile which Communist China has just announced? A I don't believe it will have any actual military worth, but it can elevate China's influence and be of use to her in a propaganda way for prestige. I think the reaction of the Chinese people will be pride, just as they were proud that China had an atom bomb. ? Is there any sentiment of importance in favor of Chiang Kai-shek's coming back from Taiwan? A Older people might like to see Chiang come back. Others might want the personal liberties that they now be- lieve existed under the Nationalist Government. But the young people know hardly anything about Chiang and the Nationalists?except what the Communists tell them. ? Is there any man or group who appears to the Chinese to give hope of restoring the personal liberties they want? A I know of no specific person or group, but the people do long for personal freedom. So, eventually, maybe the peo? - ple will be able to find such a man or group for themselves. 60 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0306fAdobilbarlillYeMr" 7, 1966 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDIbigffifiliflgiiiitthide66661Vn China . "The U.S. is the enemy in the popular mind" CPYRGHT Many, particularly the older people, long for the old ways and customs. I'll give you an example: A few years ago, Mao Tse-tung ordered the whole Peking Opera changed. This was the great opera of China. The songs were familiar, and many people loved them. Mao Tse-tung changed the opera so that it would do songs that help the revolution. One day, in a barber shop in Peking, I heard an older man ask the barber to please turn off the radio while it was playing one of the new songs of the opera. The barber did. CI How would you describe the kind of personal liberties that the Chinese want? A There are many different kinds, depending on who the individual Chinese is and where he is. A peasant wants to own his own land. A worker wants to be free to enjoy his time off work. A writer wants to be free to put down his own thoughts?to criticize if he feels strongly about something. What it amounts to, I guess, is the kind of revisionism they have in Russia and Eastern Europe, although this I did not realize until after I left China. The material shortages bother the Chinese people. But many people live just about as they did before. Some?the lower peasants?may live a little better than before. But it is the spiritual oppression that is hated most?the thought control, the control of your time. 12 How tight is political control from the party headquar- ters in Peking? A It is extremely tight. Whenever provincial party lead- ers get out of line, people are sent out from Peking to straighten them out. This happened in Anhwei and in other provinces. Now the Red Guards are being used against some of the provincial party headquarters. CI What do the Chinese people generally feel about the American people now? Are we the hated enemy, or would they like to make friends again? A I am sorry to say that the U. S. is the hated enemy in the popular mind as a result of the propaganda. I do not feel that they particularly fear the U. S.?and this, also, is the result of propaganda. It is hard for foreigners to understand this if they have never lived under such a system. Ever since 1950, the prop- aganda against the United States has been never-ceasing. After being subjected to such cleverly devised propaganda day after day for 15 years, the human mind can't help but he affected by it. CHANCES OF WAR WITH U. S.? o What about the war? What would make the Chinese. enter the fighting in Vietnam? A We Chinese do not feel that the party wants war with the United States. I personally never felt we were going to war in 1958 over the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. I cannot say now what would force the party to decide to fight in Vietnam. Once the party said China would go to war if Hanoi was bombed. But Hanoi was bombed, and China did not go to war. Maybe China would go to war if American ground troops invaded North Vietnam and moved too close to the Chinese border. But I am not even sure of that. It isn't like Korea. There, the party feared that the Americans would threaten the Chinese industries just north of the Yalu River. I think China might enter the war if the whole regime of Ho Chi Minh were threatened, but I don't know. O In your view, what is the main danger that Commu- nist China now presents to its neighbors? A I can't say what the danger is to any other neighbor- ing country now, except for Vietnam. There, the Chinese Communist Government policy is to prevent any peace ne- gotiations. There are two reasons: First, Chinese Communist foreign policies are in conflict with Soviet foreign policies. Therefore, the Chinese Commu- nists, by pushing their foreign-policy ideas in Vietnam, hope to win an ideological victory over the Soviets. Second, the Chinese Communists hope to expand Commu- nism throughout Southeast Asia through successes in Viet- nam. The Vietnam war, therefore, is the basic key to Mao's whole theory of world revolution and wars of "national lib- eration." He wants victory in Vietnam because that would be taken as evidence that he is right and Russia is wrong. But, if the United States can bring about negotiations for peace, he loses. South Vietnam is not Mao's whole goal. It is the key to Communist expansion generally. So Mao will try every pos- sibility to prevent peace. WHY COLLAPSE IS UNLIKELY- O Where does China go from here? Is it headed for in- ternal collapse, for example? A So far, I haven't seen anything to indicate that an internal collapse is coming to China. But, inside China, there are a lot of contradictions, and these contradictions are sharpening. The main one is the desire of the people for more freedom. After a period of time?how long, I really couldn't guess ?this might bring about a trend toward something like re- visionism and changes in China. But, so far, I really see no basis for believing internal collapse is coming. O Is there a chance that China will break up into semi- autonomous regional governments or regimes? A I see no possibility of this, because the power of the Central Government?Mao and his group?is simply too strong, too ironclad. China won't go back into the old system of war lords. And I don't think there will be semiautonomous regional governments set up. We had them, you know, even under Communism. It wasn't until 1954 that Mao Tse-tung was able to break the hold that some party groups had over various regions. But what you are more likely to see develop is political divisions among various groups. We already have had that ?which is why we now have the purges and the cultural revolution. CI In your personal opinion, what is the best course China could take? A This is a very difficult question. My personal view of revisionism is that it is the period of transformation from a socialist system to a capitalist system. You see, Marx himself told how to carry on revolution against capitalism, but he never explained a specific way to build socialism. All over the world there are people who say they are Marxists, and many are trying to build socialism. But Rus- sia itself, after almost 50 years, has reverted to revisionism, and this, to my mind, is evidence of the failure of socialism. So, up to now, I don't know how to build socialism in China, and I don't know who does. Also, I don't see how anybody can deny that modern capitalism is successful. U.S. NEWAKSINT,FtWA9616ease 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 61 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061AR00199a0r7709p69(-3 THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF MARCH 12, 1947 The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved. One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Am- bassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation. I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek government. Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940 this industrious and peace-loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife. When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreat- ing Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five per cent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings. As a result of these tragic conditions a military minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible. Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of re- construction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic as- sistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel, and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security, so essential for economic and political recovery. The Greek government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists, and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creat- ing a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public adminis- tration. Doctrine Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier be- tween Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other. Meanwhile, the Greek government is unable to cope with the situa- tion. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government through- out Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid, but these are inadequate. There is no other country to which demo- cratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government. The British government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece. We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to ex- tend help of the kind that is required. It is important to note that the Greek government has asked for our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece and in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece, in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting and will help to build an economy in which a healthy de- mocracy can flourish. No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic pro- cesses can be pointed out and corrected. The government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents 85 per cent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign ob- servers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people. The Greek government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this coun- try does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek 2 (Doctrine Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 government had done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we con- demn now, extremist measures of the Right or the Left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now. Greece's neighbor Turkey also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are consid- erably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the dis- asters that have beset Greece. And during the war the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. The British Government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implica- tions with you at this time. One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue: in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will and their way of life upon other nations. To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and inde- pendence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their free institu- tions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes, imposed on free peoples by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States. The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The government of the United States had made frequent protests against coercion and intimida- tion in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countires there have been similar developments. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000480c0t708 C nt) 69i- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is dis- tinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and free- dom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly impressed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a con- trolled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to main- tain their freedom the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor Turkey would be immediate and serious. Con- fusion and disorder might well be spread throughout the entire Middle East. Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war. It would be an unspeak- able tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against over- whelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence. Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action. I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds I have taken into consideration the Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-030,1A1C040X170009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war. In addition to funds I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the re- quest of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel. Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized. If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation be- fore the Congress. On this subject the executive and legislative branches of the government must work together. This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. The United States contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace. The as- sistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than one tenth of one per cent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain. The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation. Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely. 5 (Doctrine) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London, S.W.1 THE WORLD TODAY Pre-election manceuvrings in France ,PETER STRAFFORD FRANCE has been living through a long-drawn-out pre-election period ever since last year's presidential campaign. The elections for the National Assembly, which have to be held by next March at the latest, have been described as the third round of the presidentials and, although this terminology is disputed by Gaullists, there is no denying the close link between the two votes. 'I'aken together, they will demonstrate not only the electorate's view of the achievements of Gaullism, but also something of the pattern that French political life will have in the future. General de Gaulle, after all, is an exceptional figure, and the events that brought him to power were also exceptional. Now that France is in a less critical state, the question is how far the present pattern of things is to be continued. The immediate issue is whether the present Gaullist coalition will retain its overall majority in the Assembly. This majority has enabled the General to go his own way with little hindrance from parliamentarians, and has drastically reduced the importance of the Assembly. If the Gaullists now lose their majority the situation will immediately be altered. Whatever their divisions?and they arc considerable?the Opposition parties will still have the possibility of outvoting the Govern- ment, and this fact alone will give extra weight to the Assembly. - The Gaullists received a scrious shock from the General's relatively poor performance in the presidential election. If they arc again returned with a majority in the Assembly, much will have been done to repair the damage, and politics will settle back into the familiar pattern. But things Mr Strafford is a commentator on the French political scene. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78.-03061A000400070009-3 -Approved-For Release-t999108124 . - DP78--0306tA00040007.0009--3-- FRANCE will not be quite the same as before. People will be looking ahead to the day of the General's departure, sooner or later, and the centrifugal tendencies which have been building up within the Gaullist coalition in the last few months would seem likely to become more marked. M. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, in particular, the former Minister of Finance and now increasingly vocal as the leader of the Independent Republicans,. 'has been doing everything he can to convince public opinion that he is not. an 'unconditional' Gaullist. Unless his party comes very badly out of the elections, more will be heard of him, and it will almost certainly not be to the liking of the orthodox Union for the New Republic (UNR) The situation shows all the signs, then, of becoming more lively than it has been, and the question is whether French politics are heading back to a state comparable with that of the Fourth Republic. General de Gaulle did not hesitate to threaten that this would be the result if he was not re- elected last December, and Gaullists are making much of this in their campaign preparations. Their high command, with M. Pompidou at its head, has the title of Comite d' Action pour la Verne Republique, with the ,implication that all the Opposition parties are trying to return to the Fourth Republic. The recent announcement by M. Pierre Pilimlin, Mayor of Strasbourg and a member of the Mouvement Republican Populaire (MRP), that he would not be standing for re-election to the Assembly' was, with its implication that the choice, was between Gaullism and chaos, grist to their mill. To speak of a return to the Fourth Republic is, however, to ignore the changes that have conic about in French political life under Gaullism. In the first place, the presidential election, now part of the country's voting habits, has done much to modify political structures. There has also been a groundswell of general political interest which is 119W just beginning to challenge the ways of the traditional parties. The growth of this interest has been in strong contrast to the impotence of the parties, and to a great extent in reaction to it. It is not solely a reaction to the rule of Gaullism. It began with disgust at the way politics were conducted under the Fourth Republic, and has been further stimulated by the high-handedness of the Gaullist regime. The most obvious sign of this concern, and the means by which it has been focused, have been the political clubs. The growth of these clubs has been one of the most marked features of the Fifth Republic. Some, of course, such as the Club des Jacobins, had been created before 1958, but the greater part of them have come into existence since then and they now exist in towns all over France. They burst on the public conscious- ness in 1964, when the two main groups each held a congress, and a number of them now have an established position in the Fdderation de la Gauche Democrate et Socialiste, the left-wing grouping 'headed by M. .Francois Mitterrand. Club members have long worked for a fusion of parties in the interest of greater effectiveness, and they have been able to bring a certain pressure to bear on the evolution of the federation. They have played a part in the working out of its programme, and have suc- ceeded on occasion in preventing the big parties, the Socialists and the Radicals, from imposing their views on the federation as a whole. Le Monde, 24 August 1966. CPYRGHT 4 Approved For Release 1999/08/11: : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 CPYRGHT It is oftourse important not to overestimate the political weight of the clubs. They consist to a great extent of 'intellectuals'?academics, civil servants, and professional people?and when it comes to nominating candidates, or getting out the vote, in the elections for the Assembly they cannot have much direct influence. What they have done, however, is to enable a whole new section of informed people to find their place in political life. In the past too many people tended to look down their noses at the activities of politics, even if they had an interest in public affairs as such. They regarded politicians as mediocre, and the political parties did nothing to encourage them to take an active part. This meant that the parties tended to lack qualified people to speak on the issues of the day, and concentrated on the purely political aspects involved. The clubs have provided a half-way house, between non-involvement and total party commitment, and enabled their members to bring their expertise to the service of the parties. They vary considerably in their political leanings, and have very different views on the degree to which they should commit themselves to political action. By far the greater part of them are on the Left, and they have used their relative freedom to dis- cuss political issues in depth and to bring pressure on the left-wing parties. Their most marked feature is their view that French political life, and particularly the traditional parties, need to be re-structured. In this they have come up against the resistance of the parties them- selves. The influential Club Jean Moulin, for instance, gave strong back- ing to M. Gaston Dcfferre, the Mayor of Marseille, last year when he attempted to create a new federation ranging from the Socialists to the MRP, and the move failed. Members of the hierarchy of the Socialist Party speak with scorn of the 'unrealistic' ideas of club members, and the current smear-word `technocrat' is freely used against them. A techno- crat, for these officials, is someone who knows what is best for other people and aims at deciding for them; he is a man who regards himself as belonging to an Clite, and considers that politicians are idiots. The violence of this reaction reveals the strength of the feelings in- volved, and the divisions which have to be overcome if the Federation de la Gauche is to develop into a more effective force. At the moment the Socialists regard it as more or less their property, and their leadership shows no intention of allowing any diminution of its own sovereignty in the interests of a wider, more co-ordinated movement.. In this they are opposed by the club members, but one may suspect that it will take more than the pressures of a few `technocrats', however vocal, to make them change their minds. There is, none the less, an evolution, in that the federation has agreed On a common programme and is to present candi- dates standing in its own name, rather than in those of the parties, in virtually all constituencies. Further progress will depend, on the success that it meets at the polls. The aim of the federation is to present itself as an alternative Govern- ment, with its own left-wing programme and leaders capable of taking over the Ministries.. It is this which lies behind the proclamation of a 'contre-Gouvernement', or shadow Cabinet, and the specialists who have worked on the programme have attempted to make it a plausible document, with realistic objectives. The road to power will be a long haul, however, and on the way the federation will have to decide what attitude to take towards the Communist Party, which now monopolizes approximately half France's left-wing voters. 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-'03061A000400070009-3 ---Approved-f-orRefease--1-999/08/24 . CFA,RDP78-03064A000400070009-3- 1 CPYRGHT The federation is the main example of an evolution in French political life which has begun during the Fifth Republic. It has succeeded in ' bringing together the Socialists and the Radicals, as well as M. Mitter- rand's Union Democrate et Socialiste de la Rdsistance (UDSR), a small party founded, as its name suggests, at the end of the war. At the same time, it has brought in the 'intellectuals' of the clubs, many of them _ highly qualified men in their own fields, and this has given it an informed , basis for policy that French political parties have not traditionally had. It is, of course, easy to point to its shortcomings. It is nowhere near winning an overall majority in the Assembly, it is divided within itself, and it is strongly opposed by some of the most vocal elements of the non- Communist Left, in particular the supporters of M. Pierre Mends- France. The innovators, the 'forces vives', come up against the rigid and doctrinaire attitudes of the traditional parties, and it is not at all certain - that the whole structure will not fall apart after the elections for the Assembly. It does nevertheless exist, and if it can poll a higher percentage of votes than the Communist Party it will have taken its first step towards its aim?of becoming the major pole of attraction for the Left. The problem for the Gaullists is a very different one, but it does have !a number of points in common with that of the federation. The Gaullists, , too, have to face the question of maintaining the cohesion of a coalition, ? though for them it has evolved in the opposite direction. Whereas the , Left is confronted with the need to unite a number of distinct entities, the Gaullists have to think how they are going to keep together the various shades of opinion which have been brought into the same camp ? by the personality of the General. The strength of General de Gaulle's appeal has always been that it has attracted men with many different political sympathies. This applies particularly in something like a referendum, or the presidential election, when he has been able to pick Up votes that would normally go to, say, the Socialists or the Com- munists. It also means that the spectrum of active Gaullists is now a very wide one, ranging from a new grouping of those of the Left who are entirely in agreement with his foreign policies to people of the traditional Right who see him as the man who brought stability and self-respect to France. This wide electoral appeal has given the General and the Gaullists ' commanding position since 1962. France has had strong and stable government for the first time for many years, and the question confront- ing the Gaullist leaders is how to maintain this situation when the General is gone?or is felt to be on the point of going. For the UNR, of course, the ideal solution would be that it should increase its number of seats in the Assembly, now rather short of an absolute majority, to a - majority, so enabling it to do without the increasingly grudging support of M. Giscard d'Estaing's Independent Republicans. It certainly cannot , count on such an eventuality, however, and the tactics since the cold douche of the presidential election have been to enlarge the base of .sup- port for the Government itself. M. Edgar Faure, a Prime Minister during the Fourth Republic and a man with his own following, has been brought into the Government as Minister of Agriculture, and a certain prominence has been given to 'left-wing Gaullists' in general. M. Edgar Pisani, now Minister of Equipment, has taken a leading part in the Front du Progth, an association of this type, pronouncing himself firmly for a change in the Government's internal policies. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 CPYRGHT This wing of the coalition serves to balance the more right-wing Independent Republicans, and to justify the claim, made by M. Pom- pidou himself, that the Gaullists are in the centre of the political spectrum. It is an indication, however, that the UNR itself, the core of Gaullism, is on the defensive, and only the future will tell whether these various ele- ments will find enough common ground to stick together. If they do, the Gaullist vision is of a vast majority grouping, basing itself essentially on the principles enunciated by General de Gaulle, but 'pragmatic' in their, application. The vision does not include an effective Opposition, capable of coming to power in the place of the Gaullists. - It is interesting that the Gaullists, like the innovators of the Federation de la Gauche, now lay emphasis on the need for politicians to have the backing of expertise. Here too they have arrived at a similar position after setting out from a quite different basis. Whereas it is felt in the federation that Deputies should be qualified and well informed in order to help ! raise the standing of the Assembly from its present low ebb, the Gaullists take the view that the Assembly now fulfils its role very well. It has given up its habit of overturning Governments, and this, in the Gaullist view, means that the Deputies, deprived of the opportunity of `playing' politics', take more trouble to prepare their positions. They claim that Gaullist Deputies, far from being the mere ciphers they. appear to be, play an important role in influencing Government policy behind the scenes. This optimistic view ignores the notorious rate of absenteeism in most sessions of the Assembly, and the difficulty that all parties are now having in finding able men ready to stand for election. The Assembly as it is at present simply does not attract such men. The Gaullists are never- theless attempting to relieve their old guard, replacing them with younger, better-qualified men who will present a more modern image. Gaullism is, after all, something of a brotherhood at its centre, its mem- bers taking pride in being able to assert that they were with the General . in London during the war. It is now realized that the movement must change if it is to become an effective party for the future. 'Military' Gaullism has to be transformed into 'political' Gaullism, as one UNR official has put it, and the close family feeling must be replaced by pro- fessional competence. This attitude is not unlike that of those on the Left . who are struggling to replace the old warhorses of the past. In the case of the Gaullists, it will mean that a number of Deputies now in the Assembly will not be encouraged to stand again. The Gaullists tend to decry the political importance of the clubs that have developed on the Left. The UNR has nevertheless created a few of its own in a number of provincial centres?there is one, for instance, in Marseille, another in Clermont-Ferrand?and in them they promote the ! examination of specific local problems, rather than broad political issues.- ! M. Giscard d'Estaing, too, has set about founding clubs very actively this year, as part of his campaign for promoting his party's .interests. They now exist in several different towns, under the general title of Perspectives et Realitds. The object of these clubs is not only to give purely political backing to particular parties, but also to provide a forum in which the problems of the day can be examined in detail. This tendency towards . tapping the resources of specialists is one of the marks of the present . political scene. . A more specialized approach to political problems will not, however, - by itself -make for stability when General de Gaulle has gone. The presi- Approved For Release 1999/08/245. CIA-RDP78-03061A0004000.70009-3 -Approved-For Release- 19n/08/24 -:- C1A---RDP78-0306-1A00040007-0009-3 CPYRGHT dential election seems likely to remain, and it is this which has clipped the wings of the traditional parties. But for the present system, there would have been no possibility of M. Mitterrand or M. Jean Lecanuet, the centre candidate, achieving the status of national figures, and subse- quently being able to launch political movements that are not limited by the traditional boundaries between parties. It is not surprising that the presidential election is supported by many members of the left-wing political clubs, while being opposed by the party hierarchies, The election by universal vote has enabled the candidates to win a particular place ? with the electorate which is a means of bringing pressure on the parties. On the other hand, it is not only the 'system' which is responsible for the present relative simplification of French political life. There is also the personality and political ability of General de Gaulle. Last year's presidential election was dominated by the General, and the Opposition parties were obsessed by the need to measure up to him. Unless the General is still on the scene in 1972, when he will be eighty-two years old, the same will not be true at the next presidential election, and it is not im- possible that there will then be a whole array of candidates, more than one of them from the present Gaullist coalition. M. Mitterrand's success in ; winning the support of the whole of the Left?Radicals, Socialists, and Communists, as well as of the smaller parties?was largely due to the presence of the General opposite, and there is no certainty that he or a successor will bring off a similar feat next time. There could be more than one 'Gaullist' candidate, and more than one from the Left. The manceuvrings that have been taking place in preparation for the elections to the Assembly hardly suggest that French politics are going to , lose their long-standing complexity. If one excludes the extreme Right, , which came particularly poorly out of the presidential election, there are at least five main groupings, none of them homogeneous, jostling for position: the UNR, the Independent Republicans, M. Lecanuct's Democratic Centre, the left-wing federation, and the Communist Party. Alliances will certainly be struck up between them, but there is nothing to suggest that these alliances will survive the elections. The Gaullists, as the coalition in power, have the most to lose. The UNR is far and away the largest party in the Assembly, and feels that it should dominate strategy for the Government group. It has, however, run up against the ambitions of the Independent Republicans, and the resulting dispute between the two parties has damaged the Gaullist image. M. Giscard d'Estaing has agreed to sit on the Comild d' Action pour la Verne Republique, but it is still not certain that he is going to go along with M. Pompidou's ruling that there should be only one Gaullist : candidate standing in each constituency. He is determined to increase the number of Independent Republican Deputies, and there arc several constituencies, in the Paris region in particular, in which his ambitions and those of the UNg clash. M. Giscard d'Estaing has declared his Sup- ; port for Government policies in general?having left office only in I January, he would have found it difficult to do otherwise?but he has made it clear that this support does not always extend to particular aspects. He has announced, for instance, that if he had remained at the Ministry of Finance he would not have followed the same policies as his successor, M. Michel Debre. He is also making a strong bid for the sup- port of people who oppose General de Gaulle's European policy. One of the key sectors in the elections will be the area now known as the centre. To the amusement of political commentators, claims to Approved For Release 1999/08/g4 : 'CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 CPYRGHT orril d have now bx ut foi N d by dace political leaders, M. Lecanuet, M. Giscard d'Estaing, and, last but not least, Porn, pidou. It was M. Lecanuet, the surprise candidate in the presidential election, who first demonstrated the value of this sector, and the danger to the whole Gaullist position if it were lost. The centre includes people !. who disagree with the Gaullist concept of Europe, but also many who are -dissatisfied with the Government's internal economic and social policies. The Democratic Centre, which M. Lecanuet founded after the presi- dential election, aims at repeating his success of last December by taking votes both from the Gaullists and from the Left. It is, of course, a target for Gaullist onslaughts, and M. Giscard d'Estaing has set his sights on at least a part of its potential electorate. M. Lecanuet reckons, however, on winning enough votes to enable the Democratic Centre to emerge as the 'arbiter' of any Government that may be formed afterwards. His view is that no overall majority will emerge from the elections, and that the centre will be able to impose its conditions for participation in, or support for, the new Government. Since such a Government is in- finitely more likely to be Gaullist than Leftist, M. Lecanuet appears to consider that he will be able to influence the policies of General de Gaulle ?more effectively from outside the coalition than M. Giscard d'Estaing ever succeeded in doing from inside. He may not be right, but it is interesting that a poll published by the French Institute of Public Opinion in August found only 22 per cent of those questioned in favour of a majority consisting solely of Gaullists, while a further 21 per cent favoured a coalition of Gaullists and the Democratic Centre. M, Lecanuet's position would be stronger if he had better chances of an alternative alliance on the Left. The question of possible alliances be- tween the centre and the Federation de la Gauche has, however, become the major point of disagreement on the Left, and, in spite of various overtures, M. Lecanuet cannot count on much open support from that quarter. There are many members of the federation, particularly among the Radicals, who would be very willing to co-operate with the centre. But they have been flatly told by the Communists that the federation cannot have it both ways: either it allies itself with the 'reactionaries' of the Democratic Centre, in which case any deal with the Communists is out, or else it reaches an agreement with the Communists. Put this way, the dilemma of the federation is a difficult one. An exclusive alliance with the Communists can, after all, be counted to frighten away a number of supporters. On the other hand, since the failure of M. Defferre's plan for a centre-Left federation, M. Mitterrand and other leaders of the non- Communist Left have given priority to links with the Communists. For the Communists, the main object of the election campaign is not so. much to defeat the Gaullists, much of whose foreign policy they support, as to take a further step out of the 'ghetto' in which they have been kept since the 1940s. Their support for M. Mitterrand in the presidential election was a move in this direction, but it was taken out of weakness, for fear of the poor showing-211y Communist candidate would have made on his own. They feel stronger in the campaign for the. Assembly, and arc determined not to find themselves committed to a non-Communist Left which is itself tainted with centrism. M. Lecgrolpt iq +keno tio.wi,fige.-1 7 ? Approved For Release 1999%08/24 : CIA-RDP78.-03061A000400070009-3 Approved-ForRelease-1-999108/24-: CIA----RD-P-78-43061At700400070009-3 CPYRGHT all worlds, 'Atlantic' ii his foreign policy and 'liberal' at home. They sec no reason to trust the policies of the federation towards the centre, and give every sign of playing their own cards strongly in the elections. They were the first to present a full list of candidates, and the first to have their election posters out in Paris. The federation has remained unruffled and equivocal in the face of Communist demands, conceding only the principle that priority goes to an arrangement with the Communists. Its own interest, as far as the . elections go, lies in the traditional policy of making different alliances in different constituencies, some with the Communists, some with the centre. Its two leaders, M. Mitterrand and M. Guy Monet, the secretary- general of the Socialist Party, are both astute politicians, and of the two it is M. Mollet who swings more political weight within the federation. He is a man who likes to keep all his options open for as long as possible. The main question-mark over the elections is how far General de Gaulle will intervene in the campaign himself. The Gaullist party leaders are counting on him, and he learned last December that an Olympian. attitude did him no good with the voters. If he associates himself strongly with the UNR, he will do something to counteract their weakness at local level, and help them to take votes from the Socialists and Communists. He himself has always been able to do this, and his visits this year to the Soviet Union and Cambodia are certain to have appealed to left-wing . voters. On the other hand, such a degree of involvement would also mark him out as a party leader, and this is something that he is notoriously reluctant to be. It would also involve him in any setback that the Gaullists might suffer. What he will do if such a setback takes place remains even more un- certain. Clearly much depends on the extent of the damage, and the limitations that are imposed on him. The Opposition parties arc so divided among themselves that they could be ineffective against him. He has the possibility of calling new elections, of introducing a referen- dum, or even, in the last resort, of taking special powers under Article 16 of the Constitution. He could, of course, decide that the moment had come for him to return finally to Colombey-les-deux-liglises. But the situation would presumably have to be very critical before he took this step. 8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 199 MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 12 December 1966 . Communist progress in France CPYRGHT From our Correspondent Paris, December 11 The Commums; ,rarty, with 425,000 card-carrying mem- bers, is now at its 'strongest point since the return of General de Gaulle to power in 1958. A report prepared or the party congress which meets on January 4 discloses that during the three years after General de Gaulle's return the party lost 80,000 members Since 1961. CPYRGHT - .... I! , . A? 1 .' ? . q s -Du , ne 0.__' o , Spp 1'. .11 or mem- bership have steadily increased, more senior members of thr and today there are 20,000 more party's Politburo, who was sq members and 2,500 more cells imprudent as to let himself bi than in 1958. The circulation of photographed shaking hands with " Humanite " is said to have General de Gaulle in the Russian reached 203,000, an increase of Embassy last week, has thi 23,000. weekend tried his best to play The report emphasises the pro- down the effects of the Kosygir portion of members under 30 who visit on the party's rank 'and flleh hold positions of responsibility," Th French do not make uk but adds that "much remains'their minds on the strength o' to be done In this domain." in a ,visit by a foreign stateman, bu fact, the party is having serious because of taxes and rents whiel difficulties with the Union of are increasing," he said C o m m u n St Students and 1,4, Duclos R aid thnt the, roml AeueiaLly had tt,t supress severatmunisLs Dore no personat grungd cells in the Paris Faculty of Law against General de Gaulle, and and the important Ecole Normale wished him "a long and happy Superieure for their pro-Chinese retirement." Explaining the ,tendencies. % famous handshake which must have staggered those Socialists No grudge and Communists who for years The party has also got to set have been following the order to about undoing the damage to" Boycott de Gaulle," he said: "I am a polite man. I was invited their election prospects which by the comrades and there the the yisit of Mr KosYgin gentleman who I know offered undoubtedly wrought, to the ill-me his hand. After all, if Com concealed dplight of the rade Kosygin saw nothing wrong in shaking the General's hand, Gaullists. why should little M. Duclos." CHRISTIAN scNcE MONITOR 12 DECFXBER 1966 Lnpro.,,1 etarian. tastes CPYRGHT A Vvnat is more symbolic of royal diyertis- sement than a hunt in the coverts on the great estate at Rambouillet? And what is more symbolic to anti-Marxists of Marxist zeal than socialized medicine? The juxta- position of these questions results from ''our amusement at two reports appearing ' simultaneously in the newspapers on Fri- day. The first was about the Soviet leaders' day out with their guns as guests of Presi- dent de Gaulle at Rambouillet. The second was about the Soviet physicians who have made the quite startling proposal that ' Russians should open self-supporting 1 hospitals in which patients should pay for care. ? . Of course all this is further evidence of how we fool ourselves by accepting stereo- types. We really should not have been' startled in the first place. Russia is still ! Russia, despite all the slogans we have heard for nearly half a century about the 1:workers of the world, about the interna- tional proletariat?or even dialectical ma- ' terialism. Increasingly, we are coming to see that Commissars end up as ambitious as Czars to further Russia's rather than communism's interests. And we were, of course, shortsighted if we ever thought that communism would make much differ- ence to human nature for very long. There in the woods at Rambouillet. These photos were the male counterpart of those which appeared at the time of the visit of the de Gaulles to Moscow, showing a quietly elegant Mrs. de Gaulle in company with: some of the Soviet leaders' wives. The latter were far from dowdy in their choice of dress and maquillage. Indeed they were doing very well in trying to keep up with the Faubourg St. Honore? and seemed eons away from peasant ker- chiefs or even collective farms. The most recent news we read about collective, farms was that they were changing, too. They have not been dis- mantled or turned over to private owner- ship yet. But pay and benefits for workers on them are robbing the farms of their original dour austerity. So much so, in fact, that guaranteed minimum wages are keeping workers on the farms now, even in slack periods. There was a time when workers welcomed slack periods as an opportunity to slip off and make some- thing on the side through self-employ- ment. Now they are so much better off that they turn up for work on the farms, winter and summer, and the management does not know what jobs to give them. As the proposal about payment for care in self-supporting hospitals further shows, when people see a chance to better them- certainly very selves, not even the most high-soundinit oatormotortaittrit: war??6-7?11,1) was riot much -Approved For Release--1-999/08/24 : CIA:RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 CPYRGHT 12T:11;471 T 1141166 FRENCH LEFTISTS IN ELECTION PACT Communists and Federation of Other Parties Join in Fight Against Gaullism CPYRGHT The Communist party is the second biggest in France, after President de Gaulle's 'Union for the New Republic, and claims about 20 per cent of the elec- torate. The Federation was formed last spring under Frari-, cols Mitterand, the Independ- ent left-winger who took 45 per cent of the vote Sri the run-off presidential balloting ?against General de Gaulle a year ago. In the first round of. the last legislative, elections,. in Novem- By RICHARD E. MOONEY ber, 1962, the Guallists received Special to The New York Times 32 per cent of the nearly 19 PARIS, Dec. 20?The non- million votes cast, the Corn. communist left and tile Uom---muius &IRMA 12 per cent, the munist party agreed early today to fight Gaullism together in next spring's parliamentary elec- tions. The terms of the agreement, which are not to be published until tomorrow, are considered. to be less important than it existence. Assuming that it is respeetet during the campaign, the agree. ment marks the end of the Corm munists' long virtual isolation from other political groups. The 'Communists were in the first all- embracing coalition that governed France just after World War II but were than outi in 1947 and have been isolated since. The agreement does not mean that the left will win the elec? tions next March. Rather it is viewed as a first step in the 'direction of developing a uni- fied left. It is still commonly expected that the Gaullists will retain a majority, even if they have to piece it together with some non-Gaullists. The leftists' unity agreement is itself re- ported to be a loose one, be- cause even among the partici- pants there is dissent. Moreover, It embrades only a part of the opposition and, in fact, only a part?albeit a major part---of the left. ' Federation Is Young The parties to the agreemtnt are the Communist. party and the Federation of the Democrat- ic-Socialist Left, which com- prises the big Socialist party, the once-big Radical party, and several small political "clubs." Within the Federation, some Radical party members feel that they should be making al- liances with the political center and not with the far left. An- other group of young politi- cians and professionals who call themselves the Jean Moulin Club have joined the Federa- tion but recently published an angry criticism of, any link to the Communists. The Communists themselves evidently have internal dissen- sion. French Communism, base- ? ally pro-Moscow, also has its ? elements 'distrustful of any al- liance. There are also hold-outs. The Socialist 12.5 per cent, the Radicals 4.7 per cent and a centrist got 15 per cent.. The remaining votes went mostly to conservative ?groups, most of which are now likely to vote Guallist. The first part of the new agreement is a common plat- form that notes the points on which the parties agree, ac- knowledging that they disagree on others. They agree, for M- stance, in their opposition to "one-man rule," but not on the more fundamental point of what form of government France should have. The second part of the agree- ment provides for the with- drawal of candidates in next spring's elections. In the first- round balloting, on March 5, the Communists and. the Feder- ation will have their own sep- arate candidates in most of the 485 constituencies. There is no rule for narrow- ing the field to two contestants In the second round, a week later. But if two leftists stay In the running against a Gaullist they risk giving the election to the Gaullist. Thus the agree- ment establishes conditions for one or the other of the leftists to pull out. Third Part Called Vital ? ? The third part a the agree- ment goes beyond next year's elections and is being interpret- ed as the most important. Its essential point is that the Com- munists and the Federation should continue to work to- gether., The Communists have been champions of unity for some time. Mr. Mitterrand has wanted to link the Federation with the Communists, but not so closely that the unity Would seem to mean the formation of a Com- munist dominated left. , smau untried bocianst party is the absent organized leftist rsroup, but more notable Rierre Mendis-France, the former Premier who is cam- paigning ' to get back into ac... tive politics as a Deputy from Grenoble. The new pact was announced in the small hours this morning at the end of a meeting that began late yesterday afternoon. It was the third meeting in a week. There were only about a dozen participants, and they have been very discreet about what went on. The public announcement of the text was delayed to permit review by members of both groups' leadership who were not Pre!Iel?t? " Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 2 Lor:RN CPYRCA4PPr?Y$AfifihryR13)gaSe 1999/08/2 HOW POPULAR A FRONT? --- .?Is,a ,French Popular Front really in ; the making? The agreement signed a fortnight ago between the communists and M. MITTERRAND'S Federation of the Left was little more than an arrangement for working together in the March par- liamentary elections. But in his address to the Communist Party Congress yester- day M. WALDECK ROCI1ET, the secretary- general, made it clear that he is looking beyond this poll. The aim of the party remained the establishment of a political programme common to the whole left, he told the delegates. ? That is a good deal more than has been achieved up to now, though last month's agreement did look forward to the long-term objectives of the left. Much will obvioutly depend upon the success of this initial arrangement. What are the chances ? ? , ' The failure to reach agreement on ' more than a few items of policy need not be a fatal handicap at this stage. , M. MITTERRAND certainly benefited from his arrangement with the communists when , he' ran for the' presidency against GENERAL DE, GAuLLE just over a year ago?even, though he differed from them on a number of questions, particularly on foreign policy. Norway has shown how four separate parties with their own individual programmes can win an election and go on to form an effective coalition government. Political leaders .often find It difficult. however, to gain the ardour of ? their followers for a mere marriage Of con- venience. The'present'pateis no more than that, and it maY'be significant that , M. RocitET was at pains to justify it to doubters in, the party yesterday. May not some communist voters prefer' Gaullists to candidates' of the left?vvho speak in Atlantic terms? And may not some other left-wing voters be driven by fear of the communists either to M. L:ECANUETIS Democratic Centre . or even to: the Gaullists 7 Above 'all, hew well Will the 'leaders themselves work together when it comes to the point 7 M". MITTERRAND and his colleagues have preserved their freedom of action to support?C'entre candidates, I provided they are really opposed to DE CiAULLE. when they' seem to have the best chance of ,defeating the Gaullist. Here is an obviouS sotirce Of potential strife. ?- ' ? ' ? ' All 'in' all, the March election may reveal not so muelt an old-style Popular Front as a clearer'diviSion than before tstedgizecinFteteatce,499 /0 cc t edand left. ?, ) I : CPYRGHT tends,' Gaullist Opposition to Peking's Isolation .Gains European Support By HAROLD KING ! JAPAN TDISS PARIS (Kyocio.:Reuter) ? Vim an ambassackor installed in Peking the French Govern- ment is pursuing a discreet but assiduous campaign to bring China into the concert of nations. even if it cannot bring it into the United Na- tions Organization. - " The latest evidence of this was an appeal to parliamen- tary representatives from the seven Western European Union' nations to "treat the China of (Chairman) Mao :like a civilized community." I This plea came from a French Gaullist member of the national assembly, Col. Pierre Bourgoin, . who has close contact with 'President de Gaulle, At a meeting of the parliamentary assembly of the Western European Union on last Dec. 13. . ' "With her present mentali- ty," said Col. Bourgoin, "Chi- na is a danger to ,peace. If there is any means of ward- ing off this danger, it certain- ly is not to be found in piling up ever more armaments, be- cause China will also acquire the frightful possibility of destroying the world, not to, safeguard herself but in order ,not to perish alone." No Isolation for China While keeping Its own nuclear powder dry, the West had every interest, Col. Bour- goin claimed, ."in helping China out of her isolation, be- cause that is the only way left open to us to promote any .reassuring development of 'China's mentality." His report was endorsed by ,the members of narliarnpnt present from Britain, France, 6 January. 1967 dl y oetween party officials and ; pro-Chi'. nese , Communist - groups' which have sprung up in the, larger indtistrial towns and in the universities. The Communist Party: newspaper, L'Humanite, pub-, lished on Dec, 14 a long letter' from a, party member,' known in Lyons, who is em- ployed in the Bernet. car Ric-, ,tory there. ? i This letter reads like a, James Bond serial. In it, coni- rade Louis Faradoux (Corn-; munist. Party membership' card NO. 186,455) reports how, he was wooed and enticed by'', Chinese' who were on the, , factory floor as experts from', Peking in connection with a Chinese order for 1,500 lor-i l'iPS. Having won the confidentel of these Chinese, reports cont- rade Faradoux, he was InvIt-: ed by a Chou Hsiang-chi to, join some pro-Chinese Marx.' , ist-Leninist clubs with a view? to spreading pro-Chinese sym, pathies in the factories. But worse was to come. Faradoux's Story "They offered me money to, betray the' party," reports. comrade Faradoux. "Chou told me that they were pre- pared to cope with the finan- cial difficulties of all kinds, which my activities would in-! valve." 'At this point, comrade' Faradoux considered .that things had gone far enough. ' So he reported everything to his party superiors. The number of Chinese from Peking temporarily, : West Germany, Italy, Bel- working at the Berliet plant %gium, Holland and Luxem- at Venissieux, near Lyons, Is !burg. Gordon Walker, former only 14, a company represen- 7 tative explained. They are' British Foreign Secretary, :considered the. report was due to return to Peking by 1"more Chinese than the Chi- the end of 1066, he added. nese", but agreed that its ob. 'Yet the French Communist: :servations on China were Party has seen fit to make, "just and penetrating." a big issue of the relations; Gen. De Gaulle's approach between this small band of ! to China is that, however dif. Chinese, ? Communists and, ficult, the aim must be to be some members of the French. on speaking terms with this orthodox party. j huge country and to draw This is generaliy assumed Peking into the normal here to reflect the customary' diplomatic circle of the world, alignment of French Corn- because, in the late Sir Win- munist Party line with that .ston Churchill's words "jaw- of Moscow. But it may also Jaw is better than war-war." reflect nervousness of the Hostile to Mao party lest the young, who ? In the .French Communist are not flooding into the Party camp, however, feeliAbatiebotir . tije revolu- uf,1 ? . Tse-tung s hostile. The party pro-Chinese Communists more 8/24 toA-Fc f7187a0306$ of the, . leaders are definitely against attractive. 3 Approved-for ReTease1-99-9/08/24-:.-C1A=RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES CPYRGHT 8 January 1967 French Left Unites, in a Way By RICHARD E. MOONEY Special to The New York Times Paris, Jan. 7 ? The Fre ich a substantial slice of the electorate , Into voting for the status quo_ by asserting that the choice is be- The non-Communist center and right, of course, will have nothing to do with the Communists at all. And, most significantly, the new . left-wing alliance is itself a cau- tious arrangement, decidedly less ' solid than the left?wing Popular Front that actually held power in the mid-1930's. At that time, the two senior partners of the coalition, Leon' Blum's Socialists and Edouard, Herriot's powerful Radical 'Social- ists, were .for a time unconditional ? allies of the Communists, then led.' ,by Maurice Thorez, in an alliance' cemented by the fierceness of at- tacks against it from the right and center. Undoubtedly, the constitution of '- today's alliance has been facilitated by the general detente between' East and West that gradually de- veloped since the Khrushchev era and the ensuing more relaxed view of Communism taken in most of Europe. This evolution has been furthered by General de Gaulle's recent overtures toward the East., ? The new arrangement links the Communists to the nine-month old' Federation of the Democratic-So- cialist Left. The Federation is the big Socialist party, the once big but now small Radical party, and a collection of left-wing political groups. The Federation's leader is Francois Mitterrand, the man who ran second in the Presidential elec- tions 13 months ago.' He shares his influence, though, with Guy. Monet, the ex-Premier who heads, the Socialists, and there are vari- ?Ili interpretations as to which onel has been really the more influen-: tial . in shaping the new alliance with the Communists. In fact, nei- ther one is rated as a strongman.' The alliance started taking' shape in late 1965, when the Com- munists decided not to run a Presi- dential candidate of their own and to support Mr. , Mitterrand. ' their 18th party Congress. They had a new look. Their meeting hall was a smartly styled gymnasium in the Industrial suburb of Levallois ? well lighted and ventilated, and not a militant slogan in sight. A ? large adjacent room Was temporar-, ily made over as a gallery of mod- ern art, with hardly a trace of the old "socialist realism." The visible newness was sym- bolic and intentional. Not three weeks ago the party made an al- liance with France's non-Com- munist left to fight together against the Gaullists in the Na- tional Assembly elections in March. Their historic pact put an end to, two 'decades of Communist isolation as the untouchables of French politics. The Communists are the second most powerful party here, after President de Gaulle's Union for the New Republic. They polled 20 per cent of the vote in the last Assembly elections, five years ago, and they hold 41 of the As- sembly's 487 seats. (This is a smaller percentage than their popular vote because seats are contested by districts.) There are Communist mayors in Le Havre and more than 200 other smaller cities and towns, including 60 sub- urbs of Paris. , Because of the Communists' strength the Government must ac- commodate them from time to time. General de Gaulle's flirtation with Moscow is at least partly motivated by this. But fundamen- tally they have lacked national respectability since the cold war began. Members of the broad coalition that ruled France at the end of World War IT, they were kicked out in 1947 and have re- mained out. Even today the Communists are far away from full acceptance. The Gaullists count on frightening liniment iioais The Communists, seeking a place In the main stream, were the prin-4 wanted more than they got. The : .Federation, seeking voting? strength, was hesitant, and is still, not committed to support those? . Communist candidates whom they! I judge incapable of winning. In,: short, the Communists want a, militant left while the Federation,, Wants a winning coalition. 4 The Communists and the Fed, eratiOn will each run a complete! slate of candidates in the first round of the Assembly elections,, on March 5, and they have only a conditional agreement to get out of each other's way for the second round, a week later. They have, issued a common communiqu?n the points of policy which they commonly support ? largely do- mestic ? but they acknowledge that in some essential respects, such as NATO, they disagree. Thus the alliance as constituted is incomplete. Also, there are still some other small left-wing fee- tions outside it, notably the Uni- fied Socialist party whose star is. Pierre Mendes-France, and a splinter of pro-Chinese defectors, from the pro-Moscow main body,? of the Communists. In addition to: the left there is the non-left op- position ? the Democratic Center, of Jean Lecanuet, who placed third In the Presidential race, plus other' smaller groups, to the right. 1, It is not expected, nor seriously, claimed, that out of all this the new alliance could pull off a ma-: jority victory. It is not even cer- tain whether it will increase or reduce its composite strength, though the assumption is an in- crease. President de Gaulle's eight years In office have stabilized French po., Mies, but have not clarified them! He has consolidated a strong ma- jority. The frustrated minorities; are only now, beginning to try to achieve the same kind 'of con." % solidation. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 CPYRGHT LONDON OBSERVER 8 January 1967 rench oost for opuh r Front by MARK FRANKLAND., THE EIGHTEENTH Congress of the French Communist Party, which ends this evening, has more to celebrate than just the party's return to the thick of French political life through its new alliance with the non-Communist Left. ' It ? can also celebrate the most important success to date of the Popular' Front policy blessed by t Moscow .as long ago as 1956. . This policy reflects the interests of both the Soviet Union and the Euro- pean ,Communist Parties. Moscow, sctireely expecting to, See Comunist Obvcrnmznts in West Europe in the near future. would like to have instead strong .left-wing blocs that included the CoMmunists; Such blocs could be expected to be generally neutralist, anti-American, anti-NATO and in favour of East-West 'detente. Breakaway -parties . The Western Communist Parties themselves have at last accepted that they .must abandon some of their rigid exclusiveness if they are to sur- vive. , For example,. in Norway and Denniark breakaway Marxist parties can capture an increasing number of votes while the orthodox Communist rumps deCline. It neVertheleSs is still easier to propose than to practise the new Popular Front-ism., The. British CommuniSt Partji,' ;at its :congress in November. 1965, expressly criticised Its old guard members who still maintain that the Labour Party is no . different from a capitalist party. And it supported a broad militant alliance' of the British Left. The trouble here is that the British Communists are arguing from a. position of weakness, since the Labour Party has no need of them, Similarly, in the Austrian elections last year, indirect Communist support damaged the Austrian Socialist Party. In France, however, the huge strength of President de Gaulle has made M. Mitterrand's Federation of the Democratic Socialist Left more amenable to Communist advances. More gentle The effects of this policy on the Western European parties must even- tually be considerable., Alterations to Marxist-Leninist theory are already being discused by Commun- ists in France and elsewhere. At the moment, this has not gone far and the French party and M. ?Mitterrand have completely failed to agree on a common political programme. But there are already signs of rethinking too radical to be easily accepted either by the Soviet Union or by con- servative European party members. For example, discussion about the possibility of a multi-party system under Communism is no longer taboo. The key theory of the ' dicta- torship of the proletariat ' is being interpreted in a more gentle way. ironically, the conservative-minded European Communists may be tempted to join the , pro-Chinese splinter parties, where .all such new, ideas are comfortingly dismissed as revisionist.' - Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CPA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 -;:tel/tAtilts7t1101808-1A0004000-70009-PYR9HT 19 January 1967 March Election Turmoil Grows CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES 9 January 1967 FRENCH REDS LAUD French Politics CPYRGHT CPYRGHT ields Shockers DE GAULLE ON WAR Communist Conference Also Forms New Election Tie By RICHARD E. MOONEY Special to The New York Timex 'PARIS, Jan. 8?France's Corn- The'announcement of another new anti-Gaullist political pact was made by the party chair- man, Waldeck Rochet, in a speech to the final session of the congress. The Communists' newest ally is the Unified So- cialist party, a small party that, had taken the position that the larger left-wing alliance estab- lished last month was domin- ated by old dogmas and thus too soft. Junked to Federation Last month's alliance linked munists concluded their 1.6tn party congress today with a strong denunciation of Peking, restrained praise for President de Gaulle and announcement of -another new political pact for the coming French elections. ' The official theme of the five- day congress was more domestic than international ? generally building up for the National As- sembly elections in March, and specifically celebrating last month's historic agreement to wage the campaign in concert With most of France's non-Com- munist left. But there were frequent ref- erences to the war in Vietnam, the Chinese-Soviet split' and a world conference of Communist parties. The final. resolution called for the convocation of such a conference "as promptly as possible." Of China the resolution said: "The party condemns the cur- rent Chinese leaden who are breaking, in every respect. with Marxism-Leninism and with the rules of behavior for Communist parties." It said that "tahe activities of denigration and division" by Peking's leaders were an argu- ment in favor of a world con- ference. The resolution praised General De Gaulle "without hesitation" for his improvement of Paris- -Moscow relations and for his at- titude on the Vietnam war. But in the same sentence the party said that it remained opposed to "the seriously negative aspects" of his foreign policy on dis- armament, for ingtance. It explained that the few .aspects did not result from great statesmanship but from "con- tradictions between capitalist countries, accentuated by the 'change in the world balance of, power." [mit lAJIIIIIIIAILISLS WAAL WIC 11111U? month aid Federation of the Left,' which embraces the so- cialist and radical parties and a number of smaller groups that call themselves conventions and clubs. The Communists' 'arrange- ments with both the federation and the Unified Socialists pro- vides that each will run its own candidates in the first-round 'vote and that the candidates who trail in this ballot will then, in most circumstances, withdraw from the run-off in favor of those who did better, The federation itself is trying to work out a similar deal with the Unified Socialists. The party congress ended its business with the election of the Central Committee. Eight former members did not run for re-election, and 11 new mem- bers were added. , By Waverley Root Worthington Post Foreign service , an. o ica pressures building up toward the March 5 legislative elec- tions produced two shocks to French tradition today. . One looked like a govern- mental attempt to restrict the opposition's right to free as- sembly; it died quickly. The 'other was the release of a pub- 'lie opinion poll by the Com- munist Party, which usually plays its cards much closer to its chest.. The extr eme right-wing newspaper Aurore and the Intellectual leftist Combat both revealed today that the City of Paris had refused three political parties the use of the Palais des Sports, the only hall suitable for political mass meetings. The three were Sen. Jean Lecanuet's Demo- cratic Centrists, the Commu- nista, and former Finance Min- ister Valery Giscard d'Estang's Independent Republicans, who 'are allied with the Gaullists. The reason given for refus- ing the parties the hall was that the police had claimed they would not have sufficient men to handle such large gatherings. Yet the Gaullists had been given the hall for Jan. 31. The explanation was that the police expected to be overtaxed after the official campaign begins Feb. 12; the three opposition dates were When parliamentary leaders I split .up the DO minutes each 1 argument, the Gaullists got 78,1 minutes of the government's' share and the Gisc a r d'Estaing group, 12. The oppo- sition split its share 24 min utes for Lecanuet's group, 17 for the Democratic Front, 30 for the Socialists and 19 for the Cominunists. The Communist poll was taken by the neutral French Institute of Public Opinion. Of those questioned, 51 per cent found the Party's actions since 1944 useful, and only 21 per cent found them harmful. Forty percent favor Commu- nist ministers in the govern- ment, 24 per cent are opposed, and 27 per cent think it makes no difference. Asked whether Communist or Western countries will be more powerful militarily 20 years from now, 32 per cent said the Communists and 18 per cent the West. On future scientific and technical superiority, 28 per cent think the Communists will be ahead, 24 per cent think the West will; 52 per cent think Western countries will have a higher standard of living and only 11 per cent think the Communists will. A maj o rity believed the Communists, Socialists and Centrists will gain ground in- France in the next 10 years, Feb: 14, 16 and 27. while the Gaullists and the. As soon as the news was extreme right will lose. out, the Interior Ministry de- On the important issues 1111 ?flied it. The eXplanation was the March elections, 32 pert that the architectural commit- cent of the voters think the tee of the city had acted with- standard of living conies first;' out consulting higher author- 22 per cent gave econernic de ity in a routine desire to pro- tect municipal property. The velopment of France 19 per cent named the defense meetings have now been re- of liberties, 12 per cent stabil-1 scheduled. ity of government (a favorite Gaullist theme), and only 7 per cent the role of France 14 the world. - Observers also suspect the 'opposition is getting the short end of the stick in a decision to divide radio and television time for the campaign 50-50 be- tween government and oppo- sition. Since the government Approved For Release 1999/08/2414pgstakftpMV?t dozen parties, this sounds like the old wheeze about the half- [UPI reported that the goy., ernment announced it would grant advances on future wage WOOMPV40111:1c?t3irg was designed to head off pa. litically embarrassing labor ? A, 6 1?51/ t11F'ReIease 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A001\9499.01r09_99, -k66 :angkok newspapers North Vietnam Runs Guerrilla School for Thais The North Vietnamese regime has been operating a secret guerrilla warfare school for Thais for the past four or five years. One training school near Hanoi gives an eight-month course; other establishments for indoctrination of Thai farmers have been located in China and in Pathet Lao-held territory in Laos. A young Thai farmer revealed details of the school near Hanoi at a press conference in Bangkok in mid-October. Like many other Thais he had gone to North Vietnam, not knowing that he was to be given guerrilla instruc- tion. He had joined the "Farmers' Liberation Party" at the behest of a man from another Thai province, not realizing that this "Party" was a Communist front organization. Through this organization, he was offered a chance to go abroad to study, and he accepted this offer, hoping to receive medical training. The man who had induced him to join the "Farmers' Liberation Party" conducted him and four others from Thailand into Laos. There they were met and guided by Pathet Lao or Vietnamese soldiers. After 18 days of travel the group reached Hanoi, and proceeded to the training school. Our Thai farmer was given eight months of training in Communist doctrine and guerrilla warfare. A political course instructed the trainees in methods of persuasion to use to get villagers to "join the revolution" and the regular courses were reinforced by enforced listening to the clandestine "Voice of the People of Thailand," as well as to Hanoi radio. 130 Thais attended the school while the farmer was there; most of them were laborers and peasants from the south, middle and northeasterly sections of Thailand. The group in- cluded 18 women. Trainees were paid in Vietnamese currency at a monthly rate equivalent to 120 Thai baht. On leaving, they received a pair of pants and a final payment of 400 baht. The farmer said that he was in the fourth group of trainees, and since the school had been set up four or five years ago, his information indicates that there are by now a sizable number of potential guerrillas in Thailand, trained by Hanoi. They return to Thailand in the way they come, via Laos; the instructors tell them that they will be given instructions by the liberation movement after they reach home. In the case of this farmer, the indoctrination failed. On arriving home in March 1966, he told his parents what had happened, and on their advice he gave himself up to the Thai police. Even before he got back to Thailand, he related, he had known that the Communists were trying to use him as a tool. Also, he had no desire to endanger his life for the sake of Communism. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 CPYRGHT Janu 1967 Outlawed Thai Communeg1 tFarty Links Itself to China-Based 'Front' By Stephen S. Rosenfeld "V,Vashinirton Post Staff Writer The Thai Communist .varty has for the first time associated Aself publicly with the 'Thailand Popular Front," the nsurgency movement welded together last year under the sponsorship of China and North Vietnam. And for the first time the Thai Party has broadcast an appeal in its own name on the clandestine radio station regu- larly, used by the Front. The station is thought to be near Kunming in southern China. The Thai Communist Party, outlawed in Thailand, is small and ? in exile or underground, and its- leaders, are unidenti- fied. Some observers saw its new move as an effort to broaden its base and to con- trol at least part of the action in northeast Thailand, focus of the insurgency. The Front has not pre- viously claimed or recognized the Communist affiliation that its opponents have con- tinuously alleged, although Party documents are said to have been discovered among Front material captured in the northeast. ? All sides agree that the in- surgents are Thais. Their op- ponents say, however, the in- surgency is directed from Hanoi and Peking. The Western consensus is that the insurgency is bother- some but not serious, because Thailand lacks the history of foreign domination which has nourished nationalism and communism ? elsewhere in Asia. The Communist Party state- ment was issued on its 24th anniversary last Dec. 1 but be- came known only through a broadcast to the northeast last , Saturday. The broadcast was monitored here. In saluting the Front, the Communist Party did not claim formal affiliation or con- trol. It said it had "welcomed with joy" the Front's forma- tion last year and it expressed "satisfaction" at the Front's "rapid development." "We want to make known here also that we are ready at any? time to cooperate with any group of patriots in the struggle to drive the Ameri- cans out the country and over- throw the Thanom - Praphat (government) , clique," the Party said. Scoring the Soviet Union, the Thai Party statement urged study of Mao 'rseAung's "thought" and also his 4.1guer- rilla warfare tactics." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Article: Thais Counter Subversion by Gordon Tate Thailand has strengthened her internal security against the threat of Chinese-inspired subversion by local Communists. The Thai Government's measures include the provision of more up-to-date weapons, communication equipment, and river craft to patrol the Mekong River which for 500 miles forms the border between Thailand and Laos. It has stepped up the social welfare programme. Plans have been put in hand for "self-help" villages in the more fertile and much less populated south: the first group of 100 families is now settled in Narathiwat Pro- vince. Both in the south and north-east, mobile development teams visit outlying villages offering practical assistance in farming, education, and public health. The government's experiment with sending young "Peace Corps" type workers (known as Rural Development Volunteers) to under-developed areas has proved so successful that a new batch was called up in August. Communist ambitions became obvious in 1964 with the creation of a united front organisation - the "Thailand Independence Movement" (TIM). In 1965, it joined a similar group, the self-styled "Thailand Patriotic Front" (TPF), ac- cepting its leadership. Both have been exhorting the people of Thailand to overthrow the government and replace it with a "neutralist" coalition com- prising "all patriotic parties in the country" - generally the first step in a Communist bid for power. Both "fronts" are backed by China, North Vietnam, the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao movement in Laos, and the "South Vietnam National Liberation Front." One of the TIM messages - reported by the New China News Agency on Novem- ber 2, 1966 - appeal to the Thai people to be ready at any time to "take up arms and unhesitatingly plunge into the glorious people's war" against "im- perialism and its Thai running dogs." It further called for "unreserved support and help" to what it described as "the people's armed forces," mean- ing the Communist terrorists. For years China has been infiltrating guerrillas and agents into Thailand through Laos and Burma. The main target for subversion has been the north- east which is separated from South China by only 200 miles of Pathet Lao-held territory, and where the hill tribes are the same on both sides of the Thai- Burmese border. Communist guerrillas, an official Thai statement revealed, are armed with the latest Chinese rifles and automatic weapons. NOTE: Gordon Tate is also a journalist and a lecturer on international affairs, who worked for many years in the Middle and Far East. (Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Armed clashes in the north-east between Security forces and terrorists have recently increased, as have the quantities of arms smuggled in. On November 14, it was stated in Bangkok that during a search operation in the jungle of Nakhon Phanom Province six policemen were killed and another three wounded. Two days earlier a police sergeant was killed during a similar encounter in the neighbouring province of Sakol Nakhon. Another area of terrorist operations is the mid-south: a third con- sists of what is known as Thailand's Deep South; in particular the four predominantly Muslim provinces of Songkhla, Yale, Pattani, and Narathiwat. In the Deep South, the challenge to stability comes from the remnants of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), whose terrorists are living in jungle camps on the Thai-Malaysian border. The MCP is a predominantly Chinese movement and has its main base in the Betong salient - a strip of Thai ter- ritory extending into Northern Malaysia, from which the terrorists operate further afield. MCP tactics include anti-government propaganda, indoctrination meetings in villages, abduction, blackmail and extortion. MCP agents collect "taxes" from the intimidated local peasantry, and many plantation owners have been compelled to pay monthly "protection money." A Bangkok report last July revealed that captured documents had estab- lished "close co-ordination" between the guerrillas in the north-east and those in the south. Non-violent agitation has also been fostered by the MCP or Thai Commu- nist Party (TCP) and TIM and TPF. In the Deep South, the MCP has been encouraging a separatist movement in the Muslim provinces by holding out the prospect of their union with Malaysia "once Thailand has been brought under Communist control." Even religion is used to achieve the same object. The Far Eastern Economic Re- view has quoted Thai Minister of the Interior, General Prapas Charusathira, as stating that "malcontents" in the area had abused Islam for their own ends, claiming it was against this religion to learn the Thai language. Communists rounded up by the authorities not long ago included a rubber planter, the manager of a bull-ring, and seven members of a shadow-play ensemble - a popular open-air entertainment given by artists travelling from village to village. The company had performed plays containing Communist propaganda. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 199 3061A000400070009-3 CPYRGHT ? An Independent Newspaper 'BANGKOK, FRIDAY DECEMBER 2, 1966 DE Cl"fRGHT RETURNEES TELL TERRORIST SCHOOL by Post reporters Brion the seerbnth Ofniiie ail: 'clren of a farin"family in Ban Kham, said he hart been recruited; by Mao Pompid. a friend in the:: 'same village. Noo told him: "Thai - eland has been colonised by: thel,. 1.1nited States" and asked him to 'help "liberate",Thailande - ? 1 Noo said Boon would be taught-, ,an occupation "abroad." $ . Telling his parents that ,he was ? going on a trip but not .sayieg. where, Boon left with five compa.! nions for North Vietnam The group rodide, its way by bus to ,Sakol .Nakorn and Beungken ln! Nongkh6i. It crossed the Mekong] River, at Paknam-krading fur, Laos. ? , -Six Pathet Lao soldiers welco-; med them on the other shore;;! They travelled on foot 20 days: until they reached Vinh in North Vietnam. After two months in,. I Vinh. the group went to Hanoi. AT LEAST SIX Thammasat University graduates are n Lab,. to 11 3,111..?A ILA .4.1morig young Thais who have? been trained in Hanoi ? 1.Ifia Binh, about 30 kilometres , from Hanoi, The school, 'consist- !Or subversive activities end fighting Thai Government ,ing of three buildings, was surH.-:, s. forces, two returnees from Hanoi revealed yesterday. rounded by hill Boon 60 Thai students, The,returneca . were arrested in Ban Nah Kham, -incl met uding 14 women. About 10 . .students, mostly women, had come Ternbel, Sawat. Amphur Leung Noke Tha, Ubol, by 'from .Bangkok. There were also' I. ? police, they told a press conference at the Public students who had come, froth the;, .. lions Department auditorium. Southera provinces ? Tne students did not know each... The captives . had lived in ? Both returncea said they met a' other's real 'vane. Boon himself , the same village. each . without number a young men and womenf.: was given the cole-name "Term."-, , knowing the other was working from Ceatra; Thailand includinV The students were forbidden to ' for the cnmniunists until they were Bangkok. ? .ask about each other's background. netted in a police round-up. These Central Thailand youths.' Tnere ' were five instructors,': One, Boon Prakob, 25, had re- _ they said, had returned, to this most of them Vietnamese able to: turned to 'lhailand in 1963 after ,countrY. Treinees who are be.. ,speak The director was nem- : eight months in Beni, while the lieved to be known to the authori- ed Binh. Boon expressed belierl other, Sod Netra, 18, returned four - ties have been sent to operate in, that ;that Binhewas Thai who knew the: , days before his arreSt. ' other parts of the country while 'Chinee.elanguage The interview was conducted by those who are '?believed to be un- Each student was given a wage., ? Pichai Wasanaeong,' well-known -known to the authorities have bean of 30 dongs ? (approximately 200'i .television personality. Questions sent back to Bangkok mainly in baht) each month. , . ? ' were fired by Thai press repre- the field of propaganda. Boon aaid he was giVen'nofitica( sentittives and foreign correspon- Bonn and Sod said the youths indoetrination and taught handlingj ' dents. Pichai translated for the I from the central provinces seethed.:, 'of weapons. Rorrespondents. F?' ? intelligent 4.1 When he rgturned to Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78.-03061A000400070009-3 Approved ForReFeasel9S9/N/24 :-CIA=RDP78=03061-A00040007floo9-a CPYRGHT he was given 600 baht and told to start giving firear,ns training to villagera joining the "liberation" movement. . He claimed to have trained only five villagers in firearms. Noo, the man who recruited him, asked him to,go into the jungle, saying he was on the police list. _However, -Boon refused to go. Boon said he did not want to go because if he went into the jungle he would die. He was not arrested until a year later. ? Boon claimed he did not obey re- gulations. For example, he said, he married secretly, although he had -been ordered not to marry until he had obtained permission from the leader. ' Noo, Boon said, was acting un- der orders of a Vietnamese, and is now in the jungles with a Commu? nist band. ? Meanwhile, Sod, the eldest of seven children of a family, said " that he had been indoctrinated by a man named "Kaew" from the, same village. "Kaew" told him the United States has sent large numbers of troops to Thailand to take over the country and land had been taken from farmers to build an airfield. Sod said he was a "patriot" and , wanted to "liberate" his country, but now he has learned he had been' a "patriot in the wrong sense of the word." , Sod said he was given communist literature to read. When asked to go to Hanoi; he agreed. He left his house on March 9,1966, 'after telling his parents he was going on a journey. He Went to Laos by ' way of Nakorn Phanom, he said, and was ?'.received on the Laotian bank by five Lao soldiers. He stayed at a ,Pathet Lao camp for two days. When he arrived in Hanoi he was f'admitted into the hospital there for . treatment of malaria he had caught ? while walking through the jungles. ' After 20 days i?he h,ospital,., Sod went to Hoa Binh to attend ' the "Communist Thailand School." It was the same school to which _ Boon had gone. He met 120 students frodi ? various parte of, Thailand, induct- ' iug 18 women. Sod used the code- name "Yue." The school was hit by bombs during a US air raid, he said. The students were removed to a new school 25 kilometres away. After eight months of training, Sod returned home on April 20. He was arrested four days later, before he started any activity.' ? He said he did not' know what Boon and Sod. They may be pro- had happened to "Kaew," who secuted in court, but because of was at home at the time of the their cooperation in giving infor- police raid. He did not know if mation during interrogation this : "Kaew" had been arrested. may be considered in their favour.' Sod claimed to be a Buddhist. for leniency. ' The Communists, he said, "told In introducing Boon and Sod. Pichai recalled that last October me that religion is all opiate, mak, 13 a defector, Porn Panne, gave an ing people b.flieve only in virtue interview on his recruitment and and am, and making them forget suffcring. Religion is all lies." training in Hanoi. On October 24. the clandestine Asked if he would' like to take radio station, "Voice of the Thai up the Buddhist monkhood, ',Sod People," alleged that there was no- hesitated for a few seconds, arid such person' as Porn Panne and' then said: "I would like to." that the Thai Government fabri-;' Both Boon and Sod said they cated the whole story about him, were only members of the Farmers PicItai said.. ? ? Liberation Movement and not yet members of the Communist Party. They said they vieie told they would have to work hard to become mem- bers of the Communist Party. Did Sod still want to join the Communist Party.? "If I were still with' them, I: would wa'nt to become a member," Sod replied. , What activity had they carried out among the people? They said they were told to work' among poor 'people, hired farm. . hands and tenant farmers. The said they were to tell the, farmers the Government was riot taking .care of' them,. and tney: should unite to overthrow the, Government so they would have. . tractors fur farming and would not be poor. The weapons used in. their traini ing, Boon said, were c:irbines. Boon said, however, there had been no battles with the authorities but some officials and informers in neighbouring villages had been assassinated. ? He estimated that in his village of 400 people about 40 per cent were Communists, although he did not know who they were since he was allowed to know only one or' two. Boon and Sod had been given' instructions by their leaders to deny all charges when arrested and not to give away any secrets. Boon was asked what he had been told about the time the revolution to "liberate" the farmers ,aould start and end. "I was told that there cannot be a definite sthedule," he said. "The revolution can go on for 20 to 30 years." Boon and Sod said they were al. so told about the fighting in North Vietnam and Laos and that this fighting was the same as the fight- ing in Thailand. They were told these were people's wars." An official said the Government is still considering what to do with: Approved For Release 1999/08/224: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : tiliMP78-03061A000?4040iite04i7 1095 WH,f. LATIN AMERICA: 25X1 C1 Ob Subversive Misuse of Universities SITUATION: In the course of 1966 universities in five Latin American countries were invaded by the security forces of their governments, in most cases in order to put an end to student-inspired violence. The coun- tries were Colombia, Mexico, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela. For Latin America this is a much more serious act than for most other areas of the world since in that region there is a long-standing tradition of university "autonomy" which in some cases has grown to the point of giving the uni- versity almost extraterritorial status. The governing councils of the universities -- composed of representatives of students, faculty and gradu- ates -- have acquired the prerogatives of hiring and firing of the entire university staff, including the rector (President), establishment of the curriculum, disbursement of all funds, even exclusive control over policing the university grounds. The only role left to the state is providing the funds. While the concept of university autonomy partly originated with the laudable objective of protecting the universities from unwarranted politi- cal interference by the governments in such academic matters as curriculum, staffing, and teaching (still a matter of honest concern in many countries), it has been perverted in too many cases to other ends. Specifically, political agitators have long taken advantage of the facilities which uni- versity autonomy offers for political, propaganda and even paramilitary action. Before the Second World War these agitators were most often Fascists. Since the war they have been most often Communists and other leftist radical groups. The result has been not only to "politicize" the universities to an inordinate degree, but also to so lower academic standards that Latin Ameri- ca's needs for well-educated university graduates are not met. At the same time university autonomy has acquired an almost mythical sanctity which has prevented governments from taking the necessary steps to depoliticize them and turn them toward their true educational purpose. Therefore the governmental interventions during 1966 and the evident approval of these actions by the people are essentially welcome steps in slaughtering the sacred cow of absolute university autonomy. We wish to draw on these events in order to encourage the governments involved to con- solidate their gains and to encourage other nations faced with similar prob- lems to take remedial action. The Central University of Venezuela (UCV) in Caracas was a prime ex- ample of the gross perversion of university autonomy. Its dormitories housed students, bandits, and guerrillas indiscriminately. Its chemistry Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 :1110100IPT (1095 Cont.) Approved For Release 19M811MTOIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 laboratories were used to produce explosives for Communist terrorists, its cellars and attics were caches for weapons of all sorts. Terrorists com- mitted their crimes and then headed full speed for the university campus. If they made it, they were "in free," since policemen in pursuit were not allowed on campus. One student was working his way through college by renting out an armored Volkswagen to student guerrillas. In December 1966 the Venezuelan government finally invaded the campus to rid it of criminals and weapons. In so doing the government announced that henceforth university autonomy would mean academic freedom and autonomy and not immunity from the nation's criminal statutes. Happily, and somewhat to everyone's surprise, the government's actions received overwhelming public approval. 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 .61?1441. (1095.) 25X1C10b .01104, Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 January 1967 Turmoil in the Universities Although the Communists have attempted to establish footholds among the peasants, workers, and students of Latin America, it is only among the latter that they have had any widespread success. It has been largely the university students who have supplied the troops for both urban and rural guerrilla forces. In Venezuela, for instance, the universities provided up to 80% of the guerrilla fighters in the countryside, the urban terrorists, even the money and equipment. During the past year this militancy has obliged various governments of Latin America to take stringent measures against the university students, including temporarily closing several universities, and sending the police into others to put down rioting and lawlessness. Over the past year or so students in Mexico caused the downfall of the. rectors of the University of Baja California, the University of Sinaloa, and even the Autonomous National University of Mexico in the country's capital. There have been less dramatic student strikes at other universities around the country. Student agitation in Durango in the summer of 1966 caused the downfall of the state governor. Demon- strations which built up from August into October 1966 in the town of Morelia, where the university of Michoacan state is located, were also aimed at overthrowing the governor there. On 8 October 1966 Mexican paratroopers and cavalry moved into Morelia, violating the customarily-immune territory of the University of San Nicolas de Hidalgo, to quell growing student riots and sabotage. The student protests had begun in August 1966 with attempts by certain students to extort free student tickets from the proprietors of the Morelia sport stadium and cinemas. In September, when the local bus company announced fare increases, students demanded a contribution from the company in exchange for foregoing protest demonstrations against the increase. However when fares were raised the students commenced rioting which resulted in the death of a student. The student's death was then used as a basis for demanding the ouster of the Michoacan state governor. When student groups attempted to sabotage two city power plants, and after increased instances of vandalism and organized terrorism against Morelia merchants, the Government of Mexico sent troops into the univer- sity grounds to end the disturbances. The governor issued a statement denouncing non-university and extra-Michoacan groups for their involvement in the riots. These groups included professional Communist agitators, some of whom had spent years in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Communist China receiving training in subversion and guerrilla warfare. Mexican officials showed to the press samples of Communist Chinese and Cuban political and guerrilla training literature found in all six student houses at San Nicolas University. In Colombia student rioting has provoked sharp reactions from the government of President Carlos Lleras Restrepo. The first major act of his government after he took office on 7 August 1966 was a decree that Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 (cont.) moo' Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 students would be required to attend 80 percent of their classes and that days missed because of participation in strikes would be counted as triple absences. This move as provoked by a prolonged strike at the Univeesty of Antioguia in Medelin. At the end. of August the univer- sity was closed for the remainder of the semester. On 24 October President Lleras Restrepo was attacked by a stone- throwing mob of about 100 students when he appeared on the campus of the National University in Bogota to inaugurate a new veterinary science building. Furious over this act of anarchy and the open disrespect for the office of the nation's president, Lleras Restrepo ordered Army troops onto the university grounds to disperse the rioters. Subsequently the Colombian government issued three stringent anti- subversive decrees. The new laws state that anyone "linked to subversive activities" can be held under house arrest, that subversive publications can be banned and the property of their publishers confiscated, that travel to Cuba is forbidden, and that the student council at National University is suspended. The decrees affirm the legal right of the police and soldiers to enter the university grounds to preserve order. They also provide severe punishment for stone-throwing, impeding traf- fic, and baiting policemen. President Lleras left no doubt about his determination to implement the decrees. In a radio speech to the nation on 27 October he said: "The group of extremists that has dominated the university because of the cowardice of some, the neglect of others, and the indifference of the majority, is trying to distort the facts, to present them with ill But they have not been able to conceal the truthe.. ...The law will be abided by, and we will not allow riots to hold sway for even a minute. ...Whenever any crime is attempted in the university, the authorities will again enter it and enforce the law... I want to convey to the country -- which is why I emphasized my words -- that the government will indeed preserve public peace, tran- quillity, and freedom of expression and thought, over and against all fanaticisms and conspiracies." A third and final example of lawlessness in the universities may be found in Venezuela, where the Central University of Caracas has long been notorious as a base for the guerrillas and terrorists who have plagued the nation for years. In fact the guerrilla movement in Venezuela has largely been defeated by the government. The turning point came in late 1963 when the Communist forces were unable to make good their threat to prevent elections. By the summer of 1966 Communist violence had been reduced to sporadic instances of terrorism against undefended targets and the orthodox Communist leadership had decided to abandon the hopeless armed struggle and shift to political activity. However a small hard core of terrorists obtained renewed support from Castro and launched a new wave of violence in the last months of 1966. In Mid-December the chief of staff of the Venezuelan army was wounded in a terrorist attack and a lawyer for the Defense Ministry was assassinated. Determined to put an end to the lawlessness, President Raul Leoni ordered the army to Approved For Release 1999/08/24 :2CIA-RDP78-03061A00040097cOpp-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 occupy the University campus, to search it thoroughly for guerrilla weapons and documents, and to arrest known criminals and guerrilla leaders hiding on university grounds. The result was a thorough sweep of the university which produced a considerable number of weapons, from dynamite to machineguns, plates for counterfeiting paper money, military clothing, radio transmitters, Cuban instruction manuals for sabotage and guerrilla warfare, and large quantities of passports, identification cards and other documents. The university was closed until mid-February 1967 and the student dormitories were converted to classrooms. President Leoni, in a hard-hitting speech to congress on 16 December, stated that the extra territorial status of Venezuelan universities would henceforth be ended, though the educational and administrative autonomy of the univer- sities would be protected. Significantly the strong actions taken against the universities in Mexcio, Colombia and Venezuela have all met with strong popular approval. It is evident that the people of those countries will no longer tolerate a situation in which a small segment of the population -- led by an even smaller group of Communists -- declared itself exempt from the normal criminal statutes of the nation. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 3 ApprokedIERDE4itabaarwr,15199/06/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT fl quir NW, A HOW CAMPUS REDS TREED VT TAKE OVER A COUNTRY There's a lesson for others in Caracas, where Communists con- , verted a university campus into a "sanctuary" to give them a free hand in plotting to overthrow the Government. They almost got 19-way with it before an official crackdown foiled them?for now. CARACAS 4: -1- Within the university, troops foul Ar a rime when student leftists are' causing more and more trouble on cam- puses in the U. S. and other countries, take a look at the Central University Caucusin Caucus to see what can happen when Communists grab control' of a university. The occupation by Venezuelan troops of the Central University in late De- cember uncovered substantial evidence that the Reds were using the school as an arsenal and staging area in a major effort to overthrow the Government. . People in this capital city of close to 2 million inhabitants have known for more than five years that the Central University was a focal point of trouble. Communist-led gangs sallied forth from the campus again and again to stage as- sassinations, rob banks and blow up supermarkets and oil pipelines. ? It was the most sustained campaign of terrorism in Latin America since Fi- ? del Castro took over Cuba. Until last month,' the troublemakers were able to: dash back to safety through the uni- versity gates. , Central University, like most others ; in Latin America, held the status of an: ' autonomous institution under the consti- tution. The campus grounds were iniJ mune to Venezuelan law and off limits to any type of federal or municipal law ' enforcement. The last straw. Tolerance of the Communist sanctuary finally ended ab- ? ruptly last month when a judge was as- . : isassinated and the Venezuelan Army 'Chief of Staff was wounded in a new :wave of violence. 1 Findings made on the campus: since ?troops moved in are enabling Venezue- lan authorities to piece together the full . story of the conversion of the university into a base of terrorist operations. ? Even though the university was on 'vacation when the troops struck, they arrested some 650 persons there. Many were not students at all but professional ,troublemakers in the pay of the Coin- munists. Forty-five were singled out as ;ringleaders. Among them was a retired 1Army major who had been involved in an abortimc uprising in 1960 pproved For Refease 1999/08/2 - , cache of anis I _udder, p.rt . ;several buildings?even in the spaces be- tween ceilings and roofs. I The arms included automatic and 'conventional .rifles, a light machine gun, assorted pistols and revolvers, grenades, :! electric detonators, explosives for mak- ing bombs, and stores of ammunition. The dormitories in which some of thesej- 1weapons caches were uncovered bore , .? such terrorist nicknames as "Stalingrad" , 1and "Chicago," . Thirty stolen cars were rounded up ? ;i !on the campus, including a Volkswagen with homemade armor which one enter- prising student had been renting to vari- ous terrorist groups. There were supplies of Army and police uniforms, false puss- .' ? ports and identification papers, a Cas- ? ,, tro-Cuban flag, guerrilla films processed .1 in Russia and a printing press for turn- ing out counterfeit money. Key find: documents. To Venezue- lan intelligence officers, their most im- portant find was a mound of papers and , ? documents. These included files on guer- . , ? rilla units in the mountains, plans for ?' future operations and maps of National ? Guard posts with instructions on how to ' attack them. There were lists of Army officers I, marked for assassination. There were 1. also sketches of utility plants in the ? ; ? Caracas area?a favorite Red target?and ?',manuals on ambushing Army, patrols. . How did Venezuela's main' university ,? ? become such a bastion for the- Commt4v4.1 , fists? Intelligence officers say it came'l about mainly through a combination of ? three things?a maximum abuse of the4;., constitutional immunity? of [ho campus, intimidation of non-Communists, and an 1: ? appeal to the romantic streak in many naive students. Of the total enrollment of more than. 25,000 students at Central University, fewer than 1,500 are considered Commu- nists. Most of the students are regarded as seriously devoted to. their studies ,and , opposed to Communism. Only 00. Red activists. It is now clear, however, that the armed Commu- . nist minority, with approximately 200 y 4: at-ritDillievill0tatitOintArtiffed/0 309-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070-00NyRGHTI A otber ems' .i..h, ailciacc. One non-. . :Communist student now says that ev- erybody knew what was going on but . was too afraid to talk for fear of Com- munist reprisal. ISome key members of the university ad !. ministration and faculty were Com- munists or sympathizers, so allowed the ; j terrorists a free hand. In this situation,' _ I campus dormitories became the refuge [ I, nal agitators. The criminals teamed, . of professional criminals as well as pro- fessio ;i i ? up with students to rob banks?"for the ...people's cause," as they told bank ofk !ems and customers. . 1 The campus became a recruiting; ground, for guerrilla units in the hills as ! some students took t"mountain sabbati- . ' cals." Many of these were [attracted to ! the, guerrillas by the supposecrglamour . . of becoming mountain fighters. ',"If -you were in: the mountains? with guerkillas," said a. non-Conminitist stu- dent who did not succumb, "ypia were ,.. I irresis:ible with girls." ' At the same time, the university sane- .: tuary was used 'as a rest and recupera- tion area for the regular guerrillas, as !? well as their fund-raising center. "Trials". and torture. Evidence also ; Is. emerging that the campus was used ' for Communist "trials" and torture. One !! recent victim was Alfredo Rafael Seijas, - I a lawyer who worked in liaison between :? the police and Army. Seijas disappeared last September while on a visit to the university. Ills bound body was found. the following night on a deserted Cara- cas street with 16 bullet holes. His .,.. mouth- was stuffed with a handkerchief. Police say Scijas was seized and hid- . den at the university by Communist I' ? terrorists, "tried" in a university audi- torium, beaten and tortured, stuffed into ' the trunk of a. par, then shot to death. ! The main function of the Communist i base at Central University, however, was i ? to serve as the .staging ground for an ; all-out campaign of terrorism against the i capital itself. That campaign got under 1 way in 1961 after Fidel Castro publicly L declared Venezuela his No. 1 target. ' r The terrorists objective was to sub- ject Caracas to so touch turmoil us to . provoke a military take-over Iand dis- ' credit the democratic Government ofI President ROmulo Betancourt. In th&. years that followed, Caracas experienced: terrorist bombings almost nightly:. For u; time, teriorist, gunners were killing ai. . policeman a day?often from fast-mov- ing cars that headed straight buck to ;the university. . Voters defied Reds. The campaign. to oust the Government by such activi- ties in:Citrates -failed. In 1963, the peo- ple defied Communist threats by going to the polls in record numbers to elect a successor 'to Betancourt. It was the first peaceful transfer of power between; democratically elected regimes in VCIIC-i zuela's history. But the Communists did not ;give upi They just shifted tactics. After, 1963,! the. Reds moved into the hills for a guerrilla campaign on the ' CuStro or Chinese Communist pattern. ? By 1964, guerrillas were operating in - eight of Venezuela's 20 Statesi. . Outwardly, ':central Ure&Oty up, peared to have 'become a in re peaceful !place after the Communists moveil their light to the hillst Secretly, however, it. i''remained a beehive; of activity on be- ,'hal( of the Reds. - Then, in the closing ?weeks of 1966,i .1 violence broke out again in Caracas, ! and it was traced to the university. Al- ter seven persons were killed and mil- . ; lions of dollars' worth of property was ; damaged, Venezuelan President, ;Raid Leoni moved in with troops. I Most Venezuelans, despite tradition of ; autonomy for universities, appear to up- 'prove the Government's occupation .0i the campus. Ordinary people say they ; were tired of terrorist gangs' using the !university as a haven. Some find fault1 with the Government, for waiting so long; ;to move. As political observers here in Caracas see it, the importance of the occupation of the university is far greater than just the arrests and the seizure of clandestine ; material. It puts out of action the Commu- nist sanctuary and center of subversive activities for the most concerted drive ever launched by the Castro Commu- nists against a South American country. ? And it involves a clear warning that it could happen again. ? A similar change of mind over the hot subject of university autonomy is going on-; throughout Latin America. Universities have been occupied in four other countries in addition to Venezuela. These are Argentina,. Ecuador,. Colombia' and Mexico. The outlook for the Communists in all. ; five countries, as a result, is for tougher [ times. No longer can they count on ? luniversity campuses as ? their 'private .!sanctuaries in working to undermine' '.governments. mon Approved For Release 1999/0 24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 4. CPYRGIfr I NNW Noe CPYRGHT A p p rovedCFPoYIN ase 1 999/08/M :vatikteDi?ZaHlikapfily09,649,04thifillitft312. ree n. Latin -America aitJOIIN T. O'ROURKE sr Fmnriltig nf WnghinnInn OnIlY Hows klow wouut you nee ur .university to be: 's Off limits to police? ? Parbicklen to dismiss students for scholastic failure? ? Forbidden to refuse sanctuary to students who, off 'campus, committed arson, vandalism and even were pursued to the university gates ,t eby police? 1. ? Forbidden to expel middle- aged, surreptitiously subsidized ,..'students,', many with families, ' ,.who were fomenting political lunrest by violence and who ? never worked for an academic ,degree and never intended to? ! ' dubious privileges enjoyed ? if that Is the word ? by i"autonomous" universities in , South America. ? ? The autonomous status differs In degree from country to , 'country, of course. It is. s supposed to preserve academic , freedom from dictatorship. s Academic "autonomy" apparently., has its roots in 'Spanish colonialism, when the sons of the ruling classes were eligible for higher learning.. It was a sort of gimmick to preserve the status quo. Now Limos have changed, and., ,it is a gimmick to upset the status quo. We've had a sample of it in * the United States Let's see ? how it worked. I ,In the ? ? Monthly for September, i Professor Lewis Feuer, 'who ' taught philosophy and. social 'science at California University, ? ? describes how the "free speech . explosion" there in 1964-65 i resulted in its decline. Faculty ? action and inaction; plus a police, failure, in compliance with 1. faculty.' equivocation, gave the university at Berkeley an "auto . to that of many South Araeri?caii universities. I.. 13....L1.?, L. It 1 1 to be. a stumbling block to Improvement in academic standards. The Califonia faculty Promulgated a charter, says Professor Fetter, which could be used to safeguard the advocacy and planning of immediate acts of violence, illegal demonstrations, terrorist operations, interference with troop trains and obscene. speech and melon ' "In* effect," he sayit,'; created a moral vacuum in the heart of the university. It founded an enclave which cancelled the limits of any previously defined freedom of speech . . . students were allowed to avocate and plan any sort of political activity, legal or Illegal, violent or non-violent PI no ? ? ? A migration of "non-students" descended on Berkeley: "Tired radials came to be rejuvenated lumpen intellectuals , . . Maoists arrived determined to , 'escalate now' on the campus; varieties of sexual reformers (orgyists, they called them- selves) expounded their creeds on the university steps." Finally, it was estimated there were about 2500 "non- , students" at Berkeley. ? MURDERER "Some were in flight from stark tragedy," he says, "some were clanging to rebellion and . adolescence and one was a youth who had murdered a 'seven-year-old child in New , York; when Federal authorities arrested him for violation of parole, he told how he had come to Berkeley to make himself useful to humanity." Professor Fetter asks "What is a non-student? . he has no job, no calling, no vocation; he is a guerilla fighter against His description fits every non- 'student in South America as 11 1 Professor Fetter fails to point out how disciplined and organized some of them are in their fight "ag'in" established Moderates in the Berkeley ? student body, disgusted with faculty capitulation' and ambivalence, stayed away from the student elections. As a result, a communist leader was elected ... The f a C u It si policy of ? , ambiguity and permilsiveness submerged the concept of freedom of speech as a means . of fair discussion. ' This also is true in many :"autonomous" South American - universities. ONE-SIDED Supporters of President ' Johnson's policies' are also, in effect, denied a forum on Berkeley's ? campus, says -Professor Feuer. Students also managed to halt momentarily , the presentation of an honorary ?degree bo lJ.S. ?Ambassador to ? the. .1Jnibed .Nations Arthur Goldberg. The students had another one for him: "Doctor of War." ' 'At a Meeting with students, a" professor had to stand for being called a "son-of-a-bitch." Only one student protested: He said he may be one but it was impolite to call him that to his face. ' ??? ? "This was Indeed a time of transition for many Berkeley professors," Says Professor Feuer, "from libertananism to authoritarianisM in one short ? year." . ? ? Student ethics lowered., the city of Berkeley had unprecedented crime (traced in large part to students and non- students) "guerilla war was waged against s m a 11 store- k r-s? Selective Service." It certainly sounds like an ' t A.A.. I university. CRACKDOWN Last month, in Argentina. provisional President Juan Carlos Onganla ended the ? autonomy of Buenos Aires University, whose schools of. science and engineering were riddled with communists ,and far-left activists. , Students got wind of his Impending action, seized the university buildings and locked themselves In them. Police were called to re-take them, r professors' and students' heads I were broken, some were jailed and several pollee wounded. NO APOLOGY "Of course I lament the violence," Gen. 'Ongania told this reporter shortly. afterward." If I did not, I would be ashamed of myself." ,i But he refused to apologize ; ifor It becauSe. he , doesn't ? ?consider it was his decree' which ' precipitated it. . ? He doesn't apologize for police behavior for the genie reason. that President Johnson' Would ' refuse to .apologize for the behavior of police In Mississippi or California. What Gen. Onganih dIci- was; put the Federally . supported . university under the Education Department,. just as many. schools schools in the U.S. are under the authority of State Depart? ments of Education. ' ? This reporter was in Montevideo a few years ago when . "students" rigged a proposed change in the law which would have taken control ? of the Uruguayan University away from its ad inistrat and put it in the hands of a coalition of left-wing students and teachers. ? 'Foiled. they seized the .u. Lt. r 'ted in front of Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00V4-66070-604:8 CPYRGHT , armored hoof ears. blasted the At any rate, students at students with water, and were Mexico University descended on ? denounced for brutality. , the town, seized the buses, took , them to the university campus Said my Uruguayan 'rum?, stole the tires And then burned Raid Irontains. hronocally, "all them. ii.0 railed university they want lode is la rake the autonomy. It's bard to see bow ? University from the taxpayers it.hdped lb. bin ; who nym ' ?? , In Caracas a few years ago:: fi" ? In Mexico. On siother visit.. " Walker Stone, editor of the . ;, the bus company had just put in ScrippaN o w a rd Newspapers, a small fare increase. No doubt. and Charles Lucey, now editor: it .was a hardship on the poor. of the Trenton Times. ,L 'modest tho it was. but English, interviewed ?a communist. ? I' German or U.S.- buses are just]. ' "student" loader on Ceram'. as expensive in Pesos as le ear f !: University campus. " Other currency. ? told with organized left wing students could set off bombs, wreck ears or whatever and be sate if they could make it back to the campus, where the police were forbidden to enter without court permission. ? ? By the lime they returned' with 'a warrant atter a bearing.' 'students. ?weapons or bombe would all be, smuggled away, and safe. ?*!.. soth Century has shown how the intellectual clan can ' become a primary, forte for an . u,s sault en democratic institutioni.e. Professor': ; Feu ? Feuer." and we may yert i? witness this phenomenon M. :America disguised tinder soda .?slogene as 'participatory. democracy.' " ? Professor Fetter's article en .1 'Berkeley makes good reading. 1 It reminds one that where I those who enjoyed univcbreity autonomy finally were able IA 'overturn the Government, ea in ; Cuba, they promptly not only ;abolished it even as theory, but along with it every e el; independence mai kfedilit , Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 Speech by Venezuelan President Raul Leoni, 16 December 1966 President and vice president of the Congress; chairman and other members of the honorable Senate committee; chairman and other members of the honorable Chamber of Deputies committee: ? I an receiving the honorable legislative committee members who have come to inform r'sic of the closing of the 1966 regular session of Congress at a time when the !Icriminal actions of terrorists have compelled me to suspend several constitutional guarantees throughout the nation with full cabinet approval. This is: the first time that I have resorted to emergency measures provided by the Constitution during Hmy term in office. I can assure all Venezuelan citizens that although I was forced Hto suspend those guarantees, it is contrary to my republican sentiments. !i However, it iz well known that the lack of adequate legal instruments and of speedy procedures to prevent and repress communist subversion and terrorism of any kind 11 obstructs government action under existing laws to protect civil liberties, the security of persons and their properties, and even the stability of our democratic institutions. Therefore it was necessary to impose emergency measures which will temporarily provide the national. government with adequate means to destroy the anti-Venezuelan conspiracy eirected by international communism from Havana which has come to the fore in Venezuela through common crimes and (words indistinct). The communists have expressed their desire for a long war in the present stage of our national life, the long-range goal of which would be a victory for establishing . a totalitarian tyranny in which life, liberty, and dignity would be meaningless. In the meantime, the communists carry out an intelligent division of work. 9n_tre , one hand. there are the fanatics who favor armed battle, which they effect through the action of rural guerrillas. That has been a complete failure in spite of intermittent resurgence. There are also the urban guerrillas, who are treacherously, scandalously, and audaciously directed to obtain money and other material resources, to frighten the ,working man, and to exasperate the forces which maintain collective , security and institutional integrity. On the othpr hand are_t.he_spft-liners, those who favor the battle of the masses and the propagandists for democratic peas;e, and amnesty for insurrectionists who have.. taken up arms against national sovereignty and for those who have stained their hands with human blood and have stolen the properties and money of others. As chief executive I can assure all Venezuelans that my government will never hesitate to courageourly assume the responsibility which the popular mandate and the constitution have placed upon my shoulders. I an convinced that it is a short step be- Itweenpolitical Juggling tnd the government's surrendering to the spasmodic attacks of communist subversion, Far from controlling subversion, a surrender by the government :would only serve to stimulate communist aggressiveness in a society and a nation , that, should it show any Weakness, might succumb to inevitable destruction. ! My government has the full and' firm support of all the people and the loYalty of the armed forces. That is why I am. in a position to completely assume my responsibility ' as chief executive and as a Venezuelan citizen and to use the powers tested in me by . law, using my own judgment for humanitarian purposes and national interests. I have so acted and I will continue to do so. Congress also has its responsibilities, which it exercises in accordance with the balance that exists circumstantially between the congressmen who support the government and those who oppose it. In my judgment Venezuela lacks the proper legal instruments to fight crime, both common and political, with maximum efficiency. I believe that such a situation inevitably leads to the enactment of laws necessary to better maintain constitutional order. Following that reasoning I issued a decree during this morning's cabinet meeting under which the thief executive assumegain fact, responsibility for Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400.070009-3 mainteggrgCglic order and the personal security of all citizens within the . boundaries of all national universities. The decree leaves the supervision and . administration of education in the hands of university authorities. --or Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 In my judgment, universities are Institutions dedicated to philosophic and scientific investigation and to the education and preparation of our citizens for life and ' the exercise of democracy, the promotion of culture, and the development of.the spirit of human solidarity, as provided for in our Constitution. As a good Venezuelan citizen and university graduate, .1 reject the idea that universities should be at the exclusive service of political groups or that they should be used for totalitarian subversion, planned and organized by international communist centers which conspire against liberty and the democratic fate of the American continent. I also believe that university autonomy has been established, not only to guarantee education and academic freedom in the universities, but also to provide freely and democratically elected university authorities with sufficient administrative power to govern their fate. We cannot accept reasoning aimed at making the university - into a state within the state. In recognizing these aims for the common welfare, my government has decided to restore to the autonomous universities their national characteristics as autonomous universities. Thereby they can better express their educational, cultural, and scientific functions, establishing them in the frameWork of national sovereignty, which is one and indivisible, The universities will remain autonomous as far as teaching and administration are concerned. However, as far as public order is concerned, they will be governed by to the laws which are the same for all citizens and all institutions which live and prosper in our nation. In order to realize this supreme aspiration of all Venezuelans, the executive branch will immediately proceed to adopt the necessary measures and regulations. From now on university schoolrooms and streets will again be reserved for the authentic concerns and aspirations of all Venezuelans, and universities will again represent the best hopes of Venezuela to definitely attain its great national and American fate. Citizen congressmen, this has been a year fraught with difficulties and calamities. The debate on the tax reform bill prompted psychological disorders which caused a serious depletion of our bank reserves and international currency. These are fortunately already being replenished. Natural disaster caused considerable damage to the national highway system and to the properties of a considerable sector of our population, unfortunately to the most unprotected sector. To repair as much. as possible the damage caused by heavy rains, I have asked Congress for authority to provide additional appropriations amounting to 45 million bolivares which, I am sure, will be approved with the urgency that the case demands. Finally, there were political difficulties such as the attempted rebellion at the Ramo Verde National Guard school, which was fortunately discovered, and the resurgence of political terrorism which, as I have already said, compelled us to suspend constitutional guarantees. Some of those calamities and problems will be overcome in a short time. Others will require more time to heal due to their very nature. This is a good time to convey to the Senate deepest and sincerest satisfaction, as well nifiuent tasks performed during the current that will serve to accelerate the economic, of the republic. I am convinced that those promote the economic development and social unnecessary to add that the government will as well as the Chamber of Deputies my as that of my colleagues.for the mag- year in providing the nation with laws social, and cultural 'transformation laws, far from upsetting them, will progress of our country. It is almost carefully watchover their implemen- tation, and that it is prepared to immediately propose any corrective order to insure the fulfillment of the goals for which they were intended. I than] the honorable congressional committees forlthgAg4t04ittem members L prosperous holidays.'' - AtsprotedsPorvlitelease 189910812C W a rosperous 2 holidays. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 CARACAS: SABADO 17 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1966 Dijo el Presidente: ? No Presidire Nunca un Gobierno Renuente a Asumir con Valentia La Responsabilidad del Mandato Popular O En la ceremonia en que comisiones del Congrep le participaron clausura de las sesiones, el Primer Magistrado anuncio la aprobaciOn _ .1? ,, i? de un decreto por medio del cue! el Ejecutivo Nacional asume el rnantenirniento del orden ptiblico en el perimetro de as universidades O El Jefe del Estado expreso qua no acepta "la tesis que,pretende convertir , a la Universidad en una especie de Estado dentro de otro Estado" ? 0 Lai Univertidad continuara siendo autonoma en el orden docente y administrativo, pero en lo qu,e atafie al orden pUblicoiestaro sometida ? . 'al ordenamiento legal IV% 0 "Con las ventanai de sus cfulas y con sus avenidas nuevamente abiertas a las verdaderas inquietudes, la Universidad volverci a representar la mejor esperanza" - ludadanos Presidente y Vice- ?.'presidente del Congreso Nacio- vtiudadanos representantcs dela 'onorabIe Camara del Sexed?, Cludacianos representantes de la qlonorable Camara de Diputa- lcios, Cludadanos; :Me toca recibir a las Honorables ,COMisiones de las Cameras Le- gialativas qlle han veniclo a par. itIceparino la clausura de las 'se- sinnes ordinaries del Congreso de Republica correspondientes a ? cite alio 066; en momcntos en quo la 'criminal activicild del te- rrorisino 'politico m ia Ilevado ? a?suspendcr,.?con ticuerdo del Con- ' scdo dc Ministros, algunas garan. ? ties constitucionales en ? todo el , orrltorio nacional. ? . ? . hEs esta la primera ,vez qua, du- tante mi mandato presidencial, recurro al expecliente do las meal- Ofit3 do emergencia preyistasen I:1 Contlituclen Nacional. puc- ci a las vericzolanos que Verme Obligado a suapender la- cs garantias nada graft) ha sick Mis 1,entlinicntos republicanos. Pero es Wen sabtdo qua la ausen- chi do normas legates adecuadas y, do proccdlmIontos expcdttivos are. prevenAr y reprimir Ia ubver- tOn eenulralrt y c terrorlamo tic 6WIttittier 8 igno, entraba1 cion Golderno denlro del ordena- mimic). Juridic? orclintir10. pare defender Ins libertacies cludada-, scguriclad cle Ins personas y do sus btenes y i estabilidec1. relsina do nuestras tristituclones, ci,m,wwfilowac*di.ore sidad'lltlrfrts melnacks To, gencia que, siquiera tempora1-1 metici?,. proven al Gobierno Jla-. Izao pres1dir6 un gobiernci renuen-. . clonal do los inedios idOncos pa- te a astnnir con valentia la. res- re. dcsarticular la . conjure anti- Ponsabilidad quo el mandato pa- venezolana, dirigida desde La Ha:- pular y la Constitucidn echaron harm por el comuntsmo interne- sobre mis- ? hombro,s, Porque estoy clonal y reforzada aqui con apor que no hay mas que tcs de delinciiericia comtln y de la, un Paso entre el malabarlsmo pa- reaccidn dictatorialista: ? . ' litico y la claudicacion del Go-. i Para los comunistas 'en it pre- bierno ante las espasmodicas erre- sent etapa, de la historib, nacto- nal su declarada aspiracion, es la guerra large, cuya culmlnaclen a largo plea.? eerie ca victoria, Ira.' vedad frente a una sociedad y un plontadora :cle la Urania del tote- Estado quo si so muestran bleu- litarismo, on que la vida, la liber- :dos elnconsecUentes podrian des - tad y la, dignidad del hombre no,- ilzane por la pellgrosa pendiente da significan. V' mientra elle do AU- Prop' a inevitable dleolu- s no s, ocurra, los comunistas rcalizan eiOn. ma inteligente division del tra- Mi Gobicrno cuenta con la an- nein. Do un lado el trabajo de los tha y recia solldariclad de todo el duros, de los fanaticos de la lu- pueblo y eon la lealtad do las Pumas Armadas, Por eso estoy cha armada, Ift que adelantan por en condiciones de asumir integre- Invite de la guerrilla rural. total- mente mi responsabilided do Ma- Inente fracnsada, por lo &tiles, a glatrado y do venezolano.y do user pcsar de sus intermitentes mani- el derecho. do gracla quo me con- f estaciones, .y de la guerrilla air- ceden las !eyes% tomando en. con- bona, quo or alevosa y auclaz- sideracion, solamente, do actierdo merit? cscandalosa, se utilize pare con mi propla conclencla, rezones proveerse de moneda y? otros re- de Inimanidad y de sena eonve- curses matcriales. pare Aternorizar nicncia nacional. As! lid procedi- al hombre de. trabajo y pare exas- do y asi continual-6 hacieridelo. perar a las fucrzas guardianas del For su parte, lns Cameras Legis4 bienestar colcctivo y de 'la into- as gridad lativ Meilen tamblon au propia institucional. Del otro la- 'resp la do los blandos. los partidarios dc onsabllidad, quo *men conform() al cquilibrio Quo -dr-, cunstancialmente puede existir en- tre los parlamentarios quo apoyanli y respaldan 11.1 Goblerno.y los quo le hacen oposicion. Tengo pare mi quo el Estado Venezolano career) do los instru- mentos legates y reglamentarlos raetidas de la subverstOn commis- ta, lo cual lejos de contener esta, salo servira para estimular su gra- ? a lucha de mesas, los propagn- dLsns deIa paz democratic y de ?la amnistia pare los alzados en arms contra la soberania nacto- nal y pare los quo han =mailed() sUS manes con sangre hermana y con blenes y productos del traba- jo Mem, ase4999/08/21440C4NeR lasegurarla_ a los venazolanos gut 3 PNANtildria tanto Ia comm como /a poli- 0009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3- tlea y quo samejanto sittiacien planters IR inapla7ablo necesidad do promover cl ordenamiento legal Indispensable para el m?aeguro mantenimiento del orden constitu- clonal.- Es atendiendo a estas razones CItle, en Is =liana do boy, y on a' Consejo do plinistros, he dictado el ?Decreto reglamentarto per me: die del cual el Ejeeutive ?ittclo- hal asumo efectivamente mart- tenimiento del Orden politicb y is seguridacl personal de la cludada- nia clentro del perimetro de las Universidades nacionales mieritra,s daia is vigilancia y et mantenl- miento del orden &canto y ultra- nistrativo s cargo de las autori- dades universitarlas. , Considero. a las .Universidades cdno plantelcs dedIcados a la in- vestige.ciOn filosofica, y cientifica y a is educaciOn y formacion?co- mo lo ordenn. nuestra Carta Fun- damental, "de ciudadanos aptos pars la vicla y pars el ejercicio de Is democracla, el fomento de la cultura y el desarrollo del espiritu do solidarldrid humans,". Como buen vcnezolano y coma cense- euente universitarlo rechazo Is Idea cle una Universidad al exclu- sivo servicio tie parcialidades o de la,subversion totalita- ria planificada y organizada des- do los centres del comunismo in- ternacional quo conspiran contra Is libartad y el destine, democra- tic? del Continonto- American?. Consider? a.simismo itte Is su- anemia un versitarI h a ha aide Ins- titufda no relo para garantizar a Ia. Universidad In libertad docentel y academtca sine tambien parts dotal' a las stutorldades, emana- das del libre ejercicio do su demo- cracia interns, de suficiente pa- der administrative para. regir .su destino. Pero no aceptamos Ia te- sis que pretende convcrtir a la Universiciad on una espccie &Es- tado dentro del Estado Venczola- no. Y es por /Caltad a estas ideas de blen comfin quo mi Gobierno ha deeldido cievolverle a is uni.-I causado cuantiosos claim en todo versidad, autonoma su fisonomia el sistema de vialidad nacional, en nacional, Is quo expresa major su la propiedad y medics de yids de funciOrt educativa, cultural y den- una respetablo porcien de nuestro tifiea, reintegrandela al marco de Is sober:min nacional qua es una o indivisible. La 17niversidad? con- tinuar?tand? autOnoma en el orden docents y administrativo, pore en ?lo quo ataile si orden pd- blico estara sometida al ordena- miento legal, quo Cs uno solo pa- ra todos los cludadanos y pars to- tins Ins instituciones qua viven y prosperan bajo el cielo nacional. Y pars hacer rcalidad esta des de orden politico. Conato de prom aspiraciOn do toclos los ve- levantamiento do is Escuela de nezolanos, el Ejecutivo Nacional Formacion de Guardias Naciona- procecieret a adoptar de inmediato les ' de Ramo Verde, felizmente cuantas medidas y provIdencias ; ?,:debelado. Y recrudescencia del te- fueren neccsarias. ' rrorismo politico, lo que, como ya Y asi, de ahora en adelante, con dije, nos lia conducido al actual las vontanas de sus sums y con estado de Suspension tie Garantias sus avenidas nuevamente abiertas Constitucionales. Calamidades y a las verdaderas inquietudes y as dificultades que las m?ya han piraciones de nuestro 'pueblo, Is side sUperadas o lc. saran a corto Unlversidad Volvera a reptesentar Is major esperanza do Venezuela pars lograr definitivamente su gran destine nacional y anierica- no. Ciudadanos Cengresantes: Este ha sido un a?o cargado de dificultades y calamidades. La dis- cusion de Is Reforms Trlbutaria produjo trastornos psicolegicos quo se tradujeron en tin scrio drenaje de los depOsitos bancarlos y de dIVISRS internacionales, de los dia. lea afOrtunadaMente ya ?stamps en via de completa recuperacidn. Calarnidatles de In naturaleza ban pueblo, la nuls clesvalida per cier- to. Para reparar en cuanto there posible, los estragos causados per la inclemencia de las lluvias, he pedido al Congreso Nacional la conalguiente autorlzacion para de- cretar un er6clito adicional del or- den de los 45 millones de bollva- res que estoy seguro sera despa- chado con la urgencia que el caso amerita,. Y por ulitimo, dificulta- plazo 'y otras requeriran un tlem- po prudencial on virtud de su imisma natursleza. Sea buena esta oportunidad pa- I ra hacer llegar tanto al &nada - come a ia Camara de Diputados, por el digno intermedio de uste- I des, mi honda y sincera satIsfac- e'en asi come Ja de rills colabora- dores, per is magnifica labor rea- _ lizada on el curse del prcsente ano pars dotar al pais de in cuerpo de layes quo aerviran pars aeele- rar el proceso de transforinacion econdmica, social y fiscal de is Republica. Estoy convencido tie qua ese conjunto de leyes lejos de entorpecer esta llamado a imptil- , sar el desarrolle economic? y el I progreso social ? de nuestro pais. Dames estit decir que el Gobierno , vigilara cuidatiasamente los resul- tados de su aplicacidn, pues tie- , ! no el animo ablerto a proponer de Inmedlato los correctives' qua ho- non neccsarios para ,lograr quo aquellos se correspondan cabal y exactamente con el propf5sito y los fines perseguidos. Ciudadanos Senadores' '. Ctudadanos Diputados: Al agradocer a las Honorables Camara LegLslativas kla partici- paciOn que acaban de hacerme, quiero tambion desearles unas ale- gres a, venturosas pascuas, coma las tendran los que habitan el to- rrItorio nacional, donde afortuna- damente reins is Mas completa, normaltdad. . , aliraflorts, Salon "El Sol del , Pen?, 18 do dIciombre , do 1968. - * ' . Approved For Release 1999/08124 : CIA-RbP78-03061A000400070009-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3 --- El Nacional?Corneas: Miereoles 14 de Diciembre de 1966 PRIMERA INTERVENCION DEL SENADOR LA RIVA ARAUJO SOBRE GUERRILLAS, VIOLENCIA, TERRORISM? Y SITUACION UNIVERSITARIA CPYRGHT SENADOR LA RIVA ARAUJO. Cludadano Presidente del Senado: Honorables Colegas: Ayer, al salir del debate que se efectue en el Senado, me dirigi a la Camara de Diputados pare presenciar otro debate en el cual desarrollaba en su discurso el Diputado Jose Vicente Rangel, el tema de la des- aparielein y muerte de Alberto Lovers. Escuche la aerie de culpabilidades e imputaciones que hada este honorable Di- putado. Me sente en las bancadas de in Camara de Diputa- dos y escuche todo el debate, en el que un grupo de la opo- sleeks sentaba en el banquillo de los acusados al Gobierno,' pare culparlo de la deseparicien y del asesinato de un ye- nezolano. For ml mente pasaron una serie de observaciones. Empece a recorder el afio de 1961, cuando una violencia im- placable se desenceden6 en este pats pare derrocar al Re- gimen Constitucional de ROmulo Betancourt. Recorde a tana tos muertos y las voladuras de oleoductos. Recorde el terro- rismo desatado en Carecae y en las grandes capitales de ye- , nezuela; pero no me explicaba, ciudadanos Senadores, como e Venezuela podia olvidar toda la tragedia que viva Vefa unaa barra aplaudiendo freneticamente al orador Jose Vicente Ran- ti gel. Vela oradores eufdricos acusando al Goblerno. Yo me es-' tremeci en la sills., cludadanos Senadores, porque no habia, derecho 'pars olvidar ni por un instante la tragedia que item' el pale. No hay derecho pare que se hayan cambiado los pa-v peles y veamos a loa acusados transformarse en acusadores: los acusadores en acusados. Entonces pergenaba la inter- vends% de hoe, en el &nada, porque yo querla y quiero ye- , nir aqui este tarde, en nombre de ml partido, a coiocar en ? ' una justa posiciem, con toda la altura y la responsabilidad tie 'dirigente del pais y con la mime, altura de siempre, el pro- blems, del recrudechniento de las guerrillas urbanas y rurales. Pruebas del Recrudecimiento de la Subversion - ? No tengo necesidad de probarle al Senado la verded en el . _tema tie mi intervencion. Peal la palabra pane hablar sobre , el recrudecimiento de las guerillas y de la accien subversi- ve en el pais. Me da la reef% el pronto Ministro de Relaciones ,Interlores, el nuevo y recien Ilegado Ministro de Relaciones Interiores, doctor Leandro Mora, cuando la prensa de boy no ' dice a grandes titulares: "Acordadas anoche medIdaa energi-' cas contra recrudectmtento del terrorismo". "Primera reunion . del doctor Reinaldo Leandro Mora con el Comando Policial Unificado". . El escrilor Juan Liscano, en articulo publicado el 12 de novlembre de 1966, me ahorrd un gran trabajo: y hace el recuento del eltimo mes, el mc s de noviembre, en que cons- tatamos hechos tremendos de la acchen subversive? Estamos Frente a una Nueva Guerra No qulero repair este resella tragica de muerte. de tra-i gedias, de hogares asolados y de pueblos asaltados. eQue paste: e con todo esto, senores? Vamos a ser sinceros y francos. No soy original porque lo han dicho personeros de Accien Demo.= cratica, pero tango que decir que nos encontramos frente Et? e tine. guerra. Una nucva guerra. No es la guerra clasica; flO es la guerra histerica. No es una guerra que este sujeta a re---,? glas y a ]eyes aceptadas or las dos partes que pelean. Es otra guerra la que se inkier en Venezuela desde 1961. Es unaa guerra sobre el individuo, sobre su moral, sobre u caracter,, aobre su creencia, sobre su mentandad. Es una guerra para.' hacer auteanatase pate meterle at hombre la idea de que tie- #44 avkt WIWI) gitabgil 'Ida cristiana, ha ilevado en el fondo de au alma el pueblo' venezolano. Se desarrolla en pueblos y cludades, contra unose pare adormecerles la conciencia, y contra otros pare asustarloe. . Li guerra sicolOgica este, haciendo indiferente a una gran; ; mass de poblaclen venezolana, porque utilizen el amino aloe logico, por un lado, para hacerle ver a muchos que no e tan grave el problema, y por el otro, dan los goipes pars confun-* dir al gobierno y a la opinion ptiblica venezolana, pero al' , fin de cuentas lo .que hacen es poner al hermano a, asesinar ; a su hermano. En este guerra,.amigos Senadores, los pueblos, e on dominados sin lucha, porque la lucha es sorda, fria y. calculada. Senores Senadores, les miter? decir: unaucha en que cada uno de nosotros es tin combattente, defendiendol ' una cause. o lee contraria, pero cada uno de nosotros este.: metido en este lucha. Unos con su indiferencia, pero estitn; metidos;? otros con las responsabilidades del Gobierno. Los militares con sus acetones en las guerrillas venezolanas. Los'. ;i expertos de los partidos analIzando las cuestiones sicolOgicas,'? pero todos, haste aqui en el Senado, estamos encuadrados.en': :? la miema guerra. Pero senores, ye qulero nether la atenciein sobre algo ; que este. sucecliendo en el pais. Planteo la gravedad de la 11 tragedia, pero slento y aprecio que en mucha parte de la Po- 1 t blacidn venezolana hay letargo, hay indolencia y hay haste tranquilidad en muchos, a pesar de todo s estos estrujones que,; ? (Hari? nos hace la subversion comunista. Senores, yo quiero Hamar la atencion a todos los combatientes en esti guerra para decirles, que la concesion que se le haga en este mo-e! ? mento al enemigo, lo for talece y le da mes Ie pare que con-; e Mille en su lucha. Por eso quiero hablarles a los combatien-e tes para que no nos posea el espirltu de concesiOn en el cm- p0 minter y en el campo politico. Las Decisiones de la Conferencia Tricontinental de La Habana Yo quisiera recordarle al Senado que esto que esti suce- diendo en Venezuela no es obra del azar. Aqui hay cerebros de una conspiraciern universal que dirigen la insurreccion. En La Habana o celebro la Conferencia Triconttnental, y se" planed todo lo quo este. sucediendo en Venezuela y en mu- chat partes de Latinoarnerica y del mundo. Yo quisiera ells- traer tin poquito la atencion de los ciudadanos Senadoree,' pare que se den cuenta de un estudio preparado por la Co- misiOn Especial de Consults sobre Segurldad de la 0. E. A. en au sexto period() de sesiones ordinaries. Esa ComisiOn obtuse" la documentaciem y todos los debates que o habian celebra-1 do en la Conference). Tricontinental de La Habana. En este estudio 68 transcriben frases de lo aprobaclo en la Conferen- cia, tales como estas: Abuser intencionalmente ?amigoie de AcciOn Democrietica, y ?igen esto? "Abuser intencionalmen- te &Ede el punto de vista politico, de la buena voluntad, con- sideracien y tolerancia de las naciones democraticas". "Ei ejercilo renecionario tiene que ser stistituido por un. ejercito revolucionerio tele 'prantice la realizacidn de pla- nes que s'e.t.sfagan las aspiraciones de todo el pueblo. Por eso . ? ,nosoiros les venezolancs hemos escogido la lucha armada sin descartar nir guna otra forma de lucha, convinamos los mc- !dios armadas y ro armados, legales o ilegales, de mesas y co- . mandos, porque consideramos que lo Importante no es la lu- cha sino la liquIdacidn del imperialismo y la, toma del poder politico, pare !lever a la practice un programa revolucionario . y de mesas'. Se propone lo sigulente en In Conferencia: "Que los movenientos revolucionarios de Colombia, Venezue- la, Pere, Panama y-Fecuador y oleos de la zone del Caribe del Sur dcl Continente, den cuanto Antes los pesos tendien- tes a examiner conjuntamente este situaciem minter,' y con el in de encontrar kismedios pare contrarrestar los 34 efectos I NB rirnelagiti " iv: 1. Pres- PVPDPRIXordzionario de Approved For Release 1999/08/24: - ? Colombia, Venezuela ..'' Olgan blen: prestar el m?decidido apoyo, a fin de responder con las medidas Inas eficaces para contrarrestar los efectos de la politica agresiva global del im- perialism? norteamericano. 2. "Denunciar ante todos los pafses de los tres Continentes la intervencion yanqui y las lucha3 armadas de Colombia, Venezuela y Peru y promover la soli- derided militante de los combatientes de estos nafses entre si, con los pueblos de los tres Continentes en la batalla por la liberaciOn nacional". ? .-Para esa decision, un poderfo inmenso se colocaba de- tree de ellos. Allf estaba presente China y la Union Sovietica -ciando el aval a la decisidn de fondo quo tomaba la Conferen- cia Tricontinental. Luego, lo que esti nasando en Venezuela no es una cuestidn de grupos aut6nomos y anarquicos del Co- munismo, sin? todo un plan sincronizado, perfectamente diri- gido, abastecido y respaldado. Ello nos tiene que llamar a mu- &Jaime reflexidn. Realizacion del Plan Veamos la realizacion del plan, cludadances Senadores. Dude 1961 ?y aqui no empiezo por hacer suposiciones, ciu- cladanos Senadores, ya que son realidades escritas en la his- lona las que hablan, ya que no son esquemas mentales de;. un Senador eopeyano? empiezan las realidades del -dolor, del sufrimiento, del pesar y de las lagrimas que se han vertido en el pais. Comienza en el Rfi0 61 una lucha implacable con- : tra el Gobierno Constitucional. Las cludades primero emple- zan a sentfr los golpes de un comando unificado resuelto a estremecer los cimientos de un Gobierno y de la sociedad ye- nezolana; y empleza Caracas, Valencia, Maracaibo, junto con los campos petroleros a recibir el impact? tremendo, al lgual gee la, produccion naclonal, las industries. Son verdades evi- (lentos; todo empleza a recibir el impact? de la destrucciOn. Vierie despues el period() de las guerrillas en el campo vene- zolam; y esa es tambien historia ya escrita en el pals. Ahora sefiores, les voy a hacer un poco de incapie en una parte del esquema de la insurrecciein comunista en Venezuela; algo sobre lo que yo quiero flamer la atenciOn. La guerra al- colOgica ?decla el Arzobispo Makarlos que es experto en cuestiones de guerra y subversion, cuando vino en su gira por Latinotimerlea? "la guerra sicoleigica es tan grave y tan peligrosa como la guerra armada". Y aqui en Venezuela cast nadie sabe las tecnicas de la guerra revolucionaria, excepto el Partido Comunista y el M.I.R. La guerra sicolOgica plant- ficada dentro de la guerra revolucionaria cuenta con mate- riales para realizar la destruccien, tal como lo denuncle una vez en el Senado al hablar del "arsenal" de Garabato, que ful a ver personahnente con otros compafieros de la Comi- sion de Defensa del Senado. Alit no hebia tal arsenal; lo que habla ?y para refits-, carles la memoria? era una especie de Escuela Superior de Guerra, en In cual se dirigia todo un plan pars la fabricacion de armas modernas, hasta cohetes; alit tenian el model? y la especificacidn para la construccion do toda clase de armas. ' Por clerto quo es neceserio reconocerle al pueblo de Venezue- la, talcnto e inteligencia, porque los expertos y los tecnicos de ermas nos decian, que las grenades que se construien o que ' se disefiaban para construlr en Garabato, eran superiores a -1 les grenades checoslovecas 3, a las grenades belgas, inclusive - a las grenades chinas que cram muy buenas. Aqui utilizaron la forma sencilla de simples botellitas de material plastico o rociador de ropa, a cuya tapa se ajusta el percutor; estas botellitas de material plastic? se compran en cualquier be- doge; y ustedes recordaran lo que les dije en aquella opor- tunidad, que los explosivos maks poderosos los consegufan los tOcnicos de la insurreccion en Venezuela, con mezclas de pol- vo de aluminio y nevazUcer o almagre. La ignicion en las mechas que se utilizan para las minas, recorre miles de metros en fracciones de segundo. Veamos como es el estado actual de la guerra. Cam- po de operaciones: Lo conocen ustedes; primer?, el campo venezoleno con nuestras montailas, ubleado en Lara, Portu- guesa, Yaracuy, Miranda, Falcon, Trujillo, Guarico y toclos sitios que ustedes conocen tanto como yo; y segundo, In ciu- ' dad ?ya lo dlje y lo recorde. dem es cuestiOn c0 o cida por usteApproevessMoveal easenabiBk3/24 )D9)(-11 G H T CIA-RDP78-0306-1A00-040-0-07- 0 '[ hay situaclones nuevas, ciudadanos Senadores. Yo quiero anunciar a esta Camara que In Insurrecciem comuntsta en Ve- nezuela esti, reagrupando sus fuerzas en la region de El Be- chiller. 2 El otro die la prensa Informd que habian desembarcado unos barbudos on las cOstas de Falcon, y empezd la con- seja popular a hacer un poco mftica In noticia sr a perderla en las brumes de In incertidumbre. MIs quericlos amigos, yo tengo la informacidn exacta de que esos barbudos era n la for y nate de algunos guerrilleros venezolanos que, amaestra- d, dos en La Habana, vinleron rumbo a Curazao, de Curazeo pa- .? saron a las costeede Falcon y de las costes de Falcon fueron trafdos a la Plaza Venezuela (en los alrededores de In Pla- za Venezuela suceden inuchas cosas). Salleron de /a UnIver-- sided, doctor Paz y de la Plaza Venezuela salieron los carros que los conducfan a El Bachiller. senores, les qu1ero anunclar algo no me digan ave agorera? pero yo tengo la grave responsabilidad como ciu- dadano y como Senador, de decirles a ustedes todo en este, A. tarde. Tengo entendido que esti aprobado el plan terrorists para la eluded de Caracas y que ha habldo contactos entre " los grupos autemornos de guerrillas dirigidos por Fidel Cas-.1 tro y el propio Partido Comunista; y se pondra en Rector' .4 muy pronto el plan para el Oriente de In RepUblica; 7 esto.1 se prueba en In Universidad, porque ya empiezan Muchos es. tUdiantes a irse de ella para ocuper sus puestos en las gue- Mlles de Oriente. En la Universidad se constata el hecho de' la emigracion de estudiantes en este epoca. Pero hay algo m? Existe un plan especial contra In I Direcclan General de POI/Cia. En este memento In Direcci6n.- .General de Policia es objeto directo de la insurreccion comU- ? nista en Venezuela; antes la hablan dirigido contra la po- ; licit% en general ?le Policia Municipial y otros cuerpos po- liciales? pero esti especificamente dirigido 'el plan contra la if Digepol, como ustedes lo podrin haber constatado. Lo peon de estas cosas es quo hay coordinacion con el .1 hampa; el Partido Comunista esti utilizando el hampa ye. nezolana y eso es ortodoxla del marxismo, seflores Senadores, porque en Venezuela aprenden la leccion que ensell6 Stalin en las luchas de tierra adentro en la Union Soviitica, nen. gl do sus aliados eran los salteadores y los asaltentes, y so Va- 116 de ellos y los hizo sus aliados. La Guerra Sicologica ? Senores: les dije que lba a hacer un aparte en el estudlo de la guerra sicoldgica y me permitire hablarles de ello por must breves =mentos.. La guerra sicoldgica se dingo con un gran talent() y toclos, inconscientemente, vim elementos de guerra en la guerra sicolOgica. Yo expresaba el otro dia en el debate sobre scguridad per- sonal que planted el Senador PicOn Giacopini, de que la Po- ; licfa actuaba con una slcosis especial. Eso es cierto, dude- , danos Senadores, es in tension nerviosa de la Policia ?quo 7 a veces es el miedo? y lo saben los medicos y los sicOlogos y el sentido com?n, que muchas veces el miedo FIC011Seja, haste Ins cosas Inas crueles, por la exasperacion que produce; y en .` nuestros policies &esta donde esti influyendo esa tensi6n ; nerviosa provoceda por un cerebro que quiere desqulciar a to.? ,s1 dos los organismos que garentizan el orden en orden en Ve- nezuela? Se desata la Ira a quienes reprimen. Pero, sefiores, esta guerra sicololiga ha sido tan grave, que hasta nos ha arrancaclo del corazdn el sentimiento tan venezolano de la generosided. Cuando fbamos per los caminos de Venezuela hace unos afios, F alguien nos podia Una lita", nosotros le abrfamos in puerta del carro y se In dabamos.'i Hoy no creo que hayan venezolanos tan ingenuo que cuando se les aparezca un extrallo en una carretera o en una Ur- banizacion y nos pida una "colita" le abramos gentil y gene- rosamente la puerta. Estamos penetrados del temor y ha lo- grado el panic? la guerra sicolOgica. Las treguas que actierdan los guerrilleros de este pals `. hacen declarer al Mini:Atte de la Defense, quo ya estin do- iltrketMlgellifatigrA 1411/21,4nAttle.dce- CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070uu9-J lice, en /seises ya avanzados en la antiguerra sicologica, de que no tie debe hablar de pacificacion et de exterminlo haste, que no este totalmente dominada Is situacion en el pais o is region. Aqui memos inocentemente en la trampa y el Mi- nistro declare: "Erradicadas las guerrillas de Falcon", "En tal zona no existe ya nada", y a los ocho dias revienta la mis- ma guerrilla en Falcon. Porque ellos hacen treguas pare que el Ministro crca y catga en is trampa de dar Is declaraciem, y entonces es cuando el pueblo empieza a no creerle al Mi- ;lisle? de Defense: guerra sicolOgica pars, desvirtuar is per- sonalidad y la autoridad que debe tener un Ministro de is De- fense, el persons* mks important? de is penes y lo hticen quedar mal. Pero hay otra tramps m?premeditada, que Accion De- mocratica is conoce muy bien porque la ha estudiredo mu- ch?, cual es el plan de "pacificacitin democratica" del Partido Comunista y de los guerrilleros del pals. Le estate haciendo creer al Gobierno que ellos estan dispuestos a entrar en una , ? politica de pacificaciten et hay quienes se lo han creido y em- ? piezen a converser. Pero algo m?que converser ha sucedido en este pals. Este Congreso aprob6 la Ley de Conmutecien de Penns, por presion de prensa y de propaganda de una guerra* sicologica que hada reclamar en perloclicos, en los mittnee y - en las conversactones, que habia qua toner espiritU de gene- rosidad, que se debia ser comprensivo; que habia que ser ge- ? neroso; entonces se abri6 Is brecha de is Ley de Conmutaciem , de Penes y rtparece el espiritu de "convivencia". Senores de la mayoria del Gobierno. Les voy dar un 4?4 alerts: Ya empez6 la campatia sicologica a favor de is Ley de Amnistia. ICUldadol querldos amigos, st caen en la tram- pa en \ que cay,eron con la Ley de Conmutecidn de Penes! A mejor los bacon aprobar esa Ley do Amnistla, porque es , , tan inteligente la conduccidn sicoldgica de la insurreccien en e este pais, que ha Ilegado hasta hacer confundir al Gobierno y a Is opinien en los conceptos de pacificaciem y apacigua- miento. El Gobierno cree que es lo mismo pacificaciem que apaeiguamiento to algunos del Gobierno, no acusemos a to- dos). En la opine% general hay tambien confuse% entre pa- cificaciOn y apaciguamlento, to mime que entre amnistia, e indulto. Hay una sublime e inteligente confusion de concep- tos. La pacificaciem es restablecer la paz, es eliminer las CRUM de Is guerra, y la pacificacion sincere y real, amigos ? de Accien Democratica, conlleva Ia entrega de las armas del. enemigo que ataca. Y yo no he sabido que en los planes de pa-, cificaciem del Gobierno hays peclido la primers entrega de ? armas al etiemigo. A veces el apaciguamiento se confunde ? ,con 'la tregua que realize el enemigo. Otras veces es calmer, es aquietamiento. Sera esto lo que est?ogrando el Gobler- r no en lugar de pacificaciem? eaquietamiento?, ecalmar los animos? Hay que pensar detenidarnente sobre esto. eY la, amnistia? La aministia es el perdtin de la falta, tEil como viene con este Ley que nos estan asomando. ellasta donde. , se perdona la fella a los que asesinaron, a los que mataron, a elair h los qua violaron? a los que saquearon, a las que hicieron de- / sastres, a los que Ilenttron de dolor et legrimas muchos hogs- res venezolanos? Giros piden que ,olvidemos su falta, pero ;. mientras no hay e un ejemplo de severidad con quien co- , mete un dent? y haste que no hays is conducciem aerie y formal de una idea exacta de la pacificacien, estaremos slcndo juguetes y burla del contrail?. El indult? es el perddri de la pena que fella, por eso es e distinto indultar quo amnistiar. Recordemos que en In luche subversive no se actua tanto contra e1 adversario aparente. En este guerra sicoldgica se , Reties sobre In comuntdad, sabre la poblaciem; Is guerra no es entre las Fuerzas Armadas y los guerrilleros; no se trate de quien gene y quien toma El Tocuyo, de quien tome Bo- cone; este, guerra is genre quien domino Is opine% publics, : y quien logre ciesquiciar los fundamentos del regimen, quien destroce los cimientos espirituales de is sociedad y quien lo- gre imponer otros principlos y otras normas pare, regir Is vida colectiva, La Universidad Central de Venezuela ? Pero sehores, en este plan de neck% del Partido Comunista hay Cuarteles Generales, hay Estados Mayores, hay Escuelas Superiores de Guerra, y por eso quisiere detenerme un pace a las acts ri,e en Ary1019111/14111. Kni5rRP40441.444. 440:11?)R494- 54511 A -Rjatartatt pfloFirTni in n; eversiva como centro neurelgteo do operaciones. tn la Uni- versidad se trams y opera sem eminentemente tactic?. Slue. ; rrillero y hay cuestiones que linden con lo econtimico. Toman ' is bandera de Is autonomia universitaria pare 'soder meter de contraband? la insurrecciem que se teje en el srno de in ' Universidad. Con is bandera tie is autonomia universIteria confundiendo Is autonomist docente y eciministrative, con- funden al Gobierno pars hecerle ereer que no puede nem 1, a Is Universidad a salver la vida tic tin hombre o a eviler qua e tin hempen se refugle en sit sena; ni dejan mantener el or- den dentro de un institeito en 'donde es primordial mantener el orelen, Set/lore& ayer Ia bendera de In autonomia era her- moss y linda; yo llbre mil balances en Is Asamblea Nacional Constituyente para pedir que se %corporal's en is Constitu- cien el principio de la autonomie universiteria, con mi bal., buceo de muchacho de veinte anos, alborotado e idealist. t Era un derecho que reclamaba Is Universidad pars defenderse de los' ejecutivisrnos de los gobiernos; pero boy la bandera a. de la autonomia no se levanta per el extremism? pars defen- ' derse de un Gobierno, sino pars atacer a un Gobierno y atte- r car a la sociedad. Senores, si ustedes van per Is Universidad, como he ido yo, y lo saben los profesores muy erninentes en este Camera ? del Senado, (veo que mire el Senador Paz a Acosta Saignes: per cierto lo decia per Cl, porque es eminente y es profesor) pueden darse cuenta de qua en los afiches de In -Universidad, en los discursos de los mitines y en sus campanas electorale& el ambiente y el espiritu que se vele es ,de una emote per- manente de violencia. Haste en las cuestiones electoralee Pa- ra propaganda de reivindicaciones estudiantilcs los afiches representan a muchachos que se agachan y agarran una pie- /?4 dra pare zumbarsela a no se .quien. En las %elms eitudian- Wei, el espiritu, el afiche, el mitin, todo es de consagraciem a la violencia, y lo que es m?grave, los hampones de este, pais, creen que en la Universidad encuentran el refugio, se van para aIl?porque esti% seguros de que alll is insu- rreccion comunista, el estudiante que tiene conexiOn %me- diate con is insurreccion, lo ampere., porque puede ser una ficha clave y decisive pare ellos. Todo estos tenemos quo decirlo con valor, porque muchas veces se politiqueit con la' ? Universidad, y este es un moment?, Senaciores de le, mayoria y Senadores de la oposicidn, en que debemos hablar con' sin-, ceridad, porque se ester) tratando cosas muy graves. Para terminar sobre la Universidad. voy a dectr lo Ultimo , grave. Tengo que hacer una declaracion antes de entrar en este tema. Estoy seguro de que las Autoriciades Universita- rifts, los Decanos, etc., manejan con puleritud los dineros ' de la Universidad. Hago' este deciaracion de conciencia, por- que me consta y conozco is vide de muchas de las autorida- des de la Universidad; son hombres honcstos. No creo que hayan ensuciado sus manos con pealed? en el presupucsto e universitarlo. Pero esto no quite, senores, pars yo hacer otra / ? aseveraciOn. Las filtraciones estudiadas por el Partido Co- munista que se logran del presupuesto de la Universidad, he dan al Partido Comunista un ingreso anual equivalente a .1.1 diez millones de bolivares. El Partido Comunista cuenta con ; ese ingreso, no porque sustrac de tins Partida especial dichos? 'et ingresos. No, el Partido Comunista lo sabe hacer muy ? ligentemente. Aprovecha Is imprenta, la Bihnoteca, las met- tles a los estudiantes comunistas, los empleados comunistas. Vemos a jovenes recien graduados con altos sueldos, pues en ? tres afios pasan de simples recien egresados a Profesores ti- ? tulares. La burocracia gana m?que todos los Profesorer de Is Universidad juntas; mks de seiscientos .empleados son del 4 Partido Comunista. Las becas, viajes, viaticos y creditos, pre-; ; ferenciales, son dados con criterto de ayudar a los mieMbros del Partido Comunista. Yo estoy en Is obligachen de tdecir est& aqui en el Senado, y repito Is salvedad de mi prienera intervenciem frente a las autoridades universitarlas, de quo ? es pulcro el manejo de los dineros por las autoridades y sus Decanos. No creo que roben tin centavo, porque son honestos,,, pero en la inconciencia que vlve el pais, no hay Is, acucloste .. dad de descubrir mil filtraciones que se bacon con talento., Tengo is obligaciOn de decirlo. Ante la Guerra Revolucionaria .1Que Hace el Gobierno? ? 1 3'. CPYRGHT gleo y alateriglelefatfeeeNftetanlesaarcrelnrarrrirstairiros en eci124' la guerra dirlAiaen. aaageeMee fpaceigellea, mei eleg q4-APE:74i-r00141444q0sP704Pgrampuil pais, con cercbros ductores amaestrados en universIdades de guerra subversive operand? plenamente, yo hago una pre- gunta clave pars empezar este segunda parte: eQUE HACE EL GOBIERNO DE LA REPUBLICA ANTE ESTA REAL!- DAD? Senores, emplezo por hater un reconocimiento; is sin- ceridad de mi discurso y Is objetividad del mismo me obligan a reconocer en el Gobierno, que ha hecho algunas cons para enfrentarse al problems de la insurreccien comunista. to pri- mero que ha hecho es dar la orden, clara y terminante, a las , Fuerzas Armadas Venezolanas para que acometan con toda energia Is guerra antiguerrillera, Ilamemosla asi. Eso es muy bueno. Hecho positivo del Gobierno. Segundo, ha creado una conelencia antiguerrillera en algunos sectores claves de las Fuerzas Armadas; edemas de crear esa conciencia; el Go- biertio ha autorizado cursos de muchos Oficiales para que vayan a las Escuelas de Panama y a otros sitios, a obtener conocimientos sobre is guerra moderna que se esti &sem- Ilando en el pais. Se y me consta de muchos planes que tie- - ne el Gobierno, muchos de los cuales, no los ha realizado; ad y me consta que ha pretendido organizer los Comandos de las Policies a fin de unificar Is acceen de todas cites, pues su . accion era incongruente y muy desorganlzada; adtniro las' gestiones que ha hecho el Gobierno de Is Republica pars 1 organizer un Comando enico en las Policies, y pars entre- narlas eficlentemente en el plan antiguerrillero. Pero senores, estoy en Is obligacian de hacer ciertes crf- tIcas a Is politica antiguerrillera del Gobierno; y le pido a , Is mayoria gubernemental, represented& en esta Camara por los parted.% Acchen? Democratica y URD, que las crfticas que voy tram: esLa tette no me las tomen como venidas de ? un personero de la oposiclem que vs atacar al Gobierno, sin? me las tomen como emiticlas per un hombraeeque ha estudia- do varlos afios el problema; que ha escuchado a tecnicos companeros nuestros, cote con acuciosidad se han puesto a cectidrifier las tacticas, estrateglas y las operaciones gue- rrilleras? que adelantan el Partido Comunista y el M.I.R. en Venezuela. Criticas ante la AcciOn Gubernamental Frente a la Guerra Sicologica e que neva un determined? Comando pars liquiciar a determi- e, nada guerrilla. Tenemos que abrir los ?jos ante todes esas '! fuereas sicoldgices y extrailas quo operan concientemente, pa...1 ra evitar que se cambien los planes operativos de las Fuer. i - zas Armadas. La Ultima compra de aviones ?no se at fueron setenta ? y pate? aviones F-86-K que se compraron en Alemanla Oc., cidental? eesta de acuerdo esa compra de eviones, SenadoreS de la mayoria, con Is tactics sane y correcta antiguerrille- ra de las Fuerzas Armadas? gPor que en vez de mar esoS ; Millones pars comprar .aviones que no van a hacer nada, o muy poco, en una guerra antlguerrillera, no se compraron helicepteros modernos, lanchas torpederas y lenchas petit. Ileras? Lanchas de primers categoria coin? las que tiene el ejercito modern() de los Estados Unidos, de Francis 7 de In-, glaterra, que estan artilladas modernamente, con artIlleria de ofensiva y artillera antiaerea, que tienen velocidad suficien- te pars natrullar en poco tiempo infinidad de kildmetros de costa. No es lo que se neeeslta? Seflores, en las montafias de Lars eucedid un hecho quo yo quiero relater a Is mayoria. Un Destacamento antiguerrl- Pero de Is Puerzas Armadas quedd copado en una garganta a dca las montiteas de Lara y, senores, entre los miembros del I' y ejereito que estaban entregando sus vides, uno de Ices ?Ma- e les se estaba muriendo de sed, egonlzando, porque no te. re, nia quien le nevem un trago de nella: y e0mOramee alines I e ?Sabre, en yes de comprar helictipteros pars. Jr a Ilevarle a i 1. esos hombres, quo estan entregando an vide, el poco de ROA 1 : que pedian a la hors de su muerte. No estoy de acuerdo: i convdnzanme de lo contrario, pero no creo que dentro de una tactics corrects contra lite guerrillas, sea mejor comprar aviones que comprar helicopteros y qtte comprar lanchas pa- trulleras y torpederas. . . ? Les voy a hacer una pregunta en este analisis de Is. po- litica a traves del Ministate() de Is. Defense, eQue met con el barco cubano que merode6 nuestras costes hace unos dies?. Decian las noticias de prensa lo sigutente. El 12 de noviembre: , ''Encallada una nave cubana en costes venezolanaa", primers e noticia. Segunda noticia: "Duque cubano al garcte cerca de e las Islas de Ayes. Sc niegan a recibir ayuda y existe In sees- pecha de que vienen en mision del gobierno Oomunista de Castro". Noticia de prensa que sigue una categorfa: "Unida- , des do ' la Armada Venezolana vigilan de cerca el buque,' cubano". Fijense. Primer? le. noticla "Aparece un buque", "me. ' rodea", "encalla"; despues: "Unidades salon a verb". Ter. cera noticise "Orden de requisar el buque cubano si entre , en agues' venezolanas": "Sigue rechazando la ayuda que le It. ban ofrecido". "Patrulleros de la Armada Venezolana siguen : , rastros del carguero cubano". "Atrac6 Ryer en La Guaira, , decfa, el P0-6, pars reabastecerse de agua y combustible, a fin ' .1 de salir luego en ruts Norte", SIguen las notIcias. "Desapare-t i do el bare? cubano". fr asf termina la secuencia de las no-e 1 tides. iDeseparecid I Pero, ,que pas6? Yo quicro averiguar I eso. eQue pase? Yo les voy a decir Is. verdad. Tenemos In ate , informacidn en la Comisidn de Defense.. A las 10 de Is. ma-,;i' ? hana del dat 12, recibi6 la Comandancia de Is Marina Is In. ?;formacidn 'do que estaba un buque cores de las costes de e ,, Venezuela y que pedia auxin?. Entonces el Oficial de guardia !de is Marina do is orden de que el. patrullero P0-4, que eto; l etaba anclado en La Guaira, salters. en direccien a las coor-'i 1 '.. ? denadas que se le hebian sciialado pare ubicar el barco r empezar el patrullaje y la inspeccidn. Y al cabo de un mato recible contraorden de la Comandancia de la Marina, Infor. , mandole quo dicha Comandancla asumia directamente la fug- cleat de is. inspeccion del barco; y Ise revoc6 is orden del Ore- : .filcal de guardia. Pero, ea que hors proced16 Is Comandati. - cia de is Marina? En Is tette., y apenas en is tarde fue que ' salieron a buscar el barco y, IQue diantes1 Con tantaa horns, e de retraso?desapareci6 el barco cubano; as! lo dice, Is prensa. Yo quisiere que se estudiara ese prqblema, porque, 'ado-, Quire.? &dries que no conozco los planes del Goblerno" ? frente a is guerra sicologiee;',y aunqUe los conociera, quiero ? decirles quo no homes visto en el pais in contraofensiva a la guerra sicologIca que adelanta Is. insurreccidn comunista. No veo que estemes cenendo la poles en el campo sicolagico: todo lo contrario. Las tensiones de la Policia, las exasperacio- nes de les gentes, ci ward? a salir tie noche, la prensa, con Ins noticies que transmite y is. radio, contribuyen a, que se mantenga dirigIda per Is insurrection comunista, is guerra ' sicolOgiett. La Direccidn General de Policia este Ilene de de- ficiencies, Senador Paz. Eso lo saben ustedes, y quiero de- eirselo muy claro. El material human? con que tuenta as pobre, doctor Paz, Senadores de Accien Dernocretica y de URD. Y muchas veces no solamente as pobre el material hu- man?, sino que a veces, haste se llegan a recabar, el servicio tie hampones. Eso hay que cambiarlo. La Policia de Seguridad tiene boy sobre sus hombros una gran responsabilidad con el pais. El Ministerio de la Defensa ? mds se sugieren muchas cosas. Primero: /EI barco yenta o Analicemos ahora in politica del Gobierno a traves del 4 - lba hacia las costes venezolanas? eso no se ha averiguado, ? Ministerio de Is Defense.. Creemos sinceramente que hay,; . descoordinaciem entrei le politica del Gobierno y le que s1- ' e eso hay qua averiguarlo, Segundo: Tengo informaciem, Se. i, -' eders del Gobierno, de que el barco mercente de Cuba ie. gue las Fuerzes Armadas. Lo creo sinceramente. El minter ' ni a as Defenses de atraque levantadas, le cual quiere decir est?esteado en mut guerrilla, pero yo preguntaria: eSiente I (Me estaba beceenclo cm amadrinemlento con otra nave, o' eon' ese militar mixed? todo el respaldo politico del Gobierno,..' , lanchas. El harco con las defenses de atraque levantadas fue en su actuecidn? Hago esa pregunta. -.. 'sto poi un bereo de Ids Estados Unidos, quien do Is. In- Cuancio un grupo guerrillero ha estado a punto de 11. , vi . celitelicii;Zesa,"cileergu ()FehtaVERkreggstlig4079 WI 4/if.erGiA113411e' 043404 ACK1Q40047999e0,1;?,? e formacien. CPYRGHT pgruARP,M,Yitcla FA-ARVKar0011141ACM104003ZOCactra dice mucha gente per alit, doctor Paz, Senarlores del Gobierno. ,Por qui?. Por Ia confusien que existe. Cuantio converse uno con la gente de Accion Dernocratica, y. a veces, sin converser con comienza uno a descubrir la tactica del Gobierno, y pen- ,3 senses que el Gobierno tambien tiene Cu inteligencia; (eso irn es privilegio de la oposicion ni del Gobierno). Cada quien tie- ne su estrategia y su tictica, jetivo al barer etre operacion per otro lado?. Eso puede ser; es, muy elemental en la guerra una operacion de distraccidn. Vamos a analizar i fue una operacien de distraccion con el fin de meter contraband? por otro lado, distrayendonos con at barco carguero. LPor (ea tan Ingenuamente at pedir ayude lotto el muiulo, salon los barcos venezolanos a ver clue pasa, alnjntenciOnsie torar at pobrecite?. Vamos a ayudarlo, dicen 7-nuestros ?Relates. Pero, detras de qi16 Veleta?. LA que yenta? e (nee Abe?. Eso no se ha dilucidado todavla! Que hublera pasado it nosotros hubieramos abordado el buque?. Graves problemas. Fidel Castro protestaria porque atentamoscontra un barco de bandera cubana; y Castro LIslos plde a nosotros permtso pare Invedirnos el territorio, pare envier armas, pare destroe zarnos, pare armar a los hermanos que no; asesinan?. El ejercito opera el conjunto muchas veces. "Bajo control A minter San Tose de Guaribe", dice la prensa. "Fuerzas de me,' balleria y Guardia Nacional movilizadas en todo el pueblo yl 3 . en las 'zones proximas para perscguir a los guerrilleros"t dice'ei la prensa. Este no is tictica antiguerrillera. Los comandos. 4 operan con solciados, unos detras de otros, en files; destaca- ' mentos en pie de guerra coma en guerra clasica, desconocien- do elementales ticticas .guerrilleres. Deben m?bien entres mezclarse, Inclusive infIllrarse entre la poblacien civil y ene tre las poblacimies. Esto se tiene.que analizar, pare ver haste ., 'e donde es correcte la politica antiguerrillera llevada por el Mi- ,1 nisterio de ea Defense,' . . e Otra cuestien que hen in(ormado oficialee en el seno de la 7 Comisien de Defense. ePor clue hay antes emboscadas en los i cameos guerrilleros?. Porque el soldado baja la guardia. Es- . tie oche, chez, quince* dies en un puesto y no ve nunca nada; ro ye ningen movirniento y sale y concluye que por alit no pa- s sa nadie. Se pone a jugar, a converser y... ;Pe!, be dan el golpe. ;Que no bajen la .guardia! ;No!. Las Fuerzas Armadas es tlenen que mantenerse en guardia permanente, porque hay 1 III1R guerra declarada, y el que baje la guardia, ipierdel.'1Y el quo se desculda es arremetido por el adversarial. Todo tenet., que ',estudiarse con mucha serenidad,. sin .critica destructive, e . be esto?. LNegoclar?. Y los pactos secretes posibles 6C6m0 cense entre hermanos. ....11 ; los eliminan?. . . ? . , lion de la Ley Se corneten haste fallas tonte come por ejemplo en el ? slsterna de aislamlento de los presos. En el Cuartel San Carlos:, e, , . picac. est?proses los comunistas y guerrilleros junto con (Ara . ? I' . te comets, y en otras Circeles lo relsmo. Entonces los centres de Conimutacion de Penas de alslamiento de los presos se convierten en centros de *doe* .trinamiento. Haste esas tonterias se cometen. ePor quo no $e , . , bum' otro sistema carcelarlo pare evitar ,este problema?. ., ilngenuidad del Gobierno? Mitche genie, y haste por aseveraciones tie miembros de Aeelein Democritlea, suponen Is estrategla que se trees dicho Partldo, cual es is de que el Partido del Goblerno esti aprove- chando la dlvistem de los comunistas; que con su juego?ayuda A. a la gente del M.I.R. blando y del P.C.V. blando, para ponerloe a pelear con el M.I.R. duro y el P.C.V. duro. Y que el Go- bierno opera con talento para crear la division en las files enemIgas. Pero senores, el Gobierno desconoce dos cosas fune damentales, si as que utilize esa tictIca de dividir al enemigo. Desconoce, primero, que el Pallid? Comuniste esti mejor pre- pared? que el Gobierno en is guerra sicolegica y en la gue- rra subversive. Opera con /nes talent?. Tiene equines de prlmera cetegorla amaestrados en las mejores Universidades ? de. lucha del mundo, y tiene tecnicoe haste de Estado Mayor que se hen Introducido en el pais, No este boy en condiciones e de poster equipararse R esa guerra tan planificada; y segune do, haste donde puede Accien Democritica y U.R.D. asegue 4 rar que el Partici? Comunista no puede toner un pacto seat-? to con el MIR o el PCV duro?, Files diran: "negoclemos con . el Gobierno, hablemos con el Gobierno; dejemos que jueguen 41 con algunas de nuestres fiches, pero la guerre seguiri, esta guerra es a muerte". Y los etches de In Unlversidad dleen: "Olvidese el pals de que transaremos Ins guerrillas". "La gue- rra es a muerte", se dijo en La Habana; la guerra RS a muer- te Id dice el PCV y el MIR venezolanos, Y el Goblerno, eno sa- eComo ha utilized? 01 Goblerno la Ley tie Coninuteclon de:1 Penns?, Vamos a hacer un anillsis sobre eso Senedores de la , mayoria. ,Ha side en la deblrla oportunidare cuando el Go- e ' Llamado al Gobjerno y al Pais bierno ha utilized? la Ley de Conmuteclen de penes?. Puede 1 e que lo crea el Gobierno as!, pens otros podemos creer lO con- e Senores, sinceramente lenient? haberme alerted? ? tante ' trario. - . . . i 1, en este disctIrso. Tortavie me quedan tent;; ems- pendientes. Otra ?cosa preguntarla ePor que? se estan dando Inclule s por ahl y doeumentos pare ensefierlete. Pero yo ere? qua ye as to;?. ePor slue se esten dando linos indultos y otros no?. Es- hors de terminate lie planteado un esquema suficiente como ten procediendo haste en forma un poco precipitada, Senador i pare Hamar a la recapecitacien al Senado -de Is RepablIca, Paz; no poco, alegremente utIlizen la Ley; claro que as una ! Creo rpm terigo elementos suficientes pare un debate, qua lo s Leeevigente en la Repeblica, pero les voy a poner un ejemplo . reclamo hacer con la rnisma sincericlarl. Por eso lodes ml; car- de be ligereze conque actean, Porten en libertarl a Eloy. Torre; ,S tea las he pueste este norhe ante In Camara del Senado; con que fun meld? con Ins armas en In twine en Carepano, y de- '1/4 ? tote .mi alma y a sabtendas tie tortes las consecuenclas, Sc- inn preso a Gustavo Machado, perlamenterio, que podri tenor . nacior Paz; porque yo se que lo trntado es pellgroso, yo, me ,ii las acuseciones de qua dirigla tehricamente Is Insurrecelem, . que estoy abordando cuestiones fundamentales que pueden po- pero su delito es menor que el de Eloy Torres; y sin embargo, 4 ' enerrne en peligro, y sin embargo, yo peso por alto el concept? este Gobierno deja a Gustavo Machado preso y pone en liber- egoista de la vide, de supervivencia, pare lanzarlo en bolo.* Intl a Eloy Torres. Este, Senores Senadores, pone a pensar a' - causto a is Petrie, a Venezuela, que reclama de todos nosetros. In genie: este nos pone a meditar seriamente a todos los ve- I en este memento, seriedad, responsabllidad 'y union. La iguee nezolanos. Y en Melon Democratica y en U.R.D. podran ala- ,, rra que he demostrado que exist? en este pals no es una .tuee bar su tactlea y an estrateglas pero el resto del pais, que noi iIrra contra el Gobieeno, es una guerra econtra Cope!, guirra. es de Acclon Demoeretica ni de U.R.D. piensan, raionan, es- - 4 2, contra el principle cristlano del pueblo, guerra contriseun eudrIfia, observe, enniiza, y ve cases mat hechas: Vemos en Ii- , e ,ordenamiento que les estot be en su carrera secular y sectae hefted a los guerrilleros cuando se screcientart Ins guerrillas. ; ,l.. ri a de totalltarismo de estado sin Dios y sin espirltu. . Consideramos Inoportuna In apliencion de la Ley de Conmuta- 1 Oen de Penns. Y, senores, es mune, la confusiOn que hay en eli r . Amigos del Gobierno, Independlentes de este Semite es- Pals viendo sellr proses en el memento en que se mate y se 1 . cuchen ml voz que es Is verde in; madras, de los campeslnos, meta genie. Se acrecientan las guerrillas y haste hay quien , de una Venezuela inocente. Senadores: Venezuela es inocente pregona por las calles que jefes guerrilleros lien Ido a dor- y en un noventa y eine? por ciente no sabe to que esti pete...; mir en In ease de algin Gobernador de Estado; y Jefes altos sando, no sabe' del sentido de las bombas'que le entan ponien? e de Is guerrillas. Eso diens en la calle. do en el' suelo, no sabe los volcanes que este pisatido, Y se- - Tomo esto In observe In genie Ilene de suspicaciam; todo j gulmos nosotros alegres y confiados on este tierra, sin saber . CSO lo nneliza la genie 111UCIIRS veces con buena fe, otras ye- que Heger& el inomento del estallido de. cosas que no; pueden . yes con male fe. Entonces es cuendo Lodes los esqueinas se los . arrollar a todos. Por eso, amigos de Accidn DemocritIca, ' plantea In opinion publicte. Hay haste genie tan ? Ingenue en . amigos de URD, Independientes y de toclos los Partidos, mi.. este I is, Sumter Paz- que dice que las guggior invert- ' , gos del MDI, pongamanos todos a recapecitar; que no sea el to de omedafes Rialeaseal h24oCJA-REPP718-01306TA000411171006743 93e sea el testl.j, , A_pproved,EorRelease1999/08124_:_CIA-RDP78-03061A000400EARRNT monk, de unos corazonei que `sietiten la Petrie. En el epode de este senthniento, y con el espiritu de esta iniervencidn, me permito traer una aerie de conclusiones al Senado. ? - Primera.? Que hagamos una revisiOn general de Is politi- ca antlguerrillera. En este sentido,.que se Invite aquellos par., tidos de Is oposicidn que puedan aportar aigo, pars que ana- licemos torlos si Is politica que se ha seguido es corrects, y sl an prueba lo contrarlo, que se haga una revision con humil- ? dad. Les propongO, en nombre del Partido Social Cristiana Copel, el eatudio conjunto pars ham una revision (3 pars qua ustefies nos expliquen tantas cosas, que a lo mejor no las sabemos. Segundo.? Que el Alto Mando explique a) La iltima corn:- pra de los aviones en lugar de helledpteros y lanchas. patru- Items; b) El no abordaje del barco cubano. Tercera.? Que el Goblerno explique la politica de Indul- tos. A lo major la explicaciOn? la aceptamos; pero mientras ? lento la creemos contraproducente, inoportuna, discriminato- via muchas veces; tExpliquennosla: Cuarta.? Que se proeeda a la selecelon, formed& y en- trenamlento tie la Direcci?n General de la Policia. Una Poll-. Oa con problemas tan graves que , confronta, no debe de es- tar tan mecliorTemente equipada de material humano y tee-. nico. Preocuparnonos en el ,Pariamento por is e.structuraciOn ? 3 ? de la Digepol; y les ruego a los Senadores de Accion Demo- ? critica, qua le lieven al doctor Leandro.Mora la inquietud del I 'pals, pare que ese Cuerpo, en cuyos hombres se base la semo ridad del Estado, sea mita Iddoco m?seri? y m?responsad bier y que lo reorganicen totaimente.. Quinta.? Inkier una politica-de Seguro Para los Policies , y pare los Milltares. ?:-ra la guerra antisubversiva. No debemos acogernos ilnicarrten7- ' te a la Eseuela de Panama, cuyos esquemas norteamerIcanos no han podido acabar con la guerra tick Vietnam y vlenen.a"?: enseharnos a acabar con las guerrillas nuestras. Llamemos . tecnicos de Francia, que eonocen de In experiende de Indocht-; I na y Argel, inisiones estupentlas que tienen experienclas. 1+114 rnamosios sin que eso sea ?fender a los Estados Unidos, ; Septima.? Establazcemos un Organism? de fled& sleoe lagica..i,Donde esti ese Organism? del Gobierno Para II aC?? eft sicologica?. Eso e3 indispensable que' lo hagamos. Y pars terminar, aeftores, les quire? decir lo sigulentet si el Goblerno no esti convencido tie lo que le esti pasendo, at el ; Gobierno no siente que algo grave le arremete en sus cimien-'.' los, y si esa realidad lo sobrepasa, tendremos horns muy tris-. , tes y rimy graves en el pais; y is responsabilidad esta en ma- nos de quienes conducen el Gobierno; y que no digan manes ;4 na si liege Is hecatombe, que no hub? nacile que los alertara., AquS estamos nosotros pare hablarles a este Gobierno, que es puestro Gobierno de Venezuela. Aqui esti la democracia fun- cionando, no la tradicional estructura de oposlcion y Gobierno, pars matarse 'y destrozarse, sine la estructura dinelmice moderna tie Inia democracia que concibe un ensarnbiaje entre' 4 oposicion y Goblerno, para estructurar los grandes princl-A pios que delfnean la conformed& de un pueblo y la conduccithi de un pais. Le pido a Dios que nos ayude, qua sl mis palabm ban sido exageratias o agoreras, que me ?dispensen, pero ea ?1 is manera de actuar en mi vide, porque no. tango otra. Pero q que sl algo de mi discurso queda pars recapacitar, qua lo re+ cojan y que nos sentemos a converser en una hors en que el pais reclama. Que nos unamos todos. los qua estames defer i ? diendo una .misma cause traseendental en la vide, Senores, los Goblernos caen cuando no tienen conciew- eta de sus peligros, pero los Gobiernos se sostienen cuando oyen y escuchan Is. voz de su pueblo. QUe yo sea en este ins- tante is voz de ml pueblo, y si no lo soy, por lo menos qua 7 sea Is voz sincera de un hombre que quiso hablarles 'Con toda , buen, fa. Y? csm? .toda el alma.,Senoreg. , ? Sexta.? Clue se (reign misiones de adoctrinamlentn pa-.- ?1 Approved For Release 1999/%8/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3