BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 30, 1967
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Significant Dates
[ASTERISK denotes ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]
MAR
21-28 World Youth Week celebrated by World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY:
Communist front).
25* Treaties creating European Economic Community (EEC) and European Community of
Atomic Energy (Euratom) signed in Rome by France, West Germany, Italy, Bel-
gium, Netherladds and Luxembourg. 1957. TENTH ANNIVERSARY.
27* Khrushchev succeeds Bulganin as Premier of USSR. 1957.
27-5 International Union of Students Congress at Ulan Bator, Mongolia. (IUS:
Soviet-line Communist front)
29 Martyrs' Day and Youth Day. (Communist China)
APR
1* Berlin Blockade begins. In 15 months, US and Britain airlift 2.34 million
tons of vital supplies to city. (Blockade lifted by Soviets, 12 May 1949)
1948.
4* North Atlantic Treaty signed, including US, Canada and 10 West European
countries. 1949.
16* USSR and Germany sign Treaty of Rapallo; secret military accord enables Ger-
many to evade Treaty of Versailles by training men and testing and building
weapons in USSR. 1922, FORTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY.
17* Lenin delivers "April Theses" in first public appearance after return to
Russia. 1917. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
18-27* First Bandung Conference: 29 Afro-Asian countries participate. 1955.
24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and For Peaceful Coexistence. Celebrated
by WFDY and 1US. (Communist fronts)
26* 19 Foreign Ministers meet at Geneva on Indochina; 21 July, agree on armis-
tice effective 11 August. Vietnam partitioned, Laos and Cambodia recog-
nized as neutral. 1954.
28 "Expo 67" opens in Montreal with Bloc participation.
MAY
1 May Day -- International Workers' Day. First designated by Second Inter-
national (Socialist Congress) in 1889.
7* V-E Day, end of World War II. 1945.
15* Third International declared dissolved by Soviets; 1943. Announcement on
22 May 1943 declares other Communist Parties to be autonomous.
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PPIPIPPI (Significant Dates)
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30 January 1967
"The Chinese
Red Guards
Don't Know
Lenin"
Communist Writings
Which Communists
Can't Read
Briefly Noted V
TASS on Nov. 19 an-
nounced that a delegation of the
Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society
headed by PRAVDA observer V. Mayevsky
had been forced to cut short its tour
of China by Chinese provocations and
insulting, hostile attacks as reported
in our Propagandist's Guide to WCA,
#8. IZVESTIYA on the 22nd carries the
text of a long statement by M. to a
press conference on the 21st. De-
ploring the senseless "great-Khan
chauvinism and anti-Sovietism" in Red
Guard actions to eradicate foreign
culture, M. says:
"...The major part of the CR
Committee at the University have
been educated in the humanities:
they are philosophers, lawyers,
etc.... All of them call them-
selves M-Ls. Nevertheless, dur-
ing the sharp discussion, it be-
came evident that they had only
the very scantest knowledge of the
opinions of Marx, Engels, and
Lenin on culture."
After the RG stated their criti-
cal view of Beethoven, M. asked them
what they find "specifically unaccept-
able" in the Appassionata, to which they
reply: "We have not heard it, but we
regard it critically." M. comments:
"The words of Vladimir Ilyich
Lenin, who called this work an
amazing, wonderful creation of
human genius, were a surprise to
them. They sincerely admitted
that they did not read Lenin's
works on proletarian culture
and that they did not know
about L's talks with Klara Zet-
kin in which he called the widest
possible proletarian culture
could be built and the really
new and great Communist society
grow. ...The library collabor-
ators announced: 'Pushkin was
a non-proletarian writer.'
Upon our mentioning that V.I.
Lenin called Piishkin a classic,
that he valued his works and
read them again and again, they
remained silent.... (Etc.)"
We have long emphasized that the
Communists are vulnerable where they
do not -- or are not allowed to --
study their own "classics." Now a
prominent Communist journalist gives
assets a fresh peg for new commen-
taries on the subject. Leftist and
revisionist assets might stress the
utter incompatability of the parrot-
style learning of Mao's thought with
real study of Marxist classics, add-
ing that this parrot-learning recalls
similar practices in Russia under
Stalin, and that Russia has not yet
recovered from its own intellectual
straitjacket. Lenin read Pushkin;
how many of today's Soviet Commu-
nists have read Kafka?
A First-Hand
Report on Com-
munist China
A A *
Interview With A
Former Chinese
Communist
On 26 July 1966 a
young member of Peking's economic
mission to Damascus, Syria quietly
took his first open steps to escape
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(Briefly Noted Cont.)
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from the Chinese Communist mission.
Miao Chen-pal had been thinking about
this move for some time - in fact,
he had a suitcase packed for fully a
week before he saw his chance to make
a break. And when it came he took the
suitcase from the shelf above his bed
and headed straight for the U.S. Em-
bassy in Damascus. In the suitcase
were two suits, four shirts, a trans-
istor radio and a Chitese-English
dictionary. He explained that he
wanted to wear his own clothes and
be able to study English and find out
independently what was being said about
him and his exploit. U.S. officials
reported that in hotels en route to
Washington, he even insisted on making
his own bed. The attachment from U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT's 7 November
1966 issue tells the reader a great
deal more about this engaging yound
Chinese. He appears intelligent,
thoughtful, practical and objective -
qualities which come through very clearly
in the attached. It is suggested that
distribution of the interview in whole
or part should appeal to an audience
much wider than that of the youth stu-
dent or intellectual.
* * *
Authoritative "What is U.S. Policy,
Speaker Spells Anyway?"
Out Answer
Although our business
is covert, not overt,
propaganda, we are often confronted with
questions from contacts and others as to
what U.S. policy really is, especially in
Vietnam. Even friendly people often pro-
fess to be puzzled as to what the U.S.
is trying to do; less friendly individ-
uals sometimes imply or state openly
that they doubt that the U.S. knows it-
self what is is doing. Beyond this,
there is a tendency to think that the
U.S. lacks confidence in its policy,
and is unsure whether or not suc-
cess in Vietnam is possible. This
latter belief in turn encourages
Hanoi to refuse any curtailment of
its activities and demands.
Excerpts from an informal speech
by W.W. Rostow, given at confer-
ence of educators in Washington,
16-17 June 1966, and reproduced in
PRESS COMMENT, 7 February 1967,
are well-suited to answer these
questions and doubts. Rostow is,
of course, the former M.I.T.
economist and author of many books,
including STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
more recently the chief of the
Policy Planning Council of the
Department of State, and now Special
Assistant to the President, work-
ing in the White House. His
remarks are clear, authoritative,
and confident. Particularly note-
worthy is Rostow's emphasis on
the positive economic goals of
the U.S. government.
Rostow's speech is suitable
for showing to appropriate indi-
vidual contacts or for our own
background information for use in
person-to-person discussion. Out-
lets should not in general be
asked to publish all or portions
of the speech, but may use it,
together with other more recent
information, as background for
discussions of economic growth,
development programs, or U.S.
aims and policies, especially with
regard to Vietnam. All such pub-
lic discussion, of course, should
be written or broadcast from a
point of view appropriate to the
country in which the outlet is -
located or to which it addresses
itself.
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1092. THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE: TWENTY YEARS LATER
SITUATION:
"This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would
not recommend it except that the alternative is much more
serious....
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The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery
and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty
and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a
people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope
alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support
in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership,
we may endanger the peace of the world - and we shall surely
endanger the welfare of our own nation."
President Harry S. Truman, in his
Message to Congress, March 12, 1947.
On March 12, 1947, President Truman asked Congress to appropriate
000,000,000 for economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. That
Presidential Message to Congress, more popularly known as the Truman
Doctrine, signaled the end of American hopes of tranquil relations with
the Soviet Union. It marked the beginning of the open struggle between
the free world, led by the United States and communism.
Before the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, and even before the San
Francisco meeting that established the United Nations Organization (April
1945), President Truman's encounters with Molotov had given him premol.-
nitions of serious trouble. The Potsdam Conference supplied the President
and his advisers with further qualms about the intentions and the future
behavior of the Soviet Union, and from that juncture to the end of the
Truman administration (and during the ensuing years) the Soviets pursued
with increasing consistency a course of secretiveness, duplicity, obstruc-
tive hostility, and tacit repudiation of agreements, of which their pro-
longed blockade of Berlin and their fomenting of war in Korea were the
extreme manifestations. With staggering rapidity the Soviet Union built
up a ring of satellites in Eastern Europe.
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'MINK (1092 Cont.)
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Under stresses that seemed at times to be leading straight into a
third world war, President Truman was forced into improvising the radi-
cally new policy of containment -- a flexible holding operation along
the entire far-flung periphery of Soviet domination, with aid supplied
as needed to whatever forces were resisting communization. The three
crucial tests of the policy of containment were Greece, the Berlin Block-
ade and Korea. Greece was pacified, and the communist threat quashed;
the Berlin blockade was roundly beaten by the airlift, and Korea, a
stalemate by military criteria, was a success in the sense that Southern
Korea remains independent and prosperous today.
The initial hopes for a successfully functioning United Nations were
quickly dashed in the earliest days of that body by the obstructionism
of the Soviet Union. The veto, the walkout, the boycott, and calculated
rudeness became standard Soviet tactics, and there was widespread fear
that the United Nations seemed doomed to failure. It was in this context
that President Truman, in proclaiming his Message to Congress, stated
"The United Nations is designed to make possible Lasting freedom and
independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objec-
tives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to main-
tain their free institutions and their national integrity against
aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian re-
gimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian
regimes, imposed on free peoples by direct or indirect aggression,
undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the secu-
rity of the United States." (See unclassified attachment for complete
text).
Affairs in Greece had been in varying states of crisis since the coun-
try's liberation-TT-744. The British, whose forces had come in when the
Germans moved out, had tried unsuccessfully for three years to restore
stability and to cope with the communist-fomented civil war. On February
24, 1947, the British Ambassador in Washington informed the Department of
State that after March 31 Great Britain would have to discontinue her eco-
nomic assistance to Greece and also to Turkey. Subsequently, the British
Government announced that its troops in Greece would have to be altogether
withdrawn.
President Truman did not take the matter to Congress until nearly
three weeks after the British notification. One reason for his delay was
his deliberate intention to make his message coincide with the arrival of
Secretary of State Marshall in Moscow for conferences; Marshall was to im-
press upon the Soviets that the days of the soft policy were over, and that
Soviet good faith would no longer be taken for granted by the United States.
What President Truman meant by the Marshall mission and the message of aid
to Greece and Turkey was a double-barreled declaration that the United States
would stand up to the Soviets and resist their continuing subversion and
grabbing of areas vital to our security.
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Legislation was introduced and adopted in Congress (which formally
approved the request for aid on May 15) to provide that the program of
aid should lapse whenever the General Assembly or the Security Council
should decide that action taken by the United Nations had rendered the
continuance of US aid unnecessary or undesirable and that, if the ques-
tion came before the Security Council, the US would waive its right of
veto. Other provisions of the legislation passed by Congress called for
aid in the form of loans or grants and for the dispatch to Greece and
Turkey of civilian and military advisers to help the recipient govern-
ment make effective use of the aid. The President was required to with-
draw any or all aid if requested to do so by either the Greek or Turkish
governments. The recipient governments were required to give free access
to US officials and to the press so that they might observe how the aid
was being used. Full publicity was to be given to the programs within
each country.
The Truman Doctrine, although faced with formidable difficulties,
achieved its fundamental aim of keeping Greece and Turkey out of the
Soviet orbit. By the end of January 1948, over 90,000 tons of American
military equipment had been sent to Greece. At the request of the Greek
government American military advisors were sent into the field to advise
directly in operations. Toward the end of 1949 hostilities came to an
end in Greece, and attention shifted to the country's very serious eco-
nomic problems - disastrous inflation, severe unemployment, and the almost
desperate circumstances of wage earners and white-collar workers.
As to Turkey, the quarterly reports submitted on the program in 1949
expressed satisfaction with the progress toward the objective of a smaller
but more effective Turkish armed force - one better matched to the resources
of Turkey.
The Truman Doctrine first set the terms and the pattern for US finan-
cial, economic and military assistance to nations of the free world, as
later developed under the Marshall Plan and various subsequent foreign aid
programs. 25X1 C1 Ob
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References
The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practice. Edited by Louis
W. Koenig, New York University Press,
Documents of American History. Edited by Henry Steele Commager. Appleton-
Century-Crofts. 1963.
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(1092.)
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1093 EUR. FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS
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SITUATION: The 18th Congress of the French Communist Party (PCF)
was held in an industrial suburb of Paris from 4 to 8 January 1967. The
sessions were marked by little enthusiasm and no spontaneity, and the
closing statements included no surprises or innovations. These four
themes ran through the discussions at the Congress:
1. The PCF rank-and-file should realize that the Party's
agreement with the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left
(FGDS)* solidified the PCF's emergence from political isolation
and therefore justified the compromises which have been made with
the non-Communist left.
2. A campaign must be mounted to oppose the domestic policies
of the Gaullist government and voters must be encouraged to vote
for the PCF in the legislative elections now scheduled for 5 and
12 March 1967.
3. The organizational and ideological unity and discipline of
the PCF must be reemphasized.
4. On the international plane, the Chicoms and their French
supporters must be attacked while the PCF at the same time should
lead the movement calling for an international Communist conference.
*The FGDS (Fdgration de la Gauche De,
Mocratique et Socialiste) includes
the Socialists, the Radicals, and an assortment of left-wing political
conventions and clubs which initially took shape in late 1965. Its aim
was to present one candidate from the left against de Gaulle in the
Presidential elections in December of that year; the PCF decided not to
run its own candidate but to support the FGDS candidate, Franiois Mit-
terrand. An agreement between the FCP and the FGDS was formalized in
December 1966 in preparation for the forthcoming legislative elections;
see attached articles from the 21 December NEW YORK TIMES and the
5 January LONDON TIMES.
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The first day of the Congress was taken up almost entirely by the
report of General Secretary Waldeck RochW who admitted that there had
been opposition within the PCF to the recently concluded agreement with
the FGDS. Some French press observers recalled that the language he used
("sectarianism," "dogmatism," "right opportunism") was similar to that
used by the Party before a purge, but when the Congress closed, the new
Central Committee and the Politburo showed little change and Waldeck
Rochet appeared to be still in control of the Party apparatus.
As expected, the Congress paid considerable attention to the sub-
ject of Vietnam, but it showed more fervor in condemning the Chicoms for
hampering Soviet aid to Hanoi and interfering in the internal affairs of
fraternal parties. Waldeck Rochet asserted that the PCF favored a world
conference of Communist parties; the Soviet delegate, CPSU Central Com-
mittee Politburo member Arvid Pelshe, was more cautious in noting that
such a conference would have to be "thoroughly prepared", -- a theme
echoed by the Finnish CP delegate; Italian CP Secretary General Luigi
Longo expressed his party's reservations on the conference question.
The final resolution on the proposed world conference, however, declared
that the PCF "will work so that conditions for this convocation, which
have ripened recently, will be realized as soon as possible."
The most important relected amendment to the final political reso-
lution would have made it more critical of Gaullist foreign policy. The
rapporteur, Etienne Fajon, asserted that even a reactionary government
like the Gaullist one could take certain measures favorable to peace,
and to attack them would discourage the "forces of peace" and make the
PCF misunderstood by the "popular masses." According to the Soviet news
agency TASS, Waldeck Rochet's opening speech, after noting that de Gaulle's
visit to the USSR and Kosygin's visit to France had been "received with
satisfaction by the majority of Frenchmen", stated:
"At the same time, as pointed out in the draft resolution sub-
mitted to the Congress, the PCF, while unhesitatingly supporting
all steps in the direction of peace, 'comes out against the nega-
tive and dangerous aspects of de Gaulle's foreign policy which serve
the interests of monopolies and not the national interests.'
Analyzing the political situation in the country, Waldeck Rochet
noted the intensification of the economic and political struggle
waged by the working class and other social strata. He particularly
stressed the need for unity of the workers and the democratic forces
and agreement between them on the basis of a joint program with a
view to putting an end -,V) the regime of personal power [the standard
*For the fullest available reportage in English translation of this and
subsequent material concerned with the Congress see the,EBIS DAILY REPORT
for West Europe 4 to 13 January. Also see the attached article from the
8 January NEW YORK TIMES.
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PCF terminology for de Gaulle's system of government] and estab-
lishing genuine democracy."
Five days after the Congress closed, the Executive Committee of the
FGDS met under the leadership of Franiois Mitterrand and, according to
TASS, "endorsed" the agreement on joint action with the PCF in the March
elections. Under thisagreementa Communist or Federation candidate who
receives more votes in the first round of the elections will be backed
by both organizations in the second round. The FGDS was reportedly
"not displeased" with the results of the PCF Congress and plans to pro-
pose a continuing series of private talks with the PCF after the elec-
tions to discuss and widen the areas of agreement between them. The
FGDS also reportedly hopes that "more liberal elements" in the PCF will
gain more influence and that "in a decade or so" a real dialogue might
become possible. 25X1 C1 Ob
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1094 FE. NORTH VIETNAM TRAINS THAIS IN SUBVERSION
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SITUATION: In early 1965 Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi
told a visiting diplomat that "we may have a guerrilla war going in Thai-
land before this year is out." Chen went on to say that the Thai govern-
ment would be overthrown with the aid of Chinese arms and supplies sent to
the insurgents operating in Thailand. The same year China presided over
the organization of the Thailand Patriotic Front in Peking with the spe-
cific purpose of directing Communist subversive activities in the north-
eastern and southern provinces of Thailand. (Begin SECRET NOFORN) Now
there is new evidence that Thailand's Communist Party, with support from
Peking and Hanoi, is penetrating areas in northeast, northern and southern
Thailand. According to a source with good contacts in the area, the Com-
munists have brought eight villages in northern Thailand under their con-
trol since early 1966. In response to these activities the Thai government
is giving renewed attention to these areas - both to oppose Communist ac-
tivities and to expand civil programs aimed at bringing the government
closer to the people. Although government forces have been searching out
Communist strongholds in two provinces (Nakhon Phanom and Sakhon Nakhon)
they have been unable to establish contact with terrorist bands operating
there. The rugged terrain of such areas, their accessibility to Communist-
controlled areas in Laos, and the absence of effective Thai government con-
trol and contact with the people have made these areas natural targets for
Communist subversion. Peking is making capital on the situation and has
actually been training some Thai insurgents in Communist China. The extent
to which Hanoi and Peking may be coordinating their efforts in this field
is not known. (End SECRET NOFORN) It is known, however, that Hanoi has
been conducting such training of Thais in North Vietnam since at least 1962.
On 1 April 1966 a Thai farmer surrendered to the Thai government-
operated counter-subversion center in northern Thailand and reported that
he had been one of a class of 130 Thais taken to North Vietnam and trained
by North Vietnam (NVN) army personnel in guerrilla warfare against the gov-
ernment of Thailand. His details of training, indoctrination, the location
and physical layout of the school etc., were corroborated and surfaced to
the press in October 1966 (see unclassified attachment). In November two
other Thais, trained at the same school, were also surfaced to the press as
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S E IMPET (1094 Cont.)
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a second step in the field's exploitation of the discovery that North
Vietnamese are training Thai insurgents. This training and indoctrina-
tion is only one part of the developing pattern of Peking-and Hanoi-
directed action against Thailand.
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Interview
A FIRST-HAND REPORT
ON RED CHINA TODAY
With a Chinese Who Grew Up Under Communism
CPYRGHT
Behind the turmoil in Red China?
Are the Communists riding for a fall? Is their
tight control slipping? What do China's millions
really think of their rulers?
A vivid picture of today's China emerges from
this interview with a Communist defector, Miao
Chen-pai. He has only boyhood memories of
China before the Reds. But his knowledge of his
homeland since is sharp and perceptive.
Miao Chen-pai, now in the United States, was
interviewed by two members of the staff of
"U. S. News & World Report" who have lived in
China. Both were struck by his intelligent, ob-
jective answers to their questions.
Q Mr. Miao, where were you and what were you doing
when the Communists came to power in China in 1949?
A I was living with my parents about three hours' train
ride from Shanghai. I was 13 then. My parents were both
schoolteachers. I was in school.
Q As a 13-year-old boy, what did you think of the
Communists and Mao Tse-tung?
A Mao Tse-tung was a hero to me. I believed in him,
and in the Communists. I believed their ideas were right
and gopd for China, so later I joined the Communist Party.
Q Ilow long did you continue to believe?
A For many years. That's why I went on to join the
Communist Party. I could see some things that were good
for my country. Conditions improved for the lowest of the
peasants?the ones who never owned any land. The country
was unified, too?brought under one Government.
Q What advantages do you get by being a member of
the Communist Party?
A We don't get any immediate material advantages
from being a member of the party. A party member, for
example, gets the same pay as a nonparty member doing
vpie the same job. But all Chinese know that, in the long run,
the party member does benefit.
Nobody talks about this, but we can see it. Party mem-
bers are promoted faster, move up to higher jobs. Of course,
as you move up the ladder, you get better living quarters
MIAO CHEN-PAI, 29, joined China's Young Com-
munist League in 1949 and the Communist Party
itself in 1956. He was in China's armed forces from
1950 until 1957. Then he went to work for the Min-
istry of Foreign Trade. Last year, Mr. Miao was as-
signed by the Communists to the commercial mis-
sion of the Chinese Embassy in Damascus, Syria. It
was there that he walked into the U. S. Embassy
last July 26, asked for political asylum and got it.
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CPYRGHT
and better food. So, if you want to get ahead faster, you
try to get into the party.
Q Why don't people talk about this?
A You don't like to talk about anything like that in
China. For example, students in the universities are not
only graded for their work, but also are graded for their
loyalty. The party does the grading on loyalty. So, if the
party committee at your university hears that you have said
something that sounds disloyal, that is put in your record
when you graduate. This is bad for you, because it means
you are sent to an unsatisfactory job or to some faraway
place. All students know this, so they try to show how
loyal they are.
Q When did you, Mr. Miao, begin to have doubts about
Mao Tse-tung and the Communists?and why?
A Almost all Chinese trusted Mao Tse-tung, thought of
him as being almost infallible, until 1957. They believed
him when he said he wanted a hundred flowers to bloom
and a hundred thoughts to contend. Because they trusted
him, many expressed their ideas and criticisms.
Then we found out that the "hundred flowers" was a trap.
Mao Tse-tung used this trap to get people to tell their
thoughts. In this way, Mao Tse-tung found out who opposed
him?and got rid of these people.
Still, many people continued to believe in Mao Tse-tung.
They said the trap had been a smart move by him?to get
rid of people who were bourgeois and antiparty.
Personally, my doubts began in 1959, when it became
obvious to me and others that the "Great Leap Forward"?
a creation of Mao?was a failure. Then, afterward, Mao
never criticized himself for this error?although he had al-
ways said that members of the party should criticize them-
selves.
Then, when Marshal Peng Teh-huai [former Defense Min-
ister] was purged for criticizing Mao's "Great Leap For-
ward," I realized that Mao would not criticize himself, nor
would he accept the criticism of others. Instead, he blamed
others for the failure.
This strengthened my doubts. Not only did Mao Tse-tung
refuse to accept criticism, but he also was trying to make
himself appear infallible, a man who could make no error.
? Did others feel this way? Did people talk about it?
A I am certain many people felt this way. But nobody
talked about it. We were afraid. Ever since the trap of the
hundred flowers, we Chinese keep our discontent in our
hearts. We are afraid to speak of these things to each other.
? Then how can you be certain others felt this way?
A It came out later, in the last few years. It came out
in literary work. It came out in criticisms by economic peo-
ple and the educated classes. It came out even inside the
party?which is why you now see the purges and the "great
proletarian cultural revolution."
O How did you learn about these events inside the party
in China while you were in Syria?
A Beginning last May, while I still was in the Embassy
in Damascus, our Ambassador received 9rders from Peking
to implement the cultural revolution. Peking began sending
him a number of documents on the situation in China. These
were studied and discussed in long sessions held every day
in the Embassy.
Some of the documents and reports were shown only to
the relatively few Communist Party members in the Em-
bassy. As a party member, I was shown these documents.
From them, I learned what happened to Peng Chen.
Peng Chen was one of the six most-powerful men in the
Politburo of the Communist Party?the mayor of Peking, the
capital, and also head of the party organization there. The
documents showed that he was removed primarily because
he was anti-Mao.
In September of 1965, Peng Chen made statements at a
national meeting of provincial propaganda workers. The state-
ments were considered anti-Mao. What Peng Chen said was
that everyone should be given freedom to speak?and that,
even if it is Chairman Mao who is wrong, he, too, must be
criticized.
Mao Tse-tung no doubt has made many errors, but as
long as he retains power, no one will be allowed to criticize
him. Peng was purged a few months later.
Q Peng and others must have known the fish's they were
taking when they dared to criticize Mao. Why did they do
it?
A Peng and other high leaders in the party and the mili-
tary have their own followers. [don't know, but it may have
been that they felt strong enough, politically, to voice their
opinions.
But this I do know: The reason for the existence ail%
widespread opposition to Chairman Mao's policies is the
many setbacks the country has suffered. Both domestically
and in the field of foreign relations, the policies of Mao have
not succeeded. But these policies have no chance of being
changed so long as Mao Tse-tung is alive, and so long as
anyone who questions the policies is purged.
O Do you believe, Mr. Miao, that the purges and mobs
of young Red Guards will make everyone obedient to Mao
Tse-tung now?
A No, I don't. As long as Mao's policies are followed,
whether by Mao himself or by his successors, there will be
opposition. There are other groups besides the Mao Tse-tung
group. As I said, Peng Chen had many followers, and many
of these have not been purged. There are groups in the mili-
tary, too. As long as there are groups who believe that Mao
Tse-tung's policies are wrong for China, the struggle will
continue.
Q What in your mind are the main policies of Mao that
are causing the problems?
A There are two main policies: At home, there is the pol-
icy of continued class struggle; abroad, there is the policy of
world revolution.
o Are these policies popular?
A I don't think so. The class struggle at home means con-
tinuing war against the bourgeoisie and the people with
bourgeois thoughts. Chinese suspected of having bourgeois
thoughts are those who are not opposed to the bourgeoisie.
As for world revolution, I don't think the Chinese are en-
thusiastic or very much interested. They are more interested
in getting a better life for themselves. They do not like to
make sacrifices to help "liberate" people far away. People
ask why we have to send help to foreign "liberation move-
ments" when we don't have enough money for our own de-
velopment.
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INTERVIEW: a First-Hand Report on China
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? ?? "Thought cont
CPYRGHT
: GIA-RDP to-U.5061 A000400070009-3
rol is hated. People are unhappy"
Q What do rhe Chinese think they should have to make
their lives better?
A Personal freedom is the main thing. Thought control is
hated. People are unhappy with the way Communism is
breaking up traditional family life. They want time in the
evening to spend with their families?instead of attending
study groups and self-criticism meetings and listening to
propaganda lectures. People want time for themselves.
Q What do they think of things like the law against mar-
riage before a fairly advanced age?
A The law isn't too bad. It says men can marry at age
20 and women at age 18. But the party says men shouldn't
marry until they are 27, and women until they are 25. And
you must understand that, in China, what the party says is
more important than the law. So, generally, in the cities, men
don't marry until they are 27. In the countryside, however,
more people get married earlier?following the law rather
than the party.
? Chinese propaganda also discourages sexual relations
before marriage. Is this accepted?
A Many people do accept this. They work hard, practice
self-restraint. But many people do not obey?particularly in
the universities. You never hear about it in China, but there
,.re a great many babies born out of wedlock.
AweQ How effective is the party propaganda in China?
A Very effective. Remember, we hear nothing from the
outside world that the party doesn't want us to hear. As a
result, Mao Tse-tung has been able to make the Chinese be-
lieve one thing at one time, and just the opposite at another
time.
In 1956, for example, Mao Tse-tung told us that Russia
was the great leader and teacher of the revolution. Then a
few years later, after Khrushchev had gone to Camp David
to see Eisenhower, he made us believe that Khruslichey no
longer was a Marxist-Leninist, and Russia no longer was the
leader of the revolution.
AS MAO'S TROUBLES GROW?
() Well, if Mao's propaganda is that effective, why does
he now need the cultural revolution and the Red Guards and
the purges of party leaders?
A Mao Tse-tung needs all this because of the opposition
that has developed to his policies?and because of his failures.
-le started the cultural revolution because of this opposition.
4100'
Then he found that many members of the Young Communist
League were not supporting the cultural revolution, or were
not enthusiastic.
So then he had to turn to the Red Guards. These are the
younger people, who are most easily swayed and controlled
by the propaganda.
? Who are the Red Guards? How did they get started?
A The Red Guards started in the universities in Peking.
That was well after the cultural revolution had been started.
At first, the Red Guards were not publicly formed in the
name of the party. The party element behind Mao and Mar-
shal Lin Piao wanted it to appear that the Red Guards had
been formed by student leaders in the universities. But, in
fact, the Red Guards were backed, instructed and developed
by this element of the party.
? Do you think the Red Guards can be controlled?or
that they might turn out to be some kind of "Frankenstein
monster" and turn on their creators?
A I don't think it is possible that they will get out of
control, like a "Frankenstein monster." That is because Mao
and Lin have created them, would make sure to have means
of control over them. Chinese Communist Party leaders have
had great experience in creating and stopping such move-
ments, you know.
? Is the present situation connected in any way with the
results of the break with Soviet Russia?
A I don't think it is, in the minds of the people.
When it became realized that there was a break, people
were happy, in a way. Now, they thought, China can show
the world that it can progress on its -own, without help. We
Chinese had confidence that we could progress on our own,
although we realized it would take longer. But we felt that
the accomplishment would be more satisfying, because it
would be ours.
Besides, there was dissatisfaction with the type of help
Russia was giving us. Engineers told me that the automobile
plant the Russians helped us build in Changchun was not
good. I didn't see the Russian plants myself, but many peo
pie who did told me the same kind of story.
"CHINA CAN PUSH AHEAD"?
? Can China, in fact, progress on its own?
A I think China basically can push ahead economically.
Of course, China is still economically weak. Because of this,
she hopes to supplement her own technological and scien?
tific capabilities with the technological and scientific capa-
bilities of the Western countries.
She is seeking to do this now by developing her foreign
trade with these countries. Though she has shown she can
do things on her own?the atom bomb, for example?China
has a long way to go, still, in many, many fields. Such
things as bombs, of course, are not everything. China in
recent years has refused development aid from Russia, and
there have been no new developments or changes on this.
I don't believe China needs aid from Russia or anybody
else. As a matter of national pride, and because China is a
vast country and full of resources, I believe China can do it
on her own?though it will take time. And, of course, she
needs to develop her foreign trade in order to strengthen her-
self economically and technologically.
^ What will be the effects of the development of a
nuclear-carrying missile which Communist China has just
announced?
A I don't believe it will have any actual military worth,
but it can elevate China's influence and be of use to her in
a propaganda way for prestige.
I think the reaction of the Chinese people will be pride,
just as they were proud that China had an atom bomb.
? Is there any sentiment of importance in favor of
Chiang Kai-shek's coming back from Taiwan?
A Older people might like to see Chiang come back.
Others might want the personal liberties that they now be-
lieve existed under the Nationalist Government. But the
young people know hardly anything about Chiang and the
Nationalists?except what the Communists tell them.
? Is there any man or group who appears to the Chinese
to give hope of restoring the personal liberties they want?
A I know of no specific person or group, but the people
do long for personal freedom. So, eventually, maybe the peo?
-
ple will be able to find such a man or group for themselves.
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. "The U.S. is the enemy in the popular mind" CPYRGHT
Many, particularly the older people, long for the old ways
and customs. I'll give you an example:
A few years ago, Mao Tse-tung ordered the whole Peking
Opera changed. This was the great opera of China. The songs
were familiar, and many people loved them. Mao Tse-tung
changed the opera so that it would do songs that help the
revolution. One day, in a barber shop in Peking, I heard an
older man ask the barber to please turn off the radio while it
was playing one of the new songs of the opera. The barber
did.
CI How would you describe the kind of personal liberties
that the Chinese want?
A There are many different kinds, depending on who
the individual Chinese is and where he is. A peasant wants
to own his own land. A worker wants to be free to enjoy
his time off work. A writer wants to be free to put down
his own thoughts?to criticize if he feels strongly about
something.
What it amounts to, I guess, is the kind of revisionism
they have in Russia and Eastern Europe, although this I did
not realize until after I left China.
The material shortages bother the Chinese people. But many
people live just about as they did before. Some?the lower
peasants?may live a little better than before.
But it is the spiritual oppression that is hated most?the
thought control, the control of your time.
12 How tight is political control from the party headquar-
ters in Peking?
A It is extremely tight. Whenever provincial party lead-
ers get out of line, people are sent out from Peking to
straighten them out. This happened in Anhwei and in other
provinces.
Now the Red Guards are being used against some of the
provincial party headquarters.
CI What do the Chinese people generally feel about the
American people now? Are we the hated enemy, or would
they like to make friends again?
A I am sorry to say that the U. S. is the hated enemy
in the popular mind as a result of the propaganda. I do not
feel that they particularly fear the U. S.?and this, also, is the
result of propaganda.
It is hard for foreigners to understand this if they have
never lived under such a system. Ever since 1950, the prop-
aganda against the United States has been never-ceasing.
After being subjected to such cleverly devised propaganda
day after day for 15 years, the human mind can't help but
he affected by it.
CHANCES OF WAR WITH U. S.?
o What about the war? What would make the Chinese.
enter the fighting in Vietnam?
A We Chinese do not feel that the party wants war with
the United States. I personally never felt we were going to
war in 1958 over the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.
I cannot say now what would force the party to decide
to fight in Vietnam. Once the party said China would go to
war if Hanoi was bombed. But Hanoi was bombed, and
China did not go to war.
Maybe China would go to war if American ground troops
invaded North Vietnam and moved too close to the Chinese
border. But I am not even sure of that. It isn't like Korea.
There, the party feared that the Americans would threaten
the Chinese industries just north of the Yalu River.
I think China might enter the war if the whole regime
of Ho Chi Minh were threatened, but I don't know.
O In your view, what is the main danger that Commu-
nist China now presents to its neighbors?
A I can't say what the danger is to any other neighbor-
ing country now, except for Vietnam. There, the Chinese
Communist Government policy is to prevent any peace ne-
gotiations. There are two reasons:
First, Chinese Communist foreign policies are in conflict
with Soviet foreign policies. Therefore, the Chinese Commu-
nists, by pushing their foreign-policy ideas in Vietnam, hope
to win an ideological victory over the Soviets.
Second, the Chinese Communists hope to expand Commu-
nism throughout Southeast Asia through successes in Viet-
nam. The Vietnam war, therefore, is the basic key to Mao's
whole theory of world revolution and wars of "national lib-
eration." He wants victory in Vietnam because that would
be taken as evidence that he is right and Russia is wrong.
But, if the United States can bring about negotiations for
peace, he loses.
South Vietnam is not Mao's whole goal. It is the key to
Communist expansion generally. So Mao will try every pos-
sibility to prevent peace.
WHY COLLAPSE IS UNLIKELY-
O Where does China go from here? Is it headed for in-
ternal collapse, for example?
A So far, I haven't seen anything to indicate that an
internal collapse is coming to China. But, inside China,
there are a lot of contradictions, and these contradictions
are sharpening. The main one is the desire of the people for
more freedom.
After a period of time?how long, I really couldn't guess
?this might bring about a trend toward something like re-
visionism and changes in China. But, so far, I really see no
basis for believing internal collapse is coming.
O Is there a chance that China will break up into semi-
autonomous regional governments or regimes?
A I see no possibility of this, because the power of the
Central Government?Mao and his group?is simply too
strong, too ironclad.
China won't go back into the old system of war lords.
And I don't think there will be semiautonomous regional
governments set up. We had them, you know, even under
Communism. It wasn't until 1954 that Mao Tse-tung was
able to break the hold that some party groups had over
various regions.
But what you are more likely to see develop is political
divisions among various groups. We already have had that
?which is why we now have the purges and the cultural
revolution.
CI In your personal opinion, what is the best course China
could take?
A This is a very difficult question.
My personal view of revisionism is that it is the period of
transformation from a socialist system to a capitalist system.
You see, Marx himself told how to carry on revolution
against capitalism, but he never explained a specific way
to build socialism.
All over the world there are people who say they are
Marxists, and many are trying to build socialism. But Rus-
sia itself, after almost 50 years, has reverted to revisionism,
and this, to my mind, is evidence of the failure of socialism.
So, up to now, I don't know how to build socialism in
China, and I don't know who does.
Also, I don't see how anybody can deny that modern
capitalism is successful.
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THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF MARCH 12, 1947
The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today
necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The
foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.
One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you
at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and
Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek government an urgent
appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the
American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Am-
bassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek government that
assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation. I do
not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf
ear to the appeal of the Greek government.
Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources
has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet.
Since 1940 this industrious and peace-loving country has suffered invasion,
four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife.
When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreat-
ing Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities,
communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been
burned. Eighty-five per cent of the children were tubercular. Livestock,
poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out
practically all savings. As a result of these tragic conditions a military
minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political
chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible.
Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those
goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances
the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of re-
construction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic as-
sistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel, and seeds.
These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable
only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to
restore internal order and security, so essential for economic and political
recovery.
The Greek government has also asked for the assistance of experienced
American administrators, economists, and technicians to insure that the
financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creat-
ing a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public adminis-
tration.
Doctrine Cont.)
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The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the
terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by communists,
who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly
along the northern boundaries. A commission appointed by the United
Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions
in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier be-
tween Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the
other. Meanwhile, the Greek government is unable to cope with the situa-
tion. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies
and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government through-
out Greek territory.
Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and
self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance.
We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic
aid, but these are inadequate. There is no other country to which demo-
cratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide
the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.
The British government, which has been helping Greece, can give no
further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds
itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in
several parts of the world, including Greece.
We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis.
But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the
United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to ex-
tend help of the kind that is required.
It is important to note that the Greek government has asked for our
aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give
to Greece and in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost
importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece,
in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece
self-supporting and will help to build an economy in which a healthy de-
mocracy can flourish.
No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy,
however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic pro-
cesses can be pointed out and corrected. The government of Greece is not
perfect. Nevertheless it represents 85 per cent of the members of the
Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign ob-
servers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair
expression of the views of the Greek people.
The Greek government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos
and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this coun-
try does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek
2 (Doctrine Cont.)
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government had done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we con-
demn now, extremist measures of the Right or the Left. We have in the past
advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.
Greece's neighbor Turkey also deserves our attention. The future of
Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less
important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of
Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are consid-
erably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the dis-
asters that have beset Greece. And during the war the United States and
Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid.
Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey has
sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for
the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance
of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation
of order in the Middle East. The British Government has informed us that,
owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic
aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance
it needs the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to
provide that help.
I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States
extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implica-
tions with you at this time.
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States
is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to
work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue: in
the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which
sought to impose their will and their way of life upon other nations.
To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the
United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations.
The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and inde-
pendence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however,
unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their free institu-
tions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek
to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank
recognition that totalitarian regimes, imposed on free peoples by direct
or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace
and hence the security of the United States.
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had
totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The government of
the United States had made frequent protests against coercion and intimida-
tion in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria.
I must also state that in a number of other countires there have been similar
developments.
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At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose
between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is dis-
tinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections,
guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and free-
dom from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly
impressed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a con-
trolled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal
freedoms.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities
or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to
work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help
should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential
to economic stability and orderly political processes.
The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we
cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the
United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as
political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to main-
tain their freedom the United States will be giving effect to the principles
of the Charter of the United Nations.
It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival
and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider
situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority,
the effect upon its neighbor Turkey would be immediate and serious. Con-
fusion and disorder might well be spread throughout the entire Middle East.
Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would
have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are
struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their
independence while they repair the damages of war. It would be an unspeak-
able tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against over-
whelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much.
Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous
not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure
would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their
freedom and independence.
Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the
effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must
take immediate and resolute action.
I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to
Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June
30, 1948. In requesting these funds I have taken into consideration the
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maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out
of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize
for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by
the war.
In addition to funds I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of
American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the re-
quest of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction and for
the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance
as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the
instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.
Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit
the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities,
supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.
If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes
indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation be-
fore the Congress. On this subject the executive and legislative branches
of the government must work together.
This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend
it except that the alternative is much more serious.
The United States contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning World
War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace. The as-
sistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little
more than one tenth of one per cent of this investment. It is only common
sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was
not in vain.
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want.
They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach
their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.
We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us
for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership,
we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surely endanger the
welfare of our own nation.
Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement
of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities
squarely.
5 (Doctrine)
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THE
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London, S.W.1
THE WORLD TODAY
Pre-election manceuvrings in France
,PETER STRAFFORD
FRANCE has been living through a long-drawn-out pre-election period
ever since last year's presidential campaign. The elections for the
National Assembly, which have to be held by next March at the latest,
have been described as the third round of the presidentials and, although
this terminology is disputed by Gaullists, there is no denying the close
link between the two votes. 'I'aken together, they will demonstrate not
only the electorate's view of the achievements of Gaullism, but also
something of the pattern that French political life will have in the future.
General de Gaulle, after all, is an exceptional figure, and the events that
brought him to power were also exceptional. Now that France is in a less
critical state, the question is how far the present pattern of things is to be
continued.
The immediate issue is whether the present Gaullist coalition will
retain its overall majority in the Assembly. This majority has enabled the
General to go his own way with little hindrance from parliamentarians,
and has drastically reduced the importance of the Assembly. If the
Gaullists now lose their majority the situation will immediately be
altered. Whatever their divisions?and they arc considerable?the
Opposition parties will still have the possibility of outvoting the Govern-
ment, and this fact alone will give extra weight to the Assembly. -
The Gaullists received a scrious shock from the General's relatively
poor performance in the presidential election. If they arc again returned
with a majority in the Assembly, much will have been done to repair the
damage, and politics will settle back into the familiar pattern. But things
Mr Strafford is a commentator on the French political scene.
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FRANCE
will not be quite the same as before. People will be looking ahead to the
day of the General's departure, sooner or later, and the centrifugal
tendencies which have been building up within the Gaullist coalition in
the last few months would seem likely to become more marked. M.
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, in particular, the former Minister of Finance
and now increasingly vocal as the leader of the Independent Republicans,.
'has been doing everything he can to convince public opinion that he is not.
an 'unconditional' Gaullist. Unless his party comes very badly out of the
elections, more will be heard of him, and it will almost certainly not be to
the liking of the orthodox Union for the New Republic (UNR)
The situation shows all the signs, then, of becoming more lively than it
has been, and the question is whether French politics are heading back to
a state comparable with that of the Fourth Republic. General de Gaulle
did not hesitate to threaten that this would be the result if he was not re-
elected last December, and Gaullists are making much of this in their
campaign preparations. Their high command, with M. Pompidou at its
head, has the title of Comite d' Action pour la Verne Republique, with the
,implication that all the Opposition parties are trying to return to the
Fourth Republic. The recent announcement by M. Pierre Pilimlin,
Mayor of Strasbourg and a member of the Mouvement Republican
Populaire (MRP), that he would not be standing for re-election to the
Assembly' was, with its implication that the choice, was between
Gaullism and chaos, grist to their mill.
To speak of a return to the Fourth Republic is, however, to ignore the
changes that have conic about in French political life under Gaullism. In
the first place, the presidential election, now part of the country's voting
habits, has done much to modify political structures. There has also been
a groundswell of general political interest which is 119W just beginning to
challenge the ways of the traditional parties. The growth of this interest
has been in strong contrast to the impotence of the parties, and to a great
extent in reaction to it. It is not solely a reaction to the rule of Gaullism.
It began with disgust at the way politics were conducted under the Fourth
Republic, and has been further stimulated by the high-handedness of
the Gaullist regime.
The most obvious sign of this concern, and the means by which it has
been focused, have been the political clubs. The growth of these clubs
has been one of the most marked features of the Fifth Republic. Some, of
course, such as the Club des Jacobins, had been created before 1958, but
the greater part of them have come into existence since then and they
now exist in towns all over France. They burst on the public conscious-
ness in 1964, when the two main groups each held a congress, and a
number of them now have an established position in the Fdderation de la
Gauche Democrate et Socialiste, the left-wing grouping 'headed by M.
.Francois Mitterrand. Club members have long worked for a fusion of
parties in the interest of greater effectiveness, and they have been able to
bring a certain pressure to bear on the evolution of the federation. They
have played a part in the working out of its programme, and have suc-
ceeded on occasion in preventing the big parties, the Socialists and the
Radicals, from imposing their views on the federation as a whole.
Le Monde, 24 August 1966.
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It is oftourse important not to overestimate the political weight of the
clubs. They consist to a great extent of 'intellectuals'?academics, civil
servants, and professional people?and when it comes to nominating
candidates, or getting out the vote, in the elections for the Assembly they
cannot have much direct influence. What they have done, however, is to
enable a whole new section of informed people to find their place in
political life. In the past too many people tended to look down their noses
at the activities of politics, even if they had an interest in public affairs as
such. They regarded politicians as mediocre, and the political parties did
nothing to encourage them to take an active part. This meant that the
parties tended to lack qualified people to speak on the issues of the day,
and concentrated on the purely political aspects involved.
The clubs have provided a half-way house, between non-involvement
and total party commitment, and enabled their members to bring their
expertise to the service of the parties. They vary considerably in their
political leanings, and have very different views on the degree to which
they should commit themselves to political action. By far the greater part
of them are on the Left, and they have used their relative freedom to dis-
cuss political issues in depth and to bring pressure on the left-wing parties.
Their most marked feature is their view that French political life, and
particularly the traditional parties, need to be re-structured.
In this they have come up against the resistance of the parties them-
selves. The influential Club Jean Moulin, for instance, gave strong back-
ing to M. Gaston Dcfferre, the Mayor of Marseille, last year when he
attempted to create a new federation ranging from the Socialists to the
MRP, and the move failed. Members of the hierarchy of the Socialist
Party speak with scorn of the 'unrealistic' ideas of club members, and the
current smear-word `technocrat' is freely used against them. A techno-
crat, for these officials, is someone who knows what is best for other
people and aims at deciding for them; he is a man who regards himself as
belonging to an Clite, and considers that politicians are idiots.
The violence of this reaction reveals the strength of the feelings in-
volved, and the divisions which have to be overcome if the Federation de
la Gauche is to develop into a more effective force. At the moment the
Socialists regard it as more or less their property, and their leadership
shows no intention of allowing any diminution of its own sovereignty in
the interests of a wider, more co-ordinated movement.. In this they are
opposed by the club members, but one may suspect that it will take more
than the pressures of a few `technocrats', however vocal, to make them
change their minds. There is, none the less, an evolution, in that the
federation has agreed On a common programme and is to present candi-
dates standing in its own name, rather than in those of the parties, in
virtually all constituencies. Further progress will depend, on the success
that it meets at the polls.
The aim of the federation is to present itself as an alternative Govern-
ment, with its own left-wing programme and leaders capable of taking
over the Ministries.. It is this which lies behind the proclamation of a
'contre-Gouvernement', or shadow Cabinet, and the specialists who
have worked on the programme have attempted to make it a plausible
document, with realistic objectives. The road to power will be a long
haul, however, and on the way the federation will have to decide what
attitude to take towards the Communist Party, which now monopolizes
approximately half France's left-wing voters.
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The federation is the main example of an evolution in French political
life which has begun during the Fifth Republic. It has succeeded in
' bringing together the Socialists and the Radicals, as well as M. Mitter-
rand's Union Democrate et Socialiste de la Rdsistance (UDSR), a small
party founded, as its name suggests, at the end of the war. At the same
time, it has brought in the 'intellectuals' of the clubs, many of them
_ highly qualified men in their own fields, and this has given it an informed
, basis for policy that French political parties have not traditionally had.
It is, of course, easy to point to its shortcomings. It is nowhere near
winning an overall majority in the Assembly, it is divided within itself,
and it is strongly opposed by some of the most vocal elements of the non-
Communist Left, in particular the supporters of M. Pierre Mends-
France. The innovators, the 'forces vives', come up against the rigid and
doctrinaire attitudes of the traditional parties, and it is not at all certain
- that the whole structure will not fall apart after the elections for the
Assembly. It does nevertheless exist, and if it can poll a higher percentage
of votes than the Communist Party it will have taken its first step towards
its aim?of becoming the major pole of attraction for the Left.
The problem for the Gaullists is a very different one, but it does have
!a number of points in common with that of the federation. The Gaullists,
, too, have to face the question of maintaining the cohesion of a coalition,
? though for them it has evolved in the opposite direction. Whereas the
, Left is confronted with the need to unite a number of distinct entities,
the Gaullists have to think how they are going to keep together the
various shades of opinion which have been brought into the same camp
? by the personality of the General. The strength of General de Gaulle's
appeal has always been that it has attracted men with many different
political sympathies. This applies particularly in something like a
referendum, or the presidential election, when he has been able to pick
Up votes that would normally go to, say, the Socialists or the Com-
munists. It also means that the spectrum of active Gaullists is now a very
wide one, ranging from a new grouping of those of the Left who are
entirely in agreement with his foreign policies to people of the traditional
Right who see him as the man who brought stability and self-respect to
France.
This wide electoral appeal has given the General and the Gaullists
' commanding position since 1962. France has had strong and stable
government for the first time for many years, and the question confront-
ing the Gaullist leaders is how to maintain this situation when the
General is gone?or is felt to be on the point of going. For the UNR, of
course, the ideal solution would be that it should increase its number of
seats in the Assembly, now rather short of an absolute majority, to a
- majority, so enabling it to do without the increasingly grudging support
of M. Giscard d'Estaing's Independent Republicans. It certainly cannot
, count on such an eventuality, however, and the tactics since the cold
douche of the presidential election have been to enlarge the base of .sup-
port for the Government itself. M. Edgar Faure, a Prime Minister during
the Fourth Republic and a man with his own following, has been brought
into the Government as Minister of Agriculture, and a certain prominence
has been given to 'left-wing Gaullists' in general. M. Edgar Pisani, now
Minister of Equipment, has taken a leading part in the Front du Progth,
an association of this type, pronouncing himself firmly for a change in the
Government's internal policies.
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This wing of the coalition serves to balance the more right-wing
Independent Republicans, and to justify the claim, made by M. Pom-
pidou himself, that the Gaullists are in the centre of the political spectrum.
It is an indication, however, that the UNR itself, the core of Gaullism, is
on the defensive, and only the future will tell whether these various ele-
ments will find enough common ground to stick together. If they do, the
Gaullist vision is of a vast majority grouping, basing itself essentially on
the principles enunciated by General de Gaulle, but 'pragmatic' in their,
application. The vision does not include an effective Opposition, capable
of coming to power in the place of the Gaullists. -
It is interesting that the Gaullists, like the innovators of the Federation
de la Gauche, now lay emphasis on the need for politicians to have the
backing of expertise. Here too they have arrived at a similar position after
setting out from a quite different basis. Whereas it is felt in the federation
that Deputies should be qualified and well informed in order to help
! raise the standing of the Assembly from its present low ebb, the Gaullists
take the view that the Assembly now fulfils its role very well. It has given
up its habit of overturning Governments, and this, in the Gaullist view,
means that the Deputies, deprived of the opportunity of `playing'
politics', take more trouble to prepare their positions. They claim that
Gaullist Deputies, far from being the mere ciphers they. appear to be,
play an important role in influencing Government policy behind the
scenes.
This optimistic view ignores the notorious rate of absenteeism in most
sessions of the Assembly, and the difficulty that all parties are now
having in finding able men ready to stand for election. The Assembly as it
is at present simply does not attract such men. The Gaullists are never-
theless attempting to relieve their old guard, replacing them with
younger, better-qualified men who will present a more modern image.
Gaullism is, after all, something of a brotherhood at its centre, its mem-
bers taking pride in being able to assert that they were with the General
. in London during the war. It is now realized that the movement must
change if it is to become an effective party for the future. 'Military'
Gaullism has to be transformed into 'political' Gaullism, as one UNR
official has put it, and the close family feeling must be replaced by pro-
fessional competence. This attitude is not unlike that of those on the Left
. who are struggling to replace the old warhorses of the past. In the case of
the Gaullists, it will mean that a number of Deputies now in the Assembly
will not be encouraged to stand again.
The Gaullists tend to decry the political importance of the clubs that
have developed on the Left. The UNR has nevertheless created a few of
its own in a number of provincial centres?there is one, for instance, in
Marseille, another in Clermont-Ferrand?and in them they promote the
! examination of specific local problems, rather than broad political issues.-
! M. Giscard d'Estaing, too, has set about founding clubs very actively this
year, as part of his campaign for promoting his party's .interests. They
now exist in several different towns, under the general title of Perspectives
et Realitds. The object of these clubs is not only to give purely political
backing to particular parties, but also to provide a forum in which the
problems of the day can be examined in detail. This tendency towards .
tapping the resources of specialists is one of the marks of the present
. political scene. .
A more specialized approach to political problems will not, however,
- by itself -make for stability when General de Gaulle has gone. The presi-
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dential election seems likely to remain, and it is this which has clipped the
wings of the traditional parties. But for the present system, there would
have been no possibility of M. Mitterrand or M. Jean Lecanuet, the
centre candidate, achieving the status of national figures, and subse-
quently being able to launch political movements that are not limited by
the traditional boundaries between parties. It is not surprising that the
presidential election is supported by many members of the left-wing
political clubs, while being opposed by the party hierarchies, The election
by universal vote has enabled the candidates to win a particular place
? with the electorate which is a means of bringing pressure on the parties.
On the other hand, it is not only the 'system' which is responsible for
the present relative simplification of French political life. There is also
the personality and political ability of General de Gaulle. Last year's
presidential election was dominated by the General, and the Opposition
parties were obsessed by the need to measure up to him. Unless the
General is still on the scene in 1972, when he will be eighty-two years old,
the same will not be true at the next presidential election, and it is not im-
possible that there will then be a whole array of candidates, more than one
of them from the present Gaullist coalition. M. Mitterrand's success in
; winning the support of the whole of the Left?Radicals, Socialists, and
Communists, as well as of the smaller parties?was largely due to the
presence of the General opposite, and there is no certainty that he or a
successor will bring off a similar feat next time. There could be more than
one 'Gaullist' candidate, and more than one from the Left.
The manceuvrings that have been taking place in preparation for the
elections to the Assembly hardly suggest that French politics are going to
, lose their long-standing complexity. If one excludes the extreme Right,
, which came particularly poorly out of the presidential election, there are
at least five main groupings, none of them homogeneous, jostling for
position: the UNR, the Independent Republicans, M. Lecanuct's
Democratic Centre, the left-wing federation, and the Communist Party.
Alliances will certainly be struck up between them, but there is nothing to
suggest that these alliances will survive the elections.
The Gaullists, as the coalition in power, have the most to lose. The
UNR is far and away the largest party in the Assembly, and feels that it
should dominate strategy for the Government group. It has, however,
run up against the ambitions of the Independent Republicans, and the
resulting dispute between the two parties has damaged the Gaullist
image. M. Giscard d'Estaing has agreed to sit on the Comild d' Action
pour la Verne Republique, but it is still not certain that he is going to go
along with M. Pompidou's ruling that there should be only one Gaullist :
candidate standing in each constituency. He is determined to increase the
number of Independent Republican Deputies, and there arc several
constituencies, in the Paris region in particular, in which his ambitions
and those of the UNg clash. M. Giscard d'Estaing has declared his Sup- ;
port for Government policies in general?having left office only in I
January, he would have found it difficult to do otherwise?but he has
made it clear that this support does not always extend to particular
aspects. He has announced, for instance, that if he had remained at the
Ministry of Finance he would not have followed the same policies as his
successor, M. Michel Debre. He is also making a strong bid for the sup-
port of people who oppose General de Gaulle's European policy.
One of the key sectors in the elections will be the area now known as
the centre. To the amusement of political commentators, claims to
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orril d have now bx ut foi N d by dace political leaders,
M. Lecanuet, M. Giscard d'Estaing, and, last but not least, Porn,
pidou. It was M. Lecanuet, the surprise candidate in the presidential
election, who first demonstrated the value of this sector, and the danger
to the whole Gaullist position if it were lost. The centre includes people
!. who disagree with the Gaullist concept of Europe, but also many who are
-dissatisfied with the Government's internal economic and social policies.
The Democratic Centre, which M. Lecanuet founded after the presi-
dential election, aims at repeating his success of last December by taking
votes both from the Gaullists and from the Left. It is, of course, a target
for Gaullist onslaughts, and M. Giscard d'Estaing has set his sights on at
least a part of its potential electorate. M. Lecanuet reckons, however, on
winning enough votes to enable the Democratic Centre to emerge as the
'arbiter' of any Government that may be formed afterwards.
His view is that no overall majority will emerge from the elections, and
that the centre will be able to impose its conditions for participation in,
or support for, the new Government. Since such a Government is in-
finitely more likely to be Gaullist than Leftist, M. Lecanuet appears to
consider that he will be able to influence the policies of General de Gaulle
?more effectively from outside the coalition than M. Giscard d'Estaing
ever succeeded in doing from inside. He may not be right, but it is
interesting that a poll published by the French Institute of Public
Opinion in August found only 22 per cent of those questioned in favour
of a majority consisting solely of Gaullists, while a further 21 per cent
favoured a coalition of Gaullists and the Democratic Centre.
M, Lecanuet's position would be stronger if he had better chances of an
alternative alliance on the Left. The question of possible alliances be-
tween the centre and the Federation de la Gauche has, however, become
the major point of disagreement on the Left, and, in spite of various
overtures, M. Lecanuet cannot count on much open support from that
quarter. There are many members of the federation, particularly among
the Radicals, who would be very willing to co-operate with the centre.
But they have been flatly told by the Communists that the federation
cannot have it both ways: either it allies itself with the 'reactionaries' of
the Democratic Centre, in which case any deal with the Communists is
out, or else it reaches an agreement with the Communists. Put this way,
the dilemma of the federation is a difficult one. An exclusive alliance with
the Communists can, after all, be counted to frighten away a number of
supporters. On the other hand, since the failure of M. Defferre's plan for
a centre-Left federation, M. Mitterrand and other leaders of the non-
Communist Left have given priority to links with the Communists.
For the Communists, the main object of the election campaign is not so.
much to defeat the Gaullists, much of whose foreign policy they support,
as to take a further step out of the 'ghetto' in which they have been kept
since the 1940s. Their support for M. Mitterrand in the presidential
election was a move in this direction, but it was taken out of weakness, for
fear of the poor showing-211y Communist candidate would have made on
his own. They feel stronger in the campaign for the. Assembly, and arc
determined not to find themselves committed to a non-Communist Left
which is itself tainted with centrism. M. Lecgrolpt iq +keno tio.wi,fige.-1
7 ?
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all worlds, 'Atlantic' ii his foreign policy and 'liberal' at home. They sec
no reason to trust the policies of the federation towards the centre, and
give every sign of playing their own cards strongly in the elections. They
were the first to present a full list of candidates, and the first to have their
election posters out in Paris.
The federation has remained unruffled and equivocal in the face of
Communist demands, conceding only the principle that priority goes to
an arrangement with the Communists. Its own interest, as far as the
. elections go, lies in the traditional policy of making different alliances in
different constituencies, some with the Communists, some with the
centre. Its two leaders, M. Mitterrand and M. Guy Monet, the secretary-
general of the Socialist Party, are both astute politicians, and of the two it
is M. Mollet who swings more political weight within the federation. He
is a man who likes to keep all his options open for as long as possible.
The main question-mark over the elections is how far General de
Gaulle will intervene in the campaign himself. The Gaullist party leaders
are counting on him, and he learned last December that an Olympian.
attitude did him no good with the voters. If he associates himself strongly
with the UNR, he will do something to counteract their weakness at local
level, and help them to take votes from the Socialists and Communists.
He himself has always been able to do this, and his visits this year to the
Soviet Union and Cambodia are certain to have appealed to left-wing
. voters. On the other hand, such a degree of involvement would also mark
him out as a party leader, and this is something that he is notoriously
reluctant to be. It would also involve him in any setback that the Gaullists
might suffer.
What he will do if such a setback takes place remains even more un-
certain. Clearly much depends on the extent of the damage, and the
limitations that are imposed on him. The Opposition parties arc so
divided among themselves that they could be ineffective against him.
He has the possibility of calling new elections, of introducing a referen-
dum, or even, in the last resort, of taking special powers under Article 16
of the Constitution. He could, of course, decide that the moment had
come for him to return finally to Colombey-les-deux-liglises. But the
situation would presumably have to be very critical before he took this
step.
8
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MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
12 December 1966 .
Communist
progress
in France
CPYRGHT
From our Correspondent
Paris, December 11
The Commums; ,rarty, with
425,000 card-carrying mem-
bers, is now at its 'strongest
point since the return of
General de Gaulle to power in
1958.
A report prepared or the
party congress which meets on
January 4 discloses that during
the three years after General de
Gaulle's return the party lost
80,000 members Since 1961.
CPYRGHT -
.... I! , . A? 1 .' ? .
q s -Du , ne 0.__'
o , Spp 1'. .11 or mem-
bership have steadily increased, more senior members of thr
and today there are 20,000 more party's Politburo, who was sq
members and 2,500 more cells imprudent as to let himself bi
than in 1958. The circulation of photographed shaking hands with
" Humanite " is said to have General de Gaulle in the Russian
reached 203,000, an increase of Embassy last week, has thi
23,000. weekend tried his best to play
The report emphasises the pro- down the effects of the Kosygir
portion of members under 30 who visit on the party's rank 'and flleh
hold positions of responsibility," Th French do not make uk
but adds that "much remains'their minds on the strength o'
to be done In this domain." in a ,visit by a foreign stateman, bu
fact, the party is having serious because of taxes and rents whiel
difficulties with the Union of are increasing," he said
C o m m u n St Students and 1,4, Duclos R aid thnt the, roml
AeueiaLly had tt,t supress severatmunisLs Dore no personat grungd
cells in the Paris Faculty of Law against General de Gaulle, and
and the important Ecole Normale wished him "a long and happy
Superieure for their pro-Chinese retirement." Explaining the
,tendencies. % famous handshake which must
have staggered those Socialists
No grudge and Communists who for years
The party has also got to set have been following the order to
about undoing the damage to" Boycott de Gaulle," he said: "I
am a polite man. I was invited
their election prospects which by the comrades and there the
the yisit of Mr KosYgin gentleman who I know offered
undoubtedly wrought, to the ill-me his hand. After all, if Com
concealed dplight of the rade Kosygin saw nothing wrong
in shaking the General's hand,
Gaullists. why should little M. Duclos."
CHRISTIAN scNcE MONITOR
12 DECFXBER 1966
Lnpro.,,1 etarian. tastes
CPYRGHT
A
Vvnat is more symbolic of royal diyertis-
sement than a hunt in the coverts on the
great estate at Rambouillet? And what is
more symbolic to anti-Marxists of Marxist
zeal than socialized medicine? The juxta-
position of these questions results from
''our amusement at two reports appearing
' simultaneously in the newspapers on Fri-
day. The first was about the Soviet leaders'
day out with their guns as guests of Presi-
dent de Gaulle at Rambouillet. The second
was about the Soviet physicians who have
made the quite startling proposal that
' Russians should open self-supporting
1 hospitals in which patients should pay for
care. ? .
Of course all this is further evidence of
how we fool ourselves by accepting stereo-
types. We really should not have been'
startled in the first place. Russia is still
! Russia, despite all the slogans we have
heard for nearly half a century about the
1:workers of the world, about the interna-
tional proletariat?or even dialectical ma-
' terialism. Increasingly, we are coming to
see that Commissars end up as ambitious
as Czars to further Russia's rather than
communism's interests. And we were, of
course, shortsighted if we ever thought
that communism would make much differ-
ence to human nature for very long.
There
in the woods at Rambouillet. These
photos were the male counterpart of those
which appeared at the time of the visit of
the de Gaulles to Moscow, showing a
quietly elegant Mrs. de Gaulle in company
with: some of the Soviet leaders' wives.
The latter were far from dowdy in their
choice of dress and maquillage. Indeed
they were doing very well in trying to
keep up with the Faubourg St. Honore?
and seemed eons away from peasant ker-
chiefs or even collective farms.
The most recent news we read about
collective, farms was that they were
changing, too. They have not been dis-
mantled or turned over to private owner-
ship yet. But pay and benefits for workers
on them are robbing the farms of their
original dour austerity. So much so, in
fact, that guaranteed minimum wages are
keeping workers on the farms now, even
in slack periods. There was a time when
workers welcomed slack periods as an
opportunity to slip off and make some-
thing on the side through self-employ-
ment. Now they are so much better off
that they turn up for work on the farms,
winter and summer, and the management
does not know what jobs to give them.
As the proposal about payment for care
in self-supporting hospitals further shows,
when people see a chance to better them-
certainly very selves, not even the most high-soundinit
oatormotortaittrit: war??6-7?11,1)
was
riot
much
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CPYRGHT
12T:11;471 T 1141166
FRENCH LEFTISTS
IN ELECTION PACT
Communists and Federation
of Other Parties Join in
Fight Against Gaullism
CPYRGHT
The Communist party is the
second biggest in France, after
President de Gaulle's 'Union for
the New Republic, and claims
about 20 per cent of the elec-
torate. The Federation was
formed last spring under Frari-,
cols Mitterand, the Independ-
ent left-winger who took 45 per
cent of the vote Sri the run-off
presidential balloting ?against
General de Gaulle a year ago.
In the first round of. the last
legislative, elections,. in Novem-
By RICHARD E. MOONEY ber, 1962, the Guallists received
Special to The New York Times 32 per cent of the nearly 19
PARIS, Dec. 20?The non- million votes cast, the Corn.
communist left and tile Uom---muius &IRMA 12 per cent, the
munist party agreed early today
to fight Gaullism together in
next spring's parliamentary elec-
tions.
The terms of the agreement,
which are not to be published
until tomorrow, are considered.
to be less important than it
existence.
Assuming that it is respeetet
during the campaign, the agree.
ment marks the end of the Corm
munists' long virtual isolation
from other political groups. The
'Communists were in the first
all- embracing coalition that
governed France just after
World War II but were than outi
in 1947 and have been isolated
since.
The agreement does not mean
that the left will win the elec?
tions next March. Rather it is
viewed as a first step in the
'direction of developing a uni-
fied left. It is still commonly
expected that the Gaullists will
retain a majority, even if they
have to piece it together with
some non-Gaullists. The leftists'
unity agreement is itself re-
ported to be a loose one, be-
cause even among the partici-
pants there is dissent. Moreover,
It embrades only a part of the
opposition and, in fact, only a
part?albeit a major part---of
the left.
' Federation Is Young
The parties to the agreemtnt
are the Communist. party and
the Federation of the Democrat-
ic-Socialist Left, which com-
prises the big Socialist party,
the once-big Radical party, and
several small political "clubs."
Within the Federation, some
Radical party members feel
that they should be making al-
liances with the political center
and not with the far left. An-
other group of young politi-
cians and professionals who call
themselves the Jean Moulin
Club have joined the Federa-
tion but recently published an
angry criticism of, any link to
the Communists.
The Communists themselves
evidently have internal dissen-
sion. French Communism, base-
? ally pro-Moscow, also has its
? elements 'distrustful of any al-
liance.
There are also hold-outs. The
Socialist 12.5 per cent, the
Radicals 4.7 per cent and a
centrist got 15 per cent.. The
remaining votes went mostly to
conservative ?groups, most of
which are now likely to vote
Guallist.
The first part of the new
agreement is a common plat-
form that notes the points on
which the parties agree, ac-
knowledging that they disagree
on others. They agree, for M-
stance, in their opposition to
"one-man rule," but not on the
more fundamental point of
what form of government
France should have.
The second part of the agree-
ment provides for the with-
drawal of candidates in next
spring's elections. In the first-
round balloting, on March 5,
the Communists and. the Feder-
ation will have their own sep-
arate candidates in most of the
485 constituencies.
There is no rule for narrow-
ing the field to two contestants
In the second round, a week
later. But if two leftists stay
In the running against a Gaullist
they risk giving the election to
the Gaullist. Thus the agree-
ment establishes conditions for
one or the other of the leftists
to pull out.
Third Part Called Vital
? ? The third part a the agree-
ment goes beyond next year's
elections and is being interpret-
ed as the most important. Its
essential point is that the Com-
munists and the Federation
should continue to work to-
gether.,
The Communists have been
champions of unity for some
time. Mr. Mitterrand has wanted
to link the Federation with the
Communists, but not so closely
that the unity Would seem to
mean the formation of a Com-
munist dominated left. ,
smau untried bocianst party is
the absent organized leftist
rsroup, but more notable
Rierre Mendis-France, the
former Premier who is cam-
paigning ' to get back into ac...
tive politics as a Deputy from
Grenoble.
The new pact was announced
in the small hours this morning
at the end of a meeting that
began late yesterday afternoon.
It was the third meeting in a
week. There were only about a
dozen participants, and they
have been very discreet about
what went on.
The public announcement of
the text was delayed to permit
review by members of both
groups' leadership who were not
Pre!Iel?t? "
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2
Lor:RN
CPYRCA4PPr?Y$AfifihryR13)gaSe 1999/08/2
HOW POPULAR A FRONT? ---
.?Is,a ,French Popular Front really in
; the making? The agreement signed a
fortnight ago between the communists
and M. MITTERRAND'S Federation of the
Left was little more than an arrangement
for working together in the March par-
liamentary elections. But in his address
to the Communist Party Congress yester-
day M. WALDECK ROCI1ET, the secretary-
general, made it clear that he is looking
beyond this poll. The aim of the party
remained the establishment of a political
programme common to the whole left,
he told the delegates.
? That is a good deal more than has
been achieved up to now, though last
month's agreement did look forward to
the long-term objectives of the left.
Much will obvioutly depend upon the
success of this initial arrangement. What
are the chances ? ? ,
' The failure to reach agreement on
' more than a few items of policy need
not be a fatal handicap at this stage.
, M. MITTERRAND certainly benefited from
his arrangement with the communists
when , he' ran for the' presidency
against GENERAL DE, GAuLLE just over
a year ago?even, though he differed
from them on a number of questions,
particularly on foreign policy. Norway
has shown how four separate parties with
their own individual programmes can
win an election and go on to form an
effective coalition government.
Political leaders .often find It difficult.
however, to gain the ardour of ? their
followers for a mere marriage Of con-
venience. The'present'pateis no more
than that, and it maY'be significant that ,
M. RocitET was at pains to justify it to
doubters in, the party yesterday. May not
some communist voters prefer' Gaullists
to candidates' of the left?vvho speak in
Atlantic terms? And may not some other
left-wing voters be driven by fear of the
communists either to M. L:ECANUETIS
Democratic Centre . or even to: the
Gaullists 7
Above 'all, hew well Will the 'leaders
themselves work together when it comes
to the point 7 M". MITTERRAND and his
colleagues have preserved their freedom
of action to support?C'entre candidates, I
provided they are really opposed to DE
CiAULLE. when they' seem to have the
best chance of ,defeating the Gaullist.
Here is an obviouS sotirce Of potential
strife. ?- ' ? '
? ' All 'in' all, the March election may
reveal not so muelt an old-style Popular
Front as a clearer'diviSion than before
tstedgizecinFteteatce,499 /0
cc t edand left. ?, )
I :
CPYRGHT
tends,'
Gaullist Opposition to Peking's Isolation
.Gains European Support
By HAROLD KING ! JAPAN TDISS
PARIS (Kyocio.:Reuter) ?
Vim an ambassackor installed
in Peking the French Govern-
ment is pursuing a discreet
but assiduous campaign to
bring China into the concert
of nations. even if it cannot
bring it into the United Na-
tions Organization. - "
The latest evidence of this
was an appeal to parliamen-
tary representatives from the
seven Western European
Union' nations to "treat the
China of (Chairman) Mao
:like a civilized community."
I This plea came from a
French Gaullist member of
the national assembly, Col.
Pierre Bourgoin, . who has
close contact with 'President
de Gaulle, At a meeting of the
parliamentary assembly of
the Western European Union
on last Dec. 13. .
' "With her present mentali-
ty," said Col. Bourgoin, "Chi-
na is a danger to ,peace. If
there is any means of ward-
ing off this danger, it certain-
ly is not to be found in piling
up ever more armaments, be-
cause China will also acquire
the frightful possibility of
destroying the world, not to,
safeguard herself but in order
,not to perish alone."
No Isolation for China
While keeping Its own
nuclear powder dry, the West
had every interest, Col. Bour-
goin claimed, ."in helping
China out of her isolation, be-
cause that is the only way
left open to us to promote any
.reassuring development of
'China's mentality."
His report was endorsed by
,the members of narliarnpnt
present from Britain, France,
6 January. 1967
dl y oetween
party officials and ; pro-Chi'.
nese , Communist - groups'
which have sprung up in the,
larger indtistrial towns and
in the universities.
The Communist Party:
newspaper, L'Humanite, pub-,
lished on Dec, 14 a long letter'
from a, party member,'
known in Lyons, who is em-
ployed in the Bernet. car Ric-,
,tory there. ? i
This letter reads like a,
James Bond serial. In it, coni-
rade Louis Faradoux (Corn-;
munist. Party membership'
card NO. 186,455) reports how,
he was wooed and enticed by'',
Chinese' who were on the,
, factory floor as experts from',
Peking in connection with a
Chinese order for 1,500 lor-i
l'iPS.
Having won the confidentel
of these Chinese, reports cont-
rade Faradoux, he was InvIt-:
ed by a Chou Hsiang-chi to,
join some pro-Chinese Marx.'
, ist-Leninist clubs with a view?
to spreading pro-Chinese sym,
pathies in the factories.
But worse was to come.
Faradoux's Story
"They offered me money to,
betray the' party," reports.
comrade Faradoux. "Chou
told me that they were pre-
pared to cope with the finan-
cial difficulties of all kinds,
which my activities would in-!
valve."
'At this point, comrade'
Faradoux considered .that
things had gone far enough.
' So he reported everything to
his party superiors.
The number of Chinese
from Peking temporarily,
:
West Germany, Italy, Bel-
working at the Berliet plant
%gium, Holland and Luxem- at Venissieux, near Lyons, Is
!burg. Gordon Walker, former only 14, a company represen-
7
tative explained. They are' British Foreign Secretary,
:considered the. report was due to return to Peking by
1"more Chinese than the Chi-
the end of 1066, he added.
nese", but agreed that its ob. 'Yet the French Communist:
:servations on China were Party has seen fit to make,
"just and penetrating." a big issue of the relations;
Gen. De Gaulle's approach between this small band of !
to China is that, however dif. Chinese, ? Communists and,
ficult, the aim must be to be some members of the French.
on speaking terms with this orthodox party. j
huge country and to draw This is generaliy assumed
Peking into the normal here to reflect the customary'
diplomatic circle of the world, alignment of French Corn-
because, in the late Sir Win- munist Party line with that
.ston Churchill's words "jaw- of Moscow. But it may also
Jaw is better than war-war." reflect nervousness of the
Hostile to Mao party lest the young, who
? In the .French Communist are not flooding into the
Party camp, however, feeliAbatiebotir . tije revolu-
uf,1 ?
. Tse-tung s hostile. The party pro-Chinese Communists more
8/24 toA-Fc f7187a0306$ of the, .
leaders are definitely against attractive.
3
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CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
CPYRGHT 8 January 1967
French Left Unites, in a Way
By RICHARD E. MOONEY
Special to The New York Times
Paris, Jan. 7 ? The Fre
ich
a substantial slice of the electorate ,
Into voting for the status quo_ by
asserting that the choice is be-
The non-Communist center and
right, of course, will have nothing
to do with the Communists at all.
And, most significantly, the new .
left-wing alliance is itself a cau-
tious arrangement, decidedly less '
solid than the left?wing Popular
Front that actually held power in
the mid-1930's.
At that time, the two senior
partners of the coalition, Leon'
Blum's Socialists and Edouard,
Herriot's powerful Radical 'Social-
ists, were .for a time unconditional ?
allies of the Communists, then led.'
,by Maurice Thorez, in an alliance'
cemented by the fierceness of at-
tacks against it from the right
and center.
Undoubtedly, the constitution of '-
today's alliance has been facilitated
by the general detente between'
East and West that gradually de-
veloped since the Khrushchev era
and the ensuing more relaxed view
of Communism taken in most of
Europe. This evolution has been
furthered by General de Gaulle's
recent overtures toward the East.,
? The new arrangement links the
Communists to the nine-month old'
Federation of the Democratic-So-
cialist Left. The Federation is the
big Socialist party, the once big
but now small Radical party, and a
collection of left-wing political
groups.
The Federation's leader is
Francois Mitterrand, the man who
ran second in the Presidential elec-
tions 13 months ago.' He shares
his influence, though, with Guy.
Monet, the ex-Premier who heads,
the Socialists, and there are vari-
?Ili interpretations as to which onel
has been really the more influen-:
tial . in shaping the new alliance
with the Communists. In fact, nei-
ther one is rated as a strongman.'
The alliance started taking'
shape in late 1965, when the Com-
munists decided not to run a Presi-
dential candidate of their own and
to support Mr. , Mitterrand. '
their 18th party Congress. They
had a new look.
Their meeting hall was a
smartly styled gymnasium in the
Industrial suburb of Levallois ?
well lighted and ventilated, and
not a militant slogan in sight. A
? large adjacent room Was temporar-,
ily made over as a gallery of mod-
ern art, with hardly a trace of
the old "socialist realism."
The visible newness was sym-
bolic and intentional. Not three
weeks ago the party made an al-
liance with France's non-Com-
munist left to fight together
against the Gaullists in the Na-
tional Assembly elections in
March. Their historic pact put an
end to, two 'decades of Communist
isolation as the untouchables of
French politics.
The Communists are the second
most powerful party here, after
President de Gaulle's Union for
the New Republic. They polled
20 per cent of the vote in the
last Assembly elections, five years
ago, and they hold 41 of the As-
sembly's 487 seats. (This is a
smaller percentage than their
popular vote because seats are
contested by districts.) There are
Communist mayors in Le Havre
and more than 200 other smaller
cities and towns, including 60 sub-
urbs of Paris.
, Because of the Communists'
strength the Government must ac-
commodate them from time to
time. General de Gaulle's flirtation
with Moscow is at least partly
motivated by this. But fundamen-
tally they have lacked national
respectability since the cold war
began. Members of the broad
coalition that ruled France at the
end of World War IT, they were
kicked out in 1947 and have re-
mained out.
Even today the Communists are
far away from full acceptance.
The Gaullists count on frightening
liniment iioais
The Communists, seeking a place
In the main stream, were the prin-4
wanted more than they got. The
: .Federation, seeking voting?
strength, was hesitant, and is still,
not committed to support those?
. Communist candidates whom they!
I judge incapable of winning. In,:
short, the Communists want a,
militant left while the Federation,,
Wants a winning coalition.
4
The Communists and the Fed,
eratiOn will each run a complete!
slate of candidates in the first
round of the Assembly elections,,
on March 5, and they have only
a conditional agreement to get out
of each other's way for the second
round, a week later. They have,
issued a common communiqu?n
the points of policy which they
commonly support ? largely do-
mestic ? but they acknowledge
that in some essential respects,
such as NATO, they disagree.
Thus the alliance as constituted
is incomplete. Also, there are still
some other small left-wing fee-
tions outside it, notably the Uni-
fied Socialist party whose star is.
Pierre Mendes-France, and a
splinter of pro-Chinese defectors,
from the pro-Moscow main body,?
of the Communists. In addition to:
the left there is the non-left op-
position ? the Democratic Center,
of Jean Lecanuet, who placed third
In the Presidential race, plus other'
smaller groups, to the right. 1,
It is not expected, nor seriously,
claimed, that out of all this the
new alliance could pull off a ma-:
jority victory. It is not even cer-
tain whether it will increase or
reduce its composite strength,
though the assumption is an in-
crease.
President de Gaulle's eight years
In office have stabilized French po.,
Mies, but have not clarified them!
He has consolidated a strong ma-
jority. The frustrated minorities;
are only now, beginning to try
to achieve the same kind 'of con."
%
solidation.
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4
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CPYRGHT
LONDON OBSERVER
8 January 1967
rench oost for
opuh r Front
by MARK FRANKLAND.,
THE EIGHTEENTH Congress
of the French Communist Party,
which ends this evening, has more
to celebrate than just the party's
return to the thick of French
political life through its new
alliance with the non-Communist
Left.
' It ? can also celebrate the most
important success to date of the
Popular' Front policy blessed by t
Moscow .as long ago as 1956. .
This policy reflects the interests of
both the Soviet Union and the Euro-
pean ,Communist Parties. Moscow,
sctireely expecting to, See Comunist
Obvcrnmznts in West Europe in the
near future. would like to have instead
strong .left-wing blocs that included
the CoMmunists; Such blocs could
be expected to be generally neutralist,
anti-American, anti-NATO and in
favour of East-West 'detente.
Breakaway -parties
. The Western Communist Parties
themselves have at last accepted that
they .must abandon some of their
rigid exclusiveness if they are to sur-
vive. , For example,. in Norway and
Denniark breakaway Marxist parties
can capture an increasing number of
votes while the orthodox Communist
rumps deCline.
It neVertheleSs is still easier to
propose than to practise the new
Popular Front-ism., The. British
CommuniSt Partji,' ;at its :congress in
November. 1965, expressly criticised
Its old guard members who still
maintain that the Labour Party is no .
different from a capitalist party. And
it supported a broad militant
alliance' of the British Left.
The trouble here is that the British
Communists are arguing from a.
position of weakness, since the Labour
Party has no need of them, Similarly,
in the Austrian elections last year,
indirect Communist support damaged
the Austrian Socialist Party.
In France, however, the huge
strength of President de Gaulle has
made M. Mitterrand's Federation of
the Democratic Socialist Left more
amenable to Communist advances.
More gentle
The effects of this policy on the
Western European parties must even-
tually be considerable., Alterations
to Marxist-Leninist theory are
already being discused by Commun-
ists in France and elsewhere. At the
moment, this has not gone far and
the French party and M. ?Mitterrand
have completely failed to agree on a
common political programme. But
there are already signs of rethinking
too radical to be easily accepted
either by the Soviet Union or by con-
servative European party members.
For example, discussion about the
possibility of a multi-party system
under Communism is no longer
taboo. The key theory of the ' dicta-
torship of the proletariat ' is being
interpreted in a more gentle way.
ironically, the conservative-minded
European Communists may be
tempted to join the , pro-Chinese
splinter parties, where .all such new,
ideas are comfortingly dismissed as
revisionist.' -
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24 -;:tel/tAtilts7t1101808-1A0004000-70009-PYR9HT
19 January 1967
March Election Turmoil Grows
CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
9 January 1967
FRENCH REDS LAUD
French Politics
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
ields Shockers
DE GAULLE ON WAR
Communist Conference Also
Forms New Election Tie
By RICHARD E. MOONEY
Special to The New York Timex
'PARIS, Jan. 8?France's Corn-
The'announcement of another
new anti-Gaullist political pact
was made by the party chair-
man, Waldeck Rochet, in a
speech to the final session of
the congress. The Communists'
newest ally is the Unified So-
cialist party, a small party that,
had taken the position that the
larger left-wing alliance estab-
lished last month was domin-
ated by old dogmas and thus
too soft.
Junked to Federation
Last month's alliance linked
munists concluded their 1.6tn
party congress today with a
strong denunciation of Peking,
restrained praise for President
de Gaulle and announcement of
-another new political pact for
the coming French elections.
' The official theme of the five-
day congress was more domestic
than international ? generally
building up for the National As-
sembly elections in March, and
specifically celebrating last
month's historic agreement to
wage the campaign in concert
With most of France's non-Com-
munist left.
But there were frequent ref-
erences to the war in Vietnam,
the Chinese-Soviet split' and a
world conference of Communist
parties. The final. resolution
called for the convocation of
such a conference "as promptly
as possible."
Of China the resolution said:
"The party condemns the cur-
rent Chinese leaden who are
breaking, in every respect. with
Marxism-Leninism and with the
rules of behavior for Communist
parties."
It said that "tahe activities of
denigration and division" by
Peking's leaders were an argu-
ment in favor of a world con-
ference.
The resolution praised General
De Gaulle "without hesitation"
for his improvement of Paris-
-Moscow relations and for his at-
titude on the Vietnam war. But
in the same sentence the party
said that it remained opposed to
"the seriously negative aspects"
of his foreign policy on dis-
armament, for ingtance.
It explained that the few
.aspects did not result from great
statesmanship but from "con-
tradictions between capitalist
countries, accentuated by the
'change in the world balance of,
power."
[mit lAJIIIIIIIAILISLS WAAL WIC 11111U?
month aid Federation of the
Left,' which embraces the so-
cialist and radical parties and
a number of smaller groups that
call themselves conventions and
clubs.
The Communists' 'arrange-
ments with both the federation
and the Unified Socialists pro-
vides that each will run its own
candidates in the first-round
'vote and that the candidates
who trail in this ballot will
then, in most circumstances,
withdraw from the run-off in
favor of those who did better,
The federation itself is trying
to work out a similar deal with
the Unified Socialists.
The party congress ended its
business with the election of
the Central Committee. Eight
former members did not run for
re-election, and 11 new mem-
bers were added. ,
By Waverley Root
Worthington Post Foreign service
, an. o ica
pressures building up toward
the March 5 legislative elec-
tions produced two shocks to
French tradition today.
. One looked like a govern-
mental attempt to restrict the
opposition's right to free as-
sembly; it died quickly. The
'other was the release of a pub-
'lie opinion poll by the Com-
munist Party, which usually
plays its cards much closer
to its chest..
The extr eme right-wing
newspaper Aurore and the
Intellectual leftist Combat
both revealed today that the
City of Paris had refused
three political parties the use
of the Palais des Sports, the
only hall suitable for political
mass meetings. The three were
Sen. Jean Lecanuet's Demo-
cratic Centrists, the Commu-
nista, and former Finance Min-
ister Valery Giscard d'Estang's
Independent Republicans, who
'are allied with the Gaullists.
The reason given for refus-
ing the parties the hall was
that the police had claimed
they would not have sufficient
men to handle such large
gatherings. Yet the Gaullists
had been given the hall for
Jan. 31. The explanation was
that the police expected to be
overtaxed after the official
campaign begins Feb. 12; the
three opposition dates were
When parliamentary leaders I
split .up the DO minutes each 1
argument, the Gaullists got 78,1
minutes of the government's'
share and the Gisc a r
d'Estaing group, 12. The oppo-
sition split its share 24 min
utes for Lecanuet's group, 17
for the Democratic Front, 30
for the Socialists and 19 for
the Cominunists.
The Communist poll was
taken by the neutral French
Institute of Public Opinion.
Of those questioned, 51 per
cent found the Party's actions
since 1944 useful, and only 21
per cent found them harmful.
Forty percent favor Commu-
nist ministers in the govern-
ment, 24 per cent are opposed,
and 27 per cent think it makes
no difference.
Asked whether Communist
or Western countries will be
more powerful militarily 20
years from now, 32 per cent
said the Communists and 18
per cent the West.
On future scientific and
technical superiority, 28 per
cent think the Communists
will be ahead, 24 per cent
think the West will; 52 per
cent think Western countries
will have a higher standard of
living and only 11 per cent
think the Communists will.
A maj o rity believed the
Communists, Socialists and
Centrists will gain ground in-
France in the next 10 years,
Feb: 14, 16 and 27. while the Gaullists and the.
As soon as the news was extreme right will lose.
out, the Interior Ministry de-
On the important issues 1111
?flied it. The eXplanation was
the March elections, 32 pert
that the architectural commit- cent of the voters think the
tee of the city had acted with-
standard of living conies first;'
out consulting higher author-
22 per cent gave econernic de
ity in a routine desire to pro-
tect municipal property. The velopment of France
19 per cent named the defense
meetings have now been re-
of liberties, 12 per cent stabil-1
scheduled.
ity of government (a favorite
Gaullist theme), and only 7
per cent the role of France 14
the world. -
Observers also suspect the
'opposition is getting the short
end of the stick in a decision
to divide radio and television
time for the campaign 50-50 be-
tween government and oppo-
sition. Since the government
Approved For Release 1999/08/2414pgstakftpMV?t
dozen parties, this sounds like
the old wheeze about the half-
[UPI reported that the goy.,
ernment announced it would
grant advances on future wage
WOOMPV40111:1c?t3irg
was designed to head off pa.
litically embarrassing labor
?
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:angkok newspapers
North Vietnam Runs Guerrilla School for Thais
The North Vietnamese regime has been operating a secret guerrilla
warfare school for Thais for the past four or five years. One training
school near Hanoi gives an eight-month course; other establishments for
indoctrination of Thai farmers have been located in China and in Pathet
Lao-held territory in Laos.
A young Thai farmer revealed details of the school near Hanoi at a
press conference in Bangkok in mid-October. Like many other Thais he had
gone to North Vietnam, not knowing that he was to be given guerrilla instruc-
tion. He had joined the "Farmers' Liberation Party" at the behest of a man
from another Thai province, not realizing that this "Party" was a Communist
front organization. Through this organization, he was offered a chance to
go abroad to study, and he accepted this offer, hoping to receive medical
training. The man who had induced him to join the "Farmers' Liberation
Party" conducted him and four others from Thailand into Laos. There they
were met and guided by Pathet Lao or Vietnamese soldiers. After 18 days of
travel the group reached Hanoi, and proceeded to the training school.
Our Thai farmer was given eight months of training in Communist doctrine
and guerrilla warfare. A political course instructed the trainees in methods
of persuasion to use to get villagers to "join the revolution" and the regular
courses were reinforced by enforced listening to the clandestine "Voice of
the People of Thailand," as well as to Hanoi radio. 130 Thais attended the
school while the farmer was there; most of them were laborers and peasants
from the south, middle and northeasterly sections of Thailand. The group in-
cluded 18 women. Trainees were paid in Vietnamese currency at a monthly rate
equivalent to 120 Thai baht. On leaving, they received a pair of pants and
a final payment of 400 baht. The farmer said that he was in the fourth group
of trainees, and since the school had been set up four or five years ago, his
information indicates that there are by now a sizable number of potential
guerrillas in Thailand, trained by Hanoi. They return to Thailand in the
way they come, via Laos; the instructors tell them that they will be given
instructions by the liberation movement after they reach home.
In the case of this farmer, the indoctrination failed. On arriving home
in March 1966, he told his parents what had happened, and on their advice he
gave himself up to the Thai police. Even before he got back to Thailand, he
related, he had known that the Communists were trying to use him as a tool.
Also, he had no desire to endanger his life for the sake of Communism.
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CPYRGHT
Janu 1967
Outlawed Thai Communeg1 tFarty
Links Itself to China-Based 'Front'
By Stephen S. Rosenfeld
"V,Vashinirton Post Staff Writer
The Thai Communist .varty
has for the first time associated
Aself publicly with the
'Thailand Popular Front," the
nsurgency movement welded
together last year under the
sponsorship of China and
North Vietnam.
And for the first time the
Thai Party has broadcast an
appeal in its own name on the
clandestine radio station regu-
larly, used by the Front. The
station is thought to be near
Kunming in southern China.
The Thai Communist Party,
outlawed in Thailand, is small
and ? in exile or underground,
and its- leaders, are unidenti-
fied. Some observers saw its
new move as an effort to
broaden its base and to con-
trol at least part of the action
in northeast Thailand, focus
of the insurgency.
The Front has not pre-
viously claimed or recognized
the Communist affiliation that
its opponents have con-
tinuously alleged, although
Party documents are said to
have been discovered among
Front material captured in
the northeast.
? All sides agree that the in-
surgents are Thais. Their op-
ponents say, however, the in-
surgency is directed from
Hanoi and Peking.
The Western consensus is
that the insurgency is bother-
some but not serious, because
Thailand lacks the history of
foreign domination which has
nourished nationalism and
communism ? elsewhere in
Asia.
The Communist Party state-
ment was issued on its 24th
anniversary last Dec. 1 but be-
came known only through a
broadcast to the northeast last
, Saturday. The broadcast was
monitored here.
In saluting the Front, the
Communist Party did not
claim formal affiliation or con-
trol. It said it had "welcomed
with joy" the Front's forma-
tion last year and it expressed
"satisfaction" at the Front's
"rapid development."
"We want to make known
here also that we are ready at
any? time to cooperate with
any group of patriots in the
struggle to drive the Ameri-
cans out the country and over-
throw the Thanom - Praphat
(government) , clique," the
Party said.
Scoring the Soviet Union,
the Thai Party statement
urged study of Mao 'rseAung's
"thought" and also his 4.1guer-
rilla warfare tactics."
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3
Article: Thais Counter Subversion
by Gordon Tate
Thailand has strengthened her internal security against the threat of
Chinese-inspired subversion by local Communists. The Thai Government's
measures include the provision of more up-to-date weapons, communication
equipment, and river craft to patrol the Mekong River which for 500 miles
forms the border between Thailand and Laos.
It has stepped up the social welfare programme. Plans have been put
in hand for "self-help" villages in the more fertile and much less populated
south: the first group of 100 families is now settled in Narathiwat Pro-
vince. Both in the south and north-east, mobile development teams visit
outlying villages offering practical assistance in farming, education, and
public health. The government's experiment with sending young "Peace Corps"
type workers (known as Rural Development Volunteers) to under-developed areas
has proved so successful that a new batch was called up in August.
Communist ambitions became obvious in 1964 with the creation of a united
front organisation - the "Thailand Independence Movement" (TIM). In 1965, it
joined a similar group, the self-styled "Thailand Patriotic Front" (TPF), ac-
cepting its leadership. Both have been exhorting the people of Thailand to
overthrow the government and replace it with a "neutralist" coalition com-
prising "all patriotic parties in the country" - generally the first step in
a Communist bid for power.
Both "fronts" are backed by China, North Vietnam, the Communist-dominated
Pathet Lao movement in Laos, and the "South Vietnam National Liberation Front."
One of the TIM messages - reported by the New China News Agency on Novem-
ber 2, 1966 - appeal to the Thai people to be ready at any time to "take up
arms and unhesitatingly plunge into the glorious people's war" against "im-
perialism and its Thai running dogs." It further called for "unreserved
support and help" to what it described as "the people's armed forces," mean-
ing the Communist terrorists.
For years China has been infiltrating guerrillas and agents into Thailand
through Laos and Burma. The main target for subversion has been the north-
east which is separated from South China by only 200 miles of Pathet Lao-held
territory, and where the hill tribes are the same on both sides of the Thai-
Burmese border. Communist guerrillas, an official Thai statement revealed,
are armed with the latest Chinese rifles and automatic weapons.
NOTE: Gordon Tate is also a journalist and a lecturer on international
affairs, who worked for many years in the Middle and Far East.
(Cont.)
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Armed clashes in the north-east between Security forces and terrorists
have recently increased, as have the quantities of arms smuggled in. On
November 14, it was stated in Bangkok that during a search operation in
the jungle of Nakhon Phanom Province six policemen were killed and another
three wounded. Two days earlier a police sergeant was killed during a
similar encounter in the neighbouring province of Sakol Nakhon.
Another area of terrorist operations is the mid-south: a third con-
sists of what is known as Thailand's Deep South; in particular the four
predominantly Muslim provinces of Songkhla, Yale, Pattani, and Narathiwat.
In the Deep South, the challenge to stability comes from the remnants
of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), whose terrorists are living in jungle
camps on the Thai-Malaysian border. The MCP is a predominantly Chinese
movement and has its main base in the Betong salient - a strip of Thai ter-
ritory extending into Northern Malaysia, from which the terrorists operate
further afield.
MCP tactics include anti-government propaganda, indoctrination meetings
in villages, abduction, blackmail and extortion. MCP agents collect "taxes"
from the intimidated local peasantry, and many plantation owners have been
compelled to pay monthly "protection money."
A Bangkok report last July revealed that captured documents had estab-
lished "close co-ordination" between the guerrillas in the north-east and
those in the south.
Non-violent agitation has also been fostered by the MCP or Thai Commu-
nist Party (TCP) and TIM and TPF.
In the Deep South, the MCP has been encouraging a separatist movement
in the Muslim provinces by holding out the prospect of their union with
Malaysia "once Thailand has been brought under Communist control." Even
religion is used to achieve the same object. The Far Eastern Economic Re-
view has quoted Thai Minister of the Interior, General Prapas Charusathira,
as stating that "malcontents" in the area had abused Islam for their own
ends, claiming it was against this religion to learn the Thai language.
Communists rounded up by the authorities not long ago included a rubber
planter, the manager of a bull-ring, and seven members of a shadow-play
ensemble - a popular open-air entertainment given by artists travelling from
village to village. The company had performed plays containing Communist
propaganda.
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Approved For Release 199 3061A000400070009-3
CPYRGHT
? An Independent Newspaper
'BANGKOK, FRIDAY DECEMBER 2, 1966
DE
Cl"fRGHT
RETURNEES TELL
TERRORIST SCHOOL
by Post reporters
Brion the seerbnth Ofniiie ail:
'clren of a farin"family in Ban
Kham, said he hart been recruited;
by Mao Pompid. a friend in the::
'same village. Noo told him: "Thai
-
eland has been colonised by: thel,.
1.1nited States" and asked him to
'help "liberate",Thailande - ? 1
Noo said Boon would be taught-,
,an occupation "abroad." $
. Telling his parents that ,he was
?
going on a trip but not .sayieg.
where, Boon left with five compa.!
nions for North Vietnam The
group rodide, its way by bus to
,Sakol .Nakorn and Beungken ln!
Nongkh6i. It crossed the Mekong]
River, at Paknam-krading fur,
Laos. ? ,
-Six Pathet Lao soldiers welco-;
med them on the other shore;;!
They travelled on foot 20 days:
until they reached Vinh in North
Vietnam. After two months in,.
I Vinh. the group went to Hanoi.
AT LEAST SIX Thammasat University graduates are n Lab,. to 11 3,111..?A ILA
.4.1morig young Thais who have? been trained in Hanoi
? 1.Ifia Binh, about 30 kilometres ,
from Hanoi, The school, 'consist-
!Or subversive activities end fighting Thai Government ,ing of three buildings, was surH.-:,
s.
forces, two returnees from Hanoi revealed yesterday. rounded by hill Boon 60 Thai students,
The,returneca . were arrested in Ban Nah Kham, -incl met
uding 14 women. About 10 .
.students, mostly women, had come
Ternbel, Sawat. Amphur Leung Noke Tha, Ubol, by 'from .Bangkok. There were also'
I. ? police, they told a press conference at the Public Rel.at. students who had come, froth the;,
..
lions Department auditorium. Southera provinces
? Tne students did not know each...
The captives . had lived in ? Both returncea said they met a' other's real 'vane. Boon himself
, the same village. each . without number a young men and womenf.: was given the cole-name "Term."-,
, knowing the other was working from Ceatra; Thailand includinV The students were forbidden to
' for the cnmniunists until they were Bangkok. ? .ask about each other's background.
netted in a police round-up. These Central Thailand youths.' Tnere ' were five instructors,':
One, Boon Prakob, 25, had re- _ they said, had returned, to this most of them Vietnamese able to:
turned to 'lhailand in 1963 after ,countrY. Treinees who are be.. ,speak The director was nem-
: eight months in Beni, while the lieved to be known to the authori- ed Binh. Boon expressed belierl
other, Sod Netra, 18, returned four - ties have been sent to operate in, that ;that Binhewas Thai who knew the:
, days before his arreSt. ' other parts of the country while 'Chinee.elanguage
The interview was conducted by those who are '?believed to be un- Each student was given a wage.,
? Pichai Wasanaeong,' well-known -known to the authorities have bean of 30 dongs ? (approximately 200'i
.television personality. Questions sent back to Bangkok mainly in baht) each month. , .
?
' were fired by Thai press repre- the field of propaganda. Boon aaid he was giVen'nofitica(
sentittives and foreign correspon- Bonn and Sod said the youths indoetrination and taught handlingj
' dents. Pichai translated for the I from the central provinces seethed.:, 'of weapons.
Rorrespondents. F?' ? intelligent 4.1 When he rgturned to
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Approved ForReFeasel9S9/N/24 :-CIA=RDP78=03061-A00040007floo9-a
CPYRGHT
he was given 600 baht and told to
start giving firear,ns training to
villagera joining the "liberation"
movement.
. He claimed to have trained only
five villagers in firearms.
Noo, the man who recruited him,
asked him to,go into the jungle,
saying he was on the police list.
_However, -Boon refused to go.
Boon said he did not want to go
because if he went into the jungle
he would die. He was not arrested
until a year later. ?
Boon claimed he did not obey re-
gulations. For example, he said, he
married secretly, although he had
-been ordered not to marry until he
had obtained permission from the
leader.
' Noo, Boon said, was acting un-
der orders of a Vietnamese, and is
now in the jungles with a Commu?
nist band. ?
Meanwhile, Sod, the eldest of
seven children of a family, said "
that he had been indoctrinated by
a man named "Kaew" from the,
same village.
"Kaew" told him the United
States has sent large numbers of
troops to Thailand to take over the
country and land had been taken
from farmers to build an airfield.
Sod said he was a "patriot" and
, wanted to "liberate" his country,
but now he has learned he had
been' a "patriot in the wrong sense
of the word." ,
Sod said he was given communist
literature to read.
When asked to go to Hanoi; he
agreed. He left his house on March
9,1966, 'after telling his parents
he was going on a journey.
He Went to Laos by ' way of
Nakorn Phanom, he said, and was
?'.received on the Laotian bank by
five Lao soldiers. He stayed at a
,Pathet Lao camp for two days.
When he arrived in Hanoi he was
f'admitted into the hospital there for
. treatment of malaria he had caught
? while walking through the jungles.
' After 20 days i?he h,ospital,.,
Sod went to Hoa Binh to attend
' the "Communist Thailand School."
It was the same school to which _
Boon had gone.
He met 120 students frodi
? various parte of, Thailand, induct-
' iug 18 women. Sod used the code-
name "Yue."
The school was hit by bombs
during a US air raid, he said.
The students were removed to a
new school 25 kilometres away.
After eight months of training,
Sod returned home on April 20.
He was arrested four days later,
before he started any activity.'
?
He said he did not' know what Boon and Sod. They may be pro-
had happened to "Kaew," who secuted in court, but because of
was at home at the time of the their cooperation in giving infor-
police raid. He did not know if mation during interrogation this :
"Kaew" had been arrested. may be considered in their favour.'
Sod claimed to be a Buddhist. for leniency.
'
The Communists, he said, "told In introducing Boon and Sod.
Pichai recalled that last October
me that religion is all opiate, mak, 13 a defector, Porn Panne, gave an
ing people b.flieve only in virtue interview on his recruitment and
and am, and making them forget
suffcring. Religion is all lies." training in Hanoi.
On October 24. the clandestine
Asked if he would' like to take radio station, "Voice of the Thai
up the Buddhist monkhood, ',Sod People," alleged that there was no-
hesitated for a few seconds, arid such person' as Porn Panne and'
then said: "I would like to." that the Thai Government fabri-;'
Both Boon and Sod said they cated the whole story about him,
were only members of the Farmers PicItai said.. ? ?
Liberation Movement and not yet
members of the Communist Party.
They said they vieie told they would
have to work hard to become mem-
bers of the Communist Party.
Did Sod still want to join the
Communist Party.?
"If I were still with' them, I:
would wa'nt to become a member,"
Sod replied.
, What activity had they carried
out among the people?
They said they were told to work'
among poor 'people, hired farm.
. hands and tenant farmers.
The said they were to tell the,
farmers the Government was riot
taking .care of' them,. and tney:
should unite to overthrow the,
Government so they would have.
. tractors fur farming and would not
be poor.
The weapons used in. their traini
ing, Boon said, were c:irbines.
Boon said, however, there had
been no battles with the authorities
but some officials and informers in
neighbouring villages had been
assassinated. ?
He estimated that in his village
of 400 people about 40 per cent
were Communists, although he did
not know who they were since he
was allowed to know only one or'
two.
Boon and Sod had been given'
instructions by their leaders to
deny all charges when arrested and
not to give away any secrets.
Boon was asked what he had
been told about the time the
revolution to "liberate" the farmers
,aould start and end.
"I was told that there cannot
be a definite sthedule," he said.
"The revolution can go on for 20
to 30 years."
Boon and Sod said they were al.
so told about the fighting in North
Vietnam and Laos and that this
fighting was the same as the fight-
ing in Thailand. They were told
these were people's wars."
An official said the Government
is still considering what to do with:
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1095 WH,f. LATIN AMERICA:
25X1 C1 Ob
Subversive Misuse of Universities
SITUATION: In the course of 1966 universities in five Latin American
countries were invaded by the security forces of their governments, in
most cases in order to put an end to student-inspired violence. The coun-
tries were Colombia, Mexico, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela. For Latin
America this is a much more serious act than for most other areas of the
world since in that region there is a long-standing tradition of university
"autonomy" which in some cases has grown to the point of giving the uni-
versity almost extraterritorial status. The governing councils of the
universities -- composed of representatives of students, faculty and gradu-
ates -- have acquired the prerogatives of hiring and firing of the entire
university staff, including the rector (President), establishment of the
curriculum, disbursement of all funds, even exclusive control over policing
the university grounds. The only role left to the state is providing the
funds.
While the concept of university autonomy partly originated with the
laudable objective of protecting the universities from unwarranted politi-
cal interference by the governments in such academic matters as curriculum,
staffing, and teaching (still a matter of honest concern in many countries),
it has been perverted in too many cases to other ends. Specifically,
political agitators have long taken advantage of the facilities which uni-
versity autonomy offers for political, propaganda and even paramilitary
action. Before the Second World War these agitators were most often Fascists.
Since the war they have been most often Communists and other leftist radical
groups. The result has been not only to "politicize" the universities to an
inordinate degree, but also to so lower academic standards that Latin Ameri-
ca's needs for well-educated university graduates are not met. At the same
time university autonomy has acquired an almost mythical sanctity which has
prevented governments from taking the necessary steps to depoliticize them
and turn them toward their true educational purpose.
Therefore the governmental interventions during 1966 and the evident
approval of these actions by the people are essentially welcome steps in
slaughtering the sacred cow of absolute university autonomy. We wish to
draw on these events in order to encourage the governments involved to con-
solidate their gains and to encourage other nations faced with similar prob-
lems to take remedial action.
The Central University of Venezuela (UCV) in Caracas was a prime ex-
ample of the gross perversion of university autonomy. Its dormitories
housed students, bandits, and guerrillas indiscriminately. Its chemistry
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:1110100IPT (1095 Cont.)
Approved For Release 19M811MTOIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3
laboratories were used to produce explosives for Communist terrorists, its
cellars and attics were caches for weapons of all sorts. Terrorists com-
mitted their crimes and then headed full speed for the university campus.
If they made it, they were "in free," since policemen in pursuit were not
allowed on campus. One student was working his way through college by
renting out an armored Volkswagen to student guerrillas.
In December 1966 the Venezuelan government finally invaded the campus
to rid it of criminals and weapons. In so doing the government announced that
henceforth university autonomy would mean academic freedom and autonomy and
not immunity from the nation's criminal statutes. Happily, and somewhat to
everyone's surprise, the government's actions received overwhelming public
approval.
2
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.61?1441. (1095.)
25X1C10b
.01104,
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January 1967
Turmoil in the Universities
Although the Communists have attempted to establish footholds among
the peasants, workers, and students of Latin America, it is only among
the latter that they have had any widespread success. It has been largely
the university students who have supplied the troops for both urban and
rural guerrilla forces. In Venezuela, for instance, the universities
provided up to 80% of the guerrilla fighters in the countryside, the urban
terrorists, even the money and equipment. During the past year this
militancy has obliged various governments of Latin America to take
stringent measures against the university students, including temporarily
closing several universities, and sending the police into others to put
down rioting and lawlessness.
Over the past year or so students in Mexico caused the downfall of
the. rectors of the University of Baja California, the University of
Sinaloa, and even the Autonomous National University of Mexico in the
country's capital. There have been less dramatic student strikes at
other universities around the country. Student agitation in Durango
in the summer of 1966 caused the downfall of the state governor. Demon-
strations which built up from August into October 1966 in the town of
Morelia, where the university of Michoacan state is located, were also
aimed at overthrowing the governor there.
On 8 October 1966 Mexican paratroopers and cavalry moved into
Morelia, violating the customarily-immune territory of the University
of San Nicolas de Hidalgo, to quell growing student riots and sabotage.
The student protests had begun in August 1966 with attempts by certain
students to extort free student tickets from the proprietors of the
Morelia sport stadium and cinemas. In September, when the local bus
company announced fare increases, students demanded a contribution from
the company in exchange for foregoing protest demonstrations against
the increase. However when fares were raised the students commenced
rioting which resulted in the death of a student. The student's death
was then used as a basis for demanding the ouster of the Michoacan state
governor. When student groups attempted to sabotage two city power plants,
and after increased instances of vandalism and organized terrorism against
Morelia merchants, the Government of Mexico sent troops into the univer-
sity grounds to end the disturbances.
The governor issued a statement denouncing non-university and
extra-Michoacan groups for their involvement in the riots. These groups
included professional Communist agitators, some of whom had spent years
in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Communist China receiving training in
subversion and guerrilla warfare. Mexican officials showed to the press
samples of Communist Chinese and Cuban political and guerrilla training
literature found in all six student houses at San Nicolas University.
In Colombia student rioting has provoked sharp reactions from the
government of President Carlos Lleras Restrepo. The first major act of
his government after he took office on 7 August 1966 was a decree that
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(cont.)
moo'
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students would be required to attend 80 percent of their classes and
that days missed because of participation in strikes would be counted
as triple absences. This move as provoked by a prolonged strike at
the Univeesty of Antioguia in Medelin. At the end. of August the univer-
sity was closed for the remainder of the semester.
On 24 October President Lleras Restrepo was attacked by a stone-
throwing mob of about 100 students when he appeared on the campus of the
National University in Bogota to inaugurate a new veterinary science
building. Furious over this act of anarchy and the open disrespect for
the office of the nation's president, Lleras Restrepo ordered Army
troops onto the university grounds to disperse the rioters.
Subsequently the Colombian government issued three stringent anti-
subversive decrees. The new laws state that anyone "linked to subversive
activities" can be held under house arrest, that subversive publications
can be banned and the property of their publishers confiscated, that
travel to Cuba is forbidden, and that the student council at National
University is suspended. The decrees affirm the legal right of the
police and soldiers to enter the university grounds to preserve order.
They also provide severe punishment for stone-throwing, impeding traf-
fic, and baiting policemen. President Lleras left no doubt about his
determination to implement the decrees. In a radio speech to the nation
on 27 October he said: "The group of extremists that has dominated the
university because of the cowardice of some, the neglect of others, and
the indifference of the majority, is trying to distort the facts, to
present them with ill But they have not been able to conceal
the truthe.. ...The law will be abided by, and we will not allow riots
to hold sway for even a minute. ...Whenever any crime is attempted in
the university, the authorities will again enter it and enforce the
law... I want to convey to the country -- which is why I emphasized my
words -- that the government will indeed preserve public peace, tran-
quillity, and freedom of expression and thought, over and against all
fanaticisms and conspiracies."
A third and final example of lawlessness in the universities may be
found in Venezuela, where the Central University of Caracas has long
been notorious as a base for the guerrillas and terrorists who have
plagued the nation for years. In fact the guerrilla movement in Venezuela
has largely been defeated by the government. The turning point came in
late 1963 when the Communist forces were unable to make good their threat
to prevent elections. By the summer of 1966 Communist violence had been
reduced to sporadic instances of terrorism against undefended targets
and the orthodox Communist leadership had decided to abandon the hopeless
armed struggle and shift to political activity. However a small hard
core of terrorists obtained renewed support from Castro and launched a
new wave of violence in the last months of 1966. In Mid-December the
chief of staff of the Venezuelan army was wounded in a terrorist attack
and a lawyer for the Defense Ministry was assassinated. Determined to
put an end to the lawlessness, President Raul Leoni ordered the army to
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occupy the University campus, to search it thoroughly for guerrilla
weapons and documents, and to arrest known criminals and guerrilla leaders
hiding on university grounds. The result was a thorough sweep of the
university which produced a considerable number of weapons, from dynamite
to machineguns, plates for counterfeiting paper money, military clothing,
radio transmitters, Cuban instruction manuals for sabotage and guerrilla
warfare, and large quantities of passports, identification cards and
other documents. The university was closed until mid-February 1967 and
the student dormitories were converted to classrooms. President Leoni,
in a hard-hitting speech to congress on 16 December, stated that the
extra territorial status of Venezuelan universities would henceforth be
ended, though the educational and administrative autonomy of the univer-
sities would be protected.
Significantly the strong actions taken against the universities in
Mexcio, Colombia and Venezuela have all met with strong popular approval.
It is evident that the people of those countries will no longer tolerate
a situation in which a small segment of the population -- led by an even
smaller group of Communists -- declared itself exempt from the normal
criminal statutes of the nation.
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fl
quir
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A
HOW CAMPUS REDS TREED
VT
TAKE OVER A COUNTRY
There's a lesson for others in Caracas, where Communists con- ,
verted a university campus into a "sanctuary" to give them a free
hand in plotting to overthrow the Government. They almost got
19-way with it before an official crackdown foiled them?for now.
CARACAS 4: -1- Within the university, troops foul
Ar a rime when student leftists are'
causing more and more trouble on cam-
puses in the U. S. and other countries,
take a look at the Central University
Caucusin Caucus to see what can happen
when Communists grab control' of a
university.
The occupation by Venezuelan troops
of the Central University in late De-
cember uncovered substantial evidence
that the Reds were using the school as
an arsenal and staging area in a major
effort to overthrow the Government. .
People in this capital city of close to
2 million inhabitants have known for
more than five years that the Central
University was a focal point of trouble.
Communist-led gangs sallied forth from
the campus again and again to stage as-
sassinations, rob banks and blow up
supermarkets and oil pipelines.
? It was the most sustained campaign
of terrorism in Latin America since Fi-
? del Castro took over Cuba. Until last
month,' the troublemakers were able to:
dash back to safety through the uni-
versity gates.
, Central University, like most others
; in Latin America, held the status of an:
' autonomous institution under the consti-
tution. The campus grounds were iniJ
mune to Venezuelan law and off limits
to any type of federal or municipal law
' enforcement.
The last straw. Tolerance of the
Communist sanctuary finally ended ab-
? ruptly last month when a judge was as-
. : isassinated and the Venezuelan Army
'Chief of Staff was wounded in a new
:wave of violence.
1 Findings made on the campus: since
?troops moved in are enabling Venezue-
lan authorities to piece together the full .
story of the conversion of the university
into a base of terrorist operations. ?
Even though the university was on
'vacation when the troops struck, they
arrested some 650 persons there. Many
were not students at all but professional
,troublemakers in the pay of the Coin-
munists. Forty-five were singled out as
;ringleaders. Among them was a retired
1Army major who had been involved in
an abortimc uprising in 1960
pproved For Refease 1999/08/2
-
, cache of anis I
_udder, p.rt
. ;several buildings?even in the spaces be-
tween ceilings and roofs.
I The arms included automatic and
'conventional .rifles, a light machine gun,
assorted pistols and revolvers, grenades, :!
electric detonators, explosives for mak-
ing bombs, and stores of ammunition.
The dormitories in which some of thesej-
1weapons caches were uncovered bore ,
.?
such terrorist nicknames as "Stalingrad" ,
1and "Chicago,"
. Thirty stolen cars were rounded up
?
;i !on the campus, including a Volkswagen
with homemade armor which one enter-
prising student had been renting to vari-
ous terrorist groups. There were supplies
of Army and police uniforms, false puss-
.' ? ports and identification papers, a Cas- ? ,,
tro-Cuban flag, guerrilla films processed
.1 in Russia and a printing press for turn-
ing out counterfeit money.
Key find: documents. To Venezue-
lan intelligence officers, their most im-
portant find was a mound of papers and ,
? documents. These included files on guer- . ,
? rilla units in the mountains, plans for ?'
future operations and maps of National ?
Guard posts with instructions on how to
' attack them.
There were lists of Army officers I,
marked for assassination. There were 1.
also sketches of utility plants in the ? ;
? Caracas area?a favorite Red target?and
?',manuals on ambushing Army, patrols.
. How did Venezuela's main' university
,? ?
become such a bastion for the- Commt4v4.1
, fists? Intelligence officers say it came'l
about mainly through a combination of
? three things?a maximum abuse of the4;.,
constitutional immunity? of [ho campus,
intimidation of non-Communists, and an 1:
? appeal to the romantic streak in many
naive students.
Of the total enrollment of more than.
25,000 students at Central University,
fewer than 1,500 are considered Commu-
nists. Most of the students are regarded
as seriously devoted to. their studies ,and
, opposed to Communism.
Only 00. Red activists. It is now
clear, however, that the armed Commu-
. nist minority, with approximately 200 y
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A otber ems' .i..h, ailciacc. One non-.
. :Communist student now says that ev-
erybody knew what was going on but
. was too afraid to talk for fear of Com-
munist reprisal.
ISome key members of the university
ad
!. ministration and faculty were Com-
munists or sympathizers, so allowed the ;
j terrorists a free hand. In this situation,' _ I
campus dormitories became the refuge [
I, nal agitators. The criminals teamed, .
of professional criminals as well as pro-
fessio ;i
i ? up with students to rob banks?"for the
...people's cause," as they told bank ofk
!ems and customers. .
1 The campus became a recruiting;
ground, for guerrilla units in the hills as
! some students took t"mountain sabbati- .
' cals." Many of these were [attracted to
! the, guerrillas by the supposecrglamour
. .
of becoming mountain fighters.
',"If -you were in: the mountains? with
guerkillas," said a. non-Conminitist stu-
dent who did not succumb, "ypia were
,..
I irresis:ible with girls." '
At the same time, the university sane- .:
tuary was used 'as a rest and recupera-
tion area for the regular guerrillas, as !?
well as their fund-raising center.
"Trials". and torture. Evidence also ;
Is. emerging that the campus was used '
for Communist "trials" and torture. One !!
recent victim was Alfredo Rafael Seijas, -
I a lawyer who worked in liaison between :?
the police and Army. Seijas disappeared
last September while on a visit to the
university. Ills bound body was found.
the following night on a deserted Cara-
cas street with 16 bullet holes. His
.,.. mouth- was stuffed with a handkerchief.
Police say Scijas was seized and hid- .
den at the university by Communist I'
? terrorists, "tried" in a university audi-
torium, beaten and tortured, stuffed into '
the trunk of a. par, then shot to death. !
The main function of the Communist i
base at Central University, however, was i ?
to serve as the .staging ground for an ;
all-out campaign of terrorism against the i
capital itself. That campaign got under 1
way in 1961 after Fidel Castro publicly L
declared Venezuela his No. 1 target. ' r
The terrorists objective was to sub-
ject Caracas to so touch turmoil us to .
provoke a military take-over Iand dis- '
credit the democratic Government ofI
President ROmulo Betancourt. In th&.
years that followed, Caracas experienced:
terrorist bombings almost nightly:. For u;
time, teriorist, gunners were killing ai.
. policeman a day?often from fast-mov-
ing cars that headed straight buck to
;the university. .
Voters defied Reds. The campaign.
to oust the Government by such activi-
ties in:Citrates -failed. In 1963, the peo-
ple defied Communist threats by going
to the polls in record numbers to elect
a successor 'to Betancourt. It was the
first peaceful transfer of power between;
democratically elected regimes in VCIIC-i
zuela's history.
But the Communists did not ;give upi
They just shifted tactics. After, 1963,!
the. Reds moved into the hills for a
guerrilla campaign on the ' CuStro or
Chinese Communist pattern. ?
By 1964, guerrillas were operating in -
eight of Venezuela's 20 Statesi.
. Outwardly, ':central Ure&Oty up,
peared to have 'become a in re peaceful
!place after the Communists moveil their
light to the hillst Secretly, however, it.
i''remained a beehive; of activity on be-
,'hal( of the Reds. -
Then, in the closing ?weeks of 1966,i
.1 violence broke out again in Caracas,
! and it was traced to the university. Al-
ter seven persons were killed and mil- .
; lions of dollars' worth of property was
; damaged, Venezuelan President, ;Raid
Leoni moved in with troops.
I Most Venezuelans, despite tradition of
; autonomy for universities, appear to up-
'prove the Government's occupation .0i
the campus. Ordinary people say they
; were tired of terrorist gangs' using the
!university as a haven. Some find fault1
with the Government, for waiting so long;
;to move.
As political observers here in Caracas
see it, the importance of the occupation
of the university is far greater than just
the arrests and the seizure of clandestine
; material.
It puts out of action the Commu-
nist sanctuary and center of subversive
activities for the most concerted drive
ever launched by the Castro Commu-
nists against a South American country.
? And it involves a clear warning that it
could happen again.
? A similar change of mind over the
hot subject of university autonomy is
going on-; throughout Latin America.
Universities have been occupied in four
other countries in addition to Venezuela.
These are Argentina,. Ecuador,. Colombia'
and Mexico.
The outlook for the Communists in all.
; five countries, as a result, is for tougher
[ times. No longer can they count on ?
luniversity campuses as ? their 'private
.!sanctuaries in working to undermine'
'.governments. mon
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4.
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Noe
CPYRGHT
A p p rovedCFPoYIN ase 1 999/08/M :vatikteDi?ZaHlikapfily09,649,04thifillitft312.
ree
n. Latin -America
aitJOIIN T. O'ROURKE
sr Fmnriltig nf
WnghinnInn OnIlY Hows
klow wouut you nee ur
.university to be:
's Off limits to police?
? Parbicklen to dismiss
students for scholastic failure?
? Forbidden to refuse
sanctuary to students who, off
'campus, committed arson,
vandalism and even were
pursued to the university gates ,t
eby police?
1. ? Forbidden to expel middle-
aged, surreptitiously subsidized
,..'students,', many with families, '
,.who were fomenting political
lunrest by violence and who ?
never worked for an academic
,degree and never intended to? !
' dubious privileges enjoyed ? if
that Is the word ? by
i"autonomous" universities in
, South America. ?
? The autonomous status differs
In degree from country to
, 'country, of course. It is. s
supposed to preserve academic
, freedom from dictatorship. s
Academic "autonomy"
apparently., has its roots in
'Spanish colonialism, when the
sons of the ruling classes were
eligible for higher learning.. It
was a sort of gimmick to
preserve the status quo.
Now Limos have changed, and.,
,it is a gimmick to upset the
status quo.
We've had a sample of it in *
the United States Let's see
?
how it worked.
I
,In the ? ?
Monthly for September, i
Professor Lewis Feuer, 'who '
taught philosophy and. social
'science at California University, ?
? describes how the "free speech .
explosion" there in 1964-65 i
resulted in its decline.
Faculty ? action and inaction;
plus a police, failure, in
compliance with 1. faculty.' equivocation, gave the
university at Berkeley an
"auto .
to that of many South Araeri?caii
universities.
I.. 13....L1.?, L. It 1 1
to be. a stumbling block to
Improvement in academic
standards.
The Califonia faculty
Promulgated a charter, says
Professor Fetter, which could be
used to safeguard the advocacy
and planning of immediate acts
of violence, illegal
demonstrations, terrorist
operations, interference with
troop trains and obscene. speech
and melon '
"In* effect," he sayit,';
created a moral vacuum in the
heart of the university. It
founded an enclave which
cancelled the limits of any
previously defined freedom of
speech . . . students were
allowed to avocate and plan any
sort of political activity, legal or
Illegal, violent or non-violent
PI no
? ? ?
A migration of "non-students"
descended on Berkeley: "Tired
radials came to be rejuvenated
lumpen intellectuals , . .
Maoists arrived determined to ,
'escalate now' on the campus;
varieties of sexual reformers
(orgyists, they called them-
selves) expounded their creeds
on the university steps."
Finally, it was estimated
there were about 2500 "non- ,
students" at Berkeley.
?
MURDERER
"Some were in flight from
stark tragedy," he says, "some
were clanging to rebellion and .
adolescence and one was a
youth who had murdered a
'seven-year-old child in New ,
York; when Federal authorities
arrested him for violation of
parole, he told how he had come
to Berkeley to make himself
useful to humanity."
Professor Fetter asks "What
is a non-student? . he has no
job, no calling, no vocation; he
is a guerilla fighter against
His description fits every non-
'student in South America as
11 1
Professor Fetter fails to point
out how disciplined and
organized some of them are in
their fight "ag'in" established
Moderates in the Berkeley
? student body, disgusted with
faculty capitulation' and
ambivalence, stayed away from
the student elections. As a
result, a communist leader was
elected ...
The f a C u It si policy of
?
, ambiguity and permilsiveness
submerged the concept of
freedom of speech as a means
. of fair discussion.
' This also is true in many
:"autonomous" South American
- universities.
ONE-SIDED
Supporters of President
' Johnson's policies' are also, in
effect, denied a forum on
Berkeley's ? campus, says
-Professor Feuer. Students also
managed to halt momentarily
, the presentation of an honorary
?degree bo lJ.S. ?Ambassador to
? the. .1Jnibed .Nations Arthur
Goldberg. The students had
another one for him: "Doctor of
War." '
'At a Meeting with students, a"
professor had to stand for being
called a "son-of-a-bitch." Only
one student protested: He said
he may be one but it was
impolite to call him that to his
face. ' ??? ?
"This was Indeed a time of
transition for many Berkeley
professors," Says Professor
Feuer, "from libertananism to
authoritarianisM in one short
? year." . ?
? Student ethics lowered., the
city of Berkeley had
unprecedented crime (traced in
large part to students and non-
students) "guerilla war was
waged against s m a 11 store-
k
r-s?
Selective Service."
It certainly sounds like an
' t A.A.. I
university.
CRACKDOWN
Last month, in Argentina.
provisional President Juan
Carlos Onganla ended the
? autonomy of Buenos Aires
University, whose schools of.
science and engineering were
riddled with communists ,and
far-left activists.
, Students got wind of his
Impending action, seized the
university buildings and locked
themselves In them. Police were
called to re-take them,
r professors' and students' heads
I were broken, some were jailed
and several pollee wounded.
NO APOLOGY
"Of course I lament the
violence," Gen. 'Ongania told
this reporter shortly.
afterward." If I did not, I would
be ashamed of myself."
,i But he refused to apologize ;
ifor It becauSe. he , doesn't ?
?consider it was his decree' which '
precipitated it. . ?
He doesn't apologize for police
behavior for the genie reason.
that President Johnson' Would '
refuse to .apologize for the
behavior of police In Mississippi
or California.
What Gen. Onganih dIci- was;
put the Federally . supported .
university under the Education
Department,. just as many.
schools
schools in the U.S. are under
the authority of State Depart?
ments of Education. ' ?
This reporter was in
Montevideo a few years ago
when . "students" rigged a
proposed change in the law
which would have taken control ?
of the Uruguayan University
away from its ad inistrat
and put it in the hands of a
coalition of left-wing students
and teachers.
?
'Foiled. they seized the
.u. Lt. r 'ted in front of
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CPYRGHT
, armored hoof ears. blasted the At any rate, students at
students with water, and were Mexico University descended on
? denounced for brutality. , the town, seized the buses, took
, them to the university campus
Said my Uruguayan 'rum?, stole the tires And then burned
Raid Irontains. hronocally, "all them. ii.0 railed university
they want lode is la rake the autonomy. It's bard to see bow ?
University from the taxpayers it.hdped lb. bin ;
who nym ' ?? , In Caracas a few years ago::
fi" ? In Mexico. On siother visit.. " Walker Stone, editor of the .
;, the bus company had just put in ScrippaN o w a rd Newspapers,
a small fare increase. No doubt. and Charles Lucey, now editor:
it .was a hardship on the poor. of the Trenton Times.
,L 'modest tho it was. but English, interviewed ?a communist.
? I' German or U.S.- buses are just]. ' "student" loader on Ceram'.
as expensive in Pesos as le ear f !: University campus. "
Other currency. ? told with
organized left wing students
could set off bombs, wreck ears
or whatever and be sate if they
could make it back to the
campus, where the police were
forbidden to enter without court
permission. ? ?
By the lime they returned'
with 'a warrant atter a bearing.'
'students. ?weapons or bombe
would all be, smuggled away,
and safe. ?*!..
soth Century has shown
how the intellectual clan can '
become a primary, forte for an .
u,s sault en democratic
institutioni.e. Professor':
; Feu ?
Feuer." and we may yert
i? witness this phenomenon M.
:America disguised tinder soda
.?slogene as 'participatory.
democracy.' "
? Professor Fetter's article en .1
'Berkeley makes good reading.
1 It reminds one that where I
those who enjoyed univcbreity
autonomy finally were able IA
'overturn the Government, ea in
; Cuba, they promptly not only
;abolished it even as theory, but
along with it every e el;
independence mai
kfedilit
,
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Speech by Venezuelan President Raul Leoni, 16 December 1966
President and vice president of the Congress; chairman and other members
of the honorable Senate committee; chairman and other members of the honorable
Chamber of Deputies committee:
? I an receiving the honorable legislative committee members who have come to inform
r'sic of the closing of the 1966 regular session of Congress at a time when the
!Icriminal actions of terrorists have compelled me to suspend several constitutional
guarantees throughout the nation with full cabinet approval. This is: the first
time that I have resorted to emergency measures provided by the Constitution during
Hmy term in office. I can assure all Venezuelan citizens that although I was forced
Hto suspend those guarantees, it is contrary to my republican sentiments.
!i However, it iz well known that the lack of adequate legal instruments and of speedy
procedures to prevent and repress communist subversion and terrorism of any kind
11 obstructs government action under existing laws to protect civil liberties, the
security of persons and their properties, and even the stability of our democratic
institutions. Therefore it was necessary to impose emergency measures which will
temporarily provide the national. government with adequate means to destroy the
anti-Venezuelan conspiracy eirected by international communism from Havana which
has come to the fore in Venezuela through common crimes and (words indistinct).
The communists have expressed their desire for a long war in the present stage of
our national life, the long-range goal of which would be a victory for establishing
. a totalitarian tyranny in which life, liberty, and dignity would be meaningless.
In the meantime, the communists carry out an intelligent division of work. 9n_tre
,
one hand. there are the fanatics who favor armed battle, which they effect through
the action of rural guerrillas. That has been a complete failure in spite of
intermittent resurgence. There are also the urban guerrillas, who are treacherously,
scandalously, and audaciously directed to obtain money and other material resources,
to frighten the ,working man, and to exasperate the forces which maintain collective
, security and institutional integrity.
On the othpr hand are_t.he_spft-liners, those who favor the battle of the masses and
the propagandists for democratic peas;e, and amnesty for insurrectionists who have..
taken up arms against national sovereignty and for those who have stained their hands
with human blood and have stolen the properties and money of others.
As chief executive I can assure all Venezuelans that my government will never hesitate
to courageourly assume the responsibility which the popular mandate and the
constitution have placed upon my shoulders. I an convinced that it is a short step be-
Itweenpolitical Juggling tnd the government's surrendering to the spasmodic attacks of
communist subversion, Far from controlling subversion, a surrender by the government
:would only serve to stimulate communist aggressiveness in a society and a nation ,
that, should it show any Weakness, might succumb to inevitable destruction.
! My government has the full and' firm support of all the people and the loYalty of the
armed forces. That is why I am. in a position to completely assume my responsibility
' as chief executive and as a Venezuelan citizen and to use the powers tested in me by
. law, using my own judgment for humanitarian purposes and national interests. I have
so acted and I will continue to do so.
Congress also has its responsibilities, which it exercises in accordance with the
balance that exists circumstantially between the congressmen who support the government
and those who oppose it. In my judgment Venezuela lacks the proper legal instruments
to fight crime, both common and political, with maximum efficiency. I believe that
such a situation inevitably leads to the enactment of laws necessary to better maintain
constitutional order. Following that reasoning I issued a decree during this morning's
cabinet meeting under which the thief executive assumegain fact, responsibility for
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mainteggrgCglic order and the personal security of all citizens within the
. boundaries of all national universities. The decree leaves the supervision and
. administration of education in the hands of university authorities.
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In my judgment, universities are Institutions dedicated to philosophic and scientific
investigation and to the education and preparation of our citizens for life and '
the exercise of democracy, the promotion of culture, and the development of.the
spirit of human solidarity, as provided for in our Constitution. As a good Venezuelan
citizen and university graduate, .1 reject the idea that universities should be at
the exclusive service of political groups or that they should be used for
totalitarian subversion, planned and organized by international communist centers
which conspire against liberty and the democratic fate of the American continent.
I also believe that university autonomy has been established, not only to guarantee
education and academic freedom in the universities, but also to provide freely and
democratically elected university authorities with sufficient administrative
power to govern their fate. We cannot accept reasoning aimed at making the university -
into a state within the state. In recognizing these aims for the common welfare,
my government has decided to restore to the autonomous universities their national
characteristics as autonomous universities. Thereby they can better express their
educational, cultural, and scientific functions, establishing them in the frameWork
of national sovereignty, which is one and indivisible, The universities will remain
autonomous as far as teaching and administration are concerned. However, as far as
public order is concerned, they will be governed by to the laws which are the same
for all citizens and all institutions which live and prosper in our nation.
In order to realize this supreme aspiration of all Venezuelans, the executive branch
will immediately proceed to adopt the necessary measures and regulations. From
now on university schoolrooms and streets will again be reserved for the authentic
concerns and aspirations of all Venezuelans, and universities will again represent the
best hopes of Venezuela to definitely attain its great national and American fate.
Citizen congressmen, this has been a year fraught with difficulties and calamities.
The debate on the tax reform bill prompted psychological disorders which caused a
serious depletion of our bank reserves and international currency.
These are fortunately already being replenished. Natural disaster caused considerable
damage to the national highway system and to the properties of a considerable sector
of our population, unfortunately to the most unprotected sector. To repair as
much. as possible the damage caused by heavy rains, I have asked Congress for
authority to provide additional appropriations amounting to 45 million bolivares
which, I am sure, will be approved with the urgency that the case demands.
Finally, there were political difficulties such as the attempted rebellion at
the Ramo Verde National Guard school, which was fortunately discovered, and the
resurgence of political terrorism which, as I have already said, compelled us to
suspend constitutional guarantees. Some of those calamities and problems will be
overcome in a short time. Others will require more time to heal due to their
very nature.
This is a good time to convey to the Senate
deepest and sincerest satisfaction, as well
nifiuent tasks performed during the current
that will serve to accelerate the economic,
of the republic. I am convinced that those
promote the economic development and social
unnecessary to add that the government will
as well as the Chamber of Deputies my
as that of my colleagues.for the mag-
year in providing the nation with laws
social, and cultural 'transformation
laws, far from upsetting them, will
progress of our country. It is almost
carefully watchover their implemen-
tation, and that it is prepared to immediately propose any corrective measures.in
order to insure the fulfillment of the goals for which they were intended.
I than] the honorable congressional committees forlthgAg4t04ittem
members L prosperous
holidays.''
-
AtsprotedsPorvlitelease 189910812C W a rosperous
2
holidays.
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3
CARACAS: SABADO 17 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1966
Dijo el Presidente:
?
No Presidire Nunca un Gobierno Renuente a Asumir con Valentia
La Responsabilidad del Mandato Popular
O En la ceremonia en que comisiones del Congrep le participaron
clausura de las sesiones, el Primer Magistrado anuncio la aprobaciOn _
.1? ,, i?
de un decreto por medio del cue! el Ejecutivo Nacional asume
el rnantenirniento del orden ptiblico en el perimetro de as universidades
O El Jefe del Estado expreso qua no acepta "la tesis que,pretende convertir
, a la Universidad en una especie de Estado dentro de otro Estado"
?
0 Lai Univertidad continuara siendo autonoma en el orden docente
y administrativo, pero en lo qu,e atafie al orden pUblicoiestaro sometida
? .
'al ordenamiento legal
IV%
0 "Con las ventanai de sus cfulas y con sus avenidas nuevamente abiertas
a las verdaderas inquietudes, la Universidad volverci a representar
la mejor esperanza"
-
ludadanos Presidente y Vice-
?.'presidente del Congreso Nacio-
vtiudadanos representantcs dela
'onorabIe Camara del Sexed?,
Cludacianos representantes de la
qlonorable Camara de Diputa-
lcios,
Cludadanos;
:Me toca recibir a las Honorables
,COMisiones de las Cameras Le-
gialativas qlle han veniclo a par.
itIceparino la clausura de las 'se-
sinnes ordinaries del Congreso de
Republica correspondientes a
? cite alio 066; en momcntos en
quo la 'criminal activicild del te-
rrorisino 'politico m ia Ilevado
? a?suspendcr,.?con ticuerdo del Con-
' scdo dc Ministros, algunas garan.
? ties constitucionales en ? todo el
, orrltorio nacional. ? . ? .
hEs esta la primera ,vez qua, du-
tante mi mandato presidencial,
recurro al expecliente do las meal-
Ofit3 do emergencia preyistasen
I:1 Contlituclen Nacional. puc-
ci a las vericzolanos que
Verme Obligado a suapender la-
cs garantias nada graft) ha sick
Mis 1,entlinicntos republicanos.
Pero es Wen sabtdo qua la ausen-
chi do normas legates adecuadas
y, do proccdlmIontos expcdttivos
are. prevenAr y reprimir Ia ubver-
tOn eenulralrt y c terrorlamo tic
6WIttittier 8 igno, entraba1 cion
Golderno denlro del ordena-
mimic). Juridic? orclintir10. pare
defender Ins libertacies cludada-,
scguriclad cle Ins personas
y do sus btenes y i estabilidec1.
relsina do nuestras tristituclones,
ci,m,wwfilowac*di.ore
sidad'lltlrfrts melnacks To,
gencia que, siquiera tempora1-1
metici?,. proven al Gobierno Jla-. Izao pres1dir6 un gobiernci renuen-. .
clonal do los inedios idOncos pa- te a astnnir con valentia la. res-
re. dcsarticular la . conjure anti- Ponsabilidad quo el mandato pa-
venezolana, dirigida desde La Ha:- pular y la Constitucidn echaron
harm por el comuntsmo interne- sobre mis- ? hombro,s, Porque estoy
clonal y reforzada aqui con apor convencido..de que no hay mas que
tcs de delinciiericia comtln y de la, un Paso entre el malabarlsmo pa-
reaccidn dictatorialista: ? . ' litico y la claudicacion del Go-.
i
Para los comunistas 'en it pre- bierno ante las espasmodicas erre-
sent etapa, de la historib, nacto-
nal su declarada aspiracion, es la
guerra large, cuya culmlnaclen a
largo plea.? eerie ca victoria, Ira.' vedad frente a una sociedad y un
plontadora :cle la Urania del tote- Estado quo si so muestran bleu-
litarismo, on que la vida, la liber- :dos elnconsecUentes podrian des
-
tad y la, dignidad del hombre no,- ilzane por la pellgrosa pendiente
da significan. V' mientra elle
do AU- Prop' a inevitable dleolu-
s no
s,
ocurra, los comunistas rcalizan eiOn.
ma inteligente division del tra- Mi Gobicrno cuenta con la an-
nein. Do un lado el trabajo de los tha y recia solldariclad de todo el
duros, de los fanaticos de la lu- pueblo y eon la lealtad do las
Pumas Armadas, Por eso estoy
cha armada, Ift que adelantan por en condiciones de asumir integre-
Invite de la guerrilla rural. total- mente mi responsabilided do Ma-
Inente fracnsada, por lo &tiles, a glatrado y do venezolano.y do user
pcsar de sus intermitentes mani- el derecho. do gracla quo me con-
f estaciones, .y de la guerrilla air- ceden las !eyes% tomando en. con-
bona, quo or alevosa y auclaz- sideracion, solamente, do actierdo
merit? cscandalosa, se utilize pare con mi propla conclencla, rezones
proveerse de moneda y? otros re- de Inimanidad y de sena eonve-
curses matcriales. pare Aternorizar nicncia nacional. As! lid procedi-
al hombre de. trabajo y pare exas- do y asi continual-6 hacieridelo.
perar a las fucrzas guardianas del For su parte, lns Cameras Legis4
bienestar colcctivo y de 'la into- as
gridad lativ Meilen tamblon au propia
institucional. Del otro la-
'resp la
do los blandos. los partidarios dc onsabllidad, quo *men
conform() al cquilibrio Quo -dr-,
cunstancialmente puede existir en-
tre los parlamentarios quo apoyanli
y respaldan 11.1 Goblerno.y los quo
le hacen oposicion.
Tengo pare mi quo el Estado
Venezolano career) do los instru-
mentos legates y reglamentarlos
raetidas de la subverstOn commis-
ta, lo cual lejos de contener esta,
salo servira para estimular su gra-
? a lucha de mesas, los propagn-
dLsns deIa paz democratic y de
?la amnistia pare los alzados en
arms contra la soberania nacto-
nal y pare los quo han =mailed()
sUS manes con sangre hermana y
con blenes y productos del traba-
jo Mem,
ase4999/08/21440C4NeR
lasegurarla_ a los venazolanos gut
3
PNANtildria
tanto Ia comm como /a poli-
0009-3
Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3-
tlea y quo samejanto sittiacien
planters IR inapla7ablo necesidad
do promover cl ordenamiento legal
Indispensable para el m?aeguro
mantenimiento del orden constitu-
clonal.-
Es atendiendo a estas razones
CItle, en Is =liana do boy, y on a'
Consejo do plinistros, he dictado
el ?Decreto reglamentarto per me:
die del cual el Ejeeutive ?ittclo-
hal asumo efectivamente mart-
tenimiento del Orden politicb y is
seguridacl personal de la cludada-
nia clentro del perimetro de las
Universidades nacionales mieritra,s
daia is vigilancia y et mantenl-
miento del orden &canto y ultra-
nistrativo s cargo de las autori-
dades universitarlas. ,
Considero. a las .Universidades
cdno plantelcs dedIcados a la in-
vestige.ciOn filosofica, y cientifica
y a is educaciOn y formacion?co-
mo lo ordenn. nuestra Carta Fun-
damental, "de ciudadanos aptos
pars la vicla y pars el ejercicio de
Is democracla, el fomento de la
cultura y el desarrollo del espiritu
do solidarldrid humans,". Como
buen vcnezolano y coma cense-
euente universitarlo rechazo Is
Idea cle una Universidad al exclu-
sivo servicio tie parcialidades
o de la,subversion totalita-
ria planificada y organizada des-
do los centres del comunismo in-
ternacional quo conspiran contra
Is libartad y el destine, democra-
tic? del Continonto- American?.
Consider? a.simismo itte Is su-
anemia un versitarI h
a ha aide Ins-
titufda no relo para garantizar a
Ia. Universidad In libertad docentel
y academtca sine tambien parts
dotal' a las stutorldades, emana-
das del libre ejercicio do su demo-
cracia interns, de suficiente pa-
der administrative para. regir .su
destino. Pero no aceptamos Ia te-
sis que pretende convcrtir a la
Universiciad on una espccie &Es-
tado dentro del Estado Venczola-
no. Y es por /Caltad a estas ideas
de blen comfin quo mi Gobierno
ha deeldido cievolverle a is uni.-I causado cuantiosos claim en todo
versidad, autonoma su fisonomia
el sistema de vialidad nacional, en
nacional, Is quo expresa major su
la propiedad y medics de yids de
funciOrt educativa, cultural y den- una respetablo porcien de nuestro
tifiea, reintegrandela al marco de
Is sober:min nacional qua es una
o indivisible. La 17niversidad? con-
tinuar?tand? autOnoma en el
orden docents y administrativo,
pore en ?lo quo ataile si orden
pd-
blico estara sometida al ordena-
miento legal, quo Cs uno solo pa-
ra todos los cludadanos y pars to-
tins Ins instituciones qua viven y
prosperan bajo el cielo nacional.
Y pars hacer rcalidad esta des de orden politico. Conato de
prom aspiraciOn do toclos los ve- levantamiento do is Escuela de
nezolanos, el Ejecutivo Nacional Formacion de Guardias Naciona-
procecieret a adoptar de inmediato les ' de Ramo Verde, felizmente
cuantas medidas y provIdencias ;
?,:debelado. Y recrudescencia del te-
fueren neccsarias. ' rrorismo politico, lo que, como ya
Y asi, de ahora en adelante, con dije, nos lia conducido al actual
las vontanas de sus sums y con estado de Suspension tie Garantias
sus avenidas nuevamente abiertas Constitucionales. Calamidades y
a las verdaderas inquietudes y as dificultades que las m?ya han
piraciones de nuestro 'pueblo, Is side sUperadas o lc. saran a corto
Unlversidad Volvera a reptesentar
Is major esperanza do Venezuela
pars lograr definitivamente su
gran destine nacional y anierica-
no.
Ciudadanos Cengresantes:
Este ha sido un a?o cargado de
dificultades y calamidades. La dis-
cusion de Is Reforms Trlbutaria
produjo trastornos psicolegicos quo
se tradujeron en tin scrio drenaje
de los depOsitos bancarlos y de
dIVISRS internacionales, de los dia.
lea afOrtunadaMente ya ?stamps
en via de completa recuperacidn.
Calarnidatles de In naturaleza ban
pueblo, la nuls clesvalida per cier-
to. Para reparar en cuanto there
posible, los estragos causados per
la inclemencia de las lluvias, he
pedido al Congreso Nacional la
conalguiente autorlzacion para de-
cretar un er6clito adicional del or-
den de los 45 millones de bollva-
res que estoy seguro sera despa-
chado con la urgencia que el caso
amerita,. Y por ulitimo, dificulta-
plazo 'y otras requeriran un tlem-
po prudencial on virtud de su
imisma natursleza.
Sea buena esta oportunidad pa- I
ra hacer llegar tanto al &nada -
come a ia Camara de Diputados,
por el digno intermedio de uste-
I des, mi honda y sincera satIsfac-
e'en asi come Ja de rills colabora-
dores, per is magnifica labor rea-
_ lizada on el curse del prcsente ano
pars dotar al pais de in cuerpo
de layes quo aerviran pars aeele-
rar el proceso de transforinacion
econdmica, social y fiscal de is
Republica. Estoy convencido tie
qua ese conjunto de leyes lejos de
entorpecer esta llamado a imptil- ,
sar el desarrolle economic? y el I
progreso social ? de nuestro pais.
Dames estit decir que el Gobierno ,
vigilara cuidatiasamente los resul-
tados de su aplicacidn, pues tie-
,
!
no el animo ablerto a proponer de
Inmedlato los correctives' qua ho-
non neccsarios para ,lograr quo
aquellos se correspondan cabal y
exactamente con el propf5sito y los
fines perseguidos.
Ciudadanos Senadores' '.
Ctudadanos Diputados:
Al agradocer a las Honorables
Camara LegLslativas kla partici-
paciOn que acaban de hacerme,
quiero tambion desearles unas ale-
gres a, venturosas pascuas, coma
las tendran los que habitan el to-
rrItorio nacional, donde afortuna-
damente reins is Mas completa,
normaltdad. .
, aliraflorts, Salon "El Sol del
, Pen?, 18 do dIciombre
, do 1968. - * ' .
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070009-3
--- El Nacional?Corneas: Miereoles 14 de Diciembre de 1966
PRIMERA INTERVENCION DEL SENADOR LA RIVA ARAUJO SOBRE
GUERRILLAS, VIOLENCIA, TERRORISM? Y SITUACION UNIVERSITARIA
CPYRGHT
SENADOR LA RIVA ARAUJO. Cludadano Presidente del
Senado: Honorables Colegas: Ayer, al salir del debate que se
efectue en el Senado, me dirigi a la Camara de Diputados
pare presenciar otro debate en el cual desarrollaba en su
discurso el Diputado Jose Vicente Rangel, el tema de la des-
aparielein y muerte de Alberto Lovers. Escuche la aerie de
culpabilidades e imputaciones que hada este honorable Di-
putado. Me sente en las bancadas de in Camara de Diputa-
dos y escuche todo el debate, en el que un grupo de la opo-
sleeks sentaba en el banquillo de los acusados al Gobierno,'
pare culparlo de la deseparicien y del asesinato de un ye-
nezolano. For ml mente pasaron una serie de observaciones.
Empece a recorder el afio de 1961, cuando una violencia im-
placable se desenceden6 en este pats pare derrocar al Re-
gimen Constitucional de ROmulo Betancourt. Recorde a tana
tos muertos y las voladuras de oleoductos. Recorde el terro-
rismo desatado en Carecae y en las grandes capitales de ye-
, nezuela; pero no me explicaba, ciudadanos Senadores, como
e Venezuela podia olvidar toda la tragedia que viva Vefa unaa
barra aplaudiendo freneticamente al orador Jose Vicente Ran-
ti gel. Vela oradores eufdricos acusando al Goblerno. Yo me es-'
tremeci en la sills., cludadanos Senadores, porque no habia,
derecho 'pars olvidar ni por un instante la tragedia que item'
el pale. No hay derecho pare que se hayan cambiado los pa-v
peles y veamos a loa acusados transformarse en acusadores:
los acusadores en acusados. Entonces pergenaba la inter-
vends% de hoe, en el &nada, porque yo querla y quiero ye- ,
nir aqui este tarde, en nombre de ml partido, a coiocar en ?
' una justa posiciem, con toda la altura y la responsabilidad tie
'dirigente del pais y con la mime, altura de siempre, el pro-
blems, del recrudechniento de las guerrillas urbanas y rurales.
Pruebas del Recrudecimiento
de la Subversion
- ? No tengo necesidad de probarle al Senado la verded en el .
_tema tie mi intervencion. Peal la palabra pane hablar sobre
, el recrudecimiento de las guerillas y de la accien subversi-
ve en el pais. Me da la reef% el pronto Ministro de Relaciones
,Interlores, el nuevo y recien Ilegado Ministro de Relaciones
Interiores, doctor Leandro Mora, cuando la prensa de boy no
' dice a grandes titulares: "Acordadas anoche medIdaa energi-'
cas contra recrudectmtento del terrorismo". "Primera reunion .
del doctor Reinaldo Leandro Mora con el Comando Policial
Unificado". .
El escrilor Juan Liscano, en articulo publicado el 12 de
novlembre de 1966, me ahorrd un gran trabajo: y hace el
recuento del eltimo mes, el mc s de noviembre, en que cons-
tatamos hechos tremendos de la acchen subversive?
Estamos Frente a una
Nueva Guerra
No qulero repair este resella tragica de muerte. de tra-i
gedias, de hogares asolados y de pueblos asaltados. eQue paste:
e con todo esto, senores? Vamos a ser sinceros y francos. No
soy original porque lo han dicho personeros de Accien Demo.=
cratica, pero tango que decir que nos encontramos frente Et?
e tine. guerra. Una nucva guerra. No es la guerra clasica; flO
es la guerra histerica. No es una guerra que este sujeta a re---,?
glas y a ]eyes aceptadas or las dos partes que pelean. Es
otra guerra la que se inkier en Venezuela desde 1961. Es unaa
guerra sobre el individuo, sobre su moral, sobre u caracter,,
aobre su creencia, sobre su mentandad. Es una guerra para.'
hacer auteanatase pate meterle at hombre la idea de que tie-
#44 avkt WIWI) gitabgil
'Ida cristiana, ha ilevado en el fondo de au alma el pueblo'
venezolano. Se desarrolla en pueblos y cludades, contra unose
pare adormecerles la conciencia, y contra otros pare asustarloe.
. Li guerra sicolOgica este, haciendo indiferente a una gran;
; mass de poblaclen venezolana, porque utilizen el amino aloe
logico, por un lado, para hacerle ver a muchos que no e tan
grave el problema, y por el otro, dan los goipes pars confun-*
dir al gobierno y a la opinion ptiblica venezolana, pero al'
, fin de cuentas lo .que hacen es poner al hermano a, asesinar
; a su hermano. En este guerra,.amigos Senadores, los pueblos,
e
on dominados sin lucha, porque la lucha es sorda, fria y.
calculada. Senores Senadores, les miter? decir: unaucha
en que cada uno de nosotros es tin combattente, defendiendol
' una cause. o lee contraria, pero cada uno de nosotros este.:
metido en este lucha. Unos con su indiferencia, pero estitn;
metidos;? otros con las responsabilidades del Gobierno. Los
militares con sus acetones en las guerrillas venezolanas. Los'.
;i expertos de los partidos analIzando las cuestiones sicolOgicas,'?
pero todos, haste aqui en el Senado, estamos encuadrados.en':
:? la miema guerra.
Pero senores, ye qulero nether la atenciein sobre algo ;
que este. sucecliendo en el pais. Planteo la gravedad de la 11
tragedia, pero slento y aprecio que en mucha parte de la Po- 1
t blacidn venezolana hay letargo, hay indolencia y hay haste
tranquilidad en muchos, a pesar de todo s estos estrujones que,;
? (Hari? nos hace la subversion comunista. Senores, yo quiero
Hamar la atencion a todos los combatientes en esti guerra
para decirles, que la concesion que se le haga en este mo-e!
? mento al enemigo, lo for talece y le da mes Ie pare que con-;
e Mille en su lucha. Por eso quiero hablarles a los combatien-e
tes para que no nos posea el espirltu de concesiOn en el cm-
p0 minter y en el campo politico.
Las Decisiones de la Conferencia
Tricontinental de La Habana
Yo quisiera recordarle al Senado que esto que esti suce-
diendo en Venezuela no es obra del azar. Aqui hay cerebros
de una conspiraciern universal que dirigen la insurreccion.
En La Habana o celebro la Conferencia Triconttnental, y se"
planed todo lo quo este. sucediendo en Venezuela y en mu-
chat partes de Latinoarnerica y del mundo. Yo quisiera ells-
traer tin poquito la atencion de los ciudadanos Senadoree,'
pare que se den cuenta de un estudio preparado por la Co-
misiOn Especial de Consults sobre Segurldad de la 0. E. A. en
au sexto period() de sesiones ordinaries. Esa ComisiOn obtuse"
la documentaciem y todos los debates que o habian celebra-1
do en la Conference). Tricontinental de La Habana. En este
estudio 68 transcriben frases de lo aprobaclo en la Conferen-
cia, tales como estas: Abuser intencionalmente ?amigoie de
AcciOn Democrietica, y ?igen esto? "Abuser intencionalmen-
te &Ede el punto de vista politico, de la buena voluntad, con-
sideracien y tolerancia de las naciones democraticas".
"Ei ejercilo renecionario tiene que ser stistituido por un.
ejercito revolucionerio tele 'prantice la realizacidn de pla-
nes que s'e.t.sfagan las aspiraciones de todo el pueblo. Por eso . ?
,nosoiros les venezolancs hemos escogido la lucha armada sin
descartar nir guna otra forma de lucha, convinamos los mc-
!dios armadas y ro armados, legales o ilegales, de mesas y co-
. mandos, porque consideramos que lo Importante no es la lu-
cha sino la liquIdacidn del imperialismo y la, toma del poder
politico, pare !lever a la practice un programa revolucionario .
y de mesas'. Se propone lo sigulente en In Conferencia:
"Que los movenientos revolucionarios de Colombia, Venezue-
la, Pere, Panama y-Fecuador y oleos de la zone del Caribe
del Sur dcl Continente, den cuanto Antes los pesos tendien-
tes a examiner conjuntamente este situaciem minter,' y con el
in de encontrar kismedios pare contrarrestar los
34 efectos
I NB rirnelagiti " iv: 1. Pres-
PVPDPRIXordzionario de
Approved For Release 1999/08/24:
- ?
Colombia, Venezuela ..'' Olgan blen: prestar el m?decidido
apoyo, a fin de responder con las medidas Inas eficaces para
contrarrestar los efectos de la politica agresiva global del im-
perialism? norteamericano. 2. "Denunciar ante todos los pafses
de los tres Continentes la intervencion yanqui y las lucha3
armadas de Colombia, Venezuela y Peru y promover la soli-
derided militante de los combatientes de estos nafses entre
si, con los pueblos de los tres Continentes en la batalla por
la liberaciOn nacional".
? .-Para esa decision, un poderfo inmenso se colocaba de-
tree de ellos. Allf estaba presente China y la Union Sovietica
-ciando el aval a la decisidn de fondo quo tomaba la Conferen-
cia Tricontinental. Luego, lo que esti nasando en Venezuela
no es una cuestidn de grupos aut6nomos y anarquicos del Co-
munismo, sin? todo un plan sincronizado, perfectamente diri-
gido, abastecido y respaldado. Ello nos tiene que llamar a mu-
&Jaime reflexidn.
Realizacion del Plan
Veamos la realizacion del plan, cludadances Senadores.
Dude 1961 ?y aqui no empiezo por hacer suposiciones, ciu-
cladanos Senadores, ya que son realidades escritas en la his-
lona las que hablan, ya que no son esquemas mentales de;.
un Senador eopeyano? empiezan las realidades del -dolor, del
sufrimiento, del pesar y de las lagrimas que se han vertido
en el pais. Comienza en el Rfi0 61 una lucha implacable con- :
tra el Gobierno Constitucional. Las cludades primero emple-
zan a sentfr los golpes de un comando unificado resuelto a
estremecer los cimientos de un Gobierno y de la sociedad ye-
nezolana; y empleza Caracas, Valencia, Maracaibo, junto con
los campos petroleros a recibir el impact? tremendo, al lgual
gee la, produccion naclonal, las industries. Son verdades evi-
(lentos; todo empleza a recibir el impact? de la destrucciOn.
Vierie despues el period() de las guerrillas en el campo vene-
zolam; y esa es tambien historia ya escrita en el pals.
Ahora sefiores, les voy a hacer un poco de incapie en una
parte del esquema de la insurrecciein comunista en Venezuela;
algo sobre lo que yo quiero flamer la atenciOn. La guerra al-
colOgica ?decla el Arzobispo Makarlos que es experto en
cuestiones de guerra y subversion, cuando vino en su gira
por Latinotimerlea? "la guerra sicoleigica es tan grave y tan
peligrosa como la guerra armada". Y aqui en Venezuela cast
nadie sabe las tecnicas de la guerra revolucionaria, excepto
el Partido Comunista y el M.I.R. La guerra sicolOgica plant-
ficada dentro de la guerra revolucionaria cuenta con mate-
riales para realizar la destruccien, tal como lo denuncle una
vez en el Senado al hablar del "arsenal" de Garabato, que
ful a ver personahnente con otros compafieros de la Comi-
sion de Defensa del Senado.
Alit no hebia tal arsenal; lo que habla ?y para refits-,
carles la memoria? era una especie de Escuela Superior de
Guerra, en In cual se dirigia todo un plan pars la fabricacion
de armas modernas, hasta cohetes; alit tenian el model? y la
especificacidn para la construccion do toda clase de armas.
' Por clerto quo es neceserio reconocerle al pueblo de Venezue-
la, talcnto e inteligencia, porque los expertos y los tecnicos
de ermas nos decian, que las grenades que se construien o que '
se disefiaban para construlr en Garabato, eran superiores a -1
les grenades checoslovecas 3, a las grenades belgas, inclusive -
a las grenades chinas que cram muy buenas. Aqui utilizaron la
forma sencilla de simples botellitas de material plastico o
rociador de ropa, a cuya tapa se ajusta el percutor; estas
botellitas de material plastic? se compran en cualquier be-
doge; y ustedes recordaran lo que les dije en aquella opor-
tunidad, que los explosivos maks poderosos los consegufan los
tOcnicos de la insurreccion en Venezuela, con mezclas de pol-
vo de aluminio y nevazUcer o almagre. La ignicion en las
mechas que se utilizan para las minas, recorre miles de
metros en fracciones de segundo.
Veamos como es el estado actual de la guerra. Cam-
po de operaciones: Lo conocen ustedes; primer?, el campo
venezoleno con nuestras montailas, ubleado en Lara, Portu-
guesa, Yaracuy, Miranda, Falcon, Trujillo, Guarico y toclos
sitios que ustedes conocen tanto como yo; y segundo, In ciu- '
dad ?ya lo dlje y lo recorde. dem es cuestiOn c0
o
cida por usteApproevessMoveal easenabiBk3/24
)D9)(-11 G H T
CIA-RDP78-0306-1A00-040-0-07-
0
'[ hay situaclones nuevas, ciudadanos Senadores. Yo quiero
anunciar a esta Camara que In Insurrecciem comuntsta en Ve-
nezuela esti, reagrupando sus fuerzas en la region de El Be-
chiller.
2
El otro die la prensa Informd que habian desembarcado
unos barbudos on las cOstas de Falcon, y empezd la con-
seja popular a hacer un poco mftica In noticia sr a perderla
en las brumes de In incertidumbre. MIs quericlos amigos, yo
tengo la informacidn exacta de que esos barbudos era n la
for y nate de algunos guerrilleros venezolanos que, amaestra- d,
dos en La Habana, vinleron rumbo a Curazao, de Curazeo pa- .?
saron a las costeede Falcon y de las costes de Falcon fueron
trafdos a la Plaza Venezuela (en los alrededores de In Pla-
za Venezuela suceden inuchas cosas). Salleron de /a UnIver--
sided, doctor Paz y de la Plaza Venezuela salieron los carros
que los conducfan a El Bachiller.
senores, les qu1ero anunclar algo no me digan ave
agorera? pero yo tengo la grave responsabilidad como ciu-
dadano y como Senador, de decirles a ustedes todo en este, A.
tarde. Tengo entendido que esti aprobado el plan terrorists
para la eluded de Caracas y que ha habldo contactos entre "
los grupos autemornos de guerrillas dirigidos por Fidel Cas-.1
tro y el propio Partido Comunista; y se pondra en Rector' .4
muy pronto el plan para el Oriente de In RepUblica; 7 esto.1
se prueba en In Universidad, porque ya empiezan Muchos es.
tUdiantes a irse de ella para ocuper sus puestos en las gue-
Mlles de Oriente. En la Universidad se constata el hecho de'
la emigracion de estudiantes en este epoca.
Pero hay algo m? Existe un plan especial contra In I
Direcclan General de POI/Cia. En este memento In Direcci6n.-
.General de Policia es objeto directo de la insurreccion comU- ?
nista en Venezuela; antes la hablan dirigido contra la po- ;
licit% en general ?le Policia Municipial y otros cuerpos po-
liciales? pero esti especificamente dirigido 'el plan contra la if
Digepol, como ustedes lo podrin haber constatado.
Lo peon de estas cosas es quo hay coordinacion con el .1
hampa; el Partido Comunista esti utilizando el hampa ye.
nezolana y eso es ortodoxla del marxismo, seflores Senadores,
porque en Venezuela aprenden la leccion que ensell6 Stalin
en las luchas de tierra adentro en la Union Soviitica, nen. gl
do sus aliados eran los salteadores y los asaltentes, y so Va-
116 de ellos y los hizo sus aliados.
La Guerra Sicologica
? Senores: les dije que lba a hacer un aparte en el estudlo
de la guerra sicoldgica y me permitire hablarles de ello por
must breves =mentos.. La guerra sicoldgica se dingo con
un gran talent() y toclos, inconscientemente, vim elementos
de guerra en la guerra sicolOgica.
Yo expresaba el otro dia en el debate sobre scguridad per-
sonal que planted el Senador PicOn Giacopini, de que la Po- ;
licfa actuaba con una slcosis especial. Eso es cierto, dude- ,
danos Senadores, es in tension nerviosa de la Policia ?quo 7
a veces es el miedo? y lo saben los medicos y los sicOlogos y
el sentido com?n, que muchas veces el miedo FIC011Seja, haste
Ins cosas Inas crueles, por la exasperacion que produce; y en .`
nuestros policies &esta donde esti influyendo esa tensi6n ;
nerviosa provoceda por un cerebro que quiere desqulciar a to.? ,s1
dos los organismos que garentizan el orden en orden en Ve-
nezuela? Se desata la Ira a quienes reprimen.
Pero, sefiores, esta guerra sicololiga ha sido tan grave,
que hasta nos ha arrancaclo del corazdn el sentimiento tan
venezolano de la generosided. Cuando fbamos per los caminos
de Venezuela hace unos afios, F alguien nos podia Una
lita", nosotros le abrfamos in puerta del carro y se In dabamos.'i
Hoy no creo que hayan venezolanos tan ingenuo que cuando
se les aparezca un extrallo en una carretera o en una Ur-
banizacion y nos pida una "colita" le abramos gentil y gene-
rosamente la puerta. Estamos penetrados del temor y ha lo-
grado el panic? la guerra sicolOgica.
Las treguas que actierdan los guerrilleros de este pals `.
hacen declarer al Mini:Atte de la Defense, quo ya estin do-
iltrketMlgellifatigrA 1411/21,4nAttle.dce-
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070uu9-J
lice, en /seises ya avanzados en la antiguerra sicologica, de
que no tie debe hablar de pacificacion et de exterminlo haste,
que no este totalmente dominada Is situacion en el pais o
is region. Aqui memos inocentemente en la trampa y el Mi-
nistro declare: "Erradicadas las guerrillas de Falcon", "En
tal zona no existe ya nada", y a los ocho dias revienta la mis-
ma guerrilla en Falcon. Porque ellos hacen treguas pare que
el Ministro crca y catga en is trampa de dar Is declaraciem,
y entonces es cuando el pueblo empieza a no creerle al Mi-
;lisle? de Defense: guerra sicolOgica pars, desvirtuar is per-
sonalidad y la autoridad que debe tener un Ministro de is De-
fense, el persons* mks important? de is penes y lo hticen
quedar mal.
Pero hay otra tramps m?premeditada, que Accion De-
mocratica is conoce muy bien porque la ha estudiredo mu-
ch?, cual es el plan de "pacificacitin democratica" del Partido
Comunista y de los guerrilleros del pals. Le estate haciendo
creer al Gobierno que ellos estan dispuestos a entrar en una
, ? politica de pacificaciten et hay quienes se lo han creido y em-
? piezen a converser. Pero algo m?que converser ha sucedido
en este pals. Este Congreso aprob6 la Ley de Conmutecien de
Penns, por presion de prensa y de propaganda de una guerra*
sicologica que hada reclamar en perloclicos, en los mittnee y
- en las conversactones, que habia qua toner espiritU de gene-
rosidad, que se debia ser comprensivo; que habia que ser ge-
? neroso; entonces se abri6 Is brecha de is Ley de Conmutaciem
, de Penes y rtparece el espiritu de "convivencia".
Senores de la mayoria del Gobierno. Les voy dar un
4?4
alerts: Ya empez6 la campatia sicologica a favor de is Ley
de Amnistia. ICUldadol querldos amigos, st caen en la tram-
pa en \ que cay,eron con la Ley de Conmutecidn de Penes! A
mejor los bacon aprobar esa Ley do Amnistla, porque es ,
, tan inteligente la conduccidn sicoldgica de la insurreccien en e
este pais, que ha Ilegado hasta hacer confundir al Gobierno
y a Is opinien en los conceptos de pacificaciem y apacigua-
miento. El Gobierno cree que es lo mismo pacificaciem que
apaeiguamiento to algunos del Gobierno, no acusemos a to-
dos). En la opine% general hay tambien confuse% entre pa-
cificaciOn y apaciguamlento, to mime que entre amnistia, e
indulto. Hay una sublime e inteligente confusion de concep-
tos. La pacificaciem es restablecer la paz, es eliminer las
CRUM de Is guerra, y la pacificacion sincere y real, amigos
? de Accien Democratica, conlleva Ia entrega de las armas del.
enemigo que ataca. Y yo no he sabido que en los planes de pa-,
cificaciem del Gobierno hays peclido la primers entrega de
? armas al etiemigo. A veces el apaciguamiento se confunde
? ,con 'la tregua que realize el enemigo. Otras veces es calmer,
es aquietamiento. Sera esto lo que est?ogrando el Gobler-
r no en lugar de pacificaciem? eaquietamiento?, ecalmar los
animos? Hay que pensar detenidarnente sobre esto. eY la,
amnistia? La aministia es el perdtin de la falta, tEil como
viene con este Ley que nos estan asomando. ellasta donde.
, se perdona la fella a los que asesinaron, a los que mataron, a
elair h los qua violaron? a los que saquearon, a las que hicieron de-
/ sastres, a los que Ilenttron de dolor et legrimas muchos hogs-
res venezolanos? Giros piden que ,olvidemos su falta, pero
;. mientras no hay e un ejemplo de severidad con quien co-
, mete un dent? y haste que no hays is conducciem aerie y
formal de una idea exacta de la pacificacien, estaremos slcndo
juguetes y burla del contrail?.
El indult? es el perddri de la pena que fella, por eso es e
distinto indultar quo amnistiar.
Recordemos que en In luche subversive no se actua tanto
contra e1 adversario aparente. En este guerra sicoldgica se
, Reties sobre In comuntdad, sabre la poblaciem; Is guerra no
es entre las Fuerzas Armadas y los guerrilleros; no se trate
de quien gene y quien toma El Tocuyo, de quien tome Bo-
cone; este, guerra is genre quien domino Is opine% publics,
: y quien logre ciesquiciar los fundamentos del regimen, quien
destroce los cimientos espirituales de is sociedad y quien lo-
gre imponer otros principlos y otras normas pare, regir Is
vida colectiva,
La Universidad Central
de Venezuela
? Pero sehores, en este plan de neck% del Partido Comunista
hay Cuarteles Generales, hay Estados Mayores, hay Escuelas
Superiores de Guerra, y por eso quisiere detenerme un pace a las acts ri,e
en Ary1019111/14111. Kni5rRP40441.444. 440:11?)R494- 54511 A -Rjatartatt pfloFirTni in n;
eversiva como centro neurelgteo do operaciones. tn la Uni-
versidad se trams y opera sem eminentemente tactic?. Slue.
; rrillero y hay cuestiones que linden con lo econtimico. Toman
'
is bandera de Is autonomia universitaria pare 'soder meter
de contraband? la insurrecciem que se teje en el srno de in
' Universidad. Con is bandera tie is autonomia universIteria
confundiendo Is autonomist docente y eciministrative, con-
funden al Gobierno pars hecerle ereer que no puede nem
1, a Is Universidad a salver la vida tic tin hombre o a eviler qua
e tin hempen se refugle en sit sena; ni dejan mantener el or-
den dentro de un institeito en 'donde es primordial mantener
el orelen, Set/lore& ayer Ia bendera de In autonomia era her-
moss y linda; yo llbre mil balances en Is Asamblea Nacional
Constituyente para pedir que se %corporal's en is Constitu-
cien el principio de la autonomie universiteria, con mi bal.,
buceo de muchacho de veinte anos, alborotado e idealist.
t Era un derecho que reclamaba Is Universidad pars defenderse
de los' ejecutivisrnos de los gobiernos; pero boy la bandera
a.
de la autonomia no se levanta per el extremism? pars defen- '
derse de un Gobierno, sino pars atacer a un Gobierno y atte-
r car a la sociedad.
Senores, si ustedes van per Is Universidad, como he ido
yo, y lo saben los profesores muy erninentes en este Camera
? del Senado, (veo que mire el Senador Paz a Acosta Saignes:
per cierto lo decia per Cl, porque es eminente y es profesor)
pueden darse cuenta de qua en los afiches de In -Universidad,
en los discursos de los mitines y en sus campanas electorale&
el ambiente y el espiritu que se vele es ,de una emote per-
manente de violencia. Haste en las cuestiones electoralee Pa-
ra propaganda de reivindicaciones estudiantilcs los afiches
representan a muchachos que se agachan y agarran una pie- /?4
dra pare zumbarsela a no se .quien. En las %elms eitudian-
Wei, el espiritu, el afiche, el mitin, todo es de consagraciem
a la violencia, y lo que es m?grave, los hampones de este,
pais, creen que en la Universidad encuentran el refugio,
se van para aIl?porque esti% seguros de que alll is insu-
rreccion comunista, el estudiante que tiene conexiOn %me-
diate con is insurreccion, lo ampere., porque puede ser una
ficha clave y decisive pare ellos. Todo estos tenemos quo
decirlo con valor, porque muchas veces se politiqueit con la'
? Universidad, y este es un moment?, Senaciores de le, mayoria
y Senadores de la oposicidn, en que debemos hablar con' sin-,
ceridad, porque se ester) tratando cosas muy graves.
Para terminar sobre la Universidad. voy a dectr lo Ultimo
, grave. Tengo que hacer una declaracion antes de entrar en
este tema. Estoy seguro de que las Autoriciades Universita-
rifts, los Decanos, etc., manejan con puleritud los dineros
' de la Universidad. Hago' este deciaracion de conciencia, por-
que me consta y conozco is vide de muchas de las autorida-
des de la Universidad; son hombres honcstos. No creo que
hayan ensuciado sus manos con pealed? en el presupucsto e
universitarlo. Pero esto no quite, senores, pars yo hacer otra / ?
aseveraciOn. Las filtraciones estudiadas por el Partido Co-
munista que se logran del presupuesto de la Universidad, he
dan al Partido Comunista un ingreso anual equivalente a .1.1
diez millones de bolivares. El Partido Comunista cuenta con ;
ese ingreso, no porque sustrac de tins Partida especial dichos? 'et
ingresos. No, el Partido Comunista lo sabe hacer muy ?
ligentemente. Aprovecha Is imprenta, la Bihnoteca, las met-
tles a los estudiantes comunistas, los empleados comunistas.
Vemos a jovenes recien graduados con altos sueldos, pues en
? tres afios pasan de simples recien egresados a Profesores ti-
? tulares. La burocracia gana m?que todos los Profesorer de
Is Universidad juntas; mks de seiscientos .empleados son del 4
Partido Comunista. Las becas, viajes, viaticos y creditos, pre-; ;
ferenciales, son dados con criterto de ayudar a los mieMbros
del Partido Comunista. Yo estoy en Is obligachen de tdecir
est& aqui en el Senado, y repito Is salvedad de mi prienera
intervenciem frente a las autoridades universitarlas, de quo
? es pulcro el manejo de los dineros por las autoridades y sus
Decanos. No creo que roben tin centavo, porque son honestos,,,
pero en la inconciencia que vlve el pais, no hay Is, acucloste
.. dad de descubrir mil filtraciones que se bacon con talento.,
Tengo is obligaciOn de decirlo.
Ante la Guerra Revolucionaria
.1Que Hace el Gobierno?
?
1
3'.
CPYRGHT
gleo y alateriglelefatfeeeNftetanlesaarcrelnrarrrirstairiros en eci124'
la guerra dirlAiaen. aaageeMee fpaceigellea, mei eleg q4-APE:74i-r00141444q0sP704Pgrampuil
pais, con cercbros ductores amaestrados en universIdades de
guerra subversive operand? plenamente, yo hago una pre-
gunta clave pars empezar este segunda parte: eQUE HACE
EL GOBIERNO DE LA REPUBLICA ANTE ESTA REAL!-
DAD? Senores, emplezo por hater un reconocimiento; is sin-
ceridad de mi discurso y Is objetividad del mismo me obligan
a reconocer en el Gobierno, que ha hecho algunas cons para
enfrentarse al problems de la insurreccien comunista. to pri-
mero que ha hecho es dar la orden, clara y terminante, a las
, Fuerzas Armadas Venezolanas para que acometan con toda
energia Is guerra antiguerrillera, Ilamemosla asi. Eso es muy
bueno. Hecho positivo del Gobierno. Segundo, ha creado
una conelencia antiguerrillera en algunos sectores claves de
las Fuerzas Armadas; edemas de crear esa conciencia; el Go-
biertio ha autorizado cursos de muchos Oficiales para que
vayan a las Escuelas de Panama y a otros sitios, a obtener
conocimientos sobre is guerra moderna que se esti &sem-
Ilando en el pais. Se y me consta de muchos planes que tie-
- ne el Gobierno, muchos de los cuales, no los ha realizado; ad
y me consta que ha pretendido organizer los Comandos de las
Policies a fin de unificar Is acceen de todas cites, pues su .
accion era incongruente y muy desorganlzada; adtniro las'
gestiones que ha hecho el Gobierno de Is Republica pars 1
organizer un Comando enico en las Policies, y pars entre-
narlas eficlentemente en el plan antiguerrillero.
Pero senores, estoy en Is obligacian de hacer ciertes crf-
tIcas a Is politica antiguerrillera del Gobierno; y le pido a
,
Is mayoria gubernemental, represented& en esta Camara por
los parted.% Acchen? Democratica y URD, que las crfticas
que voy tram: esLa tette no me las tomen como venidas de
? un personero de la oposiclem que vs atacar al Gobierno, sin?
me las tomen como emiticlas per un hombraeeque ha estudia-
do varlos afios el problema; que ha escuchado a tecnicos
companeros nuestros, cote con acuciosidad se han puesto a
cectidrifier las tacticas, estrateglas y las operaciones gue-
rrilleras? que adelantan el Partido Comunista y el M.I.R. en
Venezuela.
Criticas ante la AcciOn
Gubernamental Frente
a la Guerra Sicologica
e que neva un determined? Comando pars liquiciar a determi- e,
nada guerrilla. Tenemos que abrir los ?jos ante todes esas '!
fuereas sicoldgices y extrailas quo operan concientemente, pa...1
ra evitar que se cambien los planes operativos de las Fuer. i
- zas Armadas.
La Ultima compra de aviones ?no se at fueron setenta ?
y pate? aviones F-86-K que se compraron en Alemanla Oc.,
cidental? eesta de acuerdo esa compra de eviones, SenadoreS
de la mayoria, con Is tactics sane y correcta antiguerrille-
ra de las Fuerzas Armadas? gPor que en vez de mar esoS ;
Millones pars comprar .aviones que no van a hacer nada, o
muy poco, en una guerra antlguerrillera, no se compraron
helicepteros modernos, lanchas torpederas y lenchas petit.
Ileras? Lanchas de primers categoria coin? las que tiene el
ejercito modern() de los Estados Unidos, de Francis 7 de In-,
glaterra, que estan artilladas modernamente, con artIlleria de
ofensiva y artillera antiaerea, que tienen velocidad suficien-
te pars natrullar en poco tiempo infinidad de kildmetros de
costa. No es lo que se neeeslta?
Seflores, en las montafias de Lars eucedid un hecho quo
yo quiero relater a Is mayoria. Un Destacamento antiguerrl-
Pero de Is Puerzas Armadas quedd copado en una garganta a
dca las montiteas de Lara y, senores, entre los miembros del I'
y ejereito que estaban entregando sus vides, uno de Ices ?Ma-
e les se estaba muriendo de sed, egonlzando, porque no te.
re, nia quien le nevem un trago de nella: y e0mOramee alines I
e ?Sabre, en yes de comprar helictipteros pars. Jr a Ilevarle a i
1. esos hombres, quo estan entregando an vide, el poco de ROA 1
: que pedian a la hors de su muerte. No estoy de acuerdo:
i convdnzanme de lo contrario, pero no creo que dentro de
una tactics corrects contra lite guerrillas, sea mejor comprar
aviones que comprar helicopteros y qtte comprar lanchas pa-
trulleras y torpederas.
. .
? Les voy a hacer una pregunta en este analisis de Is. po-
litica a traves del Ministate() de Is. Defense, eQue met con
el barco cubano que merode6 nuestras costes hace unos dies?.
Decian las noticias de prensa lo sigutente. El 12 de noviembre: ,
''Encallada una nave cubana en costes venezolanaa", primers e
noticia. Segunda noticia: "Duque cubano al garcte cerca de e
las Islas de Ayes. Sc niegan a recibir ayuda y existe In sees-
pecha de que vienen en mision del gobierno Oomunista de
Castro". Noticia de prensa que sigue una categorfa: "Unida- ,
des do ' la Armada Venezolana vigilan de cerca el buque,'
cubano". Fijense. Primer? le. noticla "Aparece un buque", "me.
' rodea", "encalla"; despues: "Unidades salon a verb". Ter.
cera noticise "Orden de requisar el buque cubano si entre
, en agues' venezolanas": "Sigue rechazando la ayuda que le
It. ban ofrecido". "Patrulleros de la Armada Venezolana siguen :
, rastros del carguero cubano". "Atrac6 Ryer en La Guaira, ,
decfa, el P0-6, pars reabastecerse de agua y combustible, a fin '
.1 de salir luego en ruts Norte", SIguen las notIcias. "Desapare-t
i do el bare? cubano". fr asf termina la secuencia de las no-e
1 tides. iDeseparecid I Pero, ,que pas6? Yo quicro averiguar
I eso. eQue pase? Yo les voy a decir Is. verdad. Tenemos In ate
, informacidn en la Comisidn de Defense.. A las 10 de Is. ma-,;i'
? hana del dat 12, recibi6 la Comandancia de Is Marina Is In.
?;formacidn 'do que estaba un buque cores de las costes de e
,, Venezuela y que pedia auxin?. Entonces el Oficial de guardia
!de is Marina do is orden de que el. patrullero P0-4, que eto; l
etaba anclado en La Guaira, salters. en direccien a las coor-'i
1
'.. ?
denadas que se le hebian sciialado pare ubicar el barco r
empezar el patrullaje y la inspeccidn. Y al cabo de un mato
recible contraorden de la Comandancia de la Marina, Infor.
, mandole quo dicha Comandancla asumia directamente la fug-
cleat de is. inspeccion del barco; y Ise revoc6 is orden del Ore-
: .filcal de guardia. Pero, ea que hors proced16 Is Comandati.
- cia de is Marina? En Is tette., y apenas en is tarde fue que '
salieron a buscar el barco y, IQue diantes1 Con tantaa horns,
e de retraso?desapareci6 el barco cubano; as! lo dice, Is prensa.
Yo quisiere que se estudiara ese prqblema, porque, 'ado-,
Quire.? &dries que no conozco los planes del Goblerno" ?
frente a is guerra sicologiee;',y aunqUe los conociera, quiero
? decirles quo no homes visto en el pais in contraofensiva a
la guerra sicologIca que adelanta Is. insurreccidn comunista.
No veo que estemes cenendo la poles en el campo sicolagico:
todo lo contrario. Las tensiones de la Policia, las exasperacio-
nes de les gentes, ci ward? a salir tie noche, la prensa, con
Ins noticies que transmite y is. radio, contribuyen a, que se
mantenga dirigIda per Is insurrection comunista, is guerra
' sicolOgiett. La Direccidn General de Policia este Ilene de de-
ficiencies, Senador Paz. Eso lo saben ustedes, y quiero de-
eirselo muy claro. El material human? con que tuenta as
pobre, doctor Paz, Senadores de Accien Dernocretica y de
URD. Y muchas veces no solamente as pobre el material hu-
man?, sino que a veces, haste se llegan a recabar, el servicio
tie hampones. Eso hay que cambiarlo. La Policia de Seguridad
tiene boy sobre sus hombros una gran responsabilidad con
el pais.
El Ministerio de la Defensa
?
mds se sugieren muchas cosas. Primero: /EI barco yenta o
Analicemos ahora in politica del Gobierno a traves del 4
- lba hacia las costes venezolanas? eso no se ha averiguado, ?
Ministerio de Is Defense.. Creemos sinceramente que hay,; .
descoordinaciem entrei le politica del Gobierno y le que s1- ' e eso hay qua averiguarlo, Segundo: Tengo informaciem, Se.
i,
-' eders del Gobierno, de que el barco mercente de Cuba ie.
gue las Fuerzes Armadas. Lo creo sinceramente. El minter ' ni a as Defenses de atraque levantadas, le cual quiere decir
est?esteado en mut guerrilla, pero yo preguntaria: eSiente I (Me estaba beceenclo cm amadrinemlento con otra nave, o' eon'
ese militar mixed? todo el respaldo politico del Gobierno,..' , lanchas. El harco con las defenses de atraque levantadas fue
en su actuecidn? Hago esa pregunta. -.. 'sto poi un bereo de Ids Estados Unidos, quien do Is. In-
Cuancio un grupo guerrillero ha estado a punto de 11. , vi
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pgruARP,M,Yitcla FA-ARVKar0011141ACM104003ZOCactra dice mucha
gente per alit, doctor Paz, Senarlores del Gobierno. ,Por qui?.
Por Ia confusien que existe. Cuantio converse uno con la
gente de Accion Dernocratica, y. a veces, sin converser con
comienza uno a descubrir la tactica del Gobierno, y pen- ,3
senses que el Gobierno tambien tiene Cu inteligencia; (eso irn
es privilegio de la oposicion ni del Gobierno). Cada quien tie-
ne su estrategia y su tictica,
jetivo al barer etre operacion per otro lado?. Eso puede ser;
es, muy elemental en la guerra una operacion de distraccidn.
Vamos a analizar i fue una operacien de distraccion con el
fin de meter contraband? por otro lado, distrayendonos con at
barco carguero. LPor (ea tan Ingenuamente at pedir ayude
lotto el muiulo, salon los barcos venezolanos a ver clue pasa,
alnjntenciOnsie torar at pobrecite?. Vamos a ayudarlo, dicen
7-nuestros ?Relates. Pero, detras de qi16 Veleta?. LA que yenta?
e (nee Abe?. Eso no se ha dilucidado todavla! Que hublera pasado it
nosotros hubieramos abordado el buque?. Graves problemas.
Fidel Castro protestaria porque atentamoscontra un barco
de bandera cubana; y Castro LIslos plde a nosotros permtso
pare Invedirnos el territorio, pare envier armas, pare destroe
zarnos, pare armar a los hermanos que no; asesinan?.
El ejercito opera el conjunto muchas veces. "Bajo control
A minter San Tose de Guaribe", dice la prensa. "Fuerzas de me,'
balleria y Guardia Nacional movilizadas en todo el pueblo yl 3
. en las 'zones proximas para perscguir a los guerrilleros"t dice'ei
la prensa. Este no is tictica antiguerrillera. Los comandos.
4 operan con solciados, unos detras de otros, en files; destaca- '
mentos en pie de guerra coma en guerra clasica, desconocien-
do elementales ticticas .guerrilleres. Deben m?bien entres
mezclarse, Inclusive infIllrarse entre la poblacien civil y ene
tre las poblacimies. Esto se tiene.que analizar, pare ver haste .,
'e donde es correcte la politica antiguerrillera llevada por el Mi- ,1
nisterio de ea Defense,' . .
e
Otra cuestien que hen in(ormado oficialee en el seno de la 7
Comisien de Defense. ePor clue hay antes emboscadas en los i
cameos guerrilleros?. Porque el soldado baja la guardia. Es- .
tie oche, chez, quince* dies en un puesto y no ve nunca nada;
ro ye ningen movirniento y sale y concluye que por alit no pa- s
sa nadie. Se pone a jugar, a converser y... ;Pe!, be dan el
golpe. ;Que no bajen la .guardia! ;No!. Las Fuerzas Armadas es
tlenen que mantenerse en guardia permanente, porque hay 1
III1R guerra declarada, y el que baje la guardia, ipierdel.'1Y
el quo se desculda es arremetido por el adversarial. Todo tenet.,
que ',estudiarse con mucha serenidad,. sin .critica destructive, e . be esto?. LNegoclar?. Y los pactos secretes posibles 6C6m0
cense entre hermanos. ....11 ; los eliminan?.
. . ? . ,
lion de la Ley
Se corneten haste fallas tonte come por ejemplo en el
? slsterna de aislamlento de los presos. En el Cuartel San Carlos:,
e, ,
. picac. est?proses los comunistas y guerrilleros junto con (Ara
.
? I' . te comets, y en otras Circeles lo relsmo. Entonces los centres
de Conimutacion de Penas de alslamiento de los presos se convierten en centros de *doe*
.trinamiento. Haste esas tonterias se cometen. ePor quo no $e
,
. ,
bum' otro sistema carcelarlo pare evitar ,este problema?. .,
ilngenuidad del Gobierno?
Mitche genie, y haste por aseveraciones tie miembros de
Aeelein Democritlea, suponen Is estrategla que se trees dicho
Partldo, cual es is de que el Partido del Goblerno esti aprove-
chando la dlvistem de los comunistas; que con su juego?ayuda A.
a la gente del M.I.R. blando y del P.C.V. blando, para ponerloe
a pelear con el M.I.R. duro y el P.C.V. duro. Y que el Go-
bierno opera con talento para crear la division en las files
enemIgas. Pero senores, el Gobierno desconoce dos cosas fune
damentales, si as que utilize esa tictIca de dividir al enemigo.
Desconoce, primero, que el Pallid? Comuniste esti mejor pre-
pared? que el Gobierno en is guerra sicolegica y en la gue-
rra subversive. Opera con /nes talent?. Tiene equines de
prlmera cetegorla amaestrados en las mejores Universidades
? de. lucha del mundo, y tiene tecnicoe haste de Estado Mayor
que se hen Introducido en el pais, No este boy en condiciones e
de poster equipararse R esa guerra tan planificada; y segune
do, haste donde puede Accien Democritica y U.R.D. asegue 4
rar que el Partici? Comunista no puede toner un pacto seat-?
to con el MIR o el PCV duro?, Files diran: "negoclemos con
. el Gobierno, hablemos con el Gobierno; dejemos que jueguen 41
con algunas de nuestres fiches, pero la guerre seguiri, esta
guerra es a muerte". Y los etches de In Unlversidad dleen:
"Olvidese el pals de que transaremos Ins guerrillas". "La gue-
rra es a muerte", se dijo en La Habana; la guerra RS a muer-
te Id dice el PCV y el MIR venezolanos, Y el Goblerno, eno sa-
eComo ha utilized? 01 Goblerno la Ley tie Coninuteclon de:1
Penns?, Vamos a hacer un anillsis sobre eso Senedores de la ,
mayoria. ,Ha side en la deblrla oportunidare cuando el Go- e ' Llamado al Gobjerno y al Pais
bierno ha utilized? la Ley de Conmuteclen de penes?. Puede 1 e
que lo crea el Gobierno as!, pens otros podemos creer lO con- e Senores, sinceramente lenient? haberme alerted? ? tante
' trario. - . . . i 1, en este disctIrso. Tortavie me quedan tent;; ems- pendientes.
Otra ?cosa preguntarla ePor que? se estan dando Inclule s por ahl y doeumentos pare ensefierlete. Pero yo ere? qua ye as
to;?. ePor slue se esten dando linos indultos y otros no?. Es- hors de terminate lie planteado un esquema suficiente como
ten procediendo haste en forma un poco precipitada, Senador i pare Hamar a la recapecitacien al Senado -de Is RepablIca,
Paz; no poco, alegremente utIlizen la Ley; claro que as una ! Creo rpm terigo elementos suficientes pare un debate, qua lo
s
Leeevigente en la Repeblica, pero les voy a poner un ejemplo . reclamo hacer con la rnisma sincericlarl. Por eso lodes ml; car-
de be ligereze conque actean, Porten en libertarl a Eloy. Torre; ,S tea las he pueste este norhe ante In Camara del Senado; con
que fun meld? con Ins armas en In twine en Carepano, y de- '1/4 ? tote .mi alma y a sabtendas tie tortes las consecuenclas, Sc-
inn preso a Gustavo Machado, perlamenterio, que podri tenor . nacior Paz; porque yo se que lo trntado es pellgroso, yo, me ,ii
las acuseciones de qua dirigla tehricamente Is Insurrecelem, . que estoy abordando cuestiones fundamentales que pueden po-
pero su delito es menor que el de Eloy Torres; y sin embargo, 4 ' enerrne en peligro, y sin embargo, yo peso por alto el concept?
este Gobierno deja a Gustavo Machado preso y pone en liber- egoista de la vide, de supervivencia, pare lanzarlo en bolo.*
Intl a Eloy Torres. Este, Senores Senadores, pone a pensar a' - causto a is Petrie, a Venezuela, que reclama de todos nosetros.
In genie: este nos pone a meditar seriamente a todos los ve- I en este memento, seriedad, responsabllidad 'y union. La iguee
nezolanos. Y en Melon Democratica y en U.R.D. podran ala- ,, rra que he demostrado que exist? en este pals no es una .tuee
bar su tactlea y an estrateglas pero el resto del pais, que noi iIrra contra el Gobieeno, es una guerra econtra Cope!, guirra.
es de Acclon Demoeretica ni de U.R.D. piensan, raionan, es- - 4 2, contra el principle cristlano del pueblo, guerra contriseun
eudrIfia, observe, enniiza, y ve cases mat hechas: Vemos en Ii- , e ,ordenamiento que les estot be en su carrera secular y sectae
hefted a los guerrilleros cuando se screcientart Ins guerrillas. ; ,l.. ri a de totalltarismo de estado sin Dios y sin espirltu. .
Consideramos Inoportuna In apliencion de la Ley de Conmuta- 1
Oen de Penns. Y, senores, es mune, la confusiOn que hay en eli r
. Amigos del Gobierno, Independlentes de este Semite es-
Pals viendo sellr proses en el memento en que se mate y se 1 . cuchen ml voz que es Is verde in; madras, de los campeslnos,
meta genie. Se acrecientan las guerrillas y haste hay quien , de una Venezuela inocente. Senadores: Venezuela es inocente
pregona por las calles que jefes guerrilleros lien Ido a dor- y en un noventa y eine? por ciente no sabe to que esti pete...;
mir en In ease de algin Gobernador de Estado; y Jefes altos sando, no sabe' del sentido de las bombas'que le entan ponien? e
de Is guerrillas. Eso diens en la calle. do en el' suelo, no sabe los volcanes que este pisatido, Y se- -
Tomo esto In observe In genie Ilene de suspicaciam; todo j gulmos nosotros alegres y confiados on este tierra, sin saber .
CSO lo nneliza la genie 111UCIIRS veces con buena fe, otras ye- que Heger& el inomento del estallido de. cosas que no; pueden .
yes con male fe. Entonces es cuendo Lodes los esqueinas se los . arrollar a todos. Por eso, amigos de Accidn DemocritIca, '
plantea In opinion publicte. Hay haste genie tan ? Ingenue en . amigos de URD, Independientes y de toclos los Partidos, mi..
este I is, Sumter Paz- que dice que las guggior invert- ' , gos del MDI, pongamanos todos a recapecitar; que no sea el
to de omedafes Rialeaseal h24oCJA-REPP718-01306TA000411171006743 93e sea el testl.j,
,
A_pproved,EorRelease1999/08124_:_CIA-RDP78-03061A000400EARRNT
monk, de unos corazonei que `sietiten la Petrie.
En el epode de este senthniento, y con el espiritu de esta
iniervencidn, me permito traer una aerie de conclusiones al
Senado.
? -
Primera.? Que hagamos una revisiOn general de Is politi-
ca antlguerrillera. En este sentido,.que se Invite aquellos par.,
tidos de Is oposicidn que puedan aportar aigo, pars que ana-
licemos torlos si Is politica que se ha seguido es corrects, y sl
an prueba lo contrarlo, que se haga una revision con humil-
? dad. Les propongO, en nombre del Partido Social Cristiana
Copel, el eatudio conjunto pars ham una revision (3 pars qua
ustefies nos expliquen tantas cosas, que a lo mejor no las
sabemos.
Segundo.? Que el Alto Mando explique a) La iltima corn:-
pra de los aviones en lugar de helledpteros y lanchas. patru-
Items; b) El no abordaje del barco cubano.
Tercera.? Que el Goblerno explique la politica de Indul-
tos. A lo major la explicaciOn? la aceptamos; pero mientras
? lento la creemos contraproducente, inoportuna, discriminato-
via muchas veces; tExpliquennosla:
Cuarta.? Que se proeeda a la selecelon, formed& y
en-
trenamlento tie la Direcci?n General de la Policia. Una Poll-.
Oa con problemas tan graves que , confronta, no debe de es-
tar tan mecliorTemente equipada de material humano y tee-.
nico. Preocuparnonos en el ,Pariamento por is e.structuraciOn ? 3
? de la Digepol; y les ruego a los Senadores de Accion Demo- ?
critica, qua le lieven al doctor Leandro.Mora la inquietud del I
'pals, pare que ese Cuerpo, en cuyos hombres se base la semo
ridad del Estado, sea mita Iddoco m?seri? y m?responsad
bier y que lo reorganicen totaimente..
Quinta.? Inkier una politica-de Seguro Para los Policies ,
y pare los Milltares.
?:-ra la guerra antisubversiva. No debemos acogernos ilnicarrten7-
' te a la Eseuela de Panama, cuyos esquemas norteamerIcanos
no han podido acabar con la guerra tick Vietnam y vlenen.a"?:
enseharnos a acabar con las guerrillas nuestras. Llamemos
. tecnicos de Francia, que eonocen de In experiende de Indocht-; I
na y Argel, inisiones estupentlas que tienen experienclas. 1+114
rnamosios sin que eso sea ?fender a los Estados Unidos, ;
Septima.? Establazcemos un Organism? de fled& sleoe
lagica..i,Donde esti ese Organism? del Gobierno Para II aC??
eft sicologica?. Eso e3 indispensable que' lo hagamos.
Y pars terminar, aeftores, les quire? decir lo sigulentet si
el Goblerno no esti convencido tie lo que le esti pasendo, at el ;
Gobierno no siente que algo grave le arremete en sus cimien-'.'
los, y si esa realidad lo sobrepasa, tendremos horns muy tris-. ,
tes y rimy graves en el pais; y is responsabilidad esta en ma-
nos de quienes conducen el Gobierno; y que no digan manes ;4
na si liege Is hecatombe, que no hub? nacile que los alertara.,
AquS estamos nosotros pare hablarles a este Gobierno, que es
puestro Gobierno de Venezuela. Aqui esti la democracia fun-
cionando, no la tradicional estructura de oposlcion y Gobierno,
pars matarse 'y destrozarse, sine la estructura dinelmice
moderna tie Inia democracia que concibe un ensarnbiaje entre' 4
oposicion y Goblerno, para estructurar los grandes princl-A
pios que delfnean la conformed& de un pueblo y la conduccithi
de un pais. Le pido a Dios que nos ayude, qua sl mis palabm
ban sido exageratias o agoreras, que me ?dispensen, pero ea ?1
is manera de actuar en mi vide, porque no. tango otra. Pero q
que sl algo de mi discurso queda pars recapacitar, qua lo re+
cojan y que nos sentemos a converser en una hors en que el
pais reclama. Que nos unamos todos. los qua estames defer
i ? diendo una .misma cause traseendental en la vide,
Senores, los Goblernos caen cuando no tienen conciew-
eta de sus peligros, pero los Gobiernos se sostienen cuando
oyen y escuchan Is. voz de su pueblo. QUe yo sea en este ins-
tante is voz de ml pueblo, y si no lo soy, por lo menos qua 7
sea Is voz sincera de un hombre que quiso hablarles 'Con toda
, buen, fa. Y? csm? .toda el alma.,Senoreg.
, ?
Sexta.? Clue se (reign misiones de adoctrinamlentn pa-.-
?1
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