COMMENTS ON THE EXERCISES OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE TROUPS, CODE NAME: 'TARCZA'['SHIELD'] BY LT.COL. .M. ZAKRZEWSKI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03082A000600360001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MISC

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POLAND
AIR MILITARY
Comments on the Exercises of Anti-Aircraft
Defence TroopD Code Names "Ta.rcza! "Shield' . by
Lt? Colo N. ZA1, 2ZLWSIa
Exercise "Tarcza" has demon:Arated the necessity and the
effectiveness of using new Anti-aircraft Defence resources. Also fully
justified were the directives of the Command of A.A. Defence Troops on the
need to create A.A. Defence groups as temporary tactical formations composed
of various A.A. Defence resources for different combat employment, earmarked
to carry out one task in a specified place and time.
2. During the exercise could be observed the creation of A.A. Defence
groups composed of A.A. artillery sub-units and sub-units for jamming enemy
radar bombsights. These groups defended many targets typical for them
such as crossings and bridges across wide water obstacles, traffic bottleneck,
unloading stations, etc. The use of A.A. Defence groups composed as
described above, strengthened the A.A, Defence of the targets. In addition
to engaging the enemy by artillery fire, there was a possibility of jamming
his radar bombsights, which eliminated the possibility of the enemy using
them.
Although most of the decisions made by those taking part in the
exercises were right, as far as the use of the A.A. Defence groups composed
of A.A. artillery sub-units and sub-units for jamming enemy radar bombsights
was concerned, a certain tendency could be noticed in those taking part in
the exercise to attach importance to such targets as concentrations of
tactical and operational missiles and command posts of operational formations,
These targets were not typical for the use, in their defence, of sub-units
for jamming enemy radar bombsights, and by the same token, for the use of
the A.A. Defence groups mentioned above. In most cases they were located
on ground which guaranteed bath optical and anti-radar camouflage.
efore
The
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Therefore, the use of sub-units for jamming radar bombsights was not nec"essar3s
Tha above targets cover a large surface area of 20 to 30 square kilometres,,
due to the need for dispersal. Protection of such wide areas by sub-units
for jamming radar bombsights requires considerable forces and resources, at
least a battalion for jamming radar bombsights, which, in camiparison with
its effectiv-?eness, would not be worth while. Owing to their special
features, these targets are not typical radar targets, and their echoes are
not likely to be visible on radar bombsight indicators. Even assuming
that the airborne enemy will succeed in detecting (observing) them on the
radar bombsight indicator, he will have immense difficulties in identifying
them on the field of combat.
4. The combat activities of A.A. missile units were organised in
most cases independently in spite of the fact that they were covering, in
many cases, the same targets as A.A. artillery or sub-units for jamming enemy
radar bombsights. It appears that those taking part in the exercises
rightly considered that the use of various A.A. Defence resources for the
defence of the same targets is right and necessary, because it increases
its effectiveness. However, a fundamental fact escaped their attention,
namely that at the same place and time the main aim of a battle must be
achieved by one commander. It is true that in many cases co-operation was
carried out between the A.A. missile units and other A.A. Defence resources
covering the same targets, consisting of the exchange of representatives.
It seems, however, that this method would not pass the test on the battlef..eldo
It is possible to use this method when two or more units are carrying out
the same task in a very short time.
5. It appears that the commands of A.A. Defence operational formations
(Army and Front) should have in reserve staffs which, ir the event of using
large forces and resources for the defence of any particular target, would
be in a position to organise the operations of these forces and to direct
their combat activities. In the event of carrying out a task with a
smaller .....
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smaller number of resources, for instance with a regiment of A.A. missiles
and a battalion for jamming enemy radar bombsights, the command of the whole
could be taken by the commander of one of the units (for instance the
commander of the A, A. missile regiment) o
6. In order to substantiate the necessity of this detaching of
separate staffs from the level of the commands of A.A. Defence operational
formatiomg,the following should be stated.
7. The commanders and the staff officers of particular units
(tactical formations) - although they have a general military education in
anti-aircraft defence, are much better acquainted with the specific
characteristics of the particular units in which they serve at present
because of the nature of the unit (tactical formation). They are less
acquainted with the problems connected with the use and operations of
special A.A. Defence units. Therefore, when various units of a special
character come under command, an unprepared staff runs up against serious
difficulties in organising combat operations. In addition, the exercises
proved that commanders any? staffs are so much absorbed by the organisation
and conduct of the combat operations of their organically subordinate units,
that they are, in practice, in no position to command the units which are
temporarily subordinated to them. Inter alia, the proliferation of
technical equipment of particular units, the rapid tempo of operations and
consequent difficulties in supply, etc. have a"bearing on this. This
problem is - where to find such staffs?
8. The above exercise has shown that there is little point in having
A.A. artillery divisional staffs under combat conditions. I am not
considering the necessity for their existence in peace time conditions.
But in combat conditions, when frequently each of the regiments belonging to
the division operates in a different area, the divisional staff is unable to
direct their combat operations and supply. The exercise proved that
divisional commanders often have difficulties in determining the present
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position of their regiments. In these circumstances it is difficult to
speak of knowledge of their stocks and replenishment. Especially since
supply routes can be hundreds of kilometres long, and the divisions have
only a limited number of transport resources at their disposal.
9. During the exercise divisional staffs were used as the, staffs of
A.A. Defence groups composed of one or two regiments of A.A. artillery from
the division, and in some cases also sub-units for jamming the enemy radar
bombsights. At the same time they were obliged to know the position and the
state of supply of the other organic regiments of the division not forming
part of ,he group.
10. These staffs had enormous difficulties in exploiting and directing
the combat operations not only of the alloted forces, but also of the organic
units employed in the defence of other targets. There seems to be a
certain inconsistency in the fact that a division of A.A. artillery is
never used as one unit for the defence of a particular target. During the
exercises there were cases where an A.A. artillery regiment belonging to a
division ',Tas made part of an A.A. Defence group which was not under the
command of its divisional commander, so that the regimental commander had
two different superiors. One of them gave him 3ombat tasks, and the
second supplied him with ammunition, P.O.L. etc. It seems that in condition,,
of mobile warfare this situation cannot be tolerated, That is why it
would be much more convenient at an operational' formation level to have a
certain number of independent A.A. artillery regiments, rather than
divisions. However, the divisional staffs would have to be re-organised,
so as to include among their regular personnel specialists of all the
resources which are at the disposal of the A.A. Defence, and to use them as
the staffs of A.A. Defence groups..
12. I would like now to dwell on the tactical decisions concerning
the employment of radar bombsight jamming sub-units.
13. The exercise gave many interesting solutions in organising
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protection of targets covering a large surface area by relatively small
forces. In these circumstances, a departure was made from the circular
grouping of jamming stations around the target, in favour of line grouping
by companies. Each company protected the target from two opposite
directions. For instance one company protected the East and Vest direction,
and the other one ?- the North and South direction. As a result, the target
in question had circular protection in spite of the jamming resources being
deployed directionally. In view of the fairly considerable lengths of
the dead area radii of the jamming stations, those taking part in the
exercises came to the conclusion that in favourable conditions most of the
jamming stations should be located in the opposite direction to the main
direction of the enemy air attacks, and the jamming should be sent across
the protected target. The exercise has also proved the possibility of
linking the tasks of several radar bombsight jamming companies operating
next to each other.
14.
The exercise supplied a basis for analysis and scientific work
in the sphere of planning A.A. defence of troops and fixed targets in
conditions of a rapid tempo of operations. It appears that organic
engineer and chemical units (sub-units) should form part of the A.A. Defence
troops to carry out, inter alia, optical and the anti-radar camouflage of
targets. The units hitherto forming part of the A.A. Defence troops viz:
A.A. missile units, A.A. artillery units, and the radar bombsight jamming
units can be interfered with and have a limited range of action against the
enemy. As a result of this, the enemy, in many cases, has the possibility
of gaining the advantage over the resources protecting given targets.
However, the range of camouflage resources is equal to the range of detection
by the enemy, and also the use of camouflage in the complex of other forms
of action against the airborne enemy (artillery fire and. radar bombsights
jamming) can considerably enhance the effectiveness of the protection of
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targets, These resources cannot be interfered with, and are difficult to
destroy owing to the small size of the equipment. Equipment used for
camouflage is simple and can also be made under field conditions, The
production cost of this equipment is much lower than the cost of missiles or
artillery, therefore we can afford to have in stock large quantities of it.
15. Camouflage resources act upon enemy reconnaissance resources by
concealing or simulating the points of the sight. For instance with the
aid of reflecting horns it is possible to simulate or to conceal small
targets from radar observation, or else to distort and partly camouflage
large objects. Reflecting horns are used alsD for simulating landmarks
used for navigation and bombing. They can also attract guided missiles at
the final phase of their flight, by the active homing method.
16. In the age of guided missiles (of the air-gi'ound type), when the
carrier aircraft has no need to enter the fire zone of anti-aircraft rockets,
and the A.A. artillery defending a given target, as it is equipped with
radar bombsights, and can carry out its task.out of firing range, the
importance of anti-radar camouflage has grown considerably. Camouflage
resources together with the Fighter Airforce, are in this case the only
resources which can be used against the enemy. However, anti-radar
camouflage does not solve the problem entirely, and its effect, as far
as hampering accurate observation of a target, can be compared with the
effects on radar bombsights of jamming used by radar bombsight jamming
sub-units. In these cases total freedom in using optical bombsights is
left to the enemy. It should be mentioned that he will use them above all
at short distances from the target, because bombing with them is more
accurate,
17. The enemy can use optical mec,.ns of aiming not only in the day
time with good visibility, but also at night with artificial illumination
of the target. He can also use inaccurate camouflage of lighting and,
during cloudless nights, also moonlight and reflections from areas of water,
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(rivers). In order to prevent the enemy using optical instruments for
navigation and bombing it is necessary to apply optical camouflage not only to
real objects, but also to dummies and anti-radar camouflage resources. The
easiest way of camouflaging these objects is by the use of smoke--screens.
The exercise revealed a lack of this kind of camouflage, because the jamming
of radar bombsights served only as a half-measure, acting exclusively upon
the radar bombsights. This deficiency was overcome in the final phase of
the exercise, when for the protection of a naval base in addition to a
radar bombsights jamming battalion, a. amoke-screen battalion was provided.
18. During the exercise under discussion, the principal targets of the
Array and the Front were defended by the active A.A. Defence resources during
the most important, although relatively short, periods. After carrying
out their tasks; these resources followed the attacking troops and proceeded
to the defence of the next targets, leaving the formerly defended targets
without any protection. It seems that the importance of particular targets
is not limited to a specially important period of a given operation.
Obviously, in view of their large number and the relatively limited amount
of active Defence resources, it is not possible to guarantee them permanent
protection by these resources. However, a periodical defence of these
targets by an assembly of all the available A.A. Defence resources during
the most important periods of the battle, is justified. It appears, however
that during the remaining periods protection for them should be laid on by
passive means.
19. Owing to the use of camouflage resources, the enemy will not be
able to observe the target and the landmarks and consequently will not be
able to aim, or direct flying bombs and air missiles of the air-ground
type.
20. A fundamental conclusion from the above is: contemporary anti-
aircraft defence of targets located within an army zone of operations should
be carried out by an A.A. Defence group composed of all the available currert
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ground A.A. Defence resources (A.AA missiles, A.A. artillery, radar bombsights,
jamming sub-units, and camouflage sub-units, in co-operation with the
Fighter Airforce of the Front). Let us analyse this problem in detail as
applied to a target chosen as an example (Diagram 1). Let us assume that
the target in question consists of a bridge complex situated across a wide
water obstacle. For the anti-aircraft- defence of this target were detailed
the following ground A.A. Defence resources: a regiment of anti-aircraft
missiles, a. regiment of small calibre anti-aircraft artillery, two radar
bombsight jamming companies, a smoke-screen battalion, and an anti-radar
camouflage sub-units equipped with reflecting horns. These forces formed an
A.A. Defence group commanded by a command and staff detailed by the
headquarters of the operational formation A.A. Defence.
21. The arti-aircraft missile regiment is deployed according to general
principles. Its deployment was adapted for the defence of two bridges
located within the boundaries of a village, and the third bridge to the
South of it is within the range of its fire. The task of this regiment
consists cf the engagement of medium and high altitude targets.
22. The small calibre anti-aircraft artillery regiment is defending
two bridges against low level attacks. In view of their close position,
batteries defending individual bridges have fire-control communication.
23. The anti-radar camouflage sub-unit carried out the following
camouflage:
part of the river within the boundaries of the village was
camouflaged with the aid of reflecting horns. The railway
bridge at the South of the village was brought into the radar
area of the target with the aid of the reflecting horns, and
the whole village was extended towards the South;
around the Southern bridge were built from reflecting horns
three dummy bridges prepared for carrying out a move. The
erection of the dummy bridges in respect of the real bridge,
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can be done in an arbitrary fashion;
the first company for jamming radar bombsights was deployed in
a line of platoons in front of the main target. Individual
platoons were also deployed in a line. The combat action of
the company was set in the win direction of the enemy air attacks.
However, the task of the complete protection of the target was
beyond its capability;
the second company protected the bridge situated to the South
of the village. The company was deployed in the form of a
triangle. The target was protected from all directions. In
addition, it supported the operations, of the first company;
the smoke-screen battalion was used in the following way: two
companies were used for covering two bridges with a smoke-screen
and the anti-radar camouflage of the main target, the third
company covered the third bridge with a smoke-screen.
On the basis of the above example, one can estimate the situation
in which en enemy bomber crew which has to bomb a definite target finds
itself. To get a better idea of the example let us make the following
assumptions.
25. The aircraft is flying from the vest, and at a long distance from
the target the navigator has switched on his radar bombsight in order to
find the target. He can see on the screen an outline of the river as a
dark line, and also the light colour reflection from the village. However,
he does not know that the target has been extended southwards, also he does
not see separate echoes from the bridges, he can only see the whole target
as a light coloured spot. He hopes that when approaching the target he
will distinguish the bombing targets, i,e. the bridges. He looks at the
right side of the screen where he expects to see on the reflection from the
river a bright reflection from a separate bridge. He is surprised when
instead of a single reflection he sees four separate small bright points.
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The dummy bridges were placed at distances exceeding the linear value of the
radar bombsight resolution perametera The navigator now looks at the
reflection from the main target of attack and can still see the whole of it.
In the meantime, the aircraft has flown over a considerable distance and is
approaching the start of the combat route, so that in a moment it will be
too late fcr the use of the radar bombsight. Therefore he casts his eye on
the optical bombsight - it is still too far, he cannot see the target. He
looks back on the screen - apart from the reflections from the targets he can
observe interference, which grows with the approach to the target. He now
realises that he will not be able to observe tl.e target as a separate point
on the indicator, he must give up using the radar bombsight and go over to
target observation through the optical bombsight. But he does not know that
active jamming is being used to interfere with his work and for psychological
effect. The bomber crew becomes flustered.
26, The first aim of the anti-aircraft defence has been achieved. In
a moment the aircraft will enter the fire zone of the anti-aircraft missiles.
Should they lose height to avoid being hit? By flying within the range of
missiles the aircraft will certainly be brought down. Assuming that the
, an
enemy is in possession of damming resources and radar counter-measures d
that in spite of all he decides to fly across the fire zone of the anti-
aircraft missiles. If he loses height, he will meet the fire of the small
calibre anti-aircraft artillery regiment. One way or another he must aim.
The radar bombsight is of no use.
27. Let us assume that the aircraft keeps flying on, although in all
probability it would be brought down by the anti-aircraft missiles. The
enemy now intends to use the optical bombsight, but smoke is obscuring the
target. One more thought: should the bombs be released blindly? ': 7e will
leave this decision to the enemy. Should he release the bombs aiming into
the smoke-screen, the probability of hitting the bridges is extremely small.
28. As a rule, the start of the combat route is already behind the
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aircraft. Let us assume that the navigator had time to aim with the aid of
the radar bombsight and that in spite of the active radar jamming he could
observe the southern border of the town on the indicator. He knew that the
railway bridge was on the southern border. Therefore, as impulses are
coming from the town, it is better to aim at the edge of it than into the
vast smoke-screen, which is not symmetrically spread over the target. He
aims and releases the bombs which fall to the right of the bridge. The
navigator did not know that the reflecting horns extended in this direction
the reflections from the target. It is also possible to "help" the enemy
in finding the target. For this purpose it i.~ sufficient to simulate the
bridge over the river on the southern border of the village with the aid of
reflecting horns. This dummy bridge should be shown to him in such a way
that he will suppose that its visibility is the result of imperfect camouflage.,
In this case there is no doubt that he will tales advantage of the "favourable"
circumstances and will bomb the dummy bridge. Because of the camouflage, the
enemy is not able to determine the effect of his bombing. He flies away
and is continually exposed to anti-aircraft missile fire. The task of the
anti-aircraft defence has been accomplished, irrespective of whether the
enemy aircraft has been brought down or not,
29., If the enemy attacks the separately located bridge (to the South
of the main target) he sees four identical reflections instead of one,
hence he must choose one of the four unknowns. In addition, his radar
bombsight is being jammed. The use of the smoke-screen does not allow him
to use the optical bombsight. In addition, the target is within the fire
zone of the missile artillery.
30. Diagram 1 shows an example of the protection of a target by an A.A.
Defence group. There can be many soluv'-ions concerning the allotment of
forces and resources for the protection of particular targets, as well as
concerning their employment. The protective cover of the group of bridges
as presented here, is planned well in advance. At a definite stage of
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operations, according to the decision of the Chief of A.A. Defence, the A.A.
missile regiment, the A.A. artillery regiment, and two radar bombsights
jamming companies will be transferred to perform other tasks. After their
departure, for the protection of the target, the smoke-screen battalion and
the anti-radar camouflage sub-unit will remain.
31. Camouflaging a target does not, however, entirely solve all the
problems connected with aiming. It is known that the modern battlefield will
supply the enemy with an additional number of convenient landmarks) and
therefore the radar picture of a given sector of terrain will change, and will
make more, difficult the choice of basic landma:ks. Landmarks of any
particular kind, such as lakes, should be partly camouflaged in order to
change their outline. As a rule, however, the forces available for this
purpose are insufficient, as there are relatively many landmarks in the
neighbourhood of the taret (villages, lakes, etc.).
32. As is known, a bridge is basically a linear target (the width of
a bridge is usually small, and is not taken into consideration) and a direct
hit is necessary to destroy it. This in turn requires accurate aiming.
Aiming with the aid of landmark., especially landmarks of large dimensions
(as compared with the bridge) is difficult, and therfore such landmarks are
of not much use when the target is small. Especially valuable for the enemy
in this case will be fixed landmarks giving small but distinct and clear
echoes on the screen of the radar bombsight. These may be the clear radar
objects or the oharact*istic points located in front of the defended target
in the direction of flight. Therefore knowing the particular radar
properties of various objects and enemy operational tactics it is possible to
select and camouflage some of the large number of landmarks.
33. For the anti-aircraft defence of targets within the zone of
operations of an army and on the area of a Front, various alternative methods
of using the forces and resources should be applied. The idea is that the
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enemy should continually meet with new difficulties and surprises,
34. I realise that I have discussed only a few selected problems which
in my opinion are the most important and which require a wider discussion and
analysis among our officer cadre.
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